

London School of Economics and Political Science

**The Transition From War to Peace: Politics, Political Space
and the Peace Process Industry in Mozambique, 1992-1995**

A Thesis Submitted by

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ABSTRACT

The ‘peace process’ is a common expression in international politics. It describes and explains events in seemingly disparate locations as Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and Southern Africa, which share only the common occurrence of violent conflict. One outstanding feature of these peace processes is the active participation of international actors or external ‘third parties’. Whether they are states, international organisations or non-governmental organisations, these external actors comprise an industry focussed on the peace process. However, in providing assistance to countries making the transition from war to peace, as an industry these external third parties often reconfigure the political space of host societies in a manner which frustrates the intended goal of attaining peace.

The following analysis focuses on the process of implementing a comprehensive peace settlement to show how the peace process industry operates, using the case of Mozambique. The Mozambican peace process was selected because it is generally presented as a success which justifies similar activities in future cases. Therefore it is crucial to examine whether the intervention was a success, what kind of success and a success for whom. As Mozambique was inundated with international actors engaged in all kinds of activities, supported by substantial funding, it serves as a useful example from which to study the peace process industry at work. Mozambique is also one of the poorest countries in the world and is thus representative of larger processes in the developing world and its relationship with donors and the United Nations.

This thesis draws out a number of themes on the aggregate impact of external third parties on the political space of Mozambique and uses this as a basis for reaching conclusions applicable to other cases. It seeks to contribute to debates in international relations on how questions regarding the role of international actors in peace processes and the assistance they provide should be answered.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Assembly Area
CCF	Cease-Fire Commission
CCFADM	Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force
CENE	National Executive Commission for the Emergency
CIVPOL	Civilian Police (United Nations)
CNAT	National Commission on Territorial Administration
CNE	National Elections Commission
COMINFO	National Information Commission
COMPOL	National Police Affairs Commission
CORE	Reintegration Commission
CSC	Supervisory and Control Commission
CTNA	Centre for Non-Assembled Troops
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DPCCN	Department for the Combat and Prevention of Natural Disasters
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
FADM	Mozambican Defence Force
FAM	Forças Armadas de Moçambique
FPLM	Forças Popular de Moçambique
FRELIMO	Frente Libertação de Moçambique
GPA	General Peace Agreement
GTZ	German Society for Technical Cooperation
ICRC	International Committee for the Red Cross
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Office for Migration
IRI	International Republican Institute
JVC	Joint Verification Commission
MIVECO	Military Verification Committee
NDI	National Democratic Institute
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
PIDE	Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado
PRE	Economic Recovery Programme
RIP	Rapid Intervention Police
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional de Moçambicana
RSS	Reintegration Support Scheme
SISE	State Information and Security Service
STAE	Electoral Administration Technical Secretariat
TU	Technical Unit for Demobilisation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNOHAC	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
UNSCERO	United Nations Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Mozambique



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Commission Structure¹




Table 1

¹The General Peace Agreement called for the establishment of a National Elections Commission (CNE), but this was the responsibility of the government. The National Commission for Territorial Administration (CNAT) was agreed to by the parties during the peace process but did not function.

INTRODUCTION

Reconsidering international intervention in the transition from war to peace

The ‘peace process’ is a common expression in international politics. One seemingly inevitable feature of a peace process is the active participation of international actors or external third parties. The purpose of their participation is to resolve or end conflicts, out of which ‘peace’ is expected to materialise.¹ Whether they are states, international organisations or non-governmental organisations, these external actors are coalescing into a peace process industry.² However, in providing assistance to countries making the transition from war to peace, external third parties often reconfigure the political space of host societies in a manner which frustrates the intended goal of attaining peace.

Political space refers to the arrangement of norms, institutions and procedures which organise political life, and as such, is the basis for the exercise of politics. By understanding how the peace process industry reshapes political space, the chapters which follow seek to highlight and analyse the political consequences of the industry and its activities. It examines the outcomes of a peace process and the actors and processes which produce them. It explicitly focuses on the process of implementing a comprehensive peace settlement and aims to show how the peace process industry operates, using the example of Mozambique. Although I use the case of Mozambique to make the argument, the idea that external third parties reconfigure political space applies elsewhere.

The aim of this introduction is to show that the current literature in international relations

¹The definition of peace will be discussed in chapter two.

²By industry, I mean a collective group of producers engaged in activities that result in an aggregate output of certain goods, where the ownership and design of the goods lies with the producer and not the purchaser. The idea of a peace process industry parallels the idea of a ‘development industry’ articulated by James Ferguson in *The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development’, depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. The idea of an industry is explained further in chapter one.

does not reflect upon the political impact of external third parties and in particular their impact on political space. It begins with a review of the concept of intervention which encompasses those activities by international actors targeting the domestic affairs of another state. As the literature on intervention expanded to include ethical issues, second generation peacekeeping and peace-building activities, it has increasingly drawn from the conflict resolution literature. This literature analyses the roles of third parties, but does so within an understanding of a structure of conflict. Both literatures are converging in the area of post-conflict transitions, but neither is sufficient to provide a framework for understanding the political implications of intervention in this area. An expanded framework for intervention which accounts for political space is then presented. This is followed by a plan of the thesis and the role the case of Mozambique plays in the thesis.

Is intervention still relevant?

In international relations, activities by external actors targeting the internal affairs of another state fall within the concept of intervention. R.J. Vincent articulated the traditional definition of intervention as,

that activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a group of states or an international organization which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state. It is a discrete event having a beginning and an end, and it is aimed at the authority structure of the target state. It is not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break a conventional pattern of international relations.³

Vincent's definition focuses on intervention as an activity that breaches the principle of sovereignty which preserves the international system of states. It targets the authority structure of the sovereign state, defined by Rosenau as "the identity of those who make the decisions that are binding for the entire society [and/or] the processes through which such decisions are made."⁴ Although Vincent's taxonomy remains useful as a framework for debates about intervention, his definition appears anachronistic and restrictive in light of

³R.J. Vincent, *Nonintervention and International Order*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 13.

⁴James Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 13(2), June 1969, p. 163.

transformations in the post-Cold War international system. Practices of intervention have moved beyond the traditional definition, which has both expanded the concept of intervention, while seeming to render it less pertinent.

The ending of the Cold War has brought five major consequences to the study of intervention. First, although states remain important intervening actors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations have gained greater significance and legitimacy. Under the resuscitated Security Council, 32 UN peacekeeping operations have been launched since 1989, compared to the 15 operations established between 1948 and 1988.⁵ Second, one of the perceived legacies from the Cold War is that civil or intrastate wars, rather than conflicts between states, pose the central threat to international peace and security.⁶ These civil or internal wars are now the primary and legitimate target for intervention.⁷ Third, the objectives of intervention have shifted from participating in conflicts to ending or resolving them. King observed that “[p]romoting negotiations has supplanted victory as the chief objective of Western involvement in civil wars.”⁸ Fourth, the ethical dimension of intervention has gained greater prominence which has increased the legitimacy and urgency of humanitarian intervention. In addition, the notion of what constitutes humanitarianism has expanded from its origins in human rights to include the

⁵United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, New York, NY: Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 3; and Kofi Annan, *The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa*, Report of the UN Secretary General, New York, April 1998, paragraph 29.

⁶However, the frequency of civil wars has not increased after the end of the Cold War. Intrastate wars have outnumbered interstate wars since 1945. See Roy Licklider (ed.) *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End*, New York: New York University Press, 1993, pp. 5-6.

⁷For the first time in its 24 year history, the 1993 edition of SIPRI’s *Yearbook on World Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* included non-military aspects of security such as the number and location of interstate and intrastate conflicts, preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping. The International Institute for Strategic Studies also shifted its focus to civil conflicts as a threat to security, see *Survival*, Issue on Ethnic Conflict and International Security, 35(1), Spring 1993, and Issue on Conflict, Diplomacy and Intervention, 37(4), Winter 1995-1996, and Adelphi Papers 305 and 308.

⁸Charles King, *Ending Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper 308, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies and Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 81.

use of military convoys to facilitate the delivery of emergency assistance, safe havens and military strikes against perpetrators of ethnic cleansing and genocide. And fifth, in part because of humanitarian incentives, a strong consensus has emerged that intervention is a useful policy instrument. The ‘new interventionism’⁹ expresses an activism, particularly within U.S. foreign policy, to respond to crises and conflicts anywhere in the world. It describes an “outlook combin[ing] an awareness that civil war is a legitimate issue of international security with a sentiment for crusading liberal internationalism.”¹⁰

The literature on intervention has evolved in response to these changes in the international system. With the expanded scope for legitimate intervention, intervention is studied less as a *problem* in international relations, than as a practice requiring justification and evaluation.¹¹ In addition to the proliferation of volumes on humanitarian intervention¹², the selection of essays edited by Forbes and Hoffman¹³ sought to push the limits of justifications for intervention by contesting the ethical status of the state through questions

⁹This activism has been tempered by experiences in Somalia and Rwanda.

¹⁰Stephen John Stedman, “The New Interventionists,” *Foreign Affairs*, 72(1), Winter 1993, pp. 1-16.

¹¹The approach to studying intervention as a problem can be found in Stanley Hoffmann, “The problem of intervention,” in Hedley Bull, (ed.) *Intervention in World Politics*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 7-28; and James Mayall, (ed.) *The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. On the idea of intervention as a set of practices see Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, *Humanitarian intervention in contemporary conflicts: a reconceptualization*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996; and Thomas Weiss and Larry Minear, (eds.) *Humanitarianism Across Borders: sustaining civilians in times of war*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993.

¹²On humanitarian intervention see, Michael Akehurst, “Humanitarian Intervention,” in Bull, *Intervention in World Politics*, pp. 93-118; Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear, (eds.) *Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995; Stanley Hoffmann, *Duties Beyond Borders*, Ithaca, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981; Gene Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, (eds.) *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention*, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995; Bhikhu Parekh, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,” *International Political Science Review*, 18(1), January 1997, pp. 49-70.

¹³Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman, (eds.) *Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention*, London: Macmillan Press, 1993.

about the moral dilemmas raised by concerns for human rights, identity and agency. This volume also incorporated ideas developed in the field of conflict resolution and marked a shift away from the legality of intervention to a preoccupation with the resolution of conflicts and conflict itself. This trend was also evident in more policy-oriented studies which specifically focussed on ending civil wars.¹⁴ Most of this literature posed the likelihood of ending civil wars through stable negotiated settlements against military outcomes where one side is defeated. They assumed that the unique features of civil wars structure and limit the possibilities of external intervention and sought to define a role for external actors in facilitating peaceful settlements.

The deployment of UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Somalia and Bosnia has also generated extensive empirical studies on UN peacekeeping. Not surprisingly, this research focuses on the capacity of the UN to respond to conflicts in terms of its functions, resources, and political will. The study of UN peacekeeping branched into two directions. The first, which received the most attention, was a preoccupation with peace enforcement and humanitarian intervention, where force was to be used to transform war into peace and peace was often designed by third parties.¹⁵ The second, was a focus on second generation peacekeeping, which involved UN peacekeepers in new functions including monitoring human rights and the police; overseeing the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons; and preparing, holding and monitoring elections.¹⁶ Under the schema

¹⁴See King, *Ending Civil Wars*; Barbara Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” *International Organization*, 51(3), 1997, pp. 335-364.; Licklider, *Stopping the Killing*.

¹⁵Adam Roberts, *Humanitarian Action in War*, Adelphi Paper 305, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996. See also *Survival*, 37(4), Winter 1995-1996 including Adam Roberts, “From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use of Force,” pp. 7-28, Stanley Hoffman, “The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention,” pp. 29-51; and Shashi Tharoor, “Should UN Peacekeeping Go ‘Back to Basics’?”, pp. 52-64.

¹⁶On second generation UN peacekeeping, see Mats Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?* Adelphi Paper 281, London: Brasseyes for International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993; Sally Morphet, “UN Peacekeeping and Election Monitoring,” in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, (eds.) *United Nations: Divided World*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 183-239; Cedric Thornberry, *The Development of International Peacekeeping*, London: LSE Centenary Lectures; Alan James, “Problems

set out in *Agenda for Peace*, these activities constituted peace-building beyond traditional peacekeeping. The area of peace-building, post-conflict reconstruction or rehabilitation, as it has invariably been called, is a new and vibrant area of research.¹⁷ The wide range of activities encompassed within this area has brought together those interested in complex emergencies and in longer-term development, generating research into the links between relief and development, and between development and conflict prevention.¹⁸

As a consequence of the enlarged scope for legitimate intervention, there are fewer arguments against intervention to counter the ‘new interventionism’. Those that have been advanced are less concerned with upholding the principle of sovereignty, than arguing that intrinsic features of civil wars make them more intractable and less amenable to external intervention. In the aftermath of Somalia and Bosnia, arguments against intervention centre on the inability of the UN to adequately respond to such situations and favour caution instead of activism. Stedman argued the UN “must acknowledge the limitations imposed by civil war - what can realistically be accomplished by outside forces in violent internal conflict - and the limitations imposed by its own organisational makeup and procedures.”¹⁹ Peace enforcement, he warned, based on poor preparation, a lack of coherent strategy, insufficient leverage or resources and poor timing can just as easily prolong conflicts than bring about negotiated ends. Similarly, Betts cautioned against unfettered intervention based on the assumption that intervention “should be both limited and impartial, because weighing in on one side of a local struggle undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of

of Internal Peacekeeping,” *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 5(1), 1994, pp. 21-46; Donald C. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, (eds.) *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, London: Macmillan Press, 1993; Tom Woodhouse, Robert Bruce and Malcolm Dando, (eds.) *Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards Effective Intervention in Post-Cold War Conflicts*, London: Macmillan Press, 1998.

¹⁷This area of research will be examined in the next chapter.

¹⁸Mary B. Anderson, *Doing No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace Through Aid*, Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action, 1996; Mark Duffield, “Complex emergencies and the crisis of developmentalism,” *IDS Bulletin*, 25(4), 1994, pp. 37-45; and Krishna Kumar, (ed.) *Rebuilding War-Torn Societies: Critical roles for International Assistance*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997.

¹⁹Stephen John Stedman, “UN Intervention in Civil Wars: Imperatives of Choice and Strategy,” in Daniel and Hayes, *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, p. 40.

outside involvement.”²⁰ Using force to impose peace and maintaining neutrality are incompatible and can lead to dangerous consequences. Nevertheless, Betts claimed that limited and impartial intervention still holds true for monitoring cease-fires and other peace-building activities. Stedman as well, favoured a stronger role in peace-building and argued the UN “must be more muscular in pressing antagonists to fulfil their obligations to peace and isolating those parties who violate their commitment to peace.”²¹ Peace-building activities are suitable for international activism because they are less strictly acts of intervention.

While peace enforcement is considered within the framework of intervention, the activity of post-conflict peace-building seems to move outside of the concept. Peace-building and post-conflict activities may not constitute intervention because they rest on the consent of the warring parties and third parties participate as impartial and neutral actors. The nature of these activities in building peace are not seen to be coercive or dictatorial and therefore are not deemed to be interventionary. However, post-conflict activities still fall within the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state and still concern the authority structure of the target state. Moreover, peace-building activities target more than the legal sovereignty of the state, they address the fundamental structures of a state and its relations to society. Peace-building missions “intervene directly in the internal affairs of states, redefining the relationship between the government and its citizens and, in many cases, supporting popular legitimacy over traditional claims of state sovereignty.”²² The boundaries between peacekeeping and peace-building are also thinly drawn, especially in situations such as Angola where peace-building activities verge on peace enforcement when dealing with cease-fire violations. Post-conflict activities are acts of intervention but the present framework for understanding intervention is inadequate for understanding such activities.

This inadequacy is derived from a flawed assumption in the framework which treats all

²⁰Richard K. Betts, “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention,” *Foreign Affairs*, 73(6), November/December 1994, p. 20.

²¹Stedman, “UN Intervention in Civil Wars,” p. 40.

²²Eva Bertram, “Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United Nations Peace Building,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39(3), 1995, p. 392.

dimensions of intervention (the actor, target, activity, type, purpose and context) equally and begins by presuming the international system is composed of equal sovereign states. Intervention is conceived as a neutral category of activity undertaken by any state or other actor depending on the context. In practice, intervention is rather more endemic in some parts of the world than others and undertaken by some actors more than others. Hedley Bull highlighted the frequency of interventions in the ‘Third World’. He concluded that not only is the intervening actor superior in power to the object of intervention, but that it is “because the former is relatively strong and the latter relatively weak that the question arises of a form of interference that is dictatorial or coercive.”²³ Dictatorial or coercive interference is a defining feature of the structural inequality between powerful states and their agents more likely to undertake intervention, and those states and their citizens more likely to be the target of intervention. The international system is defined by this inequality, divided between the more powerful and the less powerful, developed and non-developed, Western and non-Western, and states with peace and those without. Intervention is a feature of the structural inequality of sovereignty.

Apart from Bull, curiously very little has been written from the perspective of non-Western, developing countries where most interventions take place. The few existing examples focussed mainly on developing countries as the intervening actor and not just the object of intervention.²⁴ Others focussed on the endemic nature of foreign military intervention in particular regions, such as Africa.²⁵ One notable exception to this, was the work of Caroline Thomas who studied the developing world as a particular target of intervention.²⁶ Thomas argued that the attitudes and experiences of developing countries play “a formative role in

²³Hedley Bull, “Introduction,” in Bull, *Intervention in World Politics*, p. 1.

²⁴Hedley Bull, “Intervention in the Third World,” in Bull, *Intervention in World Politics*, pp. 135-155; Martin Zuberi, “Intervention in the Developing World: A Southern Perspective,” in Caroline Thomas and Paikiasothy Saravanamutu, (eds.) *Conflict and Consensus in South/North Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 135-143.

²⁵Keith Somerville, *Foreign Military Intervention in Africa*, London: Pinter, 1990.

²⁶Caroline Thomas, *The Debate on Intervention in World Politics: Challenges from the Developing World*, Doctoral Thesis, University of London, 1983.

the ethical debate surrounding the non-intervention norm,”²⁷ but that they are also the objects of new forms of intervention from technical agencies that systematically disregard sovereign rights such as international financial institutions. Hoffmann also categorised these kinds of activities as intervention when he observed that “[w]hile most states resent attempts by other states to intervene through the use of economic instruments, the resort to such tools of intervention by bodies like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the OECD has become perfectly normal.”²⁸ Without attracting attention, the forms and instruments of intervention have expanded to encompass international financial and lending practices, extending the targeted area of domestic jurisdiction to include fiscal and monetary authority. In such countries, the areas of domestic jurisdiction open to international intervention are vast.

Despite pleas for greater respect for state sovereignty from developing countries, the absence of a perspective from the target of intervention means that a range of intervention practices are either kept outside the framework for intervention, or have expanded the concept of intervention by nullifying its political significance and impact. For those states that are the objects of interference from stronger states, “the recognition of the rule of non-intervention at least gives weak states some legitimacy in their protestations against the stronger ones... Without such notions they have no chance of any degree of autonomous decision-making.”²⁹ This applies to all aspects of the transition from war to peace, including post-conflict activities. Intervention is still at the very crux of international activity for the targeted state but this perspective has yet to be incorporated in the framework for understanding intervention.

The Turn to Conflict Resolution

An alternative perspective on external third parties is provided by the literature on conflict

²⁷Thomas, *The Debate on Intervention*, p. 16.

²⁸Hoffmann, “The problem of intervention,” p. 22.

²⁹Caroline Thomas, “The Pragmatic Case Against Intervention,” in Forbes and Hoffman, *Political Theory*, p. 95.

resolution. This literature comprises a number of sub-categories: these are the study of conflict, peace research, third party mediation, conflict management and the specific area of conflict resolution. A third party is defined as “someone who is external to a certain conflict and who interposes between the conflict parties in order to help them with their conflict management efforts.”³⁰ Third parties can be individuals, states, international or non-governmental organisations.³¹ Third parties are not assumed to be states or configured around the state, nor are they necessarily external or international. The literature, however, differs with respect to the roles and activities of third parties in terms of the motives, resources, capacities, and functions.³²

This literature is not only open to the type of intervening actor, but also attempts to accommodate the dynamic nature of the process allowing for multiple actors to engage in many and different kinds of interventions in one process. Scholars in this field systematically break down the process of conflict and its resolution into different stages, describing a cycle of conflict from latent to manifest to escalating conflict or a sequence of activities from pre-negotiation to negotiations, mediation or conflict facilitation workshops,

³⁰Jacob Bercovitch, *Social Conflicts and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984, p. 13.

³¹On third parties or intermediaries, see Oran Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967; Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, (eds.) *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, Washington, D.C.: Westview Press, Foreign Policy Institute, 1985; Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Rubin, (eds.) *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management*, London: Macmillan Press, 1992; Jacob Bercovitch, (ed.) *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996; Thomas Princen, *Intermediaries in International Conflict*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992; Hugh Miall, *The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Since 1945*, London: Macmillan Press, 1992; Mark Hoffman, “Third Party Mediation and Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era,” in J. Bayliss and N.J. Rengger, (eds.) *Dilemmas in World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 261-86.

³²For an explanation of the differences in third party roles and resources, see Hoffman, “Third Party Mediation”; Christopher Mitchell and Keith Webb, (eds.) *New Approaches to International Mediation*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988. See in particular, Keith Webb, “The Morality of Mediation,” pp. 16-28 and Christopher Mitchell, “The Motives for Mediation,” pp. 29-51.

to post-negotiation strategies.³³ Third party intervention is also ad-hoc, although different actors and activities may overlap, and some engage and disengage frequently in a single process. Mitchell has created a list of third party mediation roles potentially applicable to any phase of the process.³⁴ But little else has been written on what happens after a peace agreement has been signed. Hampson has explored why peace agreements succeed or fail, emphasising the role of external third parties in ensuring the successful implementation of an agreement;³⁵ while Stedman has argued for a more robust peace-building strategy from the UN, particularly in managing the threats posed by ‘spoilers’ to peace processes.³⁶

This set of literature has also been merging with the traditional intervention literature and influencing its development in two ways. First, the objective of third party intervention is now characterised as solving conflicts as a means of attaining peace. What all third parties are expected to do, as the name conflict resolution implies, is to resolve, manage or transform conflicts. Although there is a debate as to whether conflicts are resolved, settled or managed and what outcomes constitute success, the common denominator is faith in a pacific process to end conflicts. By focussing on the process, third parties assist conflicting parties to reach agreement on a peaceful outcome. The outcome should not be determined by the dynamics of conflict, of having one side win or lose, but through a shared process of resolving the conflict peacefully. Therefore the means that are employed by third parties are necessarily pacific and are juxtaposed to other types of conflict management such as

³³See Loraleigh Keashly and Ronald J. Fisher, “Towards a Contingency Theory of Third Party Intervention in Regional Conflicts: A Cyprus Illustration,” *International Journal*, 45(2), 1990, pp. 424-53; Janice Gross Stein, (ed.) *Getting to the Table: The Processes of International Prenegotiation*, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989; Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson, (eds.) *Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflict*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991; Michael Lund *Preventing Violent Conflict: a strategy for preventive diplomacy*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996.

³⁴Christopher Mitchell, “The Processes and Stages of Mediation: Two Sudanese Cases,” in David R. Smock, (ed.) *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa*, Washington, D.C.:United States Institute of Peace, 1993 pp. 107-38

³⁵Fen Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail?* Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996.

³⁶Stedman, “UN Intervention in Civil Wars,” and Stephen J. Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *Foreign Affairs*, 22(2), Fall 1997, pp. 5-53.

coercion, violence and war. Many in this field would deny their activities constitute traditional intervention because “the basis of third party involvement is voluntary. Its intervention, moreover, is of an ad hoc nature and the influence a third party exerts is supposed to be beneficial.”³⁷ If they are engaging in intervention at all, it is intervention that only interposes between parties to a conflict.³⁸

Second, the target of external third parties is specifically the conflict itself. This exclusive focus on conflict draws on ideas which isolate the phenomenon of conflict as a social process. Conflict analysis and peace research, according to Banks and Mitchell,

sees conflict as an approximately similar phenomenon at different social levels at which it occurs. It distinguishes characteristic attitudes and behaviour by parties to conflict and it identifies repeated patterns in the dynamics of the relations between the parties when they are in conflict.³⁹

Conflict occurs at all social levels and displays basic structural characteristics across those levels. The structure of conflict, identified by Galtung, is composed of three components: a conflict situation, conflict behaviour and conflict attitudes and perceptions.⁴⁰ A conflict emerges when two or more parties are mobilised to obtain incompatible goals. It describes a relationship between those parties, whether they are individuals, communal groups or states. Conflict, however is not problematic, rather the violent manifestation of conflict, resulting from an inability to manage or express conflict leads to violence and war.

By intervening into a conflict relationship, the issue of neutrality and impartiality is a core concern of the literature. Carnevale and Arad argue that impartiality and neutrality can refer to any aspect of the process, from the parties, to the interests of the intermediaries, to the

³⁷Bercovitch, *Social Conflicts and Third Parties*, p. 13.

³⁸See Bruce Jones “‘Intervention without Borders’: Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda, 1990-1994,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 24(2), 1995, pp. 225-249.

³⁹Michael Banks and C.R. Mitchell, “Conflict Theory, Peace Research and the Analysis of Communal Conflicts,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 3(3), Winter 1974-5, p. 252. See also Christopher Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict*, London: Macmillan Press, 1981.

⁴⁰Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 6, 1969, pp. 167-191.

content of the settled outcome.⁴¹ According to Young,

the existence of a meaningful role for a third party will depend on the party's being perceived as an impartial participant (in the sense of having nothing to gain from aiding either protagonist and in the sense of being able to control any feelings of favoritism) in the eyes of the principal protagonists.⁴²

However, Young did not think third parties could remain neutral if neutrality refers to the outcome of the process and the effect that third party actions have on terminating the conflict. Bercovitch concurred that "a third party is not, and can not be neutral. By its very presence, it affects the process..."⁴³ Touval and Zartman similarly thought third parties become part of the conflict triangle and that this is a useful resource or source of leverage.⁴⁴

Although the conflict resolution literature developed outside the mainstream in the Cold War era, many of its ideas are a product of the Cold War and developed in reaction to international relations' preoccupation with 'realism' and power politics. During the Cold War, conflict and peace scholars within international relations specialised in identity and communal-based violent conflicts, with reference to cases such as Northern Ireland, Lebanon and Cyprus. Azar and Burton, for example, developed a theory of protracted social conflict.⁴⁵ These intractable conflicts emerged when communal groups defined by their shared ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural characteristics were denied their identity or collective development needs.⁴⁶ When the Cold War ended, the shift in analysis towards

⁴¹Peter Carnevale and Sharon Arad, "Bias and Impartiality in International Mediation," in Bercovitch, (ed.) *Resolving International Conflicts*, pp. 39-54.

⁴²Young, *The Intermediaries*, p. 81.

⁴³Bercovitch, *Social Conflicts and Third Parties*, p. 16.

⁴⁴Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in Theory," in Touval and Zartman, *International Mediation*, p. 13-14.

⁴⁵Edward Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990; and Edward Azar and John Burton, (eds.) *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, London: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986.

⁴⁶Francis Deng and I. William Zartman, (eds.) *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991; I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989; Stephen John Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in*

civil wars seemed to confirm and vindicate the field, particularly arguments linking identity and communal needs to the root causes of conflict.⁴⁷ However, theories about conflict in the literature did not specifically look at civil wars as a special category of conflict. Rather, civil conflicts were social conflicts and as such could be understood by the dynamics and structures of conflict in general. Without reassessing itself in light of the end of the Cold War, the conflict resolution field applied these generic ideas regarding conflict to civil wars without defending the application or the commonalities of civil wars to all social conflicts. The problematic nature of some of these assumptions has not been addressed.

One problematic assumption is the reification of the phenomenon of conflict which obviates or preempts concern with the authority of the state in which civil conflicts take place. In lieu of the state, the boundaries of the conflict define the political context and the self-identified ‘parties’ to the conflict define the parameters of the potential intervention. Intervention takes place in the space between the parties defined by the conflict relationship and third parties become part of the conflict dynamic. The marginalisation of the larger political context outside the conflict dynamic is problematic for understanding civil conflicts where the state is a defining part of the dynamic. Although some scholars have introduced the state to studies on conflict resolution, through analyses of failed or collapsed states, this has not yet applied to the roles of third party intervention.⁴⁸ In reifying conflict and third party processes, most scholars overlook the social and political processes in which they take place. Similarly, by predetermining the outcome as peaceful peacemaking and banishing violence, the role violence plays in political processes, such as state formation and the struggle for political community, is rejected without arguing that it is possible for such processes to be effected through peaceful means.⁴⁹

Zimbabwe, 1974-1980, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991.

⁴⁷For a critique of this assumption see King, *Ending Civil Wars*.

⁴⁸Thomas Ohlson and Stephen John Stedman with Robert Davies, *The New is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994; I. William Zartman, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994.

⁴⁹Mats Berdal and David Keen “Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: Some Policy Implications,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 26(3), 1997, pp. 795-818. Mark Duffield “The political economy of internal war: asset transfer,

As the conflict resolution literatures expands into the area of post-conflict transitions to peace, the parameters for understanding and explaining this transition remain limited by the abstracted understanding of conflict as a relationship between two or more parties. An understanding of the target receiving assistance from external third parties is incomplete. If this framework is too restricted by overlooking the social, historical or political context, while the intervention framework is rarely concerned with the target altogether, is it possible to develop a more inclusive framework for understanding third party intervention in post-conflict processes?

Constructing a new framework

The boundaries between traditional intervention and conflict resolution are increasingly blurred. While one studies the problem of intervention and the other the problem of conflict, they are both converging in the areas of post-conflict transition, second generation peacekeeping and relief-to-development activities. While scholars in both fields are studying the myriad roles and activities of external actors in these processes, the convergence of the two has consequently expanded the concept of intervention. Returning to Vincent's definition, the actor no longer revolves around the state, but includes non-governmental organisations, international financial institutions, donors and other agencies within a state, as well as individuals. The activities that are undertaken have opened further areas of domestic jurisdiction to intervention, such as running elections, establishing judicial tribunals and rehabilitating public sectors such as health and road building. The context is more favourable towards intervention because of impatience with violent conflict and an unwillingness to preserve state sovereignty over a greater moral good. The act of intervention is less problematic than the consequences of conflict. Therefore the question is less frequently whether to intervene, but who is to intervene and how.

The intervention and conflict resolution literatures on peace processes are also converging

complex emergencies and international aid," in Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi, (eds.) *War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies*, London: Zed Books, 1994.

with research produced and inspired by experience in the field. This draws heavily from activities already underway in a number of specific countries. Consequently, research in post-conflict transitions often takes the form of field reports, evaluations of programmes and operations, and inventories of activities and recommendations. This in turn is generating demand for more case-study research as a basis for comparative analysis from which general lessons and recommendations on 'best practices' can be drawn. The World Bank has produced studies on the transition from war to peace focussing on the problems of demobilising and reintegrating soldiers. The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) has started a War-Torn Societies Project, while UNESCO has launched programmes embracing a culture of peace. In addition to the UN, the numbers and types of actors involved in post-conflict peace processes have multiplied to include NGOs, donors and regional organisations, who also produce and disseminate their own reports.

Nevertheless, there are a few underlying problems with these studies on the peace process and the research that results from it. First, almost all of these policy prescriptions contain concepts such as capacity-building, good governance, civil society, or multi-party democracy which are used loosely, yet are upheld as a kind of scripture that is not debated or contested. Second, there is an underlying premise of social engineering, that the right policy, rightly implemented will lead to the right outcome. What is involved is a technical process relying on the efficient implementation of an inventory or recipe of activities.⁵⁰ Thus a new form of discourse constructed on this recipe of acceptable concepts and activities is circulating amongst field personnel, agencies and research institutes, policy-makers and scholars. These ideas in turn are reinforcing and encouraging the continuation of activities in transition countries that are already in operation. As a result, experts on the various components of the peace process are converging into a specialised industry based on their knowledge and experience in implementing these concepts and activities. As a direct consequence, both the discourse and practice of external third party intervention into

⁵⁰United Nations Task Force, *An Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities*, New York, NY: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, 1996.; Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner and Ingo Wiederhofer, *The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996.

peace processes are being systematically de-politicised.

By focussing on technical activities, the peace process industry has mobilised notions of conflict, democracy, or peace-building that de-emphasise their political significance. The political content of peace and the peace process is not fully recognised because the target of this assistance receives less attention than the nature of third party activities. The objects of post-conflict activities or the target in the sense of both the “the thing which is having something done to it by an outside actor and that part of the target at which the intervention is aimed”⁵¹ is rarely the central or primary object of analysis. This seems to confirm King’s idea of *narcissistic intervention*. King suggests that “external involvement is sometimes judged less in terms of its impact on the termination of the conflict and more in terms of its effects on the intervening state or coalition of states... with questions about the long-term effects of external involvement pushed to the back of the queue.”⁵² A positive outcome in the target country is presumed, whereas the impact on intervening actors and their credibility is examined or problematised.

While two dimensions of the target of intervention have been considered, the sovereign state and violent conflict, the connections between them have not been fully explored in relation to intervention. One of the reasons explanations are unsatisfactory is that rarely do such explanations start from or focus on politics. Politics and the space in which it is conducted is overlooked in understanding the state, civil conflict and the target of intervention. This is problematic because contemporary civil conflicts are fundamentally contests over what constitutes political space, that is the norms, institutions and procedures which order and organise political life. Without basic agreement on this arrangement or system of norms, institutions and procedures, the exercise of politics is made difficult which prevents the management of conflict. By ignoring or retreating from politics, the activities of the peace process industry are likely to exacerbate tensions which fuel conflict, because what is at stake is how that society is politically organised.

⁵¹Vincent, *Nonintervention and International Order*, p. 5.

⁵²King, *Ending Civil Wars*, p. 12.

Thus external third parties have an impact on conflict, but in doing so they also exert a formative influence on the configuration of political space. In other words, as Navari suggested, “implicit in the very idea of intervention is an outsider’s entrance into a political space,”⁵³ where the interveners or outsiders join the insiders. The peace process industry operates in the political space of another society and inevitably has a political impact on that space. It is not only the legal validity of the state, or a particular policy or activity of a state that is disrupted by intervention, but rather the totality of norms, structures and institutions which give meaning to politics. Intervention transgresses state sovereignty, but it also alters the state’s relation to its society and society’s relation to the state. According to Navari, “[o]ne of the reasons we are concerned about intervention is the external disruption to the real circumstances within which we live and the way we organise our activities.”⁵⁴ This takes place not only through the act of intervention, but as Anderson argued, in the procedures and practices of intervention which convey political ideas and influence the development of norms, values, expectations and attitudes.⁵⁵ However, this also takes place in an existing context of disruption occasioned by conflict creating a complex of discontinuities and confusion which conditions the impact of external intervention.

The aim of the thesis is to broaden the framework for looking at intervention in the transition from war to peace by looking at how the range of international actors and their activities involved in this transition impact on political space. Examining the impact of external third parties on political space reorients the framework for understanding intervention by focussing on the outcomes of the peace process for the target of intervention. In other words, the conceptual tools by which we understand the nature of the assistance that has been given, how we analyse and evaluate third parties and their activities, and of whether they have assisted the insiders relates to the question of political space. For the countries receiving international assistance, it is imperative to assess whether

⁵³Cornelia Navari, “Intervention, Non-Intervention and the Construction of the State,” in Forbes and Hoffman, *Political Theory*, p. 43.

⁵⁴Navari, “Intervention, Non-Intervention” p. 44.

⁵⁵Anderson, *Doing No Harm*, p. 4.

this assistance leads to outcomes which are beneficial or not, whether in fact a transition to peace is being made.

The plan of the thesis

This thesis attempts to look at the role of external third parties in shaping political space through the example of Mozambique's transition from war to peace. Mozambique is used in the thesis as a case study in which to present and assess certain ideas. This work is not intended to be a comprehensive empirical record of events or a systematic examination of the process in Mozambique. The following analysis presents an overview of the whole process which may not satisfy someone interested in a particular aspect of the process, a particular international actor, or even with Mozambique itself. Within the constraints of the space available, the thesis aims to draw out a number of themes on the aggregate impact of external third parties on the reconfiguration of political space in Mozambique as a basis for drawing larger conclusions pertinent to other examples.

Mozambique has been selected as a case study because it is presented as a success, which justifies similar activities in future cases, particularly for the United Nations. Therefore it is crucial to examine whether the intervention was a success, what kind of success and a success for whom. As Mozambique was overrun by international actors engaged in every imaginable activity, supported by a substantial amount of funding, it serves as a useful example from which to study the peace process industry at work. Mozambique is also one of the poorest countries in the world, of which nine of the ten poorest are found in Sub-Saharan Africa,⁵⁶ and is thus representative of larger processes and features in Africa and Africa's relationship to the developed world through donors and the United Nations. However, as with any case study, there are features specific to Mozambique. For example, Mozambique's conflict was primarily one between two belligerents, with few ethnic dimensions, which had many ideological overtones relating to apartheid South Africa and the Cold War. Second, the money that was available for Mozambique was a rare example

⁵⁶The World Bank, *World Development Report*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997.

of donor largesse. Bearing these specificities in mind, Mozambique is still a useful case study for an explanation of the concentration of international actors in order to draw out themes for future comparative analysis.

Part I carries on the discussion introduced in this chapter. Chapter one explores the different conceptual approaches to post-conflict transitions, and assesses the impact of international actors during the transition from war to peace by explicitly focussing on the implementation of a peace agreement. However, unlike most approaches to post-conflict transitions, it argues that not only operational, but political assumptions underlie the process. A broader framework is needed. This is explored in chapter two which introduces the idea of political space and how it is structured by the state and its relationship to society. The transition from war to peace depends upon reconfiguring political space in order to create the conditions for the exercise of politics which is the basis for peace. It is in this political space that external actors operate during their intervention in the peace process and which they ultimately reshape in their attempts to help bring about peace.

Part II introduces the case study of Mozambique. Chapter three presents an overview of the history of Mozambique as a history of weak state and civil society formation with frequent external interventions. This extended historical narrative provides a much overlooked context in which to understand Mozambique as a society and political community and subsequently the war with Renamo. This is followed in chapter four by a narrative on the peace process negotiations, from 1983 to 1992, which culminated in the signing of the General Peace Agreement in Rome. It ends by giving a broad outline of the agreement and the roles to be played by the multiplicity of actors during the implementation. It sets out the three dimensions of the peace process which follow and explains why the economic dimension is not considered on its own but is woven throughout the text.

Part III looks at how the General Peace Agreement was implemented in Mozambique from 1992 to 1995. It focuses on the three major components of the peace process in which external third parties were active: demilitarisation, humanitarian assistance and political assistance. Chapter five examines the process of demilitarisation which was a key

component to the process and a key area of external third party participation. Chapter six focuses on the provision of humanitarian assistance where again international actors were heavily involved. This assistance was complicated by tensions between UN peacekeepers and humanitarian agencies, amongst the humanitarian actors themselves, and between international humanitarian actors and domestic political actors. Chapter seven focuses on the explicit political provisions and the assistance provided by external actors for the first multi-party elections in Mozambique. It highlights how the future shape of politics in Mozambique was influenced by the impact of international actors in encouraging or closing off political space and debate.

The conclusion draws attention to the limitations of intervention in post-conflict processes. It begins by evaluating the apparent success of the peace process in Mozambique, and the legacies of the peace process industry on Mozambique's political space. It explores the features and impact of the peace process industry and then assesses the framework for understanding intervention in peace processes. The assistance external third parties extend to countries making the transition from war to peace is limited by their own operational shortcomings and by the political space in which they intervene. Drawing from the example of Mozambique, the peace process industry needs a greater awareness of its innately political nature in order to understand, evaluate and accommodate the inevitable impact on political space in such a way that sustains and consolidates peace. However, if this political impact is not recognised, and if the limitations of what intervention can accomplish are not respected, then a strong case can be made against external intervention in post-conflict transitions.

CHAPTER ONE

The peace process industry: bringing back the political

There appears to be an assumption that societies in conflict cannot independently make the transition from war to peace. It is almost unthinkable for any aspect of the peace process to take place without the participation of at least one international actor, although most often there are many. When civil wars end through a peace settlement, the presence of external third party actors is frequently built into the mechanisms for implementing agreements during negotiations. After agreements are signed, the international community is actively involved in sustaining and consolidating peace. In recent years, the international community has assisted post-conflict peace processes in Mozambique, Cambodia, El Salvador, Namibia and more.

Because of their on-going and concentrated presence, external actors are comprising an industry working to promote, support and define peace processes around the world. However, there are as yet few standards on what this industry ought to be doing, how it should operate and how to evaluate its performance. Rather, those who comprise the industry have been deciding on an ad hoc basis the areas of activity to get involved in, how, and when. Three blueprints have entered the discourse on post-conflict assistance: the implementation of a peace agreement, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction or rebuilding war-torn societies. However these three approaches lack clear and coherent objectives and seem to revolve around checklists of similar activities. While the mandates of the peace process industry may be politically ambitious, they lack substance and coherence. The objectives of the peace process industry remain unclear because the industry does not fully appreciate the political implications of the transition from war to peace. International actors participating in peace processes do not sufficiently account for their innately political nature and their political impact on host societies.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section argues that international actors comprise a peace process industry and examines the actors in the industry, the activities

they engage in, and the roles and functions they perform. The second section studies the three blueprints that are circulating amongst the actors in the industry: implementing peace settlements, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. After looking at the actors in the peace process industry and their objectives, the final section looks at the role of the industry in shaping the outcomes from a peace process. I argue that the peace process industry cannot account for these outcomes until they fully appreciate the different dimensions of their own political character. The subsequent chapters on Mozambique will elaborate on the political nature of the peace process industry in greater detail.

*Is there a 'peace process industry'?*¹

To speak of an industry focussed on the peace process, rather than on any particular international actor, highlights the increasing numbers of such actors involved in peace processes around the world.² As a direct consequence of the number, variety and concentration of international agencies and personnel operating in a country making the transition from war to peace, the significance of this collective presence extends beyond the performance and operation of any single actor. Collectively, many such actors have an aggregate impact on society which may not have been intended or desired. This is not to suggest that these actors work towards a common goal or share the same values and intentions, although 'peace' is the affirmed objective. The industry is a loose and inchoate collection of international actors, but to constitute these actors as an industry draws attention to a shared perspective as the providers of assistance in relation to the host society, the recipients. It also points to the relationships and tensions amongst those who comprise the industry and their varied interests, while focussing attention on the 'peace process' above other activities.

¹The 'peace process' is an all-encompassing phrase. I am primarily concerned with what happens after negotiations have produced an agreement which involves two or more parties in reconstructing political society.

²This section draws from the argument put forward by James Ferguson with respect to the operation of a development industry. James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development', depoliticization and bureaucratic power in Lesotho*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

The combination of a prodigious number of actors, the volume and breadth of activities, the amount of money and resources being spent, and the number of peace processes that are taking place, all suggest that the industry is growing. But the survival and growth of this industry is not tied to the success or failure of a particular peace process, but to the perceived demands of ‘the peace process’. Certain states, organisations and individuals are building up experience and developing an expertise on the general mechanics of peace processes which is applied from process to process. The idea of an industry highlights the fact that these actors and the activities they engage in are becoming more professional and institutionalised, acquiring more practical and technical experience. While some organisations have emerged specifically to engage in peace processes, it is more frequently the case that old ones have reoriented and expanded their remit to include the demands of post-conflict activities. In either case, there are numerous offices, bureaucratic systems, and a network of experts moving from agency to agency, and from process to process, specialising in ‘the peace process’.³ Although there are country specialists, neither the industry, nor any particular actor, is tied to a specific process, but retains the option of pulling out and participating in the next process.

The peace process, in other words, provides a point of entry for international actors to operate in another society without a permanent or sustained presence. The idea of an industry highlights this distinction between external actors⁴ and a society directly affected by the peace process and its consequences, not only parties to conflict, but the political values, institutions and procedures which structure society. Although most international actors involved in peace processes rarely interpret their role as political, as an institution, they produce political effects. Looking at international actors as an industry suggests that

³Personnel often overlap through secondment from resident development agencies to peace operations, while some personnel move from operation to operation. Personnel from UNAVEM I in Angola and UNTAC in Cambodia were directly transferred to ONUMOZ.

⁴The peace process industry excludes domestic actors since such actors are tied to a specific peace process and participation in other peace processes would transform them into external actors. The external dimension of these actors draws attention to their ad hoc and ‘neutral’ quality. External actors sometimes form partnerships with local NGOs for greater legitimacy to implement programmes.

the collective resources, personnel and knowledge of the industry are generating forms of power in relation to the recipients of international assistance which may constitute a form of intervention. Questions of power and discrepancies between plans and outcomes are associated not only with a peace process, but is more readily apparent with development. Ferguson has suggested that with respect to development, the “outcomes of planned social interventions can end up coming together into powerful constellations of control that were never intended and in some cases never even recognized, but are all the more effective for being ‘subjectless’.”⁵ This observation holds as much to peace processes as it does to development, but in a peace process the subjects of intervention encompass the entire society and its political organisation.

This section describes the leading actors in the industry, the three main types of activities they engage in, and the roles that are undertaken. It presents a picture of what the industry does in any given peace process.

THE ACTORS

The peace process industry comprises four main types of actors, all of whom were active in Mozambique: international organisations, states, non-state actors and international financial institutions. International organisations involved in peace processes include the United Nations and other regional organisations. The UN is the most actively involved organisation with a number of its agencies involved in post-conflict assistance and peace-building. The Secretary-General instigates and oversees UN peace operations, particularly through his special representative on the ground. He is supported by and receives a mandate from the Security Council; while operationally, many activities take place through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance and the Department of Political Affairs, not to mention other accounting, procurement and management divisions. Other UN specialised agencies active in the field in any one process include UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and WHO.

⁵Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine*, p. 19.

The second category comprises individual states, whether regional powers, donor agencies, or the former superpowers. While neighbouring states may be crucial players in a peace process, they are not necessarily part of the industry unless they consistently participate in different processes and in a technical not just political capacity. In other words, the participation of West African states in ECOMOG in Liberia does not qualify them as part of the industry unless these states consistently participate in African peacekeeping continent-wide. Rather, the states that dominate the industry are primarily Western, developed and 'peaceful'. These states have developed an institutional capacity and memory for participation in post-conflict peace processes, but they are not one unified actor. They comprise several components including government leaders, the ministry of foreign affairs, the department of defence, development agencies, and their field level representatives. Donor agencies and the development community have been taking an active interest in leading the peace-building agenda to establish the principles and procedures for post-conflict assistance.⁶

The third category are non-state actors, individuals and consultants, religious groups, private sector firms and in particular non-governmental organisations (NGOs). NGOs refer to a wide range of organisations, but distinctions must be drawn between "the big eight" that control half the US\$ 8 billion market for NGOs,⁷ and the thousands of smaller organisations proliferating at any given time. Although some NGOs are primarily concerned with conflict resolution, most international NGOs involved in post-conflict activities tend to be either relief, development or human rights organisations reorienting themselves to peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, such as MSF, OXFAM, and

⁶Nicole Ball with Tammy Halevy, *Making Peace Work: The Role of the International Development Community*, Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1996, is one example from the donor community attempting to develop an agenda for peace-building. See also OECD, *DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation*, Paris: OECD, 1997.

⁷The big eight are CARE, World Vision International, OXFAM, MSF, Save the Children Federation, CIDSE (Cooperation Internationale pour le Developpement et la Solidarite), the Coalition of Catholic NGOs, APDOVE (Association of Protestant Development Organizations in Europe), and Eurostep (Secular European NGOs). See Riva Krut, *Globalization and Civil Society: NGO Influence in International Decision-Making*, UNRISD Discussion Paper 83, Geneva, April 1997, fn 29.

CARE. These NGOs set up their own offices in the field and recruit local staff, while coordinating with headquarters in their home countries. The private sector may also play a role, for example in Mozambique, LONRHO, which had commercial interests across Africa, facilitated access to Renamo and offered many inducements and encouragements to Renamo to keep them in the negotiating process.

A fourth category of actors, whose role in a peace process is rarely made explicit, are international financial institutions. Although most peace agreements do not refer to the World Bank, the IMF, or Club of Paris, their ad hoc participation often conditions the feasibility of the transition process. The parallel participation of these powerful actors in financing activities, devising macroeconomic policy and setting limits on spending, is a fundamental part of post-conflict processes which does not receive enough attention. This poses problems because of the potential for an economic process to overlap with, or even threaten a peace process. This occurred in El Salvador, where the UN-sponsored peace process was at risk from the objectives of the IMF, World Bank and other UN agencies. El Salvador was faced with the dilemma of instituting ambitious reforms in the peace agreement or implementing a rigorous economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programme.⁸ It is important to detect when and how economic and financial institutions participate in a post-conflict transition in order to understand their likely impact.

Which actors become involved in a peace process depends on the context of a conflict, but certain actors such as the UN, major donors and larger NGOs are involved more frequently than others and dominate the industry. Actors differ according to their motives, mandate, constituencies, prestige, capacity, expertise, resources and leverage, but also the interests, values and goals they are trying to promote. This plurality is exacerbated by the multiple identities and functions assumed by any one actor in a process, for example, a state may be a donor agency, a funding agency to NGOs, and a diplomatic personality through the UN. These diverse actors operate by setting up local offices, work according to their own operational procedures including processes for budgeting, accounting, recruiting and

⁸Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, "Obstacles to Peacebuilding," *Foreign Policy*, No. 94, Spring 1994, p. 70.

evaluating projects. It has been noted that relief agencies “[spawn] bureaucratic structures, lines of communication and organizational cultures which duplicate development institutions and sometimes cut across them.”⁹ The relationship and interaction amongst these actors is as important a factor as the actors themselves. Relations amongst external actors often reflect a combination of competition and coordination, both personal and institutional. Given that a combination of actors are typically engaged in a variety of capacities at different times, there are often overlapping and unclear mandates, conflicts between coordinating and executing agencies, and other tensions amongst the array of actors. Although all claim the need for greater coordination and integration, few in fact want to be coordinated because of contrasting operating styles and the need to compete for funding, media and public attention.

THE ACTIVITIES¹⁰

Drawing from the experience in Mozambique and the limited research on this subject, there appears to be a standard package of activities deployed in process to process. Analysis of these activities has mainly taken place in evaluations of assistance programmes, compilations of lessons learned, and lists of recommendations and guidelines for best practices produced by the external interveners themselves. Although there is no apparent

⁹Margaret Buchanan-Smith and Simon Maxwell, “Linking Relief and Development: An Introduction and Overview,” in *IDS Bulletin*, 25 (4), 1994, p. 2.

¹⁰This survey is based on United Nations Task Force, *Inventory on Post-Conflict Peace-building Activities*, New York, NY: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, 1996; Ball, *Making Peace Work*; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, New York, NY: Department of Public Information, 1992; Krishna Kumar, (ed.) *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997; OECD, *DAC Guidelines on Conflict*; Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner, Ingo Wiederhofer, *Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda*, Discussion Paper No. 331, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996, p. xiii, and *The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996; J. David Whaley and Barbara Piazza-Georgi, “The Linkage Between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding,” in Mark Malan, (ed.) *Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Lessons for Africa from a Seminar Past*, ISS Monograph Series, No. 10, p. 74.

consensus on how to categorise them, for analytical purposes it will serve here to distinguish three main spheres of activities. These are (1) military/security, (2) humanitarian/social and (3) political/electoral. This section briefly outlines each of these dimensions and discusses the relationship amongst them as part of the framework for the following discussion of the peace process in Mozambique.

The military/security dimension is concerned with removing the threat of and recourse to violence. There are two main priorities: upholding cease-fire arrangements to ensure that fighting has stopped and preventing the resumption of fighting. The first involves monitoring cease-fires, reporting violations, and ensuring compliance to provisions on the movement and activities of troops. The second includes a range of activities from removing foreign forces, assembling and demobilising combatants, disarming and destroying weaponry, monitoring security and police forces to restructuring national armed forces and integrating former combatants as in Mozambique. Meeting the needs of child, disabled or women soldiers, and reintegrating ex-combatants back into society follows on from demobilisation, but can also be a part of the humanitarian sphere. It is intended that through the security provisions, confidence and trust is built into the process to reinforce and consolidate peace. Reducing the threat of violence is a precondition for the social and political components by restoring a degree of security for people to return, resume their way of life and rebuild social and political institutions, but it also depends on progress in other spheres to build confidence.

The second dimension, the humanitarian/social category, focuses on emergency needs and on the long-term development needs of society. International actors are heavily involved in providing emergency relief such as delivering food aid and medical care. They are also involved in rebuilding society, by relocating and reintegrating dislocated segments of the population found either within the country or in neighbouring countries. This might involve repatriating refugees, reuniting families, assisting women and children and healing society through reconciliation and rebuilding trust. It frequently includes the removal of land mines and overlaps with the first dimension by dealing with the reintegration of former combatants and meeting the needs of vulnerable groups such as children and the disabled.

It often involves the rehabilitation of basic services, from health and sanitation, schools, water sources, roads, houses, to economic production and distribution. It could also include reforms in the social sector to improve the design and delivery of basic services. In Mozambique, very few activities within the humanitarian/social sphere were not undertaken by different international agencies.

The political/electoral component of a peace process also comprises many things: the political management of the process; reconciliation between the parties; institution building, and an electoral process leading to multi-party elections. International actors often supervise, monitor and organise peace processes. They may also assist in the reunification of territorial administration, create truth commissions, encourage and pressure democratic processes and greater press freedom. Rebuilding political institutions might involve providing assistance on writing or rewriting constitutions, monitoring human rights, creating war crimes tribunals, reviving justice systems and regulating or training civilian police. The electoral process involves external actors in everything from building political parties, rewriting the electoral law, promoting civic education, and holding elections. As in Mozambique, multi-party elections are often the culmination of a peace process which require the completion of military and humanitarian dimensions before proceeding, otherwise the possibility of violence may disrupt or challenge the political outcome.

These three sets of activities are outlined in peace settlements, peacekeeping mandates and operational mandates of different external actors subsequent to an agreement which may result in overlap, duplication and confusion. Although each dimension is a distinct sphere of activity, no activity can be seen in isolation from the others, both temporally and substantially. Delays in the process of demobilisation affect the confidence, timing and outcome of the entire process, while elections before complete demobilisation may lead to renewed violence. Similarly rebuilding political institutions and starting up development activities makes little sense unless acknowledging financial constraints. Sometimes elections overshadow other aspects of a peace process, to the detriment of securing complete demobilisation and disarmament. The long-term objective of development overlaps with and overshadows the whole process and thus the duration of these activities

may extend beyond the official process itself. These activities will be further elaborated in the chapters on Mozambique detailing these spheres of activities.

Underlining all three kinds of activities is an economic and financial dimension. Economic and financial considerations are not ignored, but the overall economic implications of and for a peace process are rarely made explicit. This economic factor takes two forms: the need to finance the various components of the peace process, and the more structural need to provide for long term development to sustain peace. These economic conditions and the access to financial resources often determine the success of the transition from war to peace because of the obvious constraints it places on political action. But as economic considerations are important throughout the entire transition from war to peace, it constitutes an underlying context or condition rather than a discreet kind of activity. Presently, financial commitments from donor agencies and international financial institutions remain ad-hoc and short term which reflect donor preferences to maintain flexibility and sometimes their reluctance to carry the financial burden.

It is not clear from this outline of activities, what the priorities are, the balance amongst the three categories, or how to deal with contradictions between them. These dilemmas are a product of the nature of the industry which has little regulation or direction, yet is engaged in all manner of activity, reaching all aspects of society. According to an UNRISD study,

[c]onfusion exists as to the relative policy mix with which the international community should intervene in post-conflict situations: how to integrate into one coherent approach different tools and forms of action (humanitarian, developmental, political, military) so that they reinforce each other rather than operate independently or against each other, and how to simultaneously pursue relief, development, political and security objectives within one coherent and efficient policy approach.¹¹

Often this is determined less by the needs of the recipients and more by practical considerations for the international actors that some activities are easier to fund than others. For example, integrating national armies is considered to be an important part of the process, but donors maybe unable to provide financing because of legal restrictions on

¹¹*Problems of International Assistance in Post-Conflict Situations* cited in Whaley and Piazza-Georgi, “The Linkage Between,” p. 72.

supporting foreign armies.¹² Similarly, support for the reform of the internal security sector is “outside the mandate of practically all NGOs, most IGOs, and most relief agencies. In fact, many bilateral agencies are prohibited by law from giving assistance to police.”¹³ At present, international actors engage in most kinds of activities according to the perceived demands of a peace process at the time. However, focussing on the activities of the peace process industry keeps the focus on international agencies and not the recipients of their assistance and whether the outcomes from this assistance meet the needs of those receiving it. This preoccupation and lack of attention respectively is based on understandings of the role of the peace process industry in the process.

THE ROLES¹⁴

Through these activities, international actors perform different roles in relation to the protagonists of a peace process. It is frequently argued that the presence of international actors facilitates the compliance of belligerents to an agreement and increases the chances for a successful peace process by offering encouragement and support, demonstrating concern and commitment, providing a catalyst for the process and helping to sustain its momentum. This section highlights some of the different roles they assume.

The most basic role is to monitor the implementation of an agreement or the progress of a peace process by verifying whether each party has fulfilled its commitment to the provisions in an agreement. External parties also ensure that the parties refrain from violating the terms and spirit of an agreement and give explanations for non-compliance.

¹²In Mozambique USAID was unable to provide financial assistance to the assembly areas because some combatants would join the new army. This problem was resolved by limiting assistance to the percentage of soldiers expected to demobilise. See Kimberly Mahling Clark, “The Demobilization and Reintegration of Soldiers: Perspectives from USAID,” *Africa Today*, 1st and 2nd Quarters, 1995, pp. 50-51.

¹³Kumar, *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War*, p. 13.

¹⁴An outline of third party roles can be found in Christopher Mitchell, “The processes and stages of mediation: Two Sudanese Cases,” in David R. Smock, (ed.) *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1993, pp. 139-159.

This function serves to reassure each party that other parties are meeting their obligations, thereby minimising the costs of participation. A monitoring function is seen as an important but passive role. In Angola, many observers blamed the collapse of the Bicesse process to a weak and limited monitoring role for the UN. A slightly more active role is to supervise the process. This can mean a number of things. In Cambodia, “the UN effort was defined in the peace agreement as strictly supervisory; the combatants themselves were responsible for confining and disarming their troops. Although the demobilisation failed, the UN was able to carry out an election.”¹⁵ But Cambodia also demonstrated the extent of supervisory powers as UNTAC exercised control over all aspects of the process including civil administration, military functions, elections and human rights.¹⁶ The UN operation in Mozambique attempted to bridge the roles of monitoring and supervising the process by chairing the working body created in the peace agreement to manage the process.

In performing any of these functions, such actors legitimate the process and help adversaries accept the process and outcome “by adding prestige to the procedure, ...lend[ing] their symbolic weight and prestige to endorse and legitimize the agreement, making its acceptance by constituencies more likely and enhancing its stability and probable longevity.”¹⁷ By providing resources and incentives in the settlement package to induce the parties to follow the process through, external third parties can be seen as patrons of the process or as Stedman suggests “custodians of peace.”¹⁸ They sometimes offer guarantees on the process, providing insurance against possible breakdowns of the process “by lowering the risks to the warring parties of entering and remaining in the peace

¹⁵Stephen John Stedman, “UN Intervention in Civil Wars: Imperatives of Choice and Strategy,” in Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, (eds.) *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, London: Macmillan Press, 1993, p. 43.

¹⁶Carlyle A. Thayer, “The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia: The Restoration of Sovereignty,” in Tom Woodhouse, Robert Bruce and Malcolm Dando, (eds.) *Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards Effective Intervention in Post-Cold War Conflicts*, London: Macmillan Press, 1998, p. 151.

¹⁷Mitchell, “The Processes and Stages,” p. 145.

¹⁸Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security*, 22(2), Fall 1997, p. 6.

process.”¹⁹ Outside parties can also take a more forceful role by enforcing the terms of the agreement should the antagonists fail to meet their obligations. As enforcers, they police behaviour by adversaries and impose sanctions for non-performance or non-compliance of agreed terms of the settlement.²⁰

International actors also take on more overtly political roles by facilitating dialogue, convening discussions, chairing talks, interpreting statements, communicating positions, providing ideas and solutions, exploring compromises etc. Quite often external actors are called on to referee disagreements, assist in long term reconciliation, help to build new relationships, bridge distrust and reduce suspicion. They also provide technical assistance in institution building, holding elections, campaigning, and writing constitutions. External actors may even assist weaker parties or insurgents in developing the political skills and organisational capacity necessary to fulfil their obligations in the agreement. In Mozambique, for example, the UN set up a controversial trust fund to finance Renamo’s transformation into a political party.

These multi-faceted and multi-functional roles are usually combined and assumed by various actors. The assignment of roles to different parties can result from requests by the combatants, be found in the terms of a peace settlement or be outlined in mandates for peacekeeping operations. Others arise from the dynamics of the process and the demands that may arise such as overcoming deadlocks and maintaining momentum. The nature of these roles and the combination of actors involved depend on the nature of the objectives guiding actors in the peace process industry which is the subject of the next section.

¹⁹Gerardo L. Munck and Chetan Kumar, “Civil conflicts and the conditions for successful intervention: a comparative study of Cambodia and El Salvador,”*Review of International Studies*, 21(2), p. 160.

²⁰Mitchell, “The Processes and Stages,” p. 147.

The objectives of a post-conflict peace process

The first section provided a lengthy description of the actors, activities and roles of the peace process industry in any given process. What has not been made clear yet is what are the objectives of the international community in a post-conflict peace process? There are three difficulties in answering this question. First, it is difficult to speak of collective objectives of the peace process industry as a whole, as the industry is unregulated and disaggregated. Contradictions and tensions amongst different actors are built into the industry. Second, the actors in the industry are also not clear in what they seek to achieve. Third, it is difficult to synthesise the vast array of activities and claim that they cohere into one kind of approach or another. Nevertheless, within the emerging literature on peace processes, three constructs or blueprints are shaping the discourse on post-conflict assistance. These three blueprints are (1) implementing a peace agreement, (2) peace-building, and (3) post-conflict reconstruction or rebuilding war-torn societies. This section attempts to identify the objectives defining each approach, how each approach corresponds to the peace process, and the connections and overlaps between them.

IMPLEMENTING A PEACE AGREEMENT

In recent peace processes, external third parties have assisted a number of countries implement their peace agreements. Although ‘implementing a peace agreement’ is the least clear construct since it refers to an activity moreso than an objective, it is most closely associated with the peace process. A post-conflict peace process begins with the signing of an agreement and ends when the conditions in the agreement have been met, often taking no more than one to a few years. Thus on one level, a peace process is defined by, limited to, and structured by an agreement and how it is to be implemented. On another level, the actual progress of a peace process is shaped by the dynamics of the process and international actors frequently become involved in ways unforeseen by an agreement. Although a few people have written on the role of the international community in making peace settlements work, the ideas generated thus far are derived mostly from the practice of implementing agreements in specific cases. This section attempts to generalise the

features, objectives and boundaries of implementing a peace agreement by discussing the nature of agreements and the process of implementing them.

Although there is a broad range of peace agreements, the focus of this thesis is on complex and comprehensive settlements that encompass a wide range of objectives, activities, procedures and structures to 'end' conflicts, not just the fighting. It is only with this kind of ambitious agreement that it is possible to speak of a post-conflict phase, suggesting that violent conflict has effectively stopped. Comprehensive agreements contain objectives relating to the three main dimensions of security, humanitarian and political activities. They detail provisions securing the end of conflict, through the demobilisation of armies, the reintegration of ex-soldiers, and the creation of impartial security structures. They may also include objectives relating to refugees, land reform, and economic development. Most agreements outline explicit political goals, from setting up truth commissions to creating new forms of government. Various agreements in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, included all of the above, along with the objective of holding multi-party elections.

Peace settlements also outline mechanisms for carrying out these objectives and sometimes contain transitional institutional frameworks detailing the management of the process. They detail how objectives in the agreement are to be realised and provide benchmarks on whether parties have met their obligations. In so doing, agreements specify the parties in the process, and confer on them specific responsibilities, obligations and concessions to facilitate their compliance. Good agreements also establish norms and values for the parties to live up to. Agreements set deadlines, give order to activities, and link success in one area to the start of another. It is in the technical detail, the modalities of an agreement, that the role of the peace process industry is introduced. In addition to the roles they undertake, international actors provide technical assistance by helping parties to implement their agreements. International actors also provide financial assistance, even though agreements rarely clarify the financial details of the process or long term economic need.

The process of implementing an agreement revolves around two things, the agreement and

the dynamics of the process. No matter how comprehensive the negotiations, no agreement can anticipate all the issues preoccupying the antagonists. It is during implementation that there is a fuller appreciation of the interests, goals and strategies by the parties, as they realise what has been lost and gained at the table and the implications of their commitments. Every agreement also contains elements which prove to be unrealistic. What might appear good on paper becomes complicated or inconvenient in reality. Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms may be inadequate or unsuited to the conditions on the ground. An ambitious framework within which the conflicting parties attempt to reconstruct society and address the underlying causes of conflict may overwhelm the capacities of the parties and institutions. During negotiations, the pressure to reach consensus can force compromises in order to overcome deadlocks in discussion, or it may dictate that certain issues be overlooked. Peace agreements “include what they can get and omit what they can’t. This is sensible as far as negotiation goes, but often results in a blueprint containing gaps and distortions which come back to haunt the implementors.”²¹ Depending on the inclusiveness of the process, settlements may also exclude extremist factions, who threaten to disrupt the agreement during implementation.

These kinds of dilemmas were evident in Mozambique, Angola and El Salvador. The Mozambican agreement contained an ambitious timetable which required the completion of demobilisation, repatriation and elections within 12 months in conditions of near complete destruction. In the case of Angola, one US adviser to the 1990-91 peace talks,

admitted that the demobilization and integration of armies was an afterthought to the successful negotiations of the Bicesse accords. Unwilling to risk the progress made on other issues in the peace settlement and eager to generate momentum for peace, the mediators fudged the details of how demobilization and reintegration would take place.²²

The consequence was a return to civil war. In another example, in El Salvador, the ‘arms

²¹ Jonathan Moore, *The UN and Complex Emergencies: Rehabilitation in Third World Transitions*, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1996, p. 4.

²² Stephen John Stedman and Donald Rothchild, “Peace Operations: From Short-Term to Long-Term Commitment,” *International Peacekeeping*, 3(2), Summer 1996, p. 25.

for land deal' was intended to demobilise and reintegrate former combatants into society through the transfer of land. Although not seeking to institute land reform, it was suspended because it effectively required changes to deep-rooted economic and cultural traditions.

The implementation of agreements also depends on the dynamics of the process which alters expectations, perceptions and behaviour of the protagonists. "However deep the desire for peace, practical commitment to it depends on the belief that political goals can be realized through peaceful means."²³ The implementation of a peace settlement tests this commitment and political will. Deadlocks, setbacks, and unforeseen disagreements during the process of implementation create new challenges and require timely interventions and assistance from the peace process industry to facilitate the ongoing compliance of the parties to their obligations in the agreement.

Thus it seems that the objectives of the international community are found within the agreement and the dynamics of the process. However, the objectives of the peace process industry are not only derived from an agreement apparently created by the protagonists. The peace process industry also helps to formulate those objectives by assisting in the design of the agreement during negotiation. Subsequently during implementation, in devising their own mandates and operational programmes, they reinterpret the agreement and may incorporate their own interests and agendas. In every reinterpretation, the role of international actors can be redefined and redefined in ways not always consistent with the agreement or what the host parties envisaged. In other words, there are frequent openings for international actors to inject their own ideas and objectives into the process which complicates implementation. International actors can also complicate the dynamics of the process and the timing of implementation by delaying deployment, concluding the process or withdrawing even if it is incomplete, or emphasising some components over others.

Focussing on the implementation of an agreement connects the peace process to a specific settlement and its implementation. Implementing a peace agreement is about getting to the

²³*The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995.* New York, NY: Department of Public Information, 1995, Introduction, p.68.

end of the process by fulfilling the terms of the agreement. This suggests that implementing a peace agreement is a technical rather than a political process which focusses on the concrete modalities of implementation in the short term. The problem with favouring the short term demands of an immediate transition is that it neglects longer term structures and processes needed to consolidate peace. Some scholars query whether the implementation of an agreement is the end of a peace process and argue that the peace process should be extended beyond the limits set out in an agreement. Given the breadth and scope of the activities involved, the objectives of the peace process encompass more than just technical implementation, they also imply ambitions of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.

THE IDEA OF PEACE-BUILDING

The problem of setting limits for the implementation phase suggests that this construct may not encompass all the objectives of the post-conflict phase. An alternative approach is the idea of post-conflict peace-building which aims to remove the root causes of conflict and create structures that will consolidate peace. The concept of post-conflict peace-building emerged in reference to United Nations activities, and follows the sequential activities of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. As articulated by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace*, post-conflict peace-building refers to “action[s] to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”²⁴ He adds its goal is “the construction of a new environment... [where] sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation.”²⁵ However, peace-building is no longer the preserve of the UN, it is a general objective aiming to sustain and consolidate peace which does not have to take place through a peace agreement. Peace-building can begin in pre-conflict situations, or before an agreement has been signed to add pressure to negotiations. In other words, peace-building does not necessarily result from a violent conflict or a peace process.

²⁴Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, p. 32.

²⁵Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*. p. 33.

Although the concept of peace-building implies a more abstract and ambitious approach based on the notion of peace, thus far, there do not appear to be many serious attempts to define peace itself. With the exception of a few peace scholars who define peace-building in relation to a process of social change and justice,²⁶ most practitioners implementing the idea of peace-building focus on activities which are assumed will *produce* peace. The most illustrative example of this is a UN interdepartmental Task Force, assigned with the task of identifying the tools for post-conflict peace-building. This Task Force produced a comprehensive list of activities in *An Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities*.²⁷ These were broadly divided into relief and humanitarian assistance; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; enhancement of human rights and building a participatory system of government; and rehabilitation, reconstruction and reconciliation. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has since defined peace-building as “the creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed development.”²⁸ Both the Task Force and the Secretary-General left open the strategy for how these activities were to be accomplished and the delegation of responsibility amongst actors and agencies.²⁹

However, this focus on activities, which again appears to be technical in orientation, leads to practical and conceptual overlaps with peacekeeping. Multi-functional, second-generation UN peacekeeping operations now include tasks relating to electoral support, humanitarian assistance in the return of refugees and displaced persons and disaster-relief

²⁶Ronald J. Fisher, “The Potential for Peacebuilding: Forging a Bridge from Peacekeeping to Peacemaking,” *Peace and Change*, 18(3), July 1993, p. 250.

²⁷UN Task Force, *An Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities*.

²⁸Kofi Annan, *The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa*, Report of the UN Secretary General, New York, April 1998, Paragraph 63.

²⁹Hence the criticism that “UN intervention in civil wars since 1989 has been dictated by humanitarian concerns, good intentions and assumptions of reasonableness on the part of warring factions. Absent has been a coherent strategy or understanding of peacemaking or peacebuilding in civil war.” Stedman, “UN Intervention in Civil Wars,” p. 50.

operations, mine clearance, observation and verification of cease-fires, separation of forces, their demobilisation and the collection, storage and destruction of weaponry.³⁰ There are clear parallels and overlaps between the functions of UN peacekeepers and the activities of peace-building which has generated tensions between military and development personnel. These definitions also bear a striking resemblance to the implementation phase. It could be argued that the implementation phase is a stage that precedes the more advanced idea of peace-building,³¹ but the objectives of consolidating peace and preventing the relapse into conflict are very much the goals of the implementation phase.

The increasing overlap of these concepts draws attention to the fact that the definition of peace-building is remarkably vague and expansive. There are no clear parameters to the concept to enable assessment of whether peace-building is successful or not. Cox observed of *An Agenda for Peace* that,

The section on peace-building... moves beyond immediate remedial measures to longer-term programmes when it discusses the need for agricultural, transportation and resource co-operation amongst states as a means of ensuring that the future likelihood of conflict is reduced.³²

This confidence in economic and social development as the foundation for durable peace is based on an assumption that the root causes of conflict lie in the problems of underdevelopment and poverty which is not explained. On this assumption, it is argued that “without a greater emphasis on developmental practice and some of the philosophical precepts that underpin development, the UN is unlikely to arrive at a sophisticated, workable understanding of what it takes to reconstitute war-torn societies.”³³ If peace-building is in effect development, then peace-building is an indefinite process with no clear beginning or ending, or a distinguishable mandate.

³⁰Mats Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?* Adelphi Paper 281, London: Brasseyes for International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993, p. 12.

³¹Nicole Ball takes this approach by dividing peace-building into transition and consolidation phases. See *Making Peace Work*.

³²David Cox, *Exploring An Agenda for Peace: Issues Arising from the Report of the Secretary-General.* Aurora Paper #20, Ottawa: Global Security Programme, 1993, p. 8.

³³Jeremy Ginifer, “Development and the UN Peace Mission: A New Interface Required?” *International Peacekeeping*, 3(2), Summer 1996, pp. 11-12.

Cox also observed that *Agenda for Peace* simultaneously argues that, “[t]here is an obvious connection between democratic practices -such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making - and the achievement of true peace and security in any new stable political order.”³⁴ Peace is also liberal-democracy. Peace-building as democratisation appears to promote the values of liberal internationalism as the basis for peace. It is

in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering - an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalization.³⁵

Again, there are no clear markers clarifying when a democratic transition has been effected or why democracy sustains peace. Instituting democratic principles and multi-party elections may in fact destabilise peace and reconciliation because liberal-democracy revolves around contest and competition. Democratisation and development together suggests that “peace-building efforts are nothing short of attempts at nation-building; they seek to remake a state’s political institutions, security forces, and economic arrangements.”³⁶ Nevertheless, these implicit definitions of peace as development and/or liberal-democracy have not been fully articulated or openly acknowledged. It is still unclear what the mandate for peace-building entails or why these particular political values ascribed to peace in fact produce peace.

REBUILDING WAR-TORN SOCIETIES AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

The third construct to understanding the objectives of a post-conflict transition process also overlaps with development by centring on the societies which are recovering from prolonged war. Many recent civil conflicts have taken place in poorer, underdeveloped nations. In addition to a post-conflict peace process, war-torn societies share many of the same challenges of development and reform processes with peaceful societies. War-torn

³⁴Cox, *Exploring An Agenda for Peace*, p. 8.

³⁵Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” *International Security*, 22(2), Fall 1997, p. 56.

³⁶Eva Bertram, “Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United Nations Peace Building,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39(3), September 1995, p. 389.

societies are nevertheless distinguished by

[t]he magnitude of the damage to infrastructure, depletion of human resources, militarization of society, low regime legitimacy, societal disruption, and institutional weakness [which places them] on a different plane from societies undergoing relatively peaceful transformation.³⁷

In order to resume the normal challenges of development, there must be a transitional process of reconstructing, rebuilding or rehabilitating society. Although this process is more than a return to pre-conflict conditions, the underlying premise is one of transforming the physical conditions and structures of society.

The objectives of rebuilding war-torn societies concentrate on reversing the damage effected by war and reconstructing society. War-torn societies are distinguished by the destruction caused by war, in physical, human, economic, and political terms. In physical terms, transportation links such as roads, railways, and ports; power stations; buildings and homes; hospitals, schools and other institutions have been damaged or destroyed. Access to much of the country and people is usually restricted and remains treacherous in light of the indiscriminate scattering of land mines. Agricultural, resource and industrial production has declined or been destroyed, thereby weakening the economic capacity of the country to sustain itself and finance aspects of the settlement. Consequently, a country's financial resources are often depleted, leading to unsustainable foreign debts. The legacy of physical and economic destruction is exacerbated by the human cost of war, the overall loss of lives and the weariness, disaffection and psychological scars of those who survived. Moreover, the skills needed most to rebuild society have often been lost because the “[i]ndividuals with professional training such as doctors, lawyers, teachers and government officials are often targeted during civil wars.”³⁸ War-torn societies are also characterised by the erosion of authority structures, weak political institutions, and competing political organisations. The proliferation of the means to violence adds to general insecurity caused by a partially or wholly absent framework for governance, weak justice system and lack of civil and political order.

³⁷Ball, *Making Peace Work*, p. 18.

³⁸Ball, *Making Peace Work*, p. 22.

The comprehensive and exhaustive list of challenges included in post-conflict reconstruction reflects the broad and ambitious framework of thinking behind it. The World Bank has been developing a framework for post-conflict reconstruction that focuses on “the rebuilding of the socio-economic framework of the society..., the reconstruction of the *enabling conditions* for a functioning peacetime society.”³⁹ Kumar’s definition of rehabilitation of war-torn societies

involves redefining and reorienting relationships between political authority and the citizenry, revisiting relationships between different ethnic and social groups, creating a civil society in its broadest sense, promoting psycho-social healing and reconciliation, and reforming economic policies and institutions that foster entrepreneurship and individual initiative.⁴⁰

Kumar argues political rehabilitation is the most critical element in rebuilding war-torn societies, but although “the need for political rebuilding is widely recognized, the international community lacks a well-defined framework for political reform and reconstruction that can inform its interventions.”⁴¹ These broad political objectives lack substance without further articulation of how the different dimensions of rehabilitation cohere together into peace. The World Bank’s overall objectives “to facilitate the transition to sustainable peace after hostilities have ceased and to support economic and social development,”⁴² is applicable to everything and consequently means nothing.

Although this approach is concerned with identifying the needs of war-torn societies, it originates with external agencies seeking a framework for how they provide assistance.⁴³ Post-conflict reconstruction focuses on activities and programmes designed by external third party actors. The reason for this lies in the origins of post-conflict reconstruction: the

³⁹The World Bank, *A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1997, p. iii.

⁴⁰Kumar, *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War*, p. 2.

⁴¹Kumar, *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War*, p. 4.

⁴²The World Bank, *A Framework for World Bank Involvement*, p. iii.

⁴³Kumar’s book, *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War*, focuses on the “challenges for the international community” and the “lessons learned for strategies for effective international involvement.”

Marshall Plan for post-war reconstruction in Europe and Japan after World War Two; and emergency assistance in response to natural disasters in poorer countries. Emergency relief has expanded to include complex emergencies resulting from the combined impact of disasters, war, and famine. The increase in emergency assistance has drained resources from development assistance, leading practitioners to draw links between relief and development.⁴⁴ The discourse on rehabilitating war-torn societies corresponds to the idea that there is a continuum from relief to development. It is an attempt by donor agencies to account for activities that qualify as neither strict emergency nor development assistance, but include elements of both and reaffirms the importance of development.

Focussing on war-torn societies also includes post-conflict situations without peace settlements through military victory of one side, as in the case of Uganda or Ethiopia. As a result, rehabilitating war torn societies is identified least with a peace process because it assumes that conflict has ended and there is a measure of security to begin reconstruction. But it is not clear when post-conflict reconstruction begins and when it can be assumed war has ended. As seen in Mozambique, many rehabilitation activities began before there was effective demobilisation of soldiers and disarmament during the implementation of the peace agreement. Rebuilding war-torn societies overlaps with both peace-building and the implementation of an agreement through the idea that peace is built through the rehabilitation of material conditions and services. Although there is a fuller appreciation of political outcomes found within this construct, there is not yet enough appreciation of the political implications of what they are trying to achieve. Moreover, post-conflict reconstruction focuses mainly on what has been destroyed, it does not account for what has been created, that is the changes to society wrought by war including new winners and losers in society.

All three blueprints outline broad areas of activities which are presumed will lead to peace and are based on practical experiences in conflict-afflicted countries. International assistance in a peace process will combine elements of all three. Although the terms of

⁴⁴See *IDS Bulletin*, Issue on Linking Relief and Development, 25(4), 1994.

discourse and the emphasis differ, these constructs are often used interchangeably.⁴⁵ Other times they represent distinct stages in an overall process, where the transition from war to peace begins with the implementation of a peace agreement, incorporates the objectives of peace-building, and is superceded by the rehabilitation of society. What these definitional and conceptual problems demonstrate is that an effective and coherent strategy for undertaking these activities is still absent. Consequently, there is a danger that in the absence of a coherent strategy, external actors are tempted to do everything simultaneously.

Anthony Lake has warned that

it is vital that careful attention be paid to priorities in reconstruction planning - that in every case there be a clear strategy rather than merely a summons to every possible task. As a number of private commissions and study groups have shown, when the needs are so great it is tempting to call for a massive effort to resolve all the problems at once. But an effort to do everything quickly will inevitably lead to waste, confusion and disillusion.⁴⁶

This scenario occurred in Mozambique where the whole range of actors in the peace process industry engaged in numerous activities with little cross-sector or long term integration which left a legacy of incomplete and unsustainable projects across the country.

To attempt to take on every task effectively leads to taking over the administration of another society. Assuming such vast powers within another society often leads to unforeseen problems, but to attempt to do so haphazardly is potentially more threatening to peace. A framework that concentrates only on activities and objectives is incomplete if it does not account for outcomes. After discussing the peace process industry, then its objectives, the final section considers the outcomes of a peace process and the role of the peace process industry in shaping these outcomes.

⁴⁵These three concepts were used interchangeably in Mozambique, while the process was structured along sectoral activities. Thus the following chapters on the peace process in Mozambique are structured along the three dimensions of activities rather than any of these blueprints.

⁴⁶Anthony Lake, "After the Wars - What kind of peace?", in Anthony Lake, (ed.) *After the Wars: Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Indochina, Central America, Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa*, Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 1990, p. 16.

Problematising the outcomes from a peace process: bringing back the political

The poorly articulated objectives and inadequate strategic framework for realising them put forward by the peace process industry are carried through to understandings of the outcomes from a peace process. It often appears that the peace process has one outcome: success or failure. This success or failure is defined by the peace process industry mostly in terms of their own participation. It is based on a preoccupation with themselves which supports King's idea of narcissistic intervention. This section seeks to problematise this current framework of how to evaluate the outcomes from a peace process and seeks to proffer a more complete framework.

Many writers see the role of external third parties as pivotal to the success of a peace process. Hampson and Crocker argue that third parties "have a critical role to play in nurturing peace," because very often "[w]ithout outsiders to sustain the settlement through several years of implementation, the underlying agreements would have collapsed."⁴⁷ The outcome from a peace process depends on the performance of external actors. Hampson argues that "it takes strong support and unified political direction from outside actors to help the parties realize their desire for peace."⁴⁸ Although Hampson offers a definition of success as "directly related to a society's ability to make an effective transition from a state of war to a state of peace marked by the restoration of civil order, the re-emergence of civil society, and the establishment of participatory political institutions,"⁴⁹ his work focuses almost exclusively on the argument that "success and failure are indeed linked to the quality and level of support given by third parties to the peace process, especially during the implementation of an agreement."⁵⁰ He does not make clear how the latter contributes to securing the former. The implication of his argument, is that if a peace process is neglected by international actors, it is more prone to collapse and failure. Hampson argues that

⁴⁷Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, "Making Peace Settlements Work," *Foreign Policy*, No. 104, Fall 1996, p. 55, 57.

⁴⁸Fen Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail?* Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996, p. 206.

⁴⁹Hampson, *Nurturing Peace*, p. 10.

⁵⁰Hampson, *Nurturing Peace*, p. 210.

“[s]ettlements that fail have generally been ‘orphaned,’ because third parties either failed to remain fully engaged in implementing the settlement or were unable to muster the requisite level of resources, both economic and political, to build the foundations for a secure settlement.”⁵¹ The committed participation of the peace process industry is instrumental to the success or failure of a peace process.

Stedman is similarly convinced that the responsibility for a successful peace process lies with the international community who serve as ‘custodians of peace’. He counters the adage that solutions to internal conflicts must come from the participants themselves. In this study successful management of internal conflict has resulted from the willingness of external actors to take sides as to which demands and grievances are legitimate and which are not.⁵²

He argues that “where international custodians have created and implemented coherent, effective strategies for protecting peace and managing spoilers, damage has been limited and peace has triumphed.”⁵³ Stedman is an advocate of a strategic approach that maximises the long term commitment by warring parties to agreements through the methods of implementing those agreements.⁵⁴ This means that “the UN must encourage the parties to choose political, cultural, social and economic security-building measures during the negotiation phase and systematically apply confidence-building measures to the military components of implementation.”⁵⁵ A coherent strategy for a successful post-conflict transition requires designing a more appropriate and effective international response that concentrates on the compliance of the parties, particularly parties that could become ‘spoilers’ to the process.

⁵¹Fen Osler Hampson, “Why orphaned peace settlements are more prone to failure,” in Chester Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, (eds.) *Managing Global Chaos: Sources and Responses to International Conflict*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996, p. 533.

⁵²Stedman, “UN Intervention in Civil Wars,” p. 52.

⁵³Stedman, “UN Intervention in Civil Wars,” p. 6.

⁵⁴Stephen John Stedman and Donald Rothchild, “Peace Operations: From Short-Term to Long-Term Commitment,” *International Peacekeeping*, 3(2), Summer 1996, p. 18.

⁵⁵Stedman and Rothchild, “Peace Operations,” p. 17.

In comparing El Salvador and Cambodia, Munck and Kumar share with the others a focus on the interactions between the parties and international third party actors, but give a stronger emphasis to the cooperation of the conflicting parties as the foundation for success. They argue that four variables account for the outcome of the implementation phase: “the number, inclusiveness and cohesion of the parties to the peace accords; the number and interests of external parties; the transitional institutional framework; and the peace signatories’ perceptions of their electoral chances.”⁵⁶ The greater the number of internal and external parties, the more interests there are to appease, the more difficult to coordinate, and hence the more difficult implementation is likely to be. They emphasise that successful implementation is more likely

when institutional mechanisms are provided for regular contact between signatories to the peace accords. This allows for the containment and gradual overcoming of the natural distrust among parties, reinforcing the guarantees that no party will be worse off provided by international intervention. Both points are crucial, then, inasmuch as they determine the ability for mid-course corrections, which can help resolve unforeseeable problems in a way that prevents the derailing of the entire peace process.⁵⁷

The parties must also perceive their chances of electoral success to be uncertain so that whoever loses still retains status in the new system. This uncertainty ensures their continued participation in the process of implementation.

These examples share three features which seem to prevail across the broad spectrum of actors engaged in peace processes. First, none of the examples seem to question what the outcome(s) of a peace process is or ought to be. Although the objectives of external third parties are intended to lead to peace, a definition of peace is often absent or simplistic and seems to refer to the successful conclusion of a peace process. Even where definitions of peace are offered, the institutions and mechanisms for realising peace are not explained. In the transition from war to peace, it is doubtful that there is either success or failure, there is only the degree and quality of peace and the relative absence of violence and its means. The content of peace may also differ between external actors and those who are supposed

⁵⁶Munck and Kumar, “Civil conflicts,” p. 160.

⁵⁷Munck and Kumar, “Civil conflicts,” p. 164.

to benefit from international intervention, as well as the mechanisms for achieving it. It is not enough and it is also inaccurate to suggest that external actors sustain the interests of the peace process as neutral ‘custodians of peace’. Peace is not an abstract and neutral condition, it is a ongoing process connected to power and politics. The outcome from a peace process is less about the successful conclusion of the process than the political legacies from the process, both short and long term.

Second, these three examples seem to presume that the right plan leads to the right outcome pointing to a linear relationship between cause and effect. They suggest that the process in fact produces *an* outcome which is either successful or not. Assessing the impact of external actors in post-conflict transitions frequently involves studying the activities they undertake and whether these have been successfully carried through. However, little consideration is given to how the combination of actors and activities secure an outcome called peace. A peace process produces a constellation of outcomes, some more visible than others and some which strengthen peace more than others. Insufficient attention is paid to the multiple and partial outcomes of a process which result from the collective impact of all actors. Moreover, the outcomes of a process pertain not only to a condition that is produced, but in the experience of the process, particularly the experience of resolving disagreements.

Third, although there is mention of larger political and historical processes, the operationalisation of the concept of politics by the peace process industry seems at times limited and confined to the parties in the peace process, and at other times vast and ambitious, yet hollow. Hampson claims the focus for third parties is “the commitment and cooperation of the disputing parties in the overall peacemaking and peace-building process.”⁵⁸ Stedman’s ‘spoilers’ in a peace process refer to the parties involved. Kumar and Munck discuss the composition of the parties and their relationship to external third parties. Thus the peace process in Mozambique refers to the Frelimo government and Renamo, in Angola, the government and UNITA, in El Salvador, the FMLN and the government. It would seem the official peace process is restricted to the politics between warring parties,

⁵⁸Hampson, “Why orphaned peace settlements ”p. 534.

while discounting the political, social and historical conditions in which they emerged. By concentrating on the parties, some analysts have turned Clausewitz's dictum on its head, so that the outcome of a peace process is the continuation of war by other means,⁵⁹ which freezes the conflict relationship. At the same time, the peace process industry deploys concepts like democracy, civil society, and justice which seem both wide-ranging and shallow. Notwithstanding the explicit values behind such concepts, these concepts embody different institutions and procedures, the variety, complexity and rationality of which are obfuscated by the single-mindedness of the peace process. The politics of the peace process seems obscured, buried deep within the language of assistance or distilled through unexplained or ill-defined concepts.

This underlies a further assumption that war overrides, reduces or makes impossible all other aspects of social and political life. The discourse on war seems to overshadow or isolate other aspects of governance and the ordinary politics of society from conflict. The normal everyday politics of collecting taxes, passing laws, maintaining hospitals, and the institutions and people that perform or fail to carry out these functions do not figure in the language of the 'peace process'. And yet, in relation to the industry, governments have or set up special counterpart agencies for external actors, different departments liaise with foreign officials, local staff are hired, offices and houses are rented, material and equipment are imported which affects the local market and society; all of which attests to the political and social institutions beyond the parties themselves. Undoubtedly, many of these institutions have been disrupted and weakened through violent conflict, but rarely have they completely and absolutely disappeared. More often they are part of the conflict and need to be reconfigured as part of the peace.

Tensions over the demands of short term versus long term goals, the priorities of the peace process versus a self-sustaining peace, and intended versus actual outcomes arise because of the inherently political nature of the industry. This political quality refers to the political

⁵⁹Nicole Ball used this phrase in a talk given to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996 and Eva Bertram wrote if "war is a continuation of politics by other means, then a negotiated settlement is a continuation of war by political means." Bertram, "Reinventing Governments," p. 394.

attributes of the peace process industry, the political nature of the activities they undertake, and the larger political context in which they operate. Whatever their claims to neutrality, or arguments that they are “devoid of extraneous agendas, political religious or otherwise,”⁶⁰ given their size, financial resources, and logistical capabilities, international actors are powerful actors, especially in extremely poor countries. When external actors are comparable or greater in power, scope, and size to the warring parties, they take on a profoundly powerful and political role. This disparity in power and resources is exacerbated by the aggregate impact of external actors and is manifested through the means and methods that are employed. On one level, political representatives who manage peace processes have at their command budgets sometimes surpassing the GDP of a host country, better armed and equipped military troops, and access to international leaders and financial lenders. On another level, the technical implementation of activities involves a discretionary influence which is rarely transparent or accountable. Such actors do not generally recognise the political nature of their activities because of a widely-shared preoccupation with technical, short-term activities.

These problems are not unique to the peace process but prevail in other forms of international assistance. They parallel problems in the development industry where there are often

overdesigned interventions that lack flexibility, untested intervention models, multiplicity of international actors, poor coordination among donors, bureaucratic red tap, delays in disbursing funds, inappropriate placement of projects, failure to create ownership of programs in implementing agencies, high costs of implementation and limited involvement of beneficiaries in interventions.⁶¹

NGOs have developed a record of interference in African states that has taken decision-making out of the hands of the state. They have “sought to supplement or displace African governments in every field, from famine relief and human rights monitoring to the

⁶⁰Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, *Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, p. 20.

⁶¹Kumar, *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War*, pp. 33-4.

protection of the elephant and the rhinoceros.”⁶² NGOs are reluctant to concede they engage in politics, but “the resources which they distributed, the mechanisms through which these were distributed, necessarily conferred power on some groups and in the process at least relatively disadvantaged others.”⁶³ In Mozambique, expatriate experts have had a profound effect on the running of the country. They have created counterparts in the state, “economists, planners, and public administrators, who will share the assumptions and speak the language of aid agency employees, in order to facilitate the acceptance and implementation of their policy prescriptions.”⁶⁴ In the example of health, officials

spend most of their working hours entertaining visiting delegations, meeting donors, and preparing project documents.... Financial planning is almost impossible, as the MOH [Ministry of Health] does not know the true extent of donor contributions. Most project aid is short-term, preventing long-term planning... Few [donors] are willing to transfer funds and give management responsibility to the MOH... Some donors have chosen to set up parallel offices to run their own projects, as they regard MOH departments as weak and inefficient...There is no skills transfer and the offices close when the project ends.⁶⁵

This compounds what for many developing countries, particularly in Africa, is an established pattern of the externalisation of authority from states to international financial institutions and other creditors.

These problems are compounded during a transition from war to peace. The number of external agencies increase substantially. For example, in Rwanda 150 NGOs arrived after the genocide⁶⁶, while in Mozambique, NGOs increased from 100 to 250 NGOs by the end of the peace process. Notwithstanding the efficiency and effectiveness of services, issues of coordination, competition and fragmentation impact on the local system. International

⁶²Christopher Clapham, “Discerning the New Africa,” *International Affairs*, 74(2), April 1998, pp. 266, 265

⁶³Clapham, “Discerning the New Africa,” p. 260.

⁶⁴David N. Plank, “Aid, Debt and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and Its Donors,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31(3), 1993, p. 426.

⁶⁵Julie Cliff, “Donor-dependence or donor control?: The case of Mozambique,” *Community Development Journal*, 28(3), 1993, p. 239.

⁶⁶Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The politics of state survival*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 259.

agencies channel efforts through different government agencies while the pressure to solve urgent problems leads to the employment of expatriate staff or the few qualified staff from the public sector which causes labour shortages for the government. In Mozambique, by providing security, delivering basic health services and managing the process, external actors assumed functions normally undertaken by the state. The Supervisory and Control Commission chaired by the UN became a powerful executive body running the peace process, responsible for settling all disputes of interpretation of the agreement until the new government took office. This level of intrusiveness eroded public confidence in political institutions and further weakened those institutions. Each of the three spheres of activities in the post-conflict transition offered opportunities for external actors to redefine political norms, institutions and procedures by forming attitudes, behaviour and customs, creating expectations and instilling institutional practices in Mozambican politics which might not have been otherwise.

The plurality and diversity of responsibilities international actors assume in a peace process implies that such actors are not simply instrumental and administrative. In seeking to restore peace to another country they cannot maintain a limited and defined role because they are effectively engaging in a political process to restore order and rebuild society. Comprehensive peace agreements contain a conception of political community and may serve as a constitutional framework structuring political relations for resolving disputes and establishing the rules of the political process. By establishing future rules of conduct and instilling principles, the implementation of a peace accord involves a process of forming and altering political values, practices, and structures. If external actors as mediators “becomes the agent of trust and the assessor of risk,”⁶⁷ then they are not encouraging the practice of politics but engaging in it themselves. The functions of communication, overcoming misperceptions, distrust and suspicion, settling differences and disputes are the very heart of politics. In continuing to mediate between the parties and the society at large, international actors effectively define the shape of politics. International actors may not see

⁶⁷I. William Zartman, “Inter-African Negotiation,” in John Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, (eds.) *Africa in World Politics: Post-Cold War Challenges*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, p. 237.

their actions as governing or administering another country, but in fulfilling the mandate of a peace settlement, they may exercise authority which effectively make them executive and judicial bodies.

Without acknowledging their innately political nature, the peace process industry may do more harm than good by preventing a sustainable peace from taking hold. Most post-conflict situations occur in political space shaped by weak or incomplete states and civil societies. By entering into this kind of political space, international actors have a more pervasive effect because by obscuring the state, already fragile state institutions are easily undermined. External actors do not always act in consultation with the host country, display operational transparency, or prove responsible or accountable to the people of the host society which may be inimical to the goal of supporting a sustainable peace.

Conclusion

Many interventions by international actors seem almost experimental in nature, with war-torn societies the testing ground. However, “[i]t is neither fair nor prudent to leave such dilemmas solely to peace builders on the ground to resolve ad hoc.”⁶⁸ This short term and myopic approach limits the framework to understanding post-conflict assistance to the process alone. It overlooks the outcomes from that assistance, whether those outcomes resemble the intended objectives, and how those objectives were supposed to lead to peace. Successful outcomes seem to happen by accident rather than by design. Without understanding the outcomes, actors in the peace process industry are unable to assess their overall impact and contribution to the process of making a transition from war to peace. Without stepping back from meeting immediate needs in the field there is little pressure for better regulation, accountability or transparency of the industry to improve the assistance they provide so that they meet the needs of the intended beneficiaries.

By looking at the whole picture of the peace process and its outcomes, it becomes apparent that there are tensions between the needs and priorities of the peace process industry and

⁶⁸Bertram, “Reinventing governments,” p. 416.

the interests of host societies undergoing the transition from war to peace. The peace process industry is driven by a dual set of concerns, ambitious but unsubstantiated political mandates and self-serving interests to sustain their own significance, credibility and status. These concerns draw attention away from the recipients of international assistance. The actors in the peace process industry are political actors and have a political impact on the societies they assist. This impact is not monolithic but involves a constellation of multiple impacts. Without a serious debate on post-conflict activities, the peace process industry will continue to impose their ideas more forcefully on those to whom their expertise is targeted. Therefore in assessing the impact of external actors, in defining success, and in understanding the transition from war to peace, the society undergoing the transition ought to be at the centre of analysis. The next chapter presents a framework to study the targeted society of international intervention by focussing on political space.

CHAPTER TWO

Peace, politics and political space: framing the recipients of international assistance

... there is no greater necessity for men who live in communities than that they be governed, self-governed if possible, well-governed if they are fortunate, but in any event, governed.¹

In chapter one, I argued that international actors are innately political in providing assistance to countries making the transition from war to peace. The political character of the peace process industry shapes the outcomes resulting from a peace process and helps explain discrepancies between these outcomes and the original objectives. The political nature of external third parties is reinforced by their operation in a pre-existing political framework or context. At present, the peace process industry does not operate with a full understanding of the political context in which it intervenes and thus it is unable to account for the variety of outcomes from a peace process. Most often, the focus of the peace process industry is on itself and its activities, rather than the recipients of its assistance, that is the host society and political context that are the target of intervention practices. In other words, without considering the political context, the peace process industry may provide assistance that does not secure and consolidate peace because it cannot fully appreciate what the outcome of peace is supposed to be and how the manner in which it operates constrains the realisation of this objective.

This chapter presents a framework that explains the political context in which the peace process industry intervenes to enable them to think through the transition from war to peace. It seeks to explain the political structures, relations and organisation of society by defining this context as political space. The chapter begins by problematising the objective of peace which I shall argue, is a political project. Peace is defined by the activity of politics which only has meaning in a political context defined as political space. I then articulate what I mean by political space. The second section uses this account of political space to explain how particular configurations of political space create specific conditions for peace

¹Walter Lippmann cited in Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 2.

or conflict, which may lead to civil conflict and war. The final section examines the specific features of political space in Africa in which there have been frequent interventions by the peace process industry. In conclusion, I argue that an account of political space provides an alternative framework for evaluating the assistance provided by the peace process industry and makes clearer some of the problems confronting the industry when providing assistance.

Peace, politics and political space: the recipients

THE MEANING OF PEACE

When external third parties engage in a peace process, the implied objective is to help in the realisation of peace. However, the definition of this objective, that is the meaning of peace, does not figure very prominently in the thinking and practices of the peace process industry. Yet without an understanding peace, it is difficult to evaluate whether the outcomes from a peace process produce peace. The problem with defining peace is that it is often presented as a universal, uncontentious and desirable good. While peace may be a universal norm, peace is embodied in particular institutions and practices which also make it an intellectual and political project. In short, peace has a political content. It takes place within a political context, whether this context is the international system, the state, a community or the overlapping jurisdictions between them. However, the political content of peace is generally neglected because peace is defined by absence. Peace is most often defined negatively as the absence of war. War as an organised form of violence is not peace, since violence contradicts peace.

While the absence of violence is a necessary condition for peace, it does not provide a sufficient definition of peace. Peace has positive qualities. Windsor argued that war is the ultimate act of liberation because it unleashes the bonds of restraint upholding society.² Peace, then, even as the absence of war, implies the practice of restraint according to rules

²Philip Windsor, "The State and War," in Cornelia Navari, (ed.) *The Condition of States*, Buckingham: Open University Press, 1991, pp. 125-142.

outlined by society and humanity. Peace is civilised behaviour which serves a social function. Peace is also equated with order or harmony. However, Banks rejects this equation as unnecessary and inadequate if it implies the elimination of all disagreement and conflict. Disagreement and conflict are both

inevitable and necessary. It is inevitable because both people and groups have basic needs, expressed in society through competing values and clashing interests. It is necessary in order to provide the catalyst for social processes without which life would hardly be worthwhile: stimulus, challenge, change and progress.³

However, in extolling the benefits of conflict, Banks nevertheless recognises that not all conflict is functional. Conflicts often become violent and lead to war rather than progress. The tendency towards destructive outcomes does not discredit the value inhering in conflict but points to the failure to constructively express and manage it.

Some authors and policy-makers in the peace process industry define peace as either development, liberal-democracy and/or government. As explained in chapter one, this particular articulation of peace equates peace with both development and democracy without distinguishing any characteristics specific to peace. This approach also ascribes specific liberal values to the political content of peace which weakens its universality without having first and foremost acknowledged the political quality of peace. Bertram takes a step back by defining the political content of peace more generally as government or state institutions. However, Bertram does not problematise the state or government, thus her definition also remains historically and culturally contingent. Banks recognises but also opens up the political content of peace by defining peace as the successful management of conflict. Peace is a process, “in which the essential properties arise from how we do things, not what we do.”⁴ The management of diversity and conflict occurs through the activity of politics. Thus peace is defined and realised through the practice of politics which obviates the need for and use of violence.

³Michael Banks, “Four conceptions of peace,” in Dennis Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste, (eds.) *Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications*, London: Francis Pinter, 1987, p. 260.

⁴Banks, “Four conceptions of peace,” p. 269.

IN POLITICS LIES PEACE

If peace is a practice and this practice is politics, politics then, is the basis for social and political order. Politics informs the nature and exercise of rule. According to Crick, politics “is a way of ruling divided societies without undue violence - and most societies are divided, though some think that is the very trouble.”⁵ Crick explains that a political community is sustained by the management of conflicts and social divisions through a legitimate distribution of power. Politics is “the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community.”⁶ For Crick, the meaning of politics is more than simply acquiring or having power, it is about the functions that power serves in managing conflicts which confers legitimacy onto its exercise.⁷ It is through politics that power is neither arbitrary, nor an exercise of coercive force and it is through the predictability of political practice that power relations are mediated. Politics is the means by which a stable and sustainable political order is created and maintained.

Politics is a necessary and universal part of social life because each person in society manifests his or her own interests, goals, perceptions and ideas which collectively produces a plurality of difference and disagreement. Politics is the activity which mediates this diverse plurality and sustains social cohesion. Without the rituals and experience of politics, social life would be a cacophony of discordant interests and goals. Connolly idealises politics as “a form of interaction in which agents adjust, extend, resolve, accommodate and transcend initial differences within a context of partly shared assumptions, concepts and

⁵Bernard Crick, *In Defence of Politics*, London: Penguin Group, 1962, p. 33.

⁶Crick, *In Defence of Politics*, p. 21.

⁷This contrasts with definitions of politics which focus solely on the distribution of power. Weber defines politics as the “striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state.” Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, (eds.) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, London: Routledge, 1948, p. 78. Lasswell defines politics as who gets what, when and how. Harold Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*, London: Whittlesey House, 1936.

commitments.”⁸ This accommodation does not imply harmonisation or homogenisation. Politics not only protects differences but realises an ideal form of unsettled accommodation which persistently questions its own resolution. Connolly explains that,

[p]olitics, at its best, is the medium through which essential ambiguities can be expressed and given some redress. It is simultaneously the best way to establish or confirm commonalities and to expose uncertainties, repressed voices, exclusions, and injuries lodged within them. Politics, again at its best, calls into question settlements sedimented into moral consensus.⁹

Politics rejects the claim to absolute truth and accepts ambiguous and uncertain outcomes.

Politics, then, entails a degree of forbearance and toleration of other traditions, viewpoints, ideas and goals. Self-restraint in dealing with other people results from an awareness of membership in a collective whole. Shils argues that to

practice politics, to be civil towards another human being, means regarding other persons, including one’s adversaries, as members of the same inclusive collectivity, ie., as members of the same society.¹⁰

In the words of Crick again, politics “is a great and civilizing human activity.”¹¹ It is civilising because the practice of politics entails civility which according to Shils,

limits the intensity of conflict. It reduces the distance between competing demands; it is a curb on centrifugal tendencies. Civility, by the attachment of its individual bearers to the society as a whole, places a limit on the irreconcilability of the parochial ends pursued. Attachment to the whole reduces the rigidity of attachment to the parts.¹²

The intrinsic value of politics inheres in the *activity* of politics as a process of discussion amongst different and competing ends. Politics, fundamentally, is about words taking precedence over force; it is the force of argument not the force of arms which prevails.

⁸William Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993 edition, pp. 6-7.

⁹William Connolly, *Politics and Ambiguity*, London: The University of Wisconsin Press, Ltd., 1987, p. 16.

¹⁰Edward Shils, “The Virtue of Civil Society,” *Government and Opposition*, 26(1), 1991, p. 13.

¹¹Crick, *In Defence of Politics*, p. 15.

¹²Shils, “The Virtue of Civil Society,” p.15.

Arendt argued that “to be political, to live in a polis, meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion.”¹³ Politics is the articulation of conflicting ideas and deciding between them without recourse to violence. To trust the force of words means that human beings come to obey rules of civil intercourse, the standards of which, renders violence incompatible with participation in politics. Politics as an activity rejects the use of force, ensuring that power does not mask domination and coercion. It is through politics that peace is manifested.

It is evident that few actors in the peace process industry operate with this conception of politics. The activities of many NGOs, donors and other agencies seem to embody a definition of politics drawn from Weber which focuses on the distribution of power between parties or between the state and civil society, than on the functions politics serves in managing conflict and sustaining peace. Moreover, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters, the peace process industry has a strong tendency to denigrate the authority, accountability and transparency of local political actors. The presence and activities of the peace process industry often obstructs the activity of politics by compromising the ability of host societies to reconcile differences and make political choices that consolidate peace. With such impoverished notions of politics, the peace process industry can just as easily prolong conflict than assist in the transition to peace. However, care must also be taken to ensure this definition of politics does not override values found in the political societies under consideration. However a respect for indigenous values does not mean isolating them from the influence of universal norms which is an untenable position given that the distinction between inside and outside is no longer sharply defined. The value attached to reconciling differences is a universal norm intrinsic to most societies, but the mechanisms and means through which it is to be realised ought to reflect particular societies.

Nevertheless, there are forms of politics which are distorted, subverted and marginalised that do not mediate differences and manage disputes. The contradiction between the idea

¹³Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, London: University of Chicago Press, 1958, p.26.

and practice of politics results from the context in which politics is conducted. This context, defined as political space, comes in different configurations which produces different forms of politics. Not all of these forms create the conditions for peace. The next section discusses political space.

DEFINING POLITICAL SPACE

Every society is served by a particular political arrangement that helps to order and maintain social interactions in the face of competition, conflict and cooperation.¹⁴ What emerges from these interactions is the activity of politics which sustains society by reconciling the differences which underlie conflict and competition, while uncovering the compromises which enable cooperation. But in order to understand politics, to explain what politics is, what functions it serves, how politics is conducted and where politics is located, depends on recognising and explaining what is meant by a political arrangement. The political arrangement of society or how society is politically organised is based on three interconnecting elements, norms, institutions and procedures; that is the values and preferences which give meaning to politics, and the mechanisms and processes through which these values are realised and politics is conducted.

Norms which define a political arrangement include moral values which guide political choices, rules of political behaviour which offer guidelines on custom and practice, and principles that locate the boundaries of where politics can take place. Norms inform and prescribe the rules of political conduct, the distribution and exercise of power and the nature of political authority which binds the ruler to the ruled. The rules of political conduct establish patterns of behaviour and define the practices of politics. Power refers to the ability to control society, compel compliance or effect change. Power is discussed in reference to its distribution and allocation amongst different social groups. Power is also exercised through political institutions and thus is also understood by the degree to which it is institutionalised. Authority differs from power by referring to the right to rule over

¹⁴Edward Soja, *The Political Organization of Space*, Resource Paper No. 8, Washington, D.C.: Association of American Geographers, 1971, p. 7.

others, the entitlement to hold and exercise power, implying an acceptance and recognition of authority by those over whom it is discharged. Authority "precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, authority itself has failed."¹⁵ The rules of politics, power and authority manifest the normative parameters of how society is to be politically organised.

However, these norms are articulated and manifested in institutions and procedures. These refer to the areas of jurisdiction over which politics applies, the process through which decisions are taken on these issues and the formal structures through which these decisions are executed. In other words,

the structures of meaning in which political conduct is defined and attitudes towards the accommodation of interests are closely related to an experience of authority (both its organizational/procedural form and manner of exercise) exercised through both public institutions and a particular set of social relations.¹⁶

Formal structures, decision-making processes and areas of jurisdiction refer specifically to such things as institutions of the state or civil society, democratic procedures or political parties, federal divisions of power, majority versus proportional representation and so forth. However, within these formal procedures are ideas about politics which reflect values and preferences regarding the organisation of politics, that is the rules of the game, the exercise and distribution of power and the nature of authority. These procedures and institutions effect and transmit normative ideas by establishing regular and standardised patterns of political practice.

Thus the political arrangement of society is based on three interlocking elements, norms, institutions and procedures. The activity of politics emerges from the constellation of these elements and contributes to the process of working through them. The form of political activity which evolves is not only constituted by the kinds of norms, institutions and

¹⁵Hannah Arendt, "What was authority?" in Carl J. Friedrich, (ed.) *Authority*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958, p. 82.

¹⁶Kenneth Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an Idea and an Institution*, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980, p. 50.

procedures which underlie the political organisation of society, but by how these elements are arranged and cohere together. However, politics also contributes to the process of how this arrangement comes together and takes shape. This arrangement or configuration is political space. Political space is defined as the configuration or arrangement of norms, institutions and procedures that organise and order political life. By recognising this arrangement of space, the concept of political space recaptures the totality of politics and the political organisation of society. It suggests that the whole constellation of what is politics emerges from a complex set of interrelationships between norms, institutions, and procedures; between the nexus of the rules, power and authority, and the jurisdictions of authority, decisions and institutional processes. It highlights the connections, the contradictions, the tensions, and the disjunctures which define any arrangement of politics. Political space captures more than just the state, civil society, or any particular aspect of a political system. Political space is interesting because it refers to the arrangement or configuration of how the system fits together and the framework that emerges from the whole nexus that is politics.¹⁷

Political space implies that the spatial organisation of society structures the relations of those living within that space. However, not all political spaces are the same. Political space is an unfinished product that is defined by the degree of coherence in the constellation of norms, institutions and procedures and whether this configuration has meaning. Political space has a purpose, it is defined by its function. For political space to be functional and meaningful, it must embody a logic.¹⁸ The logic of political space refers to the use and means through which political activity becomes possible and holds political space together. Political space functions when it encourages and allows for the practice of politics. But this function is also defined in the process of constructing political space, that is in the process

¹⁷Political space captures a different essence from concepts like political order, political society or political community. Political order seems to refer solely to the patterns which define society, while the idea of society or community emphasise the ties that bind, relate and separate the parts. Political space seems to capture both ideas while implying a structural form of organisation that serves a particular purpose.

¹⁸Bill Hillier and Julienne Hanson, *The Social Logic of Space*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 1.

of defining politics and how politics is to be conducted. Political space conditions and gives meaning to how politics is conducted and the kind of context that emerges from political activity, while it simultaneously evolves through the ongoing process of political activity.

Political space can be likened to the political architecture of a society. Keeping to the architectural metaphor, the meaning of political space can be visualised by using the metaphor of a building. Every building has a certain logic to it both through its physical and abstract form. Through its exterior and interior composition, a building is an ordered arrangement of space, it functions because of how the space is organised.

Buildings may be comparable to other artefacts in that they assemble elements into a physical object with a certain form; but they are incomparable in that they also create and order the empty volumes of space resulting from that object into a pattern. It is this ordering of space that it is the *purpose* of the building, not the physical object itself. The physical object is the means to an end.¹⁹

Political space provides the means to the end of politics. The ordering of space in buildings orders relations between people. A building is a system of spatial relations or patterns that joins and separates people and gives meaning to their relations with each other.²⁰ Thus, the building serves both to bring people together in one entity, but also separates them within that entity. This organisation of space is similar to Arendt's image of a table to explain the notion of a public sphere.²¹ A table around which people are sitting, both joins those people together, yet keeps them separate. The image of the building however operates on a larger scale by relating groups of people in different arrangements as parts of a larger whole. This arrangement or organisation of space functions if these groups can be joined together within the whole while maintaining their separate spaces.

¹⁹Hillier and Hanson, *The social logic of space*, p. 1.

²⁰Hillier and Hanson, *The social logic of space*, p. 3.

²¹“To live together in the world means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time.” Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 52.

A building always has an outer structure which encapsulates a space within. In terms of political space, the foundation of the building and its outer structure comprises the state which defines the shape, location and limits of political space. Inside the building, how that space is divided and structured internally in terms of the rooms, the connections between the rooms, the functions different rooms serve, is civil society. If there is little arrangement of the internal space this refers to society, however if there is an order to the division of space, then it suggests a ‘civil’ society.²² Like a building, the state has no meaning without

²²I use ‘civil’ society loosely because of the many normative dimensions associated with the concept. As the chapter progresses, the concept becomes more defined through its application to African societies. I prefer to focus on the order and structure within civil society, which by no means captures the wealth of possible meanings attached to the concept. Definitions of the concept of civil society are often contradictory and confusing and can refer to diametrically opposing phenomenon. These problems stem from the expansive nature of the concept which is derived from the political purposes for which the concept is deployed and subsequently defined. Civil society is all that is outside, beyond and against the state. It has been defined negatively, as the “residue once the realm in which state power is exercised has been well defined.” (Noberto Bobbio, *Democracy and Dictatorship: The Nature and Limits of State Power*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989, p. 23.) But Bobbio argued that this can lead to “various emphases depending on whether the identification of the non-state with the pre-state, the anti-state or the post-state prevails.”(Bobbio, p. 24)

The confusion surrounding the state in civil society arises from its association with democracy and tensions within liberal-democracy itself over the state, ie. whether the state is a source of protection or a source of threat. Thus, civil society has been used as both as a critique and a defence of democracy. Although civil society has been used as part of the critique of capitalism and hence liberal-democracy by Marx, it is primarily associated today with the democratic impulse that reemerged in the struggles against totalitarianism in East and Central Europe. The revitalisation of the concept of civil society is intrinsically tied to these processes of transition to democracy, not only in Europe but also in the ongoing political crises of Latin America and Africa.

Civil society can be defined as a set of voluntary, market regulated or privately controlled associations, including everything from trade unions, voluntary associations, clubs, guilds, hospitals, churches, to the market, capitalist enterprises etc. which provide a buffer between citizen and state. Other times, civil society is conceived as a place or an arena of in which the norms and principle of political governance are constituted. “Civil society is the place where, especially in periods of institutional crisis, *de facto* powers are formed that aim at obtaining their own legitimacy even at the expense of legitimate power; where in other words, the processes of delegitimation and re legitimisation take place.” (Bobbio, p. 26) For my purposes, civil society will be used to refer to the norms and rules of political organisation, specifically “the point of agreement on what those working rules [of the political order or state] should be.” (John Harbeson “Civil society and political renaissance in Africa,” in John Harbeson, Donald

society and society rests on the organisation of the state. Political space then does not just refer to one particular room within the building, it refers to the complex arrangement of all the rooms and the space within them. Thus it would be possible to speak of altering the spatial composition of a building by rearranging particular spaces, like knocking down walls. The decisions and preferences regarding the foundations of the building, the shape of the building, the division of space, the materials involved etc., refer to the norms, institutions and procedures arranged in political space.

While political space is tied to the territorial location of the state, decisions and plans regarding its design are not tied geographically or temporally. Inhabitants of buildings are often not responsible for the design of their own structure but move into the building, live in it, while it is under construction or after it has been constructed. These inhabitants may have their own ideas about the kind of building that would serve their purposes and may include trained architects. But the ideas of the inhabitants are never entirely derived locally, they include many exogenous influences, simply through seeing, hearing about and living in other buildings. Thus, it is not only the people who live in and use the building who influence its design, external architects are often called in to help improve the building. These architects are not constructing a new building, but work with and repair a pre-existing structure that is most likely imperfectly and incompletely formed, yet operating on a basic but uncertain level for those who occupy it. This group of architects involved in the re-design or reconstruction of the building resembles the peace process industry. To argue that the peace process industry reconfigures political space implies that external agencies redesign and thus redefine the structure and organisation of another political society which affects the logic of how that society functions. Thus the relationship between the architects and the inhabitants plays an important role in the design and construction of the building. The question is how much the relationship between architects and inhabitants reflects relations of power, and to what degree decisions regarding the norms, institutions and procedures of political space, incorporated into the design and reflected in the construction

Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, (eds.) *Civil Society and the State in Africa*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994, pp. 3-4.)

of the building, are determined by this power relationship. Buildings function best when architects take into account the needs and wishes of those who use it, but more often reflect relations of power.

If political space is represented by a building, the peace process industry parallels both architect and contractor. Each architect appears to be designing a portion of the building, works on a section of one floor, perhaps on another, usually without a blueprint of the whole structure, while another architect does the same thing on some other part of the building. If one actor in the peace process industry works on one element of political space, it is unlikely that section will be well-connected to other spaces within the building, or to the structure as a whole, which will undermine how the building functions. There may be coordination and cooperation amongst the architects, but rarely is there a conception or agreement on what the overall structure ought to look like and how it should function by the entire group of architects which leads to a chaotic organisation of space. By their individual and independent actions, the peace process industry may frustrate the logic of the building, thus preventing the integration of state and society and the coherent arrangement of space. Moreover, like any industry, there are also few guarantees that everyone in the peace process industry who is engaged in the construction of the building is licensed, has similar or sufficient experience or qualifications, or the resources to carry out the work. Rogue contractors captures the idea of a proliferation of unqualified, unregulated agencies who endanger their own staff and those they seek to help which reflects negatively on the reputation of the industry as whole.

While the metaphor of a building provides a useful tool for visualising political space, nevertheless there are limitations to using the metaphor. Political space unlike a building is never fully completed, nor does it have the permanence of a building. Political space is always under construction and is more fluid than what is suggested by the building metaphor. However, focussing on the differences between buildings, for example, Windsor Castle versus a log cabin, illustrates that some buildings have more solid foundations than others. Second, the idea of architects implies a degree of training in a specialised skill and accreditation which gives them the authority and experience to advise the people in the

building. However, it is not clear where members of the peace process industry receive their training, whether in fact they are trained in a specific skill, and hence where they derive their authority to offer advice. Also, architects and contractors in the peace process industry may not have even been invited to participate in constructing the building by the inhabitants. Third, the notion of design in a political sense carries with it connotations of social engineering, the expectation of having plans leading to a desired outcome. This is problematic not only when dealing with the nebulous sphere of politics, but also when operating on the scale of an entire country or society. But every policy and most political activities are undertaken with intended objectives, the point of using the building metaphor is to highlight that plans on one floor affect other floors and the building as a whole. The metaphor provides a useful image for visualising political space, the structure and its construction, but also its relation to other similar spaces within the larger system. What emerges from the image of the building is an account of political space as a whole structure that depends on the integration of the parts and the assimilation of inner and outer structures into a patterned whole.

Political space: the configuration of peace and conflict

THE CONFIGURATION OF PEACE IN POLITICAL SPACE

If political space is a building, then what kind of building ensures peace by enabling the practice of politics, and what are the problems with a building that frustrates politics and is susceptible to conflict? Before proceeding, it is important to clarify that peace and conflict are not opposite conditions. A building characterised by peace indicates conflicts are well-managed, whereas a building with little peace implies a proliferation of unmanageable conflicts, from which a civil conflict may evolve to tear at the whole building. The difference between the two is characterised by the degree of politics exercised within political space. Two ‘physical’ or institutional elements of the building will predispose it towards peace or conflict: (1) the foundations and outer structure of the building meaning the nature of political community (the state), and (2) the internal division of space meaning the political organisation within society, (a civil society). However,

political space is also constituted by more abstract elements. These are (3) the integration of the outer and inner forms, which constitutes (4) a public sphere to serve all of the users of the building, all of which produces (5) a pattern or system that constitutes a configuration or arrangement of norms, institutions and procedures. Political space is defined by the nature of this arrangement and the extent to which there is an institutionalised pattern of rules to order political life so that the building functions for those it is intended to serve. This section discusses these parameters of political space first in terms of peace and then conflict.

A building will encourage politics and ensure peace if its foundations and outer structure are solid and there is a meaningful division of space within. In political terms, this means first, that there is a form of political community which encapsulates society. This form of political community is presently conceived of as the state given that the international system is composed of a collection of sovereign states. The state is defined by Mann as

(1) a differentiated set of institutions and personnel, (2) embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from the centre to cover a, (3) territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises, (4) some degree of authoritative, binding rule-making, backed up by some organized physical force.²³

The structure provided by the state proscribes limits on where politics takes place, the institutions through which politics is to be exercised, how it is conducted and the authority which sustains it. However, the strength and solidity of the outer structure will depend on how strongly constructed the state is²⁴, while its foundations are a product of the historical processes which formed particular states. There must be enough organisation to the polity to enfold society within its boundaries while its foundations must be rooted in society so that the building stands fast.

The space within a building refers to society. The activity of politics is encouraged when

²³ Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power: The rise of classes and nation-states, 1760-1914*, Vol. II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 55.

²⁴ This is different than a strong state which implies that the state is strong in relation to society and its capacity to control society.

this inner space is arranged, that is when relations in society are structured in a meaningful way. The division of space implies the creation of private spaces that are connected to constitute a public space defined by the whole building. The public space of the building is constituted when there is an ordering and patterning to this arrangement of space, arbitrary and haphazard spaces prevent and potentially disrupt the coherence of the whole space. The connecting arrangements also determine the coherence of the building. This arrangement of space within must be fixed in such a way that is permanent but flexible so that it does not threaten the foundations of the building. The arrangement may be simple or complex, but there must be enough order for the building to function. The more formal, complicated and patterned the division and arrangement of space suggest that society may constitute something that can be labelled as civil society.

Beyond these physical features, political space must also embody three abstract principles. Political space must embody a cohering logic based on an institutionalised system of rules giving order to political life and that these apply to a public who live in the building. The construct must be solid enough to withstand challenges and yet be capable of modification without threatening to bring the whole building down. The outer and inner structures must be incorporated together, since neither form of organisation is sufficient to capture all of political life, or can be defined in isolation from the other. This implies that the state and society/civil society are interdependent. The capacity for politics resides in the intersections which integrates the state with civil society and coheres political space. Keane argues

that without a secure and independent civil society of autonomous public spheres, goals such as freedom and equality, participatory planning and community decision-making will be nothing but empty slogans. But without the protective, redistributive and conflict-mediating functions of the state, struggles to transform civil society will become ghettoized, divided and stagnant, or will spawn their own, new forms of inequality and unfreedom.²⁵

Civil society acts within the limits set by the state on the understanding that it has a role in establishing those limits itself. This means that the state provides and maintains an environment propitious for civil society and civil society accepts the services of the state

²⁵John Keane, "The Limits of State Action," in John Keane, (ed.) *Democracy and Civil Society*, London: Verso, 1988, p. 15.

and participates in it. Peace requires deepening the connections between them.²⁶

These connections are deepened if a public sphere is constituted through them. The integration of the outer and inner structures must also constitute a public space serving the common welfare of all the residents in the building. Political space must encapsulate the public sphere. The public sphere represents and protects what is common to the whole of society through an appreciation of difference and diversity. Arendt explained that “the reality of the public realm relies on the simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which the common world presents itself.”²⁷ Each individual simultaneously affirms his or her individual freedom and expresses membership within the larger community, the individual is both related to and separated from the whole. Thus the public sphere represents “the points of intersection between various existing power vectors. It is at these locations that politics takes place and around these foci that authority is accumulated and support garnered.”²⁸ Politics is manifested in the public realm and the public realm is constituted by political discussion and practice. State institutions, personnel and leaders must serve all members of society based on an understanding of the inclusive moral universe. By upholding the principle of universality, the state maintains cohesion within society. This requires that agents within civil society pursue their parochial interests according to universal principles. What is good for the part must also be good for the whole. The significance of civil society

is not that they form a non-political social sphere, but rather that they form the basis for the fragmentation and diversity of power within the political system. What is relevant is not their life outside, but the way they are

²⁶This discussion overlooks two important debates about state-civil society relations. First, these relations are often characterised as confrontation, where the state seeks to control civil society, and civil society is organised against the state. Second, it presupposes that the state and civil society are clearly separated. Other theorists have argued that civil society is a mirror of the state, or that the state is merely representative of interests in civil society.

²⁷Arendt, *The Human Condition*, p. 57.

²⁸Naomi Chazan, “Patterns of State-Society Incorporation and Disengagement in Africa,” in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, (eds.) *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988, p. 140.

integrated into the political system, and the weight they have in it.²⁹ It is not just any civil society, but the organisation of a society consonant with the public sphere. “Without strong political institutions, society lacks the means to define and to realize its common interests. The capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create public interests.”³⁰

Political space is “not just any coming together, but a regularized, stable and sustained coming together, the coming together must in short be institutionalized.”³¹ Peace comes from regularised procedures and institutions, where processes are easily created and old ones disappear without threatening collapse of the overall structure of interaction. When there is a patterned relationship between state and society, a web of interaction and routine relations, political space coheres. This means there is a basic agreement on a system of norms, institutions and procedures to order and organise political life. In reference to Rustow, Manning argues that in politics,

agreement to abide by a set of rules must come first. Commitment to those rules, and institutionalization of the new system, can come only as a result of their use, and the realization (or not) by each party that the rules serve their own interests better than any realistically available alternative..³²

The system of norms underpinning political authority, accountability and responsibility provide parameters for managing conflict without which other options involving violence may be used to resolve differences. Thus, the intersections of political space, the creation of agreed rules of the game, institutions of power and structures of authority determines the degree to which the practice of politics is possible within this political space. When the foundations and outer structure are strong, when the division of inner space is ordered and flexible, where both come together in a patterned arrangement to serve the public interest by constituting a system of rules, the exercise of politics generates and manifests peace.

²⁹Charles Taylor, “Modes of Civil Society,” *Public Culture*, 3(1), Fall 1990, p. 114.

³⁰Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 24.

³¹Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 10.

³²Carrie Manning, “Constructing Opposition in Mozambique: Renamo as Political Party,” *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 24(1), March 1998, p. 189.

THE MANIFESTATION OF CONFLICT IN POLITICAL SPACE

When there are problems with the foundations and structures of space, the division, integration and the public constitution of space, and the ordered arrangement of this space through a system of rules, then political space is not fully functional and the practice of politics is made difficult. The nature of these deficiencies in political space will determine the degree or limits of politics in managing conflicts. If one of the five elements is missing, a combination of elements is missing or the whole construct is feeble, then the conditions for politics are absent and conflicts are unlikely to be managed and more likely to lead to civil conflict and violence. This in turn affects the condition of political space. A political space prone to conflict is one that may be weak or problematic but functioning as a system, structurally weak and only partially functioning or completely chaotic and near collapse.

Political space will be susceptible to unmanageable conflicts if any one of its five components is missing or minimal. Political space is virtually untenable if either of its two 'physical' or organisational structures are missing or weak, meaning either that its foundations and external organising structure are feeble, or there is no or little ordered division of the internal space. Such a building is poorly constructed meaning that not all who are supposed to use the building take up residence in it, they may spill out of the building or not seek protection within the building. In political terms this implies a weak state where state institutions lack the capacity to exert political authority, an inability to implement policy, or take binding decisions. It could also mean the incoherence of the state as a form of political community arising from competition with alternative forms of political organisation, such as traditional authorities or international agencies, that manifest authority and usurp authority from the state. The idea of a building's weak foundations points to the uneven process of state formation if the state was a transplanted form of political organisation imposed on society, or if those who constructed the building were unconcerned with the functioning of the building. Problems with the division of space within a building points to varying degrees of tensions between social groups. It may be that the boundaries dividing the space within a building are mutually exclusive, implying that certain social groups refuse to acknowledge other groups even though they inhabit the same

political space. It could also mean that the connections between the different private spaces are blocked or not well constructed inhibiting the relations between different parts of the same building. Disorder or an unworkable ordering of space within a building is a failing of the political relations between social groups in forming a society. If either of these basic organising structures are absent or dysfunctional, political space has little possibility of working and is susceptible to unmanageable conflict.

In addition to these structural weaknesses, the logic of political space as an integrated structure that embodies a public sphere and creates an ordered arrangement of norms, institutions and procedures, may be weak or non-existent. If the outer organisation and the inner division of space do not correspond to each other through a breakdown or absence of connections or one overwhelms the other, then such contests suggest that either the state or civil society seeks to define political space independent of the other. The state may seek to negate the political function of social activity or civil society to prevent the state from fulfilling its functions. States may attempt to control political space by closing off parts of society, excluding them from setting the rules and procedures of decision-making, denying access or resource to power, and relying on coercion rather than authority and accountability. When the state is trying to control society without being open to it by preventing social groups from accessing and modifying state power, pressures from society may lead to conflict. The partial and incomplete closures of political space animate conflict and create openings for its violent manifestation.

State-society relations can also be problematic if they fail to converge, and one seeks to evade or disengage from the other leaving vast areas free from interaction. This may reflect the state's loss or lack of jurisdiction over parts of its population, territorially, functionally or socially. This loss of control usually can be attributed to a lack of capacity and competence of the state, particularly in its ability to maintain order and security for its people.³³ Members of society often decide to disengage from the state. Disengagement

³³However, states sometime withdraw from society if it is in their interest to do so, as in privatisation. The difference is the degree of choice and the ability to control the process and the terms of disengagement.

“refers to ongoing societal activities conducted by individuals and groups beyond the public domain.”³⁴ This could mean physically leaving the country as refugees or migrants, ignoring state control in certain areas of jurisdiction, or not fulfilling the expectations and needs of the state, such as tax evasion. Disengagement is not specifically material but may also include opting out of the cultural and ideological symbols and values that the state is advocating,³⁵ particularly national ideas.

This process has the potential to paralyse the state by creating a situation that one author has called of “states without citizens.”³⁶ This is an acute problem because of the “increasing growth of spheres of society out of touch with the state,”³⁷ particularly if society is opting out of the state’s function of providing security and managing conflict. From this it can be inferred, that there is little sense of a common fate. The disintegration of relations between the state and society arises from an inability to construct a public domain. However, the absence of a public sphere or a clear differentiation of a public from a private sphere may also arise from the ongoing process of formation or evolution. It may also be that parts of society do not want to be joined in one political space. From this, a social group may seek to opt of the political arrangement and form an alternative political space which may dissolve or disintegrate the state and political space.

Some differences may be too threatening to be resolved by politics because they arise from

³⁴Naomi Chazan, “State and Society in Africa: Images and Challenges,” in Rothchild and Chazan, *The Precarious Balance*, p. 331. See also in the same volume, Victor Azarya, “Reordering State-Society Relations: Incorporation and Disengagement,” pp. 3-21. The concept of disengagement parallels the idea of ‘exit’ defined by Hirschman as withdrawal from an organisation (ie. leaving the organisation or ceasing to use its goods and services) in response to its unsatisfactory performance. Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: responses to declines in firms, organizations, and states*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.

³⁵Chazan, “Patterns of State-Society Incorporation,” pp. 121-148.

³⁶John A.A. Ayoade, “States without citizens: an emerging African phenomenon,” in Rothchild and Chazan, *The Precarious Balance*, p. 100.

³⁷Peter Ekeh, “The constitution of civil society in African history and politics,” in B. Caron, A. Gboyega and E. Osaghae, (eds.) *Proceedings of the Symposium on Democratic Transition in Africa*, Ibadan: CREDU Documents in Social Sciences and Humanities, 1992, p. 208.

confusion over the rules of the game in which this resolution can take place, such as who is allowed to participate in politics. Authority relations produced by processes of organisational consolidation and fragmentation may be disputable within society and become a source of conflict. The logical conclusion of a degeneration of the state and/or society is the dissolution of political community,³⁸ leaving a vacuum for violent conflict. If society is excluded from all forms of political participation by the state and it is destroyed, subverted, or negated, there is merely control, political space does not function. If civil society assumes control of political activity and the state withers away, as in revolutions where social actors take over the state, or state failure where there is a loss of centralised government and social groups assume responsibility for their own security challenging the monopoly of violence, political space will collapse. The disintegration of state and civil society means a viable political space cannot be sustained which creates openings for civil conflict and war with few mechanisms or options to manage or contain them. A constellation of problems which prevents the functioning of political space means there is no basis for a stable polity. It is impossible for the building to function and conflict is endemic within that the political space which has the potential to lead to civil conflict. Thus civil conflicts emerge from contests over political space, that is contests over the norms, institutions and procedures which organise political life.

While conflict may be endemic to a particular political space, whether this conflict becomes violent will depend on other factors, particularly access to the means to pursue war. Access is not restricted to local or endogenous actors, but is very often dependent on arms suppliers from other societies. Those who live in other political spaces can also influence tensions within a political space by weakening the foundations, the divisions of space, or their integration. For example the minimal state pursued by Western liberals reduces the number of intersections between the state and civil society, thereby weakening the integration of the two without strengthening the remaining intersections. Conversely, external assistance can help to strengthen and cohere a political space if policies promote peace, defined earlier as

³⁸Donald Rothchild and Letitia Lawson, “The Interactions Between State and Civil Society in Africa: From Deadlock to New Routines,” in John Harbeson, Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, (eds.) *Civil Society and the State in Africa*, London: Lynne Rienner, 1994, p. 269.

strong foundations, and an ordered space, that leads to a system of rules. The discussion of Mozambique in chapters five, six and seven will examine how external third parties weaken or strengthen political space. The next section discusses the political space of African societies in more general terms.

The problem with politics in Africa

After explaining that the objectives of the peace process industry need to be located in a political context defined as political space, the previous section explained how certain configurations of political space encourage peace while others are more prone to conflict. This section examines in more detail the political space of a region considered to be riven with conflict and subject to frequent interventions by the peace process industry. It has already been suggested that the peace process industry intervenes more frequently in underdeveloped, non-Western countries. Nowhere is this observation more pertinent than the African continent. The peace process industry has operated in every region of the continent from Mozambique, Namibia, Angola, Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia to the Horn of Africa. However, the proliferation of technical assistance has also been accompanied by the political neglect and marginalisation of Sub-Saharan Africa. This is not contradictory but represents two sides of the same problem, since technical assistance often compensates for a policy vacuum. This problem reflects a reluctance of donors to get involved along with a limited understanding of the political context by those external third parties who do intervene. This section offers a cursory examination of the political structures, practices and norms in Africa by discussing the African state, 'civil' society and political order. It examines the features of political space in Africa which predisposes it towards conflict and a crisis of politics. In turn, this crisis generates a politics of crisis response from the peace process industry.

THE FAILURE OF AFRICAN STATEHOOD³⁹

The nature of politics in Africa finds its roots in the legacies of colonialism which imposed new forms of political organisation onto African society. Prior to colonialism, various forms of political organisation existed across Africa: empires, kinship groupings, tribes, city-states, etc. Although immensely diverse, these political groupings shared similarities in their connections with the external world, particularly through trade; the nature of rule over people rather than land; and the ability and propensity for outlying peoples to escape and separate from centres of rule and power.⁴⁰ The 1884 Berlin Conference and the division of the continent into territorial units uniformly imposed the sovereign state across Africa. Although the colonial state existed for little more than half a century, it created new rules of politics, new dimensions of power and new relations of authority which left a lasting legacy on African political space.

The colonial state imposed artificial boundaries that separated African societies and joined new societies together. It was coercive and bureaucratic but prior to the end of the 19th century, state power rarely extended beyond capital cities or coastal frontiers. Control over colonies was established by co-opting urban elites and traditional authorities for indirect rule, which was “by and large a celebration of kinship institutions to which the colonial state delegated important state functions of providing for the security and welfare needs of the ordinary colonized African.”⁴¹ But in this process of exercising social control, the colonisers left a legacy of patron-client politics and ethnic cleavages tied to the centralised state. In Sierra Leone for example,

[b]y building up the chiefdoms as the principal units of ‘native administration’ the British had made them and especially the chieftaincy itself prizes worth coveting and by confining the chieftaincy to representatives of specified families within each chiefdom, they had created

³⁹For a discussion of the state in Africa, see Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the International System: The politics of state survival*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

⁴⁰Jeffrey Herbst, “Responding to state failure in Africa,” *International Security*, 21(3), Winter 1996/97, p. 127-129.

⁴¹ Ekeh, “The constitution of civil society,” p. 192.

a group of local patrons with their own clienteles within the chiefdom and a built-in basis for competition between them.⁴²

The colonial state was also built on the conviction of redeeming the society over which it ruled. Through the belief that native African society was irredeemably flawed, the state was established to correct society's imperfections. The state was thus hostile to society. It was also predatory and aggressive, extracting labour in a coercive manner, although this varied between different colonial powers. The colonial state was also defined by its orientation towards the imperial capital, extracting and exploiting resources for the empire. It depended on revenue from the centre and "derived its power from legally sanctioned coercion unaccountable to the subjects of the state, but from outside."⁴³ Thus, the African colonial state imposed new rules, institutions and procedures of statehood but it was also a mutated form of statehood since it never conformed to the model of the European state.

At independence, nationalist African leaders unanimously embraced the nation-state, assuming the reins of government within colonially designated boundaries. These new states gained immediate and unconditional recognition of their identity, sovereignty and the inviolability of territorial integrity. These were enshrined by African leaders in the formation of the Organization of African Unity. However, the legality of statehood contrasted sharply with the empirical substance of the state.⁴⁴ In the struggles for liberation, nationalist leaders had "generated philosophical alienation from the colonial state for the purpose of political disengagement and by so doing ostracized the state."⁴⁵ By setting up the state as false and foreign to society, liberation leaders at independence needed to

⁴²Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 114.

⁴³Patrick Chabal, *Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation*, London: Macmillan Press, 1992, p. 76.

⁴⁴African states have been labelled quasi-states. Despite their international legitimacy, quasi-states "have not yet been authorized and empowered domestically and consequently lack the institutional features of sovereign states as also defined by classical international law." Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 21; and Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in Statehood," *World Politics*, 35(1), October 1982, pp. 1-24.

⁴⁵Ayoade, "States without citizens," p. 104.

integrate society back into the state. However the struggles for liberation had made the task more difficult by leaving

a highly fragmented social prism through which the state entered the consciousness of Africans in different ways, reflecting in part the patterns of access and exclusion built into newly emergent state structures, and the manner in which these came to be perceived by specific social categories or communities.⁴⁶

The task of consolidating the territorial state had to be implemented throughout the territory top-down, rather than arising from outward expansion and consolidation of authority. Apart from the cities, the state rarely had a social base from which it could extend its reach and rule. In part to address these difficulties, African elites configured the state into highly personalised, one-party states, because “African political leaders were anxious to eliminate or, at least, effectively control all forms of political opposition in their countries by occupying all possible political space through their parties and the control of state power and institutions.”⁴⁷ Many African states became neo-patrimonial states, controlled by elites whose legitimacy depended on their ability to provide rewards to supporters. The army was both client and patron, taking power in a number of countries.

From the beginning, African statehood lacked coherence and its foundations were weak. The weakness of the African state and attempts by African leaders to compensate for this, reinforced the paradox that was the post-colonial state. The post-colonial state was both overdeveloped and soft, “overdeveloped because it was erected artificially on the foundations of the colonial state, soft because it lacked administrative and political means.”⁴⁸ It was overstaffed and inefficient, incongruent with the needs or resources of the people, structurally deficient, and lacking in political means and legitimacy. In the process of state consolidation, the scope of governmental responsibilities expanded far beyond the administrative capacities of government. This was compounded by the inability of “most

⁴⁶Rene Lemarchand, “Uncivil States and Civil Societies: How Illusion Became Reality,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 30(2), 1992, p. 183.

⁴⁷John Mw Makumbe, “Is there a civil society in Africa,” *International Affairs*, 74(2), April 1998, p. 307.

⁴⁸Patrick Chabal, “Introduction: Thinking About African Politics,” in Patrick Chabal, (ed.) *Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 13.

African governments... to establish the minimum productive basis required for the economic well-being (and sometimes even the survival) of their people.”⁴⁹ The overdeveloped but weak state was sustained through international recognition and direct support through developmental and military aid. Relations with the former imperial powers and with the superpowers were critical to the survival of African states. With the ending of the Cold War, the weak foundations of the state were further exposed. Economic decline, pressure for state reform and structural adjustment from the IMF and World Bank, and the inability of leaders to provide for their supporters, led to the breakdown of the neo-patrimonial system and rise of internal discontent.

The state’s response to social discontent was often to pulverise other forms of social control and rule-making ability outside state organisations.⁵⁰ Migdal called this process the politics of survival. African leaders’

basic weakness in the face of continued fragmentation of social control has led them to a political style and politics - the politics of survival - that have prevented the state from enhancing its capabilities by not allowing the development of complex organizations in state institutions.⁵¹

Thus a cycle of the state’s shrinking competence, followed by state repression, further decline in state capacity and ability to exercise physical control over the territory, characterised many African states. In extreme cases, the state is in or has gone through a process of failure and collapse. State failure occurs when “a minimal government structure... has experienced economic breakdown or political unrest but not complete civil destruction, where a country is incapable of governing itself and where there is no control or agreement frequently leading to violence and civil war.”⁵² Others point to collapsed states which lack central coordination and decision-making rules, exhibit makeshift

⁴⁹Patrick Chabal, “A few considerations on democracy in Africa,” *International Affairs*, 74(2), April 1998, p. 291.

⁵⁰Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, p. 2.

⁵¹Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, p. 236.

⁵²G. Helman and S. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” *Foreign Policy*, 89, Winter 1992-93, p. 3.

arrangements, and have lost the monopoly of violence.⁵³ Collapsed states are both the cause and result of civil war, for example in Liberia, Somalia and potentially the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Although there are few failed or collapsed states, the state's record in Africa is poor. The state is not only unable to manage conflict because its authority is weak, it is also a source of conflict. Chabal and Daloz argue the state is not just weak it is an empty shell. The state has "failed to become differentiated from the society over which it rules, it cannot acquire the neutral political status which alone would allow its legitimization and its proper institutionalization."⁵⁴ Nevertheless, even as a shell, the state has provided a framework which organises politics in African societies. This framework may be dysfunctional and it may even create the conditions for conflict, but its existence is not something that can be ignored. The contradictions of the state attest to the fact that the state in Africa is not a finished product but still caught in a process of formation which is partial, incomplete and disproportionate. Political space in Africa is defined by the contradictions, partial formations and imbalances arising from aspects of the state-building project.⁵⁵ Whereas in Europe the process of state-formation evolved over centuries and crystallised through many different evolutions, the state in Africa was imposed and has had to develop all the attributes of modern statehood simultaneously in less than half a century. The state in Africa does not fully encourage the practice of politics because there remains to be agreement on what the form of political organisation ought to be and how this is connected to the structure of relations within society.

⁵³Ayoade, "States without citizens," p. 103.

⁵⁴Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, Oxford: The International Africa Institute in association with James Currey and Indiana University Press, 1999, p. 13.

⁵⁵See James Manor, (ed.) *Rethinking Third World Politics*, London: Longman, 1991, p. 5.

THE PROBLEMS OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN AFRICA

In Africa, the state is often seen to be “responsible for the [political] crisis, so now civil society is viewed as the solution.”⁵⁶ The current fascination with the concept of civil society and Africa is derived from populist protests against dictatorship and repression in the mid-1980s to 90s, but also against the hardships imposed by structural adjustment programmes. Political change and the pressures for multi-party democracy meant “the concept of civil society has been freely used in recent years to characterize efforts and structures that challenge dictatorship and maximize individual freedom in Africa.”⁵⁷ This does not imply that elements of civil society did not exist before the 1980s, but that the concept of civil society was not applied to such phenomenon.⁵⁸ Voluntary associations and trade unions existed in both colonial and post-independence states, while many of the liberation movements of the 1950s and 60s emerged directly from civil society organisations. However, the present salience and fixation with civil society also reflects an alternative agenda within development and democratisation. It represents a backlash against modernisation theories which posited the state as the primary engine of development. This section will look at the problems defining civil society and its development in Africa.

Providing a sharply demarcated definition of civil society is highly problematic, especially with respect to Africa. Bayart defined civil society in Africa as “society in its relation to the state... in so far as it is in confrontation with the state or, more precisely, as the process by which society seeks to ‘breach’ and counteract the simultaneous ‘totalisation’ unleashed by the state.”⁵⁹ Civil society is founded upon the image of the state as a predator. Both the colonial and post-independence states sought to remake society and expunge potential civil societies, thus civil society typically refers to challenges to authoritarian and despotic

⁵⁶Eboe Hutchful, “The civil society debate in Africa,” *International Journal*, 51, Winter 1995-96, p. 64.

⁵⁷Ekeh, “The constitution of civil society,” p. 188.

⁵⁸Jean-Francois Bayart first popularised the concept of civil society with respect to Africa in his article, “Civil Society in Africa,” in Chabal, *Political Domination in Africa*, pp. 109-125.

⁵⁹Bayart, “Civil Society in Africa,” p. 111.

politics. Confrontation however assumes a hegemonic state in control of the means of coercion. In Africa, more often it is weak, not hegemonic states that exist. Thus it is unclear what associational groupings are organised against. However, social groupings in civil society are not even necessarily oriented against the state. Ndgewa has suggested that there are two faces of civil society, one which may promote democracy and oppose authoritarianism and one which accommodates the state. Civil society organisations, even if arranged against the state, are not always progressive. Warlords, strongmen and war profiteers also emerge from civil society and benefit from challenging the state. Lemarchand points out that “certain key sectors of society are just as thoroughly discredited as the state.”⁶⁰ The political vacuum in Africa has also been filled with parochial ethnic groupings, religious fundamentalists, and those engaged in corruption and economic plundering.⁶¹

It is also problematic to assume that civil society is clearly separate from the state in Africa. Because the state in Africa attempted to politicise all of social life, many organisations and interests associated with civil society fall into the state and parastatal sector. It is from these forces that the popular intellectuals and ‘civic strata’ are preponderantly drawn,⁶² ensuring that many civil society leaders have close ties to the state. Civil society leaders also often come from the same economic strata as state officials because to “participate actively and effectively in voluntary organizations requires relatively high levels of education, easy access to financial resources, and free time - all attributes of upper-class lifestyles.”⁶³ Since these elites straddle both political spheres, it is difficult to argue that there is a clear separation between state and civil society. If however, the weak state excluded civil society from official and legitimate political space, civil society may have been forced outside the political arena into other spaces, particularly at the local level. The power of civil society is not generally formal and it is not always evident where civil society is active, since the

⁶⁰Lemarchand, “Uncivil States and Civil Societies,” p. 191.

⁶¹Lemarchand, “Uncivil States and Civil Societies,” pp. 177-191.

⁶²Hutchful, “The civil society debate in Africa,” p. 69.

⁶³Robert Fatton Jr. *Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992, p. 5.

politics of civil society in Africa could be one of resistance, rather than confrontation with the state.

African society is also structured along an urban/rural divide, as the vast majority of Africans live in rural areas. This has led to the inclusion and incorporation of traditional forms of authority within an African civil society that contrasts with European notions of civil society as distinct from traditional or pre-political society. However, in Africa, kinship structures and patrimonial linkages remain important elements of African politics.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, patron-client politics creates a number of tensions for African statehood and civil society. Ekeh argues that there are two public realms in Africa; one associated with the formal public sphere of the state, and the other with the primordial public linked to kinship lineages. Because of the predatory character of the state, the formal, civic public sphere is considered to be amoral and to be taken advantage of, whereas morality and ethics reside in the primordial public and kinship groups.⁶⁵ Thus he argues that “it is insufficient to argue that the mere presence and ever further growth of civil society will help the development of democracy in Africa.”⁶⁶

Others point to the inherent weaknesses in African civil society. Like the state, civic groups lack economic and human resources. Civic groups and NGOs are not in a position to find independent sources of income, such as membership dues or contributions. Most groups and NGOs depend on revenue from either the state, international donors or partnerships with foreign NGOs, and inevitably find themselves tied to the political imperatives and projects of those who finance them. This not only fosters dependency, but also fails to ensure accountability and transparency. If civil society is taken to mean fully formed autonomous civic organisations, then civil society does not appear to exist in Africa. Formal associations are few and play an insignificant role in African politics. NGOs in

⁶⁴However, one should not conclude that patronage politics is specific to Africa, similar structures existed in European history.

⁶⁵Ekeh, “The constitution of civil society,” and Peter Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 17(1), 1975, pp. 91-112.

⁶⁶Ekeh, “The constitution of civil society,” p. 198.

Africa may not even signal a flourishing grass roots civil society. They may reflect “the successful adaptation to the conditions laid down by foreign donors on the part of local political actors who seek in this way to gain access to new resources.”⁶⁷ NGOS provide a new form of political and financial enrichment for African political elites.

The problems of defining civil society and applying it to Africa paradoxically demonstrates the usefulness of the concept by pointing to dilemmas and tensions in African politics. For example, for a variety of reasons, civic organisations are often “content to look after the affairs of other segments of the public realm out of reach of the state or those about which the state shows little concern.”⁶⁸ Yet,

[i]f civil society in Africa is to be able to effectively safeguard the people’s rights and interests against government, it needs to acquire knowledge or at least awareness of the workings of government and state apparatus. A major inhibition to civil society’s effectiveness in Africa today is the lack of this knowledge and awareness.⁶⁹

Civil society is weak in Africa because there is a poor sense of a collective membership, the sense of being joined together in a society. Thus while there are undoubtedly strong private spheres, the public element of civil society is weak which means that it has a limited ability to fulfil its political functions of countering the state in a positive way to extend or enlarge political space, and not just subvert it. Disengagement from the state does not enlarge the public sphere unless civil society in Africa is interested in redefining the rules of the game. The absence of a collective sense in the notion of civil society suggests that there may be some confusion about civil society in Africa, mistaking civil society for society. For while civil society is weak in Africa, African societies are strong and have exercised a lot of power against the state. According to Harbeson, “civil society typically refers to the point of agreement on what those working rules [of the political order or state] should be.”⁷⁰ This look at civil society in Africa focuses on the ordered arrangements of society in Africa, or rather the process of developing and working through these working

⁶⁷Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*, p. 22.

⁶⁸Ekeh, “The constitution of civil society,” p. 197.

⁶⁹Mw Makume, “Is there a civil society in Africa?”, p. 312.

⁷⁰Harbeson, “Civil society and political renaissance,” pp. 3-4.

rules of the political order, which may be pointing to an emergent or nascent civil society.⁷¹

The shortcomings of civil society and statehood attest to a crisis of politics in Africa. Because the state and civil society are both unfinished and muddled products, their integration and coherence are highly problematic. This is

attributable not only to such factors as resource scarcity and limited regulatory and coercive capacity; but also to social incoherence, ie. the lack of recurrent patterns of political exchange and reciprocity in the relations among social forces. To be sure, diversity of class, ethnic and regional interests makes competition and conflict among groups and leaders virtually inescapable; however, the destructive effects of these struggles can be reduced if the patterns of interaction among these contending elements can be regularized and if the state can play an effective mediatory role, helping set out the terms of relationship among competing interests.⁷²



In Africa, politics is poorly defined because the distinctions between formal and informal, public and private are blurred. One of the reasons the public sphere is weak in Africa is the continued understanding of the political as the communal and personalised.⁷³

The ‘economy of affection’ that reinforces personalized and paternalistic relations in Africa will continue to influence the manner in which organizations function and relationships are constituted by fostering dualities in Africa in which universal norms are in constant conflict with the particularistic behaviour of certain groups... African politics is a patchwork of discontinuities more than a seamless pattern of evolution.⁷⁴

Political space in Africa is characterised by weak and ill-formed political structures, exacerbated by failing economies, which has created political vacuums for social conflicts to develop into organised violence and civil war. Africa is susceptible to political instability and civil conflict because of “an absence of legitimized norms governing how society and



⁷¹The discrepancies between what is taking place in African politics and definitions of civil society also illustrate where there are contradictions and confusion with regards to the concept of civil society more generally.

⁷²Donald Rothchild and Michael W. Foley, “African states and the politics of inclusive Coalitions,” in Rothchild and Chazan, *The Precarious Balance*, p. 234.

⁷³Chabal and Daloz, *Africa Works*, p. 156, p. 8.

⁷⁴Dwayne Woods, “Civil Society in Europe and Africa: Limiting State Power through a Public Sphere,” *African Studies Review*, 35(2), September 1992, p. 86.

the state are to be constituted.”⁷⁵ The most fundamental political issues, the shape and structures of how politics is to be organised, the conditions for the integration of state and society, within a common political framework are all subject to disagreement. Civil conflict signals the breakdown or impossibility of any kind of agreement on what those rules should be. However, while Sub-Saharan Africa is characterised by a great deal of political confusion, nevertheless a number of countries have not experienced conflict and maintain a peaceful existence. However imperfect, a working agreement on a system of rules in some societies means the possibility for peace exists in Africa, but its realisation requires a comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of political space.



Conclusion

If Africa is to overcome its political crises and establish peaceful polities, Africans must search for ways that will enable the state and Africa’s civil society to be mutually engaged in the public arena, lessening the claims of the state for total ownership of the political space of the public realm and encouraging the competence of the individual with respect to his view of who owns the public realm where the state operates.⁷⁶

The crisis of politics in Africa requires a new configuration of political space that is based on an ordered arrangement of norms, institutions and procedures. When a basic agreement exists on this arrangement, the activity of politics to mediate differences and reconcile conflicts will be able to flourish. Peace lies in the degree and form of political space. Thus, peace requires a working form of political organisation that encapsulates society, is based on an ordered division of society which produces an integrated public space that reinforces a system of rules. Political space captures this essence of the arrangement of political society, both the structure and functions of the whole political arena, coherence of the system, and how all the elements fits together. The transition from war to peace depends on reconnecting, binding and cohering political space.

⁷⁵ John Harbeson, “Civil Society and Political Renaissance in Africa,” in Harbeson, Rothchild and Chazan, *Civil Society and the State in Africa*, p. 25.

⁷⁶ Ekeh, “The constitution of civil society,” p. 198.

The point of departure for the preceding discussion was the intervention of the peace process industry in countries making the transition from war to peace. The outcomes from this process point to a certain fixing of political space. If the peace process industry does not wish to obstruct or weaken the prospects for peace, it needs to consider the contours of political space. It also implies that in assessing their assistance, they must be aware of how their actions impede on the state in the performance of its political functions, on civil society, and on the integration of the two. International actors must assess their impact upon political space and ensure that they do not interpose between the state and civil society, or mediate relations between them. Before exploring these ideas in the Mozambican peace process, it is necessary to understand the history and construction of Mozambique's political space.

CHAPTER THREE

Mozambique: traditions of war and resistance

In the history of Mozambique, and for most of Southern Africa, peace has been the exception to the regular and repeated patterns of war, conquest, domination and insurrection. The peace accord signed in October 1992, sought to end 16 years of war between the government of Mozambique and Renamo. However, it also marked the conclusion of nearly 30 years of war involving Mozambicans from the launch of the liberation struggle in 1964. The roots of war and its recurrence can be found in the historical, political and social conditions of Mozambique and the region in which it plays a major role. These conditions are related to the processes of state and civil society formation in the development of political space. Historically, the state has always been weak. Establishing centralised authority in Mozambique has been constrained by the extent of its territory, its multi-ethnic composition, traditions of resistance to authority, raiding banditry and outside interference. In some sense, these pockets of social resistance were nascent forms of civil society. Although it is problematic to impose the language of contemporary social science on historical phenomena, the history of Mozambique is in part a history of weak state and weak civil society-formation.

I shall argue that at the time of the peace process, political space in Mozambique was constituted by a weak state unable to project itself and a nascent civil society still in the process of cohering. The political organisation of society was characterised by a lack of integration and coherence. In the following chapter, I shall create a composition of what political space looked like at the time of the peace process by sketching the history of Mozambique up to the 1990s. The chapter is divided chronologically into five sections: (1) early history and the Portuguese arrival, (2) the consolidation of Portuguese control, (3) the liberation struggle, 1962-1974, (4) the independence years under Frelimo, 1975-1990s, and (5) a return to war: Renamo, 1976-1992. The chapter outlines the contours of the political space in which the peace process industry will operate and interact with when the implementation of the peace agreement begins.

The history of Mozambique reveals a remarkable continuity of themes which provide a much overlooked context in which to understand Mozambique as a society and its propensity for war. These themes are first, geographical conditions. The size of the country accessed by a network of rivers and its extended coastline along the Indian Ocean has played a crucial role in Mozambique's history and regional importance. Mozambique's north-south frontiers are delineated by the Rovuma and Maputo rivers; while the Limpopo, Save, and Zambezi rivers effectively carve the country into three regions, south, central and north. As a consequence, Mozambique has been oriented in an east-west direction, linking the south to South Africa, the centre to Zimbabwe, and the north to Tanzania and Malawi, at the expense of north-south or national integration. (See Map of Mozambique, p. 6)

The second theme is economic opportunity arising from the importance of Mozambique as the gateway to the interior, its established trading networks, the mining of precious metals and the exploitation of labour. The third theme is foreign penetration and assimilation. Mozambique is a product of the persistent imposition of foreign peoples, cultures, and power on local inhabitants, followed by the almost inevitable incorporation of foreigners with the native peoples. The fourth theme is the problem of establishing centralised authority over this diverse and localised population throughout parts of Mozambique and then the country as a whole. These attempts have encountered persistent acts of social resistance, violence and banditry which is the fifth theme pervasive throughout Mozambican history. The recurrence of these five themes provide the context in which the state and civil society in Mozambique, and hence its political space, has developed.

Early history and the Portuguese arrival



Amidst the missionary records and Portuguese tales, the history of Mozambique emerges as an ongoing story of foreign penetration and assimilation through invasion, conquest and trade. Long before Vasco de Gama arrived off Mozambique Island in 1498, major kingdoms had formed and collapsed as different bands of people invaded then ruled local inhabitants. The Portuguese noted three native African inhabitants, the Makua, north of the Zambezi, and the Karanga and Tonga to the south. One of the earliest attempts at

centralised authority began with the Karanga kingdom, a sub-group of the Shona, who exerted their hegemony from the Dzimbabwe court near Fort Victoria across much of central Mozambique. Newitt describes the Karanga kingdom as

a kind of overrule grafted on to these pre-existing institutions with which they tried to form ties in various complex ways. In time of war or civil strife, the Karanga states could rapidly break down into their component sub-chieftaincies whose rulers either asserted their independence or transferred their payment of tribute (in effect their allegiance) to some other paramount chief or to the Portuguese.¹

In a pattern repeated until the 19th century, conquest by one overlord was eventually threatened by secession from rebellious regions which threw kingdoms into civil war allowing new invaders the opportunity to establish new suzerainties.

Expanding trading networks and the exposure to foreign influences was integral to this process. An advanced trading network along the Zambesi, Save and Limpopo rivers linked market fairs throughout the hinterland. Trade was primarily conducted by Muslim traders who had operated along the coast and inland rivers since about AD1000², controlling important trading centres and urban settlements. African chiefs relied on these traders who “in return for gold, copper and ivory, ...brought by caravan to Zimbabwe considerable amounts of Asian cloth, Indian beads, and even some Chinese porcelain.”³ The close links between the Sheiks and chieftains were strengthened by intermarriage and the adoption of Islam by some African chiefs. Indian merchants also operated and lived in Mozambique. They included both Hindu Indians who provided capital for the economy and later on Catholic Goans who settled along the rivers.

It was into this established network of trade that Vasco de Gama landed off Mozambique Island in northern Mozambique during a voyage to India. Initially Portuguese interest in Mozambique was “for mineral wealth from coastal bases to pay Indian merchants for spices

¹Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, London: Hurst & Company, 1995, p. 43.

²Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, London: Rex Collings Ltd, 1978, p. 6.

³Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, p. 6.

and wars; it was the beginning of a policy of trade, not territorial domination.”⁴ However, the promise of gold in the interior lured the Portuguese inland and led to a more aggressive policy. Portugal’s declining mercantile power and increasing inability to finance its trading expeditions led to attempts to impose their political and military authority in the Indian Ocean. Portugal also decided to eliminate rival Muslim middlemen to create a crown monopoly on trade. Allied with African chiefs, Portuguese crews attacked Muslim towns and installed puppet clients. However, Portuguese expansion often encountered Muslim resistance on the mainland, beginning a tradition of resistance amongst the Makua people in the north.

Although the Portuguese continued to attack coastal towns to assert control over the coastline, “by the second decade of the [16th] century the Portuguese were busy weaving themselves into the existing fabric of the coast’s commercial life.”⁵ As with the Muslim traders before them, the Portuguese began to assimilate into the local community, often through intermarriage, creating a new class of landed Afro-Portuguese. This class deepened the rift between the crown and its agents, creating competing centres of power which characterised Portuguese rule. The shortage of men and ships spread across the Portuguese empire from Brazil to Africa to Asia meant that Portugal’s nominal control over Mozambique was almost always overstretched. Portugal recognised that their “thin resources and scarce manpower determined that the crown from the outset of expansion should delegate judicial, administrative and fiscal duties to individuals.”⁶ Local rulers of the coastal cities granted trading licenses, dealt with African and Muslim chiefs, controlled all shipping and shipbuilding and were also the principal traders. The independence of Portuguese officials allowed them to personally profit from trade, stealing from and neglecting the crown’s trade. According to Newitt, “as early as 1510 an estimate suggested that three-quarters of Portuguese trade was in private hands.”⁷

⁴Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, p. 17.

⁵Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 22.

⁶Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, p. 56.

⁷Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 26.

Allied with rival African chiefs, the Portuguese gradually established themselves along the Zambesi, the only area of Portuguese settlement. In the Zambesi valley, Portugal's authority was exerted through the *prazos da coroa* or crown estates along the Zambesi river. Originating in the sixteenth century, prazos were land grants from the crown to Portuguese backwoodsmen. Prazo estates varied in size from minor landholdings to vast empires ruled by competing families like the da Cruz, de Sousa and the Perreiras. What was particularly interesting about the prazos was the transformation of a feudal Portuguese system into an Africanised society. Through intermarriage to Africans, Muslims, and Goans, these *muzungos* (Afro-Portuguese) retained only the cultural symbols and family name from Portugal. They often took on the status of African chieftain because of their reliance on Africans for their defence and political authority. Living in the valley meant that

the *muzungos* adopted an African way of life, farming, mining, travelling, ruling and fighting according to local African custom, because they ultimately had to fit into patterns of inheritance, land use and reciprocal obligation that would satisfy their African kin and their African retainers and clients.⁸

The vast armies, independent chieftaincies and general lawlessness of the prazo system however, threatened Portuguese control. The breakdown of Portugal's *Estado da India*, the Karanga civil wars, migrations from Central Africa into the north and south of the Zambesi, locusts and drought all contributed to chaos in the territory in the 16th and 17th centuries.

Portuguese authority was also challenged by other European powers in the region. From the 16th century, Dutch and English ships traversed the Indian Ocean, waylaying Portuguese vessels. The Dutch attempted to seize Mozambique from Portugal on three occasions. The Portuguese were able to fend them off but unable to establish control of the coastal waters. After peace treaties were signed, trade between the three countries began to flourish even if their commercial rivalry continued. In later centuries, Portugal was ineffective against British navy patrols along the coast enforcing the abolition of slavery, while Scottish missionaries such as David Livingstone set up religious missions near Malawi, condemning the Portuguese for brutal labour practices.

⁸Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 128.

Towards the end of the 18th century into the 19th century, the slave trade dominated Mozambique. An interior slave trade had flourished in Mozambique under Muslim influence for centuries but the new demand from plantations in the New World revived and expanded the activity.⁹ It has been estimated that 15,000 slaves were taken from Mozambique every year in the 1820s and 1830s. Prazo owners enthusiastically took part in this trade, not only selling their own slaves, but free peasants and other members of their estates to slavers. The slave trade disrupted the social and economic base of their system by leading to “the emergence of large protected settlements, militarised societies and larger-scale political organisation. The depopulation created a vacuum and encouraged migration, so that whole chieftaincies relocated in the early nineteenth century.”¹⁰ Smaller prazo estates disappeared, while power concentrated in a few settler families. The aggressive expansionary drives and competitive rivalries between the remaining families started the Zambesi wars in the 1840s which eventually destroyed the prazo system. Although they began as attempts to establish or resist the dominance of one African group over another, they “continued after the 1880s with appeals to wider unity against the extension of Portuguese sovereignty.”¹¹ The Portuguese exploited the wars, using one against another to establish control over the fractious landowners. However, they were unable to do so until after the turn of the century when the prazo system was finally abolished in 1930.

Mozambique’s long history of upheaval and war was derived from these pressures to establish control and the strong traditions of resistance this generated. From this early history, the foundations of political space in Mozambique were slowly being structured to encapsulate the whole territory comprising modern Mozambique. This expansion of the boundaries of political space involved bringing in diverse groups of people into one collective political entity, generating persistent struggles for and against authority. Political space in Mozambique has always been characterised by this strong tension between

⁹The slave trade was also fuelled by instability from the Ngoni invasions in the 1820s. Led by Zulu chiefs, they swept northward from Natal in South Africa into southern Mozambique, founding the Gaza kingdom.

¹⁰Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 253.

¹¹Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, p. 84.

centralising and decentralising pressures, both pulling at the structure of political space.

The Portuguese colonial state

The colonial system dispossessed Africa, and it's the dispossession that matters. It's not that you knock people on the head and take their goods. It's that you dispossess them of their sense of person, their sense of value, their sense of history - everything.¹²

Throughout their hold on Mozambique, Portuguese rule was highly decentralised, disorganised and run by poorly educated and corrupt administrators. As late as 1890, Portuguese control of Mozambique "was ..confined to a half-dozen... forts or... garrisons at Lourenço Marques, Sofala, Tete, Sena, Quelimane and on Mozambique and Ibo Islands... Twenty years later Portugal... occupied nearly all of the country."¹³ At war with the da Cruz family in the Zambesi wars, Portugal also began a pacification campaign against the Gaza king, Gungunhana, in southern Mozambique, which destroyed the Gaza kingdom. Nevertheless despite these military conquests, Portuguese domination was tenuous and frequently challenged. Towards the end of the 19th century, economic activity was expanding in Mozambique with the rise of plantation agriculture and the demand for labour from the diamond and gold mines of the Transvaal. With economic growth came further aggression from the Boers and the English who claimed sovereignty over parts of Mozambique. After the Berlin Congress in 1884-85 established the principle of effective occupation rather than prior discovery as the right to territorial possession, Portugal desperately sought to consolidate and demonstrate its control over Mozambique.

Although Cecil Rhodes sought to justify his claim to northern parts of the Zambesi, treaties between Britain and Portugal finally settled upon the boundaries which define Mozambique today. While the outward boundaries of Mozambique were settled, the colony still "lacked any unified system of administration or law, was largely unmapped, had little in the way of public revenues or communications infrastructure, and had few of even the most basic

¹²Basil Davidson, interview in *The Guardian*, 15 February 1997.

¹³Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, p. 92.

services.”¹⁴ For most of Portuguese rule, Mozambique was administered by military personnel because Portugal never developed a professional colonial service.¹⁵ Following the pacification campaigns, “military posts were established under Portuguese officers backed by black *cipais* [police], and these began to collect tax, recruit labour and carry out other rudimentary governmental functions using the *regulos* - petty chiefs or village headmen - as their agents and replacing them if they refused.”¹⁶ The Portuguese used taxation as a means of binding Africans to colonial authority since taxes were a symbol of homage to a sovereign authority in Mozambique.

The effective administration of the colony was undermined by Portugal’s position as the poorest European nation. Portugal itself lacked revenue and depended upon foreign investment to finance its overseas adventures. Consequently, much of Mozambique was under the authority of foreign charter companies. These concessionary companies such as the Moçambique Company, the Niassa Company, and the Zambesia Company had been granted land charters with extensive administrative powers. The Moçambique Company, originally financed by French and British capital, for example was granted

the right to raise taxes, to grant mineral and land concessions and to issue currency and postage stamps. In return it undertook the administration, pacification and settlement of the region between the Zambesi and latitude 22 degrees south of the Sabi, and agreed to pay the Portuguese government 7.5% of all profits.¹⁷

The first railways were also built by foreign capital. In the late 19th century, it was France not Portugal who was Mozambique’s largest European trading partner in both imports and exports and this was second to trade with India.¹⁸

In marked contrast to other colonial powers which exported capital overseas, the wealth of

¹⁴Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 356.

¹⁵The absence of a settler class prevented the emergence of an autonomous class of settler administrators who might have governed the territory.

¹⁶Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 382.

¹⁷Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 369.

¹⁸Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, pp. 320-1.

Africa would develop Portugal. Portugal discovered that the most valuable resource in the colony was the African population itself. The Portuguese found that “the products of African agriculture could be exported, Africans could be sold Portuguese wine and textiles, they could be taxed, and their labour could be employed in various ways.”¹⁹ As a result, Portugal instituted exploitative labour practices known as *chibalo* or forced labour. According to the 1899 labour code, “all natives of Portuguese overseas provinces are subject to the obligation, moral and legal, of attempting to obtain through work, the means that they lack to subsist and to better their social condition.”²⁰ They “must civilize themselves through work.”²¹ In addition to this, laws decreed in 1901 that all land not privately owned became the property of the state. Since most Africans could not afford to own their land, they were dispossessed of their land and forced to become labourers.²²

As the provincial economy was directed towards Portugal’s needs, African farmers were forced to produce cash crops, such as cotton to support Portugal’s textile industries. This was labour intensive and time-consuming which resulted in the neglect of food crops leading to starvation and famine. The system of production was reoriented towards large plantations producing sugar, tea, sisal and cashews. However, plantation owners found themselves in competition for African labour with South African mines. Mozambique and South Africa had formalised agreements in which the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association was given a monopoly to recruit Mozambicans, employing over 100,000 Mozambicans in the 1920s. In exchange, gold reserves were directly given to the colonial government and there was a guaranteed level of traffic through the port at Maputo.

With the ending of the charter companies in the 1930s, the whole of Mozambique was solely under Portuguese control and influence for the first time. In 1932, the Portuguese monarchy was overthrown by the military, ushering in the dictatorship of Antonio Salazar.

¹⁹Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 406.

²⁰Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, London: Penguin Books, 1969, p. 33.

²¹Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, p. 116.

²²Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, p. 31.

Salazar's colonial policies were conservative and autarkic, disallowing foreign investment and nationalising industry and agriculture to ensure 60% Portuguese ownership. Salazar also encouraged rural and uneducated Portuguese peasants to migrate to Mozambique to relieve overpopulation in Portugal and to increase the number of settlers in the province. The white population in Mozambique increased from under 20,000 in 1930, doubling by 1950 and again by 1960 with over a 100,000 new immigrants arriving in the 1970s.

It wasn't until after World War II however, that Portugal attempted to develop Mozambique, embarking on a number of large development and infrastructure projects. One of the most ambitious was the Cahora Bassa dam in Tete province, jointly owned by Mozambique, Portugal and South Africa, which became the fifth largest hydro-electric dam in the world. Still, much of the country remained undeveloped and neglected. As late as 1964, there were only 7366 miles of national highways built across the province. This particular neglect

had the effect of increasing isolation of the different regions from each other, emphasising their relationship with nearby countries to which they were linked by railway lines or simply by geographical proximity, and underlining yet again the dis-integration of the country as a whole.²³

Moreover, this new energy towards developing the colony did not extend to Africans. Basic health and education services were neglected and any opposition was repressed.

Under Salazar, the Catholic Church was given "special recognition as an instrument of civilisation and national influence."²⁴ In the absence of state education, "[m]ission education became official education, and the missions thereby became a branch of the government with an important role in propaganda and social control."²⁵ Protestant and Catholic missions were mostly located around urban centres with Protestant missions concentrated in the south. Where Islam dominated in the north, there were few formal educational opportunities. There were also restrictions on African advancement in schools

²³Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 464.

²⁴Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 479.

²⁵Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 479.

in the form of fees, labour, and religious requirements. There were no higher educational institutions because the Portuguese were “hesitant to create an intellectual elite similar to the one which played a leading role in the doom of the British and French colonial empires.”²⁶

Although the Portuguese claimed to have a multi-racial policy, officially the Portuguese distinguished between *indigenas* and *nao-indigenas*, with the former subject to colonial law and the latter, full citizenship under metropolitan law. All *indigenas* were required to carry identity and work cards, without which could result in immediate arrest and labour recruitment. The Portuguese also distinguished between *mestiços* who were of mixed parentage and *assimilados*, those Africans who had assimilated Portuguese culture with an ability to read, write and speak Portuguese. *Assimilados* were few in number, reaching only 4554 in 1955,²⁷ and were never fully accepted in white European society. However, many of the leaders of the liberation struggle emerged from this class.

Only the threat of insurrection prompted Portugal to initiate reform and increase investment in Mozambique. In 1961, *indigenas* became full Portuguese citizens, while in 1962, forced labour was outlawed. From the 1950s, restrictions against foreign investment were relaxed and completely abandoned from 1965.²⁸ Military and security threats due to the liberation struggle led to the building of roads, ports, docks, schools and hospitals. In 1972, Mozambique was made a state within Portugal with more power over taxation and expenditure but not over defence. These efforts were already too late, not only with respect to the progress of the war but the fact that Portugal’s influence was already overshadowed by South Africa which became Mozambique’s largest trading partner in 1971 and main source of foreign capital by 1974.²⁹ Despite Portugal’s belated attempts to effect centralised control over the colony, this period of Mozambique’s history was dominated by

²⁶Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, p. 146.

²⁷Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 475, see table 17.2.

²⁸Thomas Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique’s War of Independence, 1964-1974*, London: Greenwood Press, 1983, p. 163.

²⁹Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 533.

decentralised and fragmented pressures. Although symptomatic of colonial states, attempts by the Portuguese to exercise authority were characterised by force and coercion which is often the hollow base of centralised authority. The experience of centralised authority for the majority of Mozambicans was excessively violent, which in turn generated a violent response.

FRELIMO and the liberation struggle

The character of the government in Portugal itself makes a peaceful solution inherently unlikely. Within Portugal the government has promoted neither sound economic growth nor social well-being, and has gained little international respect. The possession of the colonies has helped to conceal these failures: the colonies contribute to the economy; they add to Portugal's consequence in the world, ... they have provided a national myth of empire which helps discourage any grumbling by a fundamentally dissatisfied population. The government knows how ill it can afford to lose the colonies.³⁰

Eduardo Mondlane

The Portuguese colonial state was coercive and exploitative, repressing any expression of dissent. Yet resistance to the Portuguese and other kinds of domination had a long tradition in Mozambique. Mondlane, FRELIMO's founder, was descended from a chief in the Gaza kingdom who had fought against the Portuguese in the pacification campaign of 1895. Resistance against the Portuguese took many forms, often ethnically or regionally based. These protests included strikes, riots and local demonstrations, particularly amongst the Makonde in the North, the last region pacified by Portugal. Muslims in the north had always defied Portuguese control until Portugal conquered the region in 1910, although this control was shortlived with another rebellion in 1917 put down in 1920. In addition to popular rebellion there were also acts of personal resistance to the colonial state such as migrating, avoiding taxes, escaping labour projects, or working in South African mines.

The beginnings of national consciousness, however, lay with the intellectuals. It was the educated and *assimilado* Africans, caught between Portuguese discrimination and African

³⁰Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, p. 123-4.

alienation, who mobilised criticism of Portuguese rule through newspapers such as *O Africano* and later *O Brado Africano* which were both closed by the government. These intellectuals and others were inspired by Nkrumah and Nyerere and the peaceful transition to independence under French and British colonialism. Intellectual resistance also included subversive poetry which mocked Portuguese exploitation and hypocrisy but resulted in police persecution for the poets. A number of political associations and student organisations emerged, but these quickly attracted police surveillance and eventual closure. The violent repression by the Portuguese and Portuguese hostility towards independence meant that resistance went underground with exile movements forming in neighbouring Tanzania and Zambia.

Three exile movements dominated the early 1960s. These were UDENAMO, a group of workers and exiles from south and central Mozambique formed in Tanzania, MANU, mostly Makonde from the north and dominated by English speakers and UNAMI, organised by Mozambicans from Tete in Malawi. At the insistence and encouragement of Julius Nyerere, these three movements formed a coalition called FRELIMO, the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*, under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane in Dar es Salaam in 1962. FRELIMO³¹ was immediately recognised by the OAU, as the “sole recipient of aid to Mozambican groups,”³² and a few months later, held its first party congress in Dar es Salaam with delegates from all regions in Mozambique.

From the beginning, FRELIMO was beset by factions and in-fighting over divergent interests, objectives and the definition of the enemy. Mondlane believed that the task of the liberation movement was not to replace white Europeans with black Africans but to transform the colonial system itself. Thus he advocated a multi-racial movement which welcomed all Mozambicans who believed in democracy, whether they were black, white, or *mestiços*. However, this open policy was resented by those who felt the influence of *mestiços* from the south was too strong. Other problems related to international support and

³¹FRELIMO refers to the liberation movement, while Frelimo is reserved for the official party and government of Mozambique.

³²Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, p. 170.

ideological orientation. Within Frelimo

divergent groups each accused each other of pro-Western, pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese sympathies. Other reasons for cleavages were the stresses and strains of exile politics among a heterogeneous leadership of varied ethnic, language, religious, social and educational backgrounds who had little political experience.³³

Mondlane was considered to be too Western and accused of being a CIA spy, while his white American wife, Janet was resented for running the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam. Students at the Mozambique Institute, part of Frelimo's educational system preparing students for education abroad, rebelled against her control and closed the school for months. Mondlane also faced criticism from students abroad who refused to give up their education and return to Mozambique to join the military effort.

Although defections plagued FRELIMO, none of the defectors were able to form a significant opposition to FRELIMO and none gained international recognition. The first to leave FRELIMO was Adelino Gwambe, the first president of UNDENAMO who had sought the presidency of FRELIMO himself. He was later expelled from Tanzania for being a Portuguese agent, a common and useful accusation, but he later formed another group in Uganda. Another high-level departure occurred during the war, when the Makonde chief and MANU leader, Lazaro Kavandame, was removed from office for 'exploiting' the peasantry. A conservative and traditional leader, Kavandame was alarmed by the growing radicalism in the movement, resented the burden of warfare in the north of the country and wanted the northern provinces to secede. With the Portuguese, Kavandame and others, were implicated in the assassination of Mondlane in 1969. His death created a severe setback for FRELIMO. A transition council led by Samora Machel, FRELIMO's army commander, Marcelino dos Santos, a prominent mestiço and former poet, and Uria Simango, a conservative leader, led to another contest between radical and conservative elements. The further radicalisation of movement became inevitable after Machel became FRELIMO's new leader, and Simango was expelled as a Portuguese agent.

At the beginning, FRELIMO was torn between two options, political diplomacy to

³³Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, p. 173.

negotiate independence or a guerrilla campaign. Portuguese intransigence, their refusal to recognise the principle of self-determination, and moreover their claim to Mozambique as an overseas province, convinced FRELIMO that only armed struggle would achieve independence. From 1963, militants including Machel, began guerrilla training in Algeria. With only 250 guerrillas, FRELIMO began the war on 25 September 1964, with small units hitting administrative positions in Cabo Delgado province. Like other insurgent groups, FRELIMO used guerrilla warfare tactics of ambush, sabotage, hit-and-run raids, then fading into the bush. However, they were severely constrained by a lack of skills, most guerrillas couldn't drive or operate machinery, and the poor quality of weapons, some from World War II. At the beginning, the leaders avoided “[the] destruction of development schemes that independent Mozambicans would inherit.”³⁴ This would change as the war progressed.

The assault surprised the Portuguese. Since a revolt in Angola in 1961, Portuguese authorities had been preparing to defend against attacks from Tanzania, not inside Mozambique. They moved people from the border into fortified villages, called *aldeamentos*, to provide security and create village militias but also to deny guerrillas access to the people. Forced relocation into these villages, away from ancestral lands to face more restrictions and harassment by Portuguese officials, generated greater peasant resentment. This served to create more sympathy for FRELIMO as well as refugees, who having fled to Tanzania, were easily recruited by FRELIMO. The Portuguese also recruited a significant numbers of Africans into the colonial army, particularly from the Islamic Makua and Yao groups. From 4000 in 1961, this rapidly expanded to 35,000 by 1964, and 65,000 by 1968. By 1974, Africans comprised 60% of the colonial army, with the greatest concentration in special commando units.³⁵

After FRELIMO's initial successes, there was a lull in fighting until 1965 when FRELIMO opened another front in Niassa province. There they met stronger Portuguese resistance and hostility from the Yao and Makua peoples who were traditional enemies to the Makonde, and who as Muslims feared religious persecution given some of FRELIMO's rhetoric.

³⁴Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, p. 191.

³⁵Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, p. 198.

FRELIMO held its second party congress in 1968 in Niassa province to demonstrate that the struggle was taking place on Mozambican soil. But again, despite opening a third front in Tete province, Frelimo advances were stalled leading to more internal division. In response to FRELIMO's incursions the new Portuguese commander, Kaulza de Arriaga, launched a massive offensive using 35,000 troops in Cabo Delgado province in Operation Gordian Knot. Despite this effort and Portugal's use of siphoned NATO military assistance, neither side gained a real advantage. However, Portugal was increasingly losing money and men in a war it wasn't winning because of FRELIMO's use of the country's size to overextend Portuguese resources. FRELIMO also attacked the Cahora Bassa Dam for symbolic value and to draw Portuguese troops into a defensive position, diverting troops from other areas.

In 1972, FRELIMO began to target railways and white settlements in Manica and Sofala. With greater assistance, weapons and training from Eastern Bloc countries, the USSR, China and Vietnam, FRELIMO intensified their campaign, attacking strategic towns and targets. The level of violence directed at both settlers and Africans in central Mozambique generated hostility towards FRELIMO in the region which continues to persist. They also struck at transport routes leading to Salisbury and coordinated tactics with Zimbabwean insurgents which brought Rhodesian forces over the border. By 1974, FRELIMO was advancing into central Mozambique south of the Zambesi close to Gorongosa. They crossed the Save River and tentatively advanced towards Lourenço Marques. Stretched over three fronts in Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, the Portuguese army became increasingly demoralised.

The ongoing progress of the war radicalised FRELIMO's political orientation which intensified but also partially resolved FRELIMO's internal divisions. From an anti-colonial movement, FRELIMO evolved into a social revolution that "has as its point of departure the negation of the exploitation of man by man."³⁶ This phrase, the exploitation of man by man figured in many FRELIMO speeches. Mondlane was behind much of FRELIMO's

³⁶Tom Young, "The Politics of Development in Angola and Mozambique," *African Affairs*, 87, p. 167.

socialist orientation, seeking to rebuild “Mozambican society, using the intensive solidarity of the revolutionary struggle to transform it into a state free from foreign or traditional exploitation.”³⁷ This included exploitation by petty bourgeois capitalists such as Kavandame. His expulsion and others like him allowed the movement to eliminate traditional elements and consolidate the revolution, which formed the basis for the future government. Although FRELIMO originated as a force prising open colonial political space, their internal development subsequently also closed off alternative conceptions of political space unsympathetic to the social revolution.

The guerrilla army was one of the agents for social change by which FRELIMO put their claims into practice. FRELIMO soldiers not only underwent ideological training, but different ethnic and regional groups were mixed together to foster solidarity and create national consciousness. Women as well, were allowed into combat units and given a voice in political meetings. The army was also used as a forward movement for mass mobilisation. In areas won by FRELIMO, the liberated zones in the north, FRELIMO set up a rudimentary administrative apparatus, encouraging cooperative agriculture, village committees, schools, a primary health system and women’s politicisation. Although it is difficult to establish the verity of nationalist claims, “embryonic forms of socialist practice were forged in the liberated zones, in the development of political mobilization, new forms of collective production, new methods of socio-political organization and even the creation of a New Man.”³⁸ The war was not only a struggle for liberation but a social revolution.

By the middle of 1974 there was an undeclared truce between Portuguese and FRELIMO troops with Portuguese soldiers refusing to fight. The lack of progress in the war, the war in Angola, rising Portuguese casualties and mounting pressure for reform at home led to the Generals’ coup in Lisbon in 1974. Although there were settler factions who dreamed of a Mozambican UDI, Portugal quickly agreed to a cease-fire and negotiations. The Lusaka Accord of September 1974 unconditionally handed power over to FRELIMO and brought in a 9-month transitional government. Apart from an aborted coup attempt by settlers, the

³⁷Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History*, p. 174.

³⁸Young, “The Politics of Development,” p. 169.

transition was peaceful and Mozambique became independent on 25 June 1975.

The independence years

Our people's experience of a State and government, the experience of all workers has been that State and government are oppressive structures, hostile forces compelling us to submit and resign ourselves to foreign domination, to the domination of big financial interests.³⁹

Samora Machel

Although independence came to Mozambique, the war had not been won. FRELIMO's ten year struggle had invested it with legitimacy, military power and internal party strength, but its uneven success across the country meant that the south, centre and north had different experiences of the war with far reaching implications for the future. In the north where they had established the liberated zones, FRELIMO's authority was strongest. In the centre, they encountered more resistance, relying more on coercion and violence against the people, while the south escaped most of the fighting, although many of the leaders originated from there. Premature victory shortened the revolutionary process but FRELIMO's leaders were committed to transforming their guerrilla movement into a political vehicle through which to revolutionise the state. The elimination of traditional and conservative elements during the struggle left a core cadre of leaders unwilling to compromise over the revolution. However, the Frelimo government soon encountered hostility to its project and new challenges to its authority and moral integrity.

Frelimo's radical socialist rhetoric, the uncertainty of independence and reports of revenge killings hastened the flight of Portuguese settlers from the country. Although Frelimo had called for a new multi-racial society and encouraged Portuguese settlers to participate in building a new Mozambique, a rapid Portuguese exodus began. Between September 1974 and April 1975, 52000 settlers from a total of 200,000 left, with only 20,000 settlers remaining by June 1976. Many of the fleeing Portuguese sabotaged the possessions they left behind, including cars, tractors, buses, houses, farm machinery, cattle, and produce.

³⁹Samora Machel, "Frelimo's Tasks in the Struggle Ahead," in *Mozambique: Revolution or Reaction*, Richmond, B.C.: LSM Press, 1975, p. 7.

Although most of the settlers were poorly-skilled and only semi-literate, they had formed the administrative class which had sustained Mozambique's infrastructure and economy. The mass exodus of drivers, technicians, teachers, health workers, shopkeepers, managers, businessmen, and state officials created a severe crisis for the new government.

Frelimo devised a policy called 'intervention' using the state to take over small abandoned businesses and farms. Frelimo also began to nationalise "all health services, education, legal services and especially rented property... the whole of the retail sector,"⁴⁰ and land itself. With its faith in scientific socialism, Frelimo committed itself to state ownership of the productive resources and overall state control of the economy. They created a centrally planned economy and set up a Planning Commission to oversee the direction of economic targets and their implementation. From the outset, there was a contradiction between the ambitious reach of the state into every aspect of the economy, and the administrative capacity to carry it through. At the time of independence, illiteracy stood at 97% and there were some 150 university educated graduates⁴¹ to assume the country's administration.

Frelimo believed these obstacles could be overcome by the party and at its third party congress in 1977 declared itself to be the vanguard party of Marxism-Leninism.⁴² This reduced the state to a vehicle for the party, but also through the party extended the state. Frelimo created

a system of public administration in which the party secretary at a particular level was also the top official in the government hierarchy. The provincial first secretary was always the governor of the province. The district administrator was the first secretary of Frelimo at the level of the district.⁴³

Frelimo also used 'dynamising groups' to transmit Frelimo's ideology to the masses in

⁴⁰Young, "The Politics of Development", p. 174.

⁴¹Prakash Ratilal, *Mozambique: Using Aid to End the Emergency*, New York, NY: UNDP, 1990, p. 16.

⁴²The credibility of Mozambique's Marxism has been debated, see Michel Cahen, "Check on Socialism? What Check, What Socialism," *Review of African Political Economy*, 57, 1993, pp. 46-59.

⁴³Bridget O'Laughlin, "Interpretations Matter: Evaluating the War in Mozambique," *Southern Africa Report*, January 1992, p. 29.

factories, schools, villages and neighbourhoods, for organising everything from literacy programmes to the running of factories.⁴⁴ A number of mass organisations were created, such as the Mozambican Woman's Organisation, Mozambican Youth Organisation, and the Organisation of Mozambican Workers. They also established "people's assembly elections at local levels in 1977 and 1980 [to] provide the opportunity for voters to accept or reject party-proposed candidates... [as] the basis for indirect elections to provincial and national assemblies."⁴⁵ In its external relations, Mozambique signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR in 1977, followed by similar treaties with Cuba and East Germany. This brought a cheap supply of oil from the USSR, material and technical assistance, especially military equipment and advisors.

Despite the claims to popular participation or *poder popular* (people's power), in reality, certain people were barred from election, among them traditional chiefs and *regulos* who had held posts under the colonial regime; great tension was created in some areas where the 'natural' leaders of the community were replaced by party nominees with no local standing whatever.⁴⁶

In seeking to modernise traditional society, Frelimo overlooked and reduced the authority of traditional chiefs, and minimised regional and ethnic differences. Frelimo concentrated on forging national unity and thus refused to "recognise tribes, regions, race or religious beliefs," ... "We only recognize Mozambicans who are equally exploited and equally desirous of freedom and revolution."⁴⁷ Frelimo also sought to create a secular state, closing churches and confiscating church property. Frelimo's leaders, predominantly from the Protestant South, viewed the Catholic Church with suspicion because of its role in colonial education and its opposition to the independence struggle. One beneficiary of Frelimo ideology however were women. Machel declared the liberation of women "a fundamental necessity for the Revolution, the guarantee of its continuity and the precondition for its

⁴⁴Mark Simpson, "Foreign and Domestic Factors in The Transformation of Frelimo," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31(2), 1993, p. 317.

⁴⁵William Minter, *Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique*, London: Zed Books, 1994, p. 26.

⁴⁶Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 544.

⁴⁷Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983, p. 112.

victory.⁴⁸ But liberating women posed another threat to traditional authority. Dogmatic faith in the modernising capacity of scientific socialism and its revolutionary potential, while rejecting a ‘backward’ peasantry, generated more enemies than Frelimo needed. Through the party, Frelimo created new norms, institutions and procedures to create and serve public interests, but it did so by closing off political space to certain groups and defining the public sphere in an exclusionary manner.

A large part of Frelimo’s leadership came from the *assimilado* class, whose roots did not lie with the peasantry, ethnic or lineage associations. This created an urban bias that was exacerbated by the shift of power from the north to the south in the 19th century. The two major cities, Maputo and Beira, were “created out of nothing to serve the needs of the British hinterland, ...situated in the extreme south and the centre-south. As a result, the urban African elite had nothing on which to depend, no tradition.”⁴⁹ Although rural peasants formed the majority of Mozambicans (over 90% in 1983) and the backbone of the agricultural economy, the leadership rejected the peasantry as an obstacle to the expansion of agricultural output. This hostility towards the peasantry influenced Mozambique’s development strategy of a capital intensive state farm sector. Government resources were given to large state farms and cooperatives, rather than small peasant holdings, the distribution network was run by the state through People’s Shops, with producer and consumer prices set by state bodies, while industry produced heavy machinery for state farms rather than basic goods such as tires and hoes. It is estimated that 90 per cent of agricultural investment in 1977-1983 went to the state sector, 2 per cent to cooperatives, and virtually none to the small family sector.⁵⁰ As part of this policy and to provide better services, Frelimo also created communal villages based on the example of *ujamaa* in Tanzania creating 1500 villages containing over 1.5 million people by 1981.⁵¹ Peasant

⁴⁸Samora Machel, *Mozambique: Sowing the Seeds of Revolution* cited in Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism*, p. 115.

⁴⁹Cahen, “Check on Socialism,” p. 49.

⁵⁰Mark Chingono, *The State, Violence and Development: The Political Economy of War in Mozambique, 1975-1992*, Aldershot: Avebury Press, 1996, p. 37.

⁵¹Otto Roesch, “Rural Mozambique Since the Frelimo Party Fourth Congress: The Situation in the Baixo Limpopo,” *Review of African Political Economy*, 41, 1988, p. 76.

reluctance to communalisation led Frelimo to use more forceful tactics to move villagers. One notorious example was Operation Production carried out in 1983 which rounded up an estimated 50,000⁵² unemployed city-dwellers and sent them to work on farms in the far north. It was again primarily the coercive side of the state, that is the army and the police, that the vast majority of Mozambicans experienced the post-colonial state.

However, Frelimo was immensely successful in education and health services, its two proudest achievements. Giving priority to both,

between 1974 and 1981 the number of children attending primary school increased from 700,000 to 1,376,000, almost half of whom were girls, while secondary school enrolments went from 20,000 to more than 135,000. Moreover the rate of illiteracy dropped from 97 to 75 percent during the first five years of independence, and among Mozambicans aged ten to twenty-four, it declined to less than 60 percent.⁵³

Immunisation also took place with a national vaccination campaign against measles, tetanus and smallpox in 1979 reaching more than 90% of the population.⁵⁴ In addition to this, Frelimo began to accept responsibility for their early mistakes in economic and agricultural policy and initiated policy reforms and structural changes. As one eminent Mozambican writer remarked,

We didn't realise how influential the traditional authorities were. We are obviously going to have to harmonize traditional beliefs with our political project. Otherwise we are going against things that the vast majority of our people believe; we will be like foreigners in our own country.⁵⁵

The Fourth Party Congress in 1983 recognised this and promised greater support to the peasantry and family agriculture. But these promises failed to bring about real change, as state administrators failed to implement policy decisions and because of the fate of the war.

This lack of change was also in part due to the character of political leadership and the

⁵²Simpson, "Foreign and Domestic Factors," p. 328.

⁵³Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism*, p. 139.

⁵⁴Isaacman and Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism*, p. 139.

⁵⁵Luis Honwana, the Mozambican writer, cited in Tom Young, "The MNR/ Renamo: External Dynamics and Internal Dynamics," *African Affairs*, 89(357), p. 507.

shape of the political process in Mozambique. Like other socialist countries, Frelimo considered dissent subversive and illegitimate, thus disallowing and punishing criticism. This was reinforced by the party's history of factionalism. Potential sources of opposition were repressed but also stifled by a bureaucratic vision of democratic centralism and a populist style of politics. As head of state, head of government, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and leader of the ruling party, the charismatic and dominating presence of Samora Machel greatly influenced the shape of Mozambican politics from the liberation struggle to his death in 1986. He not only enjoyed tremendous personal popularity but also expected the people to meet his standards of morality and conform to his ideas of politics.⁵⁶ Mozambican politics offered little room for dissenting opinions, public debate or the involvement of others in political discussion, for fear that this implied sharing decision-making power and would be perceived as weakness.⁵⁷

The return to war in the 1980s and the emergency it created, fundamentally transformed the country. The gains from the early years of independence were reversed followed by a rapid agricultural decline and economic collapse. GDP declined by 30 percent between 1982 and 1985 while external debt increased from zero in 1982 to \$4.7 billion in 1989.⁵⁸ The emergency situation created severe food shortages and displaced millions of people. The diminishing capacity of the state to provide security for the people and the war itself led to an ever shrinking state. To protect villagers, the government distributed large numbers of weapons to create peasant militias which increased the levels of insecurity and criminality. Attacks on railways linking the interior countries to the coast brought troops from Tanzania, Malawi and Zimbabwe to guard the transport corridors. From an initial 1000 troops, Zimbabwe had 10,000 troops in Mozambique by the end of the war engaging in offensive strikes against Renamo. The failure to defend the people against RENAMO, signalled the

⁵⁶For an account of the leadership and personality of Machel, see Iain Christie, *Machel of Mozambique*, Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988.

⁵⁷Interview with Migel de Brito, Researcher, War-Torn Societies Project, Mozambique, Maputo.

⁵⁸David N. Plank, "Aid, Debt and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and its Donors," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31(3), 1993, p. 410.

failure of the government itself.⁵⁹

The space left by the shrinking state was filled by a host of donor agencies, UN agencies and international NGOs arriving because of the emergency. The influx of these international actors posed a further challenge to the state, weakening the public spirit of the regime, and undermining the possibility of re-establishing the state's rural network in the countryside. Many observers noted how "existing NGOs in Mozambique... [set] themselves up as a kind of parallel state apparatus, an alternative to what is viewed as a corrupt and/or inefficient Frelimo state."⁶⁰ In 1980 there were just seven NGOs⁶¹, but from 1987 to 1990, the number of foreign NGOs opening offices in Mozambique rose to over 100.⁶² Many observers concluded there was a "dramatic erosion of domestic authority as donors, foreign consultants, and non-governmental organisations (N.G.O.s) assume[ed] responsibilities previously reserved to the state."⁶³

The challenge to the government's authority in Mozambique was accompanied by a transfer of authority out of the country. Towards the end of the 1980s, Mozambique became the largest recipient of US emergency aid in Southern Africa, the largest single recipient of Italian foreign aid,⁶⁴ received humanitarian and development assistance from the Scandinavians and military training assistance from Britain as early as 1986. By the 1990s, Mozambique's foreign aid accounted for more than two thirds of GDP making

⁵⁹Eric Berman, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*, Geneva: UNIDIR, p. 53.

⁶⁰Bridget O'Laughlin, "Mozambique: What Is To Be Done?" *Southern Africa Report*, March 1992, p. 33.

⁶¹João Cravinho, *Modernizing Mozambique: Frelimo Ideology and the Frelimo State*, Doctoral Dissertation, Oxford University, 1995, p. 226.

⁶²Jon Bennett, "Mozambique: Post-War Reconstruction and the LINK NGO Forum, 1987-1994," in Jon Bennett, (ed.) *Meeting Needs: NGO Coordination in Practice*, London: Earthscan, 1995, p. 70.

⁶³Plank, "Aid, Debt and the End of Sovereignty," p. 407.

⁶⁴Alex Vines, *RENAMO: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?* London: James Currey, 1996, p. 42; and William Finnegan, *A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique*, Oxford: University of California Press, 1992, p. 35.

Mozambique the most aid dependent country in the world.⁶⁵ Donor dependence led to the appellation of the Donor's Republic of Mozambique but had serious implications on where decisions were being taken. Mozambique had also radically reoriented its economic development policies by joining the IMF and World Bank in 1984 and the Lome Convention in 1985, and accepting a structural adjustment package in 1987. The government moved towards a more market oriented strategy, cutting back the state in both services and personnel, embarking on rapid privatisation schemes and devaluing the currency. As a result of both internal and external pressures, in 1989 at the fifth party congress, Frelimo abandoned Marxism-Leninism and in 1990, enacted a liberal constitution which transformed Mozambique into a multi-party democracy, guaranteeing freedom of the press, judiciary and religious expression. Many mass organisations declared independence from the party, becoming independent members of civil society.

The decision to accept a structural adjustment programme with the IMF and World Bank in 1987 had a profound effect on political space.⁶⁶ The goal of the PRE (Economic Recovery Programme) was to restore production levels by giving priority to agriculture and to peasant producers. However, Mozambique was unique in the world for initiating such a programme in the midst of war. The logic of transferring resources from urban to rural areas was seriously questioned by a war in the countryside. Although GDP improved in the first three years, the assumption that structural adjustment measures would increase agricultural production was irrelevant in the face of mass population movements out of agricultural areas due to the war. Similarly because of the war, reductions in state supplied inputs and marketing services were not replaced by private ones. The focus on macro-

⁶⁵Plank, "Aid, Debt and the End of Sovereignty," p. 411.

⁶⁶Given the limited space and also given the deliberate underplaying of economic factors in the thesis, the impact of structural adjustment on the political space of Mozambique will not be discussed in great depth. For further reading, see Hans Abrahamsson, "The International Political Economy of Structural Adjustment: The Case of Mozambique," *European Journal of Development Research*, 7(2), December 1995, pp. 297-319; Merle L. Bowen, "Beyond Reform: Adjustment and Political Power in Contemporary Mozambique," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 30(2), 1992, pp. 255-279; Judith Marshall, "Structural Adjustment and Social Policy in Mozambique," *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 47, pp. 28-43.

economic policies to restructure the economy neither realised its goals of generating increased levels of production, nor strengthened the Mozambican economy because of its configuration along micro-economic lines. Mozambique soon developed many conditions experienced in other African countries undergoing structural adjustment: rises in basic food prices, a devalued currency and social unrest. The social impact of structural adjustment was devastating. Declining standards of living were accompanied by greater inequalities and social differentiation, increased corruption, crime and riots. In 1990, a wave of strikes took place across the country, by port, media, industrial and health workers, teachers, and other mass trade unions and cooperatives. As in the rest of Africa, discontent was directed against the government, not the international financial institutions.

In addition to undermining the social fabric of Mozambique, the PRE had political repercussions stemming from the retraction and reduction of the state from society in the services provided and in the number of officials planning, administering and delivering such services. The health and education sectors deteriorated further because of reduced resources from the state and the state's partial withdrawal from these sectors as a public good. The state's ability to monitor and regulate society was decreasing, and its capacity to manage and respond to the crisis increasingly limited. Mozambique's control over policy and the country's development was eroding and passing to the technocrats of the IMF and World Bank. International pressure regarding structural adjustment, good governance and privatisation, demoralised the government and eroded Frelimo's commitment to progressive politics. What had characterised the government in the past, "a strong sense of *public* purpose, one premised on the envisaging of society-wide transformations that might actually change the lives of the vast majority of Mozambicans in positive ways,"⁶⁷ was being lost and replaced by so-called 'Afro-pessimism' which still colours the current political landscape.

Whatever the successes or failures of FRELIMO's configuration of political space, it can only be judged against the backdrop of the region and war which engulfed Mozambique.

⁶⁷John Saul, "Twenty Years After: Recolonization of Mozambique," *Southern Africa Report*, January 1996, pp. 16-17.

Compounding the government's weaknesses were a series of natural disasters, from massive flooding of the Limpopo, Incomati and Zambezi rivers in 1977-78, drought in 1981-1983 in the centre and south of Mozambique from which an estimated 100,000 people died, and drought across Southern Africa in the early 1990s. But it was war which debilitated the country. After Mozambique's independence, the ongoing liberation struggle for Rhodesia/Zimbabwe dominated the region. Mozambique continued to serve as the rear base for ZANU guerrillas. Their support for the Zimbabweans brought attacks from Rhodesian forces and the creation of a surrogate guerrilla force, the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR/Renamo). Most Mozambicans assumed Zimbabwe's independence would finish the MNR and its attacks on Mozambique, but as the next section discusses, this did not happen.

A return to war: The Mozambique National Resistance/Renamo

Interpretations of the war in Mozambique have become part of the war itself. To describe the war in Mozambique as a civil war implied the legitimacy of Renamo as a political movement with popular support. To refer to the war as a war of destabilisation pursued by South Africa characterised Renamo as puppets of the apartheid regime without domestic support. Newitt suggested that Renamo must be understood in the context of Mozambique's history. He argued that "because of the relatively small and disorganised political units in much of the country, there has always been the opportunity for bandit leaders, warlords, mercenaries and the like to carve out domains for themselves."⁶⁸ However, this local pattern was overlaid with the dynamics of the region and the imprint of the Cold War. Renamo's war with the government was similar to other counter-revolutionary movements, it was a war of "slow attrition - and the gradually compounded vulnerability - of the Mozambique state itself."⁶⁹ Over the progress of the war, Renamo's character changed but the impact of the war on the state and society fundamentally rearranged the rules, structures and practices

⁶⁸Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, p. 575.

⁶⁹John Saul, "Development and Counterdevelopment Strategies in Mozambique," in Edmond Keller and Donald Rothchild, (eds.) *Afro-Marxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1987, p. 135.

of political space in Mozambique.

The external origins of Renamo have been well-documented. In response to the deteriorating security situation in colonial Mozambique and the success of Robert Mugabe's ZANU forces from bases inside Mozambique, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) formed psuedo-terrorist groups for cross-border operations in 1973. These groups were modelled after Portuguese secret police units, the *flechas*, and were used to provide intelligence information on ZANLA bases and operations in Mozambique. However, after Mozambique's independence and its decision to close its border with Rhodesia,⁷⁰ Rhodesia created a surrogate force, the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR)/Renamo)⁷¹, providing military assistance and training at a camp inside Rhodesia. Ken Flower, director of the CIO at the time, remarked on "the surprising ease with which the Mozambique Resistance Movement developed... particularly as we kept the movement small and clandestinely manageable during the first five years whilst it could provide the eyes-and-ears of our Intelligence in Mozambique."⁷²

In addition to the *flechas* and other former colonial commando units, Renamo comprised a disparate set of groups. It included dissident independence factions who had lost in power struggles within Frelimo and disaffected students who had refused to fight in the guerrilla war. To these were added expelled Frelimo members detained at re-education centres, including Andre Matsangaissa, Renamo's first leader, charged with corruption,⁷³ and Afonso Dhlakama, Matsangaissa's successor who fled to Rhodesia before being detained for theft. A number of wealthy Portuguese settlers also joined Renamo, including Jorge Jardim, a godson of Salazar, and Orlando Christina, a former Portuguese agent, who formed

⁷⁰ Machel closed the border with Rhodesia in compliance with UN sanctions in 1976, estimated to have cost Mozambique \$500 million.

⁷¹ Originally designated as the Mozambique National Resistance Movement, it adopted the Portuguese acronym, Renamo in 1983. Renamo shall be used in the rest of the thesis.

⁷² Ken Flower, *Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record, Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964-1981*, London: John Murray, 1987, see Appendix, p. 302.

⁷³ The truth of this story has been challenged by some as Frelimo propaganda.

its external wing, representing Renamo in Lisbon.

In its early phase, Renamo numbered no more than a few hundred serving as scouts for the Rhodesian army. Due to the proximity of the border, Rhodesia recruited mostly from central Mozambique which gave Renamo its initial orientation as a Shona dominated, central Mozambican movement. Renamo's leadership, usually the most experienced fighters, was primarily Ndau, a smaller branch of the Shona group found in both central Mozambique and Rhodesia. Ndau subsequently became the semi-official language of the movement. However, as recruitment spread throughout the country, the composition of Renamo's rank and file later consisted of many different ethnic groups. In 1979, Matsangaissa was killed and succeeded by Dhlakama, supposedly against the wishes of the Rhodesians. In 1980-81, after a series of successful raids by the government army, Renamo was driven from central Mozambique, losing their main base at Garagua. With the impending independence of Zimbabwe after the Lancaster House agreement, Renamo was in disarray. According to Flower, Rhodesia began to divest itself of Renamo, severing all future links yet arranging for their transfer to the South African military. He noted that "the South African response was immediate and enthusiastic... Within days, the final arrangements were completed and the MNR were transferred lock, stock and barrel."⁷⁴

South Africa was concerned by its neighbours' security situations and had assisted both the Smith and Portuguese regimes. The independence of first Angola and Mozambique, then Zimbabwe, heralded the end of the white colonial bulwark shielding South Africa from the rest of the continent. The installation of pro-Marxist governments in Angola and Mozambique, and the growing militancy of the ANC and the South African communist party fuelled South African fears of a 'total onslaught'. After direct military intervention in Angola failed, South Africa launched a campaign of destabilisation against its neighbours, the 'total strategy'. South Africa was especially hostile towards Mozambique for two reasons. First, South Africa wanted to discourage Mozambique's support for the ANC who had almost unlimited access from Mozambique to launch raids into South Africa. The second reason was to heighten Mozambique's vulnerability to South Africa,

⁷⁴Flower, *Serving Secretly*, p. 262.

and through it, to demonstrate the region's economic dependence on South Africa as well.⁷⁵ For South Africa, "the immediate objective, according to a 1983 memorandum, was to cause the maximum destruction possible. The medium-term objective was to force the Mozambican government to adopt a more favourable attitude to South Africa."⁷⁶ In addition to Renamo, South Africa launched commando raids into Mozambique, hitting Maputo a number of times.⁷⁷ South Africa also severed economic links with Mozambique, reducing the number of Mozambican mine workers allowed into South Africa from nearly 120,000 in 1975 to 45,000 by 1983. Port and rail traffic was redirected to South African ports from Maputo, which in 1983 received only 16% of 1973 levels. These acts severely reduced Mozambique's much needed foreign exchange earnings.

With South African support, Renamo entered into a new and more deadly phase of operation. South Africa provided training bases in the Northern Transvaal and SADF personnel acted as military advisors and instructors to the guerrillas. South Africa also provided weapons, ammunition, transportation, food, medicine, and radio equipment. South African support was critical for Renamo's military success, particularly the logistical and communications network that allowed Renamo to organise attacks across the country. With this assistance, Renamo began to operate outside the central provinces of Manica and Sofala into northern Gaza and Inhambane, and parts of Tete province. Renamo launched a major offensive in the populous and fertile Zambezi valley threatening to split the country in half in 1981-82 and again in 1986-1987. This was accompanied by a substantial increase in size, from 1000 in 1980 to 8000 in 1982, increasing to 20,000 by the end of the war.⁷⁸

⁷⁵In 1989, the Front Line States formed SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) to circumvent South Africa's economic hegemony in the region. Mozambique's transport corridors were pivotal for the delivery of goods for SADCC countries.

⁷⁶Minter, *Apartheid's Contras*, p. 134.

⁷⁷"South African ground, air and naval forces violated Mozambican sovereignty with impunity on a regular basis, spreading captured arms and equipment (from Angola) across the countryside."Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood*, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992, p. 243.

⁷⁸*The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995*, New York: Department of Public Information, Introduction, p. 9, fn 20.

Under South African direction, Renamo specifically targeted state institutions and development projects in an organised and methodical fashion. Renamo attacked the transport corridors, not only sabotaging railroads and mining roads but “hundreds of private cars, vans and lorries were also attacked. The goal seemed to be to make people afraid to travel.”⁷⁹ They attacked food convoys, and other aspects of the rural economy, mining farms and pathways leading to agricultural fields, destroying peasant grain stores and destroying the food distribution network. They attacked internationally funded farms and development projects, kidnapped foreign aid workers and technicians and demobilised the Cahora Bassa dam. They also struck at Frelimo’s proudest achievements, education and health, forcing the closure of 2655 schools and destroying over 800 health posts by the late 1980s.⁸⁰ However, Renamo never really challenged the government’s control of the cities or their hold on the capital, Maputo. Renamo targets were “chosen precisely to exacerbate or create conflicts between the socialist government and the peasantry rather than to confront the power of the state or to construct a counter-power.”⁸¹

Renamo’s relations with Mozambican society were characterised by three features: the nature of its recruitment, its extreme violence and lack of a political programme. One study on Renamo⁸² claimed Renamo’s method of recruitment was a systematic and consistent pattern of forced kidnapping from villages, schools and fields. After basic training, abducted recruits were initiated into Renamo by being forced to kill, binding them to Renamo out of guilt and fear of retribution. However not all scholars agree with this characterisation. Geffray, a French anthropologist, argues that Frelimo policies, particularly the elimination of traditional authority, created a pool of discontented peasants willing to join Renamo. He contends that

⁷⁹Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, London: Catholic Institute for International Relations and James Currey, 1986, p. 141,

⁸⁰One noticeable target exempted from Renamo attack were religious institutions with the church or mosque the only structure still standing in villages.

⁸¹Bridget O’Laughlin, “Interpretations Matter,” pp. 25-26.

⁸²William Minter, *The Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) as Described by Ex-Participants*, Report for the Ford Foundation and the Swedish International Development Authority, 1989.

joining the war had the character of a reassertion of political initiative by the people against Frelimo and its village state apparatus. The simple fact that the people had been given the military means to put themselves beyond the reach of the state permitted Renamo to plant itself firmly within the dynamic of local conflicts... without having to formulate a political plan to legitimize itself.⁸³

Finnegan suggests the reasons were more prosaic; hunger, the importance of the gun for procuring food and the promise of social status prompted many young Mozambicans to join Renamo. It is misleading to speak of Mozambicans or the peasants as a whole, different strata reacted in different ways, changing over time as the situation demanded. For example, contrary to expectations, "the most economically advantaged sectors of rural society in central Mozambique, as elsewhere, have generally sided with 'socialist' Frelimo against 'capitalist' Renamo."⁸⁴ while peasants sided with Renamo because of disaffection from forced relocations under the government.

Renamo has also been characterised by its cultivation and instrumental use of extreme violence and brutality. Hall argued that Renamo had a conscious strategy of directing violence against civilians to create an image of terror and instil fear in the population, thereby gaining control over society against the state. Renamo deliberately targeted the state.

Officials of FRELIMO, and of the administration, are priority targets. In rural areas, their physical elimination serves to isolate communities and remove them from the rival authority of the central power. It complements the destruction of the economic infrastructure and the severing of communications. Essentially it works to disarticulate the state.⁸⁵

Renamo's brutal reputation developed from stories of retribution, public mutilation, crucifixion, and grotesque methods of execution. Refugees recounted how "Renamo kills people slowly with unsharpened axes or knives. They can pick any family and kill them one

⁸³Christian Geffray, cited in Finnegan, *A Complicated War*, p. 278, fn 19.

⁸⁴Otto Roesch, "Mozambique Unravels? The Retreat to Tradition," *Southern Africa Report*, May 1992, p. 28

⁸⁵Margaret Hall, "The Mozambican National Resistance Movement(Renamo): A Study in the Destruction of an African Country," *Africa*, 60(1), 1990, p. 52.

by one... But they always leave someone to escape to tell the tale.⁸⁶ Finnegan also noted how comprehensive Renamo's violence was, observing that

Every window, every window frame, every door, every door-frame, every piece of plumbing or wiring or flooring had been ripped out and carried away. Every piece of machinery that was well bolted down or too heavy for a man to carry... had been axed, shot, sledge-hammered, stripped or burned. ... It was systematic, psychotically meticulous destruction.⁸⁷

Renamo emphasised the visual and ritualistic impact of the killing, leading Wilson to characterise Renamo as a "cult of violence."⁸⁸ Renamo also extensively used Shona spirit mediums to haunt peasants and create cults around its dead leaders.

Although Renamo had a reputation for brutality, there were regional variations and these changed over the course of the war. Gersony's⁸⁹ 1988 report on Mozambican refugees brought to light the degree of violence exercised by Renamo and their regional differences. According to Gersony, Renamo designated three administrative zones; tax areas, control areas and destruction areas. In tax areas, primarily in the north or in Ndau speaking areas, there was less destruction with Renamo demanding food from villagers and using villagers as porters to transport supplies. In control areas, Renamo set up bases, holding the civilian population in guarded settlements, surrounding Renamo bases to shield soldiers from attack. Here, farmers were forced to produce food for Renamo, escape was prevented, women were used to service soldiers and all were subject to a greater degree of beating and extraction of labour. "In those areas of central Mozambique that it effectively control[ed], Renamo [also] reinstated the old colonial system of indirect rule, reinstating traditional chiefs to administer the civilian population and collect taxes on behalf of Renamo."⁹⁰ In destruction areas, primarily located in the south where Frelimo's support was strongest,

⁸⁶Ken Wilson, "Cults of Violence and Counter-Violence in Mozambique," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 18(3), p. 527.

⁸⁷Finnegan, *A Complicated War*, pp. 11-12.

⁸⁸Wilson, "Cults of Violence and Counter-Violence," pp. 527-582.

⁸⁹Robert Gersony, *Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique*, Report submitted to the US Bureau for Refugee Programs, April 1988.

⁹⁰Roesch, "Mozambique Unravels?" p. 29.

Renamo attacked more villages, with more looting, wilful destruction, and greater brutality. The release of this report, following closely upon the Homoine massacre in 1987 where hundreds were reportedly killed, severely damaged Renamo's international reputation and prevented Renamo from securing American support.

Renamo was never able to attain credibility or legitimacy as an insurgent movement, not only because of its extreme violence, but because it lacked a political programme or political character. In contrast to other guerrilla insurgents, Renamo was primarily a military organisation that lacked political ideas and did not attempt to win over the population. In the reports by Gersony and Minter, political indoctrination and political speeches were rare according to both refugees and ex-soldiers. The apolitical character of Renamo's internal organisation had its origins in the objectives of the foreign sponsors which created it. Neither the Rhodesians, nor the South Africans envisaged Renamo as an alternative government to Frelimo, nor did they provide the kind of support which could have brought this about. The South African objective was "not primarily to change governments, but to change policies."⁹¹ Documents found at Renamo headquarters at Gorongosa "record the South African side telling the MNR that they should seek a ceasefire as a step towards 'power sharing' because the Mozambican government 'is recognised internationally and you are not. The RSA does not have the money to help Renamo recuperate the economy if it wins the war.'"⁹²

However, South Africa encouraged Renamo to develop a political orientation and credibility, primarily to mask South African support. Ironically, as South Africa was attempting to restrain Renamo, their direct control and influence, and also that of former Portuguese colonials, was diminishing.⁹³ Renamo established a national council and tried to create a structure of political leadership. But the real power was held in the hands of

⁹¹ Anders Nilsson, "From Pseudo-terrorists to Pseudo-guerrillas: the MNR in Mozambique," *Review of African Political Economy*, Part 1, 57, p. 66-67.

⁹² Rob Davies, "The SADF's covert war against Mozambique," in Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, (eds.) *War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa*, Cape Town: David Philip, 1989, p. 113.

⁹³ Vines, *RENAMO: From Terrorism*, pp. 21-24.

Afonso Dhlakama, Renamo's president and military commander. Dhlakama and Renamo portrayed themselves as freedom fighters, democrats and Mozambican nationalists, but their rhetoric was crude, anti-communist and anti-Frelimo. Inconsistencies, such as demanding the restoration of private property to colonial owners, pointed to the influence of external forces and were often drafted by non-Mozambicans.

However ordinary Mozambicans were not passive in the face of Renamo's aggression or the deteriorating emergency situation. Renamo's use of spirits was taken on by peasants who called on vengeful ancestral spirits who disapproved of Renamo's violence to protect them. One successful example was the Naprama movement which created zones of peace in Zambezia and empowered other peasants to resist. Founded by Manuel Antonio, soldiers underwent an elaborate ceremony where they were cloaked in a special vaccine which made them impermeable to bullets.⁹⁴ The significance of this resistance was also an attempt by Mozambican peasantry "to reconstitute a new system of meaning and social order out of the war-shattered wreckage of Frelimo's post-independence experiment and the colonial-cum-traditional society which Frelimo sought to transform."⁹⁵ Through their resilience and resourcefulness they transformed and subverted their relations with Renamo and with the state. The breakdown of the trading networks and the decline in agricultural production also created a war economy and the development of parallel markets, "which undermined state power by providing avenues for accumulation of wealth, which was translated into political power." Notwithstanding the destruction caused by the war, war was also a powerful social process, breaking down the norms and values binding society and transforming relations in society, and society's relations to the state. War opened up Mozambique's political space to new political elements once again.

⁹⁴For an account of the use of spirit mediums and counter-violence, see Wilson, "Cults of Violence and Counter-Violence," pp. 527-582.

⁹⁵Roesch, "Mozambique Unravels," p. 30.

Conclusion: legacies of the war

Sixteen years of war had a profound legacy on the political space of Mozambique. The state apparatus was dismantled through much of the countryside, the idea of the state was weakened in the eyes of the population, and its authority challenged and appropriated by Renamo, international agencies and traditional leaders. Foreign powers had become active players in Mozambique, as allies of the two combatants guarding the transport corridors, or as major donors sustaining the Mozambican budget. Although the war generated its own crisis, it also compounded pre-existing obstacles to the process of state formation. From the ancient kingdoms, through Portuguese rule, to the Marxist government of Frelimo, power was always decentralised and disorganised throughout Mozambique's history. However, the Frelimo government's state-building project of a centrally controlled and planned economy and its failure to deliver economic prosperity, succeeded only in generating resistance which further weakened the state's foundations. Moreover, the liberalisation policies adopted by the government but all but imposed by international financial institutions, retracted the reach of the state into Mozambican society, reduced the ability of the state to regulate and articulate political struggles in the country, while demoralising state administrators under pressure to accommodate demands from society and all reaches of international agencies. The state in Mozambique was weak, but the project of building the state itself was also under threat.

Although the state apparatus was demobilised by the ongoing war and its institutions and laws failed to reach a majority of Mozambicans except in urban centres, the state had not completely collapsed or disappeared. The state in Mozambique existed to a degree in that the boundaries of the country were never challenged and it was accepted that Mozambican society was defined within the state, whose centre of government was always recognised to be in Maputo, even if its reach did not extend far into the countryside. The Mozambican state existed at the signing of the peace accord because of two factors. The first was the equation of the state with the party. Through party representatives and the historical importance of the party in the liberation struggle, the strong Frelimo regime kept the state alive. The state also found resonance with the peasantry in the personalisation of the state

through the popularity of leaders, like Machel and Chissano even if rulings in Maputo had no impact. Nevertheless, the state was not a strong presence, in part because of the natural resistance to it from alternative sources of power, such as traditional chiefs, and the churches. These elements of civil society found themselves strengthened because of the war and because of the loss of the authority of the state.

Although civil society in Mozambique is nascent, Mozambique's society has always been strong.⁹⁶ Its diverse ethnic, regional and local identities and communities were characterised by strong traditions of resistance against attempts to centralise authority through all of Mozambican history. Mozambique has always been challenged by the size of the country and the importance of regional differences, with the centre and north of the country resenting the power of the south. Under Frelimo, Mozambicans opted out of the state (by force and by choice), the official economy and the war. It has also been argued that the war was in part a reflection of discontent with Frelimo's attempts to centralise authority and remake traditional society into a model of modern society. During the war, Mozambican society was not passive in the face of Renamo's aggression or the predations of the government army. Mozambicans fled the country to become refugees, engaged in the parallel economy but also used its own strengths to fight Renamo, as in the Naparama movement, or call for peace as in the Churches. What has been occurring in Mozambique, "is the painful birth of civil society."⁹⁷

Oscar Monteiro, former minister of state administration, believes that surviving through the war, drought, and famine clearly showed the capacity of social groups to organise themselves and activate a public sphere. If civil society is defined in terms of formal NGOs, then civil society is weak in Mozambique and is related to areas donors consider priorities or the NGOs they give their money to. However, a wider notion of civil society may exist because of the creation of a social network solving common conflicts in society which were related to the public interest. The challenge for Mozambique is to relate to these informal

⁹⁶See Joel Migdal *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.

⁹⁷Agostinho Zacarias cited in Simpson, "Foreign and Domestic Factors," p. 337.

groups and mechanisms, to bring them into the state, to formalise the informal and informalise the formal, and to bring in and accept these social groups without emasculating them.⁹⁸

As a result of the war, the rules of politics, the exercise and allocation of power, and the nature of authority underwent another transformation. On the one hand this revolved around Renamo and Renamo's impact on Mozambique's political space. Although initially an externally sponsored surrogate force, over 16 years of war, Renamo's survival opened up political space for its own participation and exercise of power, challenged the socialist principles of the government and became the only alternative to Frelimo for those dissatisfied with the government. On the other hand, the war's legacy on political space also revolved around the penetration and pervasiveness of foreign influence through NGOs, donors and international financial institutions. Mozambique's foreign debt and reliance on donor assistance, ensures that the externalisation of authority which began with the war will continue. Mozambique's economic importance in the region and its vulnerability to South Africa has also had and continues to have a major influence on the shape of its political space. As a result of the internal shifts and reorientations in power and the external imposition of norms and practices, political space in Mozambique was weak and ill-formed because basic agreement on the political order is still in the process of being worked out. This weakness will be magnified and exacerbated by the impact of the external actors as they converge in Mozambique's political space to implement the peace agreement.

⁹⁸Interview with Oscar Monteiro, Maputo, May 1997.

CHAPTER FOUR

Accepting dialogue: negotiating peace in Mozambique, 1983-1992

Throughout the conflict, the Frelimo government dismissed Renamo as *armados bandidos* or armed bandits. The government would not acknowledge that a war in the countryside was taking place and “showed a marked reticence to deal publicly and politically with the war.”¹ This stemmed from the government’s perception that Renamo was a surrogate force for Rhodesia and then South Africa. However, after South African assistance transformed Renamo into a more effective and deadly force, the government was finally forced to acknowledge that: (1) Renamo attacks and the resulting rural insecurity were devastating the economy; (2) Renamo enjoyed significant support from South Africa which made it militarily successful; and (3) the Mozambican army was proving incapable of solving the problem. The severity of the situation prompted President Machel to initiate a process of dialogue in 1983. Without abandoning the military solution, Machel embarked on a new strategy of negotiation continued by his successor, Joaquim Chissano, which eventually culminated in the General Peace Agreement signed in 1992.

The search for peace in Mozambique through dialogue entailed redefining and reactivating politics and political space which had been increasingly paralysed because of the war. The question of how to end the war and secure a peace agreement opened up broader questions of politics, political participation, the state and its relations to society in Mozambique. Initially, the government excluded Renamo from this process and negotiated directly with South Africa. However, only after Renamo was allowed to participate in the future political space of Mozambique was a successful agreement possible. This change in attitude towards Renamo emerged after the government had reoriented its relationship to the state and society of Mozambique. In addition to the two parties, other third party actors, both international and Mozambican, played an important role in the process of dialogue. The

¹Judith Marshall cited in John Saul, “Development and Counterdevelopment Strategies in Mozambique,” in Edmond Keller and Donald Rothchild, (eds.) *Afro-Marxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy*, London: Lynne Rienner, 1987, p. 148

shifting involvement of these third party actors, and the tensions between those dominating the peace process industry and newer actors, had an impact on the design of Mozambique's political space and future articulation.

This chapter makes the argument that the configuration of political space in Mozambique was redesigned through the negotiation process leading up to and including Rome, and through the role of external third parties in shaping the content and outcome of the talks. It traces the dynamics between the government, Renamo, and third party actors in the negotiations and their influence on political space from 1983 to 1992. The first section outlines the beginning of a negotiated approach which led to the signing of the Nkomati Accord. The second section looks at attempts to facilitate dialogue through the unofficial channels of the churches and the official diplomacy of regional mediators which led to talks at the Sant'Egidio Community in Rome. The last three sections examine the Rome process, within which I identify three phases of negotiation. The third section looks at the first four rounds of talks which were preoccupied with establishing a political framework for the talks. The fourth section recounts the discussions on political principles in rounds five through nine. The last section deals with the final round of discussions on military issues and the concrete issues of implementation. Finally, the conclusion examines the impact of the negotiation process and the content of the agreement on the configuration of Mozambican political space. It also assesses how the discussions allowed for the mobilisation of the peace process industry and the institutionalisation of their role in the implementation process.

How to end the war? A new strategy, 1983 to 1985

Under South African sponsorship, Renamo began operating in nine out of ten provinces by 1983. The effectiveness of Renamo's economic sabotage and the resulting rural insecurity created an economic and humanitarian crisis. The severity of the emergency and the increasing inability to rectify it prompted President Machel to seek an end to the war by opening a process of dialogue. However, to the government, Renamo was not a legitimate force but a surrogate for South Africa's policy of destabilisation in weakening

Mozambique. Therefore, the question of how to end the war revolved around how to find a way for South Africa and Mozambique to peacefully coexist. According to the government, the war was an external manifestation and therefore did not reflect any weaknesses in Mozambique's political space. This interpretation reflected the government's conception of political space. This conception equated the party with the state with political space and excluded the legitimate participation of other political forces not associated with or challenging the party. Only the party could define and construct political space in Mozambique, other conceptions of politics were not welcomed. This corresponded to what José Luís Cabaço recounts as Frelimo's "conception of national unity of the time, [which] was once more understood as a simple assimilation of other social groups to the positions of the single Party."² This was premised on a belief that opposition groups formed since the liberation struggle, including Renamo, had their origins in Frelimo.³

Machel began negotiations with South Africa on a comprehensive security pact based on the termination of all financial, logistical and military support to Renamo by South Africa. After intense negotiation, the Nkomati Accord on Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness was signed in 1984. Under the Accord, Mozambique prohibited all military activity by the ANC and limited the size of the ANC's office in Maputo; although they retained the right to continue their moral, political and diplomatic support for the ANC. In exchange, South Africa agreed to respect Mozambique's territorial integrity and to cease all aggression against it.⁴ According to the Mozambican negotiator, General Jacinto Veloso, "[t]he essential point of the agreement is that my country will not serve as a base for attacks or violence against the territory of South Africa and vice versa."⁵ The foundation

²José Luís Cabaço, "The long march of Mozambican democracy," in Brazão Mazula, (ed.) *Mozambique: elections, democracy and development*, Maputo: Sponsored by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1996, p. 84.

³This idea is not without merit since many dissidents who had defected from Frelimo during the liberation struggle joined Renamo. Renamo's language of liberated areas and party congresses seemed reminiscent of Frelimo propaganda.

⁴Keesings, *Record of World Events*, Bethesda, MD: Keesings Worldwide, Vol. 30, No. 5, May 1984, p. 32835.

⁵Quote from the New York Times, cited in Cameron Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1994, p. 11.

for peace and security was obtained through respect for national sovereignty. The frontline states condemned the agreement and accused the Mozambican government of capitulating to the apartheid regime. Nevertheless, Oliver Tambo, the ANC president, conceded, “it must be accepted that the South African regime had decided to destroy Mozambique, to kill it as a state, and the leadership was forced to decide between life and death.”⁶

Even after the signing of the agreement, Renamo’s attacks continued.⁷ At first, it seemed Renamo was acting independently of South Africa and Mozambique accepted South Africa’s offer to set up direct talks with Renamo. The basis for talks was limited given that Machel was only willing to allow Renamo guerrillas to rejoin Mozambican society as individuals not as part of a political organisation.⁸ Renamo refused and demanded the immediate dissolution of the Mozambican government, multi-party elections and a number of ministerial posts. Nevertheless in late 1984, the Pretoria Declaration was signed by the government and Renamo. In the declaration, Renamo accepted the legitimacy of Samora Machel as president of Mozambique, the cessation of all conflict, and a tripartite commission with South Africa to implement the agreement. The government interpreted this agreement as recognition of the legitimacy of the Mozambican state and government. Renamo denied this and resumed their demands for a new government. Although South Africa continued to pursue discussions, the talks collapsed when Renamo withdrew on the eve of a new agreement.

In spite of the Nkomati agreement, the government realised that the South Africans had not acted in good faith and continued to support Renamo. The Mozambican armed forces uncovered evidence which proved that South Africa had supplied Renamo with six months

⁶Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War*, Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986, p. 28.

⁷Alex Vines, *Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?*, London: James Currey, 1996, p. 23; and Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Dangerous Neighbourhood*, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992, p. 245.

⁸The government offered a general amnesty to Renamo soldiers in 1987 and 1988, 3000 accepted.

of provisions just prior to the signing of the accord and had continued to supply Renamo with munitions and technical assistance after Nkomati.⁹ Although, the South African government denied any involvement with Renamo, certain elements within it, along with private interests, continued to do so.¹⁰

By 1986, Nkomati was an overwhelming failure. Not only did the attacks continue but Renamo attempted to cut through Zambesia province to the coast, which would have split the country in half. This was followed by the death of Samora Machel in a mysterious plane crash later that year, believed to have been carried out by South Africa. The war reached a peak in 1987-88, with Renamo forces estimated at 17,000-20,000 operating throughout most of Mozambique, while the government controlled the major cities and towns. The government army was in disarray. Despite attempts at reorganisation, the army was unable to feed, clothe and arm its soldiers, and was accused of gross corruption and of forcibly and illegally recruiting conscripts. The effectiveness of the armed forces was further weakened by the decline of Soviet support with the end of the Cold War. The loss of subsidised oil from the Soviet Union created a severe shortage for the government which could not afford to buy oil on the world market.¹¹ Troops from Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania were brought in to guard the transport corridors, but outside the corridors there was little security.

⁹Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism: The Destabilization Report*, London: Commonwealth Secretariat and James Currey, 1989, p. 25. In 1985, government forces overran the Renamo base at Casa Banana and recovered documents, the Vaz diaries, which were records of South African instructions recorded by Dhlakama's secretary. They included instructions to:

1. Destroy the Mozambican economy in the rural zones.
2. Destroy the communications routes to prevent exports and imports to and from abroad, and the movement of domestic produce.
3. Prevent the activities of foreigners (*cooperantes*) because they are the most dangerous in the recovery of the economy.

See Margaret Hall, "The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (Renamo): A Study of the Destruction of an African Country," *Africa*, 60(1), 1990, p. 58.

¹⁰The US embassy in Maputo reported that Renamo was still receiving support from South Africa in 1989, and the US defence agency confirmed this again in 1991. Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, p. 19.

¹¹In 1991, the oil import bill alone exceeded total export earnings for the year. *Financial Times Survey of Mozambique*, 15 January 1991.

A stalemate existed across the country, while the cost of the conflict continued to escalate.¹² The prolonged state of emergency, military impasse and general war weariness, compelled the government to reopen the negotiation process.

The government had never really abandoned the diplomatic strategy, but it was premised on isolating Renamo from its external supporters. After Nkomati, Machel succeeded in sidelining Renamo's other regional backer, Malawi, after "Zimbabwe and Tanzania, landlocked Malawi's big neighbours, threatened Malawi's ancient president, Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, with a trade boycott unless he stopped protecting the rebels."¹³ The government distanced itself from the Soviet bloc and pursued better relations with the West. Frelimo improved relations with the Reagan government to deflect American support for Renamo and assisted them during the Namibian negotiations by facilitating access to key figures in the Angolan government.¹⁴ Similarly, the government had established good relations with Great Britain after assisting them at the Lancaster House talks and subsequently became a major recipient of UK development and military assistance. The government also attempted to pursue less hostile relations with South Africa, who itself began to adopt a more friendly attitude towards Mozambique.¹⁵ Although Renamo became more isolated from its international benefactors, Renamo neither disappeared nor ceased its attacks in the countryside. The government was forced to accept that they would have to deal with Renamo directly if they wanted to achieve peace.

¹²The government estimated that the losses to its ports and railways from the closure of the Rhodesian border, revenue lost from the redirection of traffic from the Maputo port, direct loss due to sabotage and destruction and indirect losses from lost transit was \$1.94 billion from 1976 to 1988. Defence expenditure since 1980 averaged 38% of the national budget. A UNICEF report estimated that 500,000 children under the age of 5 had died between 1980 and 1988. All figures taken from Johnson and Martin, *Apartheid Terrorism*, pp. 34-50.

¹³*The Economist*, 7 March 1987.

¹⁴Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa*, p. 238.

¹⁵In 1988, "South Africa rescheduled Mozambique's debt on favourable terms, ...revived the Joint Security Commission, [and agreed] to revive the vast Cahora Bassa dam." *The Economist*, 25 June 1988.

Starting a new process: twin-track diplomacy, 1987 to 1989

To alter diplomatic course, President Chissano needed to convince his own party of the imperative for direct talks against the military hardliners who wanted to continue the war. He used Frelimo's Fifth Party Congress in 1989 as a platform to inform the party of the possibility of negotiations with what had always been referred to as terrorists. Chissano received the party's endorsement to talk to Renamo after it was revealed that Soviet military advisors would soon pull out from Mozambique, and that Zimbabwe and Tanzania also wanted to withdraw their troops. At the time of the Congress, the government was also introducing a series of radical changes to the constitution to transform the one-party state into a multi-party democracy, separating the party from the state, and guaranteeing greater civil and political freedoms. At the Congress, the party officially abandoned Marxism-Leninism. In principle at least, Frelimo began to relinquish its hold on Mozambique's political space and open it to other political voices.¹⁶

In an effort at reconciliation, the government stopped officially referring to Renamo as armed bandits and began to accept the Mozambican identity of the movement, although this was not universally followed by the national press. However, the government was still wary of conferring any legitimacy onto an organisation long depicted as a foreign puppet and terrorist group. Chissano stated that he was "always careful that whomever we contacted was not being recognised as something they're not - that is, as a real, political movement or a party, because they're not."¹⁷ Instead, Chissano sought an internal solution between a government and a rebel organisation which reconfirmed the government's primacy in Mozambique's political space. This implied Renamo's incorporation into the political space defined by the government and not allowing Renamo as an organisation to contribute towards developing Mozambican politics. In other words, the government was still not

¹⁶Renamo held its first congress in June 1989, calling for elections, constitutional talks and the government to lay down their arms. In anticipation of a settlement, Dhlakama replaced commanders associated with past atrocities with politicians, like Raul Domingos, the foreign secretary and distanced the external wing. Interview with Margaret Hall, London, April 1997.

¹⁷President Chissano quoted in *Mozambiquefile*, Issue 157, August 1989.

prepared to allow Renamo into the official political arena of Mozambique. It is primarily for this reason that Renamo has never trusted the government, fearing a “fall into the trap of integration ... the strategy through which Frelimo had wanted for years to assimilate Renamo, not giving it any political worth.”¹⁸ According to Dhlakama, Renamo wanted to end the war, but not to be integrated.¹⁹

Although the government had accepted the idea of direct talks with Renamo, establishing contact and agreeing on a basis for discussion presented numerous problems. Not only was Renamo obscured by a lack of information and propaganda from both sides, it was not easily discernible who comprised the leadership, what they wanted and what it would take to get them to agree to talks. This information was uncovered through the intervention of third parties, both external and internal. These third party actors, normally outside Mozambican politics defined by the single-party state, began to take advantage of the political space opening up in the search for peace and because of the erosion of authority and state legitimacy. Officially, mediation by Kenya and Zimbabwe served to bring the government and Renamo to direct talks. Behind the scenes, the churches reached out to Renamo to bring them into a Mozambican process of dialogue. By accepting Renamo as a genuine political group, the new process of dialogue by these third parties was changing the political landscape of Mozambique. Yet the participation of these third parties itself, reflected how the landscape was already changed.

The churches were uniquely placed to facilitate dialogue between the two sides because they had remained neutral during the war by refusing to condemn Renamo’s atrocities or cutting them off from dialogue.²⁰ After the Nkomati agreement, the Christian Council of Mozambique had set up a Peace and Reconciliation Commission and made its first

¹⁸Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, *Mozambico dalla Guerra alla Pace*, p. 179, cited in Brazão Mazula, “The Mozambican Elections: A Path of Peace and Democracy,” in Mazula, *Mozambique: Elections*, p. 27.

¹⁹Interview with Afonso Dhlakama, Maputo, May 1997.

²⁰Although generally acceptable, the role of the Christian churches did raise a protest from Muslim leaders who also wanted a role in the process. See *Mozambiquefile*, Issue 159, October 1989.

approach to Renamo.²¹ They were subsequently invited to the United States to make contact with Renamo's external wing. These proved fruitless, leading the churchmen to conclude that any real discussion would have to revolve around the internal command.²² The Catholic church had also issued a number of pastoral letters calling for direct talks. In May 1988, the Archbishop of Beira, Jaime Gonçalves "travelled to rebel headquarters in Gorongosa to explore with the Renamo leader, Mr. Afonso Dhlakama, the possibility of developing negotiations between RENAMO and the government."²³ Gonçalves established close personal ties with Dhlakama based on a shared Ndau identity and antipathy towards Frelimo. Although the government had been hostile to the churches and suspicious of their neutrality, President Chissano gave his tacit approval for these approaches to Renamo.

In 1988, Kenya's president, Daniel Arap Moi proposed to the Mozambican government that his foreign minister, Bethwell Kiplagat, meet with Dhlakama in Germany. Kenyan interest in Mozambique was biassed towards Renamo, having allowed them to open an office in Nairobi and providing supplies. Kenya became the transit point for Renamo delegations travelling overseas, providing them with passports and covering their expenses. In 1989 the Mozambican government approached Arap Moi to jointly mediate talks with Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe, an ally of the government who was keen to withdraw Zimbabwe's troops from Mozambique.²⁴ This process of mediation by two heads of state heralded an attempt at traditional African peacemaking which might later be expanded to include other African leaders.

Under the auspices of the two regional mediators, Renamo met with Mozambican religious

²¹Vines, *Renamo: From Terrorism*, p. 120.

²²*Mozambiquefile*, Issue 160, November 1989.

²³*The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995*, New York: Department of Public Information, Introduction, p. 15. In an interview, Dhlakama attributes Renamo's involvement in the peace process in part to listening to pressure from the churches. Maputo, May 1997.

²⁴These troops cost the Zimbabwe government \$750,000 a day. *The Economist*, 22 July 1989.

leaders²⁵ in Nairobi in August 1989. The churchmen, using their good offices, began to act as couriers, transmitting ideas and messages between the two sides. They presented the government's twelve-point paper to Renamo which centred on Renamo's recognition of Mozambique's constitution and their renunciation of violence before talks could begin. Renamo, in turn, presented a sixteen-point declaration calling for an end to violence, change to the existing order and the sovereignty of the people to elect their own leaders. Although there was a basis for discussion between the two documents, Renamo's proposal contained a demand to be recognised as "an active political force in Mozambique's political arena."²⁶ Chissano rejected this demand and refused to "recognise MNR as a political party but as a group of Mozambicans constituted as a group under other influences."²⁷ This reaction compelled Dhlakama to resume a harder line. Renamo repeated their rejection of the sovereignty of the Mozambican government, and insisted on talks with Frelimo in parity with Renamo as a political party, not as a government. A deadlock ensued despite persistent efforts by the mediators and Tiny Rowland, chairman of Lonrho, urging Dhlakama to resume discussion.²⁸

In December 1989, the two mediators suggested a direct meeting between the two sides be held but this initiative stalled over a choice of venue. The government favoured an African location and suggested Malawi.²⁹ Renamo rejected Malawi, fearing that its close proximity would give the Mozambican security service the opportunity to assassinate Dhlakama. The government rejected Renamo's preference for Lisbon on the basis of its colonial association and moreover wanted to distance Western involvement. A final attempt at holding a direct meeting in Blantyre, Malawi in June 1990 failed when Dhlakama left the city on the day

²⁵This included Cardinal Alexandre dos Santos, Archbishop of Maputo, Archbishop Gonçalves, Bishop Dinis Singulane and the Christian Council of Mozambique.

²⁶*Mozambiquefile*, Issue 158, September 1989.

²⁷*Mozambiquefile*, Issue 162, January 1990.

²⁸Tiny Rowland provided money, transportation and support to Renamo all through the process.

²⁹Interview with Francisco Madeira, negotiator and diplomatic advisor to President Chissano, Maputo May 1997. Malawi's close proximity would also make communication between the delegations and Mozambique simpler and less costly.

of scheduled talks despite the presence of both sides in the city.

Outside the regional process, other countries were involved on the sidelines of the peace initiatives. The United States was heavily involved in the region from 1988 onwards because of its role in brokering Namibia's independence. The US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, indicated the US favoured a negotiated end to the conflict in Mozambique but would be on the side of the government.³⁰ The United States, in early 1990, subsequently prepared a seven-point document as a basis for talks. This document echoed the government's twelve-point document and was rejected by Renamo because it recognised the Mozambican government. However, not all international interest was welcomed by the government. US facilitation was acceptable, US brokering as in Namibia was not. Portugal had been exerting pressure to be included in the process through their influence with Renamo. Right-wing Portuguese politicians also formed a Group for Peace and Democracy in Mozambique leading Chissano to remark that there were too many mediators trying to influence Mozambique's politics.³¹ South Africa expressed interest in the process after their successful participation in the Angolan talks, but was excluded. The government also grew wary of Kenyan involvement and believed Renamo was being used as a vehicle to interfere in Mozambique's internal affairs.³² Kenneth Kaunda from Zambia was also intermittently involved in the process, but his influence was overshadowed by Zimbabwe's involvement.³³

The government had been pursuing an alternative venue for face-to-face discussions and retreated from their opposition to a non-African location. They approached the Vatican to request their good offices to host the talks.³⁴ The hostility between the government and the Vatican had been lessening through reciprocal visits and diplomatic initiatives from the

³⁰Hilary Anderson, *Mozambique: A war against the people*, London: Macmillan Press, 1992, p. 47.

³¹*Mozambiquefile*, Issue 166, May 1990.

³²Interview with Francisco Madeira, Maputo, May 1997.

³³Vines, *Renamo: From Terrorism*, p. 141.

³⁴Interview with Francisco Madeira, Maputo, May 1997.

mid-1980s. However the Vatican was reluctant to take on such high profile negotiations. The government also discussed with the Italian government the possibility of their assistance in negotiations.³⁵ But it was unlikely that either party had the necessary contact with Renamo to be able to arrange and preside over the talks.

The Vatican instead suggested that a Catholic lay order and voluntary charitable organisation, the Sant'Egidio Community, host the process of negotiation between the two sides. Founded in 1968, the Sant'Egidio Community had developed many contacts in Mozambique, with Renamo in particular, through humanitarian work and by helping to negotiate the release of priests and nuns captured by Renamo in 1982. The Community had secretly invited Dhlakama to Rome in February 1990 to meet lay members and politicians from the Italian government.³⁶ The Sant'Egidio Community had also been involved in soothing relations between the government, Mozambican churches and the Vatican through Archbishop Gonçalves, who was a friend of the community.³⁷ The director of Sant'Egidio, Professor Andrea Riccardi attended Frelimo's 5th Party Congress and gave a speech on peace to the delegates.³⁸ Although there were other church and missionary societies with longer histories in Mozambique, the Sant'Egidio Community proved most acceptable to both parties at the right time.

The Rome process: the political framework, round one to four³⁹

After the collapse of the Blantyre meeting, the Sant'Egidio Community quickly moved to establish talks at their headquarters in Rome. These talks were convened under the direction

³⁵Italy was Mozambique's largest foreign partner in 1986 with investments of more than US\$ 308 million. Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, London: James Currey, 1986, p. 149.

³⁶Don Matteo Zuppi, "The Santo Egidio Community and the General Peace Agreement," in Mazula, *Mozambique: Elections*, p. 112.

³⁷Vines, *Renamo: From Terrorism*, p. 128.

³⁸Zuppi, "The Santo Egidio Community," p. 111.

³⁹Much of the following discussion is based on an account of the talks provided by Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War*.

of four observers, two members of the community, Professor Andrea Riccardi and Don Matteo Zuppi; Archbishop Gonçalves; and an Italian MP, Mario Raffaelli who had many personal contacts with Frelimo from his student days. The Rome discussions, which began in July 1990, were initially intended to lead to direct talks between the two sides akin to the preceding efforts. However, over ten rounds of discussions, this role was transformed into an unusual process of mediation enabling the two sides to reach agreement on a series of protocols which formed the corpus of the General Peace Agreement signed in October 1992.

The move to Rome and the onset of a negotiating process created an artificial and enclosed forum in which delegations from the warring parties worked out the terms of peace and the future shape of politics in Mozambique. This aspect of the political process was effectively confined to the combatants, represented by a few individuals accountable only to their leaders and not a wider constituency or society. Thus the Rome talks officially concluded the mediation by Kenya and Zimbabwe, but also the role of Mozambican churches. It also heralded a partial transfer of decision-making to Rome, which created tensions between Mozambique and Rome on the location of political authority. Most importantly, Renamo became an equal partner in the peace process, which it was not in Mozambican politics. It immediately acquired an influence and power in setting the rules of the political process which artificially reconfigured the balance of power between the parties in Rome at least. Yet the conditions in Mozambique in turn, limited and defined Renamo's use of that power, pointing to the interactions between Rome and Mozambique in shaping Mozambique's political space.

However, this dimension of the political process was complicated by the complex and unusual character of the third parties mediating the process and shaping the talks. On the one hand, the unofficial designation of holding the talks at the Catholic lay order helped to overcome the problem of officially recognising Renamo and also allowed more informal discussion to take place. On the other hand, foreign officials were extensively involved in the Rome talks. Raffaelli was a former secretary of state responsible for Africa in the Italian Foreign Ministry. He had been deeply involved in Italian co-operation with Mozambique

and through this with the Sant’Egidio Community. The Italian government also provided substantial financial and diplomatic support to the mediators and both parties throughout the process. Francisco Madeira, President Chissano’s foreign advisor and negotiator, observed that after every session, both sides would retire and consult with American, British, Italian, French and Portuguese diplomats on the day’s proceedings.⁴⁰ Foreign observers were there from the beginning of the process, and were not a new element when they were formally brought in later in the process.

As the process progressed, the role of the Sant’Egidio community diminished and the participation of other international actors became more prominent. Long-standing international agencies in Mozambique and actors dominating the peace process industry were suspicious of the participation and central role of this relatively new player. As the discussions proceeded to the technical details of the agreement, representatives of the industry interfered more frequently in the discussions and subsequently established their ongoing participation in Mozambique’s peace process. In contrast, the Rome mediators relinquished any future role in the process. The dynamics between the established members of the peace process industry, the Sant’Egidio team, and the parties shaped the substance and form of the talks and thus the content of the agreement which included a key role for the peace process industry in Mozambique. The tensions and contradictions between the actors reflected how political space was being designed in Rome and subsequently reconfigured in Mozambique.

ROUND ONE AND TWO

When the first round of talks opened in July 1990, the official observers set to create an open environment for frank dialogue and reconciliation. Quoting from the bible, Professor Riccardi spoke of working from the basis of looking for “what unites us, and put[ting] aside what divides us.”⁴¹ The observers were able to elicit from both sides a commitment to discussion and an agreement that future talks would be based in Rome. This collaborative

⁴⁰Interview with Francisco Madeira, Maputo, May 1997.

⁴¹Zuppi, “The Santo Egidio Community,” p. 114.

atmosphere was assisted by the fact that neither side engaged in recriminations or assigned blame for the war, which remained a defining characteristic throughout the peace process.

Despite the warm opening, the first two rounds of talks in July and August stalled over issues of procedure, specifically the identity and role of any third party mediator, and the agenda for talks. The Renamo delegation, led by Raul Domingos,⁴² persisted in demanding official mediators, specifically Kenyan. The government delegation, headed by Armando Guebuza,⁴³ objected to further international or any third-party assistance. Cameron Hume, the American observer to the talks, described the nature of the impasse as stemming from two polar positions:

[t]he Mozambican government had long insisted that talks between the two sides be direct, with any third-party role being minimal and designed to decrease in significance as the peace process went forward. The Renamo delegation did not trust either the government's good faith or its own ability to hold the government to commitments made in direct, bilateral talks.⁴⁴

The government had always objected to external participation in shaping the politics and political space of Mozambique which the war with Renamo represented. In contrast, Renamo consistently sought international assistance to acquire political legitimacy and to compensate for its lack of confidence in its ability to prevent the government from assimilating Renamo into Mozambican politics and setting its own agenda.

The second problem was deciding on an agenda for talks. The government's participation in the discussions centred on reaching a cease-fire, with the future politics of Mozambique left to be resolved in Mozambique itself, most likely by the government. Renamo was under no illusions that a cease-fire threatened its position at the talks and in influencing

⁴²Domingos was head of external relations. The rest of the Renamo delegation included Vicente Ululu, department of information, Agostinho Murrial, department of political affairs, and João Almirante, an advisor to Dhlakama.

⁴³Guebuza was Minister of Transport and Communications. The rest of the government delegation included Aguiar Mazula, Minister of Labour, Teodata Hunguana, Minister of Information, and Francisco Madeira, diplomatic advisor to the President.

⁴⁴Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War*, p. 34.

Mozambican politics in future. Consequently, Renamo was more concerned with the details of the process and how these would formally give it a measure of power and influence in Mozambique after the war ended. Having been excluded from the political arena in Mozambique, Renamo sought to use the Rome talks to stake a position in Mozambican politics. Although there was little substantive discussion, Domingos began criticising the government's 1990 constitutional reforms. He alleged that these changes were illegitimate because they were taken unilaterally without accounting for what was going to be discussed in Rome. The implications of Domingos' statement was that politics and the political process in Mozambique was accountable to the Rome negotiations, where Renamo had influence, and not independently determined in Mozambique, where it did not.

The impasse on both issues was left unresolved. Domingos agreed to a one-on-one meeting with Guebuza, the first of its kind,⁴⁵ but the talks still ended prematurely. During the recess between rounds, the observers travelled to Mozambique, the first of many visits to the region. The mediators were unable to meet with Dhlakama but President Chissano told them that "the Rome talks should move forward to keep pace with domestic reform."⁴⁶ In other words, the negotiations ought to reflect the changing political landscape in Mozambique. The Rome observers suggested they become formal mediators, while Kenya could serve as an advisor to Renamo. They also suggested the next round focus on the Zimbabwean troops to isolate the international aspects of the conflict from its internal dimensions. Both sides agreed to these recommendations as an acceptable compromise to keep the process moving forward. Although the parties willingly relinquished control over the process to overcome the lack of trust, the change in status conferred more authority to the mediators to lead and shape the process. However, this was tempered by the precedent that deadlocks within the Rome process were only resolvable by constant referral to the leaders in Mozambique. The shape of the process and the dynamics between the parties were beginning to take form, yet they were still constrained by the limitations of what was happening in Mozambique.

⁴⁵Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War*, p. 37.

⁴⁶Della Rocca cited in Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War*, p 41.

ROUND THREE AND FOUR

The third round from 8 November to 1 December 1990 opened in a spirit of agreement and the four observers became the mediators. Rather than allowing the talks to stall over confrontational declarations, the mediators began holding individual consultations with both sides to discover their positions and possible room for compromise. The mediators also drafted initial working proposals and transmitted compromises and modifications to both sides. Direct dialogue between the two sides rarely took place except in plenary session, while Renamo also “refused to participate in joint working sessions until the final days of the negotiation.”⁴⁷ This feature of the talks had significant political implications. While the enclosed and unpressured environment of Sant’Egidio encouraged the enhanced role of the mediators, it did not contribute towards the political socialisation of the parties or encourage more conciliatory political practices. The political process in Rome was constructed on the mediators shuttling back and forth between the two sides. The two sides were not building a working partnership or relationship, nor were they learning to resolve their differences without third party assistance. Nevertheless, this was not unusual in mediated negotiations and it was the mediators who skilfully transformed Renamo’s initial uncompromising language into more diplomatic and less threatening language to keep dialogue moving forward.

The process was further complicated by the arrival of a US State Department delegation to assist in the military discussions relating to the Zimbabwean troops. This delegation began to operate in parallel with the mediators in its own meetings with both parties. The addition of another third party pointed to the mobilisation of the peace process industry and tensions amongst different third parties pursuing their own objectives, a common feature of the process and the industry. The numerous parties aiding the talks created alternative centres of authority, rule-setting and interpretation for the government and Renamo to reconcile, yet also manoeuvre around. The American team also initiated the practice of external third party experts working out the technical details of the agreement with or without the parties. This technical assistance institutionalised the future role of the peace process industry in

⁴⁷Hume, *Ending Mozambique’s War*, p. 74.

instructing the parties on the ‘practicalities’ of what would be the mechanisms outlined in the agreement. The technical experts influenced the content of the agreement in such a way that opened up opportunities for them to ensure their continued participation and role in the future process of implementation. These early rounds thus revealed the gradual accumulation of influence by the peace process industry over the shape of peace and politics in Mozambique both in Rome and in Mozambique.

On 1 December 1990, the mediators secured agreement on the declaration of a partial cease-fire. This agreement limited the activities of the Zimbabwean troops to within three kilometres of the Beira and Limpopo transport corridors with assurances from Renamo that they would not attack the corridors, and from the government that they would not use the corridors for offensive operations. The cease-fire would be monitored by a Joint Verification Commission (JVC), based in Maputo but reporting to Rome, composed of both parties and international observers. Chaired by the Italian Ambassador in Maputo, Manfredo Incisa di Camerana, the JVC was financed by the Italian government. As the commission was setting up, talks resumed in Rome but did not capitalise on the momentum generated by the agreement. The continuing absence of any sense of urgency to improve the situation in Mozambique was another defining feature of the discussions.

When talks resumed in January 1991, the JVC submitted its first report which ended discussion. The JVC concluded that Renamo was responsible for six of the eight violations of the partial cease-fire. Renamo vehemently denied the findings and accused the JVC of bias towards the government by failing to investigate Renamo’s allegations of troop movements by the Zimbabweans. Renamo also argued that the Commission had acted beyond its facility as a technical body, by reinterpreting the agreement over the precise definition of the corridors. The JVC and Renamo disagreed over whether the corridor was a continuous enclosure which included all the towns along the route.⁴⁸ The JVC also disputed Renamo’s non-inclusion of an airport located just beyond the corridor used by Zimbabweans as their main supply transit, and on water holes accessed by Zimbabweans which were also just beyond the confines of the corridor. These issues were left unresolved

⁴⁸JVC Report/Minutes

as the mediators terminated discussions with the injunction to ‘pause for reflection’ on the purpose and nature of the talks.

The break was also called to allow Renamo to prepare for political discussions and to set up a communications link between Rome and Renamo headquarters in Mozambique,⁴⁹ requested by Domingos to enable direct consultation with Dhlakama. The two issues were not unrelated. Renamo’s representatives had little political, administrative and constitutional knowledge or experience. They were clearly less skilled at political negotiation, the technical details of monitoring and verification, and politics in general. Moreover, Domingos’ style of negotiating, which involved stating his position first and then rejecting all other opinions,⁵⁰ seemed to indicate he lacked the authority to take decisions without approval from Dhlakama who was often inaccessible. In response to an increasing sense of international isolation, Dhlakama meanwhile attacked the Limpopo corridor without informing Renamo representatives on the JVC. However, he did not walk out of negotiations. After the talks had started, Dhlakama frequently travelled to Western capitals where his hosts impressed upon him that international recognition depended on ending the war. For Dhlakama, rarely out of the Mozambican bush, personal attention from mediators, leaders and officials confirmed his importance in Mozambican politics which made him more politically socialised and susceptible to international pressure.⁵¹ Yet despite the influence gained by participating in the peace process, Renamo, and Dhlakama in particular, still revealed a great deal of insecurity in many of their actions and negotiating tactics.

Round five to nine: political principles

At the start of the fifth round on 6 May 1991, Guebuza “affirm[ed] that the government wanted a negotiated solution, but he insisted that the legitimacy of the government not be

⁴⁹The satellite link was paid for by the Italian government and set up through Malawi.

⁵⁰Hume, *Ending Mozambique’s War*, p. 42.

⁵¹Interview with Ken Wilson, Johannesburg, May 1997.

questioned by the peace process.”⁵² The government resented Renamo’s attitude that laws passed by state institutions needed to be legitimised by the Rome process. In their view, Renamo’s demands to discuss and amend the new constitution, the law on political parties and the electoral law were attempts to rewrite Mozambique’s politics from Rome. Furthermore, Renamo’s insistence on including external actors was perceived as another challenge to the sovereignty of the government whose authority was already under threat from international agencies operating in the country because of the emergency. The government repeatedly defended their sovereignty as an independent and fully recognised member of the international community.⁵³ The underlying question of how Mozambique’s political space ought to be constituted and Renamo’s place in it was preventing agreement on an agenda for discussion and stalling the talks.

The discussions were impeded because the government’s democratic reforms had undermined Renamo’s limited political agenda. By instituting these reforms before the start of talks, the government had outmanoeuvred Renamo and left them little room to define for themselves in the new emerging political arena. Most of Renamo’s demands had been met and substantively, there was very little distance between the two. As a result, Dhlakama insisted that the agenda consider first the abolition of the security service, the secret police and private armies to guarantee Renamo’s future safety. Renamo also began to retreat from multi-party democracy towards a two-party system with Frelimo and Renamo, demanding financial support from the international community to help transform into a political party. In the talks, Domingos became less flexible and wanted the agenda “to be a signed, detailed document; [so that every] part of the peace process had to be specified, and what was not specified could not be included later.”⁵⁴ Renamo also depended heavily on foreign advisors to help formulate their political proposals, one of which contained demands for a

⁵²Hume, *Ending Mozambique’s War*, p. 62.

⁵³Irrespective of the Rome process, the government proceeded to draft a cease-fire and consulted with donors regarding financial assistance for demobilisation and to cover back-pay for its soldiers. Donors refused to fund these initiatives while negotiations were taking place in Rome.

⁵⁴Hume, *Ending Mozambique’s War*, p. 62.

transitional administration during the peace process.⁵⁵

The mediators shuttled back and forth between Rome and Mozambique and between Maputo and Renamo headquarters with proposals on a detailed agenda which was finally signed on 28 May 1991. Starting with 1) the law on political parties, 2) the electoral system, 3) military issues including the new army and secret police, 4) cease-fire, 5) guarantees, and ending with 6) a donor's conference, it put political discussions before the cease-fire. But although the law on political parties was the first item on the agenda, when round six began from 1- 13 August 1991, the issue of the government's legitimacy resurfaced. Although they backed away from demands for a transitional government, Renamo insisted that key ministries be placed under the control of the UN Security Council during the transition. The government reacted by demanding "explicit acknowledgement that the government's administration of the country would be accepted by Renamo during the period from the cease-fire to the elections."⁵⁶

The mediators put forward a draft proposal on basic principles to resolve the conflicts over the basic political framework for the discussions. A breakthrough finally came during the seventh round of talks from 18 October 1991, when the two parties signed the protocol on basic principles. In this protocol, the government agreed not to "tak[e] any action that is contrary to the provisions of the Protocols to be concluded and from adopting laws or measures or applying existing laws which may be inconsistent with those Protocols."⁵⁷ Renamo agreed after a cease-fire "to refrain from armed combat and instead to conduct its political struggle in conformity with the laws in force, within the framework of the existing State institutions,"⁵⁸ and in accordance with the peace accord. The spirit of the agreement thus required Renamo to accept the legitimacy of the state and the government during the transition period, and the government not to exclude Renamo in the political process by

⁵⁵These included Bruce Fein, an American lawyer, and Andre Thomashausen, a German law professor in South Africa.

⁵⁶Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War*, p. 64.

⁵⁷GPA, Protocol I, Item 1.

⁵⁸GPA, Protocol I, Item 2.

acknowledging the parameters being set in Rome. Both parties also agreed to establish “a commission to supervise and monitor compliance with the General Peace Agreement... composed of representatives of the Government, RENAMO, the United Nations and other organizations or Governments.”⁵⁹ At this point, the UN and other international actors would be included as monitors on the joint commission.

The mediators reconvened talks on 21 October to discuss the law on political parties. However, after the mediators presented their proposal, Domingos presented an alternative draft to serve as a basis for discussion. This draft created a crisis by including a requirement that the government submit a draft on political parties to technical teams of both sides, making the legislative process subordinate to Rome, and the stipulation that all political parties must register with the UN instead of the Ministry of Justice.⁶⁰ These seemed to challenge the principles in Protocol I by again questioning the legitimacy of the government and Guebuza threatened to leave. The mediators persuaded Renamo that these conditions were unacceptable to any government and that the UN would not propose such a role for itself. After careful revision by the mediators, both parties signed Protocol II on the law on political parties on 13 November. The protocol’s main provisions conferred special status to Renamo, established that political parties must be democratic and national in scope and nature, parties would have access to the media and public funding, and parties must register with the government. Any disputes would be settled by the Supervisory Commission established in Protocol I.

The mediators proceeded to the next issue of the electoral law at the ninth round of talks from 17 until 20 December 1991 and resumed in January 1992. The parameters for this discussion were again in dispute over issues relating to the basic principles and the relationship between Rome and Maputo. The government’s position was that the protocol should set out broad principles upon which a law would be drafted in Mozambique, while Renamo wanted the law specified in the Rome agreement. Domingos furthermore insisted that the constitution be the first order of business for the newly elected Mozambican

⁵⁹GPA, Protocol I, Item 5.

⁶⁰*Mozambiquefile*, Issue 182, September 1991.

assembly, whereas the government argued the assembly should decide its own agenda. Renamo also wanted the UN to conduct the elections, while the government objected to a UN or power-sharing arrangement in the electoral administration. Although agreed on a system of proportional representation, Renamo also suggested a 5% electoral threshold for the parties in every province and 20% nationwide, which was higher than the original proposal with the potential to exclude other groups from the political process. Renamo's insistence on using the Rome process to set and fix the political rules stemmed from its awareness that it would have less capacity to do so in Mozambique in future. Protocol III on the electoral law was finally signed on 12 March 1992 which established both presidential and parliamentary elections within one year after the signing of the cease-fire.

However, behind the scenes and on the sidelines, other international advisors were becoming more prominently and actively involved. The US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen and his deputy, Jeffrey Davidow, frequently met with and encouraged both sides, the mediators, other governments and regional leaders. Davidow also suggested forming a contact group of interested governments to solidify and provide a framework for international support, while the technical experts started discussions on the technicalities of arranging and managing a cease-fire. After the Bicesse agreement was signed in 1991 to end Angola's civil war, the Portuguese and American governments began to press for more involvement in the Rome talks to raise the profile of discussions and to give it some urgency. Renamo also wanted to move away from informal to official mediation by the Italian and American governments. Despite the success of the protocols, the mediators were coming under increasing pressure for the lack of progress and their inability to manage and structure the talks. Their low-profile meant they lacked the leverage needed to keep the momentum of the talks going, while the rest of the peace process industry was getting restless.

The mediators were also facing criticism in Mozambique. The humanitarian crisis was worsening as one of the worst droughts in Southern Africa afflicted the entire region. The government army was threatening mutiny and donor fatigue resulted in pledges of only 60%

in response to the latest emergency appeal for 1991-92.⁶¹ The Christian Council of Mozambique criticised the Rome process for dragging on at the expense of the people's suffering, "[t]hree letters signed jointly by a group of missionary societies in 1992 called for an immediate cease-fire and blamed both sides in Rome for protracting the human suffering in Mozambique."⁶² It was also at this time that regional players reasserted their influence. With assistance from Tiny Rowland, Dhlakama met President Mugabe. Mugabe, a long time adversary, now began to reassure Dhlakama, and offered guarantees for Dhlakama's and Renamo's survival. After this meeting, Mugabe became centrally involved in bringing about a summit between the two Mozambican leaders to speed up the process in Rome.

At the end of 18 months of negotiation, the parties did not seem any closer to signing a cease-fire than when they started. Beyond agreement on an agenda and the protocols on the basic principles and political issues, the parties were still occupied by abstract rather than substantive issues. Although the political process in Rome gave Renamo and other political forces in Mozambique a prominent role; it was not enough to reassure Renamo or bring about a cease-fire, but enough for the government to feel under threat. In the final six months of talks, pressure to conclude an agreement took precedence over discussion of the remaining issues as external third parties crowded into Mozambique's political space.

The final round: military issues and implementation

In the final months of talks, the character of the negotiations radically changed. The discussions moved away from abstract principles to the technical, concrete and detailed questions of the cease-fire, guarantees and the implementation of the agreement. As the discussion moved to questions on demobilisation, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the formation of a new national army, a shift of influence occurred away from both the

⁶¹ *Mozambiquefile*, Issue 187, February 1992.

⁶² Alex Vines and Ken Wilson, "The churches and the peace process in Mozambique," in Paul Gifford, (ed.) *The Christian churches and the democratisation of Africa*, New York, NY: E.J. Brill, 1995, p. 143.

mediators and the delegates. International officials were brought in to observe the talks, while their technical experts provided further assistance where the mediators lacked experience and competence. Given the resources they were expected to provide for the implementation of the agreement, various contingents of the peace process industry, particularly the UN, began to institutionalise their presence into the agreement and into Mozambique's political space. Humanitarian agencies also took a more active part with the ICRC putting forward a number of proposals to increase the delivery of food relief, while the churches and regional actors regained some of the influence they had lost to the Rome process. Finally, the leaders began to take over decision-making from the delegates, as the final details could only be resolved in face-to-face summits. Mozambican politics began to operate at two levels, at the level of the leaders or their immediate representatives, but also at the level of technical, functional and bureaucratic experts; with the divergence and relationship between these two levels influencing the future configuration of political space in Mozambique. While Mozambicans retained formal political power at the executive level, the lack of transparency in the bureaucratic and technical level hid the access to political space and the powerful influence the peace process industry was gaining in that space.

At the start of the tenth round on 10 June 1992, invitations were extended to the US, UK, France, Portugal and the UN to attend the talks as observers on both military and political questions but to keep their contribution to the "margins of the meetings."⁶³ The presence of these third parties changed the dynamic of the plenary sessions, as substantive discussion gave way to accusation and rebuttal. Despite the agenda item on military issues and the pressing humanitarian crisis, Renamo returned to the question of constitutional matters. Renamo also demanded a review of the JVC and then released a report attacking nearly all of the international actors for their bias against them. In turn, Guebuza attacked Renamo for failing to comply with the partial cease-fire, denied any government violations and said it was time to move onto discussion of a full cease-fire. Hume commented that "the presence of the observer delegations had not facilitated discussion and the search for solutions. If anything, their presence stimulated Guebuza and Domingos to present and

⁶³Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War*, p. 102. France and the UK because they were major donors, and Portugal for its links to Renamo.

defend initial positions for benefit of their new audience.”⁶⁴ The futility of the plenary sessions, and the absence of joint working sessions, served to reinforce the practice of individual consultations between the mediators and each side; and encouraged the foreign technical experts to work independently on the humanitarian, military and cease-fire issues.

While the talks stalled over the JVC, the foreign military experts began drafting the military protocol on the formation of a new national army, the security and police services and the withdrawal of foreign troops. The military experts,

despite the small number of working group sessions or even separate discussions with the military teams from the two parties, had produced the basic draft of a protocol on military questions. Ambassador Incisa chaired these working sessions, and often the experts used the documents produced during the Angola negotiations as a point of reference.⁶⁵

Irrespective of possible differences, the experience in Angola was becoming a model for a future operation in Mozambique. In a statement before a US congressional hearing, Herman Cohen, explained the American position of “seek[ing] to keep the UN presence as lean as possible.. no larger than the UN operation in Angola.”⁶⁶ Jeffrey Davidow had also “advised the mediators to resist RENAMO’s desire for an extensive UN peacekeeping mission or direct UN role in administration. It made more sense for the parties to be responsible for implementing the process they agreed on, as in Angola, with the United Nations providing outside support.”⁶⁷

Pressure was mounting from humanitarian agencies in Mozambique to agree on a cease-fire and allow the delivery of emergency food assistance. The ICRC had put proposals before the parties regarding the delivery of humanitarian relief, while the Christian Council of Mozambique offered to contact Renamo about delays in the talks. Once Chissano agreed, in March 1992, a contact group was set up which met Dhlakama to raise concerns about the

⁶⁴Hume, *Ending Mozambique’s War*, p. 105.

⁶⁵Hume, *Ending Mozambique’s War*, p. 111.

⁶⁶Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 8 October 1992.

⁶⁷Hume, *Ending Mozambique’s War*, p. 75. Chapter five discusses how this idea was completely reversed after the collapse of the process in Angola.

slow pace of the negotiations.⁶⁸ Although the food crisis was more severe for Renamo whose soldiers depended on the local population, Renamo refused to open up roads for fear the roads would be used for military purposes by the government. Raffaelli suggested representatives from humanitarian agencies participate in a working group on the emergency in Rome. NGOs had been exerting considerable pressure on the parties and mediators to focus attention on humanitarian concerns.⁶⁹ Representatives from the ICRC, UNHCR, WFP and NGOs like Caritas joined the discussions and drafted a declaration of principles on humanitarian assistance.⁷⁰ Soon thereafter, on 16 July 1992, the Declaration on the Guiding Principles of Humanitarian Assistance was signed allowing the unimpeded access of roads, the freedom of movement of people delivering and seeking assistance, the prohibition of using roads for military advantage and the establishment of a UN-chaired committee in Maputo to coordinate and supervise humanitarian assistance operations.⁷¹ The agreement's focus on access and coordination seemed to reflect the objectives and influence of the peace process industry rather than the parties themselves.

This was demonstrated by the continuing lack of urgency in the negotiations by the parties. This led to renewed calls for a direct meeting between President Chissano and Dhlakama. A summit between the two leaders took place in Rome on 5-7 August 1992, mediated by Robert Mugabe and Tiny Rowland. This meeting was presented as an African summit in Rome, suggesting a return to African solutions, while endorsing the Rome talks. The meeting attempted to build trust and respect between the two leaders and to resolve the issue of guarantees, the constitution and Renamo's safety and transition to a political party. Chissano agreed to put the protocols before the national assembly to be ratified into law,

⁶⁸Dinis Sengulane and Jaime Pedro Goncalves, "A Calling for Peace: Christian Leaders and the Quest for Reconciliation in Mozambique," *Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives*, 3, 1998, p. 33.

⁶⁹See Sam Barnes, "Humanitarian Assistance as a Factor in the Mozambican Peace Negotiations: 1990-2," in Stephen Chan and Moisés Venâncio with Chris Alden and Sam Barnes, *War and Peace in Mozambique*, London: Macmillan Press, 1998, pp. 115-141.

⁷⁰Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War*, p. 108.

⁷¹This reversed the government's original position on UN involvement.

“giving it the force of constitutional amendment and thus precedence over previous legislation.”⁷² The leaders also accepted the “role of the international community, particularly the United Nations, in monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the General Peace Agreement, particularly the cease-fire and the electoral process.”⁷³ The summit declaration set the target date of 1 October 1992 as a deadline for completing negotiations and signing a general cease-fire.

After the summit, the negotiations slowed even further and the responsibilities of the delegates diminished with it. At the end of August, with the October deadline approaching, there was still no discussion of the arrangements for the cease-fire or demobilisation between the delegations. The talks stalled over disagreements on the security service, the size and name of the army, the police and civilian administration, and guarantees for the conduct and success of the agreement’s implementation. The government wanted a large national army to force Renamo to reveal the number of its soldiers, while Renamo wanted a smaller one. Renamo wanted to abolish the security service, while the government wanted it reformed. The two parties were also in disagreement over the nature of the commissions envisaged to supervise the formation of the new army, the police and the security services, particularly whether they would include UN or external third party participation. As for the issue of civilian administration, “Zuppi sensed that there might be no conclusive solution for the internal aspect of the sovereignty issue because the government expected to reestablish its civilian administration throughout the country but that Renamo did not expect to cede its local control anywhere.”⁷⁴ Meanwhile in Mozambique, not one road had opened for the delivery of emergency food relief, nor had the UN committee been established because Renamo’s representative had not arrived in Maputo.

While the two delegations considered the military protocol, the foreign military experts began preparing the cease-fire protocol. The basis for their proposal was a ‘UN non-paper on the modalities of United Nations verification of aspects of a peace agreement in

⁷²Hume, *Ending Mozambique’s War*, p. 113.

⁷³*Joint Declaration*, 7 August 1992.

⁷⁴Hume, *Ending Mozambique’s War*, p. 121.

Mozambique' which was transmitted to both parties on 13 August.⁷⁵ According to this non-paper, the cease-fire would have four phases: 1) cease-fire comes into force, 2) separation of forces (six days), 3) concentration of forces (30 days), and 4) demobilisation and the formation of new army (180 days). The whole process would take no more than six months or 180 days. This timetable proposal was incorporated into the agreement almost verbatim.⁷⁶ Similarly, the military protocol, drafted and revised by the experts and mediators after the summit, was adopted by the parties. The pressure to meet the October deadline, the transfer of responsibility from the delegates to the leaders, and assistance from the international experts meant the technical details of the implementation of the agreement was neither put forward or fully discussed by the parties themselves. Although, Armando Guebuza argues that the government knew what it was signing and nothing was forced on it,⁷⁷ a case can be made that the Mozambican parties relinquished a great deal of responsibility on the shape of the process of implementation to the foreign technical experts.

The institutionalisation of the peace process industry was especially evident in the evolving role of the United Nations. At first, the government was extremely reluctant to involve the UN at all. Although it was later agreed in principle to include the UN, it was the UN Secretary General who first wrote to the Mozambican government to offer assistance in May 1992,⁷⁸ in response to approaches from the Sant'Egidio Community, not the government. Although no longer opposed to UN participation, the government objected to the UN chairing either the supervisory commission established in Protocol I, or the other commissions on the armed forces, police and security services, and humanitarian assistance, as an infringement on its sovereignty. The UN Secretary-General argued that "the best

⁷⁵*The UN and Mozambique*, Letter from the Secretary-General, Document 6, 19 August 1992, pp. 97-100.

⁷⁶Eric Berman, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*, Geneva: UNIDIR, 1995, p. 30. The proposal itself mirrors a US embassy cable on a cease-fire timetable.

⁷⁷Interview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.

⁷⁸*The UN and Mozambique*, Letter from the Secretary-General, Document 2, 28 May 1992, p. 94.

results are achieved if the chairmanship is entrusted to the United Nations.”⁷⁹ The government eventually yielded on this point, apparently on the eve of the accord,⁸⁰ accepting “an effective, instead of a symbolic UN participation”⁸¹ in order to accommodate Renamo, because they realised it was the only way Renamo would sign an agreement.⁸² However, UN participation necessitated that the agreement conform to UN standard operating procedures which added another complicating factor to the discussions.

In August 1992, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that the UN had been invited to participate in Mozambique’s peace process. In September, after disagreements on the framework for a visit to Mozambique, two small UN technical teams arrived in Mozambique.⁸³ While the elections survey team could plan from the political protocols (Protocol II and III), the military survey team, looking into peacekeeping requirements, had no framework. The two-week mission, raised the issue, unforeseen in the discussions, of providing security for the transport corridors, not just monitoring them. This function would require a much larger UN force than the force size under consideration. In mid- September “it seemed that the main work of preparing specific arrangements for guarantees and the cease-fire would in fact be based on the reports of the UN survey teams.”⁸⁴ Protocol V on guarantees elaborated the role of the UN and the structure of the various commissions that were to manage the process. The government committed itself to requesting technical and material support from the United Nations, and its participation in “monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the General Peace Agreement.”⁸⁵ The UN became the chair of the Supervisory and Control Commission (CSC) which would guarantee the

⁷⁹*The UN and Mozambique*, Document 6, p. 98.

⁸⁰Berman, *Managing Arms*, pp. 29-30.

⁸¹Comments by Dhlakama in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 7 August 1992.

⁸²Interview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997. This was also true for the humanitarian assistance committee.

⁸³These teams and the UN experts at the talks have been criticised for their lack of knowledge and expertise on these matters. Interviews with Henny Matos and Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.

⁸⁴Hume, *Ending Mozambique’s War*, p. 130.

⁸⁵GPA, Protocol V, Item III.1.

implementation of the agreement, assume responsibility for the interpretation of the agreement, and settle any disputes between the parties.⁸⁶ The CSC also had under its jurisdiction the commission on the formation of the new army (CCFADM), the cease-fire commission (CCF) and the reintegration commission (CORE).

Preparations began for another summit between the leaders in Botswana to finalise the texts of the four protocols to be signed in October because it was “clear that neither Guebuza nor Domingos had the authority to settle these issues on their own.”⁸⁷ The remaining issues were still: 1) reforming the security and police services, 2) the timing of the cease-fire, 3) the location of sites and logistical support for the demobilisation and cease-fire, 4) civilian administration, and 5) Renamo’s transformation into a political party. Renamo was especially concerned about its transformation into a political party and lobbied foreign governments for financial support. Renamo also began to lobby for power-sharing arrangements after the agreement, with joint command of security and police services and control of its territories and delivery of food supplies. By trying to institutionalise its role and presence in structures and institutions, Renamo showed less interest in the political process, where it was substantially weaker than the government, and more in securing formal power and recognition in the constitution.

The two leaders met on 18 September 1992 and the next day announced agreement on all outstanding areas. While Renamo would control its own areas to keep the peace, the government could establish their administration in all areas, somehow ensuring a single administration in Mozambique. The army would be 30,000 troops, the security and police would have their own commissions without international observers and would not be subordinate to the CSC. However, these agreements were political only and the specific details were left to the mediators to clarify, with the concrete aspects of implementation still to be considered and worked out. With one week to go, there was no resolution on where assembly points would be and the draft protocols on the cease-fire and guarantees had still not been discussed. Unlike the previous 27 months of negotiation, the pressure to conclude

⁸⁶GPA, Protocol V, Item II.5.

⁸⁷Vines, *Renamo: From Terrorism*, p. 139.

an agreement overrode discussion of the most important issues of implementation.

As 1 October 1992 approached, regional and international leaders began to arrive in Rome. President Chissano arrived on 29 September but Dhlakama, who arrived on 1 October, refused to meet Chissano or anyone else to discuss the remaining issues. At this point, Savimbi had just lost the Angolan elections and it was unclear whether he would accept the result. After some confusion and delay, Dhlakama finally agreed to the remaining protocols (IV, V, VI, VII). On 4 October 1992, witnessed by the mediators, the official observers, Robert Mugabe, Herman Cohen, Pik Botha, and James Jonah, President Chissano and Afonso Dhlakama signed the General Peace Agreement comprising the seven protocols, joint communiques and declarations ending the war in Mozambique.

Conclusion: hope and contradiction

The signing of the General Peace Agreement concluded two years of prolonged and arduous negotiations between the parties, the mediators, and the official observers and advisors. Initially, the talks in Rome were intended to facilitate direct negotiations between the government and Renamo. However, the role of the mediators evolved from a facilitative to a more directed one to compensate for the level of distrust, the lack of momentum and the inequality between the two sides, particularly in the political inexperience of Renamo. As a result, the negotiations rarely involved face-to-face discussions, but were dependent on bilateral talks between each party and the mediators or foreign advisors who transmitted ideas to each side. The government and Renamo did not learn to work together. A pattern of conciliatory and inclusive political practices did not evolve, nor was there the sense of a shared problem being solved by the parties together. Despite the mediators' intentions to build a new relationship between the two parties, the process invited and institutionalised the participation of non-Mozambican actors. By the time the agreement was signed in October 1992, the international community had invested a significant amount of time, money, effort and prestige in bringing about a peaceful conclusion to the conflict in

Mozambique.⁸⁸ This coincided with the gradual entrenchment of the peace process industry and its accumulation of influence over the process which allowed it to secure a powerful role in the process of implementation. Through the technical details of the cease-fire, the military protocol and especially the protocol on guarantees, the peace process industry ensured its further participation in and management of Mozambique's peace process.

The process of discussion to reach a cease-fire also marked a transition in how political space in Mozambique was to be configured after the agreement. Because of Renamo and the war, political space in Mozambique was paralysed and near collapse. With the initiation of talks, Renamo became an equal partner in the political process and gained a position in Mozambican politics because of the legitimacy it acquired by participating in the search for peace. The Rome process inevitably began to question the contours of political space in Mozambique in terms of the legitimacy of both Renamo and the state. The Rome talks also subordinated politics in Mozambique, and dominated what was happening on the ground. In turn, changes in Mozambique defined and limited discussions in Rome. After the talks concluded, the General Peace Agreement set out a number of parameters for political space in Mozambique. The protocols on the electoral law, political parties and the formation of the new national armed forces set out parameters that embraced political pluralism and a democratic role for the security institutions. Political space in Mozambique now included Renamo as a legitimate political partner in Mozambican politics. Dhlakama noted the importance of the room opening up in Mozambique's political space, where before the government "had never opened doors for Mozambicans to be able to tell their brothers in the government, as Mozambican citizens, what was wrong or what continued to be wrong."⁸⁹

The terms on which Renamo was to be allowed to participate in Mozambique's political

⁸⁸The Italian government spent US\$ 20 million to host the talks, Renamo's satellite link and expenses, and to cover the costs of the JVC. Vines, *Renamo: From Terrorism*, p. 144.

⁸⁹Afonso Dhlakama, text of speech 7 Aug 1992 on summit declaration, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 10 Aug 1992, Radio Mozambique.

space was largely set by the international community because many of the assurances to Renamo depended on the involvement of external third parties. To keep Renamo in the process, the talks focussed primarily on institutional procedures and mechanisms which provided reassurances for Renamo's survival after a cease-fire. However, the lack of clarity on these mechanisms and the role of the peace process industry in them affected the process and impacted on political space by increasing the role of external agencies in influencing the design and construction of Mozambique's political space. This was achieved through the technical details in the agreement, but also in the agreement's omissions.

In the end, the modalities of how the agreement would be implemented were not discussed in detail, or finally resolved. This included the location of the assembly areas for the cantonment of soldiers, the composition and operation of the numerous commissions, the administration of the country, and other mechanisms and machinery, especially the precise nature of the impending UN role. The rush to conclude the agreement and the

[o]verriding concern that the UN and the Governments represented at the negotiations in Rome had in the *process* - that is of getting from point (A) war to point (B) peace, ... was of infinitely greater importance than ironing out the possible, if not probable, difficulties in implementing the finer points of the agreement.⁹⁰

Nevertheless, the General Peace Agreement was a comprehensive agreement that heralded the end of 16 years of conflict. The next step would involve translating the agreement into real peace. The enclosed atmosphere of Rome was about to be replaced by the complex reality in Mozambique, involving the soldiers, the civilian population, the politicians and their constituencies, and an army of international participants. Through the implementation of the military, humanitarian and political provisions of the agreement, the operation of the peace process industry and the impact on the configuration of political space in Mozambique would become more striking and significant.

⁹⁰Berman, *Managing Arms*, p. 31.

CHAPTER FIVE

Cease-fire, demobilisation, and disarmament: the peace process industry at work

After the signing of the General Peace Agreement (GPA), the reconstruction of political space in Mozambique consisted of incorporating the framework created by the agreement and a number of conditions initiated by the Rome process. As in the negotiating process, the government and Renamo continued to be equal partners in the political arena during the process of implementing the agreement. In addition, the accord institutionalised the role of external third party actors in the transition of Mozambique's political space, especially the UN in monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the GPA. The agreement also established a complex structure of joint commissions to manage the process of implementation, five of which included external third party representatives. The precise roles of these different actors, the relationship amongst them and with the parties, and the functioning of the commissions, were not elaborated in the agreement, but evolved as the process unfolded. Similarly, the agreement did not anticipate the insertion of different segments of Mozambican society, particularly the combatants, into the political arena and their impact on political space. Therefore, as implementation of the agreement began, the constitution of political space in Mozambique was more complicated and dynamic than during the Rome negotiations.

However, the reconfiguration of political space in Mozambique was also conditioned by Mozambique's history of civil conflict involving the state and a guerrilla movement. More than just equal partners in the process, the government was both a belligerent and representing the public institution of the state, while Renamo was both a guerrilla movement and trying to transform into a legitimate political party. This was especially pertinent in the military component of the process, the purpose of which was to remove the capacity for war and to redefine the role of state security institutions to society. Because armed force was a political instrument, these military provisions were both a distinct set of activities, but contingent upon how political space was being configured and the place and role of both parties in it. Given the duration of the war, this took place in a context of deep-

rooted levels of distrust between the parties and within society, and the almost total destruction of the infrastructure, the economy and public institutions.

As explained in the previous chapter, the military protocols, Protocol IV and VI, were signed with minimal discussion in the final stages of negotiation. As a result, explanations on how the military provisions were to be implemented, and the role of the UN and the peace process industry in this, were neglected in the agreement. This would be resolved through the interpretation and implementation of the agreement by the parties and the peace process industry, primarily through the UN operation, ONUMOZ.¹ The extensive involvement of the peace process industry in the military component of the process had a cumulative impact on the structure and operation of political space in Mozambique. This will be discussed in five sections detailing the main components of the military provisions of the General Peace Agreement. These were establishing the UN presence, the cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign troops, the process of demobilisation, disarmament, and reforming state security institutions with the formation of the new national army, and monitoring the security and police forces.² Each section will be discussed in relation to how political space was shaped by the process of implementation.

Starting up the process

After the signing of the agreement in Rome, President Chissano returned to Maputo, Dhlakama to Renamo headquarters in Maringue, Sofala province, and other foreign leaders to their respective capitals. As scheduled in Protocol V on Guarantees, the Mozambican Assembly legislated the GPA into national law on 15 October 1992, bringing the peace accord and cease-fire into effect. However, a number of other conditions set out in the agreement failed to materialise. According to the cease-fire timetable, on the 15th the UN was expected to begin monitoring and verifying the cease-fire, the two combatants were to begin the separation of forces, while Zimbabwean and Malawian troops were to begin

¹ONUMOZ is the Portuguese acronym for the United Nations Operation in Mozambique.

²The reintegration of soldiers and landmines will be dealt with in the next chapter.

withdrawing from Mozambique. Similarly, the Supervisory and Control Commission (CSC) and its subsidiary commissions established to oversee the process, were to be activated and begin operating. In order to meet these provisions, the cease-fire timetable had presumed both that a UN presence would already be established in Mozambique and that preparations for the operation of the various commissions were in place. Neither was true. In lieu of the arrival of the United Nations, the inertia and distrust which characterised the talks surfaced in Mozambique.

Prior to the signing of the GPA, the UN Secretary-General had warned the parties that there would be a delay in getting the UN operation off the ground.³ As a result of their late inclusion in the negotiations, the UN did not have time to prepare the concept of operation, determine the budget requirements or send requests to troop contributing countries before the signing of the agreement. In contrast to Angola where the UN had detailed information about the parties, their locations, and an agreement on the location of assembly areas, these basic prerequisites were absent in Mozambique. Planning the operation was further complicated by the overstretched capacity of the UN, which at the time was also operating in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Angola. However, the UN Secretary-General appointed Aldo Ajello⁴, interim Special Representative, in charge of all UN activities in support of the agreement. Ajello arrived in Maputo with 21 military observers on 15 October 1992 and set up headquarters in resident UN offices. On 4 November 1992, one month after the signature of the agreement, Ajello was able to appoint the Supervisory and Control Commission and hold its first meeting. The three main subsidiary commissions, the Cease-fire Commission (CCF), the Reintegration Commission (CORE) and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces (CCFADM) were also

³*The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995*, New York, NY: Department of Public Information, 1995. Letter from the Secretary-General, Document 10, 29 September 1992, p. 103. The Mozambique government did not formally request UN participation until October 1992, Document 12, S/24635, p. 105.

⁴Aldo Ajello was a former Italian parliamentarian and one of the most senior Italian nationals working in the UN, as an assistant secretary-general in UNDP. He also had personal ties to Mozambique.

appointed.⁵

Although the agreement stipulated that implementation would begin on 15 October 1992, ambiguities or omissions in the agreement on who was responsible for initiating the process paralysed political space in Mozambique. Although the peace process hinged on the parties compliance to the agreement, it became contingent on the UN to manage the implementation of the agreement as chair of the CSC. The role given to the UN to monitor, verify and guarantee the compliance of the parties to the agreement, put the UN at the centre of the process and Mozambique's political space. Pending the arrival of the UN, the parties had not been in communication with each other since Rome or taken steps to begin implementation. Renamo remained at their headquarters and refused to move to Maputo to meet their obligations under the GPA, claiming the government had not secured the promised accommodation, offices and transportation in order for Renamo to take up residency in the capital. The government meanwhile was realising the extent of its logistical commitments and coping with its limited capacity to meet them. Although the process stalled with the slow start-up of the UN operation, the UN was also impeded in its work by the government's reluctance to accept the UN and by delays of both parties in finalising the remaining details of the agreement. However, in leaving for New York in November to assist in drafting the mandate for the UN operation, Ajello effectively suspended the CSC and hence the process itself, until his return in mid-December.

Given the lack of clarity in the agreement on the precise role of the United Nations, this question was transferred to New York to be resolved in the drafting of the UN peacekeeping mandate. The UN's position in Mozambique's political space was to be decided through the ONUMOZ mandate in New York, not in Rome and not through the CSC in Maputo where the government and Renamo were members. In New York, preparations for ONUMOZ were overshadowed by the collapse of the peace process in Angola and Savimbi's return to war after his electoral defeat in October 1992. The UN could not afford another expensive and embarrassing failure in Africa and sought to ensure

⁵*The UN and Mozambique*, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 26, S/24892, 3 December 1992, p. 150.

that at least in Mozambique, there would be full demobilisation before elections.⁶ Contrary to previous assumptions that the operation would mirror the size of UNAVEM II in Angola, the UN, Ajello and the international community in Maputo and their country representatives in New York and Washington, all favoured a large military force.⁷

However, it was not only preoccupation with Angola which informed the size of the force, but also the UN's decision to guarantee the security of the transport corridors. The security of the corridors against banditry was essential for the delivery of emergency relief assistance. This was anticipated in Protocol IV of the GPA which stated that the, "CSC, through CCF, will, following the withdrawal of the foreign troops, assume immediate responsibility for verifying and ensuring security of strategic and trading routes, adopting the measures it deems necessary for the purpose."⁸ The UN Secretary-General linked this responsibility to the peacekeeping operation, explaining that "the need to secure the corridors emerged as the principal determinant of the size of the military component of the operation, ... [as well as the] complexity and cost of the proposed United Nations operation in Mozambique."⁹ Protection against banditry was clearly a different conception of security (in which the UN lacked experience), from most operations where peacekeepers act as a buffer or deterrent between opposing forces. However, not only was this framework for security not debated during negotiations, the agreement left open how it would be accomplished. Through the design of the operational mandate for ONUMOZ, the UN and the peace process industry reinterpreted the agreement to reflect their agenda of avoiding another Angola and their interpretation of security requirements in Mozambique.

⁶UNAVEM II was criticised for having a small deployment of 350 military observers which amounted to 5 military observers per province or per 100,000 inhabitants in a country of 10 million people with an estimated 200,000 government troops and 50,000 UNITA forces. See Margaret Joan Anstee, *Orphans of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-1993*, London: Macmillan Press, 1996, pp. 13, 14, 32. See also United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, S/22627, 20 May 1991.

⁷Richard Syng, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-1994*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997, p. 31.

⁸GPA, Protocol IV, II.4.

⁹*The UN and Mozambique*, Document 10, p. 103.

On 16 December 1992, two months after the GPA was signed, the Security Council approved the mandate for ONUMOZ. Although the government had lobbied the Security Council to limit the size of the operation, the Security Council “felt it was better to spend a bit more than necessary to avoid the costly embarrassment of another UNAVEM II.”¹⁰ ONUMOZ expanded the scope and size of the UN role by assuming a multi-functional mandate with political, military, electoral and humanitarian responsibilities. The framework for the military component was the following:

- i) To monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons;
- ii) To monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces;
- iii) To monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups;
- iv) To authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures; and
- v) To provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support of the peace process, especially in the corridors.¹¹

A civilian police component not envisaged in the GPA, but proposed by Boutros-Ghali earlier, was also mentioned. ONUMOZ would deploy 354 military observers; 5 logically self-sufficient infantry battalions, with up to 850 personnel in each; 1 engineer battalion, 3 logistic companies; and air, communications, medical and movement control support units.¹² In total, ONUMOZ would deploy over 7000 troops in Mozambique at a cost of \$332 million over twelve-months.¹³

The government was aghast at the proposed size of the UN force. One government official complained that “Mozambique was not a protectorate, the UN were to observe not send in a peacekeeping force.”¹⁴ Another Mozambican parliamentarian “warned that the United Nations could become a ‘state within a state’.”¹⁵ Although ONUMOZ resembled other UN peacekeeping operations, when compared to the poverty of Mozambique, with its logistical

¹⁰Eric Berman, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995, p. 39.

¹¹*The UN and Mozambique*, Document 26, pp. 151-2.

¹²*The UN and Mozambique*, Document 26, pp. 151-2.

¹³*The UN and Mozambique*, Document 26, Addendum 1, p. 157,

¹⁴*Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, Issue 1, January 1993.

¹⁵Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 36.

capacity, a budget far greater than the GNP of the country, and its political import, ONUMOZ had all the components of a ‘parallel state apparatus’. In addition to the military, humanitarian and electoral components,

the administrative component in Maputo, with three regional offices, [would provide] support in the areas of finance, personnel, procurement, communication, travel, compensation, building management, property control, translation and interpretation, electronic data processing and security.¹⁶

However, the government was naive or disingenuous to think UN participation would not take the form of a peacekeeping operation. Moreover, the government had neither clarified the role of the UN, nor made the connections between the provisions in the agreement and their implementation. When the government’s representations failed to change the UN’s course, they retaliated by denying landing permission to an advance mission of Italian troops arriving in Beira.¹⁷

The government used the status of forces agreement (SOFA)¹⁸ to communicate their resentment of the UN. They prolonged negotiations over what is a standard international legal instrument agreed between every host country accepting a UN peacekeeping mission. The SOFA is a basic document which provides legal immunity, freedom of movement for all UN personnel and legal exemption from import duties. Without the SOFA, the UN had to inform the government in advance of all movements of its personnel which hampered its mobility. The government had two main objections. The first was the issue of national sovereignty. Many in the government objected to the free movement of what was viewed as an “occupying force”. They also objected to the language in the document which seemed to model the experience in Cambodia where the UN served as a transitional administrative authority.¹⁹ The second was financial. Import duties were an important source of revenue

¹⁶ONUMOZ operational structure, *The UN and Mozambique*, Document 26, p. 156.

¹⁷Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 36.

¹⁸United Nations, *Model status-of-forces agreement for peace-keeping operations*, A/45/594, 9 October 1990.

¹⁹Migel de Brito, “The relationship between peacekeepers, host governments and the local population,” in Mark Malan, (ed.) *Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Lessons for Africa from a Seminar Past*, ISS Monograph Series, No. 10,

for the government which was under pressure from donors and the World Bank to raise revenue from all sources. The government was also expected to secure offices and accommodations for the UN. The SOFA was not signed until 14 May 1993, with all exemptions and immunities, but the UN agreed to pay for its own offices and housing.

Despite the Security Council's political commitment, the UN ran into difficulties securing troops from member countries and winning financial approval.²⁰ As a result, the first troop contingent did not arrive in Mozambique until February 1993 and the operation was not fully deployed until February 1994. ONUMOZ was

severely hampered by financial constraints which affected its recruitment and deployment of key personnel as well as its arrangements for accommodation and other essential services. After a start-up allocation of \$9.5 million, the operation did not receive approval of its first interim budget, amounting to \$140 million, from the General Assembly until 16 March 1993.²¹

According to Ajello, delays in the budgetary process meant that "we couldn't place any orders, we couldn't order any vehicles, any equipment... I cannot use military observers without vehicles, without radio, without anything."²² Some personnel, computers, and vehicles were transferred directly from Cambodia after the conclusion of UNTAC, even though Mozambique had a vastly different terrain and used left-hand drive.²³ Bureaucratic infighting in New York also undermined the launch of the operation. Ajello's position and authority was made tenuous by persistent rumours that he was to be replaced by James Jonah.²⁴ Jonah's reappointment as Under-Secretary-General in February 1993 ended this speculation, yet Ajello was only confirmed as the permanent Special Representative in

1997, p. 61.

²⁰Ajello believes Mozambique received less priority because of high-profile operations in Yugoslavia, Cambodia and Somalia. Berman, *Managing Arms*, p. 39.

²¹*The UN and Mozambique*, Introduction, p. 29.

²²Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 38.

²³Michael F. Stephen, "Demobilisation in Mozambique," in Jakkie Cilliers, (ed.) *Dismissed: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Africa*, Johannesburg: South Africa Institute for Defence Policy, 1996, p 67.

²⁴Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 37.

April 1993.

The British ambassador to Mozambique, Richard Edis, has argued that the first six months of the process was “a valuable, at times frustrating, exercise in gaining experience and confidence-building between all those involved, the Government, RENAMO and the international community.”²⁵ However, the dynamics in this initial phase did not suggest that the government and Renamo accepted the same framework of political space. Rather, both parties responded to and used external third parties as leverage against the other. The UN’s expanded role made it a powerful political actor in Mozambique’s political space which threatened the authority of the government. However, delays in setting up ONUMOZ undermined this position. The token UN presence, procurement problems and Ajello’s tenuous position suggested weak resolve on the part of the UN and the international community which both parties tried to manipulate to their advantage. Dhlakama demanded 65% deployment of UN forces as a precondition before meeting their obligations under the agreement.²⁶ The government wrote to the Security Council to complain about Renamo’s behaviour and pressure their compliance, using the Council as a forum to air grievances to strengthen their own position in Mozambique. Rather than developing conciliatory political practices or building confidence, these initial political manouevres added to the distrust between the parties and between the parties and the international community.

The cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign troops

In his first report creating ONUMOZ, the Secretary-General stated that because of the delays, “[t]he viability of the cease-fire will therefore in its early stages, depend critically on the political will and strict compliance of the two parties with the agreed modalities.”²⁷ Despite great uncertainty, a cease-fire emerged amongst ordinary soldiers who, in

²⁵Richard Edis, “Mozambique’s Successful Peace Process: An Insider’s View,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 9(2), 1995, p. 7.

²⁶*The UN and Mozambique*, Letter from the Secretary-General, Document 30, 22 January 1993, pp. 170-171.

²⁷*The UN and Mozambique*, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 13, S/24642, 9 October 1992, p. 128.

remarkable instances of reconciliation, shared food with each other. Wilson reported that cease-fire agreements between local commanders emerged and many Mozambicans instituted ‘a people’s peace.’²⁸ Renamo was proving more disciplined than most observers had expected. However, government soldiers awaiting instruction on their demobilisation were less disciplined, looting and threatening civilians along roads. Foreshadowing events that would later dominate the peace process, government soldiers, “including men from units trained with British help, allegedly the country’s elite... went on a two-week strike, blocking railways and roads.”²⁹ At the moment there was little concern, but the threat of these recurrent disturbances hinted at the potential significance of these soldiers in the process.

Surprisingly, serious violations of the cease-fire never took place; most violations reflected the movement of troops, the occupation of new positions or restrictions of free circulation.³⁰ Most threats to security arose from acts of banditry, not the kind of targeted attacks which characterised Renamo in the past. However, some violations of the cease-fire were reported in the days immediately following the signing of the GPA. On 20 October, Renamo was alleged to have captured 4 towns in Nampula and Zambezia provinces, while Renamo complained of government and Zimbabwean troop movements in Nampula, Zambezia and Tete. The Cease-fire Commission (CCF), composed of both parties and international representatives, began investigating 40 cease-fire violation complaints. However, its capacity to verify the violations was constrained by limited resources and the slow deployment of the operation. Effective monitoring did not begin until July 1993. The CCF also had no guidelines concerning the positions held by each party, no map to identify military installations, no inventory of manpower for the cantonment of forces and no prior knowledge as to how many paramilitary, private and irregular troops existed on

²⁸Ken Wilson, “The People’s Peace in Mozambique,” *Southern Africa Report*, March 1994, p. 22.

²⁹*The Economist*, 15 August 1992.

³⁰Comments by Pier Segala, Chairman of the Cease-Fire Commission, in Winrich Kühne, Bernhard Weimer and Sabine Fandrych, (eds.) *International Workshop on the Successful Conclusion of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)*, Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik, July 1995, p. 19.

Mozambican territory.³¹

The CCF was further undermined by the government's decision to retake the four towns and three villages in Tete province even after lodging a complaint with the commission. The government argued that the responsibility for maintaining security in the country still remained the government's. As a sovereign state,

the government assumes the responsibilities that befall it in the defence and security of the peoples and reserves the right to take the measures it deems suitable to put an end to the violations that have taken place and to restore the conditions for the compliance with and implementation of the General Peace Agreement.³²

Given the UN's absence and inability to perform its functions, the government sought to reclaim its authority in political space, and its right to ensure the implementation of the agreement. However this was interpreted by Renamo as a violation of the agreement which proved the government could not be trusted. The international community and the UN condemned Renamo's violations and the government for not respecting the agreement and not allowing the appropriate commissions to deal with the problem, resorting to force instead of political dialogue.

Zimbabwe began withdrawing troops from the transport corridors on 21 October 1992 without international supervision. The absence of international monitors meant that little confidence was given to the process, especially by Renamo. Their departure also created a security vacuum in the corridors since there was no replacement force until the following April. However, reflecting another omission of the agreement, the numbers, modalities and deadlines for the withdrawal of foreign troops were not explained in the agreement but left to the government to negotiate and present to the CSC for approval.³³ This was problematic given that the CSC was not meeting because of Ajello's absence. These delays were again interpreted by Renamo as bad faith on the part of the government and reinforced their

³¹Comments by Pier Segala, in Kühne, *International Workshop*, pp. 19-21.

³²*The UN and Mozambique*, Communiqué by the Council of Ministers of Mozambique, Document 21, S/24724, 28 October 1992, p. 145.

³³GPA, Protocol IV, Item II. 4.

uncooperative behaviour. Zimbabwe finally withdrew all of its troops in April 1993 after the arrival of the Italian contingent and in June 1993 the last Malawian troops departed from the Nacala corridor.

Despite its responsibilities to monitor and verify the cease-fire, the UN was either absent or ineffective in these early stages. The UN force commander assumed his duties on 14 February 1993, but it was only between March and May 1993 that ONUMOZ became a significant military presence in Mozambique. By April 1993, 1043 Italian troops were stationed along the Beira corridor, Botswanan troops took over the Tete corridor, a battalion from Bangladesh took over the Nacala corridor, Zambian soldiers patrolled the Limpopo corridor while Uruguayan troops protected the Beira-Maputo highway. As in most UN operations, there were differences in the capacities of each national contingent. While the Italian contingent was self-sufficient, troops from other countries were less prepared, for example, “[w]hen the Uruguayan contingent set up camp, it was provided with neither food nor water for the first two days, and half the battalion found itself deployed to a point 40 kilometres from the highway it was to patrol.”³⁴ By August 1993, there were also 303 unarmed military observers responsible for verifying cease-fire violations, setting up assembly areas and verifying demobilisation and disarmament. The UN force did not reach its peak deployment of 6615 until February 1994, after which it began to scale down.³⁵

The main responsibility of the armed forces was to guard the transport corridors until such time as the new national army could take over. This function, which was the justification for the strong UN presence in Mozambique, was not performed well. Along the Beira corridor, the number of armed attacks increased after Italian units replaced the Zimbabweans, since the first force commander “insisted on a strict interpretation of the mandate, at first refusing to allow troops to intervene to prevent banditry.”³⁶ Eventually in early 1994, troops were redeployed in Zambezia to provide a symbolic UN presence in Mozambique’s most populated province through which no transport corridor passed. In

³⁴ Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 42.

³⁵ Berman, *Managing Arms*, p. 41.

³⁶ Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 44.

response to the increase in crime and banditry, Ajello referred the issue to the Mozambican police as a criminal rather than a security matter,³⁷ since “responsibility for the maintenance of law and order will clearly remain with the Government.”³⁸ However, the lines between security, banditry, crime and violence were thinly drawn. Ajello’s position seemed to contradict the UN’s original conceptualisation of security in terms of threats from bandits, private militia and roaming groups of heavily armed irregulars, and protecting the “four transport corridors in order to avoid any vacuum that could be exploited by bandits, pending the formation of the new unified armed forces.”³⁹

In addition to not meeting their basic military objectives, “most of the contingents were also criticized for failing to make a positive contribution to rehabilitating the country’s shattered infrastructure.”⁴⁰ One observer reported that the Italian troops “have extremely little to do. They patrol the roads, phone home to their families twice a week, and eat pizza made at their own bakery.”⁴¹ According to the British Ambassador, “[m]ost of the ONUMOZ force enjoyed a relaxed existence, apart from the relatively small group of military observers who bore the brunt of the work and the danger monitoring the ceasefire and demobilisation.”⁴² Although the military was the least effective component, it cost \$162 of the \$328 million budget in the second year, with the overall personnel and administrative costs reaching 62% of the total, from November 1993 to November 1994.⁴³ The conduct of some peacekeepers in relation to the local population also created problems. In 1994, the press reported cases of child prostitution near the Italian contingent and an Italian unit was sent home after an investigation ordered by Ajello. ONUMOZ also had an impact on the local economy and provided a number of jobs for Mozambicans, especially those who could speak English. In

³⁷ *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, Issue 12, September 1994.

³⁸ *The UN and Mozambique*, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 55, S/1994/89 Addendum 1, 28 January 1994, p. 225.

³⁹ *The UN and Mozambique*, Document 26, p. 151.

⁴⁰ Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 44.

⁴¹ Dan Isaacs, “Watching and waiting,” *Africa Report*, July/August 1993, p. 41.

⁴² Edis, “Mozambique’s Successful Peace Process,” p. 17.

⁴³ Chris Alden, “The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 33(1), 1995, p. 127.

Maputo, the UN presence led to inflated rental rates but created a buoyant local market.

During this time, Renamo's representatives, Raul Domingos and Vicente Ululu, took up residence in Maputo, but Dhlakama himself remained in Maringue. Given his unchallenged control over Renamo, Dhlakama's continued absence from Maputo undermined the workings of the joint commissions. Thus, every point that required his approval meant that Ajello, his lieutenant, or representatives of the international community flew out to Maringue.⁴⁴ The government complained that Dhlakama was being treated as a head of state while continuing to deny access to areas under its control. Renamo increasingly set forth conditions for their compliance to the agreement, primarily linking demobilisation to demands for money to transform itself into a political party. Renamo revealed that the Italians had secretly promised to pay \$15 million to Renamo to sign the GPA, but had failed to deliver.⁴⁵ Renamo also demanded appointments to provincial governors and accused the government of transferring members of the army into the security and police services. Ajello insisted the process depended on Renamo, which meant accommodating Dhlakama. Ajello proposed creating a special trust fund for donors to contribute money to help Renamo transform into a political party. However in March 1993, Renamo pulled out of all of the commissions to hold a political training seminar in Maringue, not returning to Maputo until June. For three months, the commissions could not meet, nor could the CCF investigate allegations of violations.

ONUMOZ and the international community were not impartial neutral third parties with respect to the parties, or between the state and society. To keep Renamo in the process, Renamo was given special treatment by the international community by Ajello's treatment of Dhlakama and the creation of the Trust Fund. This was resented by the government which also perceived the intrusive military presence of the UN as an encroachment on Mozambique's sovereignty which endowed the UN with undue and unnecessary power in

⁴⁴During the negotiations, US diplomats had refused invitations to meet with Dhlakama at Renamo headquarters and "insisted on a neutral site". Cameron Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1994, p. 65.

⁴⁵*Africa Confidential*, 34(10), 14 May 1993, p. 3.

Mozambique's political space. The feebleness of ONUMOZ in performing its military functions only served to reinforce the resentment of the government of this symbolic yet futile presence. Ajello later agreed "the military component was too big and to a certain extent inefficient."⁴⁶ Like Rome, the two sides were not dealing directly with each other but through a third party, this time the UN. However, mutinies by soldiers from both sides was drawing more attention. The significance of this would become apparent during the process of demobilisation.

Demobilisation

PREPARING FOR DEMOBILISATION

One of the most important aspects of the peace process was the demobilisation of the armed forces. Demobilisation is "the process of converting a soldier into a civilian."⁴⁷ Berdal defines demobilisation "as the formal disbanding of military formations and, at the individual level, as the process of releasing combatants from a mobilised state. It covers a number of activities associated with establishing and maintaining assembly areas."⁴⁸ According to the cease-fire timetable, demobilisation would start 30 days after the GPA enters into force and conclude six months thereafter, including the disbanding of irregular troops and militias. Contrary to the timetable, delays in the process were aggravated by the slow pace of selecting and preparing the assembly areas, the actual cantonment, and finally demobilisation itself. The accumulation of missed deadlines contributed to the distrust of the parties and put pressure on other aspects of the process, particularly the timetable and the elections.

Protocol IV on demobilisation designated 49 cantonment sites, 29 for the Government and

⁴⁶Comments by Aldo Ajello in Kühne, *International Workshop*, p. 13.

⁴⁷Kimberly Mahling Clark, "The Demobilization and Reintegration of Soldiers: Perspectives from USAID," *Africa Today*, 1st and 2nd Quarters, 1995, p. 50.

⁴⁸Mats R. Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper 303, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies and Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 39.

20 for Renamo. The location of these sites was not outlined in the agreement but “shall be those agreed to between the Parties and the United Nations no later than 7 (seven) days after the signing of the General Peace Agreement.”⁴⁹ However, the process of identifying and agreeing on the assembly areas (AAs) proved to be long and tedious. The UN first established guidelines on acceptable standards for the AAs according to which, most of the sites proposed by both parties were found to be unacceptable because of lack of access to water, inaccessibility from roads, and proximity to mined areas. They reflected strategic rather than practical suitability by both parties trying to assert control in disputed zones or to capture new territory. By late April 1993, ONUMOZ military observers had approved only 13 of 19 proposed sites.

ONUMOZ’s plans for demobilisation incorporated recommendations from a Swiss study commissioned earlier by the government when it was considering partial demobilisation.⁵⁰ The study recommended that a civilian technical unit (TU) be created to support the military observers. ONUMOZ implemented this technical unit, giving it overall responsibility for coordinating all the logistics of the assembly areas including distributing food, medicines and other basic services; organising a database and issuing personal documents; supplying civilian clothing; organising transportation home for ex-combatants; and establishing a link with provincial and district authorities. The TU also took over responsibility for registering the non-assembled troops, mainly the disabled, administrative units, air force, marines etc., and overseeing the storage of weapons.

However, in these technical aspects of preparing and managing the AAs, the TU and the peace process industry demonstrated their overwhelming and comprehensive involvement in the process and tendency for quick-fix solutions. Once a site was approved, the TU with UNICEF, UNOHAC, USAID and other major donors provided everything from wells, soap, blankets, tarpaulins, to cooking pots, utensils, plates and cups. The TU with the World Health Organization (WHO) provided medicines and set up a clinic at each AA which was also available to surrounding local communities. They also contracted NGOs such as

⁴⁹GPA, Protocol VI, Item 6 (e).

⁵⁰*The UN and Mozambique*, Introduction, p. 39, see also Document 26, p. 152.

OXFAM and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) to provide medical personnel, medicines, salaries and vehicles. The government supplied its own doctors and offered to provide doctors for all 49 AAs but RENAMO preferred international assistance to emphasise its lack of trust towards the government.⁵¹ The World Food Programme (WFP) provided basic food rations to soldiers and their dependents. However in response to the degree of external assistance, the government insisted on providing meat and fish rations for its own soldiers, even though it lacked the resources to fulfil this commitment.⁵² The TU has since been praised as one of the most innovative and effective aspects of the UN operation, but it depended on creating an entire administrative system with a central office in Maputo and its own warehouses in three regional depots. It “was formally part of the Office of the Special Representative and was expected to report directly to Ajello,”⁵³ but it also had to coordinate activities with ONUMOZ military observers and share information with UNOHAC. However, despite its formal organisational links, “the TU operated largely independently. It even possessed its own satellite feed and, therefore, was not dependent on the rest of ONUMOZ for its communication requirements.”⁵⁴

The entire process received an immense boost when Dhlakama finally arrived in Maputo (although not taking up residence) at the end of August 1993. In a tour of the city, Dhlakama was encouraged by his enthusiastic reception from supporters and his ability to move freely in the city. After the UN trust fund for Renamo had been set up in May 1993, with pledges from a number of countries, Renamo became less obstructive. Long awaited meetings between Dhlakama and President Chissano took place in September 1993, the first in Mozambique, to settle issues relating to territorial administration, provincial governors and the police. An agreement was reached to request UN police monitors, the appointment of Renamo advisors to provincial governors and the disbanding of irregular armies, but both Dhlakama and Chissano left Maputo, and the process stalled again. The slow pace of the process was straining the patience of the international community. Ajello

⁵¹Berman, *Managing Arms*, p. 64.

⁵²Berman, *Managing Arms*, p. 64.

⁵³Berman, *Managing Arms*, p. 62.

⁵⁴Berman, *Managing Arms*, p. 62.

proposed a new timetable, starting demobilisation in October 1993, with elections one year later in October 1994. Renamo objected and their delegates left Maputo once more.

The UN Secretary-General proposed a visit to Mozambique to give momentum to the process. Between 17-20 October 1993, Boutros-Ghali, conveyed the impatience of the international community on the lack of progress a year after the signing of the GPA and warned of the possible withdrawal of international assistance and the suspension of donor assistance. The threat produced results. He secured agreement on the revised timetable and a commitment to start cantonment in November 1993 and demobilisation in January 1994. The Security Council reinforced his threat by renewing ONUMOZ's mandate for six months, with a review in 90 days, two days before the mandate was due to expire.⁵⁵ The Security Council resolution also stressed "the unacceptability of attempts to gain further concessions or to attach new conditions to the peace process... and strongly urged the parties not to raise further issues which might jeopardize the implementation of the Agreement."⁵⁶ The peace process industry had significant political leverage over the parties but this was undermined by their operations on the ground which generated politically motivated reactions from the parties in relation to each other and to international agencies in Mozambique's political space.

CANTONMENT

The first 20 Assembly Areas were officially declared open on 30 November 1993, 15 more in December, and the final 14 in February 1994. The assembly of troops began in December 1993 after "[f]ood and medicines were made available, in the hopes of exerting political pressure on the parties to start demobilizing, despite the risk that the supplies would deteriorate before the assembly process had actually started."⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the actual assembly of forces was still painfully slow. Renamo linked cantonment to other demands

⁵⁵*The UN and Mozambique*, Security Council Resolution, Document 49, S/RES/882 (1993), 5 November 1993, p. 212.

⁵⁶*The UN and Mozambique*, Document 49, p. 212.

⁵⁷Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 50.

but was also reluctant to begin cantonment because it would reveal child soldiers in its forces which had always been denied.⁵⁸ On the other hand, the government was initially eager to begin cantonment because of growing discontent among its soldiers, but not without reciprocal cantonment by Renamo. All through 1993, there were reports of mutinies by government soldiers. These mutinies only “reinforc[ed] the government’s fear of being forced into a more rapid demobilization than that required of Renamo, which was able to enforce tighter discipline among its troops.”⁵⁹

In the assembly areas, it was clear both sides were holding back their best troops, and that troops of little strategic importance entered first. To ensure transparency and put pressure on the parties, the UN released figures on the rate of assembly, which led to a dispute with the government, who accused the UN of under-reporting government numbers. The government was extremely resentful of ONUMOZ, particularly Ajello, complaining that ONUMOZ had been exerting

considerable, unilateral pressure on the Government for the cantonment of its troops - both through the media and the Security Council - but it has failed to do the same thing with regard to Renamo... The Government deems it necessary that ONUMOZ act with objectivity, avoiding any kind of partiality that might discredit and jeopardize the implementation of the General Peace Agreement.⁶⁰

The international members of the CSC supported ONUMOZ by issuing statements on the progress of the peace process, which were linked to the Security Council’s renewal of the ONUMOZ mandate.⁶¹

The registration of soldiers was also uneven, with some assembly areas having 3%

⁵⁸After many denials, Renamo admitted to having child soldiers among its ranks, 2000 children were assisted by UNICEF and SCF, and reunited with their families.

⁵⁹Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 60.

⁶⁰Statement of the Government of Mozambique to the CCF, transmitted to the Security Council, 7 July 1994, *The UN and Mozambique*, Document 66, S/1994/806, p. 249.

⁶¹Statement by the International Members of the CSC on the Assembly of Forces, 12 December 1993.

utilisation, while others were overwhelmed with 420% capacity.⁶² The AAs were designed to hold 1000 soldiers for six weeks at a time, but soldiers were unable to leave until they were formally demobilised. Once soldiers were registered, received identity cards and handed in their weapons, lists were sent to the parties to decide who would join the new army and who would be demobilised. As will be discussed in the last section, this took an extremely long time. As a result of on-going delays, there was overcrowding in the camps and increasing levels of boredom, frustration and uncertainty. Other problems emerged because of poor conditions in the camps. Government soldiers were dissatisfied not only with camp conditions but broken promises from the government regarding salaries and compensation. Dhlakama protested that his troops lacked basic necessities like food and water. Renamo combatants, who saw themselves as part of a winning army promised rewards from their leaders, found the poor conditions of the AAs difficult to accept and held their own commanders hostage.⁶³ Renamo AAs also “tended to be located in areas formerly under guerrilla control, often in very inaccessible locations,”⁶⁴ close to mined areas, difficult to resupply except by air, which added to the cost, delays and discontent. Mutinies in both camps became commonplace, spilling over into the corridors.⁶⁵ They showed “that the representatives of the Government and Renamo in the field, namely the Camp Commanders, [had] no control over their respective personnel.”⁶⁶ After reports of mass self-repatriation by refugees and displaced Mozambicans, soldiers became even more anxious to leave the camps “to get back to their home areas before all land and resources

⁶²*The UN and Mozambique*, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 63, S/1994/511, 28 April 1994, p. 233.

⁶³Alex Vines, *Renamo: From Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?* London: James Currey, 1996, p. 153.

⁶⁴João Paulo Borges Coehlo and Alex Vines, *Pilot Study on Demobilization and Re-Integration of Ex-Combatants in Mozambique*, Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, 1995, p. 17.

⁶⁵Protests by soldiers included: (1) assault to food and clothing warehouses; (2) assault to arms deposits in the camps; (3) chain of command broken; (4) threats to the security of ONUMOZ team; (5) road-block; (6) uncontrolled acts outside the camps including assault on civilians, shops etc. Coehlo and Vines, *Pilot Study on Demobilization*, p. 18.

⁶⁶ONUMOZ, *Report of the Chairman of the Cease-Fire Commission at the 33rd Plenary Session of the CSC*, 18 July 1994.

were allocated to civilian returnees.”⁶⁷

Discontent in the camps also resulted from decisions made by external third parties regarding the process of demobilisation. Ajello’s priority of quick and timely demobilisation was undermined by projects established by UNOHAC whereby soldiers arriving at cantonment camps were responsible for building their own facilities. According to Ajello,

while this plan might have made sense according to development theory... it caused numerous and unnecessary problems. The soldiers who arrived at the assembly areas (some having walked considerable distances) were offended by being treated as peasants...The situation made them question the reliability of and effectiveness of the UN. Simply put, ‘they did not appreciate the highly educational implication of this approach.’⁶⁸

Roger Carlson, director of USAID, echoed Ajello’s criticisms. He said “devising ways to educate the soldiers in assembly areas is less important than figuring out ways to get them, into, through and processed out of the camps as quickly as possible.”⁶⁹ Although the idea of providing skills-training to soldiers made sense from a development perspective, the poor morale and resistance generated by this project made the soldiers more difficult to manage and more of a security threat. Insecurity was rampant in the camps and in the countryside, such that mutinies and social banditry were almost indistinguishable.⁷⁰

DEMOBILISATION: MARCH-SEPTEMBER 1994

As will be discussed in the next chapter, in February 1994, donors agreed to fund a reintegration support scheme for demobilised soldiers, adding 18 months pay to the 6 months compensation provided by the government. With this financial incentive, most soldiers demanded immediate demobilisation. Demobilisation officially began on 10 March 1994 involving President Chissano and 250 government soldiers. In a ceremony on 18

⁶⁷Stephen, “Demobilisation in Mozambique,” p. 59.

⁶⁸Berman, *Managing Arms*, p. 64, fn 15.

⁶⁹Roger Carlson cited in Clark, “The demobilization and reintegration of soldiers,” p. 55.

⁷⁰Coehlo and Vines, *Pilot Study on Demobilization*, p. 13.

March 1994, Renamo demobilised 101 soldiers, the first of which turned out to be a child soldier to Dhlakama's embarrassment. The International Office for Migration (IOM) transported soldiers home, relocating those who lived furthest away and those who had entered the assembly areas first as part of a phased demobilisation.

In April 1994, a major dispute arose when the government presented revised figures of 49,630 troops to be demobilised, down from earlier figures of 61,838. The government claimed the miscalculation was based on the inclusion of the previously demobilised troops and on corrupt commanders who failed to declare dead soldiers in order to claim their pay. Renamo claimed again that the government was transferring its army into the police but the mistake was eventually accepted after extensive deliberation by both the CCF and CSC. Due to the slow pace of Renamo's demobilisation, the government suspended its own demobilisation until 15 June but came under attack from the international members of the CSC.⁷¹ New deadlines were eventually accepted by the Security Council for the completion of cantonment by 1 July and demobilisation by 15 August 1994. The Security Council also sent a mission to Mozambique to convey concerns over continuing delays in the process and to urge completion of the process.⁷² The Security Council issued a series of impatient resolutions warning the parties of the approaching October 1994 deadline to complete the process.⁷³ In the end, demobilisation was completed one month before the elections, with the TU registering over 91,000 troops, (67,042 government, 24,649 Renamo), demobilising about 80,000, while 11,000 joined the new army.⁷⁴

However, the shape of the demobilisation process was determined by the actions of the

⁷¹ *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, Issue 10, July 1994.

⁷² *The UN and Mozambique*, Note by the President of the Security Council, Document 68, S/1994/931, 4 August 1994, p. 251.

⁷³ *The UN and Mozambique*, Security Council Resolution, Document 57, S/RES/898, 23 February 1994, pp. 228-9; Security Council Resolution, Document 64, S/RES/916, 5 May 1994, pp. 241-2; Statement by the President of the Security Council, Document 67, S/PRST/1994/35, 19 July 1994, p. 250.

⁷⁴ *The UN and Mozambique*, Final Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ, Document 90, S/1994/1449, 23 December 1994, p. 296. There was also desertion, 90% of those registered at the AAs were demobilised or joined the FADM, while 10% disappeared.

soldiers. Mutinies by both government and Renamo soldiers in protest at the slow pace of demobilisation prevented both sides from holding troops back in the event of an unfavourable election. After demobilisation, there was still much discontent and fear amongst soldiers that they would be forgotten by their leaders. Demobilised troops from both sides threatened to disrupt the elections and joined the Association of Demobilised Soldiers (AMODEG) which became a platform to make demands.⁷⁵ The ex-combatants demonstrated a degree of power and political leverage in Mozambique's political space which had not existed before, but which was also shortlived.

Disarmament

In Protocol VI, the parties committed themselves to providing the UN with complete inventories of troop strength, arms, ammunition, mines and other explosives and to allow the UN to verify these aspects. Beyond this, the GPA did not contain a comprehensive system of disarmament, arms management or regional cooperation with respect to arms control. It also left open the arrangements for the collection, storage and destruction of weapons and ammunition. The mandate for ONUMOZ raised these issues but the implementation of the mandate did not subsequently deal with them. Disarmament was subsumed under the definition of demobilisation which restricted ONUMOZ from undertaking disarmament outside the assembly areas.⁷⁶ Guidelines as to what constituted disarmament, which organisations would be involved and how to achieve it were absent, nor was there a systematic programme to remove weapons from the civilian population, although the Christian Council of Mozambique ran a weapons buy-back scheme with limited results. When ONUMOZ requested an additional \$35 million to undertake more comprehensive disarmament, the request was turned down in New York.⁷⁷ In the end,

⁷⁵José Luís Cabaço, "The long march to Mozambican democracy," in Brazão Mazula, (ed.) *Mozambique: Elections, Democracy and Development*, Maputo: Sponsored by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1996, p. 93, fn 18.

⁷⁶Christopher Smith, "Light Weapons and the International Arms Trade," in Christopher Smith, Peter Batchelor, Jakkie Potgieter, *Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa*, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996, p. 33.

⁷⁷Smith, "Light Weapons," p. 34, fn 83.

elections took place without effective disarmament, largely because the UN exerted little pressure on the parties for disarmament. Ajello viewed disarmament from a political perspective by focussing on the political value of arms and ensuring there was no political recourse to use arms.

Neither the government nor Renamo fully cooperated in the disarmament process. They “provided incomplete lists of their troops and paramilitary forces... Information on their weapons and ammunition were not forthcoming (until June 1994).”⁷⁸ Upon entering the AAs, soldiers were expected to hand in their weapons which would be stored by the TU until they were either destroyed or transferred to the FADM. As with the soldiers, the weapons handed in were of poor quality and there were concerns that both parties were hiding weapons caches. From earlier reports, it was assumed heavy weapons were limited.⁷⁹ Those in the government’s arsenal were small in number and found to be in disrepair from lack of a supporting infrastructure and spare parts. Renamo’s heavy weapons and vehicles were mainly captured from the government and also in poor condition. The main problem was the proliferation of small, light weapons. It was impossible to estimate the number of light weapons that were circulating in Mozambique but estimates suggested a figure of 6 million AK-47s, including 1.5 million assault rifles distributed by the government to the civilian population for protection during the war.⁸⁰ Paramilitary forces such as the Naparama movement were also well armed. However, the precise number of guns was not as important as the proliferation of weapons through all segments of society and the insecurity this generated.

It was intended that weaponry collected at the AAs would be transferred regularly to regional arms depots, but both parties raised objections causing delays in the process. This led to excess and unsafe storage of arms in the assembly areas, “placing at risk not only government and RENAMO soldiers but also United Nations personnel.”⁸¹ Many weapons

⁷⁸Berman, *Managing Arms*, p. 2.

⁷⁹Berman, *Managing Arms*, pp. 50-52.

⁸⁰Berman, *Managing Arms*, p. 50-51.

⁸¹*The UN and Mozambique*, Document 55, p. 217.

stored in the AAs were stolen and sold to the civilian population. In other cases, “explosives and ammunitions which had been collected in the AAs were subsequently considered too dangerous for transport and handling. In such cases, the CCF decided to destroy the equipment in the AAs.”⁸² It was also more difficult to transport weapons from Renamo areas which tended to be in remote areas. Most of the equipment stored in the AAs was eventually handed over to the FADM in November 1994. However in his final report, the Chairman of the Cease-Fire Commission, felt that the quantity of arms and military materiel exceeded the requirements of the FADM which could contribute to internal and regional insecurity and recommended that surplus material be destroyed.⁸³ After the conclusion of the peace process, his conclusions proved prescient since the new armed force was “unable to effectively monitor and control the weapons which had been transferred from the assembly areas. Theft of weapons from the FADM storage facilities was a common problem.”⁸⁴

Post-demobilisation verification of arms caches declared by the parties around the country began on 30 August 1994 by ONUMOZ teams with representatives from both parties. This was carried out in a limited amount of time since the elections were only two months away. The parties declared 722 military positions or depots (435 for Government, 287 for Renamo), in addition, the teams inspected 146 locations not declared by either party. The UN discovered a

substantial numbers of weapons, including tanks, anti-aircraft guns, mines, armoured personnel carriers and mortar bombs abandoned or stored throughout the country. A small number of previously unregistered personnel were also identified at some Government and RENAMO bases.⁸⁵

Verification was incomplete before the expiry of ONUMOZ and was left to the newly elected government to continue. The incomplete process of disarmament and the

⁸²ONUMOZ, *Final Report of the Chairman of the Cease-Fire Commission*, Maputo, December 1994, p. 11.

⁸³ONUMOZ, *Final Report of the Chairman of the Cease-Fire Commission*, p. 16.

⁸⁴Peter Batchelor, “Disarmament, Small Arms and Intra-State Conflict: The Case of Southern Africa,” in Smith, *Small Arms Management*, p. 73.

⁸⁵*The UN and Mozambique*, Introduction, p. 43.

availability of light weapons contributed to increased crime and banditry, undermined the security situation and led to an illegal cross-border trade in weapons with a significant number of weapons surfacing in South Africa. ONUMOZ failed to meet the objectives of the disarmament process which was one of its key responsibilities.

Reforming state security institutions: the army, police and security services

FORMING THE MOZAMBICAN DEFENCE FORCE (FADM)

In Protocol IV of the GPA, the two parties agreed to form a national, non-partisan, professional armed force under the control of the civilian authority. Totalling 30,000 troops, drawn equally from the Government and Renamo, the FADM would comprise three services: a 24,000 army, a 4,000 air force and a 2,000 navy. The FADM was intended to operate before the withdrawal of ONUMOZ to provide security in the country during the elections. In addition, the GPA outlined three purposes for the new armed forces: defending the integrity and sovereignty of the state, to protect civilians against crime and violence in cooperation with the national police, and assisting in emergency and disaster situations. As part of the process of democratisation, this professional force was intended to serve society as a competent state institution. The new force was also one of the instruments designed to facilitate reconciliation between the government and Renamo through the integration of their personnel into one national command.

The process of forming the FADM was scheduled to begin with the cease-fire, conducted simultaneously with the concentration and demobilisation of personnel, and completed before the start of the electoral campaign. The GPA established a Joint Commission, CCFADM, to oversee the formation of the Mozambican Defence Force with military representatives from the government and Renamo and other countries selected by the parties, under the authority of the CSC. Specifically, the CCFADM had the authority to draw up the rules governing the FADM, control the budget, and decide the criteria for the selection of personnel.⁸⁶ The FADM High Command was subordinate to its authority and

⁸⁶GPA, Protocol IV, Item I. ii. 2 d.

although the High Command was to be involved on the commission, it was not until July 1994 that Lt. General Lidimo from the Government and Lt. General Ngonham from Renamo began participating on the commission.⁸⁷

In June 1993, after persistent pressure from Renamo, the parties requested the United Nations to chair the CCFADM which finally met on 22 July 1993. The parties had invited the UK, Portugal and France to participate on the commission, who met in Lisbon to define and coordinate their contributions, formalised in the Lisbon Accord of February 1993. According to the Guebuza, the government was compelled to accept foreign participation not only to encourage Renamo soldiers to join the new army but to convince the international community that the army would be under new control.⁸⁸ The UK was invited to train 540 Mozambican officers as military instructors, 270 from each party, at Nyanga camp in Zimbabwe. These instructors would then train 15 Infantry Battalions in Mozambique at 3 training centres, Boane, Manica and Dondo, monitored and advised by British personnel. The French would train one company of deminers and trained the first company of 100 personnel on a four month course completed in July 1994. The Portuguese would assist the formation of three battalions of Special Forces, one company of marines, officer training in administration and logistics and leadership training for generals and high-ranking officers.

Both parties were extremely slow in providing lists of personnel because of the lack of volunteers willing to forego demobilisation to join the FADM. The TU found that less than 10% of registered combatants wanted to join the new army, approximately 10% Renamo and less than 5-6% of government soldiers.⁸⁹ Few soldiers had confidence in the conditions and pay of the new force and there was evidence of involuntary recruitment.⁹⁰ Thus

⁸⁷ONUMOZ, *Report of the Chairman of the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM) to the Supervision and Monitoring Commission (CSC)*, Maputo, July 1994.

⁸⁸Interview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.

⁸⁹Berman, *Managing Arms*, p. 69.

⁹⁰When ONUMOZ attempted to transport troops for the new army, two thirds refused to go. *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, Issue 11, August 1994.

although the UK training at Nyanja was originally planned to start in March 1993, it eventually ran from 4 October to 12 December 1993, reducing the 16 week course to 10 weeks.⁹¹ The 540 instructors were then transported from the training camp to Mozambique in April 1994 by ONUMOZ where 5 of the intended 15 battalions, 900 officers and SNCOs were trained on 6 week courses.⁹² According to the British military attache in Maputo, “this phase of the training was entirely successful. It proved that integration of the two sides was possible, built confidence in the process and between the two sides and showed that the FADM had the quality of soldier and potential to produce good instructors.”⁹³ Yet, in an interview with Dhlakama two years after the process, he complained that Renamo recruits were subjected to abuse and were not accepted as equal members of the armed forces.⁹⁴ Although many of the immediate objectives were met, time was limited in which to inculcate professionalism, competency, integration and discipline.

While infantry level training was undertaken by the British, the Portuguese military trained and structured command level officers, military police, logistics personnel and administrators. The Portuguese technical team provided “conceptual, legal and organizational advice, specifically in the elaboration or rules/regulations for the FADM.”⁹⁵ Although seeming an infringement of national sovereignty, the Portuguese drafted

the directives indispensable to the training and regular functioning of the new Armed Forces... (Rules of Military Discipline, Rules of Command, Separate Rules on Uniforms, etc.)... Even rules aimed at making training programs workable and operational were drafted.⁹⁶

They also organised the structures of the offices of the High Command and sent medical teams to assess the conditions of selected personnel before each training operation. These

⁹¹Lt. Col. J. Wyatt, Defence Attache, British Embassy, *Report on United Kingdom Assistance to Formation of FADM*, Maputo, 31 October 1994, p. 2.

⁹²ONUMOZ, *Final Report of the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM)*, Maputo, December 1994, p. 2.

⁹³Wyatt, *Report on United Kingdom Assistance*, p. 2.

⁹⁴Interview with Afonso Dhlakama, Maputo, May 1997.

⁹⁵Portuguese Delegation, *Summary Report on the Portuguese Participation in the Formation of the FADM within the Framework of the GPA*, Maputo, October 1994, p. 1.

⁹⁶Portuguese Delegation, *Summary Report*, p. 3.

expenses were covered by Portugal, as well as costs for rehabilitation assistance, billeting, administration, offices, training and uniforms.⁹⁷

International material, financial and technical assistance were critical in forming the FADM and sustaining its limited logistical capacity. In Zimbabwe, all logistical support, the cost of retaining the border camp and providing for the teams was met by the British government.⁹⁸ Transportation from the AAs to the training centres, for the medical teams, and the transfer of equipment was provided by ONUMOZ and IOM.⁹⁹ Inspection of the seven selected FADM training centres in Mozambique revealed that they were in extremely poor condition and needed extensive rehabilitation of the water supply, sanitation, electricity, and accommodation.¹⁰⁰ In December 1993, the Italian government established a trust fund of US\$500,000, which was needed

to purchase fuel, uniforms, mosquito nets, contracting services, ground leveling and other logistical and infrastructure requirements. In addition to the use of the trust fund in making the training centers operational, ONUMOZ loaned equipment to assist in their rehabilitation. This combined assistance was also eventually used in preparations of the bases for the newly trained Infantry and Special Forces...¹⁰¹

Although the government contributed towards rehabilitation costs, most costs were covered by the international community to keep to the timetable.

In addition to training and logistical assistance, external third parties played an important decision-making role through the CCFADM and the CSC, both chaired by the UN. The CSC

approved a total of 19 documents relating to the organization, operating procedures, uniforms, ranking symbols and training of the unified armed forces and other matter. These documents had been elaborated by the Government and RENAMO with substantive assistance provided by

⁹⁷Portuguese Delegation, *Summary Report*, p. 2.

⁹⁸Wyatt, *Report on United Kingdom Assistance*, p. 2.

⁹⁹ONUMOZ, *Final Report of the Joint Commission*, p. 4.

¹⁰⁰ONUMOZ, *Rehabilitation Needs of Training Centres for the New Mozambican Defence Force (FADM)*, Maputo, 16 November 1993.

¹⁰¹ONUMOZ, *Final Report of the Joint Commission*, p. 3.

Portugal.¹⁰²

Although there was coordination with the Ministry of Defence on the formation of what was a state institution, approval of the FADM salary scale and budget¹⁰³ rested with the commissions, considered and adopted by the CCFADM before being sent to the CSC for approval. Similarly, “[m]anagement of the trust fund was the responsibility of ONUMOZ. Disbursements were made upon requests from the Government Delegation to the CCFADM.”¹⁰⁴ Formal requests had to be submitted by the government to the CCFADM for the authorisation of the transfer of weapons and ammunition and the transfer of specialised units from the FAM to the FADM¹⁰⁵ The CCFADM also decided “that the formation of an armed force of 30,000 personnel would not be a necessary precondition to holding elections in Mozambique.”¹⁰⁶ This followed debates which focussed on training 15,000 personnel before the elections and keeping another 15,000 in transit camps for training afterwards. Even this proved to be overly optimistic. By July 1994, only 4,500 soldiers had been recruited.¹⁰⁷

By the elections, the armed forces consisted of 11,000 troops, (approximately 8000 government, 3000 Renamo)¹⁰⁸ not nearly the strength needed to perform the functions expected of it. But a number of other serious problems remained. The Portuguese pointed out a series of major weaknesses in its final report which concluded that

the FADM has serious shortcomings in various sub-systems (Command and Control, Logistics, Personnel, etc.), its infrastructures are rapidly

¹⁰² *The UN and Mozambique*, Document 55, p. 220.

¹⁰³ A dispute over the FADM budget arose after it was approved by the Mozambican Council of Ministers, then revised by the CSC to include investment in equipment or infrastructure which had been excluded because of cost. The original budget was later approved. ONUMOZ, *Report of the Chairman of the CCFADM to the Forty-Third Plenary Session of the CSC*, 3 October 1994. Statement on the Budget of the FADM.

¹⁰⁴ ONUMOZ, *Final Report of the Joint Commission*, p. 3.

¹⁰⁵ ONUMOZ, *Final Report of the Joint Commission*, pp. 3-4.

¹⁰⁶ ONUMOZ, *Final Report of the Joint Commission*, p. 2.

¹⁰⁷ ONUMOZ, *Report of the Chairman of the CCFADM to the CSC*, Maputo, July 1994, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, Issue 12, September 1994.

deteriorating, essential equipment is lacking (vehicles and communications) and there are many gaps in the areas of standards, doctrines and regulations.¹⁰⁹

The British as well were cautious about the limitations of the forces, and made clear that the battalions could carry out basic duties but were “NOT trained to deal with civil unrest situations involving crowd control.”¹¹⁰ After ONUMOZ withdrew, the FADM remained a weak and incompletely formed institution with many unresolved questions over its management, functions and capacity. Although the national army existed as an institution, it was formed by the peace process industry using quick-fix solutions rather than sustainable long-term institution-building.

SECURITY FORCES AND THE POLICE SERVICE

Reform of the security and police institutions was even less successful. In Protocol V, the GPA left the responsibility of their transformation firmly in the hands of the government. According to the GPA, the State Information and Security Service (SISE) would continue to function throughout the transition phase in accordance with the spirit of the agreement. It was to be monitored by a National Information Commission (COMINFO) to verify that it did not violate the legal order or result in violations of the political rights of citizens. COMINFO, which excluded international participation, only received funds from the state in June 1994, and received little cooperation from regional government administrators, who gave limited access to prisons, or from SISE personnel who threatened the security of the commission’s staff.¹¹¹ Dhlakama protested to the international community on numerous occasions that the government was transferring its troops into the security and police services. Dhlakama contended that “FRELIMO is violating the conditions established in the Peace Accord by demobilizing 15,000 troops and a further 3,000 SNASP members to

¹⁰⁹Portuguese Delegation, *Summary Report*, p. 11.

¹¹⁰Wyatt, *Report on United Kingdom Assistance*, p. 6. Bold in original.

¹¹¹CSC Meeting Minutes 042, 12 September 1994, comments by the Chairman of COMINFO.

reinforce the police force.”¹¹² Renamo also complained about the heavy-handedness of the Rapid Intervention Police (RIP). This was corroborated during a visit by the mission from the UN Security Council in August 1994, who discovered a police training camp where there were heavy weapons and recruits were effectively receiving military training.¹¹³

When the mandate for the ONUMOZ operation was drafted, the UN Secretary-General proposed a civilian police component to work in conjunction with the National Police Affairs Commission (COPOL).¹¹⁴ This was initially rejected by the government on the grounds that it was not part of the peace agreement signed by the parties and it challenged Mozambique’s sovereignty. The government eventually relented to Renamo pressure for UN participation and requested the UN to monitor all police activities in the country, public and private, to monitor the respect for the rights and freedoms of Mozambican citizens and to provide technical support to the National Police Affairs Commission.¹¹⁵ The UN deployed 1144 police observers, CIVPOL, while the number of military troops were scaled down. The main function of CIVPOL was to help the national police deploy in Renamo areas, to reassure Renamo that the government was not transferring its army into the police and security service, and to fill gaps where there were disagreements between Renamo and government. CIVPOL gave “ONUMOZ a visible presence in the remotest and the most inaccessible districts in the country throughout the final months of the process...”¹¹⁶ The government criticised CIVPOL’s interference after there was a shift in focus from verification of police activities to more a more advisory role, given that CIVPOL had “only a 5-day course in human rights prior to taking up their assignment.”¹¹⁷ Moreover, CIVPOL

¹¹²*The UN and Mozambique*, Letter from Dhlakama, Document 29, 7 January 1993, p. 170.

¹¹³*Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, Issue 12, September 1994.

¹¹⁴*The UN and Mozambique*, Document 26, p. 153 and Document 55, p. 222.

¹¹⁵*The UN and Mozambique*, Letter from Mozambique, Document 41, S/26432 Annex, 13 September 1993, p. 197.

¹¹⁶Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 120.

¹¹⁷Alistair Hallam et al., *Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique*, A report submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo: Christian Michelsen Institute, 1997, p. 116.

represented 29 different countries and policing traditions, and even Ajello criticised the “differing human rights standards of the various national units, and noted that there had been an uneven level of training, an insufficient knowledge of working languages and ‘very limited driving skills’.”¹¹⁸ The contribution of CIVPOL to the peace process was unimpressive.

Conclusion

In the military component of the process, political space in Mozambique was occupied, by the government, Renamo, the peace process industry, the various commissions established by the GPA, but also the soldiers whose independent actions and protests took on political meaning. The mutinies and protests by soldiers from both sides put pressure on their commanders, leaders and the international community to hasten the process of demobilisation, while their reluctance to join the new army dictated the shape of the FADM. Local cease-fires, war-weariness and the threat they posed to security, signified that the soldiers strongly influenced the dynamics of the process and compelled both parties and the international community to give priority to their demands. Given that their political significance was unforeseen, no mechanisms for the peaceful expression of their discontent which might have contributed to the development of political space in Mozambique were created. Yet, their political significance circumscribed the actions and flexibility of the parties and the peace process industry in defining political space on other terms. During the peace process, the soldiers challenged the authority, the power and the rules comprising political space in Mozambique, undermined the formation of the new national army, and by forming their own association, AMODEG, created a future role in Mozambican politics and civil society.

Given the soldiers desire for peace, conditions for a cease-fire and demobilisation were propitious, yet this did not induce the parties to meet their obligations under the peace agreement. Renamo was not ready for the process politically. In addition to delaying the overall process, they translated their political disadvantages into obstructing the process and

¹¹⁸Comments by Aldo Ajello in Kühne, *International Workshop*, p. 14.

not complying with their obligations in the military component. The opposite was true for the government. The government was in many ways unprepared for the military component, lacking accurate knowledge of its own forces, soldiers' morale, and had little command over their troops. Their military disadvantages were obscured through posturing in the political arena. Neither side worked towards building confidence in the political arena through the military provisions. On the contrary, both sides used the presence of external third parties to negotiate with the other. Renamo relied on the UN and the international community to pressure the government, while the government often appealed to the UN Security Council in New York, excluding Renamo from the political process in Mozambique, but also circumventing Aldo Ajello. Thus, in their relations with external third parties, both parties continued to reject the other party and depended on the UN to mediate their relations. Although the commissions might have been able to resolve these disagreements, they failed to facilitate constructive political engagement by the parties and served more as an instrument for interference by the international community.

ONUMOZ and the international community were essential to fulfilling the military provisions in the agreement. They were necessary to verify the parties compliance of the agreement and also frequently and effectively applied pressure on the parties. However, the residual impact of their actions was at times counter-productive because they increased the distrust between the parties. ONUMOZ was a powerful third party actor which altered the power relations between the parties. It was not neutral and maintained a false equality between the two sides by accommodating Renamo, particularly by setting up a special trust fund to facilitate its transformation into a political party. ONUMOZ also responded more critically towards the government than Renamo, perhaps because it had the resources to do so in the second year of the process when the government was more to blame. Delays in setting up the UN operation also set the tone for and undermined the peace process. As in any peacekeeping operation, problems of coordination, procurement and operational effectiveness convey a political message to the parties. Conflicts within the UN operation and within the peace process industry did not inspire trust or respect for the international community or the process which were manipulated by the parties. The lack of a coherent plan of action linking the assembly of soldiers with their actual demobilisation, and

conflicts between peacekeeping and development in the peace process industry also complicated the process.

The peace process industry was more concerned about a successful peace process that prevented another Angola, than taking into account the specificities of Mozambique. Even though it was unprepared and bruised by the experience in Angola, the UN involved itself in the Mozambican process on a grand scale without questioning its capacity to do so. Notwithstanding the effort and work by the Technical Unit for demobilisation, ONUMOZ was particularly ineffective in guaranteeing security and in securing disarmament which never received sufficient priority. Despite being the most expensive component, ONUMOZ's military presence was less effective, and more a symbolic reminder of the weakness of the government in the face of the heavy international presence. The government complained that "ONUMOZ is acting as if its mission was to control and demand everything from the Government, and not to monitor the implementation of the General Peace Agreement by the parties."¹¹⁹

Although sometimes necessary in an uncertain security environment, quick fix solutions by the peace process industry in providing logistics, facilities and services did not help to integrate the military, state and civilian components. Throughout the process, the peace process industry set up their own administrations, managed fundamental aspects of the process, established and interpreted their own guidelines, and provided many essential services. The power they wielded and the political practices they helped to reproduce through technical assistance had an impact on the political space of Mozambique by overriding national institutions and introducing a wide array of new values, structures and procedures.

¹¹⁹*The UN and Mozambique*, Document 66, p. 249.

CHAPTER SIX

Relief and reconstruction: humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance by the peace process industry

The preceding chapter explained that delays in establishing the UN operation undermined the security situation in Mozambique's countryside. Rural insecurity was closely entwined with the humanitarian crisis as the precarious security situation continued to endanger both the people trying to reach relief agencies and the agencies trying to provide them with assistance. Given the level of destruction in Mozambique after 16 years of war and severe drought, the country was in a chronic state of emergency. However, over the two years of the peace process the emergency dissipated, and Mozambique passed from a humanitarian crisis to a situation of rebuilding and reconstructing society while trying to create and sustain peace. The changing social situation influenced other aspects of the process and the capacity of both parties to comply with the agreement, thus complicating the conception and delivery of international assistance.

Humanitarian and rehabilitation activities were pertinent to the configuration of political space in Mozambique because of how these activities linked the state to society. Decisions and practices in these social activities redefined political norms, institutions and procedures because they were fundamentally concerned with the authority and capacity of the state and its relation to society. The need for such activities demonstrated the state's failings to guarantee the survival and welfare of society. Humanitarian activities implied the state could not guarantee the survival of its population, while rehabilitation activities implied the state was incapable of providing basic services for society's welfare. The institutions through which such humanitarian and rehabilitation programmes were implemented were also connected to political space. The personnel involved in the delivery of services and the execution of programmes provided the contact between the state (or other agency) and the beneficiaries in society. They were the focus for accountability and responsibility of the state or agency; and hence conferred authority to the state or away from the state. The delivery of services and food by the government, Renamo or international agencies could also be translated into political power through votes in the upcoming election. Programme

design, programme objectives and the sustainability of humanitarian and rehabilitation activities were premised on political conceptions about the development needs and priorities of the country. Thus the actors providing humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance were political actors, while their decisions and procedures conveyed assumptions about politics.

The sphere of humanitarian and rehabilitation activities included not just Mozambican participants but also a host of international agencies operating in Mozambique. Prior to the peace process, there was an already well-established international presence of relief and development agencies. The peace process brought many new actors to Mozambique, not least ONUMOZ. Thus during the process, the full contingent of actors in the peace process industry operated in the political space of Mozambique, generating an even greater level of international activity. The concentration of actors, the intensity and confusion of activities and the relationships amongst international agencies and between these agencies and the Mozambican state and society, had an aggregate impact on Mozambique's political space. This impact involved the weakening of the state and its authority, the fragmentation of institutional structures serving society and the obstruction rather than the enhancement of state-society relations.

This chapter is divided into three sections. First, I discuss the humanitarian crisis in Mozambique and the expansion of international actors into Mozambique's political space through the openings created by the emergency. In the second section, I consider the provisions for humanitarian assistance under the General Peace Agreement followed by the humanitarian mandate for the UN operation in Mozambique. I also explain the consolidation of the peace process industry in Mozambique through these activities. In the last and largest section, I consider the five main activities undertaken by the peace process industry as they related to political space: emergency food relief, the repatriation of refugees and displaced people, the reintegration of demobilised soldiers, the rehabilitation of basic services and mine clearance.

The emergency and expansion of international actors into Mozambique's political space

Over 16 years of war, economic collapse, and recurring natural disasters, perpetuated a humanitarian crisis in Mozambique. Of an estimated population of 15 million people, at least 4.6 million Mozambicans were displaced, with an additional million having fled to neighbouring countries.¹ The movement of people away from the land severely reduced food production, which contributed to widespread malnutrition, famine and death. In 1992 the government estimated over 3 million people were at risk of starvation, 1.3 million from the drought.² Attacks along the transport corridors and scattered land mines made the delivery of emergency relief supplies dangerous and impeded efforts to counter the effects of war. Renamo also specifically destroyed state structures such as health clinics, removing the state from many rural areas and the state's capacity to deal with the crisis. However, the situation was more acute in Renamo areas, where there was almost no contact with the government, international relief agencies or NGOs, no commercial activity, and only rudimentary services provided by poorly qualified staff.

The core structures created by the government in response to the emergency included: the Coordinating Council for the Prevention and Combat of Natural Disasters (CCPCCN) for policy decisions; its implementing department (DPCCN); and the National Executive Commission for the Emergency (CENE) to supervise and coordinate operations and liaise with donors and other agencies. In 1987, the Mozambican government launched its first international emergency appeal with the UN, estimating 3.5 million people in need of food aid, seeds and tools, as well as vehicles and other logistics.³ Subsequent appeals linked the emergency to reconstruction, stating that "the immediate priority [was] to transform the Emergency Programme into the first phase of a reconstruction process in which inputs

¹*The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995*, New York, NY: United Nations Department of Public Information, Introduction, p. 12.

²Government of Mozambique, *Mozambique: Emergency Drought Appeal, 1992-1993*. Prepared in collaboration with the United Nations, May 1992, p. 2.

³This figure was revised upwards through 1992, *Mozambique: Emergency Drought Appeal, 1992-1993*.

provide the necessary relief while at the same time enhancing rural rehabilitation.”⁴ The government also stressed the importance of maintaining the DPCCN’s central role in managing, coordinating and distributing relief assistance.

As mentioned in chapter three, the 1987 appeal coincided with the government’s decision to accept a structural adjustment programme with the IMF and World Bank. Although GDP improved in the first three years, the assumption that structural adjustment measures would increase agricultural production was irrelevant due to the war. The results of structural adjustment brought the poverty of the countryside to the cities with rises in basic food prices, declining standards of living, a devalued currency, greater inequalities, corruption, crime and social unrest. In 1990, a wave of strikes took place across the country. In addition to these pressures, by the 1990s, Mozambique was the poorest country in the world with per capita GNP \$80,⁵ the most aid dependent country in the world, with foreign debt exceeding \$4 billion,⁶ and was cynically referred to as the Donor’s Republic of Mozambique.

The launch of the emergency appeal and the adoption of structural adjustment opened the door for international and non-governmental agencies to operate in Mozambique and for donors to become more actively involved in Mozambique’s political space. In 1987, the UNDP resident representative was appointed UN Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations (UNSCERO)⁷ to coordinate relief activities with the government. The number of international NGOs operating in Mozambique increased dramatically from 7 in 1980⁸,

⁴Government of Mozambique, *Mozambique: Emergency Programme Towards Reconstruction, 1993-1994*, Prepared in collaboration with the United Nations, December 1992, p. 1.

⁵World Bank, *World Development Report 1992*, New York: Oxford University Press.

⁶World Bank, *World Development Report 1992*.

⁷This was modelled on relief operations in Ethiopia in 1984-86.

⁸João Cravinho, *Modernizing Mozambique: Frelimo Ideology and the Frelimo State*, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Oxford, 1995, p. 226.

to over 100 from 1987 to 1990.⁹ According to the UN, “[b]y 1990, virtually all major United Nations agencies were active in Mozambique, in addition to other multilateral agencies, bilateral donors and official agencies from 35 countries and numerous external non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from 23 countries.”¹⁰ Foreign technical experts also provided assistance to government departments and collaborated in the preparation of emergency appeals. DPCCN received support from CARE, UNICEF, and USAID while “[b]oth the IMF and the World Bank placed advisors in the central bank, the Bank of Mozambique. The Bank also placed staff in the Ministry of Finance and the National Service of Statistics.”¹¹ An influx of foreign experts was occurring across Africa through the 1980s, although Mozambique represented an extreme case.

The sheer volume of international agencies operating in Mozambique’s political space created alternative and competing centres of authority and power both outside and inside Mozambique. As a result, the government’s authority was eroding, its decision-making powers transferring to donor countries, NGO headquarters and multilateral settings, and its institutional capacity weakening. As highlighted in chapter three, this occurred through the less formal and visible decisions taken by international agencies in setting their own agendas, planning relief and development projects, and allocating money. It also occurred through more explicit control over policy by donors with the availability of assistance conditioned on Mozambique’s adoption of certain economic and political policies relating to economic liberalisation and good governance. The shift of decision-making power to donors and IFIs demanded the creation of a particular kind of state that was minimal and technocratic.

Through ‘capacity-building’ and the encouragement of decentralisation and privatisation, the World Bank and other agencies seek to reduce the size and ambition of the public sector, and to shift its orientation from political survival to economic rationality. At the heart of this strategy is the creation

⁹Jon Bennett, “Mozambique: Post-War Reconstruction and the LINK NGO Forum, 1987-1994,” in Jon Bennett, (ed.) *Meeting Needs: NGO Coordination in Practice*, London: Earthscan, 1995, p. 70.

¹⁰*The UN and Mozambique*, Introduction, pp. 12-13.

¹¹Judith Marshall, *War, debt and structural adjustment in Mozambique: The social impact*, Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1992, p. 10.

of interlocutors for the aid agencies themselves.¹²

The government met bilateral and multilateral donors annually at the World Bank Consultative Group meetings in Paris to discuss structural adjustment and development issues. Prior to these meetings, the government submitted documents on economic and social strategy to be debated by its creditors. Mozambican politics was and still is accountable to external agencies. One Mozambican Member of Parliament has been quoted as saying, “unlike other countries and parliaments, we accept that our budget is really set by donors at the annual Paris conference. We accept that our priority is to develop a donor acceptable budget.”¹³ As will be discussed in the conclusion, this balance of power remains in the hands of donors and international agencies.

Within Mozambique, external agencies assumed responsibilities normally reserved for the state. These international actors challenged the government’s relations with society by interposing between them and creating additional exit options for rural peasants to disengage from the state. With each donor, multilateral agency and NGO, came more offices, foreign staff, and bureaucratic procedures; each group establishing a relationship with sections of Mozambican society and working through independent channels with the government.

While UNDP, as well as most bilateral donors, dealt mainly with the Ministry of Cooperation and with the Comissão Executiva Nacional de Emergência (CENE), the World Bank’s key contacts were in the Ministry of Finance, while WFP supported the Ministry of Commerce. UNICEF, meanwhile, worked mainly through the Department for the Prevention and Combat of Natural Disasters (DPCCN).¹⁴

This had a paradoxical effect in that although these programmes went through the state, they “also contributed to their further disintegration. Individual agencies, multilateral and

¹²David N. Plank, “Aid, Debt, and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and Its Donors,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31(3), 1993, p. 425.

¹³Cited in John Saul, “Twenty Years After,” p. 15.

¹⁴Aldo Romano Ajello. “The Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Mozambique in the Context of ONUMOZ,” in Jim Whitman and David Pocock, (eds.) *After Rwanda: The Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance*, London: Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 196.

non-governmental, often forged privileged links with specific government departments at the expense of overall coherence and capacity development.”¹⁵ Duplications, resource wastage and delays were inevitable because of difficulties in coordinating and integrating multi-donor funded programmes.

The government’s ability to plan nation-wide or province-wide was impeded by the fragmented nature of assistance amongst numerous actors across different sectoral activities. Donors tended to strategically target certain provinces, districts and sectors without taking into account the overall effect. For example, to generate a maximum impact to privatise agricultural production, USAID concentrated on Zambezia and Nampula provinces because they were the most agriculturally productive provinces with the highest population density.¹⁶ The British similarly focussed on Zambezia province and protected the Limpopo corridor.¹⁷ The result of this fragmentation was an uneven engagement across the country which weakened the possibility of ‘national’ development. Districts were offered the choice of clinic or no clinic, regardless of their sustainability, even though recurring costs like salaries, maintaining buildings, and providing materials were covered by the government. It was also difficult for the government to make long term plans when assistance was short term, inconsistent or unreliable.

The authority of the state was further weakened when it was bypassed altogether. Although most donors operated through the government, few agencies favour a strong state and many encouraged the reduction of the state through economic liberalisation. The state was also displaced by the

strategy among donor organizations during the Emergency period... to sponsor the formation of national NGOs as “partners” or intermediaries between themselves and the communities they wished to serve... to bypass the political and bureaucratic obstacles of government by opening-up direct

¹⁵Bennet, “Mozambique: Post-War Reconstruction,” p. 69.

¹⁶Interview with USAID officials, Sidney Bliss and Julie Born, Maputo, May 1997.

¹⁷Interview with Margaret Hall, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Research and Analysis Department, London, April 1997.

channels for the delivery of goods and services to recipient communities.¹⁸

Forging closer links between the EU and NGOs resulted in the role of ACP countries under the Lomé Convention becoming more of "a consultative one, rather than as co-decision maker."¹⁹ NGOs were more conspicuous in avoiding the state, with "many NGOs bypass[ing] existing central Government coordination mechanisms altogether, and work[ing] directly with local authorities or with local NGOs."²⁰ Some NGOs operated as an alternative state apparatus to a perceived corrupt and inefficient Frelimo government by setting up parallel administrative and logistics structures. With their large budgets, Land Rovers and levels of assistance, donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs demoralised an already understaffed, underfunded and overworked civil service. The state was further weakened when its few qualified personnel opted to work for higher paying foreign agencies leaving the state with a shortage of skilled labour.

During the emergency, there was a multitude of non-Mozambican actors operating in the political space of Mozambique. By virtue of their resources, their financing, and breadth of activities, these actors had a significant amount of political influence. Collectively they had influence over the setting of policy, decision-making and institutional capacity which displaced national institutions and personnel. With the launch of the peace process, most of these organisations reoriented themselves to meeting the objectives of the process. They, along with the rush of organisations which arrived in Mozambique after the agreement, evolved into the peace process industry, which reinforced the relationships established in the emergency. The basis and framework for their operations and their impact on political space is explained in the next section.

¹⁸Alexander Costy, "Donor Dollars and Mozambique's NGOs," *Southern Africa Report*, July 1995, p. 15.

¹⁹COWI Consulting Engineers and Planners AS, *Evaluation of EC Actions Financed by Article 255 of the Lomé Convention "Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons" under the 7th European Development Fund*, Synthesis Report, Brussels, July 1997, p. 13.

²⁰Ajello, "The Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance," p. 196.

Humanitarian assistance in the context of the General Peace Agreement and the UN mandate

There was very little official discussion of humanitarian activities at the Rome talks, with neither party pressuring for improvements in the situation. The government was convinced ending the emergency required a cease-fire, after which they would resume responsibility for humanitarian programmes. Renamo's interest in the humanitarian crisis was limited to the effect of the drought on its soldiers. The two parties disagreed over the nature and means of access to distressed populations, cross-border activities which threatened the government's sovereignty and could be used to transport arms to Renamo, institutional mechanisms for the delivery of relief and whether these would be run by the government or have an international component. Behind the scenes, the issue of access to distressed populations was raised by humanitarian actors.²¹ Donors and NGOs in Mozambique who were not involved in the Rome talks complained that the humanitarian crisis was ignored by the parties and worsened by the slow process of discussion.

As discussed in chapter four, the Rome mediators invited the UNHCR, WFP, ICRC and NGOs to participate in discussions on the humanitarian crisis. The result of these discussions was the *Declaration on the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance*, signed by the government and Renamo in July 1992. The declaration concentrated on the free movement of people and their access to humanitarian assistance by every means, particularly by opening up the roads. Both parties also agreed to set up a UN chaired committee to supervise and coordinate all humanitarian assistance operations in Mozambique. However, detailed objectives and priorities for humanitarian operations were not included in the declaration, while the language of access and free movement seemed to be a reflection of the priorities and focus of international agencies. Instead, both parties agreed “*to participate and cooperate with the international community in Mozambique in*

²¹For an account of humanitarian discussions and the role of humanitarian agencies in the negotiations, see Sam Barnes, “Humanitarian assistance as a factor in the Mozambican negotiations: 1990-2,” in Stephen Chan and Moisés Venâncio with Chris Alden and Sam Barnes, *War and Peace in Mozambique*, London: Macmillan Press, 1998.

*formulating action plans.*²² Effectively this formalised a relationship where external third party actors were placed in the centre of humanitarian activities with the two Mozambican parties brought in to discuss internationally devised priorities. The declaration also “reflected a growing concern on the part of UN agencies to establish precedents for agreed rules and procedures for humanitarian assistance in conflict situations.”²³ The only other protocol of the agreement dealing with humanitarian issues, apart from the reintegration of soldiers, was Protocol VII which called on the Italian government to convene a donors’ conference in Rome to deal with questions of financing the entire peace process from the emergency programmes to the elections.

Like the military component, the objectives and framework for humanitarian action was not decided by Mozambicans but outlined by external third parties in New York at the UN, in Rome at the Donors’ Conference, but also in Mozambique by international agencies on the ground. In preparation for the UN operation, the Secretary General sent a mission to Mozambique to assess existing UN operations and to devise a more effective and coordinated UN response to the anticipated expansion of humanitarian activities.²⁴ On the basis of this mission, the Secretary-General prepared a report for the General Assembly on the implementation of emergency and rehabilitation programmes.²⁵ This report detailed the role of the UN in support of Mozambique emergency programmes, the requirements of the emergency, and the scope of international support, development assistance and assistance from UN agencies and member states. Although it stressed the importance of close collaboration with the government and the integration of rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance with emergency assistance, the details, framework, and scope of humanitarian activities in the report demonstrated how comprehensively and extensively international agencies were already involved in Mozambique.

²²*Declaration on the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance*, Item 6, italics added.

²³Barnes, “Humanitarian assistance,” p. 135.

²⁴*The UN and Mozambique*, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 18, A/47/539, 22 October 1992, p. 132.

²⁵*The UN and Mozambique*, Document 18, pp. 131-141.

On the basis of this report, and in contrast to the agreement signed by the parties, the mandate for the UN operation closely integrated humanitarian activities into the operation as one of its four main components. The function of the humanitarian component was

to coordinate and monitor all humanitarian assistance operations, in particular those relating to refugees, internally displaced persons, demobilized military personnel and the affected local population, and, in this context, to chair the Humanitarian Assistance Committee.²⁶

It was the first UN peacekeeping operation to include a humanitarian component in order to provide the recently created Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) an opportunity to undertake a major coordinating role. The committee created in the GPA became the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHA). UNOHA was under the direct authority of the special representative, but also reported to the director of DHA.

At the donors' conference convened in Rome in December 1992, donors had a further opportunity to interpret the GPA. Although the government and Renamo were required to provide a plan of assistance to refugees and displaced persons to the conference,²⁷ in the conference recommendations, the donors sought to "[fit] in the general framework of current efforts by the international community."²⁸ These recommendations included the creation of a UN trust fund for donor contributions above bilateral assistance and the expansion of the scope of the Reintegration Commission (CORE) to include, in addition to demobilised soldiers, displaced persons and returnees.²⁹ What was clearly evident in both the UN report and the donors' conference summary was the extensive involvement of international actors in Mozambique and the potential for overlapping objectives and unclear lines of responsibility. This confusion became apparent on the ground where most of the decisions on humanitarian assistance were taken. This was particularly true in the transition from relief to rehabilitation activities as the emergency faded.

²⁶*The UN and Mozambique*, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 26, S/24892, 3 December 1992, p. 152.

²⁷GPA, Protocol V, Item III.6

²⁸Summary of conclusions of the conference, *The UN and Mozambique*, Letter from Italy, Document 28, S/25044, 4 January 1993, p. 159.

²⁹*The UN and Mozambique*, Document 28, p. 161.

As explained in the previous chapter, there were numerous delays in the establishment of the UN operation. These delays severely undermined UNOHAC, especially its coordinating role. Most donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs were already well-established in Mozambique and resented having another layer of bureaucratic administration imposed on their activities by a new body. A degree of coordination already existed through the annual consultative meeting in Paris, and through the Aid for Democracy Group, a monthly meeting of donors resident in Maputo. UNOHAC was also confronted with competition from other resident UN agencies. In the past, UNICEF and WFP had refused to work with UNSCERO, subsequently two leading agencies, WFP and UNHCR were not represented in UNOHAC. UNHCR operated separately from UNOHAC and continued to work independently.³⁰ UNOHAC was not helped by its ambitious mandate which was unclear and “overlapped with so many on-going donor-coordination activities that UNOHAC from the outset found it hard to define its own sphere of operations or to fend off competition from the rest of the donor community.”³¹ UNOHAC was thus caught between the donors and ONUMOZ under Ajello, who seemed less interested in humanitarian issues except as they related to the political situation. In the American Ambassador’s opinion, “had the donors been left to their own devices and spared UNOHAC coordination, a more effective program would probably have been in place earlier.”³²

Directly tied to UNOHAC’s operational problems was the question of financing, but not from a lack of contributions. At the Rome donors’ conference, \$400 million was pledged over and above regular development assistance. Rehabilitation and reintegration programmes between October 1992 and December 1994 were calculated to total \$755 million of which the international community committed \$633 million or 82%.³³ However, the money set aside for UNOHAC to manage was controlled by donors which undermined

³⁰Interview with Henny Matos, UNDP, Maputo, May 1997.

³¹Richard Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997, p. 72.

³²US Embassy Cable, Maputo, July 1994.

³³UNOHAC, *Final Report: Consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Programme, 1992-1994*, December 1994, Maputo, p. 6.

UNOHAC's authority and ability to start up projects. UNOHAC's position was further weakened by criticisms regarding the programmes it was responsible for implementing. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the first UNOHAC director, Bernd Bernacher, took an overly developmental approach, seen by Ajello and some donors as undermining the peace process by obstructing swift demobilisation. UNOHAC's second director, Felix Downes-Thomas, a senior official in DHA, was credited with more effectively carrying out his mandate.

For the donors, resident multilateral agencies, and NGOs, the signing of the GPA and the arrival of peace across the country meant they could put in place their own programmes that were *prevented* by the war. The start of the peace process also reversed the trend of donor fatigue which had set in from the late 1980s. Agencies found themselves understaffed and many were unprepared for the reorientation in thinking, programme design and funding that peace required. USAID observed that “[m]ost well-informed people did not expect the cease-fire to be widely respected on the ground, and it was anticipated that the already high levels of banditry would only increase after a formal peace agreement.”³⁴ Because it was unprepared for peace and wanted to quickly launch projects on the ground, the EU for example approved projects with implementing NGO partners and channelled significant funds through them, such as MSF, despite concerns about the MSF approach.³⁵ The agreement also brought a massive influx of NGOs, increasing from 150 in 1992 to 250 by the end of the process. NGOs directly received \$180.2 million to implement projects, not including funding allocated under subcontracting from donors and other agencies.³⁶

The Mozambican government was suspicious of the influx of humanitarian actors and their extensive operations throughout the country. It was noted earlier that the government delayed signing the Status of Forces Agreement with the UN in part as a statement of sovereignty and in part to collect taxes. Unable to tax the UN, the government succeeded

³⁴ USAID/Mozambique Results Review, FY 1995, Maputo, 1995, p. ii

³⁵ COWI Consultants, *Evaluation of EC Actions*, Mozambique, p. 16.

³⁶ Sam Barnes, “NGOs in Peacekeeping Operations: Their Role in Mozambique”, Paper given to the ACUNS Ninth Annual Meeting, 25-26 June 1996, Turin, p. 4.

in levying duties on imports for NGOs and the other humanitarian agencies³⁷ crowding into Mozambique's political space. The government's ability to regulate and influence the humanitarian and reconstruction programmes shaping the political affairs of the country was increasingly marginalised. Financial management was almost exclusively in the hands of international agencies and not transferred to state institutions, while UNOHAC assumed responsibility for preparing funding appeals, which had previously been a responsibility of DPCCN.³⁸ The state and Mozambicans were effectively sidelined in the process of providing relief and rehabilitation assistance. The next section explains the nature of these activities in more detail.

Humanitarian activities during the peace process

During the peace process, various actors in the peace process industry undertook an immense number of wide-ranging activities. The five main humanitarian and rehabilitation areas included emergency food relief, the reintegration of demobilised soldiers, the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, the rehabilitation of basic services and demining. In each activity, there was a plethora of international activity, although some initiatives were critical, many activities were counterproductive or irrelevant to the needs of Mozambicans. However, attending the explosion of uncoordinated and often unconnected activities was the introduction of an array of rules, procedures, and institutions into the political space of Mozambique which conditioned the exercise of power and authority. The accumulating mass of political practices arose from the consolidation of the peace process industry and the multifaceted roles and identities of actors as donors, financiers of NGOs, and members of the CSC. Thus the collective presence and activities of the peace process industry had many impacts on political space in Mozambique. This was evident in the operational strategies of the peace process industry, their implementation and the impact of those activities in terms of long-term sustainability. In the peace process

³⁷Kimberly Mahling Clark, *Mozambique's Transition from War to Peace: USAID's Lessons Learned*, Washington, D.C.: Africa Bureau Information Center, Research and Reference Services, USAID, p. 12.

³⁸Interview with Sidney Bliss and Juliet Born, USAID, Maputo, May 1997.

industry, there was a widely-shared preoccupation with technical, short-term activities which minimised the political nature of their humanitarian and rehabilitation activities. However in general, in the “conception of humanitarianism as separate from politics it is only the political struggles of the supposed beneficiaries that are ignored, and not the interests of the host and donor states.”³⁹ This section highlights how the peace process industry undertook these five main humanitarian activities in a mostly technical manner that overlooked the political impact.

EMERGENCY FOOD RELIEF

Up to four million people were considered to be at risk in meeting their food needs. For humanitarian agencies, accessing those in need depended on security in the transport corridors which was supposed to be guarded by the military contingents of ONUMOZ. The Beira Corridor had attracted one million starving people who were threatening security in the corridor, particularly when the Zimbabwean troops protecting the corridor departed and were not immediately or replaced by UN peacekeepers as the GPA stipulated.⁴⁰ Delays in the assembly and demobilisation of soldiers also left thousands of soldiers without a clear command leading to mutinies and riots. However, as food reached more people, the attacks decreased. In 1992-93, the onset of good rains brought harvests for the first time in years which vastly improved the food situation, although the influx of returnees ensured an ongoing need for food assistance. From 1992 to 1995, the number of people needing food aid decreased from 3.1 million to 1 million.⁴¹

During the war, food relief was able to reach government held areas, but Renamo areas were almost completely isolated with the exception of limited access by the ICRC. After

³⁹K. B. Wilson, *Assisting Repatriation: Recent Lessons from Self-Repatriation in Mozambique*, Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, Unpublished Report, 1993, p. 18.

⁴⁰Andrew Meldrum, “Lessons from Angola,” *Africa Report*, January/February 1993, p. 24.

⁴¹*The UN and Mozambique*, Introduction, p. 47.

the agreement, Renamo was still reluctant to allow food convoys access for fear that opening the roads would give the government military advantage. Renamo continually insisted on air lifts which the international community resisted on account of cost and inefficiency. Dhlakama alleges that Renamo was discriminated against in the distribution of assistance and denied access to food if not Frelimo supporters.⁴² These areas opened up in the second year of the process with access granted to international NGOs but not government agencies. Humanitarian assistance "was a government function which became a UN function,"⁴³ because it was the only means of delivering food to Renamo areas, whose leaders would have rejected government coordination.⁴⁴ Thus the distribution of food relief effectively recognised two administrations in the country, "forcing UNOHAC and its constituent agencies to barter with officials over access,"⁴⁵ which in turn reinforced the problems of dual administration. The distribution of food relief was a political tool for both parties and it was politically important for both parties to be seen to be distributing food to the people.

The distribution of food fell mostly under the direction of the World Food Programme (70%) and donors (30%), both of whom relied on NGOs as implementing partners, like World Vision International (the largest NGO in Mozambique), ICRC, the Mozambican Red Cross, and CARE. Although DPCCN "was at one time responsible for distribution of multilateral food aid donations in 40% of the EDPs (extended delivery points), while NGOs distributed the remaining 60%, [by] mid 1994, the division of responsibility changed to 20% and 80% respectively."⁴⁶ The capacity of state institutions was inevitably weakened while its scope and reach was restricted by its minimal access to Renamo areas. The

⁴²Interview with Afonso Dhlakama, Maputo, May 1997.

⁴³Interview with Henny Matos, UNDP/Mozambique, Maputo, May 1997.

⁴⁴Sam Barnes argues that Renamo did not fully understand the idea of operational neutrality and considered NGOs operating in its areas as Renamo NGOs. Barnes, "Humanitarian Assistance," p.125.

⁴⁵Chris Alden, "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 33(1), 1995, p. 121.

⁴⁶UNOHAC, *Final Report, Consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Programme, 1992-94*, Maputo, December 1994, p. 66.

government stressed the need to avoid dependency on food relief and to encourage food production but the international community donated food rather than seeds and tools, or vehicles and other logistical inputs. The peace process industry had a stronger capacity to provide emergency relief than long term reconstruction assistance, and thus focussed on the technical and immediate needs of the emergency in Mozambique, while choosing to ignore longer term political consequences. Agencies worked through their own procedures and institutions at the expense of state institutions and local-capacity building and independence. Operational imperatives did not facilitate the unification or integration of administration but prolonged the problems of dual administration.

THE REINTEGRATION OF DEMOBILISED SOLDIERS

While demobilisation fell under the military component under the authority of the Cease-Fire Commission (CCF), the reintegration of ex-combatants fell to the Reintegration Commission, (CORE), chaired by UNOHAC. CORE's mandate was to effect the social and economic reintegration of demobilised soldiers using the resources provided at the donors' conference.⁴⁷ However, CORE's task was made difficult by the "many projects for demobilized soldiers [which] were formalized under bilateral programmes and were outside CORE's control,"⁴⁸ and outside the remit of UNOHAC. CORE "did not enjoy the support and confidence of the larger system, which greatly undermined its authority and its ability to mobilize actions on policies and programs it advocated."⁴⁹ One reason for CORE's marginalisation was the hostility towards UNOHAC's long term programmes. UNOHAC initially devised a three-year programme involving training, employment and credit for demobilised soldiers starting from 1994, emphasising community and skills development. This conflicted with the views of Ajello and some donors that programmes should not start two years into the process and should reintegrate ex-combatants as quickly as possible to ensure a smooth process of demobilisation. USAID argued UNOHAC should have

⁴⁷GPA, Protocol IV, Item 6.2, 6.3.

⁴⁸*The UN and Mozambique*, Introduction, p. 51.

⁴⁹UNOHAC Workshop Report cited in Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p.84.

concentrat[ed] on the short to medium term because it was so vital to preservation of the fragile peace process and to ensuring the timely implementation of its various phases. In my view, [Roger Carlson] UNOHAC lost much valuable time during its first year of existence in developing... proposals that depended on strengthening Mozambican institutions which were not ready for them.⁵⁰

The government was not regarded as a serious partner even though it contributed \$10.4 million or 11.4% of the \$95 million spent on reintegration programmes.⁵¹ Instead, multiple programmes were initiated by the peace process industry which bypassed national institutions deemed to be unready for them including a Reintegration Unit already established in the Ministry of Finance. Apart from the RSS (Reintegration Support Scheme) which will be explained shortly, the plethora of international actors involved in reintegrating demobilised soldiers established numerous competing programmes. Initially, donors expressed a lack of interest in reintegration because of more pressing concerns in emergency relief, the cease-fire, electoral law and delays in demobilisation. Donors were also reluctant to target demobilised soldiers as a special category of assistance. This view changed with the growing number of mutinies by soldiers.

Given the delays in the demobilisation process and the need for stability in the upcoming elections, donors agreed to consider schemes to ease the soldiers' reintegration into civilian life that would also provide a catalyst to the process. Recognising that the economy could not absorb over 70,000 ex-combatants, an additional cash subsidy to the soldiers was proposed called the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS). This idea had worked successfully in other demobilisation programmes in Ethiopia, Uganda, Namibia, and in Central America. The proposal however, was discussed at the Paris Consultative Group meeting in December 1993, bypassing UNOHAC and CORE. Donors and the UN accepted the RSS which involved 18 months of cash payments to soldiers, in addition to the government's dispensation of six months salary. The money would be disbursed through

⁵⁰Comments by Roger Carlson, director of USAID/Maputo, cited in Clark, *Mozambique's Transition*, pp. 18-19.

⁵¹UNDP, *Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique*, Maputo, March 1997, p. 58.

local branches of the Mozambican bank, *Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento*.⁵² All funds were managed by UNDP, again not by CORE, UNOHAC or the government, but depended on close coordination with the Technical Unit for demobilisation for accurate information. The scheme was remarkably successful. As noted in the previous chapter, on learning of the scheme, most soldiers demanded immediate demobilisation. Over \$35 million was contributed from donor countries with only 5% going towards administrative costs. It resulted in an infusion of \$32.4 million into local economies where soldiers resettled.⁵³ Soldiers were also given seeds, tools, two weeks of food rations, civilian clothing and transport home with their dependents.

UNOHAC proposed three other less successful programmes to assist ex-combatants: an Information Referral Service (IRS), an Occupational Skills and Development Programme and a Provincial Fund Programme. The Information Referral Service was intended to help soldiers “resolve problems related to demobilisation entitlements, obtain information on training and employment opportunities, and other information which would support their reintegration into civilian life.”⁵⁴ The Skills and Development Programme was to provide job training while the Provincial Fund Programme was set up to provide credits and grants at the local level to promote employment creation. UNDP estimated that 26% of demobilised soldiers used the IRS, while less than 10% benefited from the training programme and 28% from the fund programme.⁵⁵

Although UNOHAC’s reintegration strategy was eventually accepted and implemented, donors initially rejected the strategy and delayed approval of projects because of debates over UNOHAC’s proposal that the government be included in projects. Donors such as USAID opposed the government’s inclusion where it had no capacity and UNOHAC’s leadership where it had no experience. USAID preferred to work through NGOs especially

⁵²One long-term impact was strengthening the institutional capacity of this bank which was later contracted by the government to disburse government pensions.

⁵³UNDP, *Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers*, pp. ii, 16, 20.

⁵⁴UNDP, *Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers*, p. 29.

⁵⁵UNDP, *Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers*, p. 33.

IOM (International Office for Migration) which was deemed to have an established presence on the ground and could effect a quick impact.⁵⁶ Planning for the Skills and Development Programme took a year, but approval from CORE, UNDP, ILO and two principal donors, Sweden and Netherlands, was delayed until July 1994. It was implemented in October 1994 and then transferred to the government after CORE was dissolved. Again, the project suffered from "a series of consultants reports and proposals which were mired in debates within the donor community on the extent of Government's future role in the implementation of reintegration programmes for DS [demobilised soldiers]."⁵⁷ Debates surrounding the Provincial Fund Programme were conditioned by donor preferences in terms of strategy and implementing agency. As a result, the programme was implemented by IOM in six provinces and GTZ (German development agency) in the other four, the former favouring a quick impact and the latter a more developmental approach, thus frustrating a consistent approach across the country and integration with local institutions.

Surveys by UNDP and others estimated that 85% of demobilised soldiers were reintegrated into civilian life.⁵⁸ What neither CORE, nor the government, nor the international community could have foreseen or planned for was the spirit of forgiveness in local communities in accepting the soldiers. Calling upon traditional mediums, local villages used spiritual rituals to cleanse and purify demobilised soldiers to rejoin society.⁵⁹ Where formal reintegration programmes lacked focus, were ineffective or delayed by debates about Mozambican institutions, Mozambicans facilitated their own reconciliation.

⁵⁶US Embassy Cable, Maputo, July 1994.

⁵⁷UNDP, *Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers*, p. 37.

⁵⁸UNDP, *Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers*, p. 59.

⁵⁹Interview with Irea Baptiste Lundin, CEEI, Maputo, May 1997.

REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

Mozambican refugees and displaced persons were another specially targeted group for international assistance programmes. Between 4 to 5 million people were displaced within Mozambique and another 1.5 million located outside the country with over 1.1 million refugees in Malawi, the rest in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Swaziland and South Africa. Relocating the refugees and internally displaced persons was an important priority to restore normality to Mozambique and to relieve pressure on host countries providing asylum. UNHCR, not UNOHAC, was the lead agency in the repatriation effort as it was already in operation in each country of asylum. UNHCR emphasised the use of government structures at both local and provincial levels, through line ministries and support to the national Refugee Support Unit (NAR).⁶⁰ UNHCR's main implementing partner was IOM, but they also used the Mozambican Red Cross and the Christian Council of Mozambique.

Although the Rome negotiations suggested the need to plan for expected population movements, UNHCR was unprepared for a large-scale repatriation effort after the signing of the agreement.⁶¹ When the agreement was signed, most resources were tied up in asylum countries and could not be easily transferred to Mozambique, nor could funding be quickly transferred from the category of refugee assistance to repatriation. In fact throughout 1992, UNHCR had been preparing to expand camp capacities in Malawi in expectation of further flight. Consequently, there was a slow process of transferring and centralising decision-making in Maputo. Delays in setting up organised repatriation programmes were also influenced by concerns about security,⁶² the conditions of returnee areas and the capacity for these areas to absorb large numbers of refugees. UNHCR did not expect to have organised repatriation programmes ready until March/April 1993. In fact these began in

⁶⁰UNOHAC, *Final Report*, p. 55.

⁶¹Wilson, "Assisting Repatriation," p. 5.

⁶²In the 1980s, UNHCR was criticised for encouraging repatriation in conditions of uncertain political stability, and consequently actively prevented refugees from returning home. Tim Allen and Hubert Morsink, (eds.) *When Refugees Go Home*, London: James Currey, 1994.

August 1993 but were not fully operational until mid-1994.

From 1989 to 1991, UNHCR had prepared a series of contingency plans for repatriation but these had been “strongly rejected within Mozambique by donors, the NGOs, and government.”⁶³ Among the many reasons for rejection were poor adaptation to Mozambique’s circumstances, distinctions between categories of people, a focus on transporting refugees to transit camps, lack of concern with security and little consideration for the transition to long-term reintegration. Despite these earlier criticisms, similar weaknesses reappeared in UNHCR’s operational programmes for repatriation. UNHCR’s official repatriation programmes involved elaborate and unnecessary transport schemes involving transit centres for returning refugees to register and then be transported to their home destination. Sometimes these transit centres were farther from the refugees’ homes than the original camps in neighbouring countries. The programmes also relied on complicated convoy transports despite poor road conditions and lack of vehicles; while there was little prioritising of transport needs, such as focussing on poorer refugees who couldn’t afford transport, or making use of peasant options like canoes or boats. These

formal programmes tend[ed] to focus on the physical relocation of refugees from a camp in exile to another camp in the return country; to many refugees this relocation [was] usually the least important and relevant contribution to going home and re-building their lives.⁶⁴

While UNHCR collected information and prepared transportation, the roads filled with people after the signing of the peace agreement. In the weeks following the GPA, thousands returned home, well in advance of official repatriation and by late 1992, several hundred thousand refugees had already returned to Mozambique.⁶⁵ In total, 1.7 million Mozambicans returned home during the peace process. UNHCR transported refugees when distances were longer, and especially the more vulnerable groups such as older people, women, children and the disabled. Most Mozambicans went home without UNHCR

⁶³Wilson, “Assisting Repatriation,” p. 5.

⁶⁴Wilson, “Assisting Repatriation,” p. 2.

⁶⁵Wilson, “Assisting Repatriation,” p. 3.

assistance and in some cases in the face of UNHCR opposition. According to UNHCR estimates, 22% returned with UNHCR assistance, while 78% spontaneously returned, mostly from Malawi.⁶⁶ However, displaced persons with the greatest capacity to self-repatriate were “the least important target group for any immediate assistance programme to repatriation.”⁶⁷

A seminar held on lessons learned from the repatriation concluded there was a need to focus more on “understanding the return strategies of the refugees themselves and facilitating that process while at the same time having an efficient management in place to bring the most vulnerable back in an organised and supervised manner.”⁶⁸ UNHCR’s formal programming persistently does not account for the fact that refugees return and reintegrate on their own. Research into repatriation in Africa, Asia and Latin America have consistently shown that “most repatriation was actually organised and implemented by the refugees themselves outside of formal assistance programmes, indeed often occurred in the face of official opposition.”⁶⁹ Wilson and Nunes discovered that “[b]etween 1988 and 1991, not one single refugee ‘officially repatriated’ from Malawi to Milange, despite all the institutional activity of meetings, delegations, camp tours and elaborate planning.”⁷⁰ Within Mozambique, thousands of displaced persons made their way back on their own following the seasonal ritual of the planting season after the good rains. Refugees planned for repatriation before peace was confirmed, by making “arrangements for an early return by having households

⁶⁶However, the 22% or 378,000 who used UNHCR assistance was larger than the entire repatriation effort in Cambodia, UNHCR’s largest operation. See UNHCR, *Mozambique 1993-95 Review Towards Reintegration*, Maputo: UNHCR Mozambique, 1995, p. 6.

⁶⁷Wilson, “Assisting Repatriation,” p. 12.

⁶⁸UNHCR, *Mozambique: An Account from a Lessons Learned Seminar on Reintegration*, Geneva, 24-25 June 1996, p. 5.

⁶⁹K. B. Wilson, *Internally Displaced, Refugees and Returnees from and in Mozambique*, Review commissioned by the Swedish International Development Agency, Oxford, November 1992, p. 21.

⁷⁰K.B. Wilson and J. Nunes, “Repatriation to Mozambique, Refugee Initiative & Agency Planning in Milange District, 1988-1991,” in Allen and Morsink, *When Refugees Go Home*, p. 215.

at both sides of the border,"⁷¹ checking on family farms to see if conditions were right for the rest of the family to move back home. The presence of 6000 peacekeepers had little influence on refugee strategies, they "were more concerned with the presence of landmines as a threat to life than with the outposting of international peacekeepers in returnee areas."⁷² Nor did the refugees return because of the building of schools or health clinics, or the number of NGOs operating in an area. They only returned on a large scale (and permanently) from Malawi when food distribution was cut off.⁷³

International assistance for reintegration similarly did not meet the needs of the intended beneficiaries. A majority of studies have found that

it is the survival strategies of the refugees themselves that are key to survival. They simply are not passive victims waiting for aid, in danger of becoming dependent. After a period of assistance by local people and local institutions like churches... it is refugees themselves that re-build their lives.⁷⁴

It was only in devising those personal strategies that refugees may or may not take into account assistance activities by international actors. Assistance programmes mostly

[come] in with marginal help, or as a cause of disruption and even threat...They often seek to construct separate economic and social activities from scratch, usually running up against formidable challenges. Indeed, far from tackling existing constraints on refugees' own livelihood strategies, assistance programmes frequently multiply them.⁷⁵

The most important issues for the returnees were land and social reconciliation and reintegration. In both cases, the international community could be of little assistance. Despite the money and effort by UNHCR, most of their programmes were of little relevance to Mozambicans. However, because of this money and these programmes, international agencies nevertheless imposed ideas, institutions and procedures about how to organise

⁷¹UNHCR, *Mozambique: An Account*, p. 5.

⁷²UNHCR, *Mozambique: An Account*, p. 3.

⁷³COWI Consultants, *Evaluation of EC Actions*, Mozambique, p. 25.

⁷⁴Wilson, *Internally Displaced*, p. 10.

⁷⁵Wilson, *Internally Displaced*, p. 11.

Mozambican society, which elements in society to assist, and consequently devalued local strategies. These agencies set themselves up in Mozambique's political space as crucial actors, with ambitious but ineffective programmes, while dismissing Mozambican institutions.

REHABILITATION OF BASIC SERVICES AND REINTEGRATION OF SOCIETY

The peace process industry was also extremely over-ambitious, yet ineffective, in the area of rehabilitation and reconstruction, with many humanitarian actors reorienting themselves to development projects. The follow-up meeting in Maputo to the Rome donors' conference held in June 1993 shifted the emphasis from emergency relief to reintegration to rehabilitation.⁷⁶ Given the devastation in Mozambique, political, social and economic reintegration seemed to draw the industry into ever larger and more extensive operations than anticipated or prepared for. This impulse applied to nearly every donor, multilateral agency and NGO operating in Mozambique and was based on the assumption that investing in rehabilitation projects gives the impression of peace and leaves a positive psychological impact which adds momentum to the process.

Many existing agencies in Mozambique found themselves redundant in providing emergency assistance and shifted their emphasis to rehabilitation and development projects. Often these agencies were ill-suited and inexperienced to take on the main activities of education, health care, water supply, and roads. MSF/F admitted that they were "a very expensive option, ill-suited to a non-emergency situation, due to a lack of personnel with experience of long-term programmes, a dependence on short-term contracts and the lack of appropriate support from the Paris office."⁷⁷ Nevertheless, they found themselves undertaking development activities in which they had no experience, resulting in projects that were of poor quality, even aggravating some conditions.⁷⁸ More generally, USAID

⁷⁶*The UN and Mozambique*, Introduction, p. 48.

⁷⁷COWI Consulting, *Evaluation of EC Actions*, Mozambique, p. 20.

⁷⁸COWI Consulting, *Evaluation of EC Actions*, Mozambique, p. 20.

observed that “not all PVOs are making the transition from relief to development at the same pace, and the tension between the short-term need for food aid and long-term developmental objectives has been evident.”⁷⁹ As rivals in the peace process industry, these agencies competed for funding for projects they had little experience in but which guaranteed their continued operation and necessity in Mozambique.

UNHCR was another unlikely actor engaged in rehabilitation activities. Although not part of its operational mandate, UNHCR became “centrally involved in a much broader and more ambitious undertaking: rebuilding the social, economic and administrative structures of a society which has been shattered by war.”⁸⁰ UNHCR developed a reintegration strategy which focussed on providing seeds and tools for food security, and rehabilitating roads, schools, health services and water facilities, with a budget of \$145 million.⁸¹ Unusually, “donor states [met] UNHCR’s appeals for funds in full,”⁸² making UNHCR an important actor in this area. The strategy identified “geographical target areas” based on a “high concentration of returnees” that would benefit the whole community. UNHCR used quick impact projects (QIPs), a “quick response in meeting urgent community or area based needs in a simple manner, often through a one-time financial or material input, that generates visible outputs whose longer-term benefit can be sustained by local efforts and available financial resources.”⁸³ It began 524 quick impact projects⁸⁴ using 45 NGOs, including 10 Mozambican NGOs.⁸⁵ UNHCR had a positive impact on rehabilitating the water sector, rehabilitated and constructed 5000 km of roads and 65 bridges, and contributed to the local economy by providing temporary wage labour.

⁷⁹Clark, *Mozambique’s Transition*, p. 13.

⁸⁰UNHCR, *Rebuilding a War-Torn Society: A Review of the UNHCR Reintegration Programme for Mozambican Returnees*, Geneva, July 1996, p. 1.

⁸¹UNHCR, *Rebuilding a War-Torn Society*, p. iii.

⁸²UNHCR, *Rebuilding a War-Torn Society*, p. 13.

⁸³UNHCR Mozambique, *1993/95 Review Towards Reintegration*, pp. 14-15.

⁸⁴There were 1500 projects by June 1996. UNHCR, *Rebuilding a War-Torn Society*, p. 1.

⁸⁵UNHCR, *Mozambique: An Account*, p. 9.

However, UNHCR was criticised for a lack of planning, poor linkages with other institutions, poor sustainability, a capacity driven rather than needs driven approach, and a focus on impact rather than effectiveness.⁸⁶ UNHCR's own review of its activities drew attention to tensions between implementation, sustainability and cost-effectiveness.⁸⁷ USAID criticised UNHCR for building schools and clinics without planning for teachers, nurses or provincial capacities for maintenance.⁸⁸ UNHCR also acknowledged that their programmes would have benefited from better planning and

involving government structures more fully in the planning process, and supporting the development of official capacities in a more systematic manner; promoting the participation of returnees and other community members in the identification and implementation of reintegration projects; establishing early linkages between UNHCR's activities and the longer-term programmes of national and international development actors, so as to ensure the continuity and maximize the impact of the organization's reintegration projects.⁸⁹

UNHCR's implementing partners were also criticised. In one sectoral assessment of QIPs, there were "numerous variations from standard designs," "on-site interpretation of work specifications," "unacceptable standards," as well as "weak supervision and quality control."⁹⁰ These projects were unlikely to be sustainable, more likely to incur higher maintenance costs and also likely to endanger the safety of those meant to benefit from them. UNHCR admitted it had little technical capacity to review NGO proposals and oversee implementation which was problematic given that many NGOs themselves lacked experience in rehabilitation work.

Donors, NGOs, and multilateral agencies were all criticised for taking an overly short-term approach with an overemphasis on physical rehabilitation, without adequate attention paid to financial and institutional sustainability. This was evident in all sectors. In education, in

⁸⁶UNHCR signed memorandums of understanding with UNDP and UNICEF to carry on its projects after it phased out of Mozambique in December 1994.

⁸⁷UNHCR, *Rebuilding a War-Torn Society*, p. iii.

⁸⁸Interview with Sidney Bliss and Juliet Born, USAID/Maputo.

⁸⁹UNHCR, *Rebuilding a War-Torn Society*, p. 19.

⁹⁰UNHCR, *Rebuilding a War-Torn Society*, p. 35.

the six provinces where UNOHAC had reliable data,

more than 40 organizations [were renovated or constructed] a total of 456 schools or 790 classrooms by the end of 1994. Few donors and implementors however, [had] made provision for school books and furniture, the construction of teachers' houses, or for improvement in quality of education.⁹¹

It was estimated that "about one hundred small health centres and posts, recently rehabilitated or constructed, are currently closed or operating below acceptable standards."⁹² A UNHCR review of health sector activities found that reliance on NGOs had resulted in an unintegrated and fragmented approach and that "[t]he variety of sources of finance had promoted the creation of parallel implementing structures, procurement systems and reporting systems."⁹³ NGOs exacerbated this trend by their tendency

to "colonise" particular districts, and carry out a range of activities in their selected districts. The problem with this, apart from the fact that NGOs find themselves carrying out activities for which they have no expertise, is that some districts have no NGO present, and then no one to act as advocate for the district. This can result in an imbalance in aid across the province.⁹⁴

International NGOs as well were not always willing to work in remote parts of the country.⁹⁵ This was complicated by assistance delivered in Renamo areas where NGO activity did not help to alleviate dual administration, some of whom continued "to operate as though they were delivering emergency health care to two sides of a conflict."⁹⁶ In the health sector, "[b]y July 1994, at least 37 different agencies and NGOs (28) were operating in the health sector in former Renamo areas across 51 districts."⁹⁷ The government was not always able to provide or deliver teachers and nurses in Renamo areas.⁹⁸

⁹¹UNOHAC, *Final Report*, pp. 75-6.

⁹²COWI Consulting, *Evaluation of EC Actions*, Mozambique, p. ii.

⁹³COWI Consulting, *Evaluation of EC Actions*, Mozambique, p. 24.

⁹⁴COWI Consulting, *Evaluation of EC Actions*, Mozambique, p. 16.

⁹⁵UNHCR, *Rebuilding a War-Torn Society*, p. 37.

⁹⁶Barnes, "NGOs in Peacekeeping Operations," p. 8.

⁹⁷*The UN and Mozambique*, Introduction, p. 52.

⁹⁸UNOHAC, *Final Report*, p. 35.

Even though there was a consciousness of the need to employ local institutions, such organisations were few in number and in demand from many international organisations seeking local partners for legitimacy. More often, the state and local institutions were bypassed or undermined. Although UNHCR cemented

contacts with the provincial authorities and to reinforce the process of decentralization within the Mozambican state structure. At the same time, however, it had the effect of marginalizing the line ministries and specialized programmes in Maputo, some of which claimed to have been left uninformed regarding the volume of UNHCR activity in their respective sectors.⁹⁹

Most donors preferred working through NGOs rather than government ministries because of their flexibility and speed at getting established on the ground. In spite of the explosion of donor and NGO activity, the Ministry of Health concluded that in general, there was "over investment in returnee areas, poor rehabilitation standards and a system that has grown up unplanned, without the involvement of the national authorities... and certain provinces with easy access had received disproportionate amounts of investment."¹⁰⁰ The result was an unplanned and uncoordinated collection of projects that was unbalanced and unrepresentative for future programmes. Thus the extensive rehabilitation activities established a pattern for social policy and administration which was heavily reliant on foreign assistance at the expense of building local capacity and inimical to developing a coherent system of social services for the public welfare of Mozambican society.

NGOs and the peace process industry also had a negative symbolic and psychological impact. The Mozambique Ministry of Health reported that "the MSF approach demoralised local health staff. Local structures could not compete with the planes, cars, houses and logistical structures put in place by MSF/F, and this negatively affected the self-perception of local staff."¹⁰¹ If this tendency occurred in almost every district, highlighted in the capital, it supported the perception that Mozambique was being overrun by foreign

⁹⁹UNHCR, *Rebuilding a War-Torn Society*, p. 29.

¹⁰⁰Ministry of Health document, "The Reconstruction Process in Mozambique," cited in COWI Consulting, *Evaluation of EC Actions*, Mozambique, p. 23.

¹⁰¹COWI Consulting, *Evaluation of EC Actions*, Mozambique, p. 20.

missionaries. In Zambezia province, “MSF/F had its own plane to visit the districts to carry out consultations. It is reported that the budget for the plane alone was greater than the Government health budget for the entire province.”¹⁰² Even though international agencies in the peace process industry were not as effective as their levels of assistance suggested, their activities simultaneously devalued state institutions to Mozambicans and created expectations which the government can not realistically expect to meet. Such agencies introduced new rules, institutions and practices into the social services sector of Mozambique’s political space which compromised the capacity and symbolism of Mozambique’s public sector.

DEMINING

Clearing landmines was designated a humanitarian activity and placed under the responsibility of UNOHAC. The demining programme involved prioritising, coordinating and contracting mine clearance, developing a Mozambican capacity for mine clearance and establishing a mine awareness programme. In the first year of the process, there was almost no systematic demining because of rivalry between UNOHAC and UNDP. Although UNOHAC had a budget of \$14 million, half from ONUMOZ and half from DHA, it was initially disbursed by UNDP in New York. UNDP was “unwilling to approve projects and programs proposed by UNOHAC, arguing over the wording of contracts, tendering procedures, and quality control.”¹⁰³ UNOHAC decided that all demining decisions had to be approved by the Cease-Fire Commission which did not meet in early 1993 due to Renamo’s boycott. The National Mine Clearance Plan for Mozambique was only approved by the CCF in December 1993. UNOHAC and the UN were severely criticised for their failure to implement the demining programme.

The UN Secretary-General issued a number of complaints about the delays in the mine clearance programme in his reports to the Security Council and finally intervened in 1994.

¹⁰²COWI Consulting, *Evaluation of EC Actions*, Mozambique, p. 7.

¹⁰³Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 78.

He transferred the demining budget from UNDP to UNOHAC, although UNOHAC had already taken decisions without seeking UNDP approval, including awarding the mines survey to Halo Trust, a British NGO. Halo Trust subsequently provided a national and provincial mines surveys which became the database for establishing priorities across the country. However, the late arrival of the survey's conclusions could not form the basis for programme prioritising. The second UNOHAC director, Felix Downes Thomas, sought to expedite demining and introduced an Accelerated Demining Programme, which by December 1994 had cleared 40,000 square metres. Another controversy emerged when the \$4.8 million contract to clear 2000 km of roads given priority by the CSC at the beginning of the operation, was awarded to a consortium including LONRHO, Royal Ordnance and a South African company, Mechem, the latter two being landmines manufacturers. Although these companies made a profit by both making and clearing landmines, they completed the project in less than the six months contracted. However, by the time the contract was awarded and completed in May 1994, priorities had changed and clearing these roads had little impact.¹⁰⁴

Increasingly frustrated with the UN system, some donors independently contracted other agencies to begin demining. "Sweden and the Netherlands [froze] use of their contributions to the Demining Trust Fund, run by UNOHAC, while the Dutch [were] suing to get their money back."¹⁰⁵ In February 1993, the EU contracted LONRHO and the Gurkhas to clear 200 km in the Renamo held town of Inhaminga. UNHCR contracted Norwegian People's Aid to train deminers and clear roads in 4 provinces.¹⁰⁶ USAID appointed a US contractor, Ronco, to clear roads in 3 provinces, and the Halo Trust, funded by the British government, cleared mines in Zambezia province. Although mines were cleared from the land, overall

¹⁰⁴Alistair Hallam, Kate Halvorsen, Janne Lexow, Armindo Miranda, Pamela Rebelo, Astrid Suerke, *Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique*, A report submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo: Christian Michelsen Institute, 1997, p. 79.

¹⁰⁵Clark, *Mozambique's Transition*, p. 21.

¹⁰⁶During a visit, Sadako Ogata objected to UNHCR involvement in demining activities and funding was withdrawn, (later covered by UNOHAC). Hallam et al., *Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance*, p. 80.

strategic planning, the setting of priorities and effective results were missing. The absence of central coordination and direction resulted in a wastage of resources.¹⁰⁷ For example, it took 3 months to clear 40km of road which had no mines and which was not even accessible due to collapsed bridges. Clearing land mines in itself was less important than the impact on local communities in terms of access to carry on with their livelihoods. Demining was only one means of opening greater access, fencing and greater awareness were other possible options that were ignored. The lack of coordination and coherence also raised the issue of territorial administration. Because there was no policy on Renamo areas, clearing Renamo areas depended on political approval. The government “prevented a British contractor, Defence Systems Ltd., from starting work, arguing that the GPA did not allow Renamo to have independent links with international agencies.”¹⁰⁸

By the time ONUMOZ withdrew, 3262 km of roads and 1.5 million square metres of territory had been cleared of mines under different agencies.¹⁰⁹ International assistance was characterised by little coordination, poor implementation, multiplication of efforts and little encouragement of local capacity.¹¹⁰ The US embassy criticised

UNOHAC’s proposals for the creation of a new Mozambican government department for the coordination and implementation of mine clearance and called for the United Nations to delegate responsibility for supervision and demining to the existing operations, transferring its unused funds to the agencies already active in the field. During 1995 a National Demining Commission was established, but most of the work of management and field operations was indeed undertaken by outside agencies.¹¹¹

In 1996, the National Demining Commission was still unable to fulfil its intended role of

¹⁰⁷The Norwegians estimated \$2 million may have been spent on tasks where demining had almost no humanitarian or economic impact. Hallam et al., *Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance*, p. 83.

¹⁰⁸Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 34.

¹⁰⁹Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 80.

¹¹⁰Halo Trust, was an exception, by employing only 3 expatriates in a staff of 150. All supervisors and medics were Mozambican, as well some administrative and management functions.

¹¹¹Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 79.

defining policy and setting mine clearance priorities.¹¹² Mozambican institutions and procedures were overlooked because of the presumed need for quick results, but the performance of the peace process industry was hardly better, even with a budget of \$14 million. It was not only that the peace process industry was counterproductive, but that their operations simultaneously pushed aside and denigrated local institutions and practices.¹¹³

Conclusion: The withdrawal of ONUMOZ and the obsolescence of UNOHAC

In terms of the main objectives of humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance, there were remarkable improvements in the basic conditions of life in Mozambique. Over 1.5 million refugees returned to Mozambique, over 3 million internally displaced persons were resettled and 200,000 demobilised soldiers and their dependents returned home. There were few incidences of refugees returning to asylum countries, and people permanently resettled across Mozambique. The number of people in need of food aid decreased from 3.8 million in 1992/1993 to 1.5 million in 1994/1995, the majority of which were returning refugees. Malnutrition rates also stabilised or dropped throughout the country in the first year of peace.¹¹⁴ Although the economic situation remained poor, the initial conditions for recovery were created.

However, social conditions in Mozambique improved because of the determination and optimism of ordinary Mozambicans and good fortune. It was Mozambicans who walked home and planted crops, who accepted soldiers back into their communities and who resumed their normal livelihoods. As with the soldiers in the military component, the actions of ordinary Mozambicans took on political significance. Equally important was the return of good rains from 1992, allowing the best agricultural seasons in years (a 400%

¹¹²Hallam et al., *Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance*, p. 81.

¹¹³Mozambican dog teams trained by NPA were later seconded to peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Angola. "After decades of receiving foreign expertise in their country, Mozambicans were proud to be exporting skilled Mozambican personnel to Europe." Hallam et al., *Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance*, p. 80.

¹¹⁴USAID/Mozambique, *1993-1995 War-to-Peace Transition Program*, 1995, Maputo, p. 5.

increase in food crop production from 1992 to 1993) which had a positive effect on consolidating peace. Continued drought would have exacerbated the fragile situation.

The international community contributed \$633 million towards emergency food needs, seeds and tools, rehabilitation and other projects. UNOHAC estimated 5.5 million Mozambicans benefited from food and non-food relief items provided by the international community during the process.¹¹⁵ Given the level of resources and the number of reconstruction activities throughout the country, positive benefits reached the intended beneficiaries. However, given the magnitude of the peace process industry operating in Mozambique, the extent and scope of their activities was not matched by the level of effectiveness or rate of return. International assistance was frequently too little, too late or irrelevant to the needs of the intended recipients. Whether implementing peace-building or post-conflict reconstruction, the lack of integration, coordination, excessive competition, and the sheer number of activities by the peace process industry pointed to the absence of a coherent plan of action, strategy or agenda that necessarily or consistently promoted or sustained peace. It was not made clear how these activities individually and collectively produced and consolidated peace.

Although designated the co-ordinating mechanism, UNOHAC was undermined by its own activities and conflicts with ONUMOZ and donors. In addition to conflicts over authority, bureaucratic differences over budget lines and procedures between DHA and DPKO created more confusion and competition. There was little integration between the military, political and humanitarian components of ONUMOZ and the other agencies. The military component was deployed to protect the economic corridors linking Mozambique to other countries in the region, but did not effectively protect the humanitarian routes within Mozambique or generate security across the country. NGOs and humanitarian agencies also distanced themselves from the military operation, yet took advantage of the protection that was offered when their security was at risk.¹¹⁶ The process was over-complicated by the

¹¹⁵UNOHAC, *Final Report*, p. 5.

¹¹⁶Barnes, "NGOs in Peacekeeping Operations", p. 12.

peace process industry without even accounting for the conflict between the government and Renamo.

Many disputes amongst the actors in the peace process industry revolved around the short-term versus long-term objectives of the process and the role and place of using government institutions and building up local capacity. USAID criticised UNOHAC for wanting to pay everything to the government which was ineffective, "donors knew you had to go through NGOs in the field to get things done."¹¹⁷ USAID complained that

the single greatest problem, however, has been the unwillingness and seeming inability of UNOHAC to understand and accept the essentially short-term politically oriented requirements of the peace process, and their continual focus on long-term development issues, to the exclusion of critical transition issues on which the peace process depends.¹¹⁸

Ajello also criticised UNOHAC for being

too involved in the elaboration and planning of medium and long-term programmes...UNOHAC should have limited its actions to the short-term and should have worked out, together with the relevant ministries, UN agencies and NGOs, an appropriate plan to bridge this short-term plan with the long and medium-term planning of the government and the development agencies.¹¹⁹

UNOHAC created too many programmes which outlived the mandate of the UN operation which were not effectively transferred to the government or long-standing agencies remaining in Mozambique like UNDP.

This short-term approach did not bring noticeable benefits but simultaneously served to weaken state institutions. Many humanitarian actors used the openings in political space to bypass the government. "Some donors took the view that the peace process gave license for international action without government interference, and this resulted in a sharp downgrading of the government's own relief bodies."¹²⁰ One foreign observer claimed "the

¹¹⁷Interview with Sidney Bliss and Juliet Born, USAID, Maputo, May 1997.

¹¹⁸US Embassy Cable, Maputo, July 1994.

¹¹⁹Ajello, "The Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance," pp. 202-3.

¹²⁰Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 86.

donor community was deliberately attempting to weaken the government rather than to promote a healthy balance between state and civil society.”¹²¹ The use of state institutions decreased during the process as nearly all financing for humanitarian and rehabilitation activities was channelled through international and non-governmental agencies and a decreasing percentage through government ministries. Mozambican institutions were also bypassed through the creation of new administration systems throughout the country. UNOHAC opened offices in all 10 provinces with 3 regional offices in addition to the central office in Maputo. WFP opened 8 subregional offices, UNHCR’s resources included, three Sub-Offices and 17 Field-Offices, reaching out into many of the least accessible and most seriously war-affected parts of the country; a sophisticated telecommunications system, providing direct and instant contact between UNHCR staff, whether in their office, at home or while travelling; a dedicated air charter services, allowing programme staff and equipment to be quickly transferred from one part of the country to another; and an extensive fleet of vehicles on the ground.¹²²

NGOs also opened offices throughout the provinces. For the poorest country in the world, supporting these expatriates required expensive logistical support which seemed ill-conceived when the impact on society did not match the expenditure or effort of international agencies.

The plurality and impunity of the peace process industry produced a cumulative impact on political space. The transfer of authority out of Mozambique, beginning with the emergency, became more pronounced over the two years of the peace process and remains a defining feature of Mozambique. Under the aegis of the peace process, Mozambique’s political space opened up to an array of international actors from which the government had little recourse to deny entry or operation. Operating under the imperatives of the process, these agencies extended their reach and expanded their scope of activities to an unprecedented level. Activities by the peace process industry were undertaken in *consultation* with the government, rather than the government drawing upon the assistance of the industry. Consequently, the notion of interference was reversed to refer to

¹²¹ Antonio Donini cited in Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 90.

¹²² UNHCR, *Rebuilding a War-Torn Society*, p. 27.

government or Renamo efforts to participate in international activities, according to international rules and objectives. Although Mozambican actors were not entirely excluded from voicing opinions or influencing decisions, these decisions rested with international agencies. In a functioning political system, the opposite would hold true with international actors seeking openings with the government to provide assistance and exert influence. However, despite their questionable competence, the peace process industry acted according to their own agendas which reoriented the norms, institutions and procedures of Mozambican politics by devaluing the state and obstructing its relations with society and preventing the coherent evolution of Mozambique's political space.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The political and electoral component: international direction by the peace process industry

After considering the military and humanitarian dimensions, this chapter turns to the political component of the peace process in Mozambique. The political component refers to those aspects of the process with specific political objectives: the political management of the peace process; the reunification of territorial administration; and the electoral process leading to multi-party elections. The dynamics between the government and Renamo in this dimension influenced all aspects of the process, but was itself influenced by progress in the military and humanitarian components. The connections between the three components focussed on Renamo's legitimisation and political socialisation; its transformation into a political party, inclusion in the political space of Mozambique and acceptance by the government. Although the process centred on the two parties, space was also opening up for other political actors.

As with the other two dimensions, the peace process industry was extensively involved in this aspect of the process. ONUMOZ, under the direction of the Special Representative, managed the implementation of the peace agreement as a political process. However, they did so in a heavy-handed and intrusive way, positioning themselves between the state and the society of Mozambique, which was not necessarily more productive or effective. This intrusive international presence existed before the official start of the implementation, but was reinforced and exacerbated through the official peace process and the UN presence. The actors in the peace process industry were not neutral third parties, but were fundamentally political actors with power and influence engaging in political activities with respect to the state and society of Mozambique. However, in contrast to the military and humanitarian spheres, Mozambican actors had opportunities to defend their interests. Thus the configuration of Mozambique's political space was shaped by the contest amongst the various players in the process resulting in an uneven impact on political space.

This chapter makes the argument that given its power and resources, the peace process

industry reconfigured Mozambique's political space in this aspect of the process by changing attitudes, behaviour and customs, creating expectations and instilling practices in Mozambican politics which might not have been otherwise. The actors in the industry had a formative influence on the definition of norms, institutions and procedures constituting Mozambique's political space through its political objectives and how they were achieved. The chapter is divided into three sections.¹ First, I discuss the commissions set up by the General Peace Agreement to administer the process and the leadership provided by the peace process industry. Second, I consider the issue of territorial administration as the government and Renamo struggled over the reunification of the country. In the third and largest section, I discuss the electoral process. This section is itself divided into five sub-sections; administering the electoral process, the formation of political parties, preparations for the election and civic education, pressure for a government of national unity and the elections themselves.

Directing the peace process: the commissions, the Special Representative and the peace process industry

As already discussed in chapters five and six, the GPA established a number of commissions to supervise the implementation of the agreement. The primary and most powerful commission at the centre of the process was the Supervisory and Control Commission(CSC). According to the agreement, the CSC would guarantee the implementation of the agreement, ensure respect for the timetable, assume responsibility for the authentic interpretation of the agreement, and settle disputes arising between the parties.² Composed of both parties, the CSC was chaired by the UN and included a number of countries involved in the Rome talks, the US, France, UK, Portugal, and Italy. The CSC was assisted by three subsidiary commissions discussed in previous chapters, including the Cease-Fire Commission (CCF), the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Armed Forces (CCFADM) and the Reintegration Commission (CORE). There

¹Human rights monitoring, truth commissions and war crimes tribunals are central to some peace processes, however, they were not important in Mozambique and shall not be discussed.

²GPA, Protocol V, Item II.5.

were also two commissions without UN participation: the National Information Commission (COMINFO) and the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL).³ With the exception of COMINFO, all the commissions sent regular reports to the CSC,⁴ and referred issues to it that could not be decided.

In a study on the implementation of peace agreements, the authors concluded that a successful implementation can be attributed to the establishment of institutional structures that involve the parties in resolving conflicts of interpretation of the agreement.⁵ Although established for this purpose, the Mozambican commissions created a complicated structure of administration sometimes beyond the capacity of the parties. While the commissions were integral to the political socialisation and inculcation of Renamo, they were also quite often hostage to Renamo, its political inexperience and its inability to staff them. This led to delays in the establishment and running of the commissions, and their complete suspension during Renamo's boycott in 1993 which affected every aspect of the process. The international community accommodated Renamo's political inexperience by exercising more flexibility towards Renamo, but also by assuming a more active and central role in the process. According to the British Ambassador to Mozambique, the GPA had indeed "provided for an *executive role for the UN and key countries* in the Commissions set up to oversee implementation, that enabled the international community to be active players in the process rather than handwringing bystanders."⁶ Guebuza argues instead that the CSC became a mechanism for non-Mozambican political forces to interfere negatively and positively.⁷ Rather than functioning as a conflict resolution mechanism between the two parties, the commissions, the CSC in particular, became instruments of the UN and the

³The National Elections Commission (CNE) and Commission for Territorial Administration (CNAT) were not under the jurisdiction of the CSC.

⁴Minutes from CSC Meeting 042, 19 September 1994.

⁵Geraldo L. Munck and Chetan Kumar, "Civil conflicts and the conditions for successful international intervention: a comparative study of Cambodia and El Salvador," *Review of International Studies*, 21(2), 1995, p. 164.

⁶Richard Edis, "Mozambique's Successful Peace Process: An Insider's View," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 9(2), 1995, p. 15. Italics in original.

⁷Interview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.

Special Representative, Aldo Ajello.

While the CSC was credited for coordinating the international community, conferring legitimacy on the process, and ensuring constant support for the UN operation, its focus was the UN and its international members. As ONUMOZ grew in strength, the CSC evolved into a judicial arbiter or a local Security Council where the parties were expected to account before a UN chairman surrounded by a council of ambassadors. Although the agreement stated that the CSC would reach decisions by consensus between the two parties, it was the international ambassadors who attempted to impose decisions. In one example, there was a proposal for Renamo soldiers to receive government pensions. The government rejected the proposal on principle and for financial reasons, but the ambassadors would not allow discussion to proceed, suspending the CSC until they eventually conceded to the government position.⁸ The need to secure approval from external third parties signified that decision making power was being taken away from Mozambicans. The commissions also received technical support from the peace process industry. The CSC concluded that the commissions needed “technical support, including an impartial secretariat, which could best be provided by ONUMOZ. Legal services will also be necessary in order to ensure that the working procedures of the commissions *meet international standards* and to resolve possible legal disputes.”⁹ The commissions seemed to operate on the basis of values, standards, and priorities set by the international community without any meaningful or conscious attempt to involve and impart knowledge to Mozambicans as part of the process for building peace. There seemed to be little about the commissions that was Mozambican.

From its inception, there were tensions between ONUMOZ and the Mozambican government over the jurisdiction and authority of the UN in the process. There were two aspects to this tension. First, the government found itself subordinate to the agreement it had signed. The GPA became a quasi-constitutional document establishing the commissions as a transitional authority and requiring amendments to the 1990 constitution,

⁸Interview with Armando Guebuza, Head of Government Delegation to CSC, Maputo.

⁹Minutes from CSC meeting 042.

such as the creation of an electoral commission.¹⁰ Since the responsibility for interpreting and implementing the agreement rested with the CSC, the government was then also subordinate to the CSC run by the UN. Ajello was unconcerned that “[the] CSC, and its principal subordinate bodies, de facto replaced the government in matters concerning the implementation of the peace accord.”¹¹ The UN through the CSC became the sovereign authority in Mozambique regarding the peace process. But since the accord took precedent over all other legislation, the agreement extended the CSC’s and hence the UN’s jurisdiction to all national matters. The UN overshadowed the state and its jurisdiction and challenged the state’s authority not only in terms of the peace process, but Mozambican politics in general. Second, as the UN established itself in Mozambique, especially during the second year of the process, its full operational capacity extended far beyond the capacity of the government. ONUMOZ began to form a parallel administration, a state within a state, with its 7000 armed troops, logistical capacity, sophisticated communications and control capacity, and relief supplies equal to half Mozambique’s GNP.¹² On the technical and institutional level, the UN presence very forcefully put the state and the Mozambican government in its place, while UN actions accentuated the primacy of international actors in the running of Mozambican politics. The UN operation had a strong symbolic impact on the political space of Mozambique which minimised and challenged the sovereign authority of the state.

The UN special representative, Aldo Ajello, was a profound source of tension with the government. Ajello has been praised for his astute and capable direction but has also been accused of acting like a colonial governor.¹³ The head of the government delegation to the CSC, Armando Guebuza commented that Ajello “tried to show he was strong enough to

¹⁰Norberto Carrilho, “The electoral legislation in Mozambique and the political and social achievement,” in Brazão Mazula, (ed.) *Mozambique: Elections, Democracy and Development*, Maputo: The Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1996, p. 127.

¹¹Aldo Ajello, “The role of ONUMOZ in the pacification process,” in Mazula, *Mozambique: Elections*, p. 120.

¹²Cameron Hume, *Ending Mozambique’s War*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1994, p. 143.

¹³Interview with Joseph Hanlon, London, April 1997.

play a powerful role by surrounding himself with elements of formal political power, like an army, police and council of ambassadors.”¹⁴ Ajello set himself up as the figurehead of the international community. To achieve this, he

held regular meetings with the ambassadors who sat on the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC), with the African group of ambassadors, with the European Union, with the Nordic group and, in general, with all those who were interested. As a result of this approach, I was never seen as the representative of a separate bureaucracy in New York, but as the representative of the international community as a whole.¹⁵

Ajello was also conscious of running a transparent process and held regular briefings with the national and international press. What was undisputable was that Ajello directed and steered the process. The UN was not a passive monitor of the process, which Ajello and many others felt contributed to the failure of UNAVEM II in Angola. According to Ajello, ONUMOZ was the “engine of the process” with himself as the driver of the engine. He managed the implementation of the peace agreement as a political process. He acknowledged that “the entire operation was led on the basis of the primacy of politics. All the other components of ONUMOZ, starting with the military, were subordinate to politics and were its instrument.”¹⁶ Ajello further contended that the success of the process rested with the flexibility exercised by the international community in allowing time for the parties to meet their obligations and applying pressure when they were dragging their feet. While this may bear some truth, as a political actor the UN took ownership of the process away from Mozambicans, making political choices with long-term consequences for Mozambican politics, without having to account to Mozambicans. This reinforced the primacy of the UN in Mozambique’s political space.

Ajello has claimed that “[w]ithout an external partner accepted by both sides as neutral, the implementation of the accord would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible.”¹⁷ In fact, Ajello would have preferred “a neutral body assuring impartial governance in the

¹⁴Interview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.

¹⁵Ajello, “The role of ONUMOZ,” p. 120.

¹⁶Ajello, “The role of ONUMOZ,” p. 123.

¹⁷Ajello, “The role of ONUMOZ,” p. 119.

transitional period [or] a power sharing arrangement for the period after elections.”¹⁸ What Ajello has failed to reconcile was the role of the UN as both political actor and neutral third party. By engaging in overt political activities such as the Renamo Trust Fund, preferring and acting as a transitional administration, pressuring for a government of national unity, and given its logistical capacity, ONUMOZ’s intervention was political, ambitious and intrusive which contradicted its neutrality. Ajello’s attitude towards the politicised role of the UN belies the notion of assistance since he sought to supplant the authority of Mozambican actors with the authority of external actors.

The politicisation of the UN was most apparent in its dealings with the parties. Since Renamo was the weaker party in the political arena, often threatening to return to war, Ajello felt Renamo needed compensation. He stated that “it was indispensable to help Renamo attain a certain minimum level, so that the entire mechanism set forth in the peace accord could work.”¹⁹ Thus Ajello created the Trust Fund for Renamo, dealt with Dhlakama directly in Maringue and exerted considerable patience with Renamo’s continued delays and obstacles, notably when Renamo boycotted the commissions in 1993. However, the \$18 million Renamo Trust Fund raised questions of whether Renamo was compensated beyond any means which could be sustained and ensured Renamo’s future dependency on international assistance. Even so, Dhlakama still perceived the UN to be siding with the government because the government was a member state of the UN.²⁰ The government for its part resented this preferential treatment, perceiving the process to be oriented against them.²¹ Teodata Hunguana, a government hardliner said “ONUMOZ lost its credibility by trying to create a ‘balance between the two parties,’ taking sides with the weaker Renamo and putting pressure on the Government to ‘renegotiate the Peace Agreement;’ [which

¹⁸Comments by Aldo Ajello in Winrich Kühne, Bernhard Weimer and Sabine Fandrych, (eds.) *International Workshop on the Successful Conclusion of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)*, Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 1995, p. 12.

¹⁹Ajello, “The role of ONUMOZ,” p. 121.

²⁰Interview with Afonso Dhlakama, Maputo, May 1997.

²¹The government attempted to circumvent the CSC by lobbying the Security Council directly in New York and by reminding Ajello of his interim status. Interview with Miguel de Brito, Researcher on War Torn Societies Project, Mozambique, Maputo, 1997.

gave] rise to suspicions about the ‘impartiality of the referee.’”²² More importantly by focussing on material means, Prime Minister Mocumbi argued the UN did not “advise Renamo to be engaged in a direct dialogue with the government.”²³ Although buying off Renamo was successful in the short term, Renamo’s political inculcation did not include developing accommodating political practices needed for future Mozambican politics.

In addition to ONUMOZ, other actors in the peace process industry strengthened their influence in the process by collaborating and coordinating their activities. This was effected through two forums. The first was the commissions. Through the CSC, the international ambassadors issued joint statements, gave public support for Ajello and “the formulation when necessary, of joint recommendations to the UN in New York, especially for action by the Security Council.”²⁴ For example, commenting on delays in opening the Assembly Areas, the international members of the CSC “remind[ed] the parties that many donors expressed concern over the pace of implementation of the peace process and the implication failure would have for future assistance to Mozambique.”²⁵ In peacetime, the diplomatic community would never have such collective power or voice. The CSC allowed the international community to be more powerful and vocal in their demands upon the government, Renamo and Mozambican affairs in general. This was reinforced through the second forum, the Aid for Democracy Group established in July 1992 by the major donors in anticipation of the peace agreement. Chaired by UNDP, this group met monthly to monitor and coordinate donor support for democratisation. They became more directly active after the signing of the electoral law, inviting participation by the government and the National Elections Commission. Although this group was useful for coordinating policies on the part of donors, it took the political initiative, with the government then required to seek a role in relation to such structures.

²²Comments by Teodata Hunguana, in Kühne, *International Workshop*, p. 16.

²³Mozambique News Agency, *AIM Reports*, 9(27), May 1993.

²⁴Comments by Richard Edis in Kühne, *International Workshop*, pp. 43-44.

²⁵*Statement by the International Members of the CSC on the Assembly of Forces*, 12 December 1993, Maputo.

The government was not alone in objecting to the intrusiveness of the international community. The Sant'Egidio community claimed the UN violated the spirit of Rome established by the mediators. They criticised the UN for trying “to solve problems by direct intervention rather than by pursuing the ‘spirit of Rome’ and ‘seeking what unites.’”²⁶ Distrust between the parties was not lessened but enhanced by the peace process industry, because they assisted Renamo and alienated the state by placing themselves at the centre of the process and decision-making. While efforts were made to politically socialise Renamo, their external character was reinforced rather than facilitating direct dialogue with the government. Problems were solved through “permanent mediation.”²⁷ According to government officials including Guebuza, even when discussing issues directly with Renamo, it seemed problems could only be solved if approval was granted by the ambassadors which meant the government was constantly negotiating with the international community.²⁸ However, the international community did not attempt to politically socialise the Mozambican state, to influence the evolution of a more impartial and neutral state, in part because external third parties ignored the state except as one of the combatants. There were few attempts to transfer skills rather than relying on foreign technical assistance, while the commissions’ procedures adopted international legal and political standards rather than seeking to serve local functions and needs. Through such practices, the donors, ONUMOZ and the peace process industry were reconfiguring Mozambique’s political space.

Territorial administration and reunification

On the ground, the core political issue was the reunification of national administration. Because of the war, the country was divided between the capital and major towns controlled by the government, and the vast majority of the countryside either under Renamo’s control or without any kind of administration. Renamo claimed 80% of Mozambique’s territory, the UN put this closer to 25%, but their threat to security denied the government access to

²⁶Andrea Bartoli, Sant’Egidio spokesman cited in Richard Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping in Action, 1992-1994* Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997, p. 57.

²⁷Interview with Oscar Monteiro, Maputo, May 1997.

²⁸Interview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.

much of the country. Thus social, territorial and political reunification revolved around bringing Renamo areas back into a single administration under the Mozambican state. It also involved bringing state institutions to society and society back into the state. This ambition was undermined by the state's limited capacity and means to restore its administration and, with demobilisation, to provide security against crime and banditry. However, the state was not only a set of institutions, it was also one of the combatants involved in the war. Renamo distrusted the idea of a neutral state, given the association and development of the state with Frelimo. Despite Frelimo's assurances on the separation of the state from the party, state officials and state resources were still closely linked to Frelimo.

The issue of territorial administration was frequently raised in the Rome discussions but never resolved. There was a vaguely worded agreement which stated that Renamo could continue to administer its areas, but must allow government administrators to expand into them.²⁹ Protocol V of the agreement stated that "public administration in the areas controlled by RENAMO shall employ only citizens resident in those areas, who may be members of RENAMO,"³⁰ but also guaranteed access to state officials. The reunification of administration was to be effected through the National Commission for Territorial Administration (CNAT) which did not include external third parties. The commission rarely functioned and ceased altogether when Renamo refused to participate in July 1994.

Renamo claimed the GPA divided the country into two independently governed zones. The government insisted there was only one administration. In addition to the political leverage it needed by controlling territory, one of the reasons for Renamo's reluctance to give up territory was access to resources. The control of economic assets was not discussed in Rome, meaning their control would rest with whoever won the elections. Until that time Renamo attempted to secure concessions from timber companies. This was opposed by the

²⁹Gaborone Mini-Summit, 18 September 1992. See Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War*, p. 133.

³⁰GPA, Protocol V, Item III. 9d.

government which argued foreign companies could only work through the government.³¹ Some diplomats argued Renamo needed an economic deal with farms, businesses, and loans to ensure them a place in post-election society.³² “Renamo expected, and wanted, special rights over the areas under its influence: it wanted a share in taxes and fees raised and in investments undertaken there, but the limits imposed by the peace accord made that illegal.”³³

In September 1993, President Chissano and Dhlakama signed an agreement allowing Renamo to appoint advisors to provincial governors “with the function of advising the Governor on all questions directly or indirectly to do with the reintegration of the zones under Renamo control, including socio-economic questions,”³⁴ while Mozambican police could re-enter areas controlled by RENAMO. The agreement also requested the UN to send a civilian police component to monitor all police activity in the country. These commitments were never realised. Renamo nominated administrators for only four provinces while the government was slow to appoint them; and some “local RENAMO authorities have denied the government police access, while the latter appears reluctant to extend its posts to former RENAMO areas.”³⁵ According to Dhlakama, the government never created the conditions for Renamo’s advisors to work with the provincial governors.

The issue of administration was partially resolved on the ground through the resettlement of 5 million Mozambicans who had been displaced by the war and by progress in demobilisation which removed Renamo soldiers from guarding their areas. It was also facilitated through humanitarian activities which opened up Renamo areas in the second

³¹Unlike UNITA’s diamond trade, there were few lucrative and easily exploitable resources to finance Renamo with the exception of ivory.

³²*Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, Issue 5, August 1993.

³³José Luís Cabaço, “The long march of Mozambican democracy,” in Mazula, *Mozambique: Elections*, p. 95.

³⁴*The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995*, New York, NY: Department of Public Information, 1995, Letter from Mozambique, Document 41, S/26432, 13 September 1993, pp. 196-198.

³⁵*The UN and Mozambique*, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 65, S/1994/803, 7 July 1994, p. 246.

year of the process. International NGOs were the first to enter Renamo areas, while government officials were denied access, although this changed in some parts of the country towards the end of the process. This implied that there were vast areas of Mozambique more likely to have contact with international NGOs than with national institutions. Between October 1992 and October 1994, 35 different NGOs were active in Renamo districts.³⁶ Rather than facilitating a reunified administration, these NGOs reinforced a fragmented and dual administration throughout the countryside. The absence of political pressure on this issue from the UN and the international community demonstrated their lack of concern with the administration and institutions of the state, despite the importance of such structures for the future governance of Mozambique. By ignoring state institutions except as a party to the conflict, the peace process industry reinforced the weak state. Long after ONUMOZ departed, this unresolved issue continues to colour Mozambican politics.

Holding elections

Holding the first multi-party elections in Mozambique was perceived to be the culmination of the peace process. Thus, the elections hinged on successful demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration of both soldiers and displaced persons; and consequently suffered from the delays which obstructed the rest of the process. The elections and the electoral process were also integral to the shaping of political space in Mozambique because the elections would determine who held power, the electoral system created would distribute that power in a particular way, while the process of administering the elections would determine the independence and integrity of the state's institutional capacity. The procedures and institutions of the electoral process imbued and imparted political norms and rules through the expectations, customs and practices they encouraged. The transparency and legitimacy of the electoral process would reflect on the authority of the new government but also the state itself.

However, elections in peace processes are more complicated than routine or even

³⁶UNOHAC, *Final Report: Consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Programme, 1992-1994*, Maputo, December 1994, p. 64.

transitional elections because of the many and often conflicting functions they serve. “Routine elections in stable democracies are held to change the government according to a preestablished constitutional agenda.”³⁷ They hold governments to account for their record of achievement. Reconciliation elections are aimed primarily at incorporating into a democratic political system antagonists who formerly related to each other by the use of force.³⁸ One the one hand, these kinds of elections are intended to consolidate peace by facilitating reconciliation. Elections are about opening up political space for insurgent groups and transforming them into political organisations. On the other hand, they also institute and promise democratic procedures. But democratic competitions do not necessarily promote peace because they are fundamentally competitions for power. Democracy rests on the contest of ideas and political actors. Elections also provide an opportunity for society to express a choice regarding the candidates. Finally, elections serve to legitimate governments not only for society, but for the international community. Not all of these functions are compatible.

These conflicting objectives were reflected in the different agendas pursued by the multiplicity of actors involved in Mozambique’s elections. After the abysmal failure in Angola, the international community was committed to investing in a carefully prepared and transparent electoral process. For the Mozambican government, elections would signal the end of international intervention and the restoration of the country’s sovereignty. For Renamo, elections provided an opportunity to acquire power in Mozambique. Although the peace process industry followed a formula of holding elections to conclude the peace process, the wish to hold elections in Mozambique was also Mozambican. Renamo’s only persistent demand was for multi-party elections, while the government had introduced a multi-party political system, originally scheduling elections for 1991. The Rome discussions devoted almost a year to negotiating details about political parties and the electoral law. However, this pressure for elections was top-down, it did not emanate from

³⁷Rafael Lopez-Pintor “Reconciliation Elections: A Post-Cold War Experience,” in Krishna Kumar, (ed.) *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997, p. 55.

³⁸Lopez-Pintor, “Reconciliation Elections,” p. 55.

society wanting to make a political choice. In fact, there was some fear that elections threatened peace because of the experience in Angola.

This section discusses five aspects of the electoral process in which the peace process industry played a part: administering the electoral process, political parties, civic education and preparation for the elections, pressure for a government of national unity, and the elections. The full array of the peace process industry provided significant assistance throughout the electoral process. However, for the industry, the process of holding elections seemed far more important than the functions elections serve in the transition from war to peace. This created expectations and reproduced political practices with long term implications for Mozambique's political space.

ADMINISTERING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

The agreement originally scheduled elections for October 1993, one year after it was signed. However, delays in the process made elections inconceivable in 1993 and were successfully postponed until October 1994. With assistance from the EU, the Mozambican government drafted the electoral law which would establish a National Elections Commission (CNE) to oversee the electoral process. The government released the draft electoral law in March 1993. However, when the government hosted an all-party conference in April to discuss the law, Renamo was absent because of its general boycott, and 12 of the minor opposition parties walked out following the opening speech by President Chissano. They did this in an attempt to increase their bargaining power in demanding office space and international funding. The conference collapsed from "a failure of the meeting's participants to reach consensus over the very term 'consensus'."³⁹ The conference reopened in July 1993 with Renamo, but by September had only reached article 16 which discussed the composition of the elections commission.⁴⁰

³⁹Michael Turner, "The international community and the Mozambican elections," in Mazula, *Mozambique: Elections*, p. 622.

⁴⁰Brazão Mazula, "The Mozambican Elections: A Path of Peace and Democracy," in Mazula, *Mozambique: Elections*, p. 37.

The slow and recriminating discussion by the parties frustrated the international community. Intervention by the Secretary-General and the Security Council pressured the participants to conclude discussions and finalise the law which was approved in November 1993, with little modification to the original draft. Despite the protracted and antagonistic character of the debate at the conference, the very fact of debate itself seemed to confirm the growing acceptance, practice and experience of dialogue.⁴¹ It also served as an opportunity for the media to participate and gain experience in democracy through their coverage, impartial and not so impartial, of the parties. However, the message from the international community was not only to pressure the parties, but that the objectives of ‘the peace process’ took priority over the experience of political discussion. Given the assistance provided by EU advisors, the rushed passage of the law seemed to place greater value on a technical document prepared by foreigners, than the right of Mozambicans to examine and discuss the norms, institutions and procedures contained in the document which prescribed rules in their own political system.

The law established the composition of the electoral commission (CNE) and required that the President be elected by an absolute majority with a second run-off if necessary, while parliamentarians would be selected from provincial party lists based on proportional representation. The law maintained the 5% threshold of the national vote to be represented in parliament which institutionalised a two-party system around Frelimo and Renamo. The law also prevented anyone living abroad, including refugees, from voting in the elections, which reflected Renamo’s distrust of embassy staff to impartially conduct elections and their perception that refugees would favour the government.

Brazão Mazula, a respected professor from Eduardo Mondlane University, unaffiliated with any party, was selected as chairman of the CNE with one advisor each from the government and Renamo. Mazula has insisted the electoral process was Mozambican. Operating from February 1994, the elections commission conferred legitimacy onto the process because it was perceived to be an independent and sovereign body which was an important symbol amidst the strong international pressure. The CNE managed to portray itself as a non-

⁴¹Turner, “The international community,” p. 623.

partisan working body rising above the distrust between the parties. One observer claimed “[t]he pronouncements of the CNE were seen as credible, particularly on those occasions when the Commission publicly recognised its own administrative shortcomings and mistakes. It publicly accepted responsibility for these, as well as taking credit for its successful actions.”⁴² Mazula especially was praised for being a consensus builder. Matteo Zuppi described Mazula as

a man of great wisdom, calm and determination who, in the difficult preparations for the elections, showed a rare ability for achieving dialogue, establishing a common language that overcame divisions in favour of the common good. The National Elections Commission, chaired by Dr. Brazão Mazula, was, I believe, exemplary. It worked on the basis of a common alphabet, and perhaps this was not achieved in the other commission envisaged under the [agreement].⁴³

But insisting on consensus and agreement on each issue was slow and time-consuming. The CNE was extremely politicised and needed to reach decisions on a multitude of issues from whether to use computers to the number of hours of radio time for the parties. Given the international community’s concerns about the timetable, Ajello and the American Ambassador, were “demonstrably impatient”⁴⁴ with the CNE and through UNDP applied pressure on the CNE to speed up decisions. Mazula replied that “it was not possible to restrict the commission to a technical and practical dimension, as in the first days of the CNE’s activities some donors, concerned with the time factor, wanted.”⁴⁵ Mazula believed it was critical for the CNE as an institution to take on “a political, social and even cultural role... [This included] adopting the ‘method of dialogue and collaboration’ mentioned in the GPA.”⁴⁶ Although Mazula sought to introduce and institute political practices that reconciled differences and encouraged political dialogue, the international community was

⁴²Turner, “The international community,” p. 646.

⁴³Don Matteo Zuppi, “The Santo Egidio Community and the General Peace Agreement,” in Mazula, *Mozambique: Elections*, p. 109.

⁴⁴Alistair Hallam, Kate Halvorsen, Janne Lexow, Armindo Miranda, Pamela Rebelo, Astrid Suerke, (1997) *Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique*, A report submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo: Christian Michelsen Institute, p. 108.

⁴⁵Mazula, “The Mozambican Elections,” p. 42.

⁴⁶Mazula, “The Mozambican Elections,” p. 42.

more concerned with the timetable and did not attempt to reconcile these differing priorities.

Nevertheless, in spite of Mazula's protestations, Mozambique's electoral machine was infused with international assistance. The EU contracted a team of specialists,⁴⁷ who assisted the government in drafting the electoral law presented to the conference in Maputo and prepared the budget presented to the Rome donors' conference which estimated the cost of the elections to be \$76-78 million.⁴⁸ They also "assessed the requirements for logistics, civic education, and training, and designed the future organization and functional responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat for the Administration of the Elections."⁴⁹ In May 1993, UNDP signed a comprehensive agreement with the Mozambican government on "Support to the electoral process in Mozambique" to provide assistance for the operation of the elections. ONUMOZ also had a small electoral component responsible for the international monitors during the election. Given the absence of any basic electoral administration in Mozambique, the role of the peace process industry in devising these technical aspects and responsibilities carried political overtones. The need for this degree of assistance created openings for the peace process industry to be more powerful, simply by being involved in devising the most basic rules of the electoral system.

It was also unclear which organisations would perform what tasks and how these would be coordinated. Given the array of interested parties, there were many overlapping and not always compatible jurisdictions and activities. For example, the Aid for Democracy Group realised that "it obviously had collateral interests with the ONUMOZ electoral programme, but not always the same emphasis or agreement over the approach to be used."⁵⁰ The primary source of disagreement seemed to stem from whether to work through state

⁴⁷Erick de Mul, "The role of the UNDP in coordinating international support for the National Elections Commission," in Mazula, *Mozambique: Elections*, p. 616. Many of these technical experts also served in Angola, see Turner, "The international community," p. 621.

⁴⁸Donors thought this too expensive. Turner, "The international community," p. 624.

⁴⁹*The UN and Mozambique*, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 33, S/25518, 2 April 1993, p. 177.

⁵⁰Turner, "The international community," p. 632.

institutions or not and the level and degree of international assistance. There were also tensions over logistical issues, for example, UNDP was not allowed to use ONUMOZ vehicles for electoral preparations. Donors were not pleased that,

[t]he UNDP electoral project would not have access to ONUMOZ aircraft to transport registration and electoral materials to the provinces and districts. Instead it had to secure donor support through the Trust Fund to lease, rent and purchase all of the helicopters, large and small fixed-wing aircraft, vehicles and equipment...⁵¹

The tensions within the peace process industry meant that their impact on political space, and the message conveyed about politics, was not only uneven but also confused.

In a functioning political system, legal, administrative and political responsibilities in elections are carefully and constitutionally divided. However during a peace process, jurisdictional and legal matters are often hazy and have to be quickly and inconclusively devolved from the government to a mix of international agencies. Very little consideration was given to this area, since there appeared to be an assumption that this transfer of responsibility and authority was automatic. The Mozambican government was less sanguine. The government delayed the formal signing of the project with UNDP until questions over sovereignty were resolved.

Earlier versions of the UNDP's administrative procedures for the Electoral Project appeared to some members of the Justice Ministry to give foreign experts administrative authority which they believed, for reasons of sovereignty, had better remain with Mozambican officials.⁵²

There were extensive negotiations with government ministries over the conditions, role and responsibility of foreign technical experts. The lack of clarity on this issue provided additional scope for the peace process industry to encroach upon the operation of national institutions.

In addition, the extensive assistance to both CNE and STAE gave "UNDP privileged access to information on the technical and financial aspects of the elections."⁵³ Erik de Mul, the

⁵¹Turner, "The international community," p. 634.

⁵²Turner, "The international community," p. 639.

⁵³de Mul, "The role of the UNDP," p. 617.

UNDP Resident Representative, observed that

[u]nlike the functions normally attributed to specialist technical staff in United Nations projects and which are concerned mainly with training and advice, the specialists stationed with the CNE and STAE took on a high profile role right from the start of their placement, and were strongly involved in the day-to-day operations and activities of these bodies.⁵⁴

This high profile indicated a shift in the power balance within government ministries between foreign technical experts and state officials. While not trying to suggest that foreign technical experts directed policy, their greater role reduced the space for domestic officials to work out problems, to develop their own expertise and the value that was placed on their work. This can partially be seen in the CNE's final report which took note of a "lack of familiarity with Mozambican reality on the parts of ONUMOZ personnel - the latter were sometimes unable to recognize the limits of their intervention in the process."⁵⁵

However, the composition of the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) at central, provincial and district levels, was highly politicised, and international personnel were seconded to STAE to neutralise the distrust between the government and Renamo.⁵⁶ A UNDP trust fund was also established, placing in the hands of UNDP, the management of finances, the electoral budget and the disbursement of funds. De Mul insisted there was a good working relationship between the different components and as a result a high level of transparency in the process.⁵⁷ The UN argued it enhanced local capacity in the preparation of official budgets, operational plans and training electoral officials. In contrast, the CNE found that because funds were disbursed by UNDP, the training of Mozambicans to manage financial resources was neglected, whereas most training concentrated on technical competence in only the area of running the election day.⁵⁸

⁵⁴de Mul, "The role of the UNDP," p. 617.

⁵⁵CNE, *National Electoral Commission Final Report*, Maputo: AWEPA, 1994, p. 16.

⁵⁶As a concession to Renamo, the government allowed 25% of the STAE staff centrally and provincially to be appointed by the UN. See Turner, "The international community," p. 638.

⁵⁷de Mul, "The role of the UNDP," p. 618.

⁵⁸CNE, *National Elections Commission Final Report*, p. 16.

The total cost for the elections was \$64.5 million. Donors spent \$59.1 million on the elections, underwriting 95% of the costs, while the government contributed 5% or \$5.4 million.⁵⁹ UNDP also installed communications and computer systems at the provincial and national levels, deployed 300 vehicles, 6 airplanes, 26 helicopters including 12 from the South African air force, and used Portuguese air traffic controllers, both of which had dubious overtones.⁶⁰ Although the international community provided substantial funding, the elections were an expensive and elaborate process. The pervasiveness of the peace process industry ensured future dependency since the technical knowledge of the foreign experts upon which so much of the process depended was not transferred to Mozambicans. Moreover, the peace process industry introduced an array of rules, norms and procedures to the electoral administration without necessarily locating them in Mozambique's political culture or institutionalising them in Mozambique's political space. Future elections may reflect the expectations generated by this first electoral experience which set a standard of what elections look like. This cannot reasonably be met in future without further assistance which may devalue future elections. Whatever spirit, initiative and experience Mozambicans had in administering their first multi-party electoral process, these elections depended heavily on international assistance.

POLITICAL PARTIES

The elections were also part of a larger project to create a democratic pluralistic system based on multiple political parties. In addition to structuring Mozambique's political space into multiple political organisations competing for power, the electoral process was intended to create and strengthen the role of the opposition to create checks and balances on the government. The primary mechanism through which this could be achieved, and also one of the key objectives of the peace process, was to bring Renamo into the political space of Mozambique.

Renamo's legitimisation and inclusion in Mozambique's political space depended on its

⁵⁹CNE, *National Elections Commission Final Report*, pp. 59-60.

⁶⁰Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, pp. 117,122.

transformation from an externally derived military organisation into a national Mozambican political organisation. Dhlakama had initiated change by removing military commanders, particularly those associated with atrocities in the war, and bringing in newer officials who bore little military responsibility. This created internal divisions within Renamo, forcing Dhlakama to buy off and placate middle level commanders. The international community created the unique, but controversial trust fund for Renamo to offset these problems and to finance Renamo's transformation into a political party. Renamo claimed that during the Rome negotiations, the Italian government had promised to pay Renamo \$15 million if it signed the cease-fire. The collapse of the Italian government from the corruption scandal in 1993 scuppered the deal and Renamo demanded compensation from the international community. In May 1993, the UN created a trust fund for donors to channel funds to Renamo for such things as training, office space, equipment and accommodation.⁶¹ After the fund was set up, Renamo became less obstructive in the second year of the process after receiving the funds. At the end of the process, Renamo received \$18 million, spending it not only on party logistics, but also on clothes, cars and other goods, yet still managing to incur substantial debts.

Although buying Renamo was successful and is largely attributed to the success of the peace process, it created future financial dependency which is not likely to be met. This form of international assistance moreover maintained Renamo's dependence on external sponsors, only for peace, not war. It did not contribute towards making Renamo a national political actor with a social base in Mozambique. This was reinforced by the fact that Renamo could not offer a credible opposition to the government because it had little in the way of a political programme. During the war, Renamo used the language of the Cold War to promote democracy against Frelimo's Marxist government. With liberalisation of the political and economic systems, the government had accommodated most of Renamo's demands. Renamo had few political ideas and had limited understanding of basic political and democratic concepts, relying on advice from foreign advisors drawn from the fringes of the right-wing.

⁶¹ *The UN and Mozambique*, Report of the Secretary-General, Document 37, S/26034, paragraph 12, 30 June 1993, p. 186.

Many of Renamo's weaknesses also applied to the other opposition parties.⁶² The so-called unarmed opposition made similar demands for money from the international community to transform into functioning political parties. In response, Ajello created another trust fund for the unarmed opposition, promising \$200,000 to each party. UNDP distributed over \$50,000 to each party with the provision that further funds depended upon accurate expense accounting. Many parties failed to do so, and subsequently not all of the money was spent. Most of these parties were small groups of people coalesced around individuals, many of whom were discredited Frelimo politicians. There were a few attempts to form coalitions and Renamo sought endorsement for Dhlakama as the single opposition candidate. By the elections, the CNE registered 12 presidential candidates and 14 political parties, including two coalitions, the Democratic Union (UD) and the Patriotic Alliance (PA). Two years after the election, only six of the new parties remained.⁶³ Although the \$2 million spent on the unarmed opposition was small in comparison to the Renamo Trust Fund, it isolated these political actors from the electorate who resented their extravagance and empty promises. This weakened the legitimacy of these parties and the multi-party system. Moreover, the money from the international community emphasised plurality over responsibility, that the number of political parties was more important than strengthening a constructive opposition. It focussed on the formal, that is political parties, rather than informal means of contributing towards public debate and accountability.

The fundamental weakness in Mozambican politics was understanding and responsibly engaging in constructive opposition after two decades of single-party rule. Apart from Renamo which served as a focal point for discontent with the government, Mozambique's political actors lacked the resources, capacity and experience to offer a credible alternative to the government. This did not mean they did not have any means to criticise the government and hold it accountable. However, to compensate for these weaknesses, the international community focussed on the material and organisational means of political parties rather than strengthening their ability to participate in public debate in the political

⁶²For a detailed account of the unarmed opposition parties, see *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, Special Supplement, October 1993.

⁶³Hallam et al., *Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance*, p. 114.

arena. Representatives of the international community also placed themselves in the role of (un)official opposition to the Frelimo government, through the CSC during the process, and through the donors afterwards. It established the precedent of holding the national government accountable to the international community within its own domestic jurisdiction. This set up the international community as an alternative centre of authority within the state. This antagonised the government, made it less receptive to democratisation and opening up Mozambique's political space, but it also kept politics in Mozambique polarised around the issue of, for Frelimo or against. The peace process industry inadvertently limited politics in Mozambique and obstructed the enlargement of political space. The problem of instituting an unfamiliar pluralist political system also pointed to the larger problem that the "political elite being formed... find themselves almost without any political culture suitable for the new rules of the game."⁶⁴ Civic education and preparations for the elections would be essential for the transition to democracy, but also through which the international community could influence what form of democracy would take hold.

VOTER REGISTRATION AND CIVIC EDUCATION⁶⁵

A monumental logistical effort and educational campaign was taken in preparation for the elections. Previously, the only electoral experience Mozambicans had was through open voting for Frelimo party candidates at local levels. In 1990, there was also limited popular participation in political debates surrounding the amendments to the constitution. The multi-party elections in 1994 would be the first opportunity for Mozambicans to vote directly for the president and for representatives to the National Assembly. However, the formal procedures of voting, the concepts behind the political system and the nature of the civic education process had to be communicated and explained to the majority of the population. A common strategy and training instruction also had to be devised for civic

⁶⁴Luis de Brito, "Voting behaviour in Mozambique's first multiparty elections," in Mazula, *Mozambique: Elections*, p. 457.

⁶⁵For an informative account of civic education, see Juarez de Maia, "Civic education in the Mozambican elections," in Mazula, *Mozambique: Elections*, pp. 151-219.

education workers⁶⁶ who themselves were continually learning about the new process. Extensive assistance was provided by the peace process industry to meet these challenges which created openings for the industry to introduce their own values, preferences and customs into Mozambique's political space.

Registration was scheduled to begin after demobilisation had concluded, but delays in the assembly and demobilisation processes required voter registration to begin before these were finished. Registration began on 1 June 1994, and by September, over six million people were registered, 81% of CNE's estimated eligible population. From March 1994, STAE, with help from UNDP, recruited 8000 people as registration agents and trained more than 4000 civic education agents. Mazula believed this heavy electoral machinery was unnecessary and reflected distrust between the parties. He believed that "with less than half the number of staff, the same results would have been obtained, probably more speedily and more efficiently, while avoiding problems of power struggles that were petty, but took up a lot of time..."⁶⁷ The large operation heavily depended on international assistance to supplement Mozambique's limited capacity. STAE started off with only 20 vehicles to deploy the 1,600 five-person brigades throughout the country.⁶⁸ Provinces and districts also lacked buildings, furniture and other basic materials. Camping equipment and food had to be provided for the brigades with WFP providing food rations. Supplying these materials was not only a technical issue. For example, the government was wary over "whether to accept aid from the United States government in the installation of a radio to assist in voter education programmes; over the provision of helicopters by the South African air force, and in the discussions of the regulations on international monitoring,"⁶⁹ for fear of American and South African support for Renamo through these material.

⁶⁶Civic education agents were required to have 6 years of formal education and knowledge of local languages. Given the small number of educated Mozambicans, recruiting sufficient agents was a problem, and in the end, not all agents had the requisite language skills.

⁶⁷Mazula, "The Mozambican Elections," p. 41.

⁶⁸Syngle, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 122

⁶⁹Mazula, "The Mozambican Elections," p. 32.

Teams of civic education workers were deployed throughout the country to explain the process, build confidence in the process and its institutions, answer questions, inculcate basic competence in voting procedures and convince people they could influence the outcome. The CNE focussed on the slogan “In your vote, the future of Mozambique”. Civic education agents need to explain a comprehensive array of new concepts relating to democracy including

multi-party system, pluralism, political party, parliamentary election, voting, the ballot, freedom, secret voting, civic education, citizen, registration, polling station, international observer, fraud, indelible ink, campaign, voter registration card, constituency, ballot box, propaganda, proportional representation, second round etc.⁷⁰

The level of instruction that was required easily demonstrates the alien character of democratic elections in Mozambique, and while this need not be innately problematic, nevertheless, it raises questions of how much and how deeply democracy and democratic procedures could be instilled in the population in such a short time. As mentioned earlier, it was not only the general population which had to be introduced to these concepts but the political elite and civic education agents as well. Cartoon strips, mobile theatre, newspapers, television programmes and radio broadcasts were all used to reach as many people as possible. Many of these teaching materials were produced in nine different Mozambican languages in addition to Portuguese. The use of Mozambican languages democratised the electoral process by extending the reach of democracy to all Mozambicans.⁷¹

The civic education campaign was faced with a number of challenges. First, many young people were frightened that registration was actually a means of military conscription. It was also feared that elections would bring an end to peace, because there were winners and losers, where the losers return to war as witnessed in Angola. The successful election in South Africa partially allayed these fears. This was accompanied by explanations that there are no winners or losers in parliamentary elections since all parties could be represented in

⁷⁰de Maia, “Civic education,” p. 156.

⁷¹Marcelino Liphola, “The use of Mozambican languages in the elections,” in Mazula, *Mozambique: Elections*, p. 285.

the assembly and thus participate in the political system which entailed explaining the difference between the government and parliament. A conscious attempt was also made to promote the equality and role of women in voting by prominently including pictures of women in printed and visual materials. This had to be explained against traditional value-systems which privileged the husband or father as head of the household. One recurring fear concerned the secret ballot. Many feared witchdoctors would be able to read people's choices and harass them if they did not vote for the witchdoctors' candidate. It was explained that the ballot was secret even from witchdoctors.

Civic education was an issue in which the peace process industry gave a lot of priority, perhaps because of their expertise in this, rather than its critical importance. Prior to the legislation of the electoral law and the creation of CNE, donors and international NGOs held seminars discussing civic education in which Mozambicans were invited to participate. While useful, this again demonstrated that the political initiative lay with the international community and not the domestic political arena. Many NGOs, religious groups and donors were involved including AWEPA, NDI, IRI, USAID, Caritas, Redd Barne. Although CNE attempted to coordinate civic education activities by taking the lead role and stipulating that all actors use CNE materials, many NGOs and donors had their own agendas and sometimes subverted CNE objectives. For example, ignoring the role of the CNE,

[c]ivic education was an area in which USAID wanted to contribute significantly... USAID added a small bilateral program, in order to demonstrate USG commitment to the elections and *to influence how the civic education campaign was developed and conducted*. USAID recognized that UNDP focussed on a government-implemented campaign, while USAID placed its priority on a more balanced approach, with extensive use of NGOs. The NDI proposal emphasized participation and working through NGOs.⁷²

In contrast,

AWEPA's civic education programme worked through Mozambican organizations (women, trade unions, churches, youth) to train civic educators who would then pass the information on to their own

⁷²Kimberly Mahling Clark, *Mozambique's Transition from War to Peace: USAID's Lessons Learned*, April 1996, p. 15. Italics added.

constituencies.⁷³

The centrality and importance of the question of whether not only to use state and local institutions, but whether to promote them and what kind of value ought to be assigned to them, implicitly reinforced the continued weakness of Mozambican institutions. By questioning the need for state involvement and the need to strengthen state institutions, external third party actors valued themselves over local Mozambican actors. Even after the new government was installed, some international NGOs, like NDI and AWEPA continued their work in civic education throughout the country,⁷⁴ and more generally through democratisation and good governance programmes.

Doubts can be also cast on the necessity of relying on the peace process industry by the role played by Mozambican civil society leaders, such as priests and teachers, in mobilising participation in the elections. Some credit the work of church groups in reconciliation and civic education for laying the foundations for the CNE because they were already on the ground promoting peace and encouraging popular participation.⁷⁵ The Catholic Church for example issued a pastoral letter extolling the duty of all Christians to vote in the elections. They distributed teaching materials which explained the meaning of politics; that through politics problems such as hunger are solved and that “making politics doesn’t mean lying or deceiving - that’s corruption. The word politics means organising the country for the common good.”⁷⁶ The media played a role in transmitting information about the parties, the international community and the implementation of the agreement, offering analysis and opinions to society, and voicing opinion from society on the elections. But the role of the Mozambican media was limited by its own transformation from working under a one-party state which controlled the dissemination of information to a pluralistic political system which encouraged freedom of expression.

⁷³Sam Barnes, “NGOs in Peacekeeping Operations: Their Role in Mozambique,” Paper delivered to ACUNS Ninth Annual Meeting, 25-26 June 1996, Turin, p. 21.

⁷⁴Barnes, “NGOs in Peacekeeping Operations,” p. 22.

⁷⁵Obede Baloi, “Conflict management and democratic transition,” in Mazula, *Mozambique: Elections*, p. 494.

⁷⁶Baloi, “Conflict management,” p. 503.

Civic education was directly tied to political space because through the campaign, ideas about politics, the meaning of political concepts and expectations about the political system were communicated to Mozambican society. By their participation alone, the peace process industry was involved in the communication of political ideas and values which raised questions not only of sovereignty but the cohesion and coherence of Mozambique's political space. Civic education involved the peace process industry on a technical level but given the limited resources of the state, the role of foreign agencies in deciding matters relating to civic education did not strengthen Mozambique's political space. The public or common good of political space was not a value that was communicated or promoted by international assistance.

GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY

Despite the effort to produce a legitimate election, concerted efforts were also taken by some members of the international community to pressure the parties to accept a government of national unity or power-sharing arrangements. This stemmed from a desire to avoid an Angola scenario but also from the power-sharing success in South Africa which was being promoted as a model for Africa as a whole. From the government's perspective, this pressure was unwanted but also challenged the very principle of holding elections and giving the people the opportunity to participate in the political process. It violated the agreement reached in Rome by the two parties and appalled some members of the government that political power could simply be handed to Renamo. Renamo acquired political ammunition and leverage from this international pressure. After a visit to the US with the American Ambassador in August 1994, Dhlakama demanded a government of national unity and then in a final meeting with President Chissano, demanded special status for the opposition, to be appointed vice-president and governor appointments in provinces won by Renamo. The government agreed only to strengthen the role of the official opposition but promised if Frelimo won the election to include members from other political parties.

The pressure for a power-sharing arrangement came from Ajello and the Western

ambassadors, at first discreetly, and then more openly, “both bilaterally and in the Security Council, especially by Britain and the United States.”⁷⁷ The American Ambassador, Dennis Jett, was particularly aggressive on the subject and was unconcerned about overriding the peace agreement signed by the parties. The government resented the interference by the international community, particularly in the middle of 1994 when the government was receiving most of the criticisms for delays in the process of demobilisation. In May 1994, Chissano refused to receive Ajello or the CSC ambassadors.⁷⁸ Relations were further strained when Ambassador Jett used a US Independence Day Speech to warn the government that Mozambicans ought to vote for those who ensure stability through sharing rather than accumulating power. The government interpreted this speech as instructing Mozambicans to vote for Renamo which was a deliberate and direct interference in Mozambique’s political space.

After this crossroads, the international community eased the pressure. On separate visits to Mozambique, the US Assistant Secretary of State George Moose and the UN Security Council mission retreated from the idea of a government of national unity and pressed for democratic stability after the elections. Other states in the region were sympathetic to the Mozambican government’s concerns. The Summit Meeting of Frontline States,

rejected the imposition of any political system of government from outside. The Summit called upon the international community to prevent and condemn in the strongest terms, interference by foreign interests that could compromise the implementation of the Mozambican peace process.⁷⁹

Ambassador Jett seemed rueful at the missed opportunity, “[w]hile international efforts had succeeded in overcoming resistance to demobilization and elections, acceptance of power-sharing was one element of the legacy of the war that outside pressure could not affect.”⁸⁰ By explicitly interfering in Mozambique’s political space, this experience did not aid the

⁷⁷Edis, “Mozambique’s Successful Peace Process,” p. 11.

⁷⁸Edis, “Mozambique’s Successful Peace Process,” p. 21, fn 8.

⁷⁹Final Communiqué of the Summit Meeting of the Frontline States held in Harare, Zimbabwe. *The UN and Mozambique*, Letter from Zimbabwe, Document 76, 27 October 1994, p. 284.

⁸⁰Dennis Jett, “Cementing Democracy: Institution-Building in Mozambique,” *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 3(2), Summer 1996, p. 6.

cause of reconciliation or the inculcation of democratic practices. By attempting to fix the arrangement of power between the two parties, it devalued the electoral process and increased the parties' distrust.

ELECTIONS: 27-29 OCTOBER 1994

As the elections approached in mid-1994, demobilisation was still taking place, there was no significant disarmament and there were misgivings over the safety and security of the elections. A significant number of refugees had not yet returned or were not registered and thus unable to participate. The UN deployed 3000 election monitors which was nearly ten times the number of monitors used in Angola, leading to criticisms about the "quantity over quality of observers, the number was excessive, and lack of proper training [which] caused instances of improper interference."⁸¹ The excessive number of monitors seemed to reinforce the centrality of external actors in the domestic political arena of Mozambique without serving a clear purpose. In addition to this, 32000 Mozambican political party monitors were recruited, registered, trained, paid and transported by the International Office for Migration (IOM) and CARE, financed by USAID.⁸² One former government minister was disappointed by the payments to the party monitors, formerly volunteers, which created expectations that this was now a form of employment which the government could not afford in future without donor assistance.⁸³ Not only did this encourage dependency, it established another precedent for the future.

The electoral campaign started smoothly on 22 September 1994. Only Frelimo and Renamo were able to reach all eleven provinces with both concentrating on the populous provinces of Zambezia and Nampula. Frelimo was aided by the state media, a Brazilian public relations team and gave out *capulanas* and t-shirts at rallies. In his speeches, Dhlakama claimed to be the father of democracy, claiming that Renamo could only lose if there was

⁸¹ AWEPA final report, cited in Hallam et al., *Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance*, p. 115.

⁸² The government did not trust US involvement but USAID was the only donor able to fund the project. See Clark, *Mozambique's Transition*, pp. 16, 34.

⁸³ Interview with Oscar Monteiro, Maputo, May 1997.

electoral fraud. The campaigns lacked concrete political or economic programmes but were calm and peaceful with little reference to the war, demonstrating that no party wanted to threaten peace.⁸⁴

It was peace that concerned most people and influenced their voting behaviour more so than political choice. One story in the media referred to “a village in southern Mozambique, repeatedly attacked by both sides during the war, [which] held a meeting and jointly decided that half the villagers would vote for FRELIMO and the other half for RENAMO, thereby ensuring that peace would be elected and forestalling any post-election retribution.”⁸⁵ The Catholic Church as well urged Mozambicans to split the vote as the best means of securing peace, suggesting voting for Frelimo’s presidential candidate and the Renamo party.⁸⁶ The experience of democracy was secondary to sustaining peace, raising questions about the relevance of civic education.

On the eve of the elections, 26 October 1994, Dhlakama suddenly withdrew on the grounds of potential irregular voting and electoral fraud.⁸⁷ The CNE rejected Renamo’s withdrawal because it failed to comply with regulations but Mazula agreed to extend the voting to a third day to allow Dhlakama to call off the boycott. Ajello, the UN Security Council, the Secretary General, and the rest of the international community urged that elections continue, while the US government declared it would not support the boycott. On the day of the elections, 27 October 1994, polling stations opened around the country and people began to vote. Although there was some confusion, it became evident that most people, including Renamo’s own polling monitors, had not heard of the boycott.

As a result of intense international pressure, Dhlakama arrived in Maputo and called off the

⁸⁴All political parties signed a code of conduct for the election campaign drafted by the CNE.

⁸⁵Cited in *USAID/Mozambique War-To-Peace Transition Program FY 1993-1995*, p. 11.

⁸⁶Richard Haines and Geoffrey Wood, “The 1994 Election and Mozambique’s Democratic Transition,” *Democratization*, 2(3), Autumn 1995, p. 365.

⁸⁷Dhlakama resented the Frontline States’ threat to intervene if Renamo did not accept the election results. He was also counselled by his advisors that electoral fraud was likely.

boycott on 28 October 1994 after assurances that the elections would not be declared free and fair until all of Renamo's allegations of electoral fraud were investigated. After three days of voting, over 5.4 million Mozambicans voted in a calm and orderly manner, almost 88% of the electorate.⁸⁸ After the polls closed, Ajello and the rest of the international community declared the elections free of major irregularities but that careful scrutiny of the counting process would take place.

The CNE chairman announced the results on 19 November 1994. President Chissano won 53.3% of the vote, compared to Dhlakama with 33.7% of the vote, only three other candidates received more than 2% of the vote. In the parliamentary elections, Frelimo won 44.3% (129 seats) to Renamo's 37.8% (112 seats), and the coalition party UD⁸⁹ won 5.1% or 9 seats.⁹⁰ However, Frelimo lost 5 of 11 provinces: Manica, Sofala, Tete, Zambezia and Nampula. Renamo's strong polling comforted its overall loss and entrenched its position as the official opposition. Dhlakama accepted the results and stated he was prepared to cooperate with the government.

Ajello declared the results of the election free and fair with no major irregularities. However, the CSC accepted "that any irregularities in the elections were insufficient to alter the outcome, ... [but] also set out a series of demands to the government that strongly implied that the main donors' future relationship with Mozambique would have a political component."⁹¹ The statement by the CSC said that for democracy

to be strong and effective, the legislature and the judiciary will need the resources and independence to ensure that the checks and balances required for real democracy are created. And real democracy is what the donor community will wish to see if it is to play the role expected of it in the reconstruction on [sic] Mozambique.⁹²

⁸⁸*The UN and Mozambique*, Introduction, p. 64.

⁸⁹Many people think the UD secured votes because it was at the bottom of the ballot which is where Frelimo had instructed people to vote for President Chissano.

⁹⁰If a majority system had been selected, Renamo would have won with 152 seats to Frelimo with 98 seats. See Carrilho, "The electoral legislation in Mozambique," p. 139.

⁹¹Syngue, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 137.

⁹²*Statement by the International Members of the CSC*, 6 December 1994, Maputo.

The tone and manner of the statement reconfirmed the perception that politics in Mozambique was accountable to the international community. As ONUMOZ began to withdraw, the government's resentment manifested itself. When parliament opened on 8 December 1994, Frelimo was inflexible over a secret ballot to select the assembly chairman. The Frelimo candidate won, Renamo walked out and boycotted parliament for three weeks. The new government, while removing hardliners and replacing them with technocrats with greater regional representation, nonetheless, was entirely Frelimo. All provincial governors were Frelimo, not one Renamo official was appointed. However, Frelimo's old guard was marginalised from the executive to languish in parliament, the only arena of political space in which Renamo and the UD could participate. Renamo continued to refuse to open up its areas of administration and boycotted schools, health services and shops believed to be associated with the government. Between the parties, there seemed to be less spirit of reconciliation at the end of the process than before.

Conclusion: the outcome

According to the UN, “[t]he *elections* brought together in an open democratic contest the ruling FRELIMO party and RENAMO... the elections symbolised a new spirit of reconciliation among the people of Mozambique...”⁹³ This was not necessarily true. It was neither democratic, nor conciliatory. Mozambique's Foreign Minister, Pascoal Mocumbi claimed that “the distance between Renamo and the government increased after the signing of the general peace accord.”⁹⁴ Certainly at the elite level, there was little political reconciliation and little decline in the levels of distrust between the two main parties. However, on the popular level, the elections allowed Mozambicans to participate in the political arena and express their commitment to peace. In the minds of the people, “the confidence-building measure of elections being held at all seemed more important than the opportunity to influence the political future of their country through the ballot box.”⁹⁵

⁹³ *The UN and Mozambique*, Introduction, p. 3.

⁹⁴ Mozambique News Agency, *AIM Reports*, 9(27), May 1993.

⁹⁵ UNHCR, *Mozambique: An Account of Lessons Learned Seminar on Reintegration*, Geneva, June 1996, p 3.

Mozambicans voted in the elections for peace not because it was part of a democratic process to legitimate a government,⁹⁶ suggesting that the elections in Angola and South Africa were more influential than civic education programmes. Nor was the legitimacy of the new government or of the political parties the focus, since the elections were not about the parties' achievements. These first multi-party elections may not have brought democracy and political reconciliation to Mozambique, but they did help to consolidate peace and transform the contest between the parties into a peaceful one.

On the surface, the elections seemed to bring all Mozambicans together in one political arena, but below the surface, there were new divisions and greater distances between society and the political elite. While the people anxiously sought to consolidate peace, their politicians fought amongst themselves and enriched themselves from international financial assistance. The divergences between society and the political leadership, between short and long term consequences and international and local objectives reflected contradictions arising from the involvement of international agencies. The peace process industry had a significant but uneven impact on the evolution of the norms, institutions, and procedures constituting Mozambique's political space. This impact resulted from the nature of their objectives and the manner in which these objectives were realised. The opportunities for the peace process industry to reconfigure political space in Mozambique resulted from the fact that few rules of conduct, institutions or procedures were defined in Mozambican politics. In response to this permeability, the peace process industry provided every imaginable form of assistance and by their involvement played an influential role in setting new rules, creating expectations and changing attitudes and altering patterns of behaviour and custom. The actors in the peace process industry were political actors, they were not neutral, either with respect to the parties or to the state and its relations with society.

The peace process industry shaped political space on three levels: logically - through technical assistance; politically - by influencing ideas about politics and the kind of political system that should develop; and more direct political interference - by dictating the

⁹⁶Interview with Migel de Brito, Researcher, War-Torn Societies Project Mozambique, Maputo.

distribution of power in Mozambique. The international community provided everything from cars and helicopters, voting materials to building roads. They gave instruction in civic education, managed budgets, decided programme objectives, designed manuals, set rules and political priorities. They assisted Renamo achieve a measure of competitiveness with the government through the Trust Fund and directly challenged the government by pressuring for a government of national unity. However, the focus on the technical and the formal by international agencies seemed to concentrate on things which were less relevant to the host population and further to ignore what was of concern to those populations. The lack of interest, priority and resources given to dialogue and political discussion by the peace process industry seemed to render dialogue as a hindrance to the timetable and the process. Although the application of pressure was often necessary, the question remained of how pressure ought to have been applied and in what direction, and whether the timetable requirements could have accommodated the need to develop political practices that support peace and strengthen political space.

The process was not owned by Mozambicans, it was directed by external third parties. Guebuza was convinced that Ajello left without believing that Mozambique had experience in government.⁹⁷ After ONUMOZ's departure

the international community was consciously seeking a lower profile, many agencies were either phasing out projects and reducing their staff or withdrawing altogether, ... they wanted to assist the Mozambican authorities to step into their rightful roles of leadership, 'displacing' the international leadership that had been so visible (and somewhat resented).⁹⁸

UNDP concluded "that its strategy of providing the machinery to solve all possible problems produced 'an excessively heavy electoral apparatus, with complex and time-consuming decision-making processes,... increased costs and subsequent dependence on the donor community.'"⁹⁹ There was little in the way of skills transfer, institution or local capacity building. The parties were not allowed the space or flexibility to consider and

⁹⁷Interview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.

⁹⁸*War-torn societies project in Mozambique*, Geneva: UNRISD and Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, 1998, p. 27.

⁹⁹UNDP report referred to in Synge, *Mozambique: UN Peacekeeping*, p. 142.

adopt different options, rather than being forced to accept internationally dictated priorities. The peace process industry assisted a complex and expensive election that did not enhance the capacity of the state which created expectations that deepened dependence on foreign donors. By undertaking so many responsibilities, the international community undermined the authority not just of the government but of state institutions which the government represented. The international community did not conceptually or practically distinguish between the state and the government, or foster the impartiality of state institutions in relation to society. This communicated certain values, particularly the weakness and the unimportance of the state to society which obstructed state-society relations. The pervasiveness of the peace process industry and its cumulative impact on Mozambique's political space prevented the coherent and cohesive arrangement of political space.

The foundations of Mozambique's political space remain unstable. The opposition is not involved in Mozambican politics in a meaningful way, there is a lack of transparency, information and dissemination of information and decisions, little popular participation, and few consultative processes to influence the policy-making process.¹⁰⁰ Such objectives may not be attainable in a two year peace process, but they should not be made more difficult by the actions of external actors. While there is peace in Mozambique, politics remains tenuous in part because it was not strengthened during the peace process and not encouraged by the peace process industry.

¹⁰⁰Interview with Migel de Brito, Maputo, May 1997.

CONCLUSION

Political space, the peace process industry and intervention

Given the majority of failed peace processes, the peace process in Mozambique was remarkable not least because Mozambique appears to have made a successful transition from war to peace. This thesis has sought to examine whether the Mozambican peace process was a success, what kind of success and a success for whom. These questions were answered through the framework of the thesis which called attention to the operation of a peace process industry and its impact on political space in the transition from war to peace. The argument was made that the variety and number of international agencies working to assist Mozambique make the transition from war to peace constituted an industry. Further, by its very character as an industry, these international actors had an unavoidable impact on the norms, institutions and procedures constituting Mozambique's political space. This impact was not uniform and undifferentiated, but was multifaceted, mixed and uneven. This was made clear in the case of Mozambique because of the number of external agencies operating in Mozambique and the comprehensiveness of their assistance. With ONUMOZ, UN agencies, donors, and NGOs all converging in Mozambique, the level of international support was unprecedented. However, as was seen throughout the thesis, this level of support was not matched by the level of effectiveness. The example of Mozambique's peace process offers many insights into the phenomenon of the peace process and the intervention of the peace process industry into the political space of a society making the transition from war to peace.

Using the case of Mozambique, the argument of the thesis was that in providing assistance to countries making the transition from war to peace, international actors reconfigure the political space of those countries. Political space was defined as the configuration or arrangement of norms, institutions and procedures which organise and gives order to political life. The arrangement and organisation of political life enables the practice of politics, where politics is an activity which constructively manages differences without recourse to violence which is the basis for peace. Without basic agreement on a system of

rules, institutions and procedures the exercise of politics is problematic, confused and a source of unmanageable conflict. Understanding the transition from war to peace requires a conception of politics and political space that is open to its complex and dynamic character. Thus explaining and understanding the impact and role of external third parties in this transition depends on fully recognising the political repercussions of international intervention.

The thesis raises four sets of conclusions discussed here. The first set of conclusions concern the peace process in Mozambique, while the second consider the reconfiguration of Mozambique's political space. The third set examine the features and impact of the peace process industry. Finally, the fourth set offers some assessments about intervention in peace processes. The aim of the thesis has been to broaden the framework for looking at international intervention in the transition from war to peace and how the range of international actors and their activities involved in this transition directly and indirectly impact on political space. Although I have used the case of Mozambique to make the argument, the idea that external third parties reconfigure political space applies elsewhere. The example of Mozambique demonstrates the importance of acknowledging the innately political nature of the peace process industry and their practices in order to understand, evaluate and accommodate the inevitable impact on political space in such a way that sustains and consolidates peace. If this political impact is not recognised, and if the limitations of what intervention can accomplish are not respected, then there is a strong case against international intervention in post-conflict transitions.

The peace process in Mozambique: outcomes and future prospects

After almost thirty years of ongoing war, Mozambique is at 'peace'. It appears that Mozambique also has a peace that will be sustained allowing for the much-needed development of the country following decades of destruction and decay. Thus the peace process has been judged a success. Three factors have been widely attributed to the success of the peace process in Mozambique: the will of the people for peace, the support and work of the international community and the success of the UN peacekeeping operation. In

addition there was a fourth factor leading to a successful outcome which was the comprehensive and sophisticated agreement upon which the process was based. An examination of these four claims explains the reasons behind the success but in so doing also questions the nature of this success.

The success of the peace process in Mozambique depended primarily on the will of the parties to secure peace and on their compliance to the General Peace Agreement. Although the level of distrust between the parties did not decline during the process and the level of uncertainty was high, neither party appeared to seriously entertain a return to the military option. While there were many prevarications and delays as the complexity of the political option was considered, the cease-fire held with few major violations. This was partially a result of the nature of the conflict which had evolved to the point where the “argument was over who should govern [and later] how the government should be chosen and how to govern.”¹ It was reinforced by the exhaustion of both parties from the drought and from lack of access to resources which could have sustained the war.² It was also a result of the momentum of the process where by the second year, both parties found themselves in a process with a dynamic from which they could not retreat. However, the parties did not maintain the political will for peace on their own. Although the international community is credited with applying pressure on the parties, local dynamics drove the peace process.³ A senior UN official observed that the peace process was going “remarkably well despite ONUMOZ, Renamo and Frelimo.”⁴ Social groups in Mozambique guaranteed peace: the soldiers, refugees and displaced people, and the vast number of people who voted in the election and enabled reconciliation within their own communities. It was their support for the peace process that helped bring about its success, and more importantly their political significance which was a crucial but unpredictable factor in bringing peace to Mozambique.

¹Cameron Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1995, p. 144.

²The ending of the Cold War and apartheid in South Africa respectively weakened both the government and Renamo militarily.

³Interview with Ken Wilson, Ford Foundation, Johannesburg, May 1997.

⁴Unnamed UN official cited in Ken Wilson, “The people’s peace in Mozambique,” *Southern Africa Report*, March 1994, p. 22.

The political significance of soldiers on both sides breaking their own chain of command should not be underestimated. The mutinies and riots by soldiers demanding to be demobilised, separated them from their commanders and prevented their leaders from holding back from the momentum of the process. Their unwillingness to remain mobilised in their respective armies forced President Chissano and Dhlakama to reject the military option and operate through political dialogue. Nevertheless, the broken chain of command and the loss of control over well-armed men heightened insecurity in Mozambique by increasing the potential for banditry and keeping civilians at risk. Banditry was not a new feature to Mozambique, but this insecurity led to a rise in crime during and following the peace process which seemed to threaten the peace. In addition to the combatants, over 5.5 million displaced Mozambicans relocated and resettled in Mozambique. They did so primarily on their own initiative and using their own resources. Their actions consolidated peace and their reconciliation strategies did more to normalise society in Mozambique than formal programmes. Finally, at the end of the process, over 8 million Mozambicans participated in the first multi-party elections, voicing their commitment to peace. Although not fully understanding or embodying democracy, the voters in Mozambique voted for peace, deliberately splitting the vote if necessary to avoid having winners and losers which had resulted in a return to war in Angola.

The second factor attributed to the success of Mozambique's peace process was the support of the international community. From the negotiations in Rome to the withdrawal of ONUMOZ, Mozambique was provided with assistance from all the major bilateral donors including the US, UK, Italy, and Nordic countries. Mozambique also received ongoing regional support from neighbouring countries, particularly South Africa and Zimbabwe with timely interventions from Nelson Mandela, Robert Mugabe and the Frontline States. In addition to government support, Mozambique was assisted by both international and non-governmental organisations, with a host of UN agencies and NGOs operating in Mozambique, supported by substantial funding from donors and the EU. The international community provided over \$600 million⁵ to finance the projects and programmes undertaken

⁵See chapter six.

in the process, excluding the costs of the UN operation. As seen in the chapters on the demobilisation, humanitarian and electoral components, external actors provided financial, technical and political support to everything from building schools, managing budgets to funding Renamo. Although there were problems with budget flexibility, procurement policies and delivery, the commitment of the international community and their concern was unique and consistent. In addition, there was a credible attempt at coordination and cooperation through the Supervisory and Control Commission and the Aid for Democracy Group. Nevertheless, there was significant overlap between international agencies who initiated numerous projects which were not integrated into long term development planning. Moreover as highlighted in the chapters on the peace process, much of this assistance was ineffective, inefficient, superfluous and did not influence the decisions of Mozambicans to return home, vote for peace, or sustain the cease-fire. Thus, the level of international assistance did not correspond to the effectiveness of that assistance, while exacerbating dependency through the failure to transfer skills and by ignoring local experience. The international community benefited from, yet reinforced the conditions of peace which were already manifest in Mozambique.

The third factor accounting for the success of Mozambique's peace process was the United Nations peacekeeping operation, ONUMOZ, led by the Special Representative Aldo Ajello. The UN has been keen to promote the success of ONUMOZ after having faced intense criticism for other operations in Africa from Somalia, Rwanda to Angola which have all failed comprehensively. According to Boutros-Ghali,

ONUMOZ succeeded admirably in all its objectives. It provided the vehicle with which Mozambicans could sustain their peace efforts, created an environment of security which allowed the cease-fire to hold, accomplished the demobilization of former combatants and, finally, provided the basis for democratic practices, rather than military confrontation, in the conduct of Mozambique's national affairs.⁶

The UN has claimed three reasons for its own success: first, the leadership of the Special Representative, Aldo Ajello; second, under Ajello's direction, the UN took on a more

⁶*The United Nations and Mozambique, 1992-1995*, New York, NY: Department of Public Information, 1995, Introduction, p. 69.

forceful and supervisory role rather than simply monitoring the process; and third, the UN's flexibility and innovation in creating the Renamo trust fund and involving Renamo as a real partner to the peace process. According to Ajello, the UN allowed the parties flexibility when it was needed and applied pressure when the parties were delaying the process.

Notwithstanding the important role of the UN, the UN's record of achievement needs to be qualified. First, the more than 6000 peacekeeping troops were ineffective. They did not have a meaningful mandate and accomplished little. It is arguable whether their mere presence put pressure on the parties, and it was not made clear how their deployment was an effective leverage on the parties. Second, as already discussed in chapter six, the humanitarian component of ONUMOZ was highly ineffective and resented by the pre-existing agencies operating in Mozambique. UNOHAC oversaw many one-off projects of unequal standard across the country and failed abjectly in one of its most important objectives, clearing landmines. Finally, although the UN as an entity was committed to securing peace in Mozambique, it was seriously limited by its operational weaknesses. As in other peacekeeping operations, the UN suffered from the credibility gap between its ambitious mandates and its ability to realise them. Although it was already overstretched by operations in other countries in 1992, the UN did not hesitate to jump into Mozambique and arrogate to itself an ambitious and comprehensive role. This created problems on the ground, not least the initial delay in launching the operation which set the whole process back six months. Nevertheless, the unarmed military observers and the technical unit for demobilisation must be credited for their tremendous effort. With only a few hundred personnel, the military observers undertook a staggering number of responsibilities from monitoring the cease-fire, collecting weapons, transporting arms and soldiers, running logistics, etc., while the innovative technical unit coordinated a complicated logistical exercise under extremely difficult conditions. As a whole, the UN contributed to the success of the peace process in Mozambique, although not in ways that were intended or given priority, but the overall conclusion is that ONUMOZ was not central to securing peace in Mozambique.

The final factor attributed to the success of the peace process in Mozambique was the

General Peace Agreement signed by the government and Renamo in October 1992 after two years of negotiation. The character of the subsequent implementation process was largely determined by the shape of the agreement and the process of negotiations which led to it. The nature of the agreement made clear that in Mozambique there was a peace to be kept. Whatever its weaknesses, the General Peace Agreement was a comprehensive agreement which

minutely laid down all the steps of democratization, including the law of the political parties, the electoral law, the formation of a joint army and the financing of the whole operation. These basic principles were never put in question, not even in the most critical moments... The accumulated text provided for a very detailed framework within which the UN could exercise its role.⁷

The agreement contained not only obligations for the parties, but also concessions and promises for the parties which gave them an incentive to comply with the agreement. Nevertheless, some problems in the military component might have been avoided had there been more discussion of those details prior to the signing of the agreement. The need to work out the remaining details during the implementation process created opportunities for the parties to become immersed in disputes that furthered delay. Furthermore, mechanisms for resolving these disputes established in the agreement did not work as intended.⁸ The government objected to the transformation of the Supervisory and Control Commission from a working body involving the government, Renamo and the UN, to a vehicle for the UN and international community. The Sant'Egidio mediators also criticised the UN for ignoring the spirit of the agreement and the basic principle of Protocol I which committed the parties to operate within the sphere of state institutions.

Both the negotiations and the implementation process were characterised by ongoing delays resulting from lack of trust between Renamo, the government and the international community. This distrust was a stable and constant feature of the peace process. The

⁷Comments by Don Matteo Zuppi, in Winrich Kühne, Bernhard Weimer and Sabine Fandrych, (eds.) *International Workshop on the Successful Conclusion of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique, ONUMOZ*, Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 1995, p. 41.

⁸See the discussion in chapter seven.

collective delays through the process in all its components, however did have the advantage of giving both parties time to adjust to the changes taking place, but also for external third parties to set up their operations and become more institutionalised. Although these delays seemed at the time to threaten to derail the peace process, nevertheless, in hindsight, there was little possibility of a return to war. This was because prior to the arrival of ONUMOZ, the war had ended in Mozambique, with few major violations of the cease-fire following the agreement. The reasons for the war's ending were the exhaustion of the soldiers, people and politicians for war and the acceptance that war could not go on any further. It was aided by a workable peace agreement that provided a framework for the government and Renamo to cooperate, supported by the experience of political compromise gained during the prolonged negotiation process. It was this pre-existing condition of peace as an absence of violence which faced the peace process industry when they finally arrived in Mozambique and whose task it was to consolidate peace, not to secure it. Although the peace process industry did help to strengthen peace, frequently the industry was superfluous to the needs of the local community and obstructed Mozambicans from realising those needs. The peace process was a success in Mozambique, because of Mozambicans and the conditions on the ground, rather than as a consequence of the practices of the peace process industry. However, the transition from war to peace concerns more than the technical implementation of a peace agreement. It also involves whether and to what extent there was a transition to peace which centres on political space.

Political space in Mozambique

In assessing Mozambique's political space, it must be remembered that Mozambique was undergoing three difficult transitions simultaneously: the transition from war to peace, from a one-party state to democratic pluralism and from a command to a liberalised market economy. These transformations were taking place within a regional environment moving from instability and apartheid to peace and democracy, and within a larger international environment from Cold War to post-Cold War politics. The legacies from the peace process on Mozambique's political space were thus part of a longer process of transformation, both in support of and in tension with these other structural developments. Three aspects of

Mozambique's political space were formatively influenced by the peace process and the peace process industry: first, the relationship between the government and Renamo or the nature of political contest at the elite level; second, the evolution of the state and civil society and the larger institution-building process; and third, the continued role of external third parties in Mozambique's political space which continues to shape the norms, institutions and procedures of Mozambican politics. While peace as an absence of violence exists in Mozambique, the foundations for a sustainable peace based on the activity of politics are fragile because of the weakness of political space.

As ONUMOZ withdrew, there was a fear that without UN administrators and military personnel, Mozambique's fragile democracy might collapse. Such fears seemed well-founded after the opening of parliament when Renamo walked out and President Chissano refused to include Renamo officials in his government despite promises made earlier. Dhlakama complained that after the elections, "the government did not consult with Renamo, sent government administrators into Renamo areas to take over the districts and force Renamo administrators out. Renamo has no control over taxation."⁹ Reconciliation at the political level continued on its downward spiral. The government's resentment of the high-profile and heavy-handed operation of Ajello, the UN and international agencies in Mozambique was asserted through its refusal to accommodate Renamo. This justified Renamo's continued distrust of the government and refusal to open up Renamo areas to government administrators. Guebuza believes one of the lessons from the peace process was that the government should have insisted on talking with Renamo more directly on more issues.¹⁰ Without the mediation of external third parties, politics as an activity of reconciling differences was proving beyond the capacity of all the political parties.

Despite their mutual hostility, the government and Renamo stabilised their relationship, while parliament evolved into a forum for political debate. It was observed that "[a]fter 15 years of civil strife, Frelimo has worked hard for peace. Dissent is tolerated and the

⁹Afonso Dhlakama, Speech to the Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College London, 17 March 1995.

¹⁰Interview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.

or its part, Renamo has been politically inactive, participating in parliament and criticising the government while continuing its transformation into a political party.¹² This transformation was still beset by three fundamental weaknesses. The first was an inability to offer a credible political programme since it shared many of the government's priorities of privatisation, attracting foreign investment and pleasing donors. Second, Renamo was afflicted by conflicts between the old leadership and more recent recruits who joined Renamo during the peace process. Many of the old guard perceived these new members as opportunists seeking access to economic prosperity through political office, while these party representatives and Renamo officials like Raul Domingos posed a challenge to Dhlakama's leadership. Third, with the Trust Fund spent and increasing debts, Renamo was still predominantly preoccupied with its financial needs. Dhlakama's attention was mainly concentrated on securing further financial assistance from Western capitals. He frequently travelled to donor countries seeking money and political validation which had been lavished upon him during the peace process but had faded quickly after the elections.

The neglect of developing political ideas and the preoccupation with money can be seen as legacies from the peace process. International financial assistance was one of the key mechanisms of the international community to keep Renamo in the process. The material means of the party, not political ideas or training were the focus of the peace process industry. This encouraged Renamo's dependency on foreign assistance, rather than focusing on a grass-roots or local capacity. Similarly, the attention accorded to Dhlakama as a virtual head of state generated expectations which influenced Renamo's political practices. When Dhlakama boycotted the 1994 elections, he used the boycott as a political tactic in Renamo's contest with Frelimo to compensate for their political weaknesses which was met by crisis management from international diplomats. In local elections held in June

¹¹ *The Economist*, 23 May 1998.

¹² In May 1997, Renamo coordinated a series of riots in Beira and other cities which surprised the government and foreign observers. The purpose of the riots were unclear but the response from the rapid intervention police was heavy-handed and violent.

1998, Renamo tried to use the same brinkmanship tactics by boycotting the elections but without much success. Renamo has yet to evolve and reproduce peaceful political practices, but it was also not encouraged to do so during the peace process.

The local elections were also part of the institution-building process in Mozambique's political space. After a number of postponements, these elections were held in June 1998 in 33 municipalities. Voter turnout was less than 15% of the population with Frelimo winning a majority on every council, even in Renamo strongholds.¹³ Voter apathy was blamed on poor organisation by the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) and unsuccessful voter education. This lack of competence by the electoral machinery is a result of its complete neglect after the 1994 elections and re-creation for these elections. This was not surprising given the pervasiveness of international assistance and foreign personnel in STAE during 1994. The absence of a transfer of skills and poor disengagement by international agencies ensured that STAE would be a weak state institution. Similarly, although the government introduced the law for local elections, much of the pressure for decentralisation of authority comes from donors. This points to the ongoing role of external agencies in Mozambique's political space but also to a lack of thinking through the idea of local elections, their purpose, what they were expected to bring to Mozambican politics and how they would help develop Mozambique's political system, which is also reminiscent of the peace process. Finally, the second national elections are scheduled for October 1999. The budget for the elections is \$42 million, less than the 1994 elections, but still expensive for Mozambique. Like the first elections,

the government is only able to provide \$9 million, \$23 million dollars is being offered by the European Union, and the remaining \$10 million will be channelled by other donors via the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The budget required for the elections came from studies carried out by the government, the European Union and the UNDP.¹⁴

In a repeat of the 1994 elections, Mozambique will conduct an unsustainable, expensive electoral process with lots of international assistance.

¹³ *AIM Report*, Mozambique News Agency, Issue 139, 20 July 1998.

¹⁴ *AIM Report*, Mozambique News Agency, Issue 151, 8 February 1999.

State institutions in Mozambique remain weak, while relations with society have not been built. Since the emergency, there has been little opportunity for Mozambicans to develop their own sense and experience of politics to accommodate the dismantlement of the one-party state. The combined power of external agencies through the emergency, structural adjustment and the peace process has limited the opportunities for Mozambicans to strengthen their own capacity for politics. During the peace process,

powerful foreign pressure creat[ed] an unhealthy tension between process and product: in the haste to establish the formal symbols of the system, the need for Mozambican state and society to develop a corresponding political culture can be neglected. The democratic state and democratic armed forces will only exist when Mozambicans have taken possession of the concepts and values that underpin democracy, and anchor them in their own specific cultural, political and social universe.¹⁵

When actors in the peace process industry, such as ONUMOZ, withdrew from Mozambique, there was little possibility for the state to take over projects left by agencies, since most projects reverted to resident multilateral agencies. Other actors in the peace process industry such as donors and NGOs rejoined the development industry, sustaining the extensive level of international assistance in Mozambique's political space.

Mozambique continues to receive high levels of foreign assistance, while the degree of assistance continues to reach into the basic structures of authority. In 1997 "some 160 foreign aid agencies operate in the country. A Danish agency is overhauling the legal system; others run huge health and education projects."¹⁶ There are always problems of coordination amongst different agencies, as well as conflicts of value between them. In contrast to Nordic countries, USAID's programming does not allocate money to the government, focussing instead on the decentralisation of authority, privatisation, and private and market-oriented agricultural enterprises.¹⁷ NGOs also continue to provide essential services in Mozambique and continue to marginalise the state. It is still common

¹⁵João Honwana, "Reflections on defence, security and democracy in Mozambique," in Brazão Mazula, (ed.) *Mozambique: Elections Democracy and Development*, Maputo: Sponsored by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1996, pp. 539-556.

¹⁶*The Economist*, 11 October 1997.

¹⁷Interview with Sidney Bliss and Juliet Born, USAID, Maputo, May 1997.

for NGOs to run programmes which

do not conform to government criteria or priorities for a region. One US-based food relief group which is now expanding into agricultural extension work explained that they welcomed the presence of Department of Agriculture officials 'in so far as they are willing to operate in the training programmes we operate,' admitting that they run a 'separate programme in the province.'¹⁸

The fragmented and uneven delivery of social services persists in preventing the organisation of a public sphere in Mozambique, while the initiative remains with international agencies at the expense of local institutions. Local NGOs remain weak from a lack of funding and shortage of personnel, they are also unable to participate in coordinating mechanisms like LINK which charge membership fees.¹⁹

The options available to the government are further constrained by the sustained power and influence of donors, the IMF and World Bank. The government and National Assembly continue to wait for decisions from the Paris Club before deciding on the budget.²⁰ The IMF rejected the government's plan to raise the minimum wage to less than \$14 per month as 'excessive and unacceptable' and demanded more budget cuts, threatening to freeze IMF and World Bank funds.²¹ In a surprising contest, the IMF was challenged by the World Bank and leading donors, including the US, who argued in favour of the increase given Mozambique's reforms, commitment to structural adjustment and the minimal impact such an increase would have. Nevertheless, this example demonstrates again the power and control the international community holds over Mozambique's decisions and its government. Under pressure from the World Bank and donors, the IMF also relaxed its policies towards Mozambique which may now

¹⁸Alexander Costy, "Who Governs? NGOs in Rural Mozambique," *Southern Africa Report*, July 1996, p. 18.

¹⁹Interview with Ana Piedade Monteiro, Centro Estudos Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, May 1997. Link was established in 1993 as a coordinating mechanism with funding from the Norwegian Refugee Council. Peidade Monteiro argues there is also a need for a national mechanism to coordinate local NGOs.

²⁰Interview with Oscar Monteiro, Maputo, May 1997.

²¹*The Economist*, 28 October 1995.

spend an extra \$140m this year -20% of total government spending-to repair damage from its civil war... Rebuilding the infrastructure has slowed; the Fund's spending caps prevented Mozambique from taking up World Bank loans for health care and roads, and Nordic help for schools. Last year it had to put Dollars 158m of aid money into a frozen bank account.... Between 1994 and 1996, Mozambique had been obliged to cut aid spending for war-damage repair by \$170m a year.²²

In spite of the rhetoric of peace-building, consolidating peace and sustainable development, the priorities and values of external agencies dominate Mozambican politics and limit the ability of Mozambicans and their government to make their own political choices.

However, there is flexibility if domestic actors uphold international values which is the case in Mozambique's embrace of the free market and economic liberalisation. Mozambique has one of the most ambitious privatisation programmes in Africa, with "more than 900 companies, a considerable chunk of the economy, ...now in private, often foreign, hands."²³ Natural resources, tourism, banking, transportation and other infrastructural projects have attracted substantial foreign investor interest. The extent of the government's willingness to embrace privatisation was evident in the tendering of control over Mozambique's customs service to a British firm, Crown Agents, in 1997.²⁴ Privatisation however has only partially changed the relationship between foreigners and Mozambicans. Private companies are beginning to take on some of the public functions of the state and perform duties similar to those undertaken by the concessionary companies of the 18th and 19th centuries. In some instances traditional authorities are "starting to treat the company like a state by asking for houses and uniforms, claiming that they had these during the colonial period."²⁵ While privatisation is not recreating colonialism, such activities "blur the boundaries between public duty and private obligations jeopardising the state's autonomy and legitimacy."²⁶

²²*The Economist*, 28 June 1997.

²³*The Economist*, 11 October 1997.

²⁴*The Financial Times*, 17 June 1997.

²⁵M. Anne Pitcher, "Recreating Colonialism or Reconstructing the State? Privatisation and Politics in Mozambique," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 22(1), March 1996, p. 72.

²⁶Pitcher, "Recreating Colonialism," p. 72.

Much of the political impact has been offset by impressive levels of growth in Mozambique since the end of the war. While this growth and high levels of foreign investment have improved a tiny economy, the benefits have not been felt by most of society. There is peace in Mozambique because of the end to the war, but peace remains tenuous while almost 50% of Mozambicans live in poverty.²⁷ Mozambican politics also remain underdeveloped because of the strong and influential presence of external third parties. This presence affects the relations between Renamo and the government by keeping the parameters and focus of political conflict on the state and the state's relationship to external agencies. Mozambique's political space remains weak because its decision-making capacity is constrained, its social responsibility overwhelmed by obligations to its creditors, and its institutions ignored or reoriented to suit the demands of projects set up by international agencies. This weakness is in part a legacy of the peace process industry but is also part of incorporation into the global economy.

Conceptualising the peace process industry and its political impact

One of the core objectives of this thesis has been to demonstrate that given the number of peace processes, and because of their intense and domineering presence, international agencies comprise an industry focussed on the peace process. The industry is a loose collection of agencies using different institutions, with different values and different notions of political space. This collection of agencies was extremely active in Mozambique, but was not unique to Mozambique and has certain features which cut across different peace processes. The industry is firstly characterised by the number and variety of actors which include states, NGOs, and international organisations, most of them based in Western, developed and peaceful countries. Thus in the example of Mozambique, the range of intervening actors included the Sant'Egidio community, the Italian government, ICRC, ONUMOZ and other UN agencies. However, within each actor, a number of identities were also assumed. For example the UK provided financing through the EU, directly financed

²⁷UNDP, *Human Development Report 1998*, New York, NY: UNDP 1998.

NGOs, was represented on the Supervisory and Control Commission, was on the Security Council and was a major donor involved through the Aid for Democracy Group with direct access to the Mozambican government. The UN was also not a single actor as it comprised a number of competing departments and specialised agencies including the Secretary-General, Security-Council, ONUMOZ, UNDP, UNHCR and WFP resident agencies. As a consequence of the number and variety of international agencies and personnel operating in a country, the significance of the collective presence extends beyond the performance and operation of any single actor. Collectively many such actors have an aggregate impact on society. This impact is all the more compelling because the collective resources and comparative strength of the industry make it a powerful actor in relation to the host country and the conflicting parties.

However, this impact is tempered by another important feature of the industry's operation which is the relationships and interactions amongst the different actors. These relations reflect a combination of coordination, cooperation and competition because each agency has its own objectives, values and operating procedures. The complex relations amongst international agencies frequently lead to overlapping jurisdictions, gaps, delays, conflicts and general confusion which add a complicating dynamic to the peace process and to relations with the parties. In the case of Mozambique,

as is also too frequently the case in the first years after conflict, the international community tended to work at cross-purposes, investing in many projects that proved to be not viable or sustainable, and failing to establish desired levels of confidence in their relations with national and local officials. The presence of so many institutions and diverse interests was proving in many ways to be as much a burden as a help.²⁸

Although there was a degree of coordination and cooperation, Mozambique's experience raises questions of how coordination should be approached and how much coordination is possible and desirable given the expansive number of agencies involved and the variety of activities in which they engage. It also points to how indelible this feature of ungoverned activity is in the operation of the industry because of the number of agencies involved.

²⁸UNRISD, *War-torn societies project in Mozambique*, Geneva, 1998, pp. 15-16.

The operation of the peace process industry is also characterised by a focus on technical activities, on the short-term and on the completion of 'the peace process'. It was argued that although there may be three broad blueprints guiding these activities, namely, implementing a peace agreement, peace-building and rebuilding war-torn societies, when these blueprints are implemented they seem to be reduced to similar lists of activities.

Within the domestic politics of major peacekeeping states, a broad value consensus can generally be assumed, and the resolution of conflict can correspondingly be reduced to essentially procedural issues: the commitment to 'peace' itself is inherently procedural, since it presupposes that conflicts can be resolved by means from which violence is excluded...²⁹

Such short-term technical activities are premised on completing them and eliminating the obstacles which stand in the way of this objective. The completion of activities underlies the driving imperative of the industry which is to conclude the process and prevent any attempts to derail it. In Mozambique, as in other internationally assisted peace processes, the industry set up programmes to reintegrate ex-combatants, build schools and health clinics and help run a multi-party election. Mozambique's first elections culminated the peace process, and although postponed for a year, were fixed by deadlines set by the UN Security Council which only renewed ONUMOZ's mandate in short installments to pressure the parties. Demobilisation, the formation and training of the new army and the electoral process were condensed into shorter timetables to meet the elections deadline.

This focus on the short-term, technical and the end of the process, takes prominence over understanding the meaning of peace, the long term consequences of the peace process and the political legacies of the process. This not only refers to the challenge of integrating development with relief or security activities, such as reconciling training projects for ex-combatants with demobilisation, or of building a continuum from relief to development. It fundamentally concerns peace. Thus in each aspect of demilitarisation, humanitarian relief and political assistance, it was not apparent how within each sphere of activities, peace was further consolidated or how together the three spheres of activities constituted

²⁹Christopher Clapham, "Being peacekept," in Oliver Furley and Roy May, (eds.) *Peacekeeping in Africa*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, p. 305.

the necessary and comprehensive components of peace. While engaging in a cross-section of activities, there was little explanation of how individual and cumulative programmes of the peace process industry produced outcomes that systematically, coherently or consistently contributed to and sustained peace. While it may seem obvious that such activities bring peace, give the impression of peace, or are peaceful, this was not defended or explained because peace was not defined. Thus the industry also appears to have given little consideration to defining what peace is or a strategic analysis of what functions, activities and roles sustain peace. There also seems to be little appreciation of the process of realising peace, that is, the experience of making a transition to peace and the practices which become instituted through the process which are needed to maintain peace.

Returning to the building metaphor discussed in chapter two, the industry resembles a group of competing architects preoccupied with the construction of the parts to produce a finished structure, rather than with the arrangement and logic of the structure so that it functions for those who use it. External agencies do not and cannot possess a political sense of public responsibility to the people they are trying to assist.³⁰ The manner of their operation suggests an inability to conceive of and foster the public sphere necessary to political space. It would seem that many objectives of the industry are decided on the ground, in an ad hoc, temporary and short-term fashion, and sometimes in a more technically oriented rather than politically conceived fashion. Although operating on the technical level, because of the overconcentration on the technical and on the parts, they also inadvertently impart and shape ideas about the whole. By focussing on the short-term over the long term, on the emergency or on reconstruction, using state institutions or international NGOs or agencies, taking decisions by consensus or by dictating etc., influences the development of norms, institutions and procedures which comprise political space. One such formative influence emerges from a contradiction in the manner of operation of external third parties. The provision of the industry's assistance is justified by the claim of conferring legitimacy to the peace process, by monitoring the transparency of government and other political parties in the peace process. However, in host societies

³⁰Interview with Armando Guebuza, Maputo, May 1997.

receiving assistance, the scale and scope of international activities are not transparent or accountable, while little of the programme planning and implementation is covered or criticised by the press, let alone the public. Given that the scale and range of these activities may constitute a large proponent of the development process, this lack of accountability communicates a political message which subsequently undermines the importance of accountability, transparency and responsibility. The peace process industry may also diminish the authority of local political actors and institutions, and simultaneously enlarge their own authority by shifting the balance between international and local actors and by taking up more space in the political arena. In Mozambique, the peace process industry crowded out Mozambicans.

Although there are many impacts of the peace process industry on political space, this plurality in itself produces a *cumulative* impact because of the volume of different practices, rules, standards, institutions, procedures, expectations, values, attitudes, customs introduced to the political space of the host country. The variety and multiplicity of actors, norms, institutions and procedures brought by the peace process industry generates political confusion which undermines the coherence of political space in host societies. The sheer mass of international agencies displaces local political actors from their own political space. If domestic political actors are not presented with a choice but are forced to accept the entire range of half-formed rules, institutions and procedures, this gives them less room to manoeuvre and inhibits the consolidation of the political system. What is problematic about the peace process industry is that their actions fail to establish consistent or standardised rules, there is little building of institutions or transfer of skills and few systematic procedures established which will outlive the peace process. Although better coordination, improved and consistent standard operating procedures, may lessen this variety, presenting one system of rules, institutions, and procedures as a single option, still does not offer domestic political actors the choice, freedom or flexibility to adopt, adapt or reject ideas. Imposing one idea of politics undermines the very value of politics as a contest accommodating differences while bringing people together into a shared political arena. The operation of the peace process industry is problematic because they obstruct the process of systematising of rules, institutions and procedures, which weakens political

space and therefore undermines peace.

The peace process industry has an inevitable impact on the development and configuration of political space. The activities they undertake, the manner of their operation, and their impact on the nature of authority in war-town societies demonstrates that the actors in the peace process industry are innately political actors. If as political actors they undermine the purpose for their intervention, namely to assist the transition to peace, this raises fundamental questions about the practices, concept and framework of intervention.

What is intervention for?

This thesis has been considering the framework for understanding intervention by external third parties on two levels, the practices of intervention and the concept of intervention. The first question regarding the practices of intervention raises the issue of whether assistance provided by the peace process industry benefits the recipients of assistance. Although the peace process was successful in Mozambique, this was attributed to conditions on the ground, the will for peace by Mozambicans and the commitment of the parties to not return to war. It was only partially assisted by international intervention. In addition to the limited contribution of the peace process industry to peace, the chapters on demilitarisation, humanitarian and political/electoral assistance provided examples where UN peacekeepers, NGOs and other agencies did not accomplish their intended objectives, their standard of work was uneven and sometimes below acceptable levels. It often seems that

[i]nternational assistance is only useful in supplementing domestic resources within the context of a disciplined national policy environment that encourages the efficient and equitable use of all available resources, both foreign and domestic. In the presence of such conditions the need for external assistance is greatly reduced. In their absence, aid is of little help and is usually counter-productive.³¹

It would be misleading to suggest the assistance provided by the peace process industry was primarily of poor quality, but the unevenness of the assistance across the country and across

³¹David Korten "International Assistance: A Problem Posing as a Solution," cited in David Sogge, (ed.) *Compassion and Calculation: The Business of Private Foreign Aid*, London: Pluto Press, 1996, p. 11.

actors, the failure to integrate programmes together or from short term to long term, and poor preparation for disengagement undermined the overall level of that assistance. More detrimentally, the priorities of the industry sometimes obstructed the goals of Mozambicans, such as refugees seeking to return home, or were irrelevant to their needs, such as providing elaborate transport schemes for refugees preferring to walk home. This unevenness and irrelevance, along with their own operational weaknesses, contributed to confusion about what international agencies were doing and what they were doing it for.

Even if assistance was ineffective, this does not necessarily imply that it brought harm to Mozambique. Fortunately, delays by the UN and the overexuberance of agencies did not adversely encourage or prolong the war. Furthermore, despite a certain wastage of resources, an extra school or health clinic built did not necessarily leave a negative impact. Nevertheless, there are consequences from uncompleted or half-hearted efforts which are often overlooked. The first consequence is encouraging dependency, in the case of Mozambique, exacerbating pre-existing levels of dependency. There was a clear indication that through the emergency and the peace process, the Mozambican government retreated from its ideals of serving the people, allowing instead unfettered privatisation and international assistance. As one of the most aid-dependent countries in the world, Mozambican officials have become extremely reliant on foreign experts. Second, schools and health clinics built by NGOs or others carry with them expectations of services and continued access to services, which if they are not integrated and maintained will lead to confusion, disappointment and frustration. This leads to the third consequence, namely the creation of a culture of failed expectations, frustration and disappointment. Popular and political cynicism has the potential to undermine social integration and political development, which may adversely affect a situation of chronic underdevelopment.

The proliferation of practices of intervention that obscure the political significance from the concept of intervention has dangerous precedents. In spite of wider and more ambitious mandates, international assistance has not been more effective, yet has been accompanied by political repercussions which do bring harm. These political implications stem from the fact that all actors in the peace process industry are political actors in relation to the host

society in which they operate. Thus in offering technical assistance, in addition to creating dependency, external agencies have the tendency to obstruct state-society relations by mediating between them. By performing technical administrative functions, external agencies expropriate one of the means that connects a state and its society and obstructing state-civil society relations does not contribute to peace. This takes place through foreign officials who become interlocutors between society and public agencies, the creation of unsystematised procedures, and use of institutions unconnected to the state or public authority. Second, given the pervasive character of the peace process industry and the weakness of the targeted structures, the industry has a tendency to exercise dictatorial or coercive interference. In Mozambique, the nature of the intervention was coercive because both parties were placed in a subordinate position to the external agencies, having to accept what had already been done or set in motion. This undermined the institutionalisation of the practices of politics and of peace. Third, in an internal war situation where one of the protagonists is the state, international assistance is likely to limit and constrain the state which undermines the operation and authority of the state. The space given to insurgent movements by international actors complicates the relationship between international actors and the state, while the state and external third parties compete with each other by undertaking similar and overlapping political functions. States, as well as guerrilla movements, need to be rehabilitated and reformed, to develop relationships with civil society and promote norms, institutions and relationships that are open to opposition voices. Weakening or reducing the state is not the same thing as rehabilitating it. Unlike negotiations, where discussion involves a limited number of people isolated from political space, post-conflict activities involve institutions, and thus directly touches society and the state in a much more complex manner.

The aggregate impact of the peace process industry points to the fact that intervention is a collective and multiple endeavour, and ought to be evaluated accordingly. The willingness, level and purpose of coordination and the nature of the relations amongst different actors in the peace process industry are further criteria for evaluation. Thus, intervention should be evaluated by the operational and technical performance of international agencies and their success in meeting objectives, both individually and collectively. However, it should

also be evaluated according to the legacies that are left behind in terms of the expectations, attitudes and behaviours generated by the practices and symbolic impact of such activities. The criteria for evaluating the practices of intervention must include outcomes. Evaluating the practices of intervention according to the success of a peace process must clarify what is meant by success, what the outcomes are and which outcomes are produced from the peace process and which from the peace process industry.

However, a focus on outcomes from the process is incomplete without understanding the context in which the peace process takes place. This context is political space. The arrangement of norms, institutions and procedures which comprise political space is the basis for the exercise politics which is the foundation for peace. Thus, even if international agencies are unable to affect the behaviour of parties in conflict, their actions necessarily change the terms and conditions on which the parties interact. Even if the peace process industry is unable to accomplish its objectives, in trying, any half or incomplete effort will have other consequences, not least of which could be to prolong conflict. An account of political space not only highlights the political impact of the peace process industry but helps to explain the nature and outline of that impact. Understanding this impact provides a clearer picture of the outcomes from a peace process by determining whether political space is strengthened or weakened and whether the activity of politics is encouraged or not. It asks whether at the end of the process there was peace and what kind of peace. However, the outcome of a planned and coherent political space may be desirable but a false alternative. The alternative is not a fully coherent functioning political space but whether the process of building and developing political space is made more difficult by the peace process industry. An account of political space makes clearer the dilemmas which underlie intervention in the transition from war to peace: the conflict between short and long term consequences, between technical and political activities, and between the parts and the whole, international and domestic objectives. An account of political space may also point the way towards resolving these dilemmas by locating the peace process within a larger framework of political space. By situating intervention within an understanding of political space, this expands the framework for understanding intervention and offers new criteria for evaluating the practices of intervention.

As a result of the experience of intervention in Mozambique and the operation of the peace process industry, notions of assistance need to be re-assessed and re-articulated. This requires reworking the framework of intervention to focus on politics and political space. Such a focus means the value of the peace process lies not only in the attainment of certain goals and on the completion of the process but rather the nature of the process and the experience of attaining them; not only political space as a building, but the construction of the building. External third parties cannot instruct the society in question on what the norms and institutions of political space should be, they ought to assist how society works through these dilemmas and arranges the rules, power and authority, institutions and procedures to fit together. Future conflicts will not be resolved and cannot be managed unless there has been the experience of managing them. It may be argued that encouraging the practice of politics and political dialogue is time-consuming and impracticable during a peace process which is more concerned about ending violence and preventing the parties from returning to war. Although timetables are important, it is not clear why the pressures of a peace process and the encouragement of politics are incompatible. There is a delicate balance to be tread between guiding and applying pressure and dictating compliance, too little pressure will go unheeded by the parties which may drag out the process, too much pressure will generate resistance and resentment which similarly may not bring about compliance. Therefore, the peace process industry must find an appropriate mix and balance which respects local political actors and accepts the political repercussions of their own actions, allowing for more subtle and sophisticated forms of intervention. Such external third party actors must also be cognizant of the symbolic impact of their interest, presence and pressure, both how it may further or disaffect the process. Lingering, expansive and semi-permanent assistance does not become more effective the longer external third parties are present.

There is a strong case against intervention because the form and practices of intervention which prevail today fail to account for political space in the sense that they discourage any sense of the whole arrangement of political society that both joins and separates people. They concentrate only on the particular and hope that somehow everything will come together, if they accept that it should come together at all. Whereas much of the

debate on intervention has surrounded the concept of sovereignty and the moral priority of the state over the ethical good of peace, giving weight to the latter to justify intervention, this thesis argues it is not so much the violation of the legal right to sovereignty as the impact on the development of political space which ought to be the criteria for intervention. Justifications of intervention and arguments against intervention ought to concern the moral worth of political space and the development of that space, and the roles and relationships of the external with the internal in the development of political space. It is how the outside meets the inside in shaping the inside that ought to concern the practices and concept of intervention. Because political space is complicated and difficult to cohere, the conditions for intervention and the forms of intervention are limited in the objectives that can be accomplished. By understanding politics and political space, the limitations of the peace process industry would be recognised as well as the limitations of what intervention can accomplish.

Conclusion

One of the objectives of this thesis has been to extend and shift the debate on the criteria and practices of intervention regarding external assistance in ‘peace processes’. The argument made in the thesis has been that any intervention, independently and collectively, will affect the shape of a recipient’s political space. The implication from this argument is that the criteria for whether, when and how to intervene in peace processes ought to revolve around an account of political space. An account of political space forces external third parties to focus on political objectives, clarifying those objectives and their potential impact on the functioning of political space and the practice of politics. An account of political space does not mean external actors should develop an ever wider and more ambitious political mandate. What is presently conceived as political objectives within the peace process industry seem to refer to what are essentially technical activities without taking into account their political import. Thus, many international agencies work from an ill-conceived and unfocused political agenda which is often lacking in substance. An account of political space aims to focus attention on the complexity of political life and to restore and reinforce the nature of politics to the idea of peace and rebuilding society. The activity

of politics in reconciling disagreements involves reaching compromises and accepting the costs and benefits, the risks and opportunities, and the implications and limitations of political action. It is untenable for agencies to think there is a set of activities that will directly produce and sustain peace or to think that they can actually 'do' something that achieves peace. Peace and politics evolve out of many, repeated, complex patterns and practices, it is not just what is done, but the having done it. The complexity of political space should serve as a deterrent for those who assume the fact of intervention can attain peace.

Unless the peace process industry acknowledges and accepts a more comprehensive and coherent approach to politics based on recognising the significance of political space to a sustainable peace, the effectiveness of this assistance will remain limited and possibly detrimental. While it is conceivable that improvements can be made raising the efficiency of international agencies, the delivery of services and the implementation of plans to reduce waste, this kind of reform will not realise the aspirations of effecting a transition from war to peace. Without an overhaul of the industry of international assistance, it is not enough to reform the operational practices of individual agencies. The first step in such an overhaul involves recognising the workings of the industry itself. Thus this thesis was intended to provoke analysis on the aggregate impact of the industry's intervention in a peace process which is a prevailing and inescapable practice in almost every peace process. As an industry, individual external agencies must then acknowledge the limitations of their ability and capacity to engineer political space, the industry should minimise their assistance in peace processes and in some cases many agencies ought to refrain from intervention altogether. It is insufficient to alter present practices and further such notions as capacity-building, institution-building or local capacity initiatives. What is required is a systematic reconsideration of all of these practices, the basis for these practices, how they fit together, and the philosophy which underlies intervention itself. This requires no less than reconsidering the relation between developed countries and developing countries, between those with peace and those without, but also the underlying approach to the peace process and what can be achieved to resolve and manage conflicts. It is false for external agencies to claim superior expertise, knowledge or experience in managing conflicts, since their own

learning experiences mirror those who receive their assistance. Although there is a substantial amount of analysis that is useful, external actors do not have a greater claim to knowledge of how the transition from war to peace is made than those making the transition. Reconceptualising intervention requires recognising the limitations of international intervention and the limitations of social engineering

At the heart of this reconsideration of international assistance is the nature of the relationship between those who offer assistance and those who receive it. Through the eighties and following the end of the cold war, power relations between international and non-governmental agencies with host countries changed greatly. NGOs, international financial institutions and other international actors acquired more power and influence at the direct expense of domestic authority, while the legitimacy and authority of local public structures has eroded immensely. The stage has arrived in some countries where the category of the international, the foreign or the external in relation to the domestic or host country has attained an unwarranted degree of legitimacy simply for being international. The point of this thesis has been to challenge the legitimacy of this claim and thus to shift the emphasis back from the external agencies to the target society that is supposed to benefit. It has sought to privilege the host recipients. Although there is a commendable sense that the problems in far off places are our problems, some bear the burdens of those conflicts every day, they are the ones who should be helped and not told what to do.

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