

The London School of Economics and Political Science

**Civilian Control of the Military in Portugal and Spain:
a Policy Instruments Approach**

José Javier Olivas Osuna

A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of
Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, March 2012

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 99042 words.

Abstract

Despite their economic, political and cultural similarities, Portugal and Spain experienced different trajectories of civil-military relations during the twentieth century. After having handed power over to a civilian dictator, Salazar, the Portuguese military eventually caused the downfall of his authoritarian *Estado Novo* regime and led the transition to democracy. In contrast, in Spain the military, which had helped Franco to defeat the Republic in 1939 remained loyal to the dictatorship's principles and, after his death, obstructed the democratisation process.

This research sheds light on these different patterns by comparing the policy instruments that governments used to control the military throughout Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships and transitions to democracy. First, it applies Christopher Hood's (1983) 'NATO' (*nodality, authority, treasure and organisation*) framework for the study of tools of government in order to identify trajectories and establish comparisons across time and countries. These tools can be considered as the institutions that structure the relationship between the governments and the military. This thesis documents that the tools used in both countries differed considerably and evolved over time and that only from 1982 onwards a process of convergence can be observed. Second, this thesis contrasts two types of neo-institutional explanations for the evolution of tool choice and civil-military relations. One based on historical junctures and path-dependence (historical causes) and the other on the continuous impact of environmental factors (constant causes). This research demonstrates that both approaches are largely intertwined and to a great extent become complementary and necessary to capture complexity in tool choice. In sum, this thesis shows that dialogue and exchange between different analytical approaches contributes to a deeper understanding of multifaceted social phenomena. The utilisation of public policy analytical frameworks, such as the NATO scheme and neo-institutionalism, provides a new angle on the evolution of civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain.

For Mariana

Acknowledgements

There are many people that have contributed to this thesis.

It is difficult to find words to express my gratitude to Martin Lodge for his detailed and unfailing support; his supervision, guidance, and demands for rigor have provided a constructive source of challenge throughout these years. His supervisorial wizardry made this process as painless as it could be; Martin does not need sticks and carrots — I cannot imagine a better supervisor.

I am also indebted to José Antonio Olmeda for his extremely helpful feedback and guidance on Spanish civil-military relations. He and Salvador Parrado were incredibly hospitable during my time in Madrid. Stefan Bauchowitz has my gratitude for his excellent suggestions and editorial support. Rafael Vázquez and, my advisor, Jonathan Hopkin I owe much for their very useful comments and practical advice in the later stages of this project. Pedro Aires de Oliveira, I am thankful to, for his help concerning Portuguese history; as well as Vassilis Paipais and Anar Ahmadov for the clarifications and long discussions on theory and methodology.

Next, I want to express my gratitude to Sebastian Balfour, Max Hänska, Johannes Wolff, Mariana Escobar, Javier Gómez, Juan Antonio Serrano, Nuria Fernández, Sensi Pérez, Amir Khnifess, Ninfa Fuentes, Trent Maul, Mike Seiferling, Ashikur Rahman, Fabrizio Scrollini, Ignazio de Ferrari, Lila Caballero, Ursula Durand, Susana Carvalho, Justin Gest, Ken Dubin, Matthew Whiting, Eric Woods, Jessica Tarlov, Ting Luo, Julio González, Kathleen Henehan, James Wong, Marta Wojciechowska, Pon Souvannaseng, Maria Kyriakidou, Roberto Orsi, Maria Brock, Eduardo Martins, Michael O'Keeffe, Ola Onuch, Fredrik Sjoberg, Alejandro Ribó, Antoine Kerfant, Diana Ávila and all my other friends and colleagues from H421 and LSE100. The discussions, laughs, trips and other moments we shared will remain as the best memories from these years.

The thesis would not have been possible without the financial support of *Fundación Ramón Areces*, *Fundación Caja Madrid*, *Abbey/Santander* Travel Research Fund, *University of London* Central Research Fund, *LSE* Postgraduate Research Scholarships and *Becas Talentia* of the Andalusian Regional Government.

This thesis is dedicated to my wife Mariana, whose love, patience and support have been fundamental all these years. It is also thanks to Mariana that during the last few months of my thesis I had an extra source of joy and motivation; my daughter Victoria.

Lastly, I wish to thank my parents, Mari and José; my brother, Santiago; his wife, Esther, my aunt, Isabel, and my grandmother Adela. Despite the distance I always had very present their love and care.

All the people above have made this long journey much more meaningful and enjoyable.

Contents

I	OBJECTIVES AND CHOICES	21
1	Civil-military relations and methodological considerations	23
1.1	Introduction	23
1.2	Why civil-military relations?	24
1.3	Why a ‘tool’ or ‘policy instrument approach?’	28
1.4	Research questions and claims	31
1.5	Methodology	34
1.5.1	Comparative historical analysis	35
1.5.2	Case Selection	36
1.5.3	Sources	39
1.6	Thesis plan	40
2	Analytical framework	43
2.1	Introduction	43
2.2	Comparative framework	43
2.2.1	Developing a tools perspective: a revised NATO framework	43
2.2.2	Why the NATO framework?	48
2.3	Explaining change in tool choice: history and context	51
2.3.1	Historical legacies and path-dependence	53
2.3.2	Environmental factors	56
2.4	Summary	59
II	PORTUGAL	61
3	History of contemporary civil-military relations in Portugal	63
3.1	Introduction	63
3.2	Estado Novo	64
3.2.1	Salazar and the inception of Estado Novo	64
3.2.2	The political institutional setting	66
3.2.3	The Estado Novo and the foreign powers	68
3.2.4	NATO membership	70
3.2.5	Attitudes and views of the military	72
3.2.6	Caetano and the downfall of the Estado Novo	76
3.3	Transition and democracy	78

3.3.1	Provisional governments (1974–1976)	78
3.3.2	Constitutional governments (1976–1986)	81
3.4	Summary	83
4	The Estado Novo's tools of government	85
4.1	Introduction	85
4.2	Organisation	85
4.2.1	Coercive organisation	87
4.2.2	Non-coercive organisation	89
4.2.3	Conclusion	93
4.3	Nodality	94
4.3.1	Information effectors	94
4.3.2	Information detectors	96
4.3.3	Conclusion	97
4.4	Authority	98
4.4.1	Rewards and incentives	98
4.4.2	Sanctions and constraints	101
4.4.3	Conclusion	102
4.5	Treasure	103
4.5.1	Evolution of military budgets	103
4.5.2	Staff expenditure	105
4.5.3	Equipment Expenditure	108
4.5.4	Conclusion	110
4.6	Summary	111
5	Tools of government in the Portuguese transition to democracy	113
5.1	Introduction	113
5.2	Organisation	116
5.2.1	Coercive organisation	116
5.2.2	Non-coercive organisation	118
5.2.3	Conclusion	122
5.3	Nodality	123
5.3.1	Information effectors	123
5.3.2	Information detectors	126
5.3.3	Conclusion	128
5.4	Authority	129
5.4.1	Rewards and incentives	129
5.4.2	Sanctions and constraints	133
5.4.3	Conclusion	135
5.5	Treasure	136
5.5.1	Evolution of military budgets	136
5.5.2	Staff expenditure	140
5.5.3	Equipment expenditure	142
5.5.4	Conclusion	143
5.6	Summary	144

III SPAIN	147
6 History of contemporary civil-military relations in Spain	149
6.1 Introduction	149
6.2 Franco's regime	150
6.2.1 The Civil War and the Second World War	150
6.2.2 Insulation of the regime	152
6.2.3 The Francoist political institutional setting	153
6.2.4 The role of the military in Franco's regime	155
6.2.5 Military subordination	156
6.2.6 The final years of the regime	158
6.3 Transition and Democracy	160
6.3.1 Suárez's governments	160
6.3.2 Anti-government plots	162
6.3.3 The First socialist government	165
6.4 Summary	167
7 Francoist tools of government	169
7.1 Introduction	169
7.2 Organisation	171
7.2.1 Coercive organisation	171
7.2.2 Non-coercive organisation	173
7.2.3 Conclusion	175
7.3 Nodality	176
7.3.1 Information effectors	176
7.3.2 Information detectors	179
7.3.3 Conclusion	180
7.4 Authority	181
7.4.1 Rewards and incentives	181
7.4.2 Sanctions and Constraints	184
7.4.3 Conclusion	186
7.5 Treasure	187
7.5.1 Evolution of military budgets	187
7.5.2 Staff Expenditure	189
7.5.3 Equipment expenditure	191
7.5.4 Conclusion	194
7.6 Summary	194
8 Tools of government in the Spanish transition to democracy	197
8.1 Introduction	197
8.2 Organisation	200
8.2.1 Coercive organisation	200
8.2.2 Non-coercive organisation	201
8.2.3 Conclusion	204
8.3 Nodality	204
8.3.1 Information effectors	205

8.3.2	Information detectors	208
8.3.3	Conclusion	209
8.4	Authority	209
8.4.1	Rewards and incentives	210
8.4.2	Sanctions and constraints	212
8.4.3	Conclusion	216
8.5	Treasure	217
8.5.1	Evolution of military budgets	217
8.5.2	Staff expenditure	221
8.5.3	Equipment expenditure	222
8.5.4	Conclusion	223
8.6	Summary	224
IV COMPARISONS AND EXPLANATIONS		227
9	Comparative analysis: trajectories in tool choice	229
9.1	Introduction	229
9.2	Trajectories in Portugal and Spain	230
9.3	Trajectories in basic resources	233
9.4	Distinct styles of control and civil-military relations?	236
9.5	Summary	239
10	Explaining change in tool choice	241
10.1	Introduction	241
10.2	Path-dependence: the legacies of macro-historical events	242
10.2.1	Legacy of the Spanish Civil War	242
10.2.2	Legacy of the Second World War	244
10.2.3	Legacy of the Colonial Wars	245
10.2.4	Legacy of the Political Transitions	246
10.2.5	Patterns in change	247
10.2.6	Summing up: path-dependent civil-military relations?	250
10.3	Environmental factors: the continuing action of context	253
10.3.1	Ideas	254
10.3.2	Political Institutional Structure	257
10.3.3	International environment	259
10.4	Explaining change in tool choice	262
11	Conclusions	265
11.1	Introduction	265
11.2	Civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain	265
11.3	Complexity in tool choice	267
11.4	Tools of government revisited	269
11.5	Bridging meta-theoretical divides	272
References		275

Books and articles	275
Newspapers and Magazine Articles	311
Archives	312
V APPENDICES	315
A Civil-military relations in Portugal from the fall of the ancien régime to the Estado Novo	317
A.1 From the Liberal Revolution to the Republic	317
A.2 The Portuguese First Republic and the military dictatorship	319
B Civil-military relations in Spain from the fall of the Napoleonic Invasion to Franco's régime	321
B.1 The period of 'Pronunciamientos'	321
B.2 From the restoration of the monarchy period to the Civil War	322
C Chronology of Events	325

List of Figures

1	Path-dependence explanation of trajectories in tool choice	55
2	Explanation of trajectories in tool choice based on context	58
3	Defence expenditure in constant million escudos of 1926 (Military Dictatorship and Estado Novo)	104
4	Defence expenditure as percentage total public expenditures in Portugal and Spain (1940–1974)	105
5	Total expenditure in defence (in constant escudos of 1926). Colonial Wars period in red.	137
6	Total defence expenditure (1974–1986) in constant escudos of 1974	137
7	Defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Portugal	138
8	Defence budget as a percentage of total public expenditure in Portugal and Spain (1974–1986)	139
9	Defence expenditure as a percentage of GNP	140
10	Percentage of defence budget allocated to staff expenditure in Portugal and Spain	141
11	Defence budget per member of the armed forces in current dollars	142
12	Spanish military budget as a percentage of the total budget (1940–1975) .	188
13	Spanish military budget as a percentage of GDP (1940–1975)	188
14	Spanish military budgets in constant pesetas of 1940 (including extraordinary allocations)	189
15	Defence budget distribution of expenditure in percentage (1946–1976) . .	191
16	Defence equipment expenditure (including investments) in constant million euros of 2009 (1946–1976)	193
17	Total Defence budget in constant million euros of 2009 during Francoism .	218
18	Total Defence budget in constant million euros of 2009 (1975–1986) . . .	218
19	Defence budget as a percentage of GDP in Spain (1975–1986)	219
20	Defence budget as a percentage of the total public expenditure in Spain (1975–1986)	219
21	Defence budget distribution of expenditure in percentage (1975–1986) . .	220
22	Distribution of defence budget (equipment -including investments- and staff) in constant million euros of 2009	222
23	Explanatory model of trajectories in tool choice	264

List of Tables

1	NATO Typology: ‘constraint’ and ‘depletability’	44
2	Revised NATO framework	47
3	Multi-dimensional approaches	49
4	Other generic typologies of policy instruments	50
5	Analytical plan for explaining change in tool choice	53
6	Subcategories in the revised NATO framework	59
7	Military Ministers as a Percentage of Total Number of Ministers.	68
8	Summary of tools of government during the Estado Novo (1933–1974)	86
9	Defence expenditure as a percentage of the GDP (NATO countries + Spain)	106
10	Military monthly salaries in January 1938 (in escudos)	107
11	Summary of tools of government in Portugal (1974–1986)	115
12	Summary of tools of government during Francoism (1936–1975)	170
13	Percentage of military ‘procuradores’ (MPs) in Spanish Francoist Cortes	182
14	Military presence in the senior positions in the administration (%)	182
15	Percentage of generals among total officers in active duty in Spain, Portugal and the US	190
16	Military annual salaries and annual per capita consumption in Spain (in pesetas)	190
17	Summary of tools of government in Spain (1976–1986)	199
18	Percentage of the total Defence Budget allocated to the central coordination bodies	203
19	Patterns in the evolution of tool choice	250
20	Summary of the evaluation of path-dependence explanations	254

List of Acronyms

ALEMI	'Altos Estudios Militares', Military High Studies, Spanish advance military training programme organised by CESEDEN
AMI	'Agrupamento Militar de Intervenção', Portuguese Military Intervention Group
AP	'Alianza Popular', Spanish right-wing political party
BMI	'Brigada Mista Independente', Independent Mixed Brigade. Portuguese elite brigade established in Santa Margarida
CDS	'Centro Democrático Social', Portuguese Social Democratic Centre
CEME	'Chefe de Estado-Maior do Exército', Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Army
CEMGFA	'Chefe de Estado-Maior-General das Forças Armadas', Chief of the Joint Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces
CESEDEN	'Centro de Estudios Superior de la Defensa Nacional', Centre of National Defence High Studies
CESID	'Centro Superior de Información de la Defensa', Higher Centre of Defence Information
CODICE	'Comissão Dinamizadora Central', Central Dynamizing Committee
COPCON	'Comando Operacional do Continente', Continent Operational Command
CR	'Conselho da Revolução', Council of the Revolution
CSDN	'Conselho Superior de Defesa Nacional' Portuguese Higher Council of National Defence
DAC	'División Acorazada', Armored Division of the Spanish Army established in Brunete, near Madrid
DGS	'Direcção-Geral de Segurança', Portuguese Security General Direction
DRISDE	'Dirección de Relaciones Informativas y Sociales de la Defensa', Spanish General Direction of Information and Social Relations of Defence
DSC	'Direcção dos Serviços de Censura', Portuguese Directorate for Censorship Services
EMACOM	'Estado Mayor Conjunto', Joint High Staff. Spanish senior military training programme organised by CESEDEN
EME	'Estado-Maior do Exército', Portuguese Army Staff Office
EMGFA	'Estado-Maior-General das Forças Armadas', Portuguese Board of Joint Staff
FNFF	'Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco', Franco's Foundation which host his personal archive
FOG	'Fundación Ortega y Gasset', Spanish Foundation that hosts a rich audio archive consulted in this thesis
GNR	'Guarda Nacional Republicana', Portuguese Republican National Guard

IDN	‘Instituto de Defesa Nacional’, Portuguese National Defence Institute
INI	‘Instituto Nacional de Industria’, Spanish state-owned industrial holding.
ISFAS	‘Instituto Social de las Fuerzas Armadas’, Social Institute of the Armed Forces
JEMAD	‘Jefe Estado Mayor de la Defensa’, Chief of the Joint Staff of the Spanish Armed Forces
JEME	‘Jefe de Estado Mayor del Ejercito’, Chief of Staff of the Spanish Army
JSN	‘Junta de Salvação Nacional’, National Junta of Salvation
JUJEM	‘Junta de Jefes de Estado Mayor’, Spanish Board of Joint Chiefs of Staff
MAAG	US Military Assistance Advisory Group
MFA	‘Movimento das Forças Armadas’, Armed Forces Movement
PCE	‘Partido Comunista Espanhol’, Spanish Communist Party
PCP	‘Partido Comunista Português’, Portuguese Communist Party
PIDE	‘Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado’, State Defence International Police
PJM	‘Polícia Judiciária Militar’, Portuguese Military Judiciary Police.
PPD	‘Partido Popular Democrático’. Portuguese Democratic Popular Party
PPM	‘Partido Popular Monárquico’. Portuguese Monarchic Popular Party
PRP	‘Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado’, Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat
PS	‘Partido Socialista’, Portuguese Socialist Party
PSOE	‘Partido Socialista Obrero Español’, Spanish Socialist Party
PSP	‘Polícia de Segurança Pública’, Portuguese Public Security Police
PVDE	‘Polícia de Vigilância e de Defesa do Estado’, State Defence and Surveillance Police
SDCI	‘Serviço de Detecção e Coordenação de Informações’, Information Detection and Coordination Services
SECED	‘Servicio Central de Documentación’, Central Documentation Service
SIME	‘Serviço de Informações Militares do Exército’, Military Information Service of the Portuguese Army
SIP	‘Servicio de Información de Personal’, Personnel Information Service
SIPM	‘Servicio de Información y Policía Militar’, Information and Military Police Service.
SNI	‘Secretariado Nacional de Informação’, National Information Secretariat
PSD	‘Partido Social Democrata’, Social Democratic Party (successor of PPD)
SPN	‘Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional’, Portuguese National Propaganda Secretariat
UCD	‘Unión de Centro Democrático’, Democratic Centre Union, Spanish centre-right political party
UDP	‘União Democrática Popular’, Popular Democratic Union
UMD	‘Unión Democrática Militar’ Spanish Democratic Military Union

Part I

OBJECTIVES AND CHOICES

I Civil-military relations and methodological considerations

I.1 Introduction

The civil-military relations of Portugal and Spain have taken different trajectories during the twentieth century. Especially during the periods of Salazar's and Franco's authoritarian rule and the transitions to democracy that followed, different patterns of military subordination to civilian rule can be observed. In Portugal, the military, which had overthrown the First Republic in 1926 and peacefully handed power over to a civilian dictator, António Oliveira Salazar, became a threat for the regime and ended up causing the downfall of the authoritarian Estado Novo with the Carnations revolution in 1974. In Spain the military, which had helped Francisco Franco to defeat the Republic in 1939 remained loyal to the dictator's principles and posed a threat to democracy, culminating in the 23F coup attempt in 1981. This research sheds light on this empirical puzzle by exploring three questions: How did Portuguese and Spanish governments use tools over time to control their military? Did they use different combinations of tools? Why did their choices diverge or converge?

To answer these questions this thesis analyses and compares the policy instruments that governments used to control the military throughout two stages of Portuguese and Spanish contemporary history: first, Salazar's and Franco's dictatorships and, second, the transitions and early democratic periods (until 1986). It applies Christopher Hood's (1983) 'NATO' (*nodality, authority, treasure and organisation*) framework for the study of tools of government in order to identify trajectories and establish comparisons across time and across countries. This thesis shows that there was no one single 'Iberian' government style or model of civil-military relations nor a constant country-specific style throughout the period analysed. Authoritarian as well as transitional governments adopted different combinations of control tools in Portugal and Spain. Only from 1982 onwards, can a clear process of convergence be observed in both countries. Finally, this thesis draws on neo-institutional theory to interpret the evolution of tool choices and civil-military relations. It explains that macro-historical events, i.e. regime formation periods and wars, generated junctures and new trajectories in the control toolkit and that these trajectories were also shaped by institutional and ideational environmental factors.

This research addresses both civil-military relations and policy instruments literatures combining political science and historical analysis. It seeks to contribute to the elements of knowledge accumulation in historical comparative analysis defined by Mahoney (2003:132): specific knowledge claims and knowledge generation tools.

At the level of specific knowledge claims, it provides descriptive and causal findings. The descriptive findings are the result of a historical examination of Portuguese and Spanish civil-military relations using extensive primary and secondary sources. In addition to new facts, this thesis provides — through the systematic application of the NATO framework — a new angle on pre-existing empirical evidence. It thus builds an alternative narrative about the evolution of civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain based on the control tools that the governments used. The causal claims result from the analysis and comparison of trajectories in tool choice against the backdrop of neo-institutionalist concepts and mechanisms. This thesis assesses two alternative explanations regarding the evolution of choices of policy instruments: one based on the impact of historical legacies and path-dependence and the other on the continuing action of environmental factors. It outlines their strengths and limitations against the background of the empirical evidence collected, showing that both types of explanations are intertwined in several ways.

It also contributes to knowledge-generation at the methodological and meta-theoretical levels. Using the empirical evidence collected on Portuguese and Spanish civil-military relations, this thesis tests the virtues and limitations of the NATO framework as a method for systematic historical comparisons and as a basis for theory building. Likewise, this thesis substantiates some of the meta-theoretical arguments that defend further dialogue and exchange across different research disciplines and traditions. First, it shows that adopting a policy-instruments approach can be very elucidating for the study of civil-military relations. Second, it combines historical research with comparative and analytical frameworks of political science. Third, it contrasts two competing neo-institutionalist approaches to tool choice and shows that they are not incompatible but complementary.

This chapter, first, analyses the state of art in the civil-military relations literature providing a brief overview of the essential contributions and limitations in this sub-field which inspire this research (Section 1.2). Next, it justifies the adoption of a tool approach (Section 1.3) and introduces the main theoretical claims concerning control styles and tool choices that animate this thesis (Section 1.4). It explains the fundamental methodological choices made in this thesis, including the use of the comparative method and a qualitative approach, case selection and sources (Section 1.5). Finally, this chapter specifies the plan of the thesis.

1.2 Why civil-military relations?

The armed forces are an essential instrument in the creation and maintenance of social communities and consequently in the building of nation-states (Finer 1975:84–103). However, history shows that the military have also used their strength to influence, blackmail, displace or even supplant governments (Finer 1988 [1962]:127). Even in the twenty-first century, the tensions between the political and military sphere are more than evident in many contexts. The coups in the Central African Republic (2003), Mauritania (2005), Fiji (2006), Guinea (2008), Madagascar (2009), Honduras (2009), Niger (2010) and Guinea-Bissau (2010) are the latest evidence on how the military can successfully overturn the government of a country.¹

¹To these it is possible to add a much longer list of coup attempts with the collaboration of military forces. For instance Venezuela (2002), Mauritania (2003), Chad (2004), Democratic Republic of Congo (2004), Thailand (2006), Timor (2008) and Ecuador (2010).

The interest of studying civil-military relations derived from the special institutional features of the armed forces and in the paradox that the organisation created to protect the polity is granted enough power to overthrow it (Feaver 1999:214). This has led scholars to consider the military as a 'necessary evil' for the maintenance of peace (Mills 1956:176). A key challenge of civil-military relations is the balance between the need for defence and a potential threat to the political system. Since there has been a longstanding normative consensus on the necessity of military subordination, the central issue in the literature is not *whether* the military should be controlled but *how* the military should be controlled.

Historians, sociologists and political scientists have studied the military, their relations with the political power and society at large, as well as the mechanisms or strategies to control them. These concerns that were already present in classical military studies (Sun Tsu 2003 [c. 500 BC]; Thucydides 1972 [431 BC]; Machiavelli 2002 [1521]; Clausewitz 1966 [1827]) have been expanded by a substantial body of modern literature which emerged in the twentieth century. There are several different waves of civil-military relations literature, although as will be explained later, the underlying concerns and discussions have not evolved greatly.²

The first wave appeared before the Second World War and supported the idea of demilitarisation. Its main proponents are Vagts (1937), who — based on Prussian and German history — reviews the concept of militarism and Lasswell (1941), who points at the dangers of evolving into a 'garrison state' in which all aspects of government action would fall under military control.

The second wave of literature emerged during the early Cold War period and discusses the need for a permanent army given the threat to liberty that such an arrangement would pose. Most of the works from this period study the US and stresses the differences between the military, civil servants and other societal groups. For instance, Smith points to the need to reconcile military power and democratic ideas and institutions (Smith 1951:36). He studies the relations with the executive, legislative and even the judiciary. Mills portrays the military as a rising power elite that renounces to exert political power thanks to a process of indoctrination and a system of symbolic or status related rewards (Mills 1956). Finally, Huntington (1957) defends the professionalisation and autonomy of the military as a means to attain 'objective' control on them. For him, the clear separation of responsibilities and functions and the non-interference of civilians in military issues would ensure political neutrality.³

The third wave of literature that emerged in the 1960s may be divided into two streams. First, a sociological examination of the military developed as a reaction to Huntington's ideas and, second, an institutionally oriented examination of civil-military relations in developing countries, with a special focus on the problem of military coups (Feaver 1999:212). Several prominent authors can be categorised in the sociological stream. For instance, Janowitz (1960) opposes the Huntingtonian idea of military subordination based on the separation from society and the development of a different ethos. He argues that military subordination is reinforced if they share the values of society at large. Abrahamsson (1972) rejects Huntington's apolitical depiction of the professional soldier and claims that professionalised military are a corporatist conservative interest group and that external institutional mech-

²The waves presented here are based on Feaver (1999).

³For Huntington the alternative is the 'subjective' control that entails the politicization of the military and occurs in undemocratic regimes.

anisms are necessary to control them. Moskos (1977) overcomes the dominant Huntington/Janowitz debate by proposing a dynamic model of military organisation: the influential 'institutional/occupational' model. He suggests that the military are changing from a traditional, more institutional type of organisation, based on corporatist values and a distinct ethos, into a more occupational type with lower levels of corporatism, higher emphasis on individual material rewards and greater proximity to civilian professions.⁴ Finally, Schiff's 'concordance theory' (1996 and 2009) uses a cultural and institutional perspective to challenge Huntington's civilian objective control theory. She shows how some countries with relatively low separation between the civilian and military spheres manage to prevent military intervention.

Other authors in this third wave shift the attention away from Western developed countries and focus on military intrusion in politics in developing countries. For instance, Finer (1988 [1962]) examines the history of military intervention in different socio-economic systems and concludes that the development of a political culture in a country strengthens civilian control. Similarly, Welch (1976:25) stresses that the strength and legitimacy of civilian political institutions deter intervention. Perlmutter (1969) introduces the concept of 'praetorian state' as one in which the military play a dominant role in the political institutions. Drawing from the example of Turkey, he warns that modernisation does not necessarily diminish the capacity for military supremacy. In a comparable line of argument, Feit (1973) suggests that with modernisation and bureaucratisation of the armies the military become 'armed bureaucrats' with concerns for efficient government similar to those of civilian administrators, and that in case of incapable political leadership they become prone to intervene. Stepan (1971) and Nordlinger (1977) put forward that threats to the military institution and corporatist interests motivate their participation in coups, and that otherwise the military prefer to confine themselves to the barracks.⁵

After the end of the Cold War, a new wave of civil-military literature has emerged. It focuses on new challenges faced by democratic governments and adopts an approach closer to mainstream political science (Feaver 1999:231–233; Burk 2002:15). For instance, Avant's (1994) neo-institutional interpretation of civil-military relations based on a principal-agent model suggests that unified political settings, as in the UK, facilitate that the military embrace civilian doctrine, while in more divided principal structures, such as in the US, civilian intervention becomes more difficult. Desch's (1999) cultural-structural approach argues that the new post-Cold War environment with low internal and external threats weakens civilian control. Feaver's (1998a; 2003) strategic bargaining principal-agent model warns about the incentives for the military to shirk and for civilian leaders to monitor intrusively.⁶ Moskos et al. (2000/eds.) introduce a 'Postmodern' military model based on the comparative analysis of thirteen Western democratic countries. The model points at new civil-military challenges

⁴See also Moskos (1986), Luckham (1971), Segal (1986) and Sorensen (1994) for a revision of Moskos Intitutional/Occupational model and its relation with the Huntington/Janowitz debate.

⁵Many authors following this line of research delve into specific cases or regions, among others: Horowitz (1980) who writes about Sri Lanka, Pion-Berlin (1992) about Latin America, Welch (1987) about Africa and Latin America, Decalo (1977) about African countries, Danopoulos (1991) about Southern Europe, Herspring (1996) about Russia and Staniland (2008) about India and Pakistan.

⁶See a similar approach in Sowers (2005).

associated with the new security and defence environment and organisational changes.⁷ Continuing this line of research, Forster (2006) extends the analysis to all European countries but concludes that the postmodern model masks important differences that exist across Europe.

Despite the variety of approaches and the interesting lessons that all these works have provided, there is still room for the advancement of research in this field. This thesis marks a clear departure from the discussions that have dominated the literature and further connects the study of civil-military relations to public policy analysis. Rather than developing a general explanation of military control, it attempts to tackle one of its components, namely the tools of control that governments choose. It provides a more fine-grained analysis that results in a more nuanced understanding of this complex phenomenon of military control.

As Forster (2006:11) argues, the literature on civil-military relations has been excessively self-referential and backward looking which resulted in the slow evolution of the discussion and approaches to the field.⁸ The traditional sociological debates in civil-military relations are centred around the concept of professionalisation, the political or apolitical ethos of the military, the need for insulation or integration, military autonomy, or the institutional/occupational model of organisation. These debates, after having dominated the field for more than three decades, seem to have reached a dead-end and have exhausted their capacities of theory generation (Feaver 1999:213). The 'old' Huntington/Janowitz debate on military autonomy and the military's normative role in sustaining democratic values is still well entrenched in the literature.⁹ Most works have focused almost exclusively on civilian control as dependent variable¹⁰ and generally study one or few explanatory variables such as the degree of professionalism, political institutionalisation, legitimisation of the civilian government and the existence of internal and/or external threats.¹¹

⁷Williams identifies five challenges: the increasing permeability of civilian and military spheres; fewer differences in service and branch, new missions, use of multinational forces under supranational supervision and the internationalisation of the armed forces themselves (Williams 2000:275).

⁸See a similar argument in Olmeda's (forthcoming) meta-analysis based on the scrutiny of *Armed Forces & Society*.

⁹The debate on military autonomy continues to be central in many works in the last wave of literature. Some recent works stress the importance of civilian management of defence and military affairs. For instance Cottet et al. (2002) suggest the necessity of extra layers of control on the military in what they call the 'democratic governance of defence and security sectors'. Cohen (2002) also argues that active civilian control has positive effects on military performance. On the other hand, some works argue that civilian interference on military affairs may have created problems of subordination, for instance, Feaver (1998a and 2003), Dauber (1998), and Desch (1998a; 1999). See also Burk's (1998) and Bacevich's (1998) critiques of Feaver, Desch and Dauber and the reply by Feaver (1998b) and Desch (1998b). Finally, it is important to mention Feaver and Kohn's (2001/eds.) project on the American civil-military 'gap' that has revived Huntington/Janowitz debate and its implications. See a similar argument in Burk (2002:15).

¹⁰See Nielsen (2005). Desch and Feaver distinguish five different dependent variables explored in the literature: coups, military influence, civil-military friction, military compliance, and delegation and monitoring (Desch 1999:3–4; Feaver 1999:217–222). However these, at least the first four of them, can be considered merely different facets and degrees of the same phenomenon that is the military subordination to civilian rule.

¹¹See Bland (1999). For instance, the development of a distinct professional ethos is the underlying explanatory variable, although with opposite effects, in Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960). Finer (1988 [1962]), Huntington (1968), Cottet et al. (2002) and Bruneau (2005; 2011) explain subordination by the degree of institutionalisation and political culture in society. For Finer (1988 [1962]) countries with a 'low political culture' are vulnerable to intervention. Huntington (1968) looks at the level of political participation and institutionalisation. Cottet et al. (2002) argue that civilian supremacy requires the establishment of an effective bureaucratic-administrative defence policy making structure, parliamentary oversight and wider civil society

In addition to the limited diversity in approaches, most existing political science efforts in the area of civil-military relations produce overly parsimonious explanations to very complex problems. They tend to treat both dependent and independent variables as dichotomous and usually rely on descriptions and inductive case studies. Few works have attempted to generate and test hypotheses following a deductive logic (Feaver 199:232–235). It also seems that there is no broad consensus concerning the applicability of the theories. The lack of consensus has hindered cumulative progress. Staniland (2009:329) highlights that there is enough empirical evidence to challenge the best-known theories in the field and that more fine-grained analyses and theories are required. It is necessary to dissect civil-military relations into finer categories that can be operationalised across cases and make findings transferable to any political model (Bland 1999:9, 22).

This thesis proposes a distinct approach that attempts to counter some of the limitations in the existing literature. It assumes that governments are concerned about military subordination but it goes beyond the traditional sociological debates and beyond the typical dependent and independent variables. It scrutinizes a narrower dependent variable: the policy instruments or tools used by governments to control the military. Control is usually studied as a dependent variable. Scholars that aimed to focus on different aspects of civil-military relations have used civilian control as independent rather than dependent variable in order to explain further phenomena such as military effectiveness, military technological and doctrine innovation or military expenditure (Zuk and Thompson 1982; Van Evera 1984; Avant 1994; Rosen 1995; Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Nielsen 2005). This research moves in another direction: it seeks a better understanding about *what* is actually done to control the military and *why*. This entails moving back along the causal chain aiming to provide some less divisive common ground of knowledge and a more stable basis for further academic attempts to assess the degree of civilian control and its implications.

This thesis also introduces a public policy comparative framework and a neo-institutionalist theoretical background into the study of civil-military relations. These analytical elements contribute not only to understanding the aforementioned *what* and *why* but also to blur the artificial boundaries that have separated the niche study of civil-military relations from some major advances in the core of political science.

1.3 Why a ‘tool’ or ‘policy instrument approach’?

This research on civil-military relations employs the ‘NATO scheme’ for the study of tools of government as comparative framework (Hood 1983:4). NATO is an acronym that refers to the

engagement with defence. Bruneau (2005) points at four institutional dimensions that need to be enhanced for civilian control: the ministry of defence, the legislature, inter-agency processes and the intelligence system. Similarly, Welch (1976) and Plattner and Diamond (1996) stress that civilian success and legitimacy precludes intervention. Lasswell (1941) and Andrzejewski (1954) base their explanations on the degree of external threats. Lasswell argues that high levels of external threats foster military intervention. In contrast, Andrzejewski claims that inactive militaries in the context of low external threats are more prone to interfere. Finally, for Desch (1999) a high external threat paired with a low internal threat produces stronger civilian control. Staniland’s (2008) more ambitious explanatory framework combines degree of institutionalisation, external and internal threats, and the level of civilian legitimacy.

four basic resources that governments possess (*nodality, authority, treasure* and *organisation*) and from which policy instruments draw their power (Chapter 2). This section justifies the choice of a 'tool' or 'policy instrument' approach in the light of some theoretical considerations and the existing literature.¹²

There are many definitions of policy instruments and tools of government in the literature but most of them stress their role as means of social control that governments have at their disposal. For instance, Salamon calls them 'techniques of social intervention' (1981:256). For Vedung they are 'techniques by which governmental authorities ... wield their power in attempting to ensure support and effect social change' (1993:50). Landry and Varone define tools as 'means of intervention by which governments attempt to induce individuals and groups to make decisions and take actions compatible with public policies' (2005:107–108). According to Lascoumes and Le Galès, a policy instrument 'constitutes a condensed form of knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it' (2007:3). In sum, policy instruments are the manifestation of the governmental power and consequently, instrument choices reflect different government strategies or styles. Since an understanding of governments and the way they exercise their power is important for civil-military relations, taking a closer look at the tools government employ seems a logical endeavour.¹³

The tools can also be considered the building blocks of policies (Linder and Peters 1989:42; Salamon 2002:20). The deconstruction of multifaceted entities, such as policy programmes, into their basic components, tools, allows scholars to make sense of the growing complexity involved in modern government action.¹⁴ By prioritising the analysis of a reduced set of basic tools that compose the myriads of different types of policy programmes observable in reality, it is possible to pin down some patterns or properties that may be hidden at first sight. This knowledge serves to devise new policies as well as to identify trends and establish cross-temporal and cross-country comparisons (Hood 1983:7–8). In addition, since government tools are basic components of policies they are also very good indicators to understand and trace policy change (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007:18). Therefore, the dissection of complex policies into a set of basic policy instruments paves the way for further cumulative research.

Similarly, using the tools or instruments as units of analysis helps avoiding some research design problems common in policy analysis. Focusing on the policy output, the tools, rather than on decision-making processes or on the evaluation of outcomes, reduces subjectivity simplifies the analysis. Focusing on 'what government does' rather than on 'how it is decided' or 'what are its ultimate goals' diminishes the room for speculation and misunderstandings in the analysis.¹⁵

¹²In this thesis the terms 'policy instruments' and 'tools of government' are used as synonyms. This seems to be Hood's approach who, as many other authors, uses the terms 'tools' and 'instruments' interchangeably. 'Techniques of government', 'governing instruments' and 'policy implements' are other terms that appear in the literature referring to the same concept. Conversely Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007:4) differentiate between three levels in the study of policy instruments, from a micro to a macro approach: tools, techniques and instruments.

¹³A similar idea is suggested by Bruneau and Matei (2008:916) who claim that the (democratic) control on the military depends on the combination of control instruments used and their institutionalisation.

¹⁴An increasing number of scholars seem to agree that the study of governance is inextricably linked to the study of the sets of instruments used to 'steer' complex networks of actors with a public purpose (Bressers and O'Toole 1998; Commission of the European Communities 2001; Salamon 2002/ed.).

¹⁵See a similar argument in Hood (1983:2).

Moreover, it is interesting to observe the contribution of this thesis against the backdrop of the still not very well-developed literature on policy instruments. So far, policy instruments have not been sufficiently studied (Vedung 1998:50) nor considered central in political science (Lascombes and Le Galès 2007:1). However, some recent works such as Eliadis (2005/ed.), Hood and Margetts (2007); Howlett 2011; Jennings and Lodge 2011) as well as the special issues in 'Governance' (2007), 'West European Politics' (2010) and 'Revue Française de Science Politique' (2011) indicate an increasing return to scholarly interest in policy instruments.

Although there is not a very extensive body of literature on policy instruments, the topic can be traced back to the pioneers of political science. Lasswell, Dahl, Lindblom and Lowi can be considered the fathers of the study of policy instruments.¹⁶ Inspired by these initial path-breaking contributions, a first wave of policy instruments literature appeared in the area of public policy and administration from the late 1970s to the early 1990s (Anderson 1977; Salamon 1981; Trebilcock et al. 1982; Doern and Phidd 1983; Hood 1983; Woodside 1986; McDonnell and Elmore 1987; Linder and Peters 1989; Salamon and Lund 1989; Schneider and Ingram 1990). This first wave of studies on policy instruments proposed typologies of instruments and evaluation criteria to assess the suitability of different tools.¹⁷ However, as Howlett claims, this first wave did not resolve the disjuncture between complexity of policy practice and simplicity in instrument analysis (Howlett 2005:33).

More recent works, mainly based on case studies or single policy areas, have attempted to investigate policy instruments and their choices through several different approaches. For instance, some works have focused on the impact of the political context and on the combinations of tools (Nispen and Ringeling 1998, Bruijn and Hufn 1998, Bemelmans-Viduc and Vedung 1998). Others have relied on the application of transaction-cost economic models in order to explain instrument choices (Horn 1995; Wood and Bohte 2004), on the analysis of potential optimal instrument design (Grabosky 1994; Cunningham and Young 1997), on coherence in policy design (May et al. 2005; Bressers, Fuchs and Kuks 2005) and on the value of instrument research for the study of network management or governance (Bressers and O'Toole 1998; Salamon 2002/ed.; Eliadis et al. 2005/eds.).

Still, the second wave of literature has not solved most of the problems that were present in the first one. For instance, empirical studies are still scarce and their comparability is limited (Landry and Varone 2005:108). Too much attention continues to be devoted to single instrument studies ignoring that the action of the government in practice always involves a mixture of the whole range of types of tools available (Hood 1983:154; Ringeling 2005:192; Howlett 2005:33). So far, the existing literature has failed to address the interplay of explanations based

¹⁶Lasswell (1958 [1936]:204) argues that there is a limited set of 'strategies' available for governments and that understanding these strategies and the instruments that compose them require the understanding of the resources available. Lasswell (1954) also suggests the manipulation of symbols, signs and icons as fundamental tools for the government. Dahl and Lindblom (1953) note the almost infinite possible combinations of policy tools, provide a set of criteria to evaluate their performance and stress their important political and economic implications. Finally, Lowi (1966) develops some of the theoretical implications of the study of the means of government intervention and introduces a threefold typology, according to which policies could be classified as distributive, regulatory and redistributive.

¹⁷These authors introduced new political dimensions to be considered in instrument choice (such as electoral calculations, ideological considerations, degree of coercion, administrative feasibility) that contrasted with the explanations proposed by economists who usually offer 'technical models' assuming optimal matches between market problems and policy instruments.

on historical legacies and contextual factors in policy choices. On the whole, the approaches of this second wave remain somewhat idiosyncratic and fragmented, and a cohesive body of policy instrument literature or a strong common ground on which base further cumulative research does not exist (Lakatos 1970).

The fundamental purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the policy instrument literature filling some of these gaps. This research provides new empirical evidence drawn from comparative cases from the sub-field of civil-military relations that help testing Hood's NATO typology and its capacity to become a standard framework for future comparative studies. This thesis does not focus on a single type of tools. It shows that governments generally use combinations of several different types of tools.¹⁸ Finally, this thesis explores historical and contextual explanations of tool choice.

In sum, a series of theoretical considerations and the opportunity to contribute to a developing body of literature justify a policy instrument approach in this work. First, policy instruments are manifestations of the government's power and their stance on social control, which makes them relevant objects of study. Second, the dissection of policies into their basic components, i.e. policy instruments, facilitates and strengthens the analysis because it helps making sense of the growing complexity in policy issues, identifying trends, tracing policy change and establishing comparisons. Third, by focusing on 'what government does', a tool approach reduces the room for speculation and subjectivity in the analysis. Fourth, the many questions unresolved and the very few empirical comparative works in the incipient policy instruments literature create an invitation for further research and theoretical contributions. This thesis grasps this opportunity.

1.4 Research questions and claims¹⁹

Two puzzles have motivated this thesis. The first one is a theoretical/methodological puzzle. Hood's (1983) NATO scheme has attracted more academic attention than any other framework for the analysis of policy instruments and has served as basis for many theoretical discussions.²⁰ However, so far there have been very few attempts in the literature to apply the framework in an empirical comparison.²¹ This raises the question whether the NATO framework, beyond its capacity to generate abstract arguments and debates, is well suited for in-depth empirical

¹⁸These combinations are referred to here as the control or government 'toolkit' or 'tool-mix'. This approach is consistent with recent claims in the literature. For instance, Howlett suggests that policy instrument research should be extending the analysis to what he calls 'policy-instruments mixes', 'portfolios', 'governance strategies', 'implementation styles' (Howlett 2005:32–33, 49) or 'governance modes' (Howlett 2009). Bressers and O'Toole (2005:135–136) suggest passing from the study of single instruments to that of 'instrumentation strategies' or 'blends of instruments'.

¹⁹The use of the term 'claim' instead of 'hypothesis' aims to avoid confusion. The methodological approach of this thesis is fundamentally qualitative; the hypothetical-deductive model is not strictly followed in statistical sense. Due to the scope of the thesis in terms of time period and intervening factors this thesis aims to provide the most plausible explanations extracted from the comparative analysis of extensive primary and secondary sources without formally testing all rival hypotheses.

²⁰740 citations in Google Scholar.com.

²¹Vabo and Røiseland's (2010) working paper and Jennings and Lodge's (2011) article are probably the sole exceptions.

comparative analysis. This thesis aims to test the heuristic value of Hood's taxonomy as a knowledge-generating instrument (Chapters 2, 11).

Second, this thesis attempts to solve an empirical puzzle: very similar countries experiencing similar political regimes and transformations developed very different civil-military relations and levels of control of the military. Whereas in Spain the armed forces remained the bastion of authoritarianism and loyal to Franco, in Portugal the military overthrew the dictatorial Estado Novo. The attitude of the armed forces during the transition in both countries may be considered almost diametrically opposed. Thus, this research throws light on the empirical puzzle and addresses the questions whether Portuguese and Spanish governments used different combinations of tools to subordinate the military and why their choices of tools diverged or converged.

This thesis examines four claims or hypotheses linked to these questions. The first and second claims deal with the styles of government and civil-military relations.²² The third and fourth claims deal with the type of factors that shape civil-military relations and the choices of tools.²³

Different styles of government or control linked to meta-policy preferences have been explored in the sub-fields of policy instruments²⁴ and civil-military relations.²⁵ The first claim examined here is about the existence of well-defined styles for governing the military, which are contingent upon geopolitical features. Historians and political scientists have debated the existence of some underlying Iberian ethos. For instance, Herr and Polt's (1989) edited work assesses the existence of an Iberian identity. Telo and Torre (2000) argue that parallel and similar processes of internal change in Portugal and, constant interrelations and joint actions support the idea of the Peninsula as a unit in the system of international relations. In their analyses of transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, Wiarda (1988) and Magone (1996) suggest the existence of a common political culture in the Iberian Peninsula. The existence of academic publications such as the 'International Journal of Iberian Studies' and the 'Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research' as well as several research institutes and groups devoted to 'Iberian Studies' implicitly support this assumption. This research assesses, through the observation and comparison of the mixes of tools of control employed in these countries, whether it is appropriate referring to an 'Iberian style of government' or 'Iberian model of

²²These two claims are assessed in Chapter 9. The trajectories identified in tool choice thanks to the NATO framework are compared between Portugal and Spain as well as between the dictatorial and the later transitional and early democratic periods.

²³These two claims are contrasted in Chapter 10.

²⁴For instance, Hood (1983:153–163) distinguishes regulatory government, government by propaganda, cheque-book government and government by duress. Later, grounded in grid/group cultural theory, he introduces four public management styles that could be applied to governments' choices: fatalist, egalitarian, hierarchist, individualist (Hood 1998). Howlett (2005: 47) identifies four basic 'implementation styles' according to the nature of the policy target and severity of state constraints: institutionalised voluntarism, regulatory corporatism, directed subsidisation and public provision with oversight. Later Howlett (2011:7–11) refers to four 'governance styles': legal, corporatist, market and network. Ringeling (2005:193–195) distinguishes between four 'governance models': command and control, governance along main policy lines, selective governance and facilitating governance.

²⁵For instance, Huntington (1956) distinguishes between objective and subjective type of control; Janowitz (1957) identifies four models of the state: aristocratic, democratic, totalitarian and garrison state; Luckham (1971) suggests eight models of control: objective, constabulary, apparatus, nation-in-arms, revolutionary nation-in-arms, guardian state, post-colonial guardian state, praetorian state.

civil-military relations'. This thesis shows that there was no one single 'Iberian' government style or model of civil-military relations, nor a constant country-specific style throughout the period analysed.

The second claim is about the existence of a style for governing the military linked to the type of regime. Many political scientists have studied the regime type as explanatory factor for economic and political outcomes (Przeworski and Limongi 1993; Olson 1993; Linz 1994; Cheibub 1998; Geddes 1999; Lijphart 1999). Portugal and Spain experienced important regime changes during the period analysed and the literature on democratisation and regime transition has often treated Portugal and Spain as paradigmatic cases of authoritarian regimes and transitions to democracy (O'Donnell et al. 1986; Chilcote 1990; Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996). It seems a logical exercise to test if the type of regime is associated with a specific style of control.²⁶ This research investigates if there are distinctly 'authoritarian', 'transitional' and 'democratic' styles of control and civil-military relations. It shows that the strategies and means for the subordination of the military within each type of regime varied across time and across country and that it would therefore not be accurate to refer to a single 'authoritarian' or 'transitional' style. The research also stresses the convergence in tools and civil-military relations from 1982 onwards, implying that the existence of a 'democratic' model of control cannot be rejected.

The third and fourth claims on the factors that shaped the trajectories in civil-military relations and tool choice are inspired by neoinstitutionalist theory.²⁷ Policy instruments are institutions (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2007:8; Halpern and Le Galès 2011:52). The tools of control studied in this thesis can be considered as the institutions that structure the relationship between the governments and the military. Their evolution can, therefore, be analysed as any other type of institutional change.²⁸ Neo-institutionalist literature provides many varied interpretations for processes of institutional stability and change.²⁹ The third and fourth claims correspond to two of these alternative (but not mutually exclusive) neo-institutional explanations.

The third claim is about the evolution of civil-military relations and tool choice as the result of 'historical causes'. The impact of macro-historical events such as the rise of Fascism, the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War, NATO membership, colonial conflicts and transitional political processes have been constantly highlighted by historians and other social researchers studying civil-military relations in Spain and Portugal.³⁰ Neo-institutional authors have suggested the capacity of past events to trigger institutional change by creating 'critical

²⁶Ringeling (2005:201) argues that instruments need to fit within the political-administrative setting of a country and are the result of political ideology, legal traditions, styles of governance and governance model.

²⁷There is, nonetheless, an extensive corpus of alternative literature analysing micro-level policy choices that will not be addressed in this thesis. For instance, Simon (1957), Lindblom (1959), Vickers (1965), Dror (1968), Cohen et al. (1972) and Williamson (1975). See Parsons (1995:245–455) for an assessment on decision analysis literature.

²⁸This is consistent with the more widely accepted definitions of institutions. For instance, Hall states that institutions are 'the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy' (Hall 1986:19) and North argues that institutions are 'the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction' (North 1990:3).

²⁹See for instance March and Olsen (1984), North (1990), Powell and DiMaggio (1991/eds.), Thelen (1999), Pierson (2004) and Hay (2006).

³⁰See abundant examples from Chapters 3 to 8.

junctures' and setting into motion some self-reinforcing dynamics and inertias also known as 'path dependent' processes.³¹ Moreover, the causal power of past events and inertia in policy choices has already been a feature of policy instrument literature.³² This research assesses whether these macro-historical events shaped governments' choices and if they were responsible for the evolution observed.³³ It shows that critical junctures and inertias are present but that explanations, exclusively based on path-dependence do not account for all changes observed in the toolkit.

The fourth claim concerns the role of context as a 'constant cause' shaping trajectories in tool choice. Many theorists in the policy instruments literature have suggested that the context in which choices are made strongly influences the selection of tools (Anderson 1971; Hall 1993; Woodside 1986; Linder and Peters 1989; Bressers and O'Toole 1998). Here, context is understood in a broad sense, encompassing ideational features such as perceptions, ideologies, values and interest as well as institutional, organisational, and systemic aspects.³⁴ This research examines whether tool choices were shaped by environmental factors such as ideas, the institutional political structure and international actors. It shows that these environmental factors altered the desirability and availability of choices thus impacting change and stability in the toolkit.³⁵

In sum, this thesis examines the capacity of Hood's NATO typology as comparative framework. It investigates whether the choice of tools of control to subordinate the military can be linked to geopolitical features or regime type as well analyses two alternative neo-institutionalist explanations for the evolution observed. It shows that Portugal and Spain developed different patterns of tool choice and civil-military relations and that there is no Iberian style of control or civil-military relations. Moreover, it reveals that there were no common trajectories associated with 'authoritarian' and 'transitional' types of regimes. Finally, this research shows that 'orthodox' path-dependence based on 'historical causes' needs to be complemented by other accounts that take into consideration the continuing effects of the ideational and institutional context.

1.5 Methodology

This is a qualitative comparative analysis of Portugal and Spain based on the historical examination of civil-military relations and the application of Hood's NATO framework. This section outlines the main choices and assumptions in terms of method of analysis, case selection and sources. The comparative and neo-institutional frameworks of analysis are developed in Chapter 2.

³¹ For instance Krasner (1984), David (1985), Collier and Collier (1991), Thelen (1999), Hacker (1998) and Pierson (2004).

³² For instance, using the example of Canadian policy programmes, Doern and Phidd (1983:322) illustrate that debates about instrument choice are a cumulative product of previous debates and choices; Linder and Peters (1989:42) stress that the collective memory of an organization tends to be associated with the repetitive utilisation of some instruments and that institutions limit choices. Hood (1983) and Howlett (1991) suggest the existence of somewhat stable government or national policy.

³³ The analytical concepts used are introduced in Chapter 2 and the analysis is developed in Chapter 10.

³⁴ See Linder and Peters for an interpretation of the 'ecology of contexts' related to tool choices (1989:48–53).

³⁵ The environmental factors are explained in Chapter 2 and the analysis is developed in Chapter 10.

1.5.1 Comparative historical analysis

This thesis combines historical inquiry with comparative politics. It identifies the main patterns of the utilisation of control tools by applying the NATO framework to wide-ranging historical evidence and then establishes (non-statistical) inferences about the factors that motivated government choices in Portugal and Spain. Although comparative historical analysis has produced remarkable contributions to social research, it also presents some dilemmas and choices which require further clarification.³⁶ This section justifies the choice of a small-n comparative analysis based on historical evidence and presents some of its theoretical assumptions.

The complexity involved in social phenomena limits researchers' ability to establish and test inferences from a pure empiricist stance. The nature of the actors involved in this work, governments and the military, makes it impossible to conduct experiments or quasi-experiments (Campbell and Stanley 1963). The inability to replicate the circumstances from which the theoretical puzzles emerge makes it necessary to collect additional historical data, in this case on civil-military relations, from other similar episodes in the same or other countries in order to deepen the understanding and corroborate the hypotheses.

Most civil-military studies have either focused on one single country³⁷ or compared many countries.³⁸ Single-case studies allow a 'thick description' (Geertz 1973) and deeper understanding of processes but have been considered less suitable to infer and test general propositions.³⁹ Conversely, the comparison of many different countries allows for inferences that are more accurate and a higher level of confidence in the rejections or verification of the hypothesis tested (King et al. 1994). Nonetheless, the larger the number of countries involved the lower the attention that may be devoted to each case (assuming limited resources) and the greater the problems adapting conceptual categories for comparisons (Sartori 1970; Collier and Mahon 1993). Some influential authors have tried to reconcile both approaches to social research and have defended the capacity of small-n qualitative analysis to generate causal inference (Bennett and George 2005; Mahoney 2000b; Brady and Collier 2004/eds.). This thesis, inspired by these approaches, seeks a nuanced position between the virtues of inference and those of complexity. It studies two countries but throughout different periods of their history.⁴⁰

This thesis avoids the epistemological and methodological battles while keeping rigor and the generation of cumulative progress as basic principles. The utilisation of Hood's resource-based framework involves a bias towards qualitative analysis and away from rational choice

³⁶See in Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003) provide an extensive list of works and introduce unresolved dilemmas and open epistemological debates.

³⁷For instance, Huntington (1957), Stepan (1971) and Herspring (1996).

³⁸For instance, Finer (1988 [1962]), Decalo (1990) and Forster (2006).

³⁹For instance, Geddes argues that a single observation gives 'no information about the direction or magnitude of the possible relationship between any hypothesized cause and the outcome' (Geddes 2003:135). Lijphart claims that a single case study 'can constitute neither the basis for a valid generalisation nor the ground for disproving an established generalisation' (Lijphart 1971:691), and Rose warns about the frequent dangers of 'uniqueness through false particularisation', this is, the absence of generic qualities, and 'false universalism' that assumes that theories tested in one country or context can be applied to others (Rose 1991). See also Gerrings' (2007) critique on single Eckstein's 'crucial cases' (1975) as a base for testing theory.

⁴⁰Due to the multiplicity of episodes analysed it would not be accurate to refer to this research as an 'n=2' comparative study.

paradigms that have been dominating political science recently. Historical and interpretative analysis can elicit not only descriptions but also explanations and generalisations and therefore contribute to a coherent and rigorous body of research (Adler 1997:348; Wendt 1998:115–118). Although some of the policy tools are numerically measured here⁴¹, a purely quantitative template would fail to capture the salience of some of the instruments in the control toolkit and the impact of the historical legacies and contextual factors on tool choices.⁴² The selection of tools cannot be reduced to utility calculi and the action of individuals. Ideas and institutions affect choices. This thesis assumes that actors are both strategic and socialised and that it is possible bridge the traditional ‘structure vs. agency’ and ‘culture vs. calculus’ divides (Giddens 1984; Wendt 1987; Hall and Taylor 1996). The criticisms that this type of middle-ground stance may attract do not invalidate its heuristic value.⁴³ Moreover, as Sil and Katzenstein (2010) argue in their defence of ‘analytic eclecticism’, borrowing from different paradigms and combining different methodological approaches and causal explanations can be very beneficial in terms of stimulating dialogue between research traditions and opening new paths for innovative contributions.

Finally, this thesis goes beyond the mere description of a sequence of events regarding civil-military relations. It pays attention to historical particularities while aiming to construct theoretical generalisations.⁴⁴ This thesis anchors its explanations at several levels. The factors that shape civil-military relations and tool choices are found at the micro, meso and macro levels, ranging from decision-makers’ preferences and personal experiences to international armed conflicts.

1.5.2 Case Selection

There are several reasons for choosing Portugal and Spain as objects of the study. First, the comparison of similar regimes within a geo-cultural region, such as the Iberian Peninsula, helps explaining institutional change (Luong 2003). Portugal and Spain share many common features, such as geographical location, social structure of the population, traditions, religion, emigration, colonialist past, long-running dictatorial regimes or parallel and interdependent democratisation experiences. The choice of these countries is inspired by Mill’s (1973 [1843]) ‘method of difference’ or Przeworski and Teune’s (1970:39) ‘most similar cases’. These cases exhibit the ‘sufficient similarity’ to make meaningful the comparisons between them (Pier-

⁴¹Fundamentally military expenditures and budgets are measured.

⁴²This fundamentally qualitative comparative study assumes the possibility of multiple causation without abandoning the goal of establishing legitimate analytical (not statistical) inferences. A similar argument can be found in Munck (2004:116–121).

⁴³This type of middle-ground approaches have become increasingly popular in political science, and usually are associated with constructivism. See for instance Onuf (1989), Wendt (1991), Adler (1997), Checkel (1998), Campbell (2001), Blyth (2002), Hay (2001). See some criticisms to constructivism in Smith and Hollis (1990 and 1991).

⁴⁴The excessive emphasis on description has been a criticism directed at traditional historical research (Roberts 1996; Bennett and George 1997). There are also authors that oppose to this. For instance, Oakeshott states that history is a ‘complicated world, without unity of feeling or clear outline: in it events have no overall pattern or purpose, lead nowhere, point to no favoured condition of the world and support no practical conclusion’ (Oakeshott 1983:94).

son and Skocpol 2002). The resemblances between these countries help isolating the causes responsible for choices and ruling out alternative factors or explanations.

Second, most arguments and claims in civil-military relations have been extracted from the analysis of the us.⁴⁵ Most representative authors, including Huntington, Janowitz, Moskos and many authors in the latest wave of literature, have focused on the us.⁴⁶ The us military and government, although extremely important, cannot be considered as archetypal cases. Using them as the main source for theory building is therefore problematic.⁴⁷ Moreover, civil-military relations in other countries face different challenges of nature and degree (Cottet et al. 2002). Thus, the study of Portugal and Spain throughout different political systems may provide a more representative picture of an average country and the findings of such an investigation might be applied into a wider range of contexts. Moreover, these are innovative cases. The policy instruments literature has never used Portugal or Spain as case studies and, although these countries have been often compared by political scientists,⁴⁸ their civil-military relations were very rarely emphasised.⁴⁹

Third, as the *New Southern Europe* literature sufficiently develops, Portugal and Spain are two different paradigmatic cases of political transitions and democratic consolidations.⁵⁰ The new wave of democratisation that the Arab world is experiencing today makes the study of these Southern European countries increasingly relevant.⁵¹ Many of the lessons they provide can help understanding the complexities and problems faced at the level of civil-military relations by countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Spain and Portugal successfully implemented civilian control of the armed forces and developed new democratic political systems. Academics and practitioners concerned with the role of the military in regime change and democratisation should therefore consider their experiences.

Finally, Portugal and Spain are comparable to a great extent and at the same time interesting and idiosyncratic enough to produce a rich analytical outcome. The paths they followed from dictatorship into consolidated democracy differed widely:

In Portugal, a military coup ended the First Republic in 1926. Salazar, a former university professor, was appointed Finance Minister in 1928. Thanks to his success dealing with the economic problems, the military handed the political power over to Salazar. In 1932, he became Prime Minister and inaugurated the civilianised dictatorship with fascist reminiscences: the Estado Novo. The Estado Novo was an autarkic, colonially based, corporatist regime in-

⁴⁵The literature about military coups in developing countries is an exception (Section 1.3).

⁴⁶Feaver (1999:230–233) refers to it as ‘an American renaissance’. For instance see Roman and Tarr (1998), Dauber (1998), Desch (1998a, 1999), Moskos (2000), Feaver and Kohn (2001) and Feaver (2003).

⁴⁷For instance, Forster (2006) shows that the postmodern new paradigm elicited from the analysis of the us does not fit in other contexts. Bruneau (2011:20) acknowledges that the us becomes a problematic source for cumulative comparative analysis.

⁴⁸For instance Linz (1977, 1981), Chilcote (1990); O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986); Wiarda (1988); Sánchez Cervelló (1993), Gunther et al. (1995), Linz and Stepan (1996) and Telo and Torre (2000).

⁴⁹Danopoulos’ (1991) article comparing civil-military relations in Greece, Spain, and Portugal is an exception.

⁵⁰See for instance Gunther et al. (1995/eds.), Diamandouros and Gunther (2001/eds.), Gunther et al. (2006/eds.) This literature also covers the cases of Italy and Greece.

⁵¹The study of other cases in the Mediterranean area such as Greece and Turkey would also be extremely helpful in this regard. See Brown (1980), Kourvetaris and Dobratz (1981), Karabelias (1998), Narli (2000) and Cizre (2004).

spired by Catholic principles in which political and individual liberties were subordinated to socio-economic priorities (Porch 1977:21; Nataf 1995:23).

In Portugal, the military did not exercise direct control of the regime but maintained important prerogatives. The armed forces were autonomous with little interference from civilian oversight organs, there was important military presence in the government and regime administration and diverse political views were tolerated among the ranks. Although Salazar experienced many military coup attempts (at least 15 between 1931 and 1965), overall the military remained subordinated to his regime (Ferreira 1992:329–330). Salazar used the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War and the cooperation with the NATO allies to reinforce his sway on the armed forces. However, the Colonial Wars (1961–1975) emerged as an important source of disagreement between the government and the military. Civil-military tensions were aggravated during Caetano's rule (1968–1974). Caetano's ability to implement policies was undermined by the very strong pressures exerted by hard liners.

A military coup put an end to the *Estado Novo* on the 25 April 1974. The so-called Carnations Revolution opened a transitional process which, from the civil-military perspective, was very convoluted. The Portuguese transition can be divided in two different phases. During the period of provisional governments (1974–1976), the military controlled not only the armed forces but also all of the governing institutions. During the period of constitutional governments (from 1976), the military influence dwindled gradually. The dissolution in 1982 of the Council of the Revolution, a military institution with far-reaching political powers, was a milestone in Portuguese civil-military relations. Portugal's EEC membership in 1986 marks the conclusion of the process of democratic consolidation.

In Spain, the socio-political situation was very unstable during the Second Republic (1931–1939) (Jackson 1965). On 17 July 1936, important sectors of the military with the support of conservative political forces and the Church rebelled against the left coalition 'Frente Popular'. The uprising failed in many zones and a civil war began dividing Spain into two camps: the loyalist Republicans and the rebel Nationalists, who — led by General Franco — won the war in 1939. This war conditioned the life of Spain for the next four decades.

The features of the dictatorship evolved over time but similar to the *Estado Novo*, the Francoist regime was for the most part a civilianized regime (Linz and Gunther 1995).⁵² Nonetheless, the military became the backbone of the dictatorship. Franco was the 'Generalísimo' of the victorious armed forces and enjoyed the loyalty of the military who gained important privileges and high levels of prestige (Payne 1967:445; Preston 1990:103–104). Franco thoroughly purged the armies, established personal ties with the military leadership, promoted a mythical image of the armed forces and granted the military a central role in the fight against the 'internal enemy'. The military also became important as a vehicle to disseminate the 'new' values and the Castilian language in multi-cultural Spain (Olmeda 1988:120–121). Thus, Franco did not have to face any major threat from the military, which remained loyal and perceived themselves as guardians of its traditions and values even after his death.

⁵²According to Payne (1986:174), the policies and structure of the dictatorship can be characterized as 'praetorian in 1936 and 1937, fascist or semi-fascist from 1937 to 1945, Catholic corporatist from 1945 to 1957 and modernizing, bureaucratic and authoritarian from 1957 to 1975'.

The death of Franco in 1975 initiated a transition process that culminated in the peaceful transfer of power to the Socialist Party, PSOE, after the 1982 elections (Linz and Stepan 1996:108). This transition has been extensively studied and is considered an example of success (Preston 1986; Linz 1996; Gunther et al. 2004). Many factors contributed to the process of democratisation, such as economic growth, industrialisation, urbanisation or skilful elite leadership; however, it is very difficult to understand it fully without examining civil-military relations. The military played a prominent role during the dictatorship and the early stages of democracy, jeopardising and conditioning the transition. The coup attempt on the 23rd February 1981 (23F) has caught the attention of many scholars but it was only one among at least six military plots against democracy between 1978 and 1985, including a plan for the assassination of the King and the Government in Coruña in June 1985 (Gilmour 1985:230–248; Preston 1990:175–202; Díaz Fernández 2005:221–224). However, less attention has been paid to the question of how and why the military disengaged from politics in Spain (Rodrigo 1992:65; Agüero 1995:7–10).

1.5.3 Sources

This thesis conducts an in-depth historical analysis of primary and secondary sources concerning civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain from the early 1930s to 1986, from the origin of the right-wing authoritarian regimes until the countries' membership into the European Economic Community which marks the consolidation of the new democratic regimes in both countries. This thesis adopts a process of quasi-triangulation (Lustick 1996:616) which mitigates problems of selection bias concerning the historical data and accounts. All narratives about tool choices have been constructed by combining several different authors and primary sources in order to increase the level of confidence in the accounts and the thickness of description. Controversial or disputed data have been explicitly acknowledged.

The primary research focuses on the examination of defence and military internal reports, laws, decrees, budgets, speeches, interviews and letters. In the case of Portugal, the main primary resources scrutinised were the personal archives of António Oliveira Salazar and Marcello Caetano as well as the Council of the Revolution and Portuguese Military History archives. These historical archives provide also valuable information on Spanish political transformations and the relationships between the Iberian countries, which for the most part have not been explored in previous analyses of Spain.

For the case of Spain, the most important sources used were Franco's personal archives and the extensive audio collection of the 'Fundación Ortega y Gasset', which contains interviews with political and military leaders as well as recordings of conferences on military issues held during the early years of democracy. These archives have hitherto been underutilised by researchers of Spain's public policy and civil-military relations.

Portuguese and Spanish legislation on defence has served as another fundamental base of evidentiary support. Newspapers and military magazines as well as books and correspondence written by some of the most relevant actors (such as Salazar, Caetano, Franco, General Spínola, General Gutierrez Mellado and Narcís Serra) have been used here.

Finally, due to the length of the periods covered, the complexity of the subjects analysed and the existing gaps in the primary resources available,⁵³ this research also covers a wide range of secondary sources, including an extensive history, sociology and political science bibliography related to defence, military affairs, international relations, and politics as well as biographies of political and military leaders.

1.6 Thesis plan

This thesis is divided in four parts: Part I (Chapters 1 and 2) outlines the objectives and choices of the thesis. Part II (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) and Part III (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) analyse civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain, respectively. Part IV (Chapters 9, 10 and 11) compares and explains trajectories in choices of control tools.

Chapter 2 focuses on the comparative and explanatory frameworks. First, it introduces a revised version of Hood's NATO resource-based framework for the comparison of tools of government and explains why this framework has been selected over other typologies of policy instruments. Second, it presents the two institutionalist explanations of the evolution of tool choice. One relies on macro-historical events as generators of path-dependence dynamics and the other on the capacity of environmental factors to shape choices.

Part II and III are the result of the analysis of empirical historical evidence from primary and secondary sources. Chapters 3 and 6 explore chronologically the contemporary history of civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain from the inception of Salazar's and Franco's dictatorial regimes until 1986. Appendices A and B complement these chapters summarising civil-military relations from the Napoleonic Wars. These chapters set the background for the posterior analysis hinting at the historical processes and contextual factors that conditioned the evolution of governments' approaches to military subordination. Chapters 4, 5, 7 and 8 have same structure and classify according to the NATO framework the tools that Portuguese and Spanish governments used for the subordination of the military. Chapter 4 covers the period of the Estado Novo (1932–1974), Chapter 7 the Francoist regime (1936–1975), Chapter 5 the transition and early democratic stages in Portugal (1974–1986) and Chapter 8 in Spain (1975–1986). These chapters synthesise the actions of governments and in doing so identify the main trends in tool choice. Their purpose is to constitute a database or baseline on the governments' tools of control to facilitate the analysis in the subsequent chapters and to serve as a test for the NATO framework.

Building on the previous empirical chapters and the comparisons established thanks to the NATO framework, Chapter 9 analyses and contrasts the most striking features in terms of trajectories in tool choices, and establishes whether these can be associated with a specific country or type of political regimes. Chapter 10 develops two neo-institutionalist explanations on the

⁵³Much of the information related to government tools surrounding some critical periods such as the Spanish Civil War, the Portuguese Colonial Wars and the 23F coup has been destroyed or remains classified. Even less controversial information about periods of apparently relative stability is still often unavailable. This is especially the case with the documentation of the Spanish Ministry of Defence. Access to documents and internal archives has been repeatedly rejected during this research; sometimes on the basis of the restrictive Law of Official Secrets 9/1968 (still in force since its enactment during the Francoist regime), sometimes on the basis of the lack of resources to conduct a security assessment required for the access to the information requested.

causal processes that triggered and shaped these trajectories. First, it examines the evolution of the control toolkit from a path-dependence angle looking at 'historical causes'. It shows that some macro-historical events (i.e. the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, the Colonial Wars and political transitions from authoritarianism) produced critical junctures in the governments' toolkits and that some features of the trajectories in tool choice can be explained by concepts such as exogenous shocks, punctuated equilibria, self-reinforcing mechanisms and sequence. However, it is argued that orthodox accounts based on path-dependence fail to capture all the dynamics observed in the toolkit. Second, it examines the continuing action of context on the trajectories of tool-choice by focusing on three sets of environmental factors (i.e. ideas, political institutional structure and the international environment).

Finally, Chapter 11 summarises the main descriptive and causal findings as well as the methodological and meta-theoretical contribution of this research. It stresses that the utilisation of public policy analytical frameworks helps developing a better understanding of civil-military relations. The NATO scheme provides a different angle and a solid ground for comparison between the two countries. It enables the identification of previously unrecognised patterns in civil-military relations.

2 Analytical framework

2.1 Introduction

This chapter specifies the comparative and explanatory frameworks used in the analysis of Portuguese and Spanish civil-military relations. The first part of this chapter introduces the comparative framework: Hood's NATO resource-based typology for the classification of tools of government (1983). It explains some adaptations made to the original NATO framework; in particular the introduction of subcategories within each of the four basic typologies; and how this classification scheme is operationalised. Next, it maps the advantages of Hood's framework vis-à-vis other alternative approaches to policy instruments and its contribution to the civil-military and policy instrument literatures.

The second part of the chapter argues that the tools used by the government to control the military are institutions and that change and that stability in tool choice can be analysed through neo-institutional theoretical paradigms for the study of institutional change. This chapter introduces two alternative types of explanations (later developed in Chapter 10): one based on the impact of historical legacies and the other on the continuing action of context. 'Historical causation' and the basic analytical concepts associated to path-dependence are presented. Finally, this chapter outlines the impact of context on civil-military relations and in particular on the control toolkit, by looking at three sets of environmental factors, namely ideas, political institutional structure and the international environment.

2.2 Comparative framework

2.2.1 Developing a tools perspective: a revised NATO framework

Hood's (1983) NATO framework sums up the four basic resources that government possess and according to which policy instruments can be classified: *nodality*, *authority*, *treasure* and *organisation*. Instruments are categorised according to the main resource from which they draw their power.¹

Nodality is the 'property of being in the middle of an information or social network' (Hood 1983:4). Governments use their nodal situation, i.e. their location in relation with the formal and informal network of communication channels to transmit and receive information. *Nodality* is used through messages, such as notifications, public announcements or propaganda, as well as by means of information gathering and management.

¹Some tools draw their power from more than one basic resource, however for the sake of simplicity hybrid categories will not be considered and tools will be classified according to the predominant resource.

Table 1: NATO Typology: ‘constraint’ and ‘depletability’

	Contingent (low) depletability	Immanent (high) depletability
High-constraint on the subject	Authority	Organisation
Low-constraint on the subject	Nodality	Treasure

Source: Hood and Margetts (2007:156)

Authority refers to the ‘possession of legal or official power … to demand, forbid, guarantee, adjudicate’ (*ibid*:5). By definition, governments are granted the power or the right to give orders or make decisions concerning others. *Authority* is used through tokens such as certificates, laws, and sanctions.

Treasure indicates ‘the possession of a stock of moneys or fungible chattels’ (*ibid*:4). Governments can spend their financial resources to attain policy goals. *Treasure* is spent in salary, rewards, materials and other equipment.

Organisation denotes ‘the possession of a stock of people … land, buildings, materials and equipment somehow arranged’ (*ibid*:6). Governments can utilise the structure or machinery of the state as an instrument. *Organisation* as a resource is employed in what Hood calls ‘treatments’, namely the use of people’s efforts and other material capabilities of the organisation.

These resources can be organised according to the criteria of ‘depletability’ and ‘constraint’ (Hood and Margett 2007:152–156). *Treasure* and *organisation* are considered ‘immanently depletable’. The financial and material capabilities of a government are limited. These resources are depleted as they are used; their use diminished the government’s capacity to use them in the future. *Authority* and *nodality* are ‘contingently depletable’ because the utilisation of these resources does not necessarily diminish them; it may even augment or strengthen them.² On the other hand, *organisation* and *authority* are considered to have the potential to set high constraints on the actions of policy subjects while *nodality* and *treasure* are usually less restraining (Table 1).

This thesis adapts the NATO framework to the context of civil-military relations. Some clarifications are important to understand how this framework is operationalised:

First, this dissertation focuses on the relationship between the government and the armed forces and not on the relationship between the government and society at large as in Hood’s study. In this thesis, the military constitute the subject or ‘problem’ addressed by the government tools.³ Although governments and the armed forces are by no means unitary entities but composed by several sub-entities and individuals, for analytical and comparability purposes they will be treated as units in the adapted framework.

²*Authority* and *nodality* operate fundamentally at a cognitive level.

³The armed forces are also tools that governments utilise for defence or control purposes.

Second, this thesis does not evaluate whether tools were successfully or intelligently designed and implemented,⁴ nor does it provide a comprehensive typology of government policy styles. A systematic assessment of the historical success of military subordination policies would involve great subjectivity at two levels: the selection of evaluation criteria and the collection of evidence. On the other hand, as Howlett (1991:13–16) suggests, in order to create a generalisable theory that links policy instruments and governing styles, more cross-sectoral and cross-country comparative research would be necessary. It would also require additional theoretical clarification around the concept of government policy style. Such an endeavour is the scope of this thesis.

Third, this thesis introduces new subcategories to the NATO framework (Table 2). Hood's basic fourfold typology is parsimonious and flexible enough to be used in the context of civil-military relations. A preliminary analysis of the empirical evidence showed that all tools of government observed could be linked to (at least) one of the four categories without difficulty. However, the fact that there is a large degree of variance within each of these categories is problematic (Linder and Peter 1989:40). Each of the categories captures very dissimilar approaches to military subordination. For instance, armed paramilitary forces, military education and the provision of jobs in the administration are three common *organisation* control instruments. Legal limitations and the prohibition of military unionism, as well as promotions and privileges rewarding obedience are all *authority* tools. The acquisition of military materials and weaponry, salary raises and individual economic incentives are *treasure* tools. In the *nodality* category, too, there are disparate tools ranging from information and disinformation campaigns to the collection of information through official internal reports or the action secret services.

To overcome this problem, Hood divides each of the four categories of tools into two types of 'applications' or subcategories: 'detectors' and 'effectors'.⁵ For Hood, detectors are 'all the instruments that government uses for taking in information' and effectors those 'that government can use to make an impact on the world outside' (Hood 1983:3). This distinction provides an elegant and homogeneous subdivision of the tools but it also introduces a significant element of ambiguity. It is very difficult to distinguish empirically Hood's *nodality* detectors ('*nodality* receivers'), from the detectors within the other categories: 'rewards' (*treasure*), 'requisitions' (*authority*) and 'ergonomic detectors' (*organisation*). *Nodality* seems to be indissolubly linked to the capacity to use information as a means of control. In fact, Hood specifies that '[n]odality gives government the ability to traffic in information on the basis of "figureheadedness" or of having the "whole picture"'. He stresses that *nodality* enables governments to 'dispense' and 'draw in' information and that the 'coin' how they spend this resource is 'messages sent and received' (Hood 1983:6). In contrast, Hood's definitions of the other

⁴For instance Hood (1983:133) suggests four 'canons of good application of government instruments' (Hood 1983:133): the examination of alternative possible tools, match to the job, ethical considerations, and economy. Hoods and Margetts (2007:145), refer to appraisal criteria for 'intelligent' design: deliberative choice, fitness for purpose, economy and moral acceptability. Other authors propose alternative criteria (see next section).

⁵These concepts originate from cybernetics, the science of general control systems (Dunsire 1978:59–60). Hood also introduces additional subsets within these subcategories; he suggests a third and fourth-tier subdivisions of tools (Hood 1983:18, 88; Hood and Margetts 2007:9–10). These are nonetheless beyond the scope of this thesis. As explained later, excessive compartmentalising of tools hinders comparability.

three basic resources do not mention their function as detectors of information and their role seems to be circumscribed to that of effectors more or less directly impacting policy targets.

The extension of the concept ‘information detectors’ beyond *nodality* contributes to a blurring of the boundaries between the different resources and complicates the classification of tools. In terms of symmetry, it also seems that for the other three categories a subdivision between ‘effectors’ and ‘detectors’ does not produce a balanced distribution of instruments. It is not surprising that most interpretations of Hood’s typology equate *nodality* to ‘information’ tools and ignore the subdivision between effectors and detectors in the other categories (Linder and Peters 1989:40; Vedung 1998:38; Howlett and Ramesh 2003:90).

Thus, for the sake of clarity, this thesis employs the subcategories ‘effector’ and ‘detector’ only within the *nodality* category and assumes that all information detection tools are *nodality* tools. This approach deviates from Hood’s logic for practical reasons. The subcategories chosen for the other resources have been constructed inductively from the empirical evidence collected and are better suited to establish distinctive trends and thus trace policy change in the context of Iberian civil-military relations. These subcategories not only reflect substantially different approaches to control but also allow a balanced distribution of tools in terms of observations between them:

Nodality-based instruments, as explained above, are classified into ‘information effectors’ that serve to disseminate information, and ‘information detectors’ that enable the government to gather information.

Organisation tools are divided into ‘coercive’ and ‘non-coercive’ tools according to whether control is to be achieved by force/threat or by other means that do not entail violence or physical power. The level of coerciveness has been a general criterion widely used to discriminate tools of government (Anderson 1977; Doern and Phidd 1983) but it is much better adapted to organisation tools than to any of the other categories.

Authority tools are divided into ‘rewards and incentives’ on the one hand and ‘sanctions and constraints’ on the other. The former are those that enable and/or stimulate specific behaviours and the latter to discourage them. This distinction follows a logic similar to that of Ajzen (1991) and Howlett (2005:37) who draw a distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ instruments, i.e. tools that encourage or discourage behaviours which are aligned or incongruent with policy goals.⁶

Finally, *treasure* tools are divided into ‘staff’ and ‘equipment expenditure’. Staff expenditure denotes the utilisation of a government’s financial resources spent directly to pay salaries, pensions and other types of benefits to the target group. ‘Equipment expenditure’ refers to the money spent to acquire goods, in this case essentially materials and weapons, with the aim to create some conditions that would reinforce a certain behaviour. These subcategories also capture the distinction between money being transferred directly to the target group or resources spent in a way that shapes the target group’s actions indirectly (Table 2).

⁶Similarly Vedung (1998:26) refers to ‘affirmative’ (promoting) and ‘negative’ (restraining) tools.

Table 2: Revised NATO framework

Hood's Tools of Government	Subcategories	Examples of the tools in the context of military subordination
Organisation		<p><i>Coercive</i>: utilisation of the stock of people, buildings and equipment in order to directly impose a desired behaviour (or deter by force a non-desired one). ⇒ Examples: paramilitary or police forces, special military units, disciplinary and political tribunals, penitentiary system.</p> <p><i>Non-coercive</i>: utilisation of the stock of people, buildings and equipment in order to persuade or stimulate behaviour without the direct use of force. ⇒ Examples: military education and training, exploitation of the organisational design and geographical deployment, provision of services, goods and jobs.</p>
Nodality		<p><i>Information effectors</i>: utilisation of the government's central position to disseminate, modify or omit information in order to induce a desired behaviour. ⇒ Examples: posters, publications, public speeches, mass media. Organisations in charge of propaganda and censorship.</p> <p><i>Information detectors</i>: utilisation of the government's central position to gather information about observance or deviance from the desired behaviour. ⇒ Examples: action of intelligence services, informants, official reports.</p>
Authority		<p><i>Rewards and incentives</i>: utilisation of the government's legal power to enable and stimulate actions in accordance with the desired behaviour. ⇒ Examples: promotions, appointments and privileges granted to loyal officers, functions granted to the military (e.g. participation in public order and justice).</p> <p><i>Sanctions and constraints</i>: utilisation of the government's legal powers to punish, forbid or hinder actions in disagreement with the desired behaviour. ⇒ Examples: limitations, prohibitions, removal of officers from crucial positions.</p>
Treasure		<p><i>Staff expenditure</i>: utilisation of the government's financial resources by transferring money directly to the target of the policy as a means to 'buy their will' and follow government wishes. ⇒ Examples: salary raises, pensions, economic incentives.</p> <p><i>Equipment expenditure</i>: utilisation of the government's financial resources on the acquisition of materials as means to increase the satisfaction of individuals and their compliance. ⇒ Examples: acquisition of modern equipment and weapons, better facilities.</p>

2.2.2 Why the NATO framework?

Several authors have proposed alternative classifications and criteria for the analysis and comparison of policy instruments. The question is why choosing the NATO framework when it has still has to be adjusted (as explained above)? This section shows that even with these adaptations, the NATO framework offers advantages over other alternative policy instrument approaches which are either too complicated to operationalise in comparative study or do not fit well the empirical evidence collected on civil-military relations. It first explains why a multi-dimensional classification has been ruled out and then specifies why NATO has been selected over other generic classification schemes as a basis for establishing comparisons.

Two different approaches compete in current policy instrument literature; one favours the development of multi-dimensional evaluation criteria and the other prefers simpler, mostly one-dimensional, taxonomies, such as the NATO framework.⁷

Authors such as Majone (1976), Kingdon (1984) and Linder and Peters (1989) claim the importance of identifying several valuation criteria or attributes as a means to classify policy instruments and, most importantly, understand their choice. Salamon goes further and defines tools as 'bundles of attributes' (Salamon 2002:20–37). Several multi-dimensional frameworks can be found in the literature (Table 3). These frameworks classify each instrument according to several qualities that decision-makers take into consideration in their tool choices. Most of these models assume that these attributes are intrinsic to the tools; that the differences are not in kind but in degree; and that decision-makers can discern the best mix of attributes required to solve each problem.⁸

Multi-dimensional approaches study different elements intervening in tool choice and, *prima facie*, could be considered more apt for the endeavour of theory building than simple, generic classifications. However, in practice they entail some serious problems. First, as Landry and Varone (2005:110) stress, putting too much emphasis on the analysis of attributes is problematic. Evaluating the 'goodness' or 'fitness' inherent to the instruments can divert the attention away from important historical and contextual factors, which might be more decisive in shaping the evolution of instrument choice and which are central to my research. Thus, these frameworks present an implicit bias towards technical or rational choice explanations that this thesis, as most of the of the policy instrument literature in political science, have rejected.⁹

Second, from a practical point of view, a multi-dimensional classification adds complexity that makes it difficult to establish comparisons.¹⁰ If these dimensions were discrete and several values were possible for each of them, their combination would produce many different types of tools. For instance, an approach using four dimensions for the classification of policy instruments would have elicited a minimum of 16 possible types of instruments, in case of only two possible values for each dimension, 81 in case of three possible values,

⁷See for instance Linder and Peters's (1989 and 1998) critiques to Hood's typology and Hood's rebuttal (2007).

⁸Linder and Peters (1989:41–45) refer to 'good' policy instrument and 'close fit' or 'goodness of match'.

⁹Most authors in the literature emphasise the need of contextualising choices (Anderson 1971; Phidd and Doern 1983; Linder and Peters 1989; Howlett and Ramesh 2003; Ringeling 2005). See next section.

¹⁰Even one of the main proponents of this type of approaches, Salamon (2002:21), acknowledges that multidimensionality complicates the task of describing and sorting tools.

Table 3: Multi-dimensional approaches

Authors (date)	Dahl and Lindblom (1953)	Salamon and Lund (1989)	Linder and Peters (1989) [†]	Bemelmans-Videc (1998)	Salamon (2002)	Sandfort et al. (2008)
Criteria, attributes or dimensions	Instrument ownership	Effectiveness	Resource intensiveness	Effectiveness	Directness	Management capacity
	Government influence	Political support	Targeting	Efficiency	Visibility	Management outcomes
	Government control	Administrative feasibility	Political risk	Legality	Coerciveness	Program capacity
	Instrument membership	Efficiency	Constraints to government activity	Democracy	Automaticity	Program outcomes
Instrument autonomy	Equity					

[†]Linder and Peters (1989:56) later in the same article decouple these attributes into eight design criteria: complexity of operation, level of public visibility, adaptability across uses, level of intrusiveness, relative costliness, reliance on market, chances of failure and precision of targeting.

Sources: Howlett (1991); Salamon and Lund (1989); Linder and Peters (1989); Bemelmans-Videc (1998); Salamon (2002/eds.); Sandfort et al. (2008)

256 types of instruments in case of four, and so forth.¹¹ Alternatively, if these criteria were to be considered as a continuum, as suggested by most of their proponents, the problems of assigning values to these (quite broad and difficult-to-measure) criteria would be added. The fact that, with the exception of Salamon's compilation (2002/ed.), practically no systematic attempt of application of any of these multidimensional approaches has been made confirms this problem.

Third, there is a trade-off between depth in terms of dimensions studied and breadth in terms of tools covered. The application of multi-criteria evaluation analysis is in practice restricted to the study one or very few instruments. However, instruments do not usually operate alone but are used in bundles or combinations (Hood 1983; Bemelmans-Videc and Vedung 1998; Howlett 2005). Policy outcomes and government action can rarely be understood by studying one or very few policy instruments only.¹²

In brief, although multi-dimensional approaches are a useful basis for policy evaluation and in-depth description they are not well-suited for systematically classifying and comparing government action across time, space and policy areas. The utilisation of parsimonious

¹¹The formula is the number of possible values raised to the power of the number of dimensions. Some non-multidimensional but maximalist tools inventories suffer from this inconvenience as well. For example, Kirschen et al. (1964) who identify 63 different types of basic policy instruments and Linder and Peters, who identify 23 different tools (1989:56).

¹²Theory building about governments' control stance based on one single or few instruments amplifies the risk of selection bias and the generalisation of the findings (Linder and Peters 1998:37–38).

Table 4: Other generic typologies of policy instruments

Authors (date)	Anderson (1977)	Bardach (1980)	Doern and Phidd (1983)	McDonnell and Elmore (1987)	Schneider and Ingram (1990)	Howlett and Ramesh (1995)	Vedung (1998)
Criteria	Degree of coercion	Government resources	Degree of coercion	Intervention strategy	Behavioural features	State capacity and policy subsystem complexity	Basic resources
Categories of policy instruments or tools	Market mechanisms	Money	Self-regulation	Mandates	Authority	Market or subsidy	Sticks
	Structured options	Administrative competency	Exhortation	Inducements	Incentives	Direct provision	Carrots
	Biased options	Creative leadership	Expenditure	Capacity building	Capacity	Regulatory or information	Sermons
	Regulation	Political support	Regulation	System changing	Symbolic and hortatory	Voluntary, community or family-based	
			Public ownership		Learning		

Sources: Anderson (1977); Bardach (1980); Doern and Phidd (1983); McDonnell and Elmore (1987); Schneider and Ingram (1990); Howlett (2005); Vedung (1998).

typologies, such as the NATO framework, facilitates identifying trends in tool choice, establishing meaningful comparisons and therefore generalisations, which is the purpose of this thesis.

Once multi-dimensional frameworks have been discarded as basis for comparison in this dissertation it is necessary to explain why the NATO scheme was chosen among other basic taxonomies. In the literature on policy instruments, there are several alternative generic tool classifications that could be used as framework for tracing patterns and change in instrument choice and establishing comparison (Table 4).

Analytical reasons suggest the utilisation of the NATO framework to compare civil-military relations in the Iberian Peninsula. First, resource-based classifications,¹³ such as Hood's, offer an important advantage. Concentrating on the basic resources from which instruments obtain their power, rather than on intentions, capacities or degrees, simplifies categorisation and reduces the impact of subjectivity. It seems easier to use Hood's four basic resources than to categorise the observed tools according to the behavioural mechanisms they supposedly aim to trigger (Schneider and Ingram 1990), the level of state capacity (Howlett 2005) or the degree of legitimate coercion the government is willing to employ (Anderson 1977). Moreover, many of the non-resource approaches classify tools as a continuum.¹⁴ They suggest technical substitutability by formalising differences in degree not in nature (Howlett 1991; Landry and Varone 2005:111). Hood's resource approach escapes this shortcoming.

¹³Lasswell (1958 [1936]:204) was the first to emphasise the need to identify the basic governing resources.

¹⁴A distinction between 'resource' and 'choice' tools is used by Vedung (1998). It is inspired by Howlett (1991) who differentiates 'resource' and 'continuum' approaches. Resource taxonomies classify instruments based on their nature. 'Continuum' models show differences in degree according to the choice criteria or attribute employed. Doern and Phidd's (1983) and Schneider and Ingram's (1990) generic classifications are examples of basic or generic 'continuum models'. Multidimensional approaches tend to consider instruments alongside several continuum dimensions.

Second, the NATO framework fits the empirical evidence on civil-military relations better than any other generic classification. The analysis of the tools employed to subordinate the military in Portugal and Spain provides several examples for each of the categories and subcategories; all instruments scrutinised can be easily identified with (at least) one of them.¹⁵ This is not always the case with other generic typologies. When attempting to use other frameworks, tools in the field of military control could often not be readily categorised and, more importantly, in some cases instruments could not be clearly allocated to any of the categories proposed in the typologies. For instance, Anderson's (1977), Doern and Phidd's (1983) and McDonnell and Elmore's (1987) typologies do not comfortably cover instruments of control based on the collection of information in order to prevent deviant behaviour (*nodality* detectors in Hood's terminology). Similarly, Vedung's (1998) classification, as the author admits, does not give room for the utilisation physical resources such people, lands, buildings or equipment (*organisation* tools in Hood's terminology).¹⁶

Finally, a further reason for the choice of Hood's typology over other generic ones can be construed from Howlett's division of policy instruments between 'substantive' and 'procedural' instruments (Howlett 2000). Substantive instruments are those designed to deliver or affect the delivery of goods and services, while procedural instruments are used to alter aspects of advisory deliberations, this is the policy process itself. Many of the generic typologies of policy instruments, such as Anderson's and Howlett and Ramesh's, are much better suited for the classification of 'substantive' instruments than for that of 'procedural' ones. Hood's typology offers the advantage to include both of them (Howlett 2005:42–45, Howlett 2011).

In sum, on the one hand multi-dimensional approaches to tools complicate comparisons when working with a variety of not easily quantifiable tools. On the other hand, classifications that are more generic can be collapsed into the NATO framework. As Howlett acknowledges, 'the virtues of Hood's model are that it is relatively straightforward and serves as an admirable synthesis of many other, earlier, resource-based models of policy instruments' (Howlett 1991:8). Many of these categories are interchangeable with one of the four resources or could be captured within them. This is especially the case after the addition of new subcategories. From the perspective of simplicity in categorisation as well as its capacity to encompass the empirical evidence and to overcome the theoretical substantive-procedural divide Hood's typology seems the appropriate choice.

2.3 Explaining change in tool choice: history and context

This thesis considers the tools of control as the institutions that structure the relationship between the governments and the military and relies on neo-institutional theory to explain the evolution of the choices of tools. In particular, it analyses the impact of macro-historical events and environmental factors. It shows that some macro-historical events produced critical junctures that altered the control tool-mix that governments employed. It then analyses

¹⁵This does not exclude the possibility that some instruments may portray characteristics of more than one category.

¹⁶Vedung's threefold typology of 'organisation strategies', based on Etzioni's dimensions of power (1975), is also a resource approach that distinguishes among regulation, economic means and information as basic government resources (Vedung 1998:38, 50–51).

whether civil-military relations and tool choice were locked in specific paths or trajectories by the legacies of these events or whether the action of the ideational and institutional context shaped these trajectories between two critical junctures.

Technical or rational choice explanations on policy instruments have been explored in economics (Posner 1974; Stokey and Zeckhauser 1978; Mitnick 1980; Wolf 1987; Weimer and Vining 1992). Nonetheless, the generalisability of their findings remains limited and most studies in political science agree that tool choices are not merely a matter of rational or technical deliberation. For instance, it has been argued that policy instruments are not neutral and that they are not selected on the bases of an optimal relationship between policy goals and means (Nispen and Ringeling 1998:211–212; Ringeling 2005:192–193). Similarly, Macdonald (2005:222) argues that no theory on instrument choice assumes a metric evaluation along a single dimension and that there is no best or most efficient instrument without taking into account values or normative considerations. Hood and Margetts (2007:147) claim that given the millions of combinations of tools faced by decision-makers, the choice of instrument cannot be a fully rational process.¹⁷ Even Trebilcock, who initially approached policy tools from a public choice stance (Trebilcock et al. 1982), later recognises that that a public choice approach to tool choices ‘does not provide a well-developed, dynamic account of what sorts of forces disrupt existing political equilibria and lead over time ... to nonincremental policy changes’ and stresses the role of ideas in the policy making process (Trebilcock 2005:54, 66–69, 72–73).

Most authors adopting a policy instruments approach in political science defend the explanatory value of both history and context. For instance, Anderson (1971:122) highlights that policy choices are made according to the possibilities in a given historical and cultural context. Macdonald (2005) rejects the hypotheses that instrument choice is ahistorical. Woodside (1986) maintains that the social and political constraints limit the choice of instruments. Linder and Peters (1989:38, 48–53) argue that decision-makers do not always pick the same instrument for the same problem and signal the important role of the cultural and social context. Hood shows that instrument choice is rarely a matter of neutral deliberation and that choices are shaped by politics, ideology and culture (2007:137). Ringeling claims instrument choice is not constant and changes over time: new instruments, the intervention of international actors and other developments in the national or international context make some instruments more popular while other fall into disgrace (2005:202). Doern and Phidd argue that ‘instruments are not matters of mere technique but are the object of normative dispute and are inextricably linked to structure and process’ (1983:321–322).

Neo-institutionalism provides alternative theoretical angles to rational-choice, giving room to explanations grounded in history and context. The trajectories in tool choice and civil-military relations in the Iberian Peninsula can be explained by drawing from two alternative but largely complementary approaches to neo-institutionalism. The first one can be associated with orthodox path-dependence accounts and focuses on the legacies of past historical events. The second one observes the specific ideational and institutional context in which decisions are made.

¹⁷Similarly, Weyland (2008:291), drawing from cognitive psychology, argues that the cognitive limitations and high computational costs hinder decision-makers’ ability to evaluate systematically all options as proponents of rational choice would assume.

Table 5: Analytical plan for explaining change in tool choice

History: path-dependence		Context: continuing action	
Macro-historical events	Analytical concepts	Environmental factors	Analytical concepts
1 Spanish Civil War	Critical junctures	1 Ideas	Logic of appropriateness
2 Second World War	Exogenous shocks	2 Political institutional structure	Isomorphism (coercive, normative and mimetic)
3 Colonial Wars	Punctuated Equilibria	3 International environment	Search for legitimacy
4 Political transitions from authoritarianism	Self-reinforcing (and self-defeating) mechanisms		Power asymmetry
	Sequence and timing		Veto Power

Although both approaches have been usually associated with historical institutionalism, they entail fundamental differences.¹⁸ In short, the first one based on ‘historical causes’ refers to the impact of previous events inhibiting or stimulating present choices (by having triggered endogenous self-reproductive mechanisms). The second type of explanation is by no means ahistorical; it looks at ‘constant causes’ and explains change by looking at the impact of the current (historical) context on present choices.¹⁹ Table 5 presents the factors and analytical concepts utilised in this thesis to develop both types of explanations.

This thesis argues that the analysis of some sets of contextual factors serve to fill the gaps left by explanations that purely rely on path-dependence. It shows a certain degree of overlapping between both approaches and concludes that while history matters, it does not explain the whole picture of the evolution in the governments’ control toolkit.

2.3.1 Historical legacies and path-dependence

This thesis studies the impact of past events in the evolution of the control toolkit. It focuses on the legacies of four different macro-historical events that shook civil-military relations in the Iberian Peninsula altering the trajectories of tool use by governments. It examines continuity and change in the toolkit against the backdrop of the fundamental concepts associated with path-dependence explanations such as critical junctures, punctuated equilibria, external shocks, self-reinforcing mechanisms and sequence.

One of the fundamental ideas in neo-institutional theory is the importance of history and its legacy. As Pierson (2004:2) suggests, many of the classical figures in social sciences such as Tocqueville, Marx or Weber adopted historical approaches and stressed the importance of temporality. Past events and choices leave ‘policy legacies’ that shape decision-makers’ ideas

¹⁸For further details about historical institutionalism see for instance Steinmo et al.(1992/eds.), Hall and Taylor (1996), Peters (1999) and Sanders (2006). The second type of explanation can also be associated with other streams of neo-institutionalism such as sociological (Hall and Taylor 1996) or constructivist institutionalism (Hay 2006).

¹⁹Thus, in the first approach history is equated to ‘past’ and in the second more broadly to ‘time’ or the current environmental conditions. A similar distinction is suggested by Raadschelders (1998:572–573) who distinguishes between the impact of ‘distant pasts’ and of present circumstances.

and interests (Weir and Skocpol 1985:119). Social scientists have shown that in order to understand policies and institutions it is necessary to look at earlier choices and formation periods (Heclo 1974; Hall 1986; Skocpol 1992; Weir 1992; King 1995; Lodge 2002). The analysis of large-scale processes, such as the evolution of civil-military relations and the control toolkit, requires sufficient perspective and attention to how events unfold over time (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003:7).

Neo-institutionalism provides theoretical perspectives on institutional change.²⁰ Stinchcombe originally introduced the concept of 'historical causation' referring to where the '*effect* created by causes at some previous period *becomes a cause of that same effect*' (Stinchcombe 1969:103). Inspired by this, neo-institutional social scientists such as, Krasner (1984), David (1985, 2000), Thelen (1999, 2002), Hacker (1998, 2002) and Pierson (2000, 2002, 2004) have developed explanations on why 'history matters' in the context of institutional change, using the notion of 'path-dependence'. 'Path-dependence' refers to the fact that historical events can trigger some institutional changes and self-reinforcing mechanisms that contribute to establishing certain trajectories or patterns that persist even in the absence of the original event. This thesis examines the extent to which the evolution of civil-military relations and tool choice fit path-dependence explanations.

Path-dependence explanations identify and explore 'critical junctures' in history. The concept of critical juncture, first introduced by Lipset and Rokkan (1967:37), refers to 'a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies' (Collier and Collier 1991:29). Thus, these critical junctures entail some specific paths of action, inertias or historical legacies that may have a continuing effect on tool choice and civil-military relations. Critical junctures are associated with 'punctuated equilibrium' models. Gould and Eldredge's (1972) model of 'punctuated equilibria' in biology was transferred to social science by Krasner (1984). These explanations suggest that sometimes longstanding institutions, or in this case control toolkits, are punctuated by exogenous shocks, producing a shift towards a new equilibrium (Jones, Baumgartner and True 1998; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). Path-dependence accounts explain that new equilibria are sustained by self-reinforcing (positive-feedback or increasing returns) dynamics triggered by past exogenous shocks (David 1985; Arthur 1989; Pierson 2000).²¹ Alternatively, a trajectory could be reversed to a previous equilibrium due to the absence of reinforcing mechanism or appearance of self-undermining (negative feedback or decreasing returns) dynamics. In sum, from a path-dependence angle the evolution of an institution, in this case the tool-mix used to control the military, can be explained by past exogenous shocks activating endogenous mechanisms of reproduction (and/or extinction).

Following the path-dependence logic of change, the effects of early events and choices, such as those during the formation periods of a regime, can be amplified overtime (Pierson

²⁰Neo-institutional theory has also been criticised for being better suited at explaining persistence or inertia than change (Peters 1999:68; Peters et al. 2005).


²¹Therefore these explanations assume that all institutional change is originally triggered by external forces. The path-dependence models of Redding (2002) and Greif and Laitin (2004) are exceptions because they also capture endogenously-generated change.

2004:63–78). Initial or early choices can reinforce later choices in the same direction while some paths of action can disappear definitively or become increasingly difficult overtime.²²

Works influenced by path-dependence have often focused on the impact of small random events shocks and insufficient attention has been devoted to macro-historical processes (Katznelson 2003:292). In contrast, this thesis examines the legacies of four macro-historical events that the literature has continuously associated with changes in civil-military relations and the patterns of utilisation of control tools: the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, the Colonial Wars and the political transitions from authoritarianism.

Figure 1 captures the path-dependence explanation examined in this thesis. Macro-historical events, such as those mentioned above, act as exogenous shocks creating critical junctures and change in the mix of tools utilised to control the military ($TC_0 \Rightarrow TC_1$). Moreover, these macro-historical events leave a legacy in tool choice; they trigger endogenous²³ self-reproducing (positive feedback) mechanisms that sustain the new ‘path’ or mix of tools (TC_1). In the absence of self-reinforcing mechanisms or the appearance of self-undermining (negative feedback) mechanisms, the path is reversed to a previous equilibrium ($TC_1 \Rightarrow TC_0$).

Figure 1: Path-dependence explanation of trajectories in tool choice



In sum, this thesis analyses to what extent the observed trajectories are the result of historical legacies and the degree to which they fit the mechanisms and concepts associated with path-dependence explanations. It explores whether the evolution of civil-military relations and tool choice follows a punctuated equilibrium model in which change was only the result of accidental exogenous shocks (macro-historical events) eliciting self-reinforcing endogenous dynamics and persisting paths (Chapter 10.2).

²²See Arthur (1994) who uses Polya’s urn model to illustrate that shifts in paths become increasingly difficult further along the process.

²³These are considered endogenous because once activated they do not require from any exogenous factor to continue operating.

2.3.2 Environmental factors

Even the proponents of historical explanations suggest the existence of rival accounts based on the ongoing impact of exogenous mechanisms²⁴ or ‘constant causes’ (Stinchcombe 1968: 101–129; Collier and Collier 1991:35–39; Thelen 2003:214–217) that contribute to the persistence (or reversal) of a given trajectory in tool choice. In addition to the impact of past events and self-reinforcing mechanisms, this research assesses the continuing effect of context on the trajectories of tool choice. Context can be defined as the set of factors and circumstances that surround a particular episode at a specific time.²⁵ The impact of context can be traced at different levels and encompasses several environmental factors that have a bearing on tool choice through mainly cognitive but also material mechanisms.²⁶ This research analyses the impact on tool choice patterns of three sets of factors: ideas, political institutional structure and the international environment.

The utilisation of these three sets of factors seeks to facilitate explanations on how context affects tool choices but it is not an attempt to create holistic model. The goal is to assess the role of the specific structural and ideological setting in which decisions are made in contrast with the deterministic interpretations based on historical legacies. The selection of these categories is justified by theoretical considerations deriving from the public policy and policy instrument literature and the by their heuristic value. This thesis acknowledges the possibility of alternative categories of factors that could be used in the analysis.²⁷

‘Ideas’, the first category studied, points to the relevance of a cognitive dimension of context influencing decision-makers’ preferences on tools strategy. Ideas play an important role in policy choices and change. The independent role of ideas in determining the course of events has been sufficiently demonstrated in public policy in the last three decades.²⁸ The study of policy instruments also emphasises the role of ideas. As Linder and Peters (1989) put forward, the impact of context is not linear but it is mediated by the ideas and perceptions of the participants. Tools often take ideological connotations than can ‘make them attractive on a priori grounds regardless of their fit with the problem to be solved’ (Salamon 2002:602). Policy instruments ‘are also partly the components of the ideologies of political movements’ (Ringeling 2005:186). Different sets of principles or worldviews may lead to different approaches to governance.²⁹ Ideas and perceptions, however, influence decisions by specifying the nature of the problem, policy goals and the instruments considered available in a given situation (Hall 1993:279; Hall and Taylor 1996:948).

²⁴These mechanisms are considered ‘exogenous’ in contrast with the endogenous mechanisms of reproduction (self-reinforcement) or extinction (self-undermining) used in path-dependence accounts. See a similar argument in Rixen and Viola (2009). Note that the endogenous mechanisms are nonetheless triggered by past exogenous shocks in path-dependence accounts.

²⁵This conception of context is broader than that used by some historical neo-institutionalists who focus exclusively on the temporal context and not on the specific circumstances in a given situation (Pierson 2004:172).

²⁶Vickers (1965) refers to four dimensions of context in decision-making: mental, institutional, situational and ecological.

²⁷An example of a very influential alternative is the categorisation of factors into ‘ideas, interests and institutions’ (Goldstein 1993; Garrett and Weingast 1994; Majone 1996; Hall 1997; Hay 2004).

²⁸See Keynes (1936), Wilson (1980/ed.), Kingdon (1984), Majone (1989), Mashaw and Harfst (1990), Rose (1993), Goldstein and Keohane (1994/eds.), Hood and Jackson (1994), Blyth (1997).

²⁹See also Doern and Phidd (1983) and Hood (1983).

As cognitive psychology shows, the rationality of decision-makers is bounded (Weyland 2008). Roles or functions normally carry embedded norms of behaviour. In order to understand the choices of policy tools and the responses to them (which indirectly influence the choice, too), it is necessary to consider the interpretations that the individuals in the government and the armed forces make of their roles and responsibilities.³⁰ Several comparable theoretical perspectives such as the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 1989 and 2006), ‘isomorphism’ (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and ‘search for legitimacy’ (Beetham 1991; Tyler 2006:63) can be used to link the cognitive dimension of the context to the choice of policy tools.

It is important to note that the ‘interests’ of decision-makers in the government and the military are here included in the category ‘ideas’. This thesis avoids the methodological individualism that prevails in most rational choice studies.³¹ It assumes that actors are both socialised and strategic and therefore their actions are not merely a direct reflection of material interests. The perceptions (or ideas) that individuals have of their own material interests define their choices.³² Discerning the weight of interests versus ideas on decision-makers’ choices and the interactive effects that ideas may have on interests and vice-versa goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Moreover, the introduction of interests as an independent category in the case of civil-military relations would not be as elucidating as in other fields of political science where interests are usually measured in economic or voting terms and modelled mathematically.

The second factor, ‘political institutional structure’ captures how the political and administrative setting within a country stimulates or constrains not only the availability of the government’s basic resources but also the capacity to introduce changes in the utilisation of policy instruments (Doern and Phidd 1983:132; Ringeling 2005:192; Jennings and Lodge 2011). The underlying theoretical assumption is that the political and administrative structures shape political action and reform (Immergut 1992; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Huber et al. 1993; Knill 1999; Pollit and Bouckaert 2000). In line with other neo-institutional works, this thesis examines the distribution of power among political and societal actors (Hall and Taylor 1996:940–941). It focuses on the configuration and transformations of the executive and legislatures powers as well as on the administrative state apparatus throughout the dictatorships, transitions and democratic periods. It examines centralisation/fragmentation, symmetrical/asymmetrical relations of power, the administrative entrenchment and veto power of some actors and institutions in Portugal and Spain in order to establish whether they contributed to changes or stability in tool choices.

The last factor, the ‘international environment’ aims to capture how actors and institutions outside the national context affected tool choice in Portugal and Spain. This divide between ‘national’ and ‘international’ factors, serves to account for the existence of various levels of causal forces and to show that even apparently very closed Salazar and Franco regimes were not impervious to external influence.

³⁰Bressers and O’Toole (2005:134) argue that both policy-makers and the target group must be considered to develop a theory of instrument choice. Bruijn and Hufn (1998:26) follow a similar logic and stress the importance of policy networks and mutual dependency between policy-makers and the target of the policy.

³¹See a similar argument in Blyth (1997:230) and Checkel (1998:326) and Wendt (1998:112–113)


³²See for instance Goldstein and Keohane (1994/eds.), Wendt (1999:113–135) and Blyth (2002:39) and Hay (2007:68–73).

The international environment influences government choices both actively and passively. This impact can be captured by the three mechanisms of institutional isomorphism proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983): 'coercive', 'normative' and 'mimetic'.³³ First, foreign countries and international bodies may intentionally attempt to impose a certain structure, standard or operating procedure on domestic public policy, including military issues. The international community can exert control through 'coercive' mechanisms such as direct demands, edicts, sanctions and formal requirements. For instance, the international embargo and sanctions against Spain and the requirements for NATO membership imposed on Portugal are examples of coercive mechanisms.

Second, international actors can exert influence through international templates, prototypes or other methods of 'normative' pressures. These devices seek voluntary adherence to some principles so that governments shape their domestic policy making according to international standards (Radaelli 2000; Sahlin-Andersson 2002; Halpern and Le Galès 2011). Countries searching for legitimacy and resources, as was the case of Portugal and Spain from the dictatorial period until the first years of democracy, may become especially sensitive to the normative influence of international organisations.

Third, the international environment can unintentionally or passively condition tool choice. Under conditions of high uncertainty, governments tend to mimic choices made by other governments. Mimetic isomorphism was common Spain and Portugal. These countries often imitated each other as well as other Western European countries. Nonetheless, in this research the impact of the 'international environment' is circumscribed to the analysis of the coercive and normative processes. The mimetic processes linked to uncertainty but not directly associated to planned foreign action are dealt within the ideas section.

Figure 2: Explanation of trajectories in tool choice based on context



As Figure 2 shows, explanations based on the continuing action of environmental factors do not necessarily formulate institutional evolution in terms of persistent paths, critical junc-

³³These mechanisms through which international actors shape policy choice are inspired by the Lukes's (1974) three-dimensional approach to power.

tures and endogenous (although exogenously generated) self-reinforcing mechanisms. These explanations are less deterministic than the path-dependence ones and envisage trajectories that are more flexible. They usually do not refer to equilibrium situations and portray a more gradual evolution of tool choice. The current action of some environmental factors causes both stability and change.

2.4 Summary

This chapter has introduced the comparative and explanatory frameworks (the NATO scheme and neo-institutional theory) that constitute the analytical backbone and make this thesis a unique work in the field of civil-military relations.

The NATO scheme is a resource-based framework that classifies the tools of government alongside four categories: *nodality*, *authority*, *treasure* and *organisation*, each of which has been here divided into two subcategories (Table 6):

Table 6: Subcategories in the revised NATO framework

Basic Resources	Subcategories
Organisation	Coercive / non-coercive
Nodality	Information effectors / information detectors
Authority	Rewards and incentives / sanctions and constraints
Treasure	Staff expenditure / equipment expenditure

The NATO framework has been selected, among several other one-dimensional and multi-dimensional approaches, to establish trends and comparisons in choice of control tools made by Portuguese and Spanish governments. Multi-dimensional models have been ruled out because they complicate comparisons. If their attributes or dimensions are considered continuous, they require assigning quantifiable values to the tools, which in the context of civil-military relations does not seem viable. If their attributes are considered discrete the tools would be scattered in the many categories elicited from the intersection of the several dimensions. Analytical reasons justify advise the utilisation of the NATO framework among other existing one-dimensional generic typologies. Basing the distinction on kind and not on degree facilitates the classification effort. The NATO framework is parsimonious but flexible enough to capture all the empirical evidence encountered in the analysis of civil-military relations in the Iberian Peninsula. Its four resources synthesise most of the categories proposed in other generic typologies and none of them is redundant. Finally, this classification accommodates both substantive and procedural types of instruments.

Alongside the NATO comparative framework, this thesis uses an explanatory framework grounded in neo-institutionalism. The policy instruments or tools of government utilised to maintain the military subordinated can be interpreted as institutions structuring civil-military relations. This research contrasts two alternative neo-institutionalist explanations for the evolution of the Spanish and Portuguese governments' control toolkits. One is based on the impact of history in tool choice: the evolution of tool choice is shaped by macro-historical events

producing exogenous shocks in civil-military relations and triggering endogenous mechanisms of self-reproduction and new stable paths. The other angle emphasises the role of context and studies three sets of environmental factors (ideas, political institutional structure and the international environment) that act as constant causes shaping trajectories. This thesis explores the advantages and limitations of the two approaches but it is beyond its scope to categorically refute or validate either one of them. This research suggests the complementarity of the two views and, more importantly, serves to illustrate that neo-institutionalism can be productively integrated in the analysis of civil-military relations and tool choice.

The following chapters now turn to the empirical evidence collected from the historical analysis of Portugal and Spain.

Part II

PORtUGAL

3 History of contemporary civil-military relations in Portugal

3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the political and military developments essential for the understanding of tool choices and the historical and environmental factors that stimulated them.¹ Civil-military relations were very turbulent from the Napoleonic Wars and the fall of absolutism to the end of the First Portuguese Republic. During this convoluted period of over a hundred years, the military took a leading role in a process of redefinition of political power. The level of military participation in politics is reflected in the number of military uprisings or 'pronunciamentos', by their involvement in the enactment and modification of constitutions and fundamental laws and by the fact that most Portuguese governments were led by military men (Appendix A). Military participation in politics became a tradition entrenched in the ideational and institutional setting.² The military continued to threaten Salazar's governments, provoked the fall of Caetano in 1974 and later shaped the democratisation process. Many officers, as well as politicians and other societal actors in Portugal, understood the recourse to force as legitimate instrument to reach power or achieve certain political goals. Thus, the control of the military was a top priority for any Portuguese government.

The analysis of the civil-military relations follows a roughly chronological structure. It scrutinises the history of civil-military relations, first during the period of the Estado Novo (Section 3.2) and, then during the transition and initial stages of democracy in Portugal (Section 3.3). The section on the Estado Novo dictatorship is divided in six subsections dealing with the emergence of Salazar and the Estado Novo; the political institutional setting of the regime; the Estado Novo's international relations; the impact of NATO membership; the ethos and views of the Portuguese military and the downfall of the regime during Caetano's rule. The subsequent analysis of the transition and the early stages of democracy is divided into two periods. First, the period of provisional governments, from the Carnation Revolution to the enactment of the 1976 Constitution, in which the revolutionary bodies selected governments and the military controlled policy and politics. Second, the period of constitutional governments until 1986, when a civilian president, Mario Soares, replaced General Eanes, the last military president, and Portugal became member of the EEC. During this period, the military were gradually disentangled from politics.

¹Note that the analysis of the tools will be developed in Chapters 4, 5 and 9 and that of the explanatory factors in Chapter 10.

²See an extensive list of internal conflicts in Portugal with the participation of the military (Valério 2001:814–831).

This chapter explains the context in which the government operated and introduces most of the factors and forces that conditioned governments' policies and tools. The explanation of which will be developed in the following chapters.

3.2 Estado Novo

3.2.1 Salazar and the inception of Estado Novo

Military infighting, financial problems and civilian political pressures weakened the military dictatorship that had replaced the First Republic in 1926 (Appendix A; Ferreira 1992:145). In 1928, António de Oliveira Salazar, a former university professor, was appointed Minister of Finance and granted special powers to tackle the economic crisis. Although its inability to cope with the problems of Portugal discredited the military government, the initial success of the corporatist economic system consolidated Salazar as the political leader of Portugal. In 1932, he was appointed Prime Minister and launched a Constitutional project to create a civilian-led dictatorship: the 'Estado Novo' (New State).³ The Estado Novo should not be considered an extension of the military dictatorship established in 1926 nor a radical depart from it.⁴ Military officers continued to occupy crucial positions in the government and administration and during the Estado Novo, the military were more politicised and unruly than in Spain. However, the Estado Novo, like Francoism, was a civilianised authoritarian regime (Linz and Stepan 1996:117). The Estado Novo became an autarkic and complex system of equilibriums between the interests of elite groups, with an important level of dependence on the colonies as source of commodities and as market for Portuguese manufactured products. Conservatism, traditionalism, Catholicism, ruralism and paternalism were the markers of its identity (Rosas 1989; Medina 2000:42).

The autocratic ideologies that emerged in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s shaped the regime from its beginnings (Campinos 1975). Salazar believed authoritarianism was not a transient trend but the political model of the future (Salazar 1935:345–346). Salazar defined the Estado Novo as a 'national and authoritarian state' (Salazar 1935:335) and in 1936 he wrote: '[w]e are anti-parliamentarians, anti-democrats, anti-liberal, and we are determined to establish a Corporatist State' (Salazar 1939:29). Salazar despised the liberal concept of citizenship which he considered as being against common interest.⁵ Social and economic rights were above

³The Constitution that officially inaugurated the Estado Novo (19/3/1933) was grounded in the 'Carta Constitucional da Monarquia' (1826), the 1911 Constitution, the Weimar Republic Constitution (1919) and in the institutional model of the military dictatorship (1926–1932) (Caetano 1957:8). The 1933 Constitution together with the Colonial Act of 1930 became the legal foundations of the Estado Novo (Salazar 1939:27).

⁴Salazar claimed 'although the Dictatorship ends, the revolution continues'. (Speech, 9/12/1934, Salazar 1935: 385). Salazar had justified the necessity of the military dictatorship as a means of restoring the 'order' in Portugal, 'imposing silence to some' and ensuring the necessary conditions of 'tranquillity and security' for public governance (Speech to military officers, 28/5/1930, Salazar 1935:52).

⁵For instance he said that '[t]he absolute liberty does not exist' and 'there cannot be liberty against the general interest' (SPN n.d.1:29). In the Congress of National Union (26/5/1934) he claimed that Portugal was a 'national and authoritarian' system, although different from a totalitarian state (Salazar 1935:335–338). Salazar also wrote that 'it is not necessary to believe that authority is to be found in the masses, that justice is ruled by

individual rights. Everything was subordinated to the ‘national interest’.⁶ This autocratic and interventionist ideology explains some of the choices made concerning information control and coercive organisation tools (Chapters 4, 10).

The military coup had the support of a wide range of parties and pressure groups. Therefore, the ideology in the Estado Novo was an amalgamation of different conservative groups’ doctrines. Although conservative traditional ideas dominated the government since its inception, the Estado Novo had an eclectic position vis-à-vis the different doctrines and was designed to enhance the cohabitation and consensus among the ruling elites.⁷ The birth of the single party National Union aimed at the reconciliation of the different political streams of the Portuguese right. Like Franco, Salazar did not endorse any particular doctrine or political stream. He used them to counterbalance each other avoiding the concentration of power in a single faction and thus enhance his own personal power.

The Estado Novo was a system of limited pluralism, with a less well-defined guiding ideology than the totalitarian regimes and a less relevant role of the single party and paramilitary forces (Linz 1970 [1964]:255–256). Due to his religious beliefs and law education, Salazar rejected totalitarianism (Salazar 1935:336–337; Braga da Cruz 1988:49). In 1934, Salazar banned the extremist National-Syndicalist party, also known as ‘camisas azuis’ (blue shirts), that imitated the Italian Fascism and German Nazism.⁸ The government strategy was to minimise the use of terror (Martins 1969:263). Compared to the Franco’s regime, the Estado Novo had a low level of political imprisonment and violence (Pimlott and Seaton 1983:45). This was also reflected in the relatively soft punishments applied to military insurgents (Chapter 4). Overall, the Estado Novo can be considered as authoritarian regime of corporatist nature but not a totalitarian regime (Lucena 1976, 1984; Linz and Stepan 1996).

Salazar was concerned by the political activity of the military. Salazar publicly expressed that they should be detached from politics and subordinated to the government. He believed that the military, which were becoming used to civilian life, would gradually lose their esprit de corps and sense of discipline. Salazar advocated the professionalisation, reorganisation the military and the improvement of the equipment and conditions of the armed forces would help the military to detach themselves from politics (Ferro 2003 [1932–1938]:21–23; Salazar 1935:103). However, the evidence suggests that in practical terms Salazar was less concerned

numbers, and that the administration of the law can be carried out by the mob instead of an élite whose duty is to lead and to sacrifice itself for the rest of the community’ (Salazar 1939:30).

⁶See number III and VIII of the ‘Decalogo do Estado Novo’, (Salazar 1935:84–87). See picture in Medina (2000:136) portraying the structure of the Estado Novo.

⁷See for instance Porch (1977:19), Pinto (1994:67–75), Azevedo (1999) and Medina (2000:21). The Portuguese Estado Novo was not the result of a party or political movement (Schmitter 1979:6). God, Fatherland and Family constituted the basic elements of Salazar’s ideological discourse (Medina 2000:55–67). Martins Barata was the artist that best reflected Salazar’s conception Estado Novo. His design ‘A lição de Salazar’ (in Medina 2000:63) is the most clear example of the ‘pax ruris’ ideal in the Estado Novo, portraying the ideal life with clear references to religion, nationalism and family. Salazar was extremely religious. His discourse was very nationalistic, but he was pragmatic, distrustful and not close to the sebastianist or messianic streams of thought or to the radical revolutionary right (Pinto 1994; Medina 2000).

⁸Pinto (1994). The movement, led by Francisco Rolão Preto, reached 50,000 members, while the coetaneous falangista party in Spain that did not surpass 10,000 members (Antunes 2000:32). Salazar believed that violence was not a suitable method for Portugal and even labelled the ‘camisas azuis’ as ‘heretics’ (Medina 1979:240–243). Salazar’s discourse also lacked the anti-semitic and racist references common in other European fascist-like movements (Medina 2000:26).

with developing military professionalism and modernisation than with co-opting their leadership so they remained subordinated (Wheeler 1979b; Faria 2000). He did not succeed in establishing strong and clear boundaries between politics and the military, which periodically threatened his government. The numerous coup attempts that Salazar faced (Section 3.2.5) show that Salazar was in a weaker position vis-à-vis the military than Franco, who was essentially unchallenged. This discrepancy in the relative strength of each dictator is also reflected in the type control mechanisms utilised by them (Chapters 4, 8, and 10).

3.2.2 The political institutional setting

Salazar defined the Portuguese Republic as a Corporatist State (Salazar 1939:21). According to him, all the sovereignty rests with the Nation, independently of the form of the regime. The Nation was composed of ‘natural organs’, among which the military was one of the most important.⁹ The longevity of the Estado Novo was based on Salazar’s management of elites’ equilibria rather than on his personal supreme authority (Rosas 1986, 1989).

The Estado Novo was a highly centralised political system in which Salazar held extensive powers and managed to offset gradually the sway of the military who had previously helped install him (Almeida and Pinto 2003:12–14). Since his appointment as Finance Minister in 1928, Salazar held a strong grip on the government. He was granted special powers over the rest of the ministries;¹⁰ to the extent that he became known as the ‘Finance Dictator’ (Nunes 1930). Within a year, he managed to balance the budget and stabilise the Portuguese currency (Gallagher 1983:48). The positive economic results in 1928–1929 increased his personal prestige enormously (Antunes 1994:16–17). Finally, in 1932 he was appointed Prime Minister. During the 1930s, Salazar’s influence and powers grew. The Spanish Civil War and Second World War accelerated the process of personal empowerment. On top of being Prime Minister (1932–1968), Salazar accumulated other positions in the government, such as Finance Minister (1928–1940), War Minister (1936–1944), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1936–1949), Defence Minister (1961–1962) even the interim President of the Republic (in 1951).

The Estado Novo had an elected president and a prime minister (PM). The executive power was held by the PM (Graham 1975; Campinos 1978). Officially, the PM was appointed by the President of the Republic, who in turn was elected by the people in often unfair elections. However, Salazar effectively had the upper hand in the power relationship because he controlled the official party National Union Central Commission, which nominated the presidential candidate.¹¹ The centralisation of powers in the hands of Salazar was so evident that Caetano referred to the Estado Novo as a system of ‘prime-minister presidentialism’ (Caetano 1957:67).

⁹Salazar defended the notion of organic society in which the basic unit was not the individual but the ‘natural groups’, among which the family was the basic one (SPN undated 1:29).

¹⁰The Finance Ministry could exert veto power on any type of augmentation of expenses in the other ministries and led plans to reduce expenses and increase revenues (Salazar 1935:4–6; Salazar 1939:44). The sessions of the Council of Ministers were replaced by individual meetings with the ministers (Almeida and Pinto 2003:12).

¹¹The concentration of executive power under Salazar is revealed by the surprise and malaise of President Craveiro Lopes when he learnt in 1958 that he was not nominated for re-election by Salazar (Caetano 2000 [1975]:775–776).

Salazar strengthened his executive power and repeatedly rejected parliamentarism, which he feared.¹² The chambers of the Portuguese parliament, the National Assembly and Corporative Chamber merely had a symbolic role. The legislative power of the Chambers was very limited. According to Schmitter (1999:81–90) they were employed by Salazar and Caetano as a ‘divide-and-rule’ device and a source of internal and external legitimacy. The National Assembly was an institution inherited from the First Republic. It had a higher autonomy than the Francoist *Cortes* (Fernandes 2006:154–158) but did not control the actions of the government or the military. Caetano referred to it as the organisation where the ‘little political activity’ in Portugal took place.¹³ The Corporative Chamber was comparable to an upper chamber where the productive sectors and institutions such as the Church, the universities and the armed forces were represented. There was a National Defence Section in the Corporative Chamber but the military were also represented among other corporative or interest groups. Such was the extent of military representation that 15.2% of its members had a military education (Ferreira 2009:345). However, as Caetano expressed in a private letter to Salazar in 1948, just before becoming the president of the Chamber, the institution was still far from representative (Antunes 1994:239–240).

The absence of a strong party system empowered Salazar. The single party National Union was founded in 1930, inspired by the Spanish Patriotic Union of Miguel Primo de Rivera.¹⁴ It was defined officially as a non-partisan organisation independent from the state with voluntary membership (SPN 1943:15)¹⁵ that did not interfere in the government actions and had very little influence in the selection of the members of the government and senior officials. The National Union was less autonomous than the Spanish Falange (Moore 1970:52) and did not have any significant influence on the strategy of control of the military.

In sum, the concentration of executive and legislative powers and the absence of political veto players increased the resources at Salazar’s disposal and placed him in a position to impose his personal preferences in terms of choices of control tools.

The military institution was very prominent during the Estado Novo and held much political influence. Due to the general weakness of civil institutions and especially the political ones, the armed forces acquired a stronger role. Especially during the initial years of the Estado Novo, the army was granted a large degree of autonomy as means to incentivise its support for the regime (Ferro 2003 [1932–1938]:22–23). However, later Salazar, concerned with the military subordination, took direct control of the War Ministry during critical periods such as the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War and the beginning of the Colonial Wars. Moreover Salazar surrounded himself with trusted officers in order to strengthen his control on the military. Fernando Santos Costa provides the best example: in 1936, the Army Captain and former Salazar student became Undersecretary of State and, in 1944, War Minister.

¹²See Salazar (1935:81–84; 1939:98–101). Salazar confessed to Ferro that he feared the Parliament: ‘O Parlamento assusta-me tanto que chego a ter receio [...] daquele que há-de sair do novo estatuto’ (Ferro 1933:162; Ferro 2000 [1932–1938]:95). Salazar blamed the parliamentary system for the failure of Portuguese democracy (SPN undated1:25).

¹³Letter to Salazar on 25/8/1950 (Antunes 1994:266).

¹⁴Antunes (1994:20). The National Union acted as the single party in Portugal with the exception of the 1945 legislative and the 1949 presidential elections to which the opposition Democratic Unity Movement also concurred.

¹⁵It was called ‘associação’ or ‘voluntariado político’.

Table 7: Military Ministers as a Percentage of Total Number of Ministers.

Cabinets (% of military)	Jun. 1926	Apr. 1933	Feb. 1938	May 1941	Jul. 1945	Jul. 1951	Feb. 1957	Jul. 1962	Oct. 1969	Mar. 1975
Spain			41.6	46.1	50	37.5	44.4	42.1	26.3	15.8
Portugal	37.5	22.2	22.2	11.1	33.3	35.7	21.4	13.3	18.2	33.3

Sources: Aguero 1995:46; Antunes 1994:409–414. Author's own analysis.

For 22 years, until 1958, when he was replaced by Botelho Moniz as National Defence Minister, Santos Costa's power in the State apparatus was second only to that of Salazar (Antunes 2000:58).

Salazar awarded his military supporters with important positions in the State apparatus. Although slightly lower than in Spain, the participation of the military was always important in Estado Novo's governments, 26.2% of the ministers had a military occupational background (Almeida and Pinto 2003:25, see also Table 7). Many officers were also members of the Chambers and occupied high-level positions in the administration. For instance, from 1934 to 1939, 16.7% of the members of the Assembly and 9.3% of the Corporative Chamber were military officers. From 1934 to 1942, the representation of the military in the top political-administrative positions was only inferior to that of the groups of 'professors and educators' and to that of 'lawyers and judges' and much higher than the representation of landowners, industrialists, engineers, physicians or workers (Schmitter 1979:12, 16, 19). The military were also very well-represented in the Censorship Services, the Republican National Guard (GNR) and the Legion. In sum, the military had a privileged position in the Estado Novo from which they could influence politics and civil-military relations, including the control mechanisms themselves (Chapter 10).

3.2.3 The Estado Novo and the foreign powers

The Estado Novo's civil-military relations have to be examined against the backdrop of Portuguese international relations. Spain had opted for a certain isolationism, especially after the Napoleonic invasions and the Congress of Vienna. In contrast, Portugal due to its historical alliance with the UK, its colonial possessions as well as its fear of its larger neighbour always sought to be more actively involved in international affairs than Spain (Ferreira 1980:48; 1989; 2006; Oliveira 2007). The strategic importance placed by the UK and its allies on the Portuguese Atlantic isles and the longstanding Anglo-Portuguese treaties enabled Portugal to play an important role in the complex system of international relations during both World Wars. The international environment constrained some of the choices of policy instruments but also provided opportunities to strengthen government control over the military. Salazar's foreign policy aimed to consolidate internally the Estado Novo regime (Ferreira 2006).

The special nature of the Portuguese-Spanish relations can be considered the main factor shaping Portuguese foreign policy (Ferreira 1989:51–53). During the Spanish Civil War, the Portuguese government sided with Franco's camp in order to reinforce and legitimise the

authoritarian Estado Novo. Salazar could not completely refuse the British pressures for an embargo but delayed its application (Rosas 1988:44). Especially during the initial months of the war, material support to the Francoist troops was very important (Oliveira 1987:154–155). Salazar and the military were extremely concerned about the possibility of a Spanish invasion by either the Republican or Francoist camps.¹⁶ Salazar took advantage of the threat of Civil War to take over the War Ministry in 1936 and strengthen his leadership. In 1939, Salazar and Franco signed the Iberian Pact of Defence, which was extended by the Additional Protocol in 1940.

However, despite the good relations between the neighbouring regimes, the fear of Spain remained entrenched among the Portuguese military and political elites.¹⁷ Thus, during the Second World War Salazar campaigned for Spanish neutrality (Nogueira 2000: 210; Beirôco 2003:67–68) and later for Spain's integration in NATO (Vicente 1996:303–307).¹⁸ Salazar considered the Iberian Peninsula as the last bastion of a Christian and conservative Europe, with Spain acting as a gatekeeper that helped maintaining stability in Portugal and protect its borders against a communist attack (Telo 1996:27, 64).

The Axis powers also affected Portuguese civil-military relations. Salazar sought recognition and material support from them. Portugal became one of the targets of the intensive Nazi propaganda in the second half of the 1930s.¹⁹ Germany put pressure on Portugal, collaborating with the Portuguese secret services and cultivating institutions such as the paramilitary Portuguese Legion and 'Mocidade' (Stone 2005:208). The use of these paramilitary organisations and military police forces as a check on the armed forces was directly inspired by Italy and Germany. Germany became the main supplier of armaments in the late 1930s until 1944 in exchange for wolfram and food and as a means to counterbalance British influence (Telo 1996:171–172).

Notwithstanding, Salazar feared that its relative weakness in the European context could make Portugal the target of German or Spanish expansionist ambitions. Salazar opted for declaring neutrality, adopting a non-belligerent stance but facilitating the action of the Allies. This was also meant to honour the historical alliance with the UK and gain support among the

¹⁶See for instance PVDE confidential report in 1937 about the Spanish Civil War denouncing that the Spanish Republican Government was already instigating the revolution in Portugal (AOS/CO/IN-8A, Folder 3, Page 61). Salazar among his personal documents kept a news clipping of the 'Evening Standard' (16/6/1939) indicating there was a strong movement among Franco's supporters in favour of the annexation of Portugal (AOS/CO/IN-8A, Folder 5, Section 9, Pages 296–298) and another one of the 'Reynolds News' (28/8/1939) arguing that Portugal for the UK was rather a liability than an asset because 'her military forces are negligible and her territory might be invaded by Franco' (AOS/CO/IN-8A, Folder 5, Section 26, Page 425–426).

¹⁷Gallagher (1983:150). Salazar was so concerned with Spain that the Portuguese National Propaganda Service edited books in Spanish, such as 'Habla Salazar' (SPN undated:1) or 'Portugal ante la guerra civil de España: documentos y notas' (SPN undated).

¹⁸For instance, in a report on 20 June 1949, the Corporative Chamber advised Salazar to sign the North Atlantic Treaty without any hesitation but explicitly lamented the exclusion of Spain (AOS/CO/IN-17-1, Folder 3, Pages 31–32).

¹⁹Up to 70 German civil servants worked permanently on Portuguese territory from 1941 to 1943 producing and distributing pamphlets, publications, radio programs and films. They stressed the similarities between the German Nazi government and the Estado Novo and attacked the UK and communism (Telo 1990; Paulo 1994:23–25). A PVDE report to Salazar (16/9/1939) indicates that German professors in Portugal distributed Fichte-Bund pamphlets (AOS/CO/IN-8A, Folder 5, Section 27, Page 440).

senior ranks, which were traditionally anglophilic²⁰ and considered Portuguese military material capabilities clearly insufficient to undertake an active role in the war (Ferreira 1992:203).

Salazar, who initially showed some anti-American preconceptions did not fully realise that, after the Second World War, the US occupied the traditional role of the UK as the main power in the Western world (Oliveira 1989:83). He rejected the first stage of the Marshall Plan (1948–1949) missing the opportunity to use the US economic support to increase military expenditure. Later, Salazar quickly changed his views. Portugal requested the participation in the second stage of the Marshall Plan (1949–1950), agreed to the American use of the Lajes military base in the Azores (1948), became a founding member of NATO (1949), and signed a Defence Agreement with the US (1951) (Beirôco 2003:72–73; Ferreira 2006:90–91). The alliance with the US and other major Western powers reinforced most of the Estado Novo's basic resources and influenced tool choice (Chapters 4, 10).

3.2.4 NATO membership

Portugal was offered to become a founding member of NATO, mainly due to the strategic value of some of its overseas ports. The position of the armed forces, expressed through the War Minister General Santos Costa, was clearly in favour of NATO membership (Nogueira 1980:142–144). Salazar saw an opportunity to finally consolidate the subordination of the military and was also supportive of NATO membership. Although the Portuguese government was genuinely worried with the defence of its territory, the main reason for joining NATO was to increase the prestige of the regime (Crollen 1973:45–48).

The integration into the Alliance in 1949 had special relevance in terms of civil-military relations. NATO pushed the regime to launch some measures to adapt its structures and multiply the contacts with members of other more modern armed forces at different levels. NATO introduced a new doctrine, procedures, organisational techniques and methods of action (Ferreira 1992:257; Telo 1999:71). NATO contributed to the idea that civilians should monitor military and defence issues.²¹ NATO experts, after evaluating the Portuguese Armed Forces, considered the organisation too complex and inadequate and military training, including the preparation of the generals, to be deficient (Matos 2004:170). The government implemented the NATO recommendations by restructuring the armed forces within the new National Defence Ministry.²² The pressure of the US through the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and

²⁰Despite the fact that the entourage of Salazar was fundamentally Germanophile (especially the Marine Minister). PVDE report in 1939 (AOS/CO/IN-8A, Folder 5, Section 29, Page 458).

²¹For instance, Washington barred a Portuguese Army General, who was covering the absence of the Defence Minister, from attending the NATO Defence Committee. The US representatives stressed that the committee had to be composed of civilian representatives. The Portuguese Ambassador Theotonio Pereira was finally named representative for the Committee (Confidential memo addressed to Salazar, 29/9/1949, AOS/CO/NE-17-1, Folder 4, Section 41, Pages 181–183 and NATO document, 5/10/1949, AOS/CO/NE-17-1, Folder 5, Section 3, Pages 253–256).

²²The Chief of the Joint Staff, the Higher Council of National Defence, the Higher Council of War and the Higher Military Council were also reformed. A report from the Army Chief of Staff Barros Rodrigues (1/5/1953) refers to the process of introduction through regulations, instructions and handbooks with NATO doctrine. These documents were elaborated in collaboration with the officers that had attended courses abroad (AOS/CO/GR-10, Folder 16, Pages 561–562). NATO suggested improving the education and training of military

important military leaders²³ was fundamental to the development of a policy strategy based on non-coercive *organisation* tools (Chapter 4 Section 4.2.2). The MAAG suggested reinforcing the instruction of Portuguese officers, concentrating efforts on the preparation of one modern division, and eliminating the elitist Corps of High Staff. The government followed most of the Group's suggestions. For instance, the Santa Margarida division became the first truly modern one; many officers were trained by US military staff and others went to American academies. Although the Corps of High Staff was not eliminated the entry requirements were broadened (Matos 2004:170). Furthermore, NATO also fostered the government's use of *treasure* tools (Chapter 4 Section 4.5). NATO advised Salazar to increase military salaries and equipment expenditure. NATO allies and especially the US supplied weapons and materials and contributed to the development of a Portuguese defence industry. In sum, the reforms imposed by NATO in the late 1940s and 1950s aimed to facilitate the coordination of the Armed Forces and to increase the operational capacity.

The officers that in the 1950s were sent abroad to be trained in other NATO member states became known as the 'NATO Generation'. Through their international experiences, many of these officers changed their negative opinions about the Western democracies and their defence methods. They soon occupied high positions in the hierarchy and influenced successive generations of officers supporting the introduction of the NATO doctrine and templates (Telo 1999:84–85). The hundreds of officers trained in the US later trained thousands of other Portuguese military. These officers had embraced and were promoting the 'occupational' component of the military profession among the ranks (Carrilho 1992). Owing to the influence of NATO, they developed a new understanding of their profession as well as new preoccupations and claims. Many of these officers opposed the regime and participated in conspiracies from the early 1960s.

Portugal remained the sole non-democratic member of NATO, perceived as a strategic ally but an inconvenient colonial power. The path of the transformations induced by NATO slowed down when the Colonial Wars erupted. NATO had excluded the Portuguese colonies from its scope even though the US and some of its European members benefitted from the overseas Portuguese ports. The dictatorial character and methods of the Estado Novo were not seriously contested until 1958, partly due to the country's declared anti-communism. The disagreements around the Portuguese colonial policy made the US reduce the number of Portuguese officers in American schools, especially after 1958. In 1961, the US apparently backed the Defence Minister Botelho Moniz's plot against Salazar. However, the loyal military with the aid of the GNR and the Portuguese Legion kept the situation under control (Maxwell 1995:47–51; Rodrigues 1996; Ferreira 2006:110). Salazar, aware of the American collaboration with the plotters and the independence movements in Africa (Mahoney 1983:187–222; Antunes 1991), decided to distance the Portuguese Armed Forces from the US and NATO and reduce

cadres and specialists (internal report of the Army General Staff, 30/6/1953, AOS/CO/GR-10, Folder 16, Pages 563–582).

²³For instance, Marshall Montgomery criticised that the education was based almost exclusively on humanities, and that there were some examples that illustrated the backwardness of the Portuguese military, such as the fact that the officers still used horses and riding boots, and different uniforms from the rest of the soldiers (making them perfect targets for snipers). Montgomery insisted in the necessity of multiplying the contacts of Portuguese officers with NATO (Telo 1996:242–243).

the military cooperation and exchange with them.²⁴ This departure had an important impact on tool choice; the government abandoned most of the NATO-sponsored changes introduced in the control mix (Chapter 4, 9, 10).

Salazar, however, did not manage to reverse the impact NATO had had on the way the military perceived their profession and government policies. The contacts with NATO had produced profound changes in the mentality of many officers. The military claimed better training and instruction programmes, a new territorial organisation, provision of housing, health care and education for the families, as well as better equipment and material facilities.²⁵ NATO had served as a yardstick to diagnose the deficiencies of the Portuguese Armed Forces.²⁶ NATO reforms made the military adopt a more critical stance on their profession and government policies. Many young officers lost part of the respect for their older superiors and the government that maintained a more traditional or outdated vision of the armed forces. This damaged the level of discipline within the ranks (Telo 1996:329–330, 246). Many military leaders requested political changes and most of those involved in Botelho Moniz's coup belonged to the 'NATO generation'. The influence of NATO can be traced up to the military that led the Carnation Revolution in 1974. In sum, NATO produced a 'quiet revolution' ('revolução serena') in the armed forces (Telo 1996:201). This revolution had a direct impact on the level of professionalism of the military but also an indirect one, raising awareness of the problems of the Estado Novo and the Portuguese Armed Forces. Ultimately, it became one of the triggers for the overthrow of the regime in 1974.²⁷

3.2.5 Attitudes and views of the military

Throughout the Estado Novo period, Portuguese military held more political power and were more prone to intervene in politics than their Spanish counterparts (Gunther 1995:74). The rebellions in Madeira (1931), in Marinha Grande (1934), in the river Tagus (1936), in Mealhada (1946), the 'Abrilada' revolutionary plot (1947), the rebellion of Sé (1959), the Botelho Moniz's coup (1961), the rebellion in Beja (1962) and the Carnation Revolution (1974), are probably the best known expressions of military discontent and opposition but not the sole ones. The sheer number of military plots and coup attempts, up to twenty between 1926 and 1974 (Manuel 1995), shows that subordination was not fully achieved. Moreover, senior

²⁴Salazar declared in 1963: 'I want this country poor but independent' and 'I do not want it colonised by the American capital'. Salazar cited in Franco Nogueira's diaries (Antunes 1985 v.1:23).

²⁵For instance, the Army report 'The great problems of the Army' (January 1958) makes continuous references to the need of modern equipment and techniques, better integration of the operational capacities of the three branches and problems of preparation of the Portuguese Army. This report set the basis for the reforms from 1958 to 1961 (AHM, divisão 1, secção 39, caixa 1, numero 1, documento 9).

²⁶See references and comparisons to other NATO countries in the General Programme for the reorganisation of the Army (AHM, divisão 1, secção 39, caixa 1, numero 1, documento 10). This programme or reform was truncated by the colonial conflict and the 1961 coup. See also the secret declassified document of the Army Minister 'Politica Militar Nacional' of April 1959, for comparative tables with the other NATO countries (AHM, divisão 1, secção 39, caixa 1, numero 56).

²⁷According to Telo (1996:344). NATO pushed Portugal to democracy. See also the 'Chronicle of events of April 1974' by Captain Salgueiro Maia in pointing at NATO membership as one of the antecedents for the Revolution claiming that the more intense contact with the exterior fostered the criticisms about the internal situation (AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numero 47).

officers led most political opposition movements.²⁸ This section shows that the role of the military as guardians against the internal enemy, their approach to discipline and authority and the diversity of ideologies are fundamentally linked to the diverse sociological composition of the armed forces. Their unfulfilled corporatist claims worsened their attitude vis-à-vis the civilian leadership.

The Portuguese military developed a strong interest in politics. The military power of the Portuguese Armed Forces was relatively low compared to other European countries. The Portuguese Armed Forces were corporatist and very bureaucratic, and did not value internal competition or innovation. Patriotism took precedence over technical skills (Telo 1996:230–231). Their lack of material, preparation and discipline was revealed during their participation in the First World War (Ferreira 1992; Marques 2004). Portugal did not have the capacity to guarantee the defence of its territory through military means and the colonial map did not allow further conquests. These factors contributed to the redefinition of the role of the military whose mission became to act as guardians of the internal order, a sort of police patrol that had to deal with radical political opposition movements and revolts, as in the case of Spain. Their role as guarantors of law and order and in the country made them more prone to intervention in politics (Welch 1987: 22). The military coups were justified by the alleged dangers or stability problems in Portugal.

The concern about military intervention was very high in the government but also among many young officers.²⁹ Most military reforms during the regime aimed to diminish the military's involvement in politics and to subordinate them to the civilian power. However, they did not manage to radically change the perception of the military as responsible for maintaining order in the metropole and especially in the overseas territories. The type of involvement of the armed forces in the colonial conflicts later reinforced their self-perception as guardians of the internal order.

The military conception of discipline and authority was another important factor explaining civil-military relations. The supreme authority they had historically obeyed, the monarch, had been ousted in 1910. Discipline in the Portuguese Armed Forces was based on the perceived capacity of leadership rather than on a strict legal-rational authority (Carrilho 1985:453). Salazar had earned a reputation as a skilled leader especially during the times of instability and crisis of the military dictatorship. In the 1930s, the young officers that had participated in the 1926 coup were those that more strongly supported Salazar. These young military had seen their careers obstructed by the inherited excess of officers from the First World War and had blamed the senior ranks for the poor situation of the armed forces and Portugal. Salazar decided to introduce a set of reforms, mainly aimed at subordinating the military to his civilian authority (Chapter 4 Section 4.4; Faria 2000). The senior ranks wanted to maintain greater autonomy but did not manage to block the reforms (Telo 1996:172–173). In the process,

²⁸For instance, José Norton de Matos (1948), Manuel Quintão Meireles (1951), Humberto Delgado (1958) and Craveiro Lopes (1958–1962) (Antunes 2000:59)

²⁹By 1931, Major Barros Rodrigues presented a plan for the reform of the armed forces, requesting a military policy closer to that of the UK and stressing the need for the demilitarisation of politics. Barros asked for the substitution of all military currently occupying political or administrative positions by civilians, as a means of initiating 'a neutralisation of the War Minister in political terms, absolutely indispensable for the progress and well being of the Nation'. Internal report sent to Salazar (11/7/1931) (AOS/CO/GR-1A, Folder 4, Document 1, Pages 117–118). Barros's proposed reform was not accomplished.

many of the old officers were forced into retirement and were replaced by younger military officers whose allegiance to Salazar and his government was reinforced.

The emphasis on leadership rather than on hierarchical rank was accentuated during the Colonial Wars, albeit not to the advantage of the government. The colonial wars were fought in small units, and in most of the field operations, there was no officer above the rank of captain. Loyal senior officers mainly stayed in Lisbon, far from the conflict zones, devoting themselves to administrative tasks. This weakened the authority of the senior officers vis-à-vis the middle-rank officers that had created a reputation by fighting. Moreover, some military leaders in the colonies, such as Spínola in Guinea, Kaúlza in Mozambique and Luiz Cunha in Angola, exhibited caudillistic traits and did not follow a strategy that was fully coherent with government policies.³⁰ The government also lost part of its authority with the substitution of Salazar by Caetano, who did not enjoy the popularity or legitimacy of his predecessor. Contrary to Franco, Salazar did not make any effort to groom a successor. In the eyes of the military, this resulted in a lack of legitimacy of Caetano and provoked a decrease in the utilisation (and effectiveness) of authority-based control tools during his rule (Chapter 4).

The composition of the Portuguese Armed Forces was more heterogeneous than that of Spanish ones. The Portuguese military were not as ideologically homogeneous and monolithically supportive of the government as in Francoist Spain. Different ideological factions existed within the armed forces (Fernandes 2006:164). The sociological composition of the armed forces was also diverse (Carrilho 1985). The Second World War entailed massive recruitment and the mobilisation of troops stimulating the influx of young militia officers with diverse backgrounds (many from urban areas) and political ideas (liberals, monarchists, integralists and socialists).³¹ The sociological composition of the Portuguese Armed Forces further diversified from the late 1950s due to NATO and the Colonial Wars. Recruitment patterns changed when Salazar, following NATO advice, abolished the tuition fees in the Military Academy and offered salaries to cadets in 1958 (Schmitter 1975:16). Most of the officers that later plotted against Caetano had graduated after 1958 and their socio-economic backgrounds were modest (Porch 1977:68). The colonial wars resulted in an extension of the period of service and made a military career a less attractive means of social mobility for middle and upper-middle class youth. At the same time, the incorporation of middle to lower class officers contributed to the introduction of less conservative ideas that sometimes clashed with those of the regime and the senior ranks.³² Moreover, several regulations sought to attract and keep in service the militia officers ('milicianos').³³ They dominated the lower levels of the officer corps and

³⁰For instance, the Governor of Mozambique Rebelo Sousa criticised Kaúlza's ambitions and demeanor since his arrival to Mozambique (letters to Caetano on 23/12/1968 and 4/1/1969) (AMC/12-1549). See also Fernandes (2006:162, 166).

³¹However, after the Second World War, a process of de-mobilisation took place. It aimed specifically those young officers that did not share the ideas of the regime (Telo 1996:185).

³²For instance in a letter to the Defence Minister, the undersecretaries of state of the Air Force, Kaulza, and the Army, Almeida Fernandes, warned about the process of 'proletarianisation'. They claimed that the members of upper and middle classes were attracted to liberal professions due to the higher salaries and only those of lower classes considered the armed forces as a status improvement. They already forecasted that this process would be aggravated in the future, which the Colonial Wars later confirmed (24/6/1958)(AHM, divisão 1, secção 39, caixa 1, numero 16).

³³For instance the Decree-Law 45661 (14/4/1964) allowed the 'milicianos' to choose their destination when they renewed their engagement. Decree-Law 43101 (2/8/1960) exempted them from the customary requirement

were composed of many former university students, including some that had been actively involved in left-wing organisations since the 1960s (Maxwell 1995:37).

Finally, the grievances linked to military working conditions and the reforms undertaken by the government show that hostility to the regime was common in the ranks and that the military often dared to express their concerns. After the reforms of the 1930s, many of these criticisms concerned the policies of retirement and promotion.³⁴ The promotions based on political criteria instead of seniority created some anxiety among the military but facilitated the government control of the military (Antunes 1994:25–26). There were also many complaints about the material and working conditions, especially amongst the lower ranks.³⁵ After the Second World War, older officers opposed the reforms undertaken with the help of the MAAG (Chapter 3 Section 3.2), because they implied more effort and profound changes in the way they had been working for years.

The Colonial Wars exacerbated military unrest. In 1961, Portugal surrendered Goa, Damao and Diu to the Indian Armies and an independence war broke out in Angola. The military considered the government plans of maintaining all the overseas territories by sheer force as unrealistic. The military were sceptical about Portugal emerging victorious from this international crisis.³⁶ There were many complaints about the insufficient material conditions, lack of expertise and about the negative treatment that the regime's propaganda machinery was giving the armed forces, especially after the loss of the possessions in India.³⁷ The military insurrection in 1961 was also stimulated by the perception that the international community was greatly in favour of the position of self-determination of the colonies.³⁸ In the colonies,

of obtaining a permit in order to get married and Decree-Law 48254 (21/2/1968) enabled them to become career officer (AHM, divisão 1, secção 39, caixa 1, numeros 16, 22, 36).

³⁴For instance, in the margin of a letter Salazar is accused, in a menacing tone, of substituting the old officers by the Legion and militia military. In the body of the letter there is a request to maintain the new salaries but paralyse the reform concerning the substitution of old officers. Letter to Salazar (undated, probably 1936) (AOS/CO/GR-1A, Folder 13, Document 2, Page 307). In January 1938, General Domigos Oliveira posed an ultimatum to Salazar. Telegram from Gibraltar informing about the ultimatum by General Domingos Oliveira against Salazar (AOS/CO/GR-6, Folder 10, Page 368). There are also other signs of protests against 1937 reforms, usually by officers forced into early retirement, militia officers who saw their rights undermined or officers who complained about the favouritism showed with the High Staff Corps (AOS/CO/GR-6, Folder 9, 12).

³⁵An officer, Sebastiano de Sousa Correia, in a letter to Salazar, criticised the conditions of equipment and food of the Army and the privileges for those serving in the Colonies (24/6/1936) (AOS/CO/GR-11, Folder 6, Document 1, Pages 73–79). In 1938, there militia officers protested against 1937 reforms (AOS/CO/GR-6, Folder 12, Sections 1–21, Pages 370–377). A confidential report from the Commander of the First Military Region Schiappa de Azevedo to the War Minister in August 1937 showed that the lower ranking officers had been badly paid for long, which created serious problems of discipline among the ranks in the region of Porto. The report enclosed a protester's manifesto that called for a revolt and the use of force against Salazar (AOS/CO/GR-1A, Folder 17, Pages 374–377). Several other documents prove the unrest among the lower ranks (AOS/CO/GR-1A, Folder 7, Pages 184–229).

³⁶For instance Brigadier Rezende's letter to Kaúlza (25/7/1961) (AHM, divisão 1, secção 39 caixa 1, numero 1, documento 29).

³⁷See for instance the transcript of the letters that Colonel Costa Gomes sent to the journal 'Diario Popular' the one Botelho Moniz sent to Salazar in 1961 following the criticisms in the media directed at the armed forces at the onset of the colonial conflict. These letters are part of Captain Ferreira Valença's report 'A Abrilada 1961' (1977) (AHM, divisão 1, secção 39, caixa 1, numero 1, documento 1, 3).

³⁸For an account on the reasons of the coup attempt see the personal letter from General Albuquerque de Freitas who had just resigned from the CEMFA to Brigadier Rezende (16/4/1961) (Declassified document AHM, divisão 1, secção 39, caixa 1, numero 1, documento 23) and letter from Brigadier Rezende to Colonel Kaúlza in

the discontent was amplified by the large gap between the military's and the white settlers' salaries and by the difficulties working outside the barracks.³⁹ The dissatisfaction originating in the economic disparities led many military to detach themselves from the government's policies as well as from the white colonial elites, internalising leftist and revolutionary ideologies and in some cases even sympathising with the African insurgents. The Colonial Wars that were initially exploited by the government to consolidate the Estado Novo regime, ended up becoming one of the main causes of military contestation and ultimately of the fall of the regime (Ferreira 2006:60).

3.2.6 Caetano and the downfall of the Estado Novo

In 1968, Marcello Caetano, former professor and politician, was appointed PM after a domestic accident left Salazar disabled.⁴⁰ Caetano's reform plan 'Renovation and Continuity' aimed at limited liberalisation in order to revitalise the Estado Novo (Sánchez Cervelló 1993:22–31; González Hernández 1999:34–35). Caetano legalised some opposition movements, increased the powers of the National Assembly and, emulating Spanish governments, gave preference to civilian technocrats over military in his governments. Following the Spanish model of the 1960s, in 1971 Caetano recruited a new generation of technocrats ('a camada nova') in order to reform the economy and move closer to Europe. Policy-making became a more collective responsibility and the Council of Ministers gained relevance during Caetano's rule (Graham 1983:224). However, these reforms were superficial and did not substantially modify the regime (Lucena 1976:185; Graham 1993:15). They faced the resistance by part of the military and the conservative President Américo Tomás, two institutional barriers that held back the evolution of the regime including the tools of control (Chapter 4). The power struggles between different political streams weakened Caetano's power and its control tools (Rebelo de Sousa 1990:66; Fernandes 2006:169–170). The half-hearted reforms only served to stress the latent contradictions of the regime and to point out that the radical substitution of the regime was the only solution to the institutional crisis (González Hernández 1999:39).

The attitude of the government vis-à-vis the colonial conflict was especially controversial. Thirteen years of expensive Colonial Wars in Africa undermined the support to the Estado Novo from the Church, business and intellectual elites (Sánchez Cervelló 1993:20–21; Manuel 1999:29–32). However, for Caetano, the most difficult challenge was to maintain the armed forces under control (Antunes 1985:27). Caetano's government failed to respond to military claims and to settle the colonial conflict. During his rule the corporatist claims and discontent grew drastically. The military requested rights of association, salaries and pensions rises, earlier passage to the reserve, free public transportation, longer holidays, better conditions for the veterans disabled during the Colonial Wars, pensions for children and widows,

which he questioned that the overseas territories were parts of Portugal similar to the regions such as Minho or Alentejo (2/6/1961) (AHM, divisão 1, secção 39, caixa 1, numero 1, documento 28). See an alternative approach on the report 'The 13 April' by Colonel Kaúlza where he explained his view of the events stressing his differences with Moniz (non dated, AHM, divisão 1, caixa 1, numero 1, documento 25).

³⁹See for instance Rebelo Sousa's letter to Caetano (26/10/1968) (AMC/12–1549) and Caetano's letter to Kaúlza (17/6/1970) (AMC/12–79) which stress the problems between civilians and the military in Mozambique.

⁴⁰Salazar suffered a stroke after he fell from a chair in his summer house. Until his death in 1970, Salazar could not speak again and remained in hospital.

elimination of the High Staff Corps (which was perceived as a cast system), and better selection process in the Military Academy. The military realised that their materiel was inferior to those of the insurgents.⁴¹ Many of them, such as the influential Generals Costa Gomes and Spínola,⁴² tried to transform the foreseeable military defeat into a political victory and requested a political solution along the lines of British and French decolonisation processes.⁴³ That solution may have reduced the levels of discontent in the armed forces and prevented the coup. However Caetano chose to remain close to the camp of the President Tomás and the 'ultras' and discharged the reformist officers (Manuel 1995:28).

An increasing number of episodes of military indiscipline due to disagreements with the Colonial Wars and corporate grievances took place during Caetano's rule. The enactment of the Decree-Law 353/73 (13/7/1973), which aimed to enhance the control of the armed forces granting privileges to the conscript officers, became a landmark in the deterioration of civil-military relations.⁴⁴ The decree fostered academy officers' discontent and internal fragmentation. A month later Decree 409/73 (20/8/1973) amended Decree-Law 353/73 but due to the continuation of protests it had to be finally revoked shortly afterwards (12/10/1973).⁴⁵ This incident shows Caetano's weakness and inability to introduce changes in the control strategy. The government's legitimacy was questioned and the loss of control of the situation was evident. Decree 353/73 became an excuse for the organisation of career officers' reunions in which the scenario of a military coup to terminate the dictatorship gradually became salient. For instance, General Kaúlza tried to take advantage of the unrest created to plot against the government. Major Carlos Fabião denounced the conspiracy and the coup was prevented in December 1973.

The Armed Forces Movement (MFA), constituted in September 1973, was a clandestine progressive movement of junior officers that conspired against the regime and triggered the events of the Carnations Revolution. Initially, the MFA demanded that Caetano revoke the decrees 353/73 and 409/73, increase military salaries and reconsider colonialist positions. However, in the MFA meeting in December 1973 in Obidos, some began to call for military intervention. Thus, Captains Vasco Lourenço and Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho were assigned the preliminary preparations for a hypothetical coup. On 5 March 1974, two hundred MFA members met in Cascais and approved Major Ernesto Melo Antunes' document '*O Movimento das Forças Armadas e a Nação*'. The manifesto stated a 'three d's political programme': democracy, de-

⁴¹ For instance General Spínola's letter to Caetano stressed the 'absolute impossibility' of success in the military effort in Guinea due to structural deficiencies. (14/3/1972) (AMC/12-1560).

⁴² Gomes was the Military Governor in Angola (1970–1972) and Chief of the Joint Staff (1972–1974) and Spínola Military Governor of Guinea-Bissau (1968–1973) and Vice-Chief of the Joint Staff (1974).

⁴³ See the report 'Chronicle of events of April 1974' by Captain Salgueiro Maia (AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numero 47).

⁴⁴ This law established that conscript veterans of war could attain a Military Academy degree through an accelerated course of only two semesters and recognised their seniority previous to their attendance of the Academy for the purpose of promotion and pay.

⁴⁵ See for instance complaint letters rejecting the Decree-Laws 353/73 and 409/73 sent to Caetano by army officers from Guinea-Bissau (signed by 45 officers, 28/8/1973) and from Mozambique and Evora (signed by almost 200 officers, 13/9/1973) (AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numero 4). See also the 'Chronicle of events of April 1974' by Captain Salgueiro Maia (AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numero 47); letter from Santos Costa to the new Army Ministry General Sá Viana (1/8/1973) in which he advises to revoke the decree; and a letter from Santos Costa to Caetano on the same subject expressing alarm about the situation in the Army (10/10/1973) (AMC/12-425).

velopment and decolonisation. Caetano's government failed to satisfy their claims. Changes in the military strategy were constrained by the highly legalistic and institutional framework that slowed down any reform and precluded more energetic actions to counter the imminent upheaval (Maxwell 1995:44). On 16 March, some soldiers rebelled in Caldas da Rainha, one hundred and fifty soldiers were imprisoned. On 24 March, the MFA decided to attempt a coup. Caetano underestimated the capacity of the rebels and tried to use them as a threat to counterbalance the influence of the reactionary groups that had held up almost any type of change in policies.⁴⁶

The coup eventually took place on 25 April 1974. Captain Otelo led an operation carried out exclusively by junior officers. He took control of Lisbon airport, radio and television broadcast centres and of the military headquarters in Lisbon and Oporto. He moved troops all over the Portuguese territory to give the sensation of a general uprising and sealed the borders with Spain to avoid any kind of intervention of Francoist troops. This well-planned operation became a success quickly. Caetano surrendered to General Spínola at the GNR Headquarters.⁴⁷ Many people went to the streets to celebrate the fall of the regime. Some clashes between police and youths took place until the morning of the 26 April when the secret police DGS headquarters, last focus of resistance to the rebellion, surrendered. Five people died by DGS shots, these were the sole victims of this otherwise 'peaceful revolution' (Porch 1977:90–93; Robinson 1979:191–193). In sum, the tools of control in place (Chapter 4) such as the paramilitary organisations and intelligence services did not suffice to preclude the military coup. The Estado Novo was defeated by the same element that created it: the military.

3.3 Transition and democracy

3.3.1 Provisional governments (1974–1976)

After the April 25 coup, the process of design and development of the new democratic institutions was launched. Political parties and class organisations were legalised and decolonisation initiated. During the Portuguese transition the military and in particular the MFA shaped the process of institutional change. Military and government affairs were extremely intertwined during this period of instability. The militarisation of politics accelerated the politicisation of the armed forces. Military structures proliferated and overlapped with the political system (Chapter 5 Section 2.2). The struggles in the civilian political sphere were intertwined with those experienced in the military arena. This was a period of instability; six different provisional governments and two military coups took place between the Carnations Revolution and the enactment of the new Constitution in 1976, which officially opened the period of democratically elected governments. Although changes in the political arena were swift and radical, the evolution of the control toolkit was marginal until the end of 1975. A failed military coup in November 1975 served to consolidate the moderate reformist agenda and to

⁴⁶ Declassified documents from the PIDE/DGS show that Caetano had information about the coup attempt at least one week before the 25 April (Porch 1977:80–87; Opello 1985:65–80; Manuel 1995:26–27).

⁴⁷ Although General Spínola was not a member of the MFA, they selected him following Caetano's demand of surrendering only to an officer of the highest rank.

reduce the power of those that claimed for more radical political transformations but at the same time signalled a turning point in the mix of control tools (Chapter 5, 9, 10).

The period of provisional or pre-constitutional governments may be subdivided in four distinct stages clearly marked by changes in civil-military relations (Manuel 1995). First, from April to September 1974, the new President of the Republic Spínola and the First Provisional Government headed by Adelino da Palma Carlos tried to moderate the MFA's revolutionary programme. They attempted to increase the powers of the executive at the expense of the military, to slow down the devolution of the colonies and to re-establish a traditional hierarchical conception of the military. They failed to impose their views over those of the MFA Coordination Committee and were obliged to resign. Palma Carlos was substituted by General Vasco Gonçalves in July and Spínola by General Costa Gomes in September following important social mobilisations orchestrated by the left.

The second period, from September 1974 to March 1975, was characterised by the disputes among different factions within the MFA that tried to impose their approach to the revolutionary process. After the crisis of September 1974, the MFA tried to reinforce its position by purging non-revolutionary officers (Porch 1977:141–143) and by institutionalising its power (Robinson 1979:232). The creation of the Higher Council of the MFA, the MFA Assembly and the first Pact between the MFA and the political parties are examples of this effort. The Pact MFA-Political Parties granted the MFA the surveillance and control of the constituent process and a decisive role in the election of the President. The political parties (mainly from the left) approached the MFA to acquire influence on the government, in exchange providing legitimacy to the military.⁴⁸

The MFA sheltered three main ideologically idiosyncratic subgroups. The MFA-Moderates, headed by Major Antunes and Vasco Lourenço, were linked to the Socialist Party, PS. This group gradually attracted many of the conservative officers and dominated most of the military regions. The MFA-Radicals or 'gonçalvistas', led by Vasco Gonçalves, were close to the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and controlled the information services Fifth Division, the Navy and the radical military group 'Soldados Unidos Vencerão'.⁴⁹ Finally, the MFA-Populists, led by Otelo, were inspired by the third world liberation movements, linked to left-wing parties such as the Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat (PRP) and the Popular Democratic Union (UDP), and controlled the Special Forces Unit COPCON.⁵⁰ Outside the MFA, many military were in favour of change but in less abrupt terms than their counterparts in the MFA. They opposed the construction of a socialist state in Portugal. Many of them were close to the centrist Democratic Popular Party (PPD) and to the centre-right Social Democratic Centre (CDS). The most prominent figure of this group was General Antonio Spínola (Manuel 1995:34–35; González Hernández 1999:52). The disputes about trade unionism, economic plans, and the institu-

⁴⁸ Carrilho (1994:52). See Structure of the political institutions in the first and second MFA-Political Parties Pacts on April 1975 and 26 February 1976 (ACR, MFA/Partidos (84), Pacto MFA-Partidos Parte I, Document 16 and Parte II Document 14). Annexe B to the Minutes of CR reunion, 31/3/1975, and Annexe F to the minutes of CR reunion, 3/4/1975 (ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 1).

⁴⁹ 'Soldados Unidos Vencerão' was a left-wing anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist movement that organised several demonstrations and claimed the improvement of the conditions of the lowest ranks in the Armed Forces (Porch 1977:214–220; Carrilho 1994:66–67).

⁵⁰ The terms MFA-Moderates, MFA-Radicals and MFA-Populists were coined by Mujal Leon (1978).

tionalisation of the MFA reveal the internal divisions in the Armed Forces and the government during this period.⁵¹

The third stage of the period of provisional governments began on 12 March 1975 with the failure of the right-wing coup, which strengthened the MFA-Radicals. The revolutionary agenda gained momentum. Some of the most important revolutionary measures were land seizures from the rich proprietors and the nationalisation of big companies. The Council of the Revolution (CR) was established to promote the objectives of the MFA Programme and to guarantee security during the process of transition.⁵² The first elections after the fall of the regime took place on 25 April 1975 to form a Constituent Assembly. The political parties actively approached the military. Some of them, dissatisfied with their electoral results such as the PCP, supported the MFA's ideal of revolutionary legitimacy against that of electoral legitimacy (Carrilho 1994:54). The level of social tensions increased especially within the left. This happened not only at the political level where there were struggles between PCP and PS, but also at the military level between MFA-Radicals that controlled the government and the MFA-Moderates and Populists.⁵³ Pressures from the MFA-Moderates and social mass mobilisations forced the resignation of Gonçalves as PM in September 1975, marking the end of the third stage.

The decentralisation of decision power, the emergence of many new veto actors and the political instability can be construed as factors that, during these first three stages, maintained a strategy of control very similar to that in place during the dictatorship (Chapters 5, 10).

However, many changes took place in the control toolkit during the fourth stage which coincided with the sixth provisional government (from September 1975 to July 1976). The new PM Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo tried to reverse the revolutionary transformations attracting the criticism from the MFA-Radicals, the MFA-Populists and the left-wing political parties, except for the PS. At least 58 protests and acts of indiscipline took place in the Portuguese Armed Forces between September and November 1975 (Carrilho 1994:67). The rising tensions culminated in a left-wing military coup on 25 November 1975. The moderate Lieutenant-Colonel António Ramalho Eanes successfully led the military operations to control the putsch.⁵⁴ The failure of the coup contributed to discredit the most radical revolutionary theses and consolidated the hegemony of the MFA-Moderates. This was a tipping point in the political transformations and in the evolution of the control toolkit (Chapter 5). Many political and military figures understood then that the role of the military in politics should be

⁵¹See different views, within the political parties and the ranks, about the institutionalisation of MFA, 1975 (ACR, MFA/Partidos (84), *Institucionalização do MFA*, Documents 1–37)

⁵²Law 5/75 (14/3/1975). The CR replaced the Junta and the Council of State. See Minutes of the CR reunion, 27/3/1975 and Political Action Plan of the Council of the Revolution, in Annex B to the Minutes of CR reunion, 20/6/1975 (ACR, *Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais*, volume 1 and ACR, *Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador*, volume 8, number 94, document 28).

⁵³The MFA-Moderates signed the 'Document of the Nine', that denounced the Gonçalves attempt to create an East European style dictatorship and urged for a 'democratic socialism'. The MFA-Populists launched their own critical document, the COPCON Document, against Gonçalves 'Autocrítica Revolucionária do COPCON e Proposta de Trabalho para um Programa Político' (ACR, *Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador*, volume 8, number 94, document 28).

⁵⁴According to the minutes of the CR reunion, 7/6/1976, there were more than 200 officers involved in the coup (ACR, *Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais*, volume 3). See Sánchez Cervelló (1993:253–258) for an account on the events surrounding the coup.

reduced. The second pact between the MFA and the political parties in February 1976 reflected this changing trajectory. For instance, it introduced the direct universal suffrage for the election of the President abandoning the system of election through a joint session of the MFA and Legislative Assemblies agreed on in the first Pact MFA-Political Parties (Rato 2000:149). This choice meant not only the introduction of a democratic component in Portuguese political system but also initiated the military disengagement from politics (Ferreira 1983:175–176). The 1976 Constitution confirmed the process of military disengagement from politics and the new trajectory in tool choice (Chapters 5, 9, 10).

3.3.2 Constitutional governments (1976–1986)

The transformations in civil-military relations from 1976 to 1986 were crucial for the consolidation of democracy in Portugal (Graham 1993:37–38). Electoral legitimacy substituted the revolutionary legitimacy and the political parties were emancipated from the MFA (Gonzalez Hernandez 1999:26). The Constitution which was approved on 2 April 1976 established that the governments should take steps towards the construction of a socialist state and restricted the participation of the military in politics to the Council of the Revolution (CR). Eanes, the candidate of the MFA-Moderates, became the President after the elections on 27 June 1976 and Mario Soares, leader of the PS, was elected PM of first constitutional government after the general elections on 25 April 1976 (Manuel 1996). These political developments reinforced the process of military detachment from politics and the new trend in the control toolkit (Chapter 5).

However, the political instability continued due to the fact that the elections produced minority governments, the fragmentation of the political spectrum and the continual tactical changes in political alliances.⁵⁵ From the legislative elections in 1976 to the interim elections in 1979, Portugal had five brief constitutional governments.⁵⁶ These governments had to deal with numerous socio-economic issues, such as the normalisation of relations with the former colonies, absorption of the 650,000 refugees ('retornados'), the reactivation of Portuguese participation in NATO, negotiations for EEC membership, high levels of inflation, unemployment and budget deficits. All these problems diverted resources and attention away from the policy for military subordination, slowing down some reforms (Chapters 5, 10)

After 1976, the CR was the only military institution that could directly participate in politics. This was an important step in order to take the political debate out of the barracks but not the definitive one. The participation of the military in politics remained higher than in most Western democracies. The functions and scope of the CR, although delimited by the Constitution, were still far-reaching. The CR held complete control over the military and veto power over important political decisions. The CR was guarantor of the constitutional institutions with capacity to enact military laws, control military promotions and to authorise the President to declare war, peace or curfew. Many politicians, including the President, were

⁵⁵For an account of the political parties see Manuel (1996:4–5) and González Hernández (1999:63–84)

⁵⁶PS only received 34.9% and 107 out of 250 seats in the MPS. Different coalitions were explored. The first government of Soares lost a vote of no confidence in December 1977. Soares' coalition government with CDS was dissolved by President Ramalho Eanes a few months later. Eanes appointed successive Prime Ministers: Alfredo Nombre da Costa (1978), Carlos Mota Pinto (1978) and Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo (1979).

military men and they did not consider the CR as an anti-democratic institution. Even the moderate military officers that had controlled the rightist and leftist military upheavals were considered too interventionist for a European style democracy (Maxwell 1995:2–3). The 1976 Constitution had also granted the CR with a legitimacy superior to that of the Assembly. This was problematic because part of the military leadership still championed the spirit of the revolution and a socialist type of democracy which contradicted the ideas held by the mainstream political parties that represented the majority of Portuguese voters (Gallagher 1983:230–239; Manuel 1996:3–11; González Hernández 1999).

The Social Democratic Party, PSD (previously PPD) and the CDS became the main opposition to the power of the CR (Manuel 1996:37–38). In the 1979 interim elections and 1980 legislative elections, the centre-right coalition ‘Aliança Democrática’⁵⁷ obtained the majority of the seats in the Assembly. PM Francisco Sa Carneiro and, after his death, PM Francisco Pinto Balsemão⁵⁸ conducted a programme of austerity that gave priority to the relations with the ECC and NATO and declared the will to reform the Constitution, reverse the agrarian reform, enhance the private sector and limit the powers of the President and armed forces. Finally, Balsemão even obtained the support of the PS, the main party in the opposition, in order to get two thirds of the Assembly seats required to circumvent President Eanes’ veto and launch the 1982 Constitutional Reform.⁵⁹ This reform eliminated all references to the goal of achieving a ‘socialist democracy’, sensibly reduced the powers of the President of the Republic and, most fundamentally, abolished the CR and reduced the role of the armed forces.

NATO became the model and driving force for the reforms in the armed forces initiated by the Law of National Defence and the Armed Forces of 1982.⁶⁰ This new law, approved despite the initial opposition of Eanes, was crucial in the redefinition of Portuguese civil-military relations and was the result of an agreement between the different political parties (Silva 1986:11). It passed the control of the military and defence decisions from the President to the PM and the government, charging the Defence Minister with managing day to day military affairs. The organisational reform became an important mechanism of civilian control (Chapter 5 Section 5.2.2). President Eanes and his supporters eventually understood that in order to build a democratic regime and enter the EEC, the armed forces should disengage completely from politics, undertake a process of professionalisation, reform their structure and participate more actively in NATO (Graham 1993:41). The gradual process of transfer of powers from President Eanes and the military to the civilians in the government and parliament continued during Soares coalition government PS/PSD (1983–1985) and later with Cavaco Silva’s PSD governments (from 1985). By the time Soares won the 1986 presidential elections peacefully, replacing General Eanes, and Portugal joined the EEC, the reorganisation of the armed forces that consolidated a democratic Western type of civil-military relations had been launched and the principle of civilian supremacy was uncontested.⁶¹ Portuguese civil-military relations

⁵⁷Democratic Alliance was a coalition formed by the PSD/PPD, CDS and PPM.

⁵⁸Carneiro died in a plane crash in 1980. Diogo Freitas do Amaral led the interim sixth constitutional government. Balsemão led the seventh and eighth constitutional governments (1981–1983).

⁵⁹Law 1/82 (30/9/1982). See Carrilho (1994), Manuel (1996) and González Hernández (1999).

⁶⁰Law 29/82 (11/12/1982). See Balsemão (1986:209).

⁶¹According to Graham the reorganisation of the Armed Forces has been finished and a Huntingtonian ‘objective’ control of the military had been achieved (Graham 1993:48–57). Graham’s claim can be considered excessively optimistic; several important military reforms were launched after 1986.

and control toolkit were finally converging with those of its Western allies, including Spain (Chapters 5, 8, 9, 10).

3.4 Summary

This chapter has shown that the military had a central role in most major political transformations in Portugal. The military were not submissive vis-à-vis the civilian power and remained a source of concern for governments and political elites throughout the dictatorship and transition into democracy. The façade of stability and endurance of the Estado Novo (1932–1974) conceals the much more volatile civil-military relations during that period. The military had initially appointed Salazar and granted him extensive powers. However, they never completely accepted a subordinated role and frequently threatened his rule. Later they provoked the fall of his successor, Caetano, in 1974 and became central political actors shaping the transitional process. This chapter has also highlighted that that political and institutional context as well as several historical junctures such as the Spanish War, the Second World War, the Colonial Wars and the transition to democracy had an important impact on military attitudes and on civil-military relations. The following chapters (4, 5) explain how the tools utilised by the government to control the military capture this effect.

4 The Estado Novo's tools of government

4.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the Estado Novo's strategy for military subordination according to Hood's four basic resources (*organisation, nodality, authority* and *treasure*) and the sub-categories introduced in Chapter 2. It outlines the most significant tools and the main trajectories observed in their usage from 1933 to 1974. Although there is evidence of the utilisation of all categories and sub-categories of policy instruments, the relative magnitude in which they were employed was different. In order to guide the reader throughout this chapter, Table 8 summarises some of the most important empirical findings. For instance, Salazar used coercive *organisation* tools such as security forces, the paramilitary Portuguese Legion and loyal military units to prevent and control military plots throughout all the period analysed (Section 4.2.1). Non-coercive *organisation* instruments, such as military education, training and the capacity of the government to shape the organisational design of the defence institutions became central to the control strategy during 1950s, mainly due to the influence of NATO and the Western allies (Section 4.2.2). *Nodality* effectors, such as propaganda and censorship instruments, were central in the 1930s and early 1940s but gradually lost relevance later (Section 4.3.1). Conversely, information detectors such as the secret police PIDE (later DGS) and the network of informants grew in salience (Section 4.3.2). *Authority* incentives and rewards were very important, particularly from 1938 to 1945, when the regulations that introduced the system of ministerial approval, 'escolha', made possible the substitution of all senior ranks by young loyal officers. The regime also granted great autonomy and prerogatives to the military (Section 4.4.1). Sanctions and legal constraints were not very severe (Section 4.4.2). Finally, the use of *treasure* tools was very limited, the military's living and working conditions were never good enough to contribute positively to military subordination (Section 4.5). Table 8 also shows that many important changes in the trajectories of tool choice can be linked to the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, NATO membership and to the Colonial Wars.

4.2 Organisation

Salazarist governments used the *organisation* capacity of the state to achieve military subordination both through coercive and non-coercive means. Loyal units of the armed forces were the main deterrent against military plots, although police and paramilitary organisations such as the PIDE, PSP, GNR and the Portuguese Legion also contributed to this task. The use of these coercive *organisation* instruments remained stable throughout the regime. More vari-

Table 8: Summary of tools of government during the Estado Novo (1933–1974)

Tools	Trajectory
Organisation	<i>Coercive</i> (Section 4.2.1): Loyal army units, security forces (GNR, PSP, PVDE/PIDE/DGS) and the Portuguese Legion helped countering military plots. Martial courts, imprisonments and executions were avoided
	<i>Non-coercive</i> (Section 4.2.2): Formal military education and training. NATO and MAAG support. Training periods abroad
	Organisation design: introduction of coordination bodies, centralisation of decision making, inter-branch competition, geographical deployment of troops
	Provision of goods, services and jobs
Nodality	Low intensity although some actions from the late 1930s. Very important during 1950s. Abandoned during the Colonial Wars
	Important reforms in the mid-1930s and in the 1950s (instilled by NARO). The Colonial Wars forced changes in the organisation design, hampering military control
	Provision of services and goods grew during the Colonial Wars
	Very strong during the 1930s and the first half of 1940s, then declining
<i>Information effectors</i> (Section 4.3.1): Propaganda (via public speeches, cinema, pamphlets, books, military magazines, pre-military training in Mocidade). The SPN/SNI coordinated the action	Very strong during Spanish Civil War and Second Civil War. The Colonial Wars hindered the capacity to censor the information within the ranks
	Censorship. DSC, PVDE/PIDE/DGS, Portuguese Legion
<i>Information detectors</i> (Section 4.3.2): PVDE/PIDE/DGS, SIME, Network of informants ('bufos'), letters and internal communications	Increasing utilisation
Authority	<i>Rewards and incentives</i> (Section 4.4.1): System of ministerial approval and appointment ('escolha') for military promotions and membership in the High Staff Corps
	Appointments of officers loyal to the government and top positions in the administration
	Wide powers and responsibilities granted to the military in the maintenance of public order. Military led the security forces, judged political crimes, worked in prisons and censorship
	Other privileges conceded: autonomy, tolerance with secondary jobs, guarantees and military awards
	<i>Sanctions and constraints</i> (Section 4.4.2): Reduction of retirement age and limitations to the size of the armed forces
	Punishment of officers involved in conspiracies (expulsions, demotions)
	Prohibitions in order to enhance a distinct esprit de corps and detach the military from politics
	Autonomy reduced after the Second World War. Rights and decorations increased during the Colonial Wars
Treasure	Introduced in 1937. Very important during Salazar's rule. Caetano relied less on military promotions and appointments
	Important representation of the military in all the regime institution. Declining from 1960s
	Stable
<i>Staff expenditure</i> (Section 4.5.2): General salary rises (fundamentally to compensate inflation). Salary differentials to get support from some groups. Pensions and benefits.	Autonomy reduced after the Second World War. Rights and decorations increased during the Colonial Wars
	Introduced in 1937. Important after the Second World War. Decreasing during Colonial Wars
	Stable. In general punishments were not severe.
<i>Equipment expenditure</i> (Section 4.5.3): Successive efforts of rearmament and modernisation of military materials insufficient. Dependence on foreign suppliers such as Britain, Germany and later the US	Stable
	Overall low intensity. The most significant salary raises occurred in 1938 and 1945
	Overall very low intensity. The most significant rearmament and modernisation attempts were undertaken during the mid-1930s, the Second World War and 1950s

ability can be captured among non-coercive *organisation* tools. The utilisation of education and training acquired special salience during the 1950s. With the Colonial Wars this was reduced and the provision of good services was fostered.

4.2.1 Coercive organisation

The utilisation of coercive *organisation* tools was not very intense or systematic. Salazar did not reach power by violent means and in general the oppression in the Estado Novo was more subtle than in the Francoist regime (Rosas 1989:27, 29). Even during late 1930s, when Salazar was at the height of his power and the regime was more repressive than ever again the leftist political movements, there was no strong systematic pattern of coercive *organisation* tools of control on insubordinate military. This does not mean that coercion was absent from the control toolkit but that it was not as central as for the Francoist regime in the late 1930s and early 1940s.

The government mainly used loyal military units as coercive tools to neutralise other mutinous military units, as in the cases of the rebellions in 1927, 1928, 1931, 1935, 1936, 1946 and 1962. However, Salazar also used the security forces GNR and PSP as well as new organisations, such the powerful secret police PVDE (later called PIDE and eventually DGS)¹ and the civilian paramilitary Portuguese Legion,² to control and deter military insubordination. The surveillance and later arrest of military officers in September 1935 and April 1938 are examples of how these organisations combined their forces to avert plots against Salazar (Pinto 1994:281–287).

Although their fighting capacity was very small compared to that of the Army, the PSP, GNR and PVDE/PIDE/DGS, actively helped loyal Army units to neutralise many of the plots against the regime. The GNR and the PVDE were especially well-trained police forces and very loyal to Salazar (Medina 2000:157–158). In addition to the military and police forces, the paramilitary Portuguese Legion could be considered as a means to challenge the monopoly of violence to the armed forces (Faria 2000:27). Founded in 1936, in 1939 the Legion counted up to 53,000 members (Pinto 1994:291). The Legion maintained its character of an armed militia and its loyalty to the government throughout the Estado Novo. There is evidence in the plans to counter possible military coup attempts that the Legion was to be deployed.³ However, in terms of military subordination its overall importance remained relatively low. The Legion was a lightly armed organisation and did not have the power that similar paramilitary organisations such as the Blackshirts (*Camicie Nere*) and SA (*Sturm Abteilung*) had acquired in Italy and

¹ PVDE was created by the Decree-Law 22992 (29/8/1933), transformed into PIDE by the Decree-Law 35046 (22/10/1945) and finally into DGS by Decree-Law 49401 (24/11/1969). PIDE participation was participation was very important in rebellions in 1946, 1947, 1952, 1959, and 1962 (Pimentel 2007: 73, 220–235).

² The Portuguese Legion ('Legião Portuguesa') was as a nationalist and anti-communist voluntary militia created by the Decree-Law 27058 (30/9/1936). From 1942, the Legion was in charge of the Civil Defence of the Territory (Decree-Law 31956, 2/4/1942). See Silva (1975) and Rodrigues (1996).

³ For instance, due to the discontent generated by 1937 reforms the government decided the mobilisation of some Army, GNR and Police units with the assistance of the Legion (Faria 2000:185). The government plans for the Lisbon Military Region in 1941 declared that in case of an eventual coup the GNR, PSP and Legion had to act in a first instance, the Army should only intervene in a second phase if needed (Telo 1996:169–170).

Germany.⁴ Quickly it became obvious that the Legion was not in real competition with the armed forces (Gallagher 1983:122). The Legion remained subordinated to the military, independent from any political party and acted as an organisation of second line and civil defence linked to the State (Caetano 2000 [1975]: 177).

In case of rebellion, all armed entities, Legion, GNR, PSP, PVDE and armed forces, were placed under direct command of the government through the War Minister (Telo 1996:169–170). Insubordinate military sometimes suffered torture, exile and harsh conditions in Salazarist prisons.⁵ However summary executions, martial courts or long term imprisonments were generally avoided. Prison confinement was usually for short periods; *authority* instruments such as exile or expulsion from the armed forces were preferred. For instance, Captain Mendes Norton's coup attempt planned for 20 May 1935 was quickly neutralized by the military and the police. The officers involved were arrested, but released soon afterwards.⁶ Only after a second attempt on 10 September 1935, did the government decide to deport Norton and the rest of the plotters to the Azores (Faria 2000:84). The reaction to the rebellion in Beja, in 1962, is the main exception to the general absence of imprisonments. There were 65 prison sentences, including a 6-year-sentence for Captain João Varela Gomes, the military leader (Wheeler 1979b:214). The assassination of the regime opponent General Humberto Delgado, in Spain in 1965, apparently by agents of PIDE, is probably one of the darkest examples of the use of a coercive *organisation* instrument.⁷ Although some deaths of military men have been attributed to PIDE,⁸ there is no solid evidence of a strategy of extra-judicial executions of military officers in any period of the regime.

Caetano, like his predecessor, trusted his secret police (DGS), the Legion and the paramilitary security forces GNR and PSP with the task of defending the regime (Porch 1977:22–23). The real deterrent capacity of these organs of control and repression vis-à-vis the armed forces was, nonetheless, very limited and drastically reduced in the last years of the regime. In general, army officers led all security forces. The heavier weapons, better training and the experience fighting the insurgency in the Colonial Wars gave the military a coercive superiority. Moreover, the geographical dispersion of the troops made it more difficult to control them. The detention by the DGS of two hundred soldiers and officers, following an uprising in March 1974, did not suffice to prevent the April revolution. During the military coup on 25 April 1974, the loyal DGS, GNR and Legion showed a complete incapacity to defend the regime from Army units.

It can be concluded that Estado Novo's governments used coercive *organisation* instruments upon the military. However, they were not extensively employed and mainly used as a last resort. The security and paramilitary forces at the service of the regime were a limited deterrent against the armed forces due to their inferior material means and lack of combat readiness.

⁴After the Second World War, the Legion began its decline, the Colonial Wars showed that the Legion had definitively lost any capacity to act as a praetorian guard for the regime (Azevedo 1999:304).

⁵For instance, see report in 1979 of anti-regime involvement of some military officers by Colonel Manuel António Correia (AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numero 51).

⁶In the plot of 1935, among the 40 people arrested, 8 were military (Pinto 1994:281).

⁷PIDE was often portrayed as the Portuguese Gestapo. See for instance (AOS/CO/NE-17-1 Folder 9, Pages 578).

⁸According to Pimentel (2007:228–229, 388) PIDE was responsible of the deaths of Captain Almeida Santos or Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Valente as well as many civilians (Pimentel 2007:387–412).

4.2.2 Non-coercive organisation

The *organisation* power of the state was also used in a non-coercive fashion in three ways. First, through education and training so that the military could improve their professional skills and learn the necessity of remaining separated from politics and subordinated to the government. Second, the government used its capacity to shape the structure of the armed forces (including changes to the hierarchy, attribution of functions and the deployment of the troops) to enhance the subordination of the military. And third, through the provision of goods, services and even employment to the military and their families as a means to improve their living standards and levels of satisfaction with the governments.

Salazar believed that if the military were concentrated on their professional duties they would be less prone to intervene in politics. Military education and training had to be reinforced in order to increase military professionalisation and as well as to correct the serious deficiencies of the Portuguese armies.⁹ Thus, in the late 1930s and 1940s, some reforms were launched aiming to introduce a more technical approach in military education and training.¹⁰ The Military School was transformed into the Army School in 1939 and in 1940 a reform of military education was launched to eliminate all content related to political science and sociology (Ferreira 1976:146). The High Military Studies Institute was created in 1937 and the Naval High Institute of War in 1948. Salazar's concern with military education and subordination was portrayed by his personal involvement in the reforms.¹¹ These reforms, however, were insufficient and the general level of instruction and professional preparation remained deficient.¹² Salazar was afraid that the military that had government skills could challenge him. Thus, the education that officers received was outdated and ignored politics, sociology and, at least partially, economics, administration or modern management (Wiarda 1988:128).

Training and education became central in the 1950s and due to NATO influence. From 1951, many Portuguese officers travelled to the US, to undertake military training. In parallel, the MAAG, examined the command, logistics, training, and maintenance systems in Portugal. As a

⁹For instance, in January 1936, General Julio Ernesto Moraes Sarmento blamed the lack of efficiency on the absence of military training and field practical activities due to the lack of material means (Report about the situation of the Army addressed to Salazar AOS/CO/GR-10, Folder 2, Section 1, Pages 6–8, 18–19). A new report in February of 1937 shows the efforts made in military training in 1936, although concludes that the situation of the Army was still precarious (AOS/CO/GR-10, Folder 2, Section 3, Pages 6–8, 62–116). A PVDE report to Salazar in 1939 explains that British were disappointed with the lack of preparation of the Portuguese army (AOS/CO/IN-8A, Folder 5, Section 29, Page 458).

¹⁰For instance, see reports for the reform of High Staff Courses (AOS/CO/GR-1A, Folder 20, Sections 1–8, Pages 412–563).

¹¹Salazar was involved in the reform of the High Staff Courses and the configuration of the High Military Studies Institute and High Command Courses. See Salazar's handwritten comments and amendments to the project (AOS/CO/GR-1A, Folder 20, Section 3–7, Pages 463–531). Salazar also supervised the project of reform of the Military College in 1944 (AOS/CO/GR-1C Folder 23, Pages 355–407). See Borges and Canas (2006) for a chronology of the higher military education in Portugal.

¹²See for instance Telo (1996:243) and Matos (2004:170). According to a report to the British Foreign Office (19/6/1950), the Portuguese Army was incapable of effectively contributing to any organised force, lacking experience, modern equipment and training (Telo 1996:205–206). In a letter to the US Ambassador (19/8/1950), Salazar claimed that the reform project of NATO would have to be delayed due to the lack of officers with enough preparation (AOS/CO/NE-17-1, Folder 11, Section 2, Page 616). A document presented by the Portuguese delegation in Ottawa in a NATO conference acknowledges that despite the recent efforts, Portugal was still far from the minimum required number of prepared officers (7/9/1951) (AOS/CO/NE-17-2 Folder 1, Pages 7, 15).

result of these exchanges, a series of reforms were launched in the 1950s.¹³ From 1951 to 1957, many regulations inspired in the US armed forces were approved. The education programme for senior officers, the High Staff Course, was reformed.¹⁴ New courses were offered, often run by the military that had been previously sent abroad. New schools were created, such as the Electromechanic Military School. Logistics and operational methods were improved following American assistance. Military careers were opened to different social strata (Telo 1996:244–245, 330–331). Military exercises were reinforced following the US model (Duarte 2010:258).

From 1958 to 1961, the government introduced another wave of NATO inspired reforms, related to military education and training, territorial organisation or some of the support services.¹⁵ Nonetheless, from the outbreak of the Colonial Wars, the collaboration with the US and the emphasis on military instruction were reduced. The Colonial Wars negatively impacted formal military education, which at the end of the regime remained deficient both in tactical-technical terms and in terms of socio-economic and political instruction.¹⁶ Moreover, the NATO-led advances in education and training ended up being counter-productive for the subordination of the military to the regime. The new approach to their profession brought new preoccupations and claims. The officers that participated in the exchanges with NATO allies realised the qualitative gap that separated them from other Western armies and became more critical with the state of the Portuguese armed forces and with the government (Telo 1996:213–214). They led the opposition movements against the regime from the late 1950s onwards.

Second, in addition to the efforts on military training and education, some of the changes in the organisational design of the armed forces were employed to achieve military subordination. The organisation reforms in the 1930s constitute the best example.¹⁷ With these reforms Salazar sought to centralise the decision making power by creating several coordinating bodies that he or one of his ministers headed. The Higher Council of National Defence (CSDN), the

¹³There is evidence of important military allocations for training purposes, for instance in training camps, language courses, training missions abroad, handbooks, publications and even the translation of NATO publications in Portuguese. See for instance Supplementary Defence Budget 1952–1954; 1955–1957; 1958; and 1961 (AOS/CO/FI-11T Folder 1, Pages 2–30; AOS/CO/FI-11T Folder 5, Pages 373–394; AOS/CO/FI-11T Folder 8, Pages 605–624; AOS/CO/FI-11T Folder 11, Pages 677–690).

¹⁴Decree-Law 39053 (26/12/1952)

¹⁵For instance, the reform of the Military Academy by the Decree-Laws 42151 and 42152. See Army Ministry memo (15/10/1959, AHM, divisão 1, secção 39, caixa 1, numero 1, documento 13). See also a list with 17 different reforms most of them organisation based in annex to an Army Ministry memo (17/11/ 1960, AHM, divisão 1, secção 39, caixa 1, numero 1, documento 11). Among them the Decree-Law 42564 (7/10/1960) for the reorganisation of the Army Ministry and many directives concerning the education and preparation of officer; the materials, dactylographic and health services; recruiting and military service, etc. See continuous references and comparatives to other NATO countries in the General Programme of Improvement of the (AHM, divisão 1, secção 39, caixa 1, numero 1, documento 10).

¹⁶See Ferreira (1976:147). The only aspect that was intensified was anti-guerrilla training, fundamentally with the support of the Belgian, Spanish and French Armed Forces (Telo 1996:327–328).

¹⁷In 1935, the military demanded a reform with the main goal of rearming and upgrading the equipments of the armed forces. For Salazar this was the opportunity to introduce organisation changes that would consolidate his control on the military. The rearmament (*treasure* indirect tool) was only partial and did not provide the Army with capacity enough to defend the land frontiers against an external threat. However, for Salazar it was a success given that it allowed him to enhance his control on the military thus diminishing the internal risks for the regime.

Higher Council of War Planning and the Mixed Commission of the High Staff were all created in 1935. Other important changes were the diminution of the size of the army, the creation of the exclusive and loyal High Staff Corps, the direct subordination of the Chief of Staff of the Army (CEME) to the War Minister (a position that Salazar occupied from 1936 to 1944), and the reduction of powers of the Higher Council of the Army and the Army Major General.¹⁸

The underlying military subordination goal to the reforms became evident soon. By 1935, the head of the Army Major-General Morais Sarmentos expressed the opposition to the reorganisation project because it withdrew an important part of the political powers and autonomy that the Army held.¹⁹ Later, in 1936, a letter exchange between Salazar and the War Minister, General Passos e Sousa, shows that the re-organisation of the Army was not made following the dictate of the CSDN but that of the Council of Ministers in which Salazar had the upper hand²⁰ Salazar was in a strong position vis-à-vis the military and pushed forward his idea of creating smaller armed forces under civilian control.

The opposition of many senior officers, who wanted to preserve the autonomy of the armed forces, did not halt Salazar's reorganisation (Telo 1996:150). In 1936, he took over the War Ministry and in 1937 launched some further reforms aiming at higher levels of political control.²¹ The fundamental change was that instead of the War Ministry being subordinated to the army, the metropolitan army became subordinated to the War Ministry (Duarte 2010:114–120). In the new structure the Undersecretary of State, Santos Costa, became very important because he led many of the reforms and shielded Salazar from many internal problems (Faria 2000).

The new organisation also preserved the separation between the continental and colonial forces and the separation of the branches in different ministries which reduced the internal cohesion of the Armed Forces and the likelihood of a coordinated conspiracy while enhancing inter-branch competition and oversight. This seems to confirm the hypothesis of a divide-and-rule tactic (Wheeler 1979b:199).

After the Second World War, the Army was reorganised and downsized (Ferreira 1992: 189, 192–193), the CSDN became a consultative body and government became responsible for the definition of defence policies.²² Nonetheless the most important changes followed the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. In 1950 a National Defence Ministry and a Chief of the Joint Staff (CEMGFA) were introduced.²³ Their functions were to coordinate the military branches (which still maintained distinct ministries). In 1956, following the NATO doctrine, the government redefined the bases for the organisation of the armed forces to consolidate the

¹⁸ Laws 1905 and 1906 (22/5/1935). See Carrilho (1985:418–421), Matos (2004:153), Duarte (2010) and project for the reorganisation of the armed forces (May 1936, AOS/CO/GR-10 Folder 3, Section 2 Pages 150–158).

¹⁹ Report to the War Minister (20/8/1935) (AOS/CO/GR-11, Folder 3, Document 1, Pages 14–22).

²⁰ Passos e Sousa complained about the lack of technical expertise of the Council of Ministers (Letter to Salazar, 11/4/1936, AOS/CO/GR-11, Folder 4, Document 1, Page 58–59). Salazar replied that these were political decisions not technical ones (17/4/1936, AOS/CO/GR-11, Folder 4, Document 2, Page 61–63)

²¹ Law 1960 (on the organisation of the Army), Law 1961 (on recruitment and military service) and Decree-Laws 27627, 28401, 28402, 28403 and 28404. See reports and correspondence about the decrees (December 1937, AOS/CO/GR-6 Folder 3, Sections 1–3, Pages 17–54).

²² Law 2024 (31/5/1947). See Duarte (2010:235).

²³ Decree-Law 37909 (1/8/1950).

subordination of the defence structures and policies to the government.²⁴ The CEMGFA, which was subordinated to the Defence Minister, was reinforced and the participation of military in the CSDN reduced (Duarte 2010:272–275). Finally the adaptation to the NATO model culminated in 1959 by a reorganisation of the Army and reinforcement of the Army information services, SIME.²⁵ The new organisational design was a NATO requirement but was perceived by the government as an opportunity to reduce the autonomy of the branches. Moreover, in the new integrated structure, the Air Force, Army and Navy had to compete for resources from limited budget, which introduced competition and mutual oversight among the branches.

The geographical distribution of troops also served a control purpose, as a means to neutralise of military attempts against the government. Loyal and elite units, such as the battalion of 'Hunters', 'Machine Guns' and the brigades of cavalry, were strategically located in the territory to defend the regime (Teixeira 2004:42). The decision power was fundamentally located in Lisbon and centralised under Salazar and a few loyal officers. Even the armed forces in the colonies were deployed such that they could support the metropolitan troops in an possible war in the peninsula.²⁶ However, from 1958, the defence of the overseas territories became the main goal, which required new geographical organisation and operating procedures. The armed forces grew from 40,000 men in 1961 to 217,000 in 1974.²⁷ The command structure was adapted.²⁸ The new war techniques and the bigger and decentralised structure weakened the authority of the senior officers and the government. Top rank officers were rarely in the theatre of operations. Many lower rank officers felt far from the centres of decisions and became alienated. Thus, the new organisational design launched by the government with a specific defence purpose indirectly contributed to undermine their control on the military.

Third, the government used its organisational resources to provide and subsidise services and goods for the military and their families in order to increase satisfaction with the government and compensate for low salaries. This use of the state capacity acquired relevance in the late 1950s.²⁹ The Social Services of the Armed Forces were created in 1958 to assist military families with housing and health problems.³⁰ The government also created a supermarket that offered credit and low prices for the military. From 1960, the acquisition of housing was also financed by the government (Matos 2004:166). The provision of goods and services was intensified during the Colonial Wars. The Caetano government also tried to increase military satisfaction by providing free transportation to the overseas territories, medical care and

²⁴Law 2084 (16/8/1956).

²⁵Decree-Law 42564 (7/10/1959). See Ferreira (1992:255, 282).

²⁶See memo about the military mission in Angola and Mozambique (December 1937, AOS/CO/GR-11 Folder 8, Section 2, Page 254–255).

²⁷Including 149,090 men mobilised in the conflict areas not counting mobilised African regulars and militia forces (Teixeira 2004:79).

²⁸The Decree Laws 41559 and 41577 in 1958 changed the military organisation in the overseas territories. The priority was not was not providing support for the defence of the metropole but of the colonies and the troops were not obliged to remain in the capitals of the provinces (Telo 1996:327). New military regions were created in Angola and Mozambique, Guiné, Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Macau and Timor became also autonomous military territories (Teixeira 2004:77).

²⁹There is little evidence of the provision of services or goods for the families of the officers in the early stages of the regime. See for instance the detailed reports about military procurement of the War Minister in 1937 (AOS/CO/GR-1C Folder 5 Pages 149–230).

³⁰Decree-Law 42072 (31/12/1958).

housing benefits to the families of the military fighting the war.³¹ The public sector served as a source of employment for many officers not only after they retired but also as a second job while in active service. Although salaries in the administration were low, often they provided power, prestige, perks and facilitated access to better paid positions in the private sector after retirement from active service (Pimentel 2007:71).

4.2.3 Conclusion

The Salazarist regime used coercive and non-coercive *organisation* instruments to control the military. The regime used loyal Army units, the security forces GNR, PSP and PVDE/ PIDE/DGS as well as the paramilitary Portuguese Legion. Although these tools were primarily used by the regime to control the civilian population, they held some deterrent capacity vis-à-vis military insurrections. The recourse to these coercive tools was stable throughout the regime. From the military rebellions in the 1930s to the Carnation Revolution in 1974, the government always relied on its coercive power to force subordination or deter further rebellion.

The non-coercive use of the organisation of the state was more varied. The regime used military education and training, the institutional design and the provisions of services, goods and jobs to maintain the military under control.

First, the government believed that a better preparation would enhance professionalisation and separate the military from politics. Some initiatives were undertaken in the late 1930s and 1940s but overall education and training remained clearly deficient. NATO membership produced a small revolution intensifying training and military exercises throughout the 1950s. Many officers were trained abroad and new techniques and ideas were introduced. The military became more professional but also more critical with the regime. The Colonial War cut short this trend and during the 1960s and 1970s, military education ceased being a priority.

Second, Salazar used the organisational design to control the military. This was especially important in the 1930s and 1950s. In the 1930s, Salazar created coordination organs, such as the CSDN, that he could dominate to exert control over the three branches of the military. In the 1950s, further organisational changes were made following the dictates of NATO to consolidate civilian supremacy in defence. The most important measures were the creation of the National Defence Ministry and CEMGFA and the reinforcement of the CSDN. There are some signs of the utilisation of the geographical deployment of troops as instruments to prevent internal threats to the regime. However, the Colonial Wars forced the growth and decentralisation of the defence structures hampering previous efforts to control the military through the institutional design.

Finally, the government used its organisational capacity to provide services, goods and jobs for the military and their families as a means to increase their support. Their use increased from the early 1960s to compensate for the penuries of the Colonial Wars.

³¹ Including support for education of the sons of the military (Decree-law 358/70) and for disabled veterans (Decree-law 201/73). See internal Army Ministry memo (13/9/1973) (AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numero 4).

4.3 Nodality

There is much evidence of the use of *nodality* through both information effectors and detectors. Like other authoritarian regimes, the government intensively manipulated the information available for the military in order to project a positive image of Salazar and to avoid discontent. Thus the selective production (propaganda) and restriction of information (censorship) became central in the strategy of military subordination. Additionally, the regime employed several mechanisms to retrieve information, such as the secret police and other information services, networks of informants, and the internal communications in the administration, in order to prevent military insurrection. In general the information effectors reduced their intensity throughout the regime while the detectors grew in salience.

4.3.1 Information effectors

The use of propaganda and censorship was especially important during the 1930s and early 1940s. The control of the information exerted by the Estado Novo was similar to that of other fascist-like regimes such as Franco's. Although information effectors continued to be used throughout the regime, their relevance decreased. The fall of the Axis, the exchanges with NATO allies and the Colonial Wars ended up decreasing the utilisation and effectiveness of information effectors upon the military.

In 1932, Salazar, influenced by the journalist António Ferro, launched his 'Política do Espírito' (politics of the spirit) that aimed to strengthen the regime through propaganda and censorship (Ferro 1933; Pimentel 2007:93). The National Propaganda Secretariat (SPN) established in 1933, became the core of the Estado Novo's propaganda machinery. Military speeches, the radio, press, cinema, specialised publications, pamphlets and books were the information channels through which the government transmitted the official discourse to the military.³² The fascist-like youth movement 'Mocidade' became also a *nodality* instrument contributing to the control of the military through the moral and civic indoctrination of future soldiers and officers.³³ The projected representation of Portugal was that of a unitary, rural, religious and traditional country with a glorious past and a strong leader, very similar to Francoist representations of Spain. Moreover there was an effort to personalise the regime in the figure of Salazar (Paulo 1994:63). Attacking Salazar would mean attacking the new regime.

The theme of the armed forces was recurrent in the regime's propaganda. The always positive depiction of armed forces aimed to increase the military's professional reputation and self-esteem (Soares 1987:165–166). Since the inception of the Estado Novo, the government discourse emphasised the necessity of keeping the military separate from politics in general

³²For instance, SPN (1934, 1940, 1942, 1943), Galvão (1937), Ferro (1938), Moniz (1939), Freyre (1940). Some were published in other languages, for instance SNP (undated 1, undated 2, undated 3 and undated 4). See also Salazar's own books of speeches and political ideas (Salazar 1935, 1939 and 1951).

³³The Portuguese Youth or 'Mocidade Portuguesa' was created by the Decree-Law 26611 (19/5/1936). 'Mocidade' was a patriotic youth movement that also collaborated with the armed forces thanks to the provision of a pre-military training. In this organisation young Portuguese were taught to praise Salazar, as exemplified by their motto: 'Who rules? ... Salazar!' (Arriaga 1976; Caetano 2000 [1975]:224).

and from communism and totalitarian views in particular.³⁴ The use of nodal effectors was intensified whenever the stability of the regime was threatened. For instance propaganda was intensively used to counter the effects of leftist Navy rebellion in September 1936 (Faria 1995; Freire 1998) and the unrest triggered by the 1937 military reforms (Paulo 1994:86; Faria 2000:184–187). Moreover, the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War were propagandistically used to drive military attention away from internal politics.³⁵ The goal of depoliticisation can also be observed in the specialised military publications that proliferated during the regime, most of which tried to stimulate the *esprit de corps* and introduced technical content (Melo 1970).³⁶

Propaganda continued to be used after the Second World War. For instance the propaganda machinery magnified the ‘Soviet menace’ to maintain the military united³⁷, supported Salazar’s candidate, Admiral Américo Tomás, against the opposition leader, General Humberto Delgado, in 1958 presidential elections³⁸, and more importantly used the Colonial Wars to produce a patriotic exaltation and military support for the regime.³⁹ Nonetheless, from the mid-1940s, there was a gradual decline in the utilisation of propaganda. In 1944, the SPN was renamed National Information Secretariat (SNI) and although it continued to carry out similar tasks it did it with a lower intensity. In the end, SNI was re-oriented to the promotion of Portugal abroad becoming in 1968 the Information and Tourism Secretariat.

Censorship was also widely employed.⁴⁰ In 1933, Salazar transferred the responsibility of censorship from the War Ministry to Interior Ministry⁴¹ and created the Directorate for Censorship Services, DSC.⁴² Many different bodies of the administration collaborated in the censorship effort including the Legion and, in particular, the PVDE/PIDE/DGS (Azevedo 1999:305–314; Pimentel 2007:92–94). The elimination or modification of the content of articles related to military affairs became a fundamental control mechanism. News concerning the military were suppressed and the journalists often intimidated by the secret police (Ferreira 1992:233). Expressions of discontent were silenced.⁴³ Censorship was so entrenched that in an interview in 1938 Salazar declared that censorship ‘constitutes the legitimate defence of the free independent States against the big disorientation of the modern thought’ (Ferro 2003 [1932–1938]:158). The regime tried to limit the exposure of the military to any information that could undermine the morale or raise doubts about the government.

³⁴ See Salazar (1935:144) and Faria (2000:56–59).

³⁵ For instance Salazar’s speeches to Army and Navy officers (6/7/1937) in and in the National Assembly (22/5/1939) (Salazar 1939:322–334 and 378–393).

³⁶ See military publications such as ‘Revista Militar’, ‘Defesa Nacional’, ‘Revista do Ar’, ‘Infantaria’, ‘Revista da Marinha’, ‘Revista de Cavalaria’, ‘Revista de Artilharia’ and ‘Revista de Engenharia Militar’.

³⁷ For instance Salazar’s speech (28/4/1948) (Salazar 1951).

³⁸ For instance, speeches of the Defence Minister Santos Costa (16/5/1958 and 6/6/1958) (Ferreira 1992:244–245).

³⁹ See abundant correspondence with the journalist Jorge Tavares Rodrigues related to propaganda in Caetano’s archive (also in Antunes 1985, vol. 2:47–114).

⁴⁰ See Azevedo (1999: 345–357) for the legal foundations of the censorship in Portugal.

⁴¹ Decree-law 22469 (11/4/1933).

⁴² Decree-law 22756 (29/4/1933).

⁴³ For instance, Generals Norton de Matos, Humberto Delgado, Vassalo e Silva and Spínola suffered the action of the censorship (Antunes 1985, vol. 1:155; Ferreira 2006).

During the periods of the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War censorship most intensive (Azevedo 1999:415–438). Later its intensity diminished until the outbreak of the colonial conflict. Salazar and Caetano used censorship to prevent an open debate on the colonial question (Ferreira 1992:290–291; Ferreira 2006:107). Although there were no substantial changes in Caetano's censorship policy,⁴⁴ gradually it became more lax and the media began to criticise the government (Pimlott and Seaton 1983:47). The government lost its grip on information, especially in the colonies. Moreover growth of the armed forces led a more heterogeneous social and ideological composition (Schmitter 1975:16; Porch 1977: 68). The military were exposed to alternative sources of information and to new progressive ideas. The regime ended up being blamed for the conflict and Caetano discredited (Soares 1987:167). The publication of General Spínola's book 'Portugal e Futuro' in 1974 in which he criticised the government exemplifies the regime loss of control on information.

4.3.2 Information detectors

The Estado Novo also relied on information detectors to subordinate the military. Several state organisations collected information critical for the stability of the regime. The most important was the secret police PVDE/PIDE/DGS. Salazar and Caetano also relied on a wide web of informants and on their central location within the Estado Novo information network. Although the use of information detectors grew throughout the dictatorship they failed to prevent the military insurrection that precipitated its fall.

The secret police (PVDE), created in 1933, quickly became a fundamental control tool employed not only to counter opposition among civilians, usually communist and far-right activists, but also threats from the quarters (Pimentel 2007:498–519). The well-armed secret police was used as a coercive *organisation* tool (see 2.1) and as an information effector fundamentally thanks to its role in the Estado Novo censorship strategy (see 3.1). However, its main contribution to military subordination derives from its function as information detector. From 1937, the PVDE ran politico-ideological checks on military officers and the candidates to the Military Academy (Carrilho 1985:421). PVDE was notorious for its inquisitive surveillance which techniques had been learnt from German and Italian police (Gallagher 1983:118). In 1945, it was transformed into PIDE and its powers increased. The interception of letters, tapped phones, interrogations and even torture were common methods to obtain information. The secret police became notorious internationally especially during the Colonial Wars when its action was intensified. In 1969 it was renamed DGS. The utilisation of the secret police increased progressively, its personnel increased from 521 in 1949 to 3,472 in 1972 (Pimentel 2007:52–53). Rather than the use of violence, the key of success of the secret police was maintaining an important network of informants, 'bufos' (Gallagher 1983:117–120 Pimentel 2007:308–337). In 1974, there were 20,000 informants working for them (Pimentel 2007:315). The information collected by the secret police served to neutralise several military plots.

⁴⁴See Azevedo (1999:455–456). When Caetano was appointed, Portuguese journalists expected the abolition of the Censorship. Due to the unstable situation and the pressures from the hardliners this was not achieved. See for instance Jorge Tavares Rodrigues' letter to Caetano (26/9/1968) (Antunes 1985, vol. 2:47–49).

The government also used other information detectors to prevent military conspiracies such as the SNP, the DSC and the Portuguese Legion.⁴⁵ There is also evidence that Salazar relied on personal informants in order to assess what units in the Armed Forces should be suspected of anti-Salazarist views.⁴⁶ However, since the military strongly disliked being scrutinised by external bodies, and especially by the PIDE/DGS, the utilisation of non-military information detectors was used with caution.⁴⁷ The regime complemented their action with the help some loyal officers and military services, such as the Army information services, SIME.⁴⁸

Additionally, Salazar and Caetano used their nodal position within the state apparatus. Letters, internal memos and reports served to obtain valuable information concerning the military. Salazar and Caetano maintained extensive correspondence with other figures in the administration and the armed forces.⁴⁹ Moreover they constantly received reports and copies of internal communications concerning the armed forces and in particular about military reforms, defence budgets and discontent within the barracks.⁵⁰ To a lesser extent than Franco, Salazar and Caetano used informal friendship networks as a tool for the control of the military. They had no military background themselves and maintained a more distant rapport with their entourage. Despite those efforts, the coup attempt in 1961 by the Defence Minister Botelho Moniz and the inadequate assessment of the risks of military plots against Caetano shows the deterioration of the information detection mechanisms.⁵¹

4.3.3 Conclusion

Information control was a very important aspect of the regime's military subordination strategy. On the one hand, Salazar and Caetano manipulated the information available for and about the military through information effectors. On the other, they closely monitored the military to anticipate discontent and insurrection through information detectors.

⁴⁵For instance, in May 1947 the Legion informed the government of the circulation of critical document signed by opposition groups within the Armed Forces (Ferreira 1992:203).

⁴⁶For instance a report from a lawyer called Angelo César, in 1938, assessed the levels of loyalty within different units of the army, GNR and PSP (AOS/CO/GR-11, Folder 11, Document 1, Pages 334–342).

⁴⁷The military despised the PIDE/DGS and Salazar and Caetano did not want them to feel humiliated or feel their autonomy threatened (Pimentel 2007:499, 505–506).

⁴⁸See evidence on Salazar's personal documentation. For instance secret report from the 3rd Military Region informed about a military officer that was visiting different garrisons to promote a military opposition movement (5/4/1947) (AOS/CO/GR-1D Folder 3, Section 1, Page 16) and report from the War Ministry identifying ten supposedly subversive officers (18/6/1949) (AOS/CO/GR-1D Folder 3, Section 9, Pages 59–60). Military intelligence reports also inform about problems of public order outside the barracks. For instance reports from the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Military Region of 1947 and 1949 (AOS/CO/GR-1D Folder 3, Section 1–11, Pages 12–80).

⁴⁹See Melo (1983), Antunes (1985, 1994), Oliveira et al. (1996) and the abundant correspondence in Salazar's and Caetano's personal archives. See for instance exchanges with Army Minister Abrantes Pinto and Defence Minister Santos Costa in 1953 (AOS/CO/GR-11, Folder 21, Pages 398–406). Salazar paid great attention to the letters received from military officers. Salazar highlighted what he considered important in the letters he received from military officers, often these were compliments but also protests. Salazar kept 21 letters addressed to him as a reaction to the 1937 military reforms (AOS/CO/GR-6, Folder 9, Sections 1–21, Pages 305–367).

⁵⁰See Salazar's and Historical Military archives.

⁵¹See extensive documentation about the 1961 coup in Captain Fernando Ferreira Valença's report (AHM, divisão 1, secção 39, caixa 1, numero 1, documentos 1–29A) and about the 1974 plots in Captain Salgueiro Maia's report (AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numero 47).

The government's propaganda was very intense and involved many different means such as public speeches, books, pamphlets, press and specialised publications. The government projected an idealised image of Salazar, Portugal and the armed forces. The very powerful SNP/SNI was in charge of coordinating the propaganda action. Additionally, several organisations exerted censorship in the Estado Novo, such as the DSC, the PVDE/PIDE/DGS and the Legion. The goal was to eliminate any information that could cause concern or raise discontent amongst the military. Both propaganda and censorship were very strong during the Spanish Civil and the Second World Wars. Later, they gradually declined. After the fall of the Axis, the type of information manipulation used by the Estado Novo became questionable in the Western sphere. During the Colonial Wars the new, larger and more decentralised organisation of the armed forces as well as its more heterogeneous composition undermined the effectiveness of the government information effectors.

Conversely, the utilisation of information detectors grew continuously throughout the regime. Most of the institutions involved in propaganda and censorship were also employed to detect potential threats. Among them the PVDE/PIDE/DGS was the most important. Its inquisitive surveillance helped to neutralise many military plots. The government also relied on a wide network of informants as well as on Salazar's and Caetano's privileged position vis-à-vis the information flows within the Estado Novo's administration. Letters, internal communications and reports received from senior officers and civil servants contributed to the assessment and prevention of risks coming from the armed forces.

4.4 Authority

The *authority*-based rewards and incentives played a very important role in the military control strategy. The capacity of the government to shape military promotions, the appointment to top positions in the state apparatus and the functions and privileges granted to the military were used to increase loyalty within the ranks. The Salazarist regime also used *authority* sanctions and constraints as control mechanisms. The government limited the retirement age and size of the armed forces, punished disloyal military and introduced some restrictions to enhance the esprit de corps and detach them from political activities. Overall, the utilisation of *authority* tools was very important and slightly more stable than those of *organisation* and *nodality* tools. However, an important peak in the use of authority tools can be observed in the late 1930s, when Salazar managed to substitute all the top senior officers by loyal younger officers through a combination of *authority* tokens, and a progressive decline from the 1960s, associated to the Colonial Wars and the loss of legitimacy of the government.

4.4.1 Rewards and incentives

First, military promotions became control tools. Most of the young officers that had participated in the 28 May 1926 coup were supportive of Salazar. Salazar gradually replaced senior officers, who in general kept a more critical attitude towards his reforms, by young, loyal ones. The use of promotions and military appointments was intensified after 1936, when Salazar be-

came self-appointed War Minister.⁵² Salazar took advantage of the ongoing military reforms to institutionalise a mechanism of political appointment and ministerial approval, 'escolha', for senior ranks (Matos 2004:160). In 1937, ministerial approval became a condition for the admission to the elite High Staff Corps⁵³ and a merit-based system of appointment replaced the traditional seniority principle for military promotions from the rank of Captain upwards.⁵⁴ Loyalty and subordination became highly rewarded. The political-ideological filter made at the top of the hierarchy was reproduced down to the rank of Captain (Carrilho 1985:421). The High Staff Corps was very appealing for most military because it involved a higher salary, fast-track promotions and access to the most desired positions such as those in the urban centres and embassies. Since ministerial approval was a prerequisite to enter the Corps and to reach the top ranks in the armed forces, ambitious officers publicly showed their allegiance to the regime. These authority-based instruments introduced in 1937 were those with a highest impact on the control of the military during the *Estado Novo* (Pinto 1994:288). The 'escolha' was extremely important from the late 1930s to 1945 and served to replace the top ranks with loyal officers. The 'escolha' persisted during Caetano's rule but he was less involved in the appointment of military chiefs than Salazar (Matos 2004:175). He did not enjoy the same legitimacy among the ranks as his predecessor and was afraid he could create unrest by interfering in the promotion system reactions (Fernandes 2006).

Second, Salazar and Caetano used their capacity to influence appointments in the administration as control tools. They systematically reserved some of the most important positions in the regime to loyal military officers, including many ministerial positions (Table 7, Page 68) and that of the President of the Republic. Although Presidents were formally elected, candidates had to be approved by the Prime Ministers who controlled the single party, National Union.⁵⁵ These appointments served to reward allegiance and held important symbolic value for the armed forces. Moreover, many other top positions in the administration were allocated to the military. From 1936 to 1944, about 35% of the Civil Governors and almost all the Colonial Governors were military men. The military had significant representation in the National Union, the Corporate Chamber and the National Assembly (Faria 2000:24–26). There is evidence that the appointment of military personnel to top positions in the

⁵²For instance, in 1936 Colonel Tasso Miranda Cabral was promoted to Brigadier and charged with the reorganisation of the army, Colonel Raul Esteves became General and Captain Santos Costa was appointed Undersecretary of State (Faria 2000:135, 145–147, 175).

⁵³Decree-Law 28401 (31/12/1937). The High Staff Corps was fundamental for Salazar's control strategy (Carrilho 1985: 318–319). Salazar personally drafted all documents related to the admission process and requirements for the High Staff Corps. See his handwritten amendments in the reform project (AOS/CO/GR-6 Folder 4, Section 1, Page 223) and in the regulations of the High Military Studies Institute concerning the requisites for the High Staff Course (AOS/CO/GR-1A, Folder 20, Section 3–7, Pages 484–494).

⁵⁴Decree-Law 28402 (31/12/1937). The ranks of Captain, Major and Colonel could be reached by seniority and appointment, the ranks of Brigadier and General only by appointment (Article 14). However in the case of members of the High Staff Corps, the promotion to the level of Major and Colonel had to be done by appointment from the War Minister. See for instance the Regulations of the High Military Studies Institute, 1939 (AOS/CO/GR-1A, Folder 20, Section 7, Page 529). Even the professors of the Military School were directly appointed by the War Minister. See Project of Decree-Law for the reform of the Army School (November 1940, AOS/CO/GR-1B, Folder 5, Section 14, Pages 301–302).

⁵⁵The three Presidents were military: General Fragoso Carmona (1928–1951), General Craveiro Lopes (1951–1958) and Admiral Américo Tomás (1958–1974). Salazar did not allow Craveiro Lopes to run for re-election in 1958 and Caetano blocked Spínola's candidacy in 1972, in both cases to prevent tensions among generals (Fernandes 2006:132–133).

state apparatus continued throughout the regime.⁵⁶ However, from the late 1950s, there was a gradual decline in their representation in the government and state institutions (Schmitter 1975:31–33; Carrilho 1985:446).

Third, some of the functions entrusted to the armed forces and some of the privileges that the military enjoyed can be considered *authority*-based rewards and incentives. According to the 1933 Constitution the military were the guarantors of the 'National Revolution' and the 'maintenance of order and public peace'.⁵⁷ This was not merely a symbolic function and the military held important power concerning public order during the Estado Novo. The security forces PIDE, PSP, GNR and Fiscal Guard were always led by senior military officers. Until 1945, the military were in charge of judging political crimes through special military courts and from 1949, the responsibility of the defence of the empire was transferred from the Overseas Ministry to the armed forces. Military officers also worked in prison services, in the Legion and Mocidade, in the censorship services, and in the colonial administration (Wheeler 1979b:201).

Additionally, there was a tacit agreement from the early 1930s between the government and the military according to which the military maintained their autonomy, privileges and some representation in the administration to compensate their extrication from politics.⁵⁸ For instance, there was a great level of tolerance for holding second jobs⁵⁹ and until 1945 the military were immune from arrest by the civilian police.⁶⁰ In 1947, the first Army Officer' Statutes were launched, introducing new guarantees for the military. During the Colonial Wars some new privileges were introduced. For instance, in 1961, the Estado Novo reintroduced the right to vote in the legislative elections (eliminated in 1947) and, in 1965, the Armed Forces Officer's Statutes increased officers' rights and guarantees.⁶¹ Moreover, numerous military decorations were awarded every year to combatants, often personally by Salazar.⁶² All these functions, privileges and formal recognitions aimed to make the military feel empowered and increase their satisfaction.

⁵⁶See General Kaúlza's letters to Caetano proposing military candidates to some state jobs (and thanking him for some favour concerning Kaúlza's brother in law)(23/11/1968) and undated letter (1968 or 1969) (AMC/12–79).

⁵⁷See for instance Article 53 of the 1933 Constitution and Salazar's early speeches and writings (Salazar 1933, 1935, 1939; SPN undated 1).

⁵⁸The reforms approved in 1935 and 1937 diminished both military autonomy and political influence. From 1939 to 1945 military autonomy and political influence grew. After 1946, Salazar managed again to reduce their autonomy (Telo 1996:226–227).

⁵⁹For instance a secret report from the 1st Military Region denounces that the poor salaries oblige the military to work in their spare time having a negative impact in their military occupation (AOS/CO/GR-1D Folder 3, Section 3, Page 30).

⁶⁰In 1945 immunity from arrest was removed (Wheeler 1979b:199–200, 205)

⁶¹The Statutes of the three branches were revised to conform the new guarantees of the Navy (1966), Army and Air Force (1971).

⁶²See Matos (2004:176). An internal memo in the Army Ministry (25/4/1963) explains that military honours and decorations were going to be made in public ceremonies as a means to elevate the morale of the troops, their families and the population (AHM, divisão 1, secção 39, caixa 1, numero 11).

4.4.2 Sanctions and constraints

Authority tools were also used to restrain the capacity of the military to oppose to the government. These can be organised in three groups: limitations to the size of the armed forces and retirement age, punishments to rebellious officers and regulations to enhance their esprit the corps and separation from politics.

First, the 1937 reforms were essential to reinforce civilian control of the military. In addition the ‘escolha’ system, these reforms introduced legal limitations to the size of the army,⁶³ to the length of the military service⁶⁴ and to the retirement age.⁶⁵ The oversized army was problematic. The government believed that smaller armed forces could be better paid, trained and equipped thus reducing the risk of military disaffection. The government also aimed to rejuvenate the senior ranks by stimulating early retirement.⁶⁶ This measure was enhanced by financial incentives. In some cases the pensions of early retirees became higher than salaries. The measure resulted in the reduction the total number of officers in active by 25% and the complete renewal of the top ranks by 1940. This was extremely important from a control point of view because together with the newly introduced ‘escolha’ system, it gave Salazar the opportunity to promote many loyal military to the top of the hierarchy. From 1938 to 1939 fifteen new generals were appointed.⁶⁷ Thanks to this combination of *authority* tools, the generation of young officers that had participated in the 28 May coup quickly attained most of the high positions within the ranks (Telo 1996:152).

The government enacted new regulations to reduce the size of the army, which had grown during the Second World War to face a possible invasion. This process included a fast process of de-mobilisation of militia officers (‘milicianos’) recruited during the war period, among which many did not share the ideas of the regime (Telo 1996:185). The size of the armed forces was reduced by more than 40% from 1944 to 1951 (Matos 2004:162). Later, however, the Colonial Wars hindered again the goal of maintaining a small army.

Second, the governments used their official capacity to discharge or demote officers when their behaviour was disloyal. This served to punish military involved in the several anti-government plots while creating opportunities for the appointment of loyal officers. There are many examples. For instance in May 1935, the government dismissed generals Mendes Ribeiro, Norton de Matos, Mendes Cabeçadas, Colonel Ferreira Guimarães and Major Rodrigues Areosa Feio for conspiring against the regime (Matos 2004:161). After the Tagus revolt in 1936 there were purges in the Navy (Freire 2003:150–151) and after that of April 1938 Colonels Silva Casqueiro, Lello Portela, Ferreira Guimarães and Brigadeiro João Almeida were forced into exile (Pinto 1994:281, 287). Captain Henrique Galvão was arrested in 1952 and later forced into retirement for criticising the colonial policy. In April 1961 Botelho Moniz and Costa Gomes were fired, and Craveiro Lopes forced to retirement after their failed coup.

⁶³Law 1960 (1/9/1937) of Organisation of the Army.

⁶⁴Law 1961 (1/9/1937) of Recruitment and Military Service.

⁶⁵Decree-Law 28404 (31/12/1937).

⁶⁶See amendments to the drafts of Decree 28404 by Salazar (1937, AOS/CO/GR-6 Folder 8, Sections 1–5, Pages 233–304).

⁶⁷See Carrilho (1985:440) and Faria (2000:192–193). The number of generals was limited to eighteen. This instrument was so effective that in only 5 years produced the retirement of all generals that had participated in the reorganisation (Faria 2000:176).

In 1963 ten officers were expelled from the army for disobeying government orders to defend Goa against the much larger Indian troops in 1961, including General Vassalo e Silva who was in charge of the colony (Gallagher 1983:152–153). Notwithstanding, overall the government's stance was comparatively soft and often military plotters were reintegrated into the military.⁶⁸ The *authority* disciplinary measures were not very stringent and did not have a strong deterrent capacity.

Third, the governments used restrictive regulation to enhance the military's distinct *esprit de corps* and detachment from politics. For instance, the right of association was restricted and secret societies were prohibited due to their historical connexion with republicanism⁶⁹, career limitations for militia officers were introduced⁷⁰, the military were not allowed to exercise liberal professions, they needed permission to get married and were restricted to non-divorced Portuguese women⁷¹ and from 1947 to 1961 they were not allowed to vote. Military were even commanded to avoid areas were anti-government demonstrations were likely to take place.⁷²

4.4.3 Conclusion

Authority tools can be considered those with the greatest impact on military subordination the military, at least during Salazar's rule. The system of appointment and ministerial approval, 'escolha', combined with the limitations to the retirement age introduced in 1937 allowed Salazar to replace completely the, often critical, senior ranks with younger loyal military officers. Pro-salazarist officers were appointed to key positions, not only in the armed forces but also in other parts of the regime Administration. The use of the government's capacity to shape appointments and the presence of the military in the State institutions was very important until the mid-1960s, but then it declined. The regime also reserved some special powers for the military concerning the maintenance of public order so that they feel empowered. Moreover the military enjoyed formal rewards and incentives to increase their satisfaction, such as high degree of autonomy, tolerance with secondary jobs, immunity to civilian arrest and they received often military decorations. These rewards were intensified during the Colonial Wars.

⁶⁸For instance see the reintegration of conservative military rebels approved in November and December 1936 (Salazar correspondence AOS/CO/GR-6, Folder 2, Section 1–6, Pages 7–16). After the failed coup on 14 April 1961 the government merely dismissed some of the conspirators but did not take any further disciplinary measure (Gallagher 1983:152–153). See also the antecedents to 1974 coup.

⁶⁹Law 1901(21/5/1935) prohibited secret societies. This measure affected many officers who belonged to the Freemasons and the Carbonari (Antunes 1994: 23). It was a request of the young officers that had participated in the 28 May 1926 coup who were very concerned with influence of the freemasons on the military hierarchy and government.

⁷⁰Project of military reform of December 1937 personally amended by Salazar limited the rank to Captain (AOS/CO/GR-6, Folder 5, Section 1, Pages 152–153, 158).

⁷¹Regulation draft of military marriage in Salazar's archive (undated, AOS/CO/GR-1B, Folder 19, Section 1–2, Pages 605–612).

⁷²For instance internal memos by the CEME (29/4/1964 and 29/4/1965) commanded the military that from 1 to 8 May 1964 and on 28 of May 1965 the military, after finishing their duties, had to return home by the shortest way and avoid the Baixa area in Lisbon due to the foreseeable subversive acts organized by the PCP (AHM, divisão 1, secção 39, caixa 1, numero 23).

In addition to lowering the retirement age that facilitated the renewal of the military hierarchy there were other *authority*-based sanctions and constraints used to enhance the control on the military. The government established formal limitations to the size of the armed forces. Smaller armed forces could be better paid, trained and equipped increasing the levels of satisfaction. Moreover, the government wielded its authority to demote or expel those involved in anti-government plots or opposed to the regime's colonial policy. However, in most cases punishments were not severe. Finally, some restrictions were imposed on the military in order to enhance a distinct esprit de corps and to keep them separated from politics.

Overall, the use of *authority* was fundamentally stable with an important peak around the 1937 reforms. Later, with the outbreak of the Colonial Wars (1961) and the arrival of Caetano (1968) most *authority* tools became less important in the government control toolkit. This points at the gradual depletion of *authority* as a government resource, the culmination of which may be observed in the failure of Caetano's *authority*-based measures.

4.5 Treasure

Salazar and some of the young officers of his entourage regarded the rearmament and modernisation of the armed forces and salary raises as incentives for the military to develop professionalism and encourage a return to the barracks. However, these ideas collided with the generally very poor economic situation of Portugal and with the austerity measures that Salazar championed and earned him his reputation. Military budgets increases were connected with reforms, such as in the second half of the 1930s and in the 1950s and with external threats, such as the Second World War and the colonial conflicts. These increases had, nonetheless, little impact on military living and working conditions and therefore on their level of subordination.


4.5.1 Evolution of military budgets

The Military Dictatorship (1926–1933) and the Estado Novo did not produce significant growth in military budgets (Figure 3). Although the impact of the Great Depression was comparatively lower in Portugal than in other Western countries (Mateus 1998:47–50) Portugal's general economic situation was poor. Portugal industry was not competitive and had a high dependence on imports and emigrant remittances (Rosas 2000). The Great Depression accentuated the trade deficit and the depreciation of the Escudo. Exports and remittances diminished drastically (Mata and Valério 1994:190–193). Salazar, influenced by the new totalitarian regimes in Europe adopted a highly autarkic economic policy (Mateus 1998:56). His protectionist and austerity policies served to counter the effects of the international crisis and legitimised his rule in the early 1930s. However, they also hampered the utilisation of *treasure* tools. For instance, the salary increases and modernisation of equipment requested by the armed forces in the early 1930s were not approved due to austerity imposed by Salazar.⁷³ The higher budgets in 1933–1935 coincide with the rearmament plans first in the Navy and

⁷³See for instance the reform proposed by Major Barros Rodrigues (11/7/1931) (AOS/CO/GR-1A, Folder 4, Document 1, Pages 117–118). Barros resigned due to insufficient funding for the project.

then in the Army. The reforms of 1937 and the threat of the Spanish War produced new increases in military budgets.

Figure 3: Defence expenditure in constant million escudos of 1926 (Military Dictatorship and Estado Novo)[†]



Source: Based on Mata and Valério (1994:253–254; 270–271)


[†]It includes expenditure in the overseas territories.

During the Second World War, exports grew drastically correcting temporarily the trade deficit. However, the crisis of supply and an inflationary process linked to the war affected the purchasing power of the military. The increases in defence budgets during the war did not positively affect military satisfaction. The increase in military expenditure was associated with the reinforcement of the garrisons in Cabo Verde, the Azores and the frontier with Spain and did not contribute to the improvement of the salaries and working conditions of the military.

The Portuguese economy grew without interruption from 1946 to 1974 (Mata and Valério 1994:200, 254) but this growth was not reflected in the military budgets. Portugal remained the second poorest European country after Greece and suffered some structural deficiencies that made Salazar prioritise other expenditures such as health, education and infrastructures over defence. In real terms, military expenditure grew slowly until late 1950s. The weight of defence expenditure vis-à-vis total public expenditure decreased until the membership in NATO and then remained stable until the colonial conflict (Figure 4). During this period, the financial resources devoted to military and defence purposes were comparatively low (Table 9).

From 1958, the military budgets quickly soared. The war effort necessitated enormous sums of money, which constrained the capacity of the government to use *treasure* for control

Figure 4: Defence expenditure as percentage total public expenditures in Portugal and Spain (1940–1974)[†]



Source: Based on Olmeda (1988: 204) and Mata and Valério (1994: 253–254; 270–271)

[†]Portuguese data include expenditure in the overseas territories.

purposes.⁷⁴ Moreover, emigration and the wars provoked a dramatic shortage of man-power that worsened the state of the Portuguese economy.⁷⁵

4.5.2 Staff expenditure

General salary raises, differentiation of wages, as well as pension and other complementary remunerations were used to maintain the military under control. However, the intensity and frequency of their use was very limited due to factors such as the size of the army, economic crises and the special needs during war periods.

The economic problems and the austerity imposed by Salazar limited the capacity to increase military salaries without introducing structural changes in the armed forces. In the early 1930s, the government rejected to increase salaries. The reduction of personnel in 1938

⁷⁴Secret correspondence among the Finance, Army and Defence Ministers about the economic situation of the Army in 1966 denounces a budgetary deficit in 1965 of 484 million escudos and serious problems in the provisions of materials. The situation was so bad that the Army Ministry was advised to ask for a loan from private banks (AOS/CO/FI-11X, Folder 7, Sections 1–2 Pages 934–963).

⁷⁵18% of the population had emigrated between 1960 and 1971 due to the transformations in Portuguese economic structure and the unequal distribution of wealth. In 1974 a fourth of the adult male population was in the armed forces and almost 150,000 men were deployed in Africa (Maxwell 1995:20).

Table 9: Defence expenditure as a percentage of the GDP (NATO countries + Spain)

	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956
USA	5.7	5.5	10.9	15	14.8	12.9	11.2	10.9
UK	7	7.3	8.9	11.1	11.2	9.8	9.2	8.8
France	6.6	6.8	8.8	10.5	11.4	9.1	7.7	9.5
Canada	2.6	3.1	6.6	9.1	9.2	8.2	7.7	7.3
Greece	7.4	7.6	8.4	8.3	6.4	6.9	6.4	6.8
Netherlands	4.3	5.2	5.6	6.2	6.2	6.7	6.4	6.6
Turkey	6.7	6.4	5.8	5.6	5.6	6.1	5.8	5.2
Norway	2.4	2.6	3.3	4.4	5.7	5.7	4.4	4.1
Italy	4.4	4.7	5.2	5.6	4.7	5	4.4	4.1
Germany						4.8	4.9	4.4
Portugal	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.9	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.4
Belgium	2.5	2.4	3.4	5.2	5.1	4.9	4	3.8
Spain	5.3	4.4	3.7	4.2	4	3.7	3.9	3.7
Denmark	2.1	1.8	2.3	3	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.4
Luxembourg	1	1.5	1.7	2.6	3.2	3.6	3.6	2.1

Sources: Carrilho (1985: 452) and Olmeda (1988: 204)

created the conditions to increase salaries without hugely increasing budgets. Thus, the government approved an important general raise to bridge the gap with civil servant salaries, increased in 1935, and also to prevent criticism of the other more controversial reforms that the government was launching in 1937.⁷⁶

The government also used salary discrimination among different ranks and Corps to reinforce military loyalty. For instance raises approved in 1937 were especially high for the senior ranks to keep their loyalty. Their salaries were higher than those of equivalent positions in the civil service (Faria 1996: 32). This aimed to compensate the reduction of the political power of the military elites (Carrilho 1985: 376–377). Membership to the new High Staff Corps also meant higher salaries for equivalent ranks (Table 10). Since ministerial approval was a requisite for the senior ranks and for High Staff Corps membership, ambitious officers had strong incentives to show allegiance to the regime.

In addition, there were other economic supplements for critical units like those in Lisbon and Porto, or for pilots and ‘observadores’ and for some especial tasks. By targeting some specific units that could have an important impact in an internal uprising Salazar was securing his position vis-à-vis a potential military threat.

Due to the inflation during the Second World War, salaries became insufficient and the military often were needed secondary jobs to sustain their families. The government approved a 15% general salary raise in February 1945 following military criticism on the plans intending

⁷⁶The salary raise was approved by the Decree-law 28403 (31/12/1937). Salazar was personally involved in this reform. See his correspondence (AOS/CO/GR-1B Folder 3, Section 1–2, Pages 17–21) and comments on the project of salary raises (AOS/CO/GR-6, Folder 3–4, Pages 27–35, 55–139).

Table 10: Military monthly salaries in January 1938 (in escudos)

Ranks	Generals	High Staff Corps	Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineering, Air Force, Military Administration, Health and Veterinary	Support services, chiefs of military bands
General	4500			
Brigadier		4000		
Colonel	3250	3000		
Lieutenant-Colonel	2750	2500		
Major	2500	2250	2150	
Captain	2000	1800	1700	
Lieutenant		1400	1300	
2 nd Lieutenant		1100	1100	

Source: Decree 28403 (31/12/1937). Salazar Archives AOS/CO/GR-11 Folder 9, Document 1, Pages 261–262.

to freeze military expenditure.⁷⁷ Again, salary raises were made possible thanks to the downsizing process launched in 1944. This general raise was, nonetheless, insufficient and did not successfully manage to curb military discontent.⁷⁸

Salazar was asked by NATO to augment military budgets and officers' salaries to incentivise exclusive dedication and attract qualified personnel (Matos 2004:166, 170). Despite NATO aid, the financial problems persisted and no relevant salary increases were made.⁷⁹ In 1958 Portugal was the second European NATO country which devoted the highest percentage of the army budget to staff expenditures: 70.3%.⁸⁰ However salaries continued to be insufficient to guarantee exclusive dedication. In 1958 the salary of a Colonel covered only 76% of the minimum living expenses for his household, that of a Captain between 60% and 73%, and that a Sergeant between 40% and 43% percent.⁸¹

Defence expenditure grew rapidly from late 1950s. Money was spent to assure the defence of the overseas territories, not on improve military salaries. The government introduced some

⁷⁷See letter to Salazar explaining that the 15% rise had relieved the military momentarily but that the effects of this measure would not last long (20/3/1945, AOS/CO/GR-1C, Folder 24, Page 408).

⁷⁸See complaints about the loss of purchasing power in secret memo from Santos Costa (8/3/1945, AOS/CO/GR-11 Folder 18, Document 1, Page 392), secret reports from the 3rd Military Region (8/3/1945), from the 2nd Military Region (8/4/1945 and 1/4/1947)(AOS/CO/GR-1D Folder 3, Section 1, Page 13; Section 2, Page 22; Section 3, Page 28).

⁷⁹See for instance the cancellation of some military promotions due to lack of economic resources. Letter from Caetano to Salazar (Antunes 1994:357–358).

⁸⁰Second after Turkey (73.7%) and far ahead of the Netherlands (32.1%), UK (40.2%), Italy (46.9%) and France (57.1%) (AHM, divisão 1, secção 39, caixa 1, numero 1, documento 10).

⁸¹The estimate was made assuming a household of four people. Army Ministry report about the bases for military salaries (AHM, divisão 1, secção 39, caixa 1, numero 1, documento 15).

economic perks. For instance, in 1960 the government created a fund to compensate the families of deceased officers.⁸² In 1962, exemptions and reductions in the payment of some services were introduced for the families of the military killed or handicapped during the war and in 1966 and 1970, military pensions were increased (Matos 2004:177). However, given the complexity of the colonial conflict and the size of the armed forces mobilised⁸³ the increases in budgets overall did not have a positive impact on military salaries, which remained very low compared to other European armed forces (Porch 1977:45–53). Military discontent at the end of the regime proves it (Chapter 3 Section 3.2.6).

In sum, although there is evidence of the utilisation of salaries and other economic incentives, the contribution of staff expenditure as control tool was very limited throughout the regime.

4.5.3 Equipment Expenditure

Salazar considered the rearmament and modernisation of the armed forces as an incentive for the military to return to the barracks. However, similar to Spain, most defence expenditure was earmarked for officers' salaries and living costs of the troops. Salazar's austerity economic policies contributed to curtail expenditure in materials and weapons. Moreover the insufficient capacity of the defence industry made Portugal very dependant on foreign aid. The modernisation of the armament and equipment remained very limited during the Estado Novo.

In the early 1930s, there was scarcity in terms of equipment, weapons and ammunition (Faria 2000:39–41). In 1933, Salazar's government adopted a budget of 200 million escudos for the acquisition of equipment for the armed forces. Salazar prioritised the Navy.⁸⁴ On top of the strategic reasons, such as the defence of the Lisbon port, the maritime communications and the colonies, the consolidation of military subordination was central to the decision. Traditionally, republican ideas had flourished in the Navy. Despite some initial purges during the military dictatorship, the opposition to the regime enjoyed important support in the Navy. Thus, Salazar intended to buy their loyalty. However, shortly after, the Army became again the privileged recipient of funds as means to prevent a land invasion from Spain where growing political instability was alarming Portuguese military and political elites. The plan of rearmament of the Army initiated in 1935 was the most ambitious ever undertaken by Portugal in its contemporary history.⁸⁵ In 1936, the rearmament was partially hindered by Salazar's support to Francoist camp. The UK and France did not satisfy Portuguese demands for the acquisition of artillery to prevent weapons from reaching Franco (Telo 1996:155). Germany replaced the

⁸²‘Cofre de Previdência das Forças Armadas’. Decree-law 42945 (26/4/1960).

⁸³In average 117,000 men were mobilised in Africa between 1961 and 1974 and a total of 1,368,900 men participated in the three main operations theatres (Ferreira 1994:83)

⁸⁴Army reports, August 1933 (AOS/CO/GR-8, Folder 1, Pages 1–156) and June 1934 (AOS/CO/GR-8 Folder 2 Pages 157–192). See also Telo (1996:138–139).

⁸⁵See Telo (1996:148) and internal government reports about equipment acquisition in 1935. For instance 68 million escudos spent for maritime defence (AOS/CO/GR-8, Folder 5, Pages 264–266), over 91 million on planes and equipment for training (AOS/CO/GR-8, Folder 6, Pages 260–263), and over 23 million investment on weapon factories (AOS/CO/GR-8, Folder 9, Pages 274–301).

UK and France as the main equipment supplier.⁸⁶ The rearmament was financed by an increase of exports of products such as wolfram, oils, cork, canned food and resins to Germany, as well as by a 20 million marks credit to be repaid within 5 years (Faria 2000:132–134).

With the outbreak of the Second World War, the supply of weapons and equipment from Germany was quickly reduced. The situation of the armed forces in 1939 was still very unsatisfactory; only one division had modern equipment. All experts agreed that Portugal could not resist an invasion from Spain⁸⁷ Once the ‘Operation Felix’ for the attack of Gibraltar (which included an eventual occupation of Lisbon) was postponed in 1941, Germany continued to support Portuguese rearmament to counterbalance British influence and remained its main supplier until 1944.⁸⁸ In 1943, after an agreement for the Allies’ utilisation of the bases in the Azores⁸⁹, the UK started to provide Portugal with some weaponry considered obsolete to fight the Germans but sufficient to improve Portuguese fighting capacity. The material included planes, tanks, machine guns, anti-tank and anti-aerial weapons, mortars, shells, trucks, auxiliary escort boats and communication equipment.⁹⁰ However, the rearmament efforts only enabled Portugal to fully equip three infantry divisions and a battalion of artillery and renew partially the armament of two other divisions at the end of the war (Teixeira 2004:52).

After the end of the Second World War the government launched a programme a programme of construction of quarters to improve military working conditions. Most of these were inaugurated the 1950s.⁹¹ However, the process of modernisation of weapons and materials continued to be very slow after the war. Portugal was the least benefitted among the recipients of the Marshall Plan (Rollo 1994). Despite NATO membership, the US military aid received by Portugal was very low.⁹² The rearmament of Navy became again a priority following NATO demands and also as a means to compensate for the Navy’s loss of autonomy and political influence. For instance, in 1951 the US approved military aid of 40 million

⁸⁶See Telo (1996:156–159) and negotiations with German Government (November–December 1936, AOS/CO/GR-8 Folder 15, Sections 1–2, Pages 498–520).

⁸⁷According to the British newspaper ‘Reynolds News’ (28/8/1939) Portugal was a liability for the UK because ‘her military forces are negligible and her territory might be invaded by Franco’ (News clipping and translation sent to Salazar by PVDE, AOS/CO/IN-8A, Folder 5, Section 26, Page 425–426). Army Chief of Staff Miranda Cabral stated that the defence of Portugal from Spain was ‘unfeasible and utopian’ if they were not helped by the UK (letter to Salazar, 27/7/1940, AHM, Fundo 26, secção 10, caixa 332, documento 167). A military assessment during the Azores negotiations with the UK concluded that Portugal would need British military support to defend from an possible Spanish invasion, and asked for their aid (Secret memos from the Portuguese Delegation, 19/7/1943, AOS/CLB/FA-5, Section 1, Pages 135–160). See also Teixeira (2004:51).

⁸⁸For instance contract of acquisition of bomb shells from Germany (11/5/1943) (AOS/CO/R-1C, Folder 18, Pages 326–334). See also Telo (1996:171–172).

⁸⁹See for instance the abundant documentation on the secret agreements of military cooperation in the Azores in July and August 1943 between the UK and Portuguese governments (AOS/CLB/FA-5, Section 1–2, Pages 1–469).

⁹⁰See secret memo of the British delegation in the Azores negotiations (31/7/1943, AOS/CLB/FA-5, Section 1, Pages 235–236) and secret report from the British Embassy (17/8/1943, AOS/CLB/FA-5, Section 2, Pages 425–436).

⁹¹See Matos (2004:161, 171). In the 1950s, many quarters were opened: in Porto (infantry in 1950 and general quarter of the North Military Region in 1957), Viseu (1951), Caldas da Rainha (1953), Abrantes (1955), Beja (1953), Braga (1958).

⁹²For instance, the total amount received by Portugal from 1949 to 1953 was inferior to that allocated to Spain in 1953. The reason might be the equipment of the Spanish Armed Forces was even older and scarcer (Telo 1996:221, 357). From 1953 to 1972 US military aid to Portugal continued to be lower than to most European countries (Barrachina 2002:269).

dollars for the Air Force, 40 million for the Army and 65 million for the Navy. Navy budgets were increased at a higher pace than those of the Army. However, the economic needs of the Navy overseas in order to defend the colonies hindered the modernisation efforts in continental Portugal and did not have a considerable impact on military satisfaction (Telo 1996:212–213, 280–281).

The Colonial Wars produced a growth in the armed forces and their budgets without a positive impact on military material conditions. There was little flexibility in personnel budgets and the government made clear that salaries were the priority over equipment. For instance, from January to May 1964, 580 million escudos out of 500 million requested were authorized for staff expenditure while only 150 million out of 717 million requested were authorised for equipment. The minimal material needs could not be satisfied, to the extent that in 1963 there were only two rifle bullets per man/day.⁹³ Dissatisfaction grew and corporatist claims multiplied. The use of *treasure* through equipment expenditure continued to be minimal and not considered central to the strategy for military subordination until the end of the regime.

4.5.4 Conclusion

Treasure tools were used to improve military living and working conditions but did not play a major role during the Estado Novo. The precarious economic situation of Portugal limited *treasure* as a resource. Overall, salaries were comparatively low and more a source of unrest than satisfaction. General salary raises, such as those in 1937 and 1945, served to compensate the effects of inflation and to appease the military when other controversial reforms were launched. These raises were made possible by policies aiming at the reduction of the size of the Army. NATO also pushed the government to improve salaries as a means of professionalisation but the colonial conflict hindered the process. In addition to general salary raises, salary discrimination was used to enhance loyalty of the senior ranks and some key corps and units. During the Colonial Wars, pensions and economic benefits for military families were introduced too.

Equipment expenditure was also very limited. Not only were military budgets low but most of them were earmarked for officers' salaries and troops' living expenses. Despite the rearmament plans in the 1930s, during the Second World War and in the 1950s, the Portuguese Armed Forces remained comparatively poorly equipped throughout the regime. Salazar's austerity policies and Portuguese dependence on foreign suppliers were limiting factors. The insufficient investment in equipment and the prioritisation of personnel expenses shows that the government was more concerned with maintaining the military relatively satisfied than with developing a strong fighting capacity. The financial penuries during the Colonial Wars also limited the capacity to equip the military, which worsened working conditions. In sum, although there is evidence of the utilisation of staff and equipment expenditure for control purposes their intensity and frequency was very low and their overall impact very limited.

⁹³See confidential report by the Army Minister to the Defence Minister on points at the precarious situation in terms of materials and weapons of the Army due to budgetary problems (22/11/1963, AOS/CO/GR-10 Folder 17, Section 1, Pages 583–597) and in an urgent confidential report the Army Minister complains about the unsustainable financial penuries of the Army and proposes the reduction of the personnel as last resort (18/11/1965, AOS/CO/GR-10, Folder 19, Section 2, Pages 681–698).

4.6 Summary

The Estado Novo used many different tools to maintain the military subordinated and their use evolved throughout the regime.

Although the Estado Novo developed *organisation* instruments with coercive capabilities to control the population, such as the police forces PVDE/PIDE/DGS, PSP, GNR, and the paramilitary Portuguese Legion their overall relevance in the control of the military was limited. These bodies helped deterring some military plots, but the action of loyal Army units was more decisive in neutralising by force military coups. Non-coercive *organisation* tools were extremely important. Salazar shaped the organisation of the armed forces following a divide-and-rule logic. During the 1950s, the US and the NATO induced important changes in military education and training as well as in the Armed Forces organisational design. These changes were intended not only to improve Portuguese defence capabilities but also to consolidate military subordination. Additionally, the provision of jobs, goods and services for the military officers and their families proved to be effective tools. The Colonial War meant a reduction in the utilisation of non-coercive tools except for the delivery of services and goods.

Nodality tools were very important in government control strategy too. The government used several state organisations such as PVDE/PIDE/DGS, SNP, Legion, SIME, and the DSC usually as both, information effectors and detectors. Inspired by Italy and Germany, the government used these organisations to produce and restrain the information available to the military and about military issues and at the same time served as ears for the regime identifying sources of unrest and conspiracies in the ranks. Propaganda and censorship were especially intensive from the inception of the regime until the end of the Second World War. Afterwards, information manipulation tools became less acceptable in the West and the exchanges with NATO allies open new alternative sources of information for the military. The Colonial Wars and Caetano's timid attempts of liberalisation also helped diminish the effectiveness of information effectors. Conversely, the utilisation of information detectors increased in salience. PVDE/PIDE/DGS acquired more power and growing networks of informants, 'bufos' collected sensible information for the regime. Additionally, internal communications, reports and correspondence exchanges helped Salazar and Caetano.

The *authority*-based incentives and rewards were extremely relevant, especially until the Colonial Wars. The 'escolha' system of promotions and retirements introduced in 1937 enabled Salazar to completely renew the top tier of the Armed Forces placing loyal military in the most important positions. The military had a strong incentive to comply with the government that had the power to approve or veto the appointments to the senior ranks and the elitist High Staff Corps. The appointments to top positions of the administration; the wide powers granted to the military related to the maintenance of public order; and other privileges, such as great autonomy, tolerance with secondary jobs and military awards can be also considered relevant *authority*-based incentives for subordination. On the other hand, the *authority*-based sanctions and constraints were less significant to control the military. Restrictions to the size of the armies and to retirement age contributed to facilitate the actions of other types of tools, such as salary raises and promotions of loyal officers. In general, Sanctions to the military involved in conspiracies were not very severe. Moreover, some restrictions were introduced to enhance a distinct esprit de corps and detach them from any political activity. The contacts

with other NATO armies, the Colonial Wars and later the arrival of Caetano gradually depleted government's *authority* and limited the utilisation of this type of tools.

Finally, *treasure* tools were the least important in the government toolkit largely because this resource was to a great extent depleted. General salary raises took place in 1938 and 1945 to counter inflation and the unrest generated by military reforms. The salary differentials for the members of the High Staff Corps and some units aimed to buy loyalty for the government. Nonetheless, except for the senior ranks, Portuguese military were poorly paid throughout the regime. Similarly equipment expenditure was insufficient and did not contribute to military subordination. The acquisition of armament and other military materials was constrained by the dependence on foreign suppliers and the austerity policies. NATO demanded increases of military expenditure but budgets did not substantially grow until the beginning of the Colonial Wars, when the important increases in budgets were absorbed by the growth of the armies and defence effort. Material conditions of the military that in fact worsened during the colonial conflict.

In sum, the most relevant tools were: *authority* incentives and rewards (especially in the 1930s and 1940s), non-coercive *organisation* tools (in the 1950s) and *nodality* tools (effectors until 1945 and detectors afterwards). It can be construed, therefore, that the regime relied more on 'carrots' than on 'sticks'. Even at the level of treasure government emphasised financial rewards over improving working conditions. At the level of trends it is worth mention that Colonial Wars produced an overall depletion of the government resources which was manifested by the decline in the utilisation and impact of many of the tools of government, which in turn facilitated the success of the Carnations Revolution and fall of the Estado Novo in 1974.

5 Tools of government in the Portuguese transition to democracy

5.1 Introduction¹

The Carnations Revolution in 1974 did not bring immediate, radical changes in the government control toolkit. However, after the failed military left-wing coup d'état of November 1975, which marked the consolidation of the MFA-Moderates and the abandonment of the radical revolutionary agenda, the pattern of utilisation of most of the basic resources underwent important transformations.

Establishing a clear divide between the government and the armed forces is problematic until 1982 when the Constitutional Reform eliminated the Council of the Revolution. As chapter 3 explains, the two institutions were deeply intertwined. The members of the MFA became political decision-makers and the executive power was fragmented in several bodies. For the purpose of simplicity, this section considers as tools of government all those employed by the Prime Minister (PM), the Council of Ministers, the President of the Republic, the Junta of National Salvation (JSN), the MFA Coordinating Committee, the MFA Assembly and the Council of the Revolution (CR).

Table 11 outlines the main findings explained in this chapter. Coercive *organisation* tools, in particular the special unit COPCON, gained salience until the coup attempt of November 1975 but they were abandoned afterwards (Section 5.2.1). This coup also marked the evolution of non-coercive *organisation* tools. Organisational design was used to recentralise the armed forces by eliminating the parallel MFA hierarchical structures that had emerged during the Revolution. Military education and training, which had been marginal since the outbreak of the Colonial Wars, gained salience progressively from 1976. However, there is no evidence of any substantial change in the provision of goods, services and jobs as control tool during this period (Section 5.2.2). *Nodality* also reflects deep changes after November 1975. Propaganda and censorship which were very intensively used by the provisional governments were abandoned after 1976. The successive constitutional governments aimed at an increase in transparency to improve mutual awareness of the civilian and military spheres and enjoyed the support of the media that campaigned in favour of military subordination (Section 5.3.1). The information detectors that had been very active until the November coup were almost completely abandoned as means of control afterwards. The introduction of political oversight mechanisms in 1982 and the reunification of the secret services in 1984 brought information detectors back to the control toolkit (Section 5.3.2). *Authority* was intensively used through-

¹This chapter refers to the transitional process in a broad sense, encompassing also the period of constitutional governments and democratic consolidation until 1986.

out this period. Nonetheless, substantial changes in the trajectories of specific tools can be observed after the coup in November 1975 and most importantly after the Constitutional Reform in 1982. After 1976, the use of military appointments and demotion for control purposes decreased. After 1982, the autonomy and special functions that had been granted to the military were severely curtailed by the Constitutional Reform and the new Defence Law (Section 5.4). Finally the utilisation of *treasure* continued to be very low and only after 1985 did military investment and re-armament programmes acquire significance (Section 5.5).

Table 11: Summary of tools of government in Portugal (1974–1986)

	Tools	Trajectory
Organisation	<i>Coercive</i> (Section 5.2.1): COPCON, AMI, some loyal military units, the security forces, the judiciary and, penitentiary systems. Even civilians were used as coercive tools during the peaks of instability in 1974 and 1975	Increasing salience until November 1975. Almost no evidence of utilisation after 1976
	<i>Non-coercive</i> (Section 5.2.2): Organisational design. The new MFA institutions created a parallel hierarchy. Later a process of re-centralisation by eliminating the revolutionary institutions and concentrating power in the civilian government	Decentralisation until 1975, recentralisation afterwards
	Military education through IDN, Military Academies and Institutes and the organisation of joint activities and courses with civilians to improve mutual awareness. Military exercises and exchanges with NATO	Education and training insignificant during the revolutionary period. It grew significantly from 1976 and became a priority from 1985
	Provision of services, goods and jobs to compensate low salaries. Some new services were provided. The administration employed many military returning from the colonies	Stable
Nodality	<i>Information effectors</i> (Section 5.3.1): Propaganda and censorship were used to politicise the military to enhance loyalty to the MFA. Fifth Division, CODICE, Dynamisation Cabinets, SDCI. Media were instrumentalised and censored. Military ad-hoc committees control the media	Very intensive use until the end of 1975. After 1976 propaganda and censorship were abandoned and the MFA information effectors eliminated
	Public and updated the information about the military and defence to improve mutual awareness of the military and civilian spheres. The media free of censorship campaigned in favour of the complete military subordination	From 1976. Increasing
	<i>Information detectors</i> (Section 5.3.2): SDCI, Fifth Division, CODICE, Second Section of EME and other state institutions collected information concerning the political allegiance to MFA in the ranks and scrutinised the media to avoid information that could create unrest in the ranks	Important until the November 1975. Abandoned in 1976. Use of detectors was extremely low until 1982
	Political oversight mechanisms	From 1982. Increasing
Authority	New integrated secret services SIRD (SIED, SIS and SIM)	From 1984. Increasing
	<i>Rewards and incentives</i> (Section 5.4.1): Military promotions and appointments to the government institutions, administration and MFA institutions within the Armed Forces	Very important during the revolutionary period. Low intensity from 1976.
	Extraordinary level of autonomy of the armed forces	Extremely high until 1982
	Special functions granted to the military in the political arena and internal affairs	Extremely high. Decreased in 1976 and finally eliminated in 1982
Treasure	Amnesty laws	Abundant amnesties from 1974 to 1981.
	<i>Sanctions and constraints</i> (Section 5.4.2): Expulsions and demotions of the Estado Novo supporters and those that rebelled against the government	Very important in 1974 and 1975, decreasing afterwards
	Abolition of the institutions such as those linked to the Estado Novo control machinery and later of the revolutionary institutions	Very important in the aftermath of the Carnations Revolution and November 1975 Coup. Suppression of CR in 1982
	Legal constraints aiming the de-politicisation and professionalisation (demobilisation of troops, prohibition to political activities, unionism, accumulation of jobs and function)	Low intensity until 1976. Reinforced in 1982
Equipment	<i>Staff expenditure</i> (Section 5.5.2): Staff spending prioritised over equipment spending. However military budgets decreased. Salaries and pensions were updated regularly to compensate inflation but remained comparatively low	Low intensity. Stable
	<i>Equipment expenditure</i> (Section 5.5.3): Re-equipment and modernisation efforts limited due to budget constraints. The BMI was the sole military unit well equipped. Portugal depended on the cooperation with NATO allies for the acquisition of equipment and the reinforcement of Portuguese defence industry	Very low intensity until 1985
	New process for military planning and a general re-armament. These measures contributed to improve the equipment and to establish civilian control on military investment and re-armament programmes	From 1985

5.2 Organisation

The coercive power of the state and a decentralised organisational design aiming the political control of the military were central for the MFA-controlled provisional governments (1974–1976). During this period political elites only played a secondary role. After the end of the dominance of the MFA-Radicals and the failure of the 25 November leftist coup, coercive *organisation* tools were abandoned and the institutional design reversed. Politicisation and decentralisation were replaced by professionalisation and centralisation. From 1976, political elites gradually recovered their power. The constitutional governments promoted military education and training in order to achieve mutual awareness of the civilian and military sphere and to keep the military focused on their professional duties and far from politics. The provision of services, goods, and jobs to military continued to compensate poor salaries. These were especially important for those returning from the colonies.

5.2.1 Coercive organisation

During provisional governments the utilisation of coercive *organisation* tools to control the military was more salient than during the Estado Novo. The use of loyal military units as deterrent to prevent and neutralise insurrections was prominent during the peaks of instability in September 1974, and March and November 1975. Additionally, the security forces, the judiciary and penitentiary systems as well as some organisations of civil society acted as deterrent against military insubordination. From 1976, coercive *organisation* tools became marginal.

The MFA-controlled government wanted to show the break with the past and with the Salazarist control machinery. Immediately after the 25 April Revolution and due to their identification as repression forces some the traditional coercive *organisation* control tools of the Estado Novo, such as the DGS and the Legion, were abolished and others, such as the PSP, the Fiscal Guard and the GNR, were put under public scrutiny. Nonetheless, at the same time the government created the Continent Operational Command, COPCON. This was a military structure consisting of several units of Special Forces with the function of controlling internal threats to Portugal, including military insurrections.² The COPCON was led by Major Otelo and formally subordinated to the Board of Joint Staff (EMGFA) but was in fact controlled by the MFA (Rato 2000:138). The COPCON held an ambiguous police-military character depriving the security forces of the former regime, the PSP and the GNR, of some of their traditional functions. COPCON also had access to intelligence.³ The COPCON participated in the dissolution of the right-wing mobilisations in September 1974 and blocked the entrance to Lisbon in order to prevent a right-wing military counter-coup. The COPCON provided the MFA-controlled government with a military advantage over the right-wing forces in March 1975 Spínolist coup (Graham 1979:236; Carrilho 1994; Manuel 1995).

When the MFA-Moderates seized control of the government, the COPCON, which continued to support the revolutionary agenda, became a threat. In September 1975, the Prime Minister,

²Decree-Law 310/74 (8/7/1974).

³See the project of reorganisation of COPCON (ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 1, Acta 24/4/1975)

Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo, complained about the government's lack of authority especially within the military sphere. The PSP, the GNR and the information services were reinforced and more importantly the Military Intervention Group (AMI) was created.⁴ The AMI was a strategic emergency unit under direct orders of the President of the Republic established to counter the threat of COPCON. The AMI was a strongly armed, cohesive and disciplined unit to neutralise coups against the government.⁵ The AMI was a deterrent for the revolutionary insurrections in October and November 1975. However, as a coercive tool it was formally suppressed on 20 November 1975 as part of a wider strategy to destabilise the most radical revolutionary actors and justify the elimination of the COPCON on 25 November 1975.⁶

The security forces contributed to deterring military insubordination too. There is evidence on the reliance of the government on the paramilitary police forces, PSP and GNR and on the Judiciary Police to counter military threats. However, the security forces were not sufficiently armed to face the new tasks. They lacked human and material means to undertake action against heavily armed organisations.⁷

The judiciary and penitentiary systems were also implicated in the action against military disobedience. After the coup attempts on 11 March 1974 and 25 November 1975, the Higher Councils of Discipline in the three branches processed many officers for their participation in the plots.⁸ A military Revolutionary Tribunal was set up to judge the March 1975 coup plotters.⁹ Military rebels were often imprisoned and subjected to solitary confinement. A Red Cross report in August 1975 criticised the difficult conditions of the political prisoners in the prisons of Caxias, Peniche and Alcoentre.¹⁰ About 130 officers were arrested and almost a thousand trials were held for the participants in the insurrections of November 1975. Although instability decreased after November 1975 the problems of discipline continued. A permanent committee was constituted in the Council of the Revolution (CR) in charge of military justice and discipline.¹¹ The last significant example of coercive *organisation* was the arrest, trial and imprisonment in 1985 of Otelo, who was accused of membership to the leftist terrorist group FP-25.

Finally, it is important to stress the use of civilian population as an *organisation* tools during the revolutionary period. For example, social mobilisation triggered by the information service

⁴Minutes of CR reunion (ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 1, Acta 25/9/1975).

⁵Confidential Internal Report of the Army Ministry about the mission of AMI (12/11/1975, AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numero 29).

⁶Minutes of the CR reunion on 20 November 1975 (ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 2, Acta 20/11/1975) The AMI was in fact integrated within the 'Regimento de Comandos de Amadora'. See Sánchez Cervelló for an interpretation of the strategy that led to the failed 25 November coup and to the (1993:254-260).

⁷Secret memo from the Justice Ministry requesting the control function to be transferred from the Judiciary Police to the military (24/11/1975) and Interior Ministry requesting the urgent armament and reform of the PSP and GNR (March 1976, ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 7, number 93, document 17).

⁸There is extensive evidence in the correspondence between the CR and Military Staff of the three branches (ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 14, 17, 18, numbers 100, 103, 104).

⁹Decree-Law 425/1975 (12/8/1975). It judged mainly ex-PIDE/DGS agents but also military officers. Minutes of CR reunion (3/4/1975, ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 1). Later abolished by Decree-law 13/75 (12/11/1975).

¹⁰ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 6, number 92, document 23.

¹¹ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 8, number 94, documents 1, 3, 4, 8, 10.

Fifth Division helped in countering the coup of March 1975 (Sánchez Cervelló 1993:226). Military units could have easily defeated the civilians that opposed them but a violent action would have produced many civilian casualties which was deemed unacceptable in that context. Although the possession or arms was restricted and civilian militias were forbidden,¹² some civilian institutions linked to political parties also experienced a process of militarisation parallel to that of politicisation of the armed forces.¹³ For instance, armed civilians collaborated with soldiers to carry out arrest warrants issued by COPCON (Maxwell 1995:89). However the landmark of this process was the mobilisation of the civilian forces around the left-wing military coup attempt of November 1975. The main leaders of the PS went to the north and put themselves under the command of Pires Veloso, the military commander of the North Military Region to help neutralising the coup. Militants of PPD surrounded the paratrooper unit that had rebelled in Monte Real and farmers from Rio Maior controlled the accesses to Lisbon. Equally, far-left civilians were mobilised and ready to follow orders from the military conspirators.¹⁴

The failure of the November 1975 coup and the suppression of the AMI and COPCON marked also a change in the control toolkit of the government. The end of political instability and overt actions of military rebellion was accompanied by the replacement of coercive *organisation* tools by other less intrusive non-coercive *organisation* approaches.

5.2.2 Non-coercive organisation

The main non-coercive *organisation* tools during the transition followed very different trajectories than during the Estado Novo. First, the organisational design of the armed forces evolved from decentralised and fragmented structure resulting from the military effort to control the government and society into a centralised structure similar to that of other Western allies, including democratic Spain. Second, professional education and training became central to the strategy of control only after 1976. Third, the government continued the supply of services, goods and positions in the public administration but they were less important in the control strategy.

The capacity to shape the design of military and political institutions was very important. Two opposite trajectories can be observed: an initial decentralisation process introduced by the MFA until the end of 1975 followed by a re-organisation aiming to recentralise power and avoid fragmentation and political and military infighting.

The MFA introduced several institutions to control both the political and military spheres. Immediately after the Carnations Revolution the MFA, seeking to reassert military power and autonomy, created a military National Junta of Salvation (JSN). The JSN was a new sovereign

¹² Project of decree-law approved by the CR, in Annexe B to the minute of CR reunion (ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 1, Acta 31/3/1975).

¹³ For instance the PCP and MFA-Radicals created the para-military Revolutionary Corps of Popular Defense in imitation of the Cuban Committees of Defence of the Revolution. They were dissolved in November (Sánchez Cervelló 1993:239).

¹⁴ Sánchez Cervelló (1993:253–260) explains the civilian involvement in the events and points at Costa Gomes as the great strategist that avoided the civil war. Carrilho (1994:68) suggests that the military operations were more a strategic game than direct violent actions, so that the risk of civil war was not so strong.

body composed of seven military officers, with the capacity to control the programme of the provisional governments.¹⁵ The MFA undertook a process of 'democratic institutionalisation'¹⁶ that aimed at the active participation of all the military in the revolutionary process, insuring their cohesion and discipline, controlling the democratisation of the armed forces and stimulating the information flows from and to the government. In October 1974, the MFA created the Higher Council of the MFA and the Armed Forces Assembly.¹⁷ The institutional arrangement included reunions at the unit, military region and branch level.¹⁸ These organisations coexisted with the MFA Coordinating Committee and the State Council that was an advisory body with a strong presence of MFA members. The MFA organisation within the armed forces acted as a parallel and alternative power structure to traditional military hierarchy aiming to insure the support within the armed forces to the provisional governments appointed by the MFA.

However, the MFA was not a cohesive organisation. Power was fragmented across not only different institutions but also different factions.¹⁹ The struggles among them provoked great institutional instability. After the March 1975 coup attempt, the MFA sought to consolidate its rule by a less fragmented institutional structure that united political and military power. Thus, the JSN, the Higher Council of the MFA, the MFA Coordinating Committee and the State Council were merged into a single executive authority: the CR.²⁰ The CR accumulated political and socio-economic functions. Most importantly it substituted the Board of Joint Chiefs of Staff (EMGFA) as the supreme body of military authority. Moreover the Armed Forces Assembly was replaced by the MFA Assembly that, for the first time, allowed non-commissioned officers and enlisted men among its members. This organ was in charge of monitoring the CR.²¹

The military coup of November 1975 revealed the degradation of the MFA revolutionary institutions and their incapacity to rule Portugal. It marked the beginning of a gradual military withdrawal from politics and fostered the process of centralisation of power (Gonzalez Hernandez 1999:26). The MFA apparatus was dismantled, including the MFA Assembly in February 1976.²² Under the 1976 Constitution, the CR remained the sole military body with political functions. It exerted constitutional review and legislative powers on military issues.²³ The EMGFA was re-established as the supreme military institution. General Ramalho Eanes

¹⁵ Decree-Law 203/74 (15/5/1974). See also Graham (1979:233–334). The power struggle between the MFA and Spínola ended up with the resignation of the later and a clear MFA domination of the JSN.

¹⁶ 'Estruturação Democrática do MFA'

¹⁷ The Council (also known as 'Council of 20') was composed of 7 officers from the MFA Coordinating Committee, the 7 members of the JSN and the MFA ministers in the Provisional Government. Initially called 'Assembly of 200', it influenced the decisions of the Higher Council (Carrillo 1994:52)

¹⁸ Confidential internal Memo of the Army Ministry on the reorganisation of the MFA, signed by CEME General Carlos Fabião (21/11/1974, AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numero 16).

¹⁹ See the Minutes of CR reunions in 1975 to appreciate the ideological cleavages (ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volumes 1 and 2). The MFA-Political Parties Pacts contributed to its institutionalisation but also accentuated ideological cleavages. Different MFA factions dominated the Higher Council of the MFA, Armed Forces Assembly and MFA Coordinating Committee (Graham 1979:240).

²⁰ Law 5/1975 (14/3/1975).

²¹ The MFA Assembly increased its members up to 240. Decree-Law 184-A (3/4/1975).

²² ACR, MFA/Partidos (84), Pacto MFA-Partidos Parte II, Document 14.

²³ The institutionalisation of the CR in the 1976 Constitution was an important step in order to take the political debate out of the barracks and therefore facilitate the consolidation of democracy (Ferreira 1992:316; Santos 2000).

was elected President of the Republic and appointed Chief of Joint Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces (CEMGFA).²⁴ Paradoxically, Eanes' accumulation of political and military functions was positive for the process of military disengagement from politics since he promoted non-partisan and more professional Armed Forces (Graham 1993:41; Rato 2000). The traditional military hierarchy, supported by Eanes, used administrative rules to circumvent the formal authority of the CR on military issues. As a result the CR gradually became a secondary player in both the political and military arenas (Rato 2000:154).

Notwithstanding, the government still did not control the military aspects of defence²⁵ and the CR and the President interfered in some of its reforms.²⁶ The constitutional reform in 1982 eliminated the CR, reduced the competences of the President and concentrated the power in the government.²⁷ Moreover the new Law of National Defence and Armed Forces transferred the supreme military authority back to the civilian government and integrated the branches in the hierarchy of the Defence Ministry.²⁸ The organisational design of the political and military institutions thus became comparable to that of most Western NATO allies including Spain and for the first time aimed to guarantee the supremacy of a democratically elected civilian government.

Second, Portuguese governments relied on professional education and training to subordinate the military, especially after November 1975. Before this date, the organisational capacity of the state, as well as that of the MFA and some left-wing political parties, was employed to politicise the military and to gain their support for the MFA revolutionary principles (see information effectors section below). During this period, cooperation with NATO and the Western allies was reduced and there was little emphasis on military training. The politicisation of the armed forces and the overlap of political and traditional military command structures led to the multiplication of acts of insubordination in the ranks (Porch 1977:118, 161; Sánchez Cervelló 1993:247). Politicisation undermined the control of the military and their capacity to carry out their defence functions.

After November 1975, the government, aware that the previous politicisation strategy had failed and created disunity and discontent in the ranks, reversed its approach to *organisation* tools. It aimed at the depoliticisation of the armed forces and the increase of their operational capacity and professionalism through education and training. The government recognised the deficiencies in military instruction, the importance of bridging the gap between military and civilian education as means to consolidate civilian supremacy and the need to further

²⁴Eanes had led the operational forces that had neutralised the November 1975 coup.

²⁵The Defence Minister was merely in charge of coordinating the action of the other ministers concerning national defence acting as an interface with the armed forces. The military component was explicitly excluded from the functions of the government. See for instance Project of Organisation of National Defence (15/2/1977, ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 20, number 106, document 10). The CR has been accused of obstructing the reform of the governments of the centre-right coalition 'Aliança Democrática' from 1980 to 1982, in particular the new project of Law of National Defence. Their opposition was such that two members of the CR told the French Defence Minister that if the law was approved they would overthrow the government. The threat was never carried out (Amaral 2000:179–181).

²⁶The CR and Eanes opposed some reforms of the centre-right coalition 'Aliança Democrática' from 1980 to 1982, in particular the Constitutional Reform and the new Law of National Defence. For instance Eanes vetoed the former that had to be resubmitted to the National Assembly (Graham 1993:49).

²⁷Law 1/82 (30/9/1982).

²⁸Law 29/82 (11/12/1982).

integrate and coordinate the branches (Ferreira 1976; Santos 1980:102–107). Several actions contributed to the new effort in military education and training. The National Defence Institute (IDN) was created in 1976 as a non-organisation tool for the professionalisation of the armed forces.²⁹ The curriculum of the Military Academy was adapted to the new laws, institutions and values of the Constitutional arrangement.³⁰ The High Military Studies Institute, the Air Force Academy and the Naval Superior Institute of War contributed to the development of a new unified doctrine in agreement with the new political and military context after 1976 (Ravara 1989:168; Ferreira 1994:238).

These institutions promoted a new concept of National Defence, introduced by the IDN in 1979, that went beyond the traditional military approach to defence by encompassing economic, diplomatic and social efforts and therefore legitimising civilian defence leadership (Correia 1978; Comprido 1979). Since 1979, both civilians and military attended defence courses. The official defence doctrine was again revised by the Defence Law of 1982. The fundamental change was the elimination of the internal enemy component (Ferreira 1994:236).

In 1985, education became a top priority. The government wanted to encourage mutual awareness between the military and civilian spheres as a means to increase military prestige and their voluntary subordination. From 1985 the diplomas and courses of military education were made equivalent to those in civilian higher education and joint research was actively promoted (Almeida 1986:29, 35). Many activities were introduced to promote the culture of defence, coordination among the branches and mutual awareness between the armed forces and society. In addition to the prestigious National Defence Courses, many seminars, conferences, as well as visits to military and political institutions were organised (Lanhoso 1985:19–21).

Military training also contributed to divert the attention away from politics and to improve the defence capacity. During the Colonial Wars and the revolutionary period there was little emphasis on military exercises and collaboration with the Western allies. From 1976, the Independent Mixed Brigade of the Army stationed in Santa Margarida became a very important *organisation* tool aiming not only at the cooperation and normalisation of the relations with NATO but also training the Portuguese military in the latest operational techniques and professional principles. New military exercises were introduced. In the mid 1980s, many units of the three branches participated regularly in these exercises, many of which were organised by other Western allies or NATO (MDN 1986:96–98, 125–127, 144, 145). This renewed impulse to military training and exchanges with other armed forces helped consolidate the change in the military mentality shifting the attention from domestic affairs to defence issues.

Third, the provisional and constitutional governments continued to use the state capacity to provide services, goods and jobs to the military and their families. These prerogatives served to compensate the poor salaries and working conditions that had generated widespread support to the 25 April coup. The Social Services of the Armed Forces continued to provide health, housing and financial services. New concessions to the prices of public transportation

²⁹Decree-Law 550-D/76 (12/7/1976).

³⁰Documents on civic education provided to recruits by the Army Staff Office on 1976 (ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 15, number 101, documents 13–14).

were granted³¹ and the support for disabled veterans was reinforced.³² The state organisation contributed to the intensification of the esprit de corps and cohesion of the armed forces, for instance through the creation of common Military Clubs and homogenisation of the services of catering and leisure for the enlisted men and officers.³³ Moreover the state-owned companies such as Military Laboratory of Chemical and Pharmaceutical Products and Military Maintenance provided not only cheap or free products to the military families but also jobs (Barata 1980). In the military statutes there was no explicit prohibition of holding secondary jobs but in 1976 the CR finally decided stop this practice and banned the military in active service from having civilian jobs.³⁴ Nonetheless the public sector continued to play a crucial function absorbing many military (and civil servants) that had been forced to return from the colonies to the metropole.³⁵

5.2.3 Conclusion

Organisation was a very important source of power for the ruling bodies during the transition and consolidation of democracy. The failed November 1975 coup marked drastic changes in the patterns of utilisation of both coercive and non-coercive tools. On the one hand the coercive use of the state organisation to neutralise attacks against the governments grew from the Carnation revolution reaching its peak in 1975. Military units, in particular the COPCON, the security forces, the judiciary and penitentiary services and even groups of civilians contributed to fight military insurrection. After the failure of the revolutionary coup of November 1975 the coercive component was abandoned.

Non-coercive *organisation* tools were very salient throughout the period. First, the capacity to shape the state institutions was used by the MFA to ensure political loyalty in the ranks. Its fundamental feature was decentralisation of political and military power in multiple institutions. The instability and displays of military indiscipline in 1975 made the governments reverse their approach to organisational design. There was a gradual re-centralisation of power and separation of the military and political spheres. After the coup of November 1975, the MFA apparatus was dismantled. Nonetheless, the military CR continued to oversight political developments until 1982 when the constitutional reform and new Law of National Defence abolished military participation in politics and integrated the armed forces into the Defence Ministry.

Second, military education and training that had been neglected since the beginning of the Colonial Wars became again relevant non-coercive control tools from 1976. The IDN, Military Academies and Institutes worked to inculcate military subordination through a new defence doctrine and the development of mutual awareness between the civilian and military

³¹For instance railway concessions up to 75% of railway ticket prices. Decree 389/75 (26/6/1976). These were revised in April 1978 (ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 8, number 94, document 7).

³²Decree-Law 43/76 (20/1/1976).

³³Minutes of CR reunions (11/12/1975, 20/10/1975, ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 2, 3).

³⁴Minutes of CR reunion (29/10/1976, ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 3).

³⁵Decree-Laws 294/76 (24/4/1976), 819/76 (12/11/1976), 357/77 (31/8/1977), 175/78 (13/7/1978), 362/78 (28/11/1978), 514/79 (28/12/1979) and 23/80 (29/2/1980).

spheres. The new military exercises and exchanges with the NATO allies also contributed to the professionalisation and depoliticisation of the military. Finally, the provision of services, goods and jobs by the public administration continued to be a source of reward for the military. The end of the Colonial War forced a supplementary effort in order to integrate and compensate ex-combatants.

5.3 Nodality

As in the case of *organisation* tools, two different trends can be observed in the utilisation of *nodality*. The turning point was again the failed coup of November 1975 that consolidated the MFA moderates and initiated the process of depoliticisation of the armed forces. Before the coup, information effectors were central to the government strategy. The MFA tried to indoctrinate and politicise the Armed Forces using newly created instruments such as the Fifth Division, the Central Dynamising Committee (CODICE) and the Information Detection and Coordination Services (SDCI) as well as the media. These institutions also contributed to censor and collect information relevant to ensure political support. The military, political parties and media were monitored as means to control political ideas and contestation in the ranks. After November 1975, there was a reversal in the government's approach to control. Politicisation was then considered counterproductive for stability and military subordination. The organisations that had conducted the propaganda campaigns and spied on the military were dismantled or transformed into public relation services that operated with civil society. The government released its grip on the media, which then became very critical with the military institution. Until 1984 information detectors disappeared from the government control toolkit.

5.3.1 Information effectors

As soon as the MFA overthrew the regime it launched an information campaign to win over the military and society for the revolutionary cause. The psychological action on the local population and the enemy had been very important during the Colonial Wars.³⁶ Many of those who joined the MFA had experience with the use of *nodality* since they had participated in the propaganda and information action against the rebels. Immediately after the revolution, a strong information effort was required to ensure that the military in the overseas territories would endorse the MFA and provisional governments. There is evidence of communiqués to the local media, internal memos and speeches to the military with that purpose.³⁷ Transcripts of important speeches in Lisbon and political manifestos were distributed in the ranks.³⁸ The delegations of the MFA became the interface with the military in the colonies. Given the po-

³⁶For instance, Kaúlza, Military Governor of Mozambique stressed this idea in his letters to Caetano (1/6/1970, 18/11/1970, AMC/12-79).

³⁷See for instance abundant documentation on the information campaign in Guinea-Bissau in 1974. Some memos stressed the topics that should be treated in the communications in the barracks (AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numero 4).

³⁸For instance Spínola's speech 'Self-determination and Democracy' (11/6/1974, AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numero 4) and the MFA Programme (AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numero 6).

litical and military instability during the transition, the MFA also intensively used information effectors as means of control in the metropole.

The information services of the EMGFA, the Fifth Division, were established in September 1974 and became very active in the propaganda campaign.³⁹ The Fifth Division aimed to promote the implementation of the MFA Programme and to improve the image of the armed forces in the public opinion. It acted as a think tank on civil-military relations, organising consultations, colloquia, debates and the study of the MFA doctrine (Ferreira 1992:311; Carrilho 1994:45–46). The Fifth Division also coordinated the actions of other important information tools such as the Information Detection and Coordination Services, (SDCI),⁴⁰ the Central Dynamisation Committee (CODICE),⁴¹ and the Unit Assemblies and Dynamisation Cabinets.⁴² The goal of these *nodality* tools was the cultural and political education of the armed forces following the logic of control through politicisation (Carrilho 1994:60–61).

The media also became a control tool for the MFA. The MFA published a bimonthly magazine, ‘Movimento 25 de Abril: Boletim Informativo das Forças Armadas’, and the members of the MFA often participated in radio and television programmes. Although the MFA Programme had requested at the end of censorship as means to promote people’s freedom, the media continued to be censored and used by the MFA-controlled governments to spread propaganda (Pimlott and Seaton 1980; Pimlott and Seaton 1983: 50–51). Informing about the acts of indiscipline within the barracks was prohibited by the CR. The infringement of this norm entailed the sequestration of the publication.⁴³ A Committee for the Control of the Press, Radio, Television, Theatre and Cinema was established in 1974 to censor reactionary ideas and confidential military issues.⁴⁴ Information regarding the process of decolonisation was also censored to avoid agitation.⁴⁵ For instance, the CR asked the CEMGFA to undertake judiciary action against the newspaper ‘A Capital’ due to ‘defamatory information’ about the armed forces in Angola.⁴⁶ There are also examples of journalist arrests for their criticism of the government or revolutionary agenda such as the arrest of the journalist of the magazine ‘O Tempo’ Vera Lagoa in September 1975 by COPCON.⁴⁷

³⁹The Fifth Division was inspired by the US Army’s Fifth Department that during the Second World War has acted as liaison between the military government and the civilian administrations of the territories liberated.

⁴⁰The SDI, created by Decree-Law 250/75 (23/5/1974), was under the direct command of the CR and also played an important role coordinating the different civilian and military organisations under control of the revolutionary left (Sánchez Cervelló 1993:253).

⁴¹CODICE was part of the Social Communication Ministry but worked closely with the Fifth Division (ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 8, number 94, document 26).

⁴²There were Dynamisation Cabinets at the branch, region, and unit levels. Their goal was the ‘non partisan politicisation of the Armed Forces’. See for instance Internal Memo in the Army Ministry (AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numero 21).

⁴³Sequestration of 10 days for newspapers and 40 days for other publications. According to the CR the media should not broadcast or publish this type of information about military indiscipline (8/9/1975, ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 1, Acta).

⁴⁴Decree-law 281/74 (25/6/6)

⁴⁵Minute of the MFA Assembly reunion (5/9/1975, ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 1).

⁴⁶Letter from the CR to the CEMGFA (16/4/1975, ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, Assuntos Económicos Sociais- Cartas Particulares- Diversos, volume 83, document 33).

⁴⁷Minutes of CR reunion (18/9/ 1975, ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 1).

The MFA leadership cultivated good relationships with many journalists and after the 25 April coup the media intensively praised the new revolutionary institutions and military figures. Moreover, the action of the Social Communication Ministry and military teams working in the public broadcasting corporation, RTP, ensured the support to the MFA doctrine in public radio and tv.⁴⁸ The media influenced public opinion and promoted social mobilisation in favour of different factions of the MFA. For instance, during the initial stages of the transition the press was often criticised for its partiality and pro-communist stance.⁴⁹ The notion of importance of the media was so entrenched among the military that the radio and tv stations as well as newspapers headquarters were priority military targets during all the revolts that occurred in from the 25 April 1974 to the 25 November 1976 (Sánchez Cervelló 1993; Manuel 1995).

However, after November 1975, the official revolutionary discourse was replaced by a moderate one that insisted on the necessity of military subordination and warned about military intervention as the main threat to democracy.⁵⁰ In 1976, following a series of severe criticisms for its radical political bias,⁵¹ the Fifth Division was restructured and downsized and later abolished in 1977. The SDCI, CODICE and the Dynamisation Cabinets were abolished in 1976. The journal 'Nação e Defesa' created in 1976 by the IDN became an influential information effector that contributed to the evolution of the defence and military doctrine and to mutual awareness between the civilian and military spheres. The Law of National Defence and Armed Forces of 1982 established that defence policy was to be object of constant and updated public information (Article 6). The government tried to increase its credibility and obtain the support for its defence policy increasing its legitimacy vis-à-vis the military and other societal actors.

The relationship with the media also changed. After the November coup the CR wanted to counter the ideological influence that the revolutionary left had on the media (Sánchez Cervelló 1993:247). The nationalisation of many publishers and the suspension of many publications due to their previous radical revolutionary stance was decreed. Many newspapers were affected by this measure such as 'O Século', 'A Capital', 'Diário de Notícias', 'Diário de Lisboa', 'Jornal do Comércio', 'Jornal de Notícias' and 'O Comércio do Porto'.⁵² From 1976 the media changed their attitude vis-à-vis the military and the CR. They demanded their de-politicisation and subordination to the political power. Publications such as 'O País', 'Liberdade', 'Jounal Novo', 'A Rua', 'Tempo', 'Barricada' and 'O Diabo' directed strong crit-

⁴⁸ See general principles about information policy in annexe to the minutes of CR reunion (30/7/1975, ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 1).

⁴⁹ In an extraordinary CR Reunion Mario Soares stressed that most of the media are under control of the PC. He threatened that the PS would abandon the government if things would not change. Reference to the case of the closure of the newspaper 'República' in minutes of CR reunion (30/5/1975, ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 1).

⁵⁰ See for instance the speech of the former Defence Minister General Santos at the IDN (3/3/1980) (Santos 1980).

⁵¹ See correspondence of CEMGFA (AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numero 28) and CR (ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 8, number 94, document 26).

⁵² The nationalisations approved on 27 November 1975 claim not only the manipulation of information but also financial reasons. Minutes of CR reunion (27/11/1975, ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 2).

icism against the members of the CR and published classified information about the armed forces.⁵³

The information campaign against the CR can be interpreted as part of a government strategy to delegitimise the CR paving the way for its dissolution in 1982 (Ferreira 1992:315). It also shows that the CR had lost control of the media and censorship was disappearing.⁵⁴

After the dissolution of the CR in 1982, the media continued its advocacy of military subordination. Military expenditure, conscientious objection, military privileges and military candidates to the presidential elections became widespread topics. The media and society had so clearly embraced the civilian supremacy as a democratic principle that the 1985 presidential electoral campaign was fundamentally focused on the defence of the idea of civilianisation to the extent that for the first time there was no military candidate (Ferreira 1994:238). However, by 1986, there was still a lack of mutual knowledge and understanding between the Portuguese society and the Armed Forces. This was due to deficient information, the lack of a social communication strategy and coordination between the media and the armed forces (Soares 1987; Begonha 1993).

In sum, from the fall of the regime to the end of 1975, propaganda was an even more salient tool than in the last period of the Estado Novo. Several organisations created by the MFA and most media cooperated in an intensive propaganda campaign to promote the MFA's revolutionary agenda. After November 1975 the idea of politicising the armed forces was abandoned. The propaganda apparatus was dismantled. Information campaigns were launched to introduce a new defence doctrine and to raise mutual awareness between the armed forces and society. Censorship disappeared and the media contributed to promote the idea of depolitisation of the military and demilitarisation of politics.

5.3.2 Information detectors

There was less emphasis on information detectors than on information effectors but these still played an important function, especially during the period of provisional governments. Several bodies monitored the military, the political parties and the media in order to detect threats to the governments. Their action was fundamental to neutralise the military coups of March 1975 and November 1975 and to weaken the factions that launched them. Afterwards the use of information detectors decreased drastically until the 1980s. The introduction of

⁵³See news clips in letters from the 'Procuradoria-Geral da República' to the CR on 1976, 1977 and 1978 (ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 20, number 106, document 12-13, 16-24). Probably the most extreme case was the letter published in the journal 'O Diabo' in which General Galvão de Melo accused the members of the CR of treason (ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 6, number 92, document 13). The CR decided to suspend the journal 'O Diabo'. Resolution of the CR in the minutes of the CR reunion (18/2/1976, ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 2). See correspondence between the Justice Minister, EMGFA and CR (November and December 1976, ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 8, number 94, document 33) and complaint from the EME (27/2/1976, ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 7, number 93, document 46) about the publication of secret information in breach of national security.

⁵⁴'Sept-sur-sept', a programme of TF1 in 1982 reported that censorship had disappeared from Portuguese tv, Telegram from the Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Affairs Ministry (19/9/1982, ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 6, number 92, document 1).

parliamentary oversight on military affairs in 1982 and the reorganisation of the information services launched in 1984 marked a new gradual increase in the use of information detectors.

Although all the information services linked to the Estado Novo had been abolished, new organisations were used to detect information relevant to the control of the military. Most of these bodies were also involved in the propaganda and censorship action. The SDCI, created in May 1974, was the main information detection tool for the CR but not the only one. The Judiciary Military Police (PJM) was established in September 1975 under direct supervision of the CR to investigate military crimes and played a central role in the court case against the November 1975 plotters.⁵⁵ The bodies in charge of political indoctrination within the armed forces during the provisional governments also collected information related to the political alignment of the military. The Fifth Division acted as information detector at the service of the EMGFA and the President. The Fifth Division was used to detect anti-government movements within the three branches of the armed forces.⁵⁶ The CODICE and the Dynamisation Cabinets scrutinised the press and the internal communications in the armed forces⁵⁷ and collaborated with the Fifth Division and the government to detect the infiltration of insurgents in the armed forces.⁵⁸ The Second Section of the Army Staff Office (EME) was in charge of the Army internal communications and collected information from the GNR, the Fiscal Guard and Military Regions. The information gathered by the EME on political activities outside and within the armed forces was shared with the CR.⁵⁹ Furthermore, the Military Committee for the Control of the Press, Radio, Television, Theatre and Cinema and the General Attorney of the Republic monitored the media and collected information to prevent military unrest.⁶⁰

All these information detectors were especially relevant during the coup attempts in March and November 1975. The intelligence collected about the Spínolista military coup in March 1975 permitted reversing its effects. Officers linked to the Fifth Division and the Navy decided to allow the military coup to be launched in order to create fear of returning to the Estado Novo and, therefore, enhance revolutionary sentiments in the country (Sánchez Cervelló 1993:225–227). Similarly information detectors were very important to neutralise the coup of November 1975. Although the far-left rebels controlled the Fifth Division and the SDCI,

⁵⁵The PJM was created by Decree-Law 520/75 (23/9/1975) and later integrated in the military structure by the Decree-Law 186/77 (8/5/1977). There is evidence PJM's important function in the coup investigation. Minutes of the CR reunion (19/1/1976, ACR, *Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais*, volume 2).

⁵⁶See for instance the Fifth Division's confidential report about the Infantry Regiment of Evora to EME (21/7/1976, ACR, *Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador*, volume 16, number 102, document 27) and confidential memos on denouncing that the activity of some political parties (especially PRP) was affecting the cohesion and stability of the Armed Forces (June and July 1976, ACR, *Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador*, volume 7, number 93, document 35–42).

⁵⁷See for example internal information produced by the Army Dinamizing Cabinet in 1975 (AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numeros 24, 31, 32 and 33).

⁵⁸See reports about infiltration attempts by the reactionary right in the Castelo Branco garrison in July 1975 (ACR, *Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador*, volume 7, number 93, document 53).

⁵⁹For instance correspondence between the EME and CR about political activities including manifestos, demonstrations and land seizures 1975–1976 (ACR, *Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador*, volume 15, number 101, documents 50,49, 56, 57, 62)

⁶⁰For instance, an internal memo in the Army Ministry requested all military to urgently report to the Committee for the Control of the Press, Radio, Television, Theatre and Cinema in case of broadcast or publication to the Army (AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numero 13). The General Attorney confidential reports in 1976, 1977 and 1978 about information in the media harmful for the interests of the CR (ACR, *Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador*, volume 20, number 106, document 12–25).

the government prepared a successful counter-offensive based on the information collected by loyal officers. As a result, the coup failed, the MFA-Moderates consolidated their sway on the CR, the moderate political parties were strengthened and the revolutionary agenda was abandoned.

During the period of the constitutional governments discipline was gradually restored and the information detectors disappeared from the control toolkit. After the abolishment of the DGS in 1974, the SDCI and CODICE in 1976 and the Fifth Division in 1977 there were no real information detection mechanisms for the control of the armed forces and the information exchanges between the military and the government were limited (Santos 1980:105–106). According to Brigadier Cardoso there was no information service capable of properly assessing politicisation, cohesion and discipline within the ranks or of coordinating military information with other areas of intelligence in order to prevent risks for the democratic order in Portugal (Cardoso 1980a, Cardoso 1980b).

In 1982, the armed forces were formally integrated into the hierarchy of the Defence Ministry, which stimulated the information flows on military issues from and to the government. Parliamentary oversight and other mechanisms of inspection on the armed forces were introduced. Finally, in 1984 three new information services coordinated by and hierarchically linked to the Prime Minister were created: the Service of Strategic Informations of Defence (SIED), the Military Information Service (SIM), the Security Information Service (SIS).⁶¹ These services integrated the new Information System of the Portuguese Republic (SIRP) and imitated those of other European countries. They worked for the defence of democracy and the constitutional order which included ensuring that the armed forces fulfilled their mission (SIS 2010; SIED 2010). Thus, at the end of the period analysed information detectors acquired new salience.

5.3.3 Conclusion

Two different trends can be appreciated in the utilisation of *nodality* tools. First, an intensive information campaign was launched in the colonies and continental Portugal to politicise and obtain the endorsement of the military for the MFA. The Fifth Division was the military unit that coordinated the propaganda campaign. Other bodies such as the SDCI, CODICE, and the Dynamisation Cabinets also contributed to political indoctrination. The MFA exerted control on the media to protect the image of the military and MFA. Although *nodality* was primarily used through effectors, the role of detectors should not be understated. Most of the organisations that participated in the revolutionary propaganda and censorship also collected information about political views and sources of unrest in the ranks. The intelligence gathered served to control some insurrections and to neutralise the coups of March and November 1975.

Second, after the failed coup of November 1975 the MFA propaganda, censorship and political espionage machinery was dismantled. The SDCI, CODICE, the Dynamisation Cabinets and the Fifth Division were eliminated. The new official discourse warned of the dangers of politicisation of the armed forces and relied on mutual awareness between the civilian and

⁶¹Law 30/84 (5/9/1984).

military spheres as a means to achieve military subordination. The media, which had strongly promoted the more radical revolutionary agenda, was sanctioned immediately after the coup but censorship was abandoned later. Freed from the previous military censorship, the media launched information campaigns against the CR and in favour of the complete subordination of the military to civilian rule. After 1976 the information detectors disappeared from the control toolkit. Only after 1982, when the armed forces were integrated into the Defence Ministry, some oversight mechanisms introduced. Nonetheless, until the creation of the SIED, the SIS and the SIM in 1984 the government lacked any reliable information system that could assess military threats.

5.4 Authority

The governing bodies used their *authority* to create incentives and rewards (appointments and promotions, high autonomy, special powers, amnesty laws) as well as sanctions and constraints (punishments for conspirators, curving the power of institutions, ban on political activities) to maintain the military under control. Both subcategories of tools were intertwined and, as in the case of *organisation* and *nodality* tools, after the failed November 1975 coup, important changes in their use can be observed. However, the most important adjustments to *authority* tools took place in 1982 when the Constitutional Reform and new Defence Law were enacted, transforming the legal framework of civil-military relations. These reforms contributed to redefine the political and military functions reinforcing the civilian government and military subordination. Afterwards the use of new *authority* tools as means of control became less discernible.

5.4.1 Rewards and incentives

After the end of the Estado Novo, the governments used several types of incentives to achieve military satisfaction and support. Military promotions and appointments were granted to reward loyal officers. At the collective level, the ruling bodies granted the armed forces an enormous degree of autonomy, important special powers beyond their typical defence functions and amnesty laws that benefited most military incarcerated or expelled from the armed forces by previous governments.

First, the *authority* of the governments and ruling bodies was used also to reward individuals. The military leaders that had participated in the fall of the regime were rewarded with military promotions. The new military and political institutional structure introduced by the MFA created new opportunities for the loyal military to acquire power and carry out functions beyond those customary to their rank. Loyal military were appointed to the public administration and to the executive bodies such as the Government, the JSN, the Higher Council of the MFA, the Armed Forces Assembly and the CR (Carrilho 1994). The process of 'democratic institutionalisation' of the MFA elicited a parallel political hierarchy with representative bodies at all armed forces levels, which collided with the traditional military hierarchy (Sánchez Cervelló 1993). This new structure with ramifications in all military branches, divisions and units created an incentive to endorse and promote the revolutionary programme of the MFA.

Those loyal to the MFA could become more powerful and influential in the armed forces than many officers of a higher rank.

After the November 1975 coup, officers loyal to President Eanes that had opposed the coup were promoted and then appointed to lead strategic units and military regions (Rato 2000:148–149). For instance, three ‘moderate’ brigadiers were appointed by the government as commanders of the military regions north, centre and south (Sánchez Cervelló 1993:229) and military from the northern regions, traditionally less revolutionary, occupied the positions of those involved in the incidents (Carrilho 1994:89).

However, from 1976 the utilisation of military promotions and appointments decreased. The MFA’s parallel political hierarchy had created disorder and unrest amongst the ranks (Graham 1979:237). After the November 1975 coup, the separation of the military and political spheres was decreed and the ‘democratic institutions’ of the MFA in the Armed Forces were abolished diminishing, therefore, the opportunities for political appointments of loyal officers. Moreover although the CR (until 1982) and the Government (from 1982) had the capacity to validate or reject the promotions of senior rank officers⁶² in reality political interferences in the system of promotions and appointments were rare. In most cases the CR and the Government were very respectful with the seniority principle (Santos 1980; Ferreira 1994:231).

Second, the extraordinary degree of autonomy was an important collective incentive. The autonomy that the armed forces enjoyed in Portugal until 1982 had no match in any other Western democracy (Graham 1993; Ferreira 1994). The MFA blamed Caetano’s government for the failures in the Colonial Wars and excessive control on military issues. In May 1975 they decreed the autonomy of the armed forces from the government.⁶³ The armed forces were led by the CEMGFA, who had a rank equivalent to that of the Prime Minister and was subordinated to the President of the Republic.⁶⁴ The Chiefs of Staff of the branches were also autonomous from the government, hierarchically linked to the CEMGFA and had a rank equivalent to that of a minister. Moreover, the CEMGFA General Costa Gomes was appointed President in September 1974. The accumulation of both positions continued during the mandate of Ramalho Eanes until 1981.⁶⁵

The 1976 Constitution reduced the prerogatives of the armed forces but preserved their autonomy (Santos 1980). Until 1982, the legislative and administrative autonomy of the military institutions remained intact.⁶⁶ Governments did not have hierarchical authority over

⁶²See examples of proposals for promotions of Generals in confidential reports, from EME, EMFA and EMGFA (1981–1982, ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 10, number 96, documents 1–12 and volume 11, number 97, documents 2–13), equally in EMA reports to CR for promotions of Admirals 1978–1981 (ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador volume 14, number 100, documents 1–8).

⁶³Law 3/74 (14/5/1974). See the political institutional structure in the first and second MFA-Political Parties Pacts (24/4/ 1975 and 26/2/1976) (ACR, MFA/Partidos (84), Pacto MFA-Partidos Parte I, Document 1–13 and 16 and Parte II Document 14).

⁶⁴Decree-Law 400 (29/8/1974).

⁶⁵Except from March to November 1975 when the command of the armed forces was transferred to the CR (Ferreira 1994:225–227)

⁶⁶Until 1982 the CR passed about 750 rules and regulations concerning the military and the Chiefs of Staff over 550 (Ferreira 1994:229–230).

the armed forces and were not responsible for the military aspects of defence and were merely given a support role. Portugal can be considered as a diarchic system because, unlike the rest of the Western European countries, the military were independent of the civilian power (Júdice 1978:27).

The Constitutional Reform and the Law of National Defence and the Armed Forces set, in 1982, a new framework for civil-military relations and tackled several issues related to military subordination such as the extensive powers of the President, the insufficient competences of the Defence Minister and the excessive autonomy of the armed forces. The Defence Ministry was then charged with the preparation and execution of defence policy and the armed forces formally integrated in the Ministry. Therefore, these laws subordinated the armed forces to the civilian power both in legislative and administrative terms (Balsemão 1986:202). The goal was to reproduce the system of civil-military relations of most NATO countries in which military autonomy was much more limited (Amaral 2000:182–183).

Third, not only were the military granted autonomy but they were also entrusted special powers. From 1974 to 1976, the military controlled the government and all major State institutions. During this period the President and the provisional governments were not democratically elected but appointed by the military ruling bodies. The CR was as an autonomous body with far-reaching powers to oversee the transitional process.⁶⁷ The members of the CR received honours equivalent to those of the ministers.⁶⁸ The political power of the CR was such that in some organisation charts the government appeared hierarchically subordinated to the CR.⁶⁹

In addition to the political functions the military were assigned many other functions related to internal affairs that strengthened their influence and pride. The military continued leading the main security forces such as the GNR, the PSP and the Fiscal Guard. The COPCON had far-reaching powers regarding internal security.⁷⁰ The military had the capacity to intervene directly in civilian affairs in order to guarantee the provision of the essential public services, the economic activity⁷¹ and electoral processes.⁷² They were in charge of the very important process of demise of the PIDE/DGS and the Legion.⁷³ In sum, the military fulfilled

⁶⁷Law 5/75 (14/3/1975).

⁶⁸Decree-Law 403/76 (27/5/1976).

⁶⁹See for instance, Annexe A to the minutes of CR reunion (ACR, ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 1, Acta 20/6/1975)

⁷⁰COPCON was granted the power to decide over the liberation of all detainees that were not under the jurisdiction of the JPM (ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 1, Acta 16/10/ 1975). See also, COPCON documents in 1975 dealing with issues such as treatment of ex-DGS in prisons, ex-DGS informants, military prisoners in Cabo Verde and even land seizures (ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 13, number 99, documents 31–44). Evidence that the COPCON commanded the Fiscal Guard to make a rigorous control of the borders for certain suspects (ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 15, number 101, document 58).

⁷¹Decree-Law 637/74 (20/11/1974). See Vieira (1995:73).

⁷²For instance, the CR decreed that the military should arrest everyone altering the normal development of the electoral process (Annexe of the minutes of the CR reunion, 27/3/1975, ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 1).

⁷³The liquidation of PIDE/DGS involved 17,000 cases, 9,000 for its personnel and 8,000 to the informants and collaborators. See correspondence between the CR and the Government in 1978 (ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 20, number 106, document 9). The CR decided that the ex-PIDE and ex-Legion members were to have a summary trial by a Revolutionary Military Tribunal, see minutes

many tasks and were implicated in decision making at many levels so that they were expected to feel empowered and to endorse the regime.

The 1976 Constitution tried to merge both the Western model of civil-military relations in which military subordination was a principle with a socialist approach that gave room to a certain level of military participation in politics. The 1976 Constitution granted the military many important functions in the new democratic system and confirmed the CR as a fundamental political institution (Articles 3.2, 10.1, 46, 142, 273.4).⁷⁴ The military were expected to ensure the equilibrium of the political system and provide guidance during crises (Pires 1976). The Constitution also reserved legislative powers to the CR concerning the organisation, functioning and discipline in the armed forces (article 148.1) and Military Justice (articles 167, 218, 293.2). Laws and decrees approved by the Government had to be then approved by the President of the Republic and ultimately by the CR.⁷⁵ In sum, no other Western constitution recognised a higher level of military autonomy and involvement in the political system (Miranda 1978). According to the Constitution the military were guardians not only against external but also internal threats (Seixas 1978). These prerogatives granted in the Constitution can be construed as a truce among the rival political and military groups that had disputed the supremacy during the transition.⁷⁶

However, the ambiguity and overlapping in functions that this system generated became problematic for civil-military relations and defence purposes (Santos 1978; Moreira 1980:136). In 1982, the Constitutional Reform and the Law of National Defence and the Armed Forces made profound changes in the formal distribution of power eliminating the CR and reducing the powers of the Portuguese Armed Forces.

Fourth, the series of amnesties launched during the transition were important *authority* incentives applied to some specific groups of military. These laws intended to produce a general positive impact on the morale of the armed forces, which felt protected by the ruling bodies. From 1974 to 1982 up to thirteen different amnesties concerning political and indiscipline crimes were decreed by the authorities. These amnesty laws responded to corporatist claims and had a positive impact on the motivation and loyalty beyond those who directly benefited from them. The officers that had been purged due to political reasons during the Estado Novo and those who had been punished for having surrendered in Goa in 1961 were re-admitted to

of CR reunion (4/6/1975, ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 1) and Law 8/75 (25/7/1975). In 1979 still almost a hundred military worked in the Coordination Service for the liquidation of PIDE/DGS and Portuguese Legion. See EMGFA document (2/9/1979, ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 9, number 95, document 13).

⁷⁴For instance, Article 3.2 established that the MFA was the guarantor of the democratic progress and the revolution and 'participated, in alliance with the people, in the exercise of sovereignty'. Article 10.1 provided that the alliance between the MFA and the political parties and other democratic organisations ensure the peaceful development of the revolution. Article 46 consolidated the exclusive use of force by specifying the prohibition of militarised or paramilitary groups other than those integrated in the State and the armed forces. Article 142 stated that the CR was guarantor of the functioning of democratic institutions and the respect of the Constitution and revolutionary principles. Finally, Article 273.4 specified that they 'have the historical mission to guarantee the conditions that allows a peaceful and plural transition of the Portuguese society towards democracy and socialism'.

⁷⁵For instance see correspondence about the approval of diverse regulations in 1979 (ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 6, number 92, documents 4-7).

⁷⁶See Maxwell (1989:135), Ferreira (1994:219) and Rato (2000:142-143). Although the Constitution was enacted in 1976 it was drafted earlier during a period of great political instability in 1975.

the armed forces. Many of the crimes committed by military during the revolutionary period, such as acts of public disorder and indiscipline, were also amnestied.⁷⁷

5.4.2 Sanctions and constraints

The governing bodies also used their authority to control the military by punishing or restraining their action. First individuals that had endorsed the previous regime or revolted against the government were expelled or demoted. Second, the institutions that could threaten the ruling bodies were abolished or saw their powers limited. Finally, legal constraints and prohibitions were introduced to achieve de-politicisation and professionalisation of the armed forces.

First, there is evidence of purges, ‘saneamentos’, associated to each of the major civil-military crises in the period analysed. After the 25 April coup, hundreds of officers were sacked or forced to the reserve or retirement due to their support to the previous regime including President Tomás and all the military in Caetano’s government.⁷⁸ After the incidents of September 1974, in which the political centre and right tried to support Spínola’s political programme through mass mobilisations, many renowned senior officers involved were sanctioned. General Spínola was forced to resign as President and the Generals Galvão de Melo, Diogo Neto and Silverio Marques were forced to quit the Junta. However, the fact that many commanding officials were removed did not contribute to the control of the armed forces. On the contrary, politicisation increased and discipline began to break down (Graham 1979:236–237). More severe punishments were applied to those involved in the counter-revolutionary coup of 11 March 1975. Those who had participated in the coup were expelled from the armed forces and lost their political rights for 20 years.⁷⁹ Some even saw their properties and bank accounts confiscated.⁸⁰

Whereas initially the military linked to the Estado Novo and right-wing movements were targeted, from November 1975 those associated with the far-left were punished too. General Otelo was dismissed as Lisbon Military Governor on 20 November 1975 and after the 25 November coup, many MFA officers that had held important positions during the revolutionary period were demoted. For instance, Vasco Gonçalves was removed from the High Military Studies Institute and then forced to retirement; the Army Chief of Staff (CEME) Carlos Fabião was relegated to do administrative tasks and replaced by Eanes; in 1978, the CEME Vasco Rocha Viera and the Lisbon Military Governor, Vasco Lourenço, were also discharged (Rato 2000:148, 155). MFA-Moderates and some centrist military filled the positions left by the MFA-Radicals and MFA-Populists. These military favoured for the first time the process of disengagement from politics. The utilisation of *authority* sanctions was part of a disciplinary strategy for the de-politicisation of the armed forces was promoted primarily by General Ramalho Eanes and ended up being very important for the success of the transition into a plural-

⁷⁷The first was amnesty was formalised by the Decree-Law 173/74 (26/4/1974). The Law 17/82 (2/7/1982) was the last important one. See also Vilar (2009) and secret law project in CR correspondence (16/5/1980, ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 7, number 93, document 12).

⁷⁸These purges were formalised through the Decree-Laws 178/74 (30/4/1974), 309/74 (8/7/1974) and 648/74 (2/12/1974).

⁷⁹Decree-Law 147-D/75 (21/3/1975).

⁸⁰Decree-Law 256/75 (26/5/1975). 19 officers were attained by this law (ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 13, number 99, document 18).

ist democracy (Santos 2000:167). After the 1982 Defence Law, which transferred the power to demote senior officers from the CR to the Government, there are not many examples of this type of sanctions. The most prominent one was the demotion of the CEME General Garcia dos Santos in 1983 for criticising the political system (Ferreira 1994:238).

Second, *authority* was also used to eliminate institutions or curb their power whenever they were considered to damage or threaten military satisfaction and level of subordination. After the Carnations Revolution, the JSN decreed the liquidation of the organisations that had contributed to the control of the military during the Estado Novo such as the PIDE/DGS and the Portuguese Legion⁸¹ as well the High Staff Corps.⁸² These were very unpopular institutions among the military that had opposed to the regime. The 25 November 1975 coup attempt marked the end of the revolutionary period. The government wanted to send the message of change and moderation and approved the elimination of many of the MFA institutions of political control. On 26 November, the COPCON was dissolved and as series of restrictions to the rights to its members imposed.⁸³ Additionally, the MFA Assembly and all the political-military assemblies in the armed forces that had been created during the process of 'democratic institutionalisation' of the MFA were dismantled. Additionally all the political organisations that had inspired acts of indiscipline appeared within the ranks during the revolutionary period, such as the 'Soldados Unidos Vencerão', 'Acção Revolucionária das Praças do Exército' and 'Forças Armadas Democráticas', were dissolved.⁸⁴ From 1976, the CR remained the sole military body with political functions.

The Constitutional Reform and National Defence laws in 1982 can be construed as the *authority* tools that completed the legal process of political neutralisation and subordination of the military (Vieira 1995:71–72). These reforms, that meant the extinction of the CR, were mainly drafted by the governments of centre-right coalition 'Aliança Democrática' (Ferreira 1994:233). These laws reduced the autonomy of the armed forces, eliminated their capacity to intervene in politics and circumscribed their functions to the defence against external threats. The legislative powers of the CR were transferred to the Portuguese Assembly. The government acquired the capacity to appoint the CEMGFA and the Chiefs of Staff of the branches. Legal mechanisms for the civilian control of the military through the Defence Ministry were introduced (Rato 2000:160–161). Thus, these *authority* constraints set the basis for normalisation of civil-military relations and civilian supremacy.⁸⁵

⁸¹ Decree-Law 171/74 (25/4/1974).

⁸² Decree-Law 634/74 (20/11/1974). The elimination of the High Staff corps followed also longstanding requests from ranks and NATO (Ferreira 2000:115).

⁸³ See minutes of CR reunion (ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 2, 27/11/1975).

⁸⁴ For instance 'Soldados Unidos Vencerão' was created by the communist PRP in August 1975 and inspired many actions of revolt in October 1975 (Porch 1977:216). 'Acção Revolucionária das Praças do Exército' was launched by the PCP, after the MFA-Moderate consolidated their power in the MFA Assembly in Tancos in September (Sánchez Cervelló 1993:248). 'Forças Armadas Democráticas' was a clandestine group of officers in favour of the Carnation Revolution but that criticised the communist drift of the transition. See manifesto in a letter from Secretary of the CR Major Loureiro dos Santos informing the SDCI about the group (16/7/1975, ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, Assuntos Económicos Sociais- Cartas Particulares-Diversos, volume 82, document 32).

⁸⁵ See Santos (2000:171). Maxwell argues that many of these limitations and principles formally introduced in 1982 were 'cosmetic' and that until the 1990s the government did not exert an effective control on the military (Maxwell 1991:3).

Third, *authority* was used to set legal boundaries to reduce their political activity and increase professionalism. These tools became salient in the governments' toolkit after November 1975.⁸⁶ For instance a specific regulation clarifying the concept of discipline and its implementation was enacted to limit the serious problem of insubordination.⁸⁷ After the end of the Colonial Wars the quick demobilisation of troops was decided. The limit to the size of the armies responded to some corporatist claims from career officers and allowed a limited improvement of salaries and working conditions. The numbers in the armed forces were reduced from 217,000 in 1975 to 59,800 in 1976 (CESEDEN 1988:197). The Law 17/75 (26/12/1975), which launched the reorganisation of the armed forces, aimed at the professionalisation and subordination to civilian authority and can be construed as an *authority*-based constraint. It prohibited political partisanship in the armed forces and specified that the necessity of a 'conscious discipline' and the unity of the chain of command. The 1976 Constitution and the new Military Disciplinary Regulations also confirmed the prohibition of political membership and participation in political activities for all the military in active duty or in the reserve.⁸⁸ On 11 August 1976, the CR approved the prohibition of accumulation of functions for the military. Members of the CR had to resign from their command functions. This also contributed to reduce the power of the CR over the military sphere (Ferreira 1992:315–316; Rato 2000:154). Moreover, any appointment outside the armed forces for public or private office had to be approved by the Chief of Staff of the branch and in some cases by the CR.⁸⁹ Finally, the Law of National Defence in 1982 eliminated the right of union membership for the military (Article 31).

5.4.3 Conclusion

Authority rewards and incentives became extremely important after the Carnations Revolution but saw their salience decrease. Appointments to senior positions in the military, public administration, the MFA organisation and Government rewarded and empowered loyal officers, especially from 1974 to 1976. An extraordinary degree of autonomy and many functions concerning political and internal affairs were granted to the armed forces as a means to reinforce collective military satisfaction and support for the regime. From 1974 to 1976, the military controlled all ruling bodies including the provisional governments. Although some military prerogatives were reduced after the coup of November 1975, the 1976 Constitution

⁸⁶Some of these types of *authority* constraints were used during the revolutionary period too. For instance, military and civilian staff were banned from political activities within military areas, including weapons factories, as a means to preserve the 'impartiality, cohesion, security and discipline of the armed forces'. See internal in the circular Army Ministry (2/12/1974, AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1, numero 14).

⁸⁷It stresses that the 'notorious and progressive deterioration of the discipline' within the armed forces could transform the 25 April Revolution into one of the major catastrophes of the Portuguese history. See Annexe I to the minutes of CR reunion (11/12/1975, ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 2).

⁸⁸Decree-Law 142/77 (9/4/1977). However the three branches rejected the complete interdiction for the military to participate in politics. They understood that military in reserve or with the age of reserve should be able to participate in politics. See the reports from the EMA (28/2/1978), EME (10/4/1978) and EMFA (13/4/1978) (ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 8, number 94, document 4). They ended up requesting a reformulation of the military disciplinary regulation from the CR in order to permit non-active military to participate in political activities. Letter from the EMGFA to the CR on 19 June 1978 (ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 8, number 94, document 8).

⁸⁹Annexe to CR reunion (ACR, ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 3, 29/10/1976).

still recognised a high degree of military involvement in the political system, through the CR, and a degree of autonomy - higher than in any other Western democratic country. Additionally, numerous amnesty laws were approved to satisfy military corporatist claims from 1974 to 1981. From 1982, *authority*-based incentives and rewards almost disappeared from the control toolkit.

Authority-based sanctions and constraints were also important. Purges were conducted aiming initially at military officers identified with the Estado Novo and later with anti-government insurrections. Similarly, some institutions were abolished for having contributed to the Salazarist control machinery, such as the PIDE/DGS, the Legion, and the High Staff Corps, and later for their involvement with the failed revolutionary experience, such as the COPCON, the MFA assemblies and committees and finally the CR. Finally a series of prohibitions and constraints were introduced in the armed forces after the events of November 1975 in order to ensure de-politicisation and professionalisation. These regulations included a ban political activities and unionism as well as the restrictions to employment outside the ranks and the accumulation of functions for the military in active.

Thus, the *authority*-based rewards and sanctions were intertwined. The expulsions and demotions were linked with the appointments and amnesties. Incentives such as wide degree of autonomy and special powers were annulled through *authority*-based constraints. In general the periods of higher instability and change of government were associated with a more intensive use of *authority* tokens. The Constitutional Reform and new National Defence Law in 1982 contributed to consolidate a Western style legal framework of civil-military relations. This new arrangement restricted the autonomy and other incentives and rewards previously enjoyed by the military and confine them to the defence functions.


5.5 Treasure

The utilisation of financial resources as tool of control on the military continued to be very limited during the transition to democracy. Portugal's economic problems had been aggravated by the colonial conflict. The deficiencies in terms of social services convinced governments to concentrate their economic efforts in non-defence sectors. This section first analyses military budgets linking them to the general evolution of the Portuguese economy, then it explains military staff expenditure as a tool of control and finally, military expenditure in equipment.

5.5.1 Evolution of military budgets

As explained in chapter 4, military budgets during the Estado Novo were in general low. The increase in defence budgets at the end of the regime was due to increased costs owing to the Colonial Wars and not to the attempt to improve military satisfaction via salaries or equipment. From 1974 to 1977, budgets drastically decreased and then remained stable until 1986 both in real terms and as percentage of GDP (Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7). The drastic initial decline can be associated with the end of the colonial conflict and the policy of demobilisation of the troops initiated by the MFA (Barros and Santos 1997:204–205).


Figure 5: Total expenditure in defence (in constant escudos of 1926). Colonial Wars period in red.[†]




Source: Based on Mata and Valério (1994:253–254, 270–271).

[†]Data include the expenditure in the overseas territories.

Figure 6: Total defence expenditure (1974–1986) in constant escudos of 1974



Source: Mata and Valério (1994:253–254, 270–271). Transformation into constant escudos by author.

Figure 7: Defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Portugal

Sources: Based on Pérez Muinelo (2009:84) and Mata and Valério (1994:253–254, 270–271)

The fall and stagnation of defence expenditure was also linked to the economic problems that the successive governments faced. The provisional governments inherited from the Estado Novo a high trade deficit (17,000 million escudos in 1974), high unemployment (8%) and a fall in GDP (-6%).⁹⁰ The fast economic growth that the country experienced in the early 1970s was interrupted as a result of the political and social agitation and the process of de-colonisation. During the revolutionary period numerous nationalisations of companies and land seizures took place but they did not solve the serious economic problems, such as large budget deficits, high rates of inflation and unemployment, shrinking commercial relations with the former colonies, high costs associated with the estimated 650,000 people returning from the colonies ('retornados'),⁹¹ as well as the fall of tourists inflows and emigrants' remittances (Robinson 1979:261–264; Mata and Valério 1994:219–223). These problems, especially unemployment, contributed to the fall of Gonçalves' revolutionary government in September 1975 (Maxwell 1995:142).

From 1976 the revolutionary agenda was abandoned and instability reduced. However the efforts to address the economic problems limited the capacity to increase military budgets. The governments undertook a fundamental reorganisation of the administration, public corporations and the agricultural sector. The expansionary policies to stimulate growth and absorb


⁹⁰See CR Political Action Plan (Annexe B to the minutes of CR reunion, 20/6/1975, ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução - Originais, volume 1).

⁹¹According to the census in 1981 in Portugal there were 505,078 'retornados'. This means more than more than 5% of the total population. The repatriation and support of such an influx of people consumed significant financial resources (Ferreira 1994:86–91).

the 'retornados' increased the deficit, debt and inflation. From 1980 to 1983 the economic situation worsened as a consequence of the appreciation of the escudo and the continuation of expansionary policy. The stand-by agreements with the IMF in 1978 and 1984 portray the complicated financial situation. The austerity policies introduced in 1984 had some positive effects from 1985 but did not solve the problem of inflation.⁹²

The economic setbacks reduced the availability of resources and diverted spending preferences away from defence. Other sectors, fundamentally linked to social expenditure were prioritised and absorbed most budget increases (Amaral 2000:184). Moreover the number of civil servants grew faster than the armed forces staff (Mesquita 1986:48–49). While total public expenditure continued to grow in real terms, military expenditure shrank in the 1970s and in the 1980s. The downward trend in the weight of defence expenditure in government spending can be also observed in other European countries, including Spain. In Portugal this reduction in the relative weight can be linked to the growth of the state and the correction of some traditional social problems inherited from the previous authoritarian regime (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Defence budget as a percentage of total public expenditure in Portugal and Spain (1974–1986)




Sources: Based on Mata and Valério (1994:253–254; 270–271) and Pérez Muinelo (2009:84).

The salience of *treasure* tools was very limited. Portuguese spending on military and defence was low in comparison to other European countries (Figure 9). Portugal was the sole member of NATO whose military expenditure decreased from 1975 to 1982. While military expenditure in most of them experienced double digit growth rated, Portugal's military expenditure decreased by 20% (IISS 1986:138). From 1977 to 1986 only Turkey had a lower per capita military expenditure in NATO (CESEDEN 1988:135; ISS 1986:140; 1988:212). Military expenditure was so low that the basic defence functions and commitments with NATO could

⁹² 20.6% average annual inflation from 1974 to 1986 (Ferreira 1994:272; Mata and Valério 1994:225–229, 254–255).

not be guaranteed. As former PM, Amaral acknowledges, the funding of Armed Forces during this period decreased below the 'acceptable minimums' (Amaral 2000:184). The fact that by 1986 a modern process of planning and budgeting to rationalise military expenditure was still not an official requirement also points at the low relevance of *treasure* in the strategy of the governments.⁹³

Figure 9: Defence expenditure as a percentage of GNP



Source: Based on CESEDEN (1988:120)


5.5.2 Staff expenditure

The capacity of the governments to use staff expenditure to improve military living conditions and therefore increase their loyalty was very limited. Although in Portugal military expenditure was fundamentally devoted to salaries, pensions and staff-related costs (Figure 10), salaries and pensions remained very low. Military budgets were shrinking and an important share was dedicated to the demobilisation process that followed the Colonial Wars. Salary increases merely attempted to compensate inflation that was severely reducing military purchasing power.

The big size of the armed forces, designed to maintain the occupation of the large colonial territories, ruled out sufficient salary raises. The initial downsizing of the armed forces after the Colonial Wars reduced the staff from 217,000 in 1975 to 59,800 in 1976. However,

⁹³See (Mesquita 1986:56–58). A modern budgeting process inspired by NATO was introduced in Spain in 1982. Portuguese civil-military relations literature devotes little attention to the utilisation of financial resources as means to appease or satisfy the military during the period of transition and consolidation of democracy confirms this hypothesis. One exception is Ferreira (1994:233) who stresses that Amaro da Costa, the first civilian Defence Minister, used the 4% increase of military expenditure approved in 1980 in order to gain support from the highest ranks

Figure 10: Percentage of defence budget allocated to staff expenditure in Portugal and Spain




Sources: Based on MDN (1986:154) and Pérez Muinelo (2009:93).

the numbers in the armed forces grew again from 1978 reaching 73,400 in 1985 (CESEDEN 1988:197). The share of expenditure per member of the armed forces remained very low in comparison with other European armed forces (Figure 11).

There were several general salary increases during the period but rather than improving the living conditions of the military and their families, they served to compensate for the effects of inflation had on their purchasing power. The economic situation of military staff was so precarious for the military and their families that many deserted the ranks to take up other jobs.⁹⁴ The Decree-laws 498-E/74, 75-V/77, 251-A/78, 209-A/79, 354/80, 164-A/81, 141/83 were *treasure* tools that updated salaries and pensions usually following previous similar adjustments in the civil service. However, these raises did not fully compensate the loss of purchasing power. As the Decree-Law 354/80 recognised, it was necessary to proceed to the update of the military salary tables aiming to recover, as far as possible, their purchasing power (Legislação.org 2010). The financial situation was so constrained that some economic prerogatives were eliminated, such as some gratuities associated with the accumulation of functions and to special tasks as well as the discrimination of salaries according to different placements in continental Portugal.⁹⁵ The military continued to rely on the Social Services of the Armed Forces to compensate for their low salaries.

⁹⁴For instance a letter to the CR from the Porto Military Region Commander, General Pires Veloso (16/10/1975), explains that there were around 50 processes of desertion opened in the Military Tribunal of Porto fundamentally linked to the precarious economic situation of the military and their families (ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volume 15, number 101, documents 39).

⁹⁵Decree-Law 59/82 (27/2/1982).

Figure 11: Defence budget per member of the armed forces in current dollars

Source: Based on CESEDEN (1988:123)

5.5.3 Equipment expenditure

The greatest part of the defence budgets was earmarked for staff expenditures and for covering the exceptional cost of the repatriation and downsizing of the armed forces. This reduced the flexibility of the governments with regard to the expenditure on equipment. The efforts to modernise weapons and materials were motivated by NATO membership and enabled thanks to the military aid from allies. However overall these efforts were insufficient and they were not instrumental in the military control strategy.

Thirteen years of Colonial Wars had created a distortion in the structure and equipment of the armed forces, which suffered from being oversized and reliant on obsolete material. In order to adapt to the new context and to the new NATO defence doctrine launched in 1968, the Portuguese Armies required a fundamental process of modernisation (Pereira 1986:63–64). This modernisation was not undertaken during the transition and early democratic period. The budgets during the transition were ‘survival’ budgets not adapted to ensure the missions of the armed forces including the compromises acquired with NATO (Mesquita 1986). Barros and Santos (1997) even suggest a free-rider attitude of Portugal as the successive governments relied on NATO to guarantee the defence of the country.

Since modernising all the armed forces was not possible given the financial constraints it was decided to concentrate efforts on the Independent Mixed Brigade of the Army (BMA). From 1976 the BMA was the flagship unit that channelled Portuguese participation in NATO and became the first unit to be modernised fundamentally thanks to the arrival of armoured vehicles from the German and US armies, which produced a qualitative leap forward for Portuguese Armed Forces (Machado 2007). The Brigade made the Army increasingly involved

with NATO and became a model for the rest of the armed forces in terms of preparation and professionalism and a source of pride for the Portuguese military.

Nonetheless, the financial resources available for the procurement of weapons and materials continued to be very scarce for the rest of the armed forces. Even PM Cavaco Silva (1986:18) recognised the shortages in terms of equipment and the need to increase budgets. The government tried to compensate for the deficient material conditions by introducing in 1985 the NATO military planning process to rationalise investments and procurement⁹⁶ and by launching a rearmament programme from 1986.⁹⁷ These measures also contributed to increase civilian budgetary control on the military since they established that all programmes for defence infrastructure and re-equipment required the approval of the Assembly. The military had to justify their requests for funds and persuade the civilian authorities about the need of the investment and re-equipment programmes (Almeida 1986:31–34).

The government also tried to increase external aid and cooperation, in particular from NATO allies, and the development of Portuguese defence industry (Silva 1986:18–19; Lopes 1986). The contacts with the more advanced armed forces of the NATO allies was considered to be the starting point for the reorganisation and modernisation (Pereira 1986:70). The US was the main contributor through subsidies and credits for re-equipment. Yet this aid was considerably lower than that received by Greece, Turkey or Spain (IISS 1990:223). Germany and France provided financial aid for the acquisition of equipment. Canada, UK, Netherlands, Norway, Italy and Belgium provided some material assistance, too. Thanks to the support of its allies, Portugal received tanks and other armoured vehicles for the Army, A-7 and C-130 planes for the Air Force, as well as components for the new programme of frigates in the Navy (Mesquita 1986:53–54; Pereira 1986:71). NATO allies also provided technical support for the manufacture of weapons and military materials in Portuguese factories. Finally the Government introduced new more flexible regulation for the defence industry to facilitate the rearmament (Almeida 1986:35).

5.5.4 Conclusion

In sum, the evolution of military expenditure in this period can be explained by the economic hardship that the governments faced, the need to absorb the ‘retornados’ and to downsize the armed forces after end of the Colonial Wars, as well as the higher priority that the governments conceded to social spending and investment in infrastructures. Comparatively speaking, the resources allocated to the military were scarce. Overall the use of *treasure* tools as means to increase military satisfaction and adherence to the governments was not salient in this period.

Although the majority of *treasure* resources were destined to staff expenditure the impact on military satisfaction was not considerable. Staff expenditure was constrained by the size of the Army and the compensation associated with the process of demobilisations of the troops after the colonial conflict. Although very often salaries and pensions were revised, these served merely to balance partially the loss of purchase power suffered by the military due to inflation.

⁹⁶Law 1/85 (23/1/1985).

⁹⁷Law 34/86 (2/9/1986) and Law 15/87 (30/5/1987).

No significant changes can be observed in the utilisation pattern of staff expenditure vis-à-vis the authoritarian period.

Equipment expenditure was also extremely stretched. Military budgets were low and staff requirements were prioritised over material requirements. The overall situation of the Portuguese Armed Forces was very precarious in terms of weaponry, ammunitions and materials. The BMI was the only well equipped military unit that became a model for the rest of the armed forces and the main Portuguese contribution to NATO Forces. The material modernisation was highly dependent on foreign financial, material and technical support and did not receive a definitive impulse until the mid 1980s. Then the Government launched a new military planning process to rationalise acquisitions and a general programme of re-equipment to improve the working conditions and defence capabilities. The new process introduced made mandatory the approval of the Assembly to any major investment and re-equipment programme.

5.6 Summary

Two different periods in the utilisation of basic resources to control the military can be outlined. The first one corresponds to the provisional governments' period and its zenith can be found around the November 1975 coup attempt. The control strategy was very different during the period of constitutional governments and especially after 1982.

Paradoxically, the approach to control developed by the provisional governments was to a great extent similar to that of the Estado Novo. Salazarist coercive *organisation* tools were abolished but replaced by a series of similar organisations and the actions concerning military control were intensified. The special military unit COPCON, in charge of fighting insurgency, was the most representative but not the sole coercive tool. Other military units, the security forces, tribunals, prisons and even civilians acted as deterrent instruments against military disobedience too. As during the last years of the Estado Novo military education and training were neglected and the provision of services, goods and jobs continued as means to compensate poor salaries. The capacity to shape the organisation of the state institutions and the armed forces helped the MFA to create a series of institutions and a parallel hierarchy that worked for the politicisation and subordination of both civilians and military. The reliance on politicisation as a mechanism of control can be also observed in use of *nodality*. New organisations such as the Fifth Division, CODICE and SDCI collaborated on an intensive propaganda campaign and the collection of information concerning political affiliation and adherence to the MFA principles. The extraordinary degree of autonomy and the extensive functions granted to the military in this period were important collective incentives to endorse the MFA-controlled governments. Amnesty laws, promotions and political appointments also contributed to reward the military. Initially, sanctions were imposed on the military officers and organisations identified with the Estado Novo and later with anti-government activities. Finally, the availability of *treasure* for control purposes was seriously compromised not only by the economic crises but also due to the funds committed to the returning military and downsizing of the armed forces. Salaries were not significantly increased in real terms and equipment was not modernised.

Despite all these control efforts, the period was characterised for continuous acts of indiscipline and insurrection. The moderate faction that controlled the MFA from September 1975 and that consolidated its power after the failed coup in November 1975 decided to abandon the revolutionary agenda, devolve political power to the political parties and return to the barracks. Deep transformations in the control toolkit were initiated, the underlying principles being de-politicisation and professionalisation of the armed forces. For instance, the abolition of the COPCON marked the end of the coercive use of *organisation*. Organisational design continued to be an important non-coercive mechanism of control but with opposite purpose. From 1976, the reorganisation efforts served to de-politicise the armed forces and de-militarise politics. Political and military power was gradually centralised. Education and military training were reinforced through the action of the IDN, military academies and institutes as well as through joint exercises with NATO and allied countries. The *nodality* tools of political control, CODICE, SDCI and Fifth Division were abolished, propaganda and censorship abandoned. The free media monitored the military, contributing to their extrication from politics. Governments promoted mutual awareness between the military and civilian spheres and a new doctrine of national defence seeking to persuade of the virtues of military subordination to civilian rule. In terms of *authority* tools, the fundamental changes were: the elimination of most non-defence functions attributed to the military, the limitation of their degree of autonomy and the introduction of legal sanctions and constraints in order to prevent politicisation and encourage professionalism in the ranks. In 1982, the CR was abolished and the Constitutional Reform and the Law of National Defence and Armed Forces defined a new legal framework for civil-military relations, formalising for the first time the principle of civilian supremacy. Lastly, although *treasure* remained marginal in the control strategy, there are some signs of the growing concerns of the government about the deficient material conditions. For instance, the government created the BMI, a brigade with full modern equipment, tried to stimulate military foreign cooperation and Portuguese defence industry, and finally in 1986 launched a general programme of rearmament and modernisation.

The key arguments about the control strategy in Portugal that have been developed in Part II (Chapters 3, 4, 5) are picked up again in Part IV (Chapters 9, 10) in order to establish comparisons with Spain and explanations of tool trajectories.

Part III

SPAIN

6 History of contemporary civil-military relations in Spain

6.1 Introduction

The military uprising that initiated the civil war in 1936 was by no means the first example of military intervention in politics in Spanish contemporary history. As in the Portuguese case explained earlier, the Spanish problem of military intervention in politics can be easily traced back to the period of the Napoleonic invasions (Appendix B). The 'pronunciamientos' and other forms of military pressure on the governments were very common. Since 1814 more than fifty 'pronunciamientos' and coups have been documented (Busquets 1982). The Army held extraordinary political power in Spain and was prone to act in order to defend its corporate interests whenever these were threatened (Boyd 1979: 274).

This chapter examines the main features of the Spanish political and military history during two periods: Franco's dictatorship (1936–1975) and the transition and early stages of democracy (1976–1986). These political and military events become fundamental in order to understand governments' choices of control tools (Chapters 7, 8, 9) and the historical events and environmental factors that conditioned such choices (Chapter 10). The analysis of the Francoist regime is divided into six sections. The first one covers the Civil War and the Second World War. The second section examines the period of insulation that followed the Second World War. The third section outlines the regime's political institutional setting. The fourth and fifth sections analyse the functions developed by the military and their attitude vis-à-vis Franco's authority. Finally the sixth section briefly describes the final years of the regime. Later this chapter examines civil-military relations from the death of Franco in 1975 until 1986. It first explains the sources of military dissatisfaction during the period of Suárez's governments. Second it explains the main military plots during the UCD governments. Finally it analyses the impact of the first socialist government (1982–1986) on military subordination. The transition to democracy is assumed to have started after the death of Franco on 20 November 1975. Despite the choice of this date, this thesis acknowledges that some changes were introduced in the regime before the death of Franco, and that formally the transitional process into democracy began in 1976 when the Francoist Cortes approved their own dissolution and a popular referendum confirmed this decision. The historical analysis is extended until 1986 which was the year in which Spain became member of the EEC, a referendum endorsed NATO membership and the socialist government was re-elected.

6.2 Franco's regime

6.2.1 The Civil War and the Second World War

On 17 July 1936 and in response to the electoral victory of the left coalition 'Frente Popular', an important part of the armed forces with the support of conservative political parties and the Church launched a coup d'état against the Second Republic. The rebels claimed that the country was in serious danger of social and political disintegration (Cardona 1983:197–247). This initiated the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) the implications of which conditioned the life of Spain for the next four decades, including the strategy and tools governments employed to control the military. General Francisco Franco Bahamonde reached power after a series of hazardous events and strategic manoeuvres that eliminated from the race to the rebel camp's supreme command more senior generals, such as Sanjurjo, Cabanellas, Queipo de Llano, Fanjul and Mola, and political leaders, such as José Antonio Primo de Rivera and Manuel Hedilla. On 1 October 1936 Franco was proclaimed 'Generalísimo' of the Nationalist Armies in Burgos, a position that he was supposed to occupy provisionally but that he maintained until his death 39 years later (Preston 1993; Cardona 2001:19–38).

Hundreds of thousands Spaniards lost their lives as a result of the Civil War (Preston 2011). The country was divided into two camps, the loyalist Republican and the rebel Nationalist. In addition to the battlefield casualties many civilian and military were executed, imprisoned or forced to exile during and after the war.¹ As a result of the war, the military were confronted with important challenges such as the reconstruction and integration of the structures that during the war had been decimated and duplicated as well as the absorption of many militia fighters, 'alfereces provisionales', that had fought for the rebels. The war also altered the basic recruitment principles of military cadres. Formal military education was suspended. Political ascription and combat experience became the driving principles until the restoration of formal military education after the end of the war. The war nonetheless allowed Franco to consolidate a personal power unparalleled among other fascist leaders or Spanish rulers (Payne 1987:245; Jerez Mir 2009). The Civil War left a very important and durable legacy not only on Spanish politics and society but also on the armed forces and civil-military relations. The Civil War also produced drastic changes in the resources available to the governments and on the tools employed to control the military (Chapters 7, 10).

Since 1936, Italy and Germany had collaborated with the Francoist camp and their ideological influence also reached Spanish civil-military relations and the government tools of control vis-à-vis society and the military. In April 1937, Franco dissolved the remaining political parties and unified the Carlist and Falangist militias² by creating the Single Party, 'Falange Española y Tradicionalista de la JONS' following the templates of the Italian Fascist and German Nazi parties. On 8 May 1939, Spain pulled out of the League of Nations and pro-Axis right-wing propaganda became pervasive in the press. The infiltration of Falange militants in the Armed Forces, the appointment of military to top positions in Falange and the use of

¹There is great controversy around the total number of victims. Recent demographic studies estimate the number of deaths in excess of 540,000 and the fewer births to 576,000 during the war period (Ortega and Silvestre 2005). See also Preston (2006 [1986]) and Beevor (2006) for more information on the Civil War.

²The unions and parties belonging to the Popular Front had been banned in 1936.

paramilitary symbolism among civilians were inspired by these totalitarian regimes. The result was a certain level of politicisation of the military and militarisation of politics. The special influence of the military in the allocation of budgets, the doctrine of the internal enemy, and the strategy of suppression of social conflict are manifestations of an overlap between the military and political spheres. The confusion between military and political values hindered the advancement of military professionalism (Bañón and Olmeda 1985:274–276, 281–282).

The Civil War and the popularity of totalitarian views in Europe until the decline of the Axis temporarily legitimised Franco's initial aggressive stance on control. Some control tools persisted throughout the dictatorship, such as the intensive use of propaganda, censorship, military speeches, and parades. However others, such as the use of armed militias or the penetration of the armed forces by the single party, were soon abandoned. Fascism was weaker in Spain and the Spanish military were less subservient than in the case of Germany and Italy (Preston 1990:7). Although initially the regime expressed its wish to build a totalitarian state³ and used control tools similar to those employed by Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy, overall Franco's dictatorship should not necessarily be considered a totalitarian regime but an conservative civilianised authoritarian one (Linz 1970 [1964]; Tusell 1988:272–305).⁴

The regime was ideologically aligned with the Berlin-Rome axis but avoided direct involvement in the war. Several reasons precluded Spain's direct participation. Francoist Armies were large, but they not suitable for the new type of warfare triggered by Germany⁵; aircrafts and mechanised forces were too scarce, men were poorly equipped. The military high command did not support the entrance of Spain in the Second World War (Preston 1990:51; Cardona 2001:83–84). Many generals were not pro-Axis.⁶ The dreadful socio-economic situation of post-war Spain, the expectation of a long conflict and the British and Portuguese diplomatic efforts also discouraged Spanish participation (Preston 1990:84; Palacios 1999:264–266). Finally, Hitler did not agree to provide the military equipment, food and industrial goods needed nor did he guarantee the concession to Spain of the French Morocco requested by Franco for joining the Axis (Serrano Suñer 1977: 299).

Despite its official non-belligerent stance, in Spain, unlike in Portugal, the Nazis had won the propaganda war during the Second World War (Stone 2005: 213). Franco's regime organised the expeditionary units Blue Division and the Blue Legion that fought alongside the Germans in the Russian front. Around 45,500 Spanish voluntary fighters joined these units (Moreno Juliá 2004). The Blue Division and the Blue Legion were a compensation for German support during the Civil War and a means to appease pro-Axis sympathisers within Spain. This enterprise was less expensive than a full scale involvement in the war to which Spain was

³For instance the law launching the Single Party Falange referred to the 'works aiming the definitive organisation of a totalitarian new state' (20/4/1937), BOE.

⁴Whether Franco's was an authoritarian or a totalitarian dictatorship is still subject to a contentious debate. However, after the mid-1940s the regime exhibited very few traits of totalitarianism.

⁵After demobilisation that followed the end of the Civil War, Franco still commanded an Army of over 500,000 men (Preston 1990:85).

⁶A PVDE report sent to Salazar, claimed that the Falange propaganda office in London considered generals Yague, Solchaga, Aranda and in particular, Queipo de Llano, as traitors and pro-Allies (26/7/1939). Another PVDE report stressed that there was an atmosphere of revolt in the ranks directed against Falangist Serrano Suñer (29/7/1939) (AOS/CO/IN-8A, Folder 5, Section 20, Page 361, 366).

not ready in terms of equipment and arms and which was less disturbing for the monarchic generals.

6.2.2 Insulation of the regime

After the Second World War the Francoist regime was insulated from the international arena due to the defeat of the Axis and the adoption of an autarchic economic model.⁷ This insulation was also reflected in a minimal evolution of the government's control toolkit partially provoked by the shortage of economic resources and low influx of new ideas (Chapter 7, 9, 10). The regime secluded itself from external influence and employed its strong propaganda machinery to conceal a situation of deep socio-economic crisis and problems such as hunger, droughts, anti-francoist guerrillas and the international boycott. Among the international community, Spain was a pseudo-fascist state that had collaborated with the Axis. However the western powers did not want to precipitate the fall of Franco or interfere in Spanish internal politics (Preston 1990:104). Roosevelt, a declared enemy of Franco was very ill, and died 12 April 1945. Churchill was too worried with Stalin to intervene militarily in Spain. France and especially the Soviet Union pushed for strong economic and political sanctions against Franco's Spain.

The UN resolution 39(I) of 12 December 1946 condemned the regime, advised the withdrawal of the ambassadors and established sanctions. Spanish membership to UN was rejected. For the next four years, most countries kept the diplomatic relations with Spain at minimal levels. The international insulation and the sanctions imposed by the UN worsened the Spanish socio-economic situation which in turn limited the capacity of the government to use *treasure* tools (Chapter 7 Section 7.5). Salazarist Portugal and Peronist Argentina were among the few sources of external support. Spain had lost the opportunity to receive Marshall Plan aid and later was not invited to join NATO, the Council of Europe or the European Communities. Contrary to the intentions of the actors that had launched the diplomatic boycott against Franco, its outcome was the reinforcement of the position of the 'Caudillo'. Franco used the UN boycott, the menace of the communist intervention and the nationalistic feelings to gain internal support. Even the critical monarchist generals stopped opposing Franco (Liedtke 1999:231; Portero 1999:218–224).

In the 1950s, new ties with the western world were gradually created. Franco sought international recognition. Spain's strategic location and Franco's anti-communism, manifested during the Korean War with declarations and symbolic offers of military aid to the US made the regime an acceptable ally.⁸ In 1953, Spain signed the Madrid Pact with the US approving the creation of four US military bases on Spanish soil in exchange of economic and military support. The support of the United States was crucial for the survival of the regime. The US

⁷Since the loss of the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Cuba in 1898 Spain had been to a great extent been isolated and adopted a secondary role in the systems of international relations. Its absence from the First World War illustrates this fact.

⁸From 1948, the US started considering that Europe north of the Pyrenees could not be defended from a soviet invasion and that the Iberian Peninsula (as well as the UK) had to become the bases for an eventual reconquest. Daily Telegraph (4/10/1948) 'U.S. need of Spanish Bases', Daily Mail (4/10/1948) 'U.S. seeking ports and airfields', New York Times (8/10/1948) 'Western Europe Fears Spain Base', Le Soir (8/10/1948) 'Franco sera-t-il admis dans l'Union Occidentale?' (Press clippings in Franco's Personal Archive, FNFF, document 8893).

facilitated Spanish integration into the UN in 1956 and to the Bretton Woods institutions in 1958. Spain also strengthened its commercial relations within Europe, becoming member of the Organisation for European Economic Co-Operation by 1958. In the 1960s, Spain undertook a semi-liberalisation of the economy that transformed the economic structure of the country and further integrated Spain into Europe.⁹ The influence of fascism in Spain had been largely substituted in the 1960s by the 'developmentalism' ('desarrollismo') of the Opus Dei technocrats (Bañón 1978; Preston 1990:14; Rodrigo 1992:64–65). This gradual socio-economic evolution in Spain was also reflected in the armed forces and in the control toolkit, especially from the late 1950s. The US provided economic, material and technical support that stimulated the utilisation of *treasure* and non-coercive *organisation* tools (Chapter 7 Sections 7.2.2, 7.5).

6.2.3 The Francoist political institutional setting

The Civil War profoundly shaped the institutional configuration of the regime (Jerez Mir 2009). The new political structure was basically an instrument designed by Franco to strengthen his personal power. Erasing the legacy of the Second Republic became a priority for Francoist governments. In 1937, all the previous political parties were dissolved and integrated into the Single Party 'Falange',¹⁰ including a variety of ideological streams such as traditionalist Carlists, fascists, authoritarian Catholics and aristocratic monarchists (Preston 1990:2). All traditional labour unions were suppressed and the new 'vertical unions' were controlled by Falange. Moreover, the Law of Political Responsibilities in 1939 paved the way for massive purges in all state institutions (Richards 2006:13). This meant the elimination of the majority of potential veto actors in Spanish institutions, which helped Franco to impose his own personal preferences in terms of policy instruments (Chapter 10 Section 10.3.1).

In the Francoist authoritarian regime, the executive, legislative and the civil service were indissolubly entangled. Spanish political institutions were a combination of highly legalistic procedures with a certain military hierarchical style (Linz 1964:327; Comas and Mandeville 1986:52). Franco had a military vision of political power, when he became the head of state he asked to have a 'Chief of Joint Staff of Politics' to assist him.¹¹ The political organisation he designed was based on the principles of hierarchy and discipline.

Francoist governments and Parliament, 'Cortes', were fundamentally composed by professional bureaucrats,¹² mainly lawyers, economists, engineers and military officers (Chapter 7 Section 7.4), all of them loyal to Franco. The unicameral Cortes had an origin and function different to those of the Portuguese National Assembly. The Francoist Cortes were created in 1942 as a council body to assist Franco in the legislative tasks and did not approve laws. Corporatism was the only form of limited pluralism allowed by the regime. Officially the term of 'organic democracy' was used and the Cortes did not represent citizens but the 'natural organisations', i.e. the local councils, the vertical unions, the corporations, the universities,

⁹The end of the autarchy was precipitated by the economic collapse rather than by pressures from the US (Preston 1993:624).

¹⁰Decree 255 (19/4/1937).

¹¹Interview José María de Areilza (FOG, 13/9/1984, cassette J8).

¹²For instance in 1967, 68% of the MPs were civil servants (de Miguel 1975:103).

the Church and the military. In 1967, with the introduction of 108 elected seats¹³ the Cortes slightly increased pluralism and independence (Alba 1981:261–261).

After the defeat of the Axis, the single party Falange was relegated to secondary role and became a mainly a patronage-dispensing machine in the service of Franco (Preston 1990:11, 112–113). In a personal conversation with the lawyer and diplomat Antonio Garrigues, Franco said that the role of Falange was like that of the ‘claque’.¹⁴ Moreover, there were no serious checks to Franco’s powers outside the state apparatus. The only strong independent organisation was the Catholic Church that from the beginning firmly supported the regime. Franco’s administration was extremely centralised but not as bureaucratised as other European ones.¹⁵ There was a profusion of administrative norms that tried to regulate every aspect of the state and society, although many of them were not observed (Olmeda 1988:150).¹⁶ Bureaucratic entrenchment in general did not affect important decisions concerning the military. The formal legalism could be easily curbed by the government whenever required. Franco was the sovereign and as such he could quite freely choose the types of policies and tools without major constraints from Spanish institutions.

Different political factions or ‘familias’ of the Spanish political right dominated the government and administration throughout the regime: the falangists from 1939 to 1945, the Catholic conservative from 1946 to 1957 and the Opus Dei technocrats from 1957 to 1969.¹⁷ Power struggles among different ‘familias’ within Francoism were common.¹⁸ Changes in the administration’s personnel and ministerial reshuffles were made with the objective of the survival of the regime and in accordance to changes in the international context. Despite the influence of these ‘familias’, Franco always maintained absolute control of the regime. Like Salazar, Franco never clearly endorsed one single family, but his personal power was much higher than that of Salazar in Portugal. He was head of State, of the armed forces, of Falange and head of the governments. Franco held the absolute authority and was not to be held accountable for his actions. A common quote by the dictator and his followers that captures this was: ‘Franco only answered to God and History’ (Aguilar Olivencia 1999:38–39).

Many military occupied top positions in the political and administrative apparatus.¹⁹ Around a third of ministers during the regime were military officers.²⁰ The military maintained their

¹³Two seats were elected per province with restricted voting rights for ‘heads of families’ only.

¹⁴A professional body of professional applauders. Interview with Antonio Garrigues Díaz-Cañabate (FOG, 4/10/1984, cassette J9).

¹⁵In 1966, Spain there was a civil servant for each 53 inhabitants compared to 40 in Italy, 26 in France or 22 in Germany (Feo and Romero 1968:333).

¹⁶The regime was self-defined as an ‘Estado de Derecho’ (rule of law). Although that notion was propagandistically used, it also shows an unwieldy legalism that surrounded most of the decisions and the use of *authority* as a source of power.

¹⁷From 1969 to 1975 there is no clear predominance of any specific family (Preston 1990, 1993). There are slightly different interpretations of the evolution of conservative ‘familias’ in the governments (De Miguel 1975).

¹⁸Especially important were the frictions between Falange and non-falangist military that started in the Civil War and were aggravated during the Second World War. See for instance complaints from falangist José A. Girón in a report to Franco (13/8/1937) (FNFF, document 26943) and note of Franco’s personal secretary on the attitude of Falange vis-à-vis the military (21/10/ 1941) (FNFF, document 28).

¹⁹See Gutiérrez Mellado and Picatoste (1983:55), Chapter 3 Table 7, Chapter 7 Table 13, Table 14.

²⁰According to De Miguel (1975:35), 32 out of 114 were military and according to Graham 40 out of 114 (Graham 1984:195). The most accurate figure is probably 40 out of 120 (33.3%) according to Linz et al. (2003:75)

strength in the public administration until the early 1960s. The military can also be considered the most important pressure group until the rise of the technocrats in the 1960s (De Miguel 1975; Bañón 1978; Jerez Mir 1982). At the end of the regime, the military continued to enjoy exclusive competences in military and defence issues and an important participation in other areas of policy and state-owned companies.

In sum, the institutional setting provided Franco with absolute control of the regime and its resources. There was no clear division of powers. His decisions and actions, including those regarding the military and the tools of control, were not contested (Chapter 10). The military actively participated at different levels in the political-administrative Francoist system and, as next section shows, developed important functions in the regime.

6.2.4 The role of the military in Franco's regime

Although the Francoist was a civilianised regime (Ballbé 1983:iii; Danopoulos, 1991:28), the armed forces and the military were a crucial institution during the dictatorship. In addition to their traditional defence function, the military became guardians against the 'internal enemy' and key in the post-war reconstruction and social integration in Spain. Franco used many different policy instruments to promote these special functions and thus, the sense of responsibility and their engagement with the regime (Chapter 7).

The Spanish military traditionally felt a strong sense of mission according to which they had the power and obligation to defend and reconstruct Spain (Fontana 1986:13). They were convinced of holding the monopoly on patriotism (Preston 1995:132) and considered themselves guardians of traditions and national values (Blanco Ande 1987:212). The military intervention that overthrew the Republic and established Franco's dictatorship was justified as a fight against an internal enemy. Franco fuelled this sense of mission constantly promoting a mythic image of the military which he even called 'apostles of the Fatherland' and portraying the Civil War as a crusade (Aguilar Olivencia 1999:53). Franco ensured that the military remained the bastion of his regime maintaining a discourse around internal threats such as communists, separatists and masons. The military became inquisitors and repressors. Military courts maintained wide competences and were in charge of the fight against communism and masonry (Olmeda 1988:110).²¹ Moreover, Army officers were appointed to lead the forces of public order, Police and Civil Guard that fought against the anti-francoist militias known as 'maquis' (between 5,000 and 6,000 fighters) who were very active until 1947 and later maintained a low-intensity insurgent activity until 1956 (Aguado Sánchez 1975).

The armed forces had an important function in the reconstruction of Spain after the Civil War. They were important re-activating the economy by consuming great quantities of fuel, textiles, food and clothing and creating a significant military industrial complex. The armed forces also had the logistics and organisational expertise necessary to re-build the destroyed infrastructures and state apparatus (Olmeda 1988:106–107). Finally the military, alongside the Catholic Church, became the most powerful tools for social integration (Bañón and Olmeda 1985:281). The mandatory military service was instituted after the Civil War on 8 August

²¹There is abundant evidence of the persecution of masonry in the 1940s found in Franco's personal documentation (FNFF documents 126, 1597, 5064, 10602, 14022, 15234).

1940. One of the main tasks assigned to the Armed Forces was the integration and homogenisation of Spanish society through the use of the Castilian language, favouring interregional mobility and the indoctrination in the values of the Francoist regime (Olmeda 1988:132).

Franco was more concerned with the internal threats and establishing mechanisms of political control to guarantee loyalty to the regime than with external threats. The organisation and equipment of the armed forces were outdated, which hampered professionalism (Bañón and Olmeda 1985:280; Payne 1986). The Second World War had revolutionised warfare not only at the material but also at the tactical and organisational levels. However, the Spanish military, and in especially those in the Army, considered themselves as experienced fighters that had prevailed in the Civil War and did not have a sense of urgency of deep transformations in the armed forces. The resistance to professionalisation and change as well as the frustration of the cadres with advanced technical skill, due to the archaic and politicised organisation, were common features. Officers were permitted to take other parallel jobs in private business or the public administration to compensate the very low salaries which negatively affected professional preparation.²² Moreover, Franco had divided the War Ministry into three independent ministries and reserved for himself the role of coordinator, strengthening his authority on the military. This made more difficult the emergence of military leaders that could have a broad support across branches and challenge his personal rule but also lowered the level of coordination against a potential external threat.

Many of the pitfalls of the Spanish Armed Forces were evidenced during the Sidi Ifni War (1957–1958). In addition to the logistics and coordination problems, the scarcity and inadequacy of material means was obvious. The weapons dated from the Second World War, there was penury of fuel, vehicles, food and boots. Even the most basic military training exercises such as shooting practice were rare. Only the support of the French Armed Forces, which were much better prepared for guerrilla warfare saved Spain from a disaster (Azcona et al. 1994; Fernández-Aceytuno 2001:560–561; Segura Valero 2006:218–220, 246–251, 311–312). As Preston asserts, 'Franco used the Army not as an instrument of national defence but as a mechanism for guaranteeing the survival of his regime' (Preston 1990:39).

6.2.5 Military subordination

The armed forces never seriously threatened Franco's position. The victory in the Civil War and the central position that they occupied in the regime enhanced military pride and maintained military contestation at the lowest levels. Military discipline and cohesion also favoured military subordination. This was an important difference, with the Portuguese military far less cohesive and docile than the Spanish military.

Only a small minority of officers dared to express their discontent with some aspects of Franco's rule such as the mandatory membership of the military in Falange, Franco's attempts to enter Spain in the Second World War, and especially for not having restored the monarchy (Preston 1990:86). From 1943 to 1948, there were several manifestations of unrest among monarchist sectors which became the sole menace for Franco's supreme authority.²³ For

²² Interview to Lieutenant-General José Gabeiras Montero (FOG, 11/12/1987, cassette J31bis).

²³ Abundant evidence on the monarchic contestation within the ranks can be found in Salazar's (AOS/CO/NE-2B1, Folder 11 and 12) and Franco's personal archives (FNFF documents 11048, 20529).

instance in 1943, 27 MPS and other prominent figures of the new regime signed a monarchic manifesto ('Manifiesto de los Veintisiete') and Generals Orgaz, Dávila, Varela, Solchaga, Kindelán, Saliquet, Monasterio and Ponte co-signed a letter, on 8 September 1943, requesting Franco to restore the monarchy (Bravo Morata 1978:319–321; Palacios 1999:436–452). Moreover, several senior officers and other personalities maintained contacts with the exiled heir of the Spanish Monarchy, Don Juan, in order to plan his return. Franco used honours, promotions, economic incentives, relocations and demotions and one-to-one meetings to silence contestation from the monarchic generals. The symbolic enactment of the Law of Succession in 1947 that declared Spain a Catholic Monarchy contributed to appease pro-monarchic generals. In addition, Franco enjoyed the loyalty of the middle-rank and militia officers (Payne 1967:445; Preston 1990: 103–104) and by the early 1950s, most of the senior generals with legitimacy to contest Franco's leadership had already died.²⁴

Loyalty to the regime was reinforced by an extreme sense of discipline inculcated in the Spanish military (Allendesalazar Urbina 1977:84–98). Discipline was the most fundamental value.²⁵ Religious and military values were to a great extent interpenetrated during Francoism (Oltra and de Miguel 1978). Obedience, abnegation, honour and religious belief were exacerbated by the official discourse as a means to guarantee military discipline. The military were led to believe that discipline was intertwined with their Christian feelings; obedience was considered an act of faith or expression of religiosity.²⁶ For the military the prestige and honours were fundamental sources of reward, more important than material ones.²⁷ The renewed fixation with discipline contributed to eliminate the problem of military interventionism and to reinforce Franco's authority. The notion of discipline was so entrenched in the military imaginary that even those trying to promote disobedience to Franco justified their claims in terms of discipline.²⁸

The strong conservatism and cohesion of the Spanish military also contributed to prevent deviant attitudes against the dictator (Aguilar Olivencia 1999). The Spanish Armed Forces surpassed the usual levels of conservatism due to the purges of republican and liberal officers, the incorporation to the ranks of thousands of militia fighters whose ideology was often ultra-rightist, and the recurrent anti-communist, anti-liberal, pro-authoritarian rhetoric fomented by the regime apparatus and the reactionary press (Preston 1990:179–180). The active role

²⁴Orgaz died in 1946, Queipo de Llano, Varela in 1951, Yagüe, Monasterio, Ponte in 1952 and Solchaga in 1953 (Preston 1990:85–108, 142).

²⁵The classical verses from Calderón de la Barca: 'Here the most fundamental exploit is to obey, and the way how it should be is without requesting or refusing ...' became the motto of the Army. The exaggerated value conceded to discipline can be perceived in the Francoist military doctrine.

²⁶For Vigón, the military oath was similar to a 'military sacrament' (Vigón 1956 [1950]:149). The ideal is that of the Catholic soldier, similar the Spanish soldiers fighting in the religious wars in the middle ages and in the XVII century. In the same direction points the highly influential ideologist of Falange, José Antonio Primo de Rivera who defended the unavoidable connection between religion and military life (Primo de Rivera 1971 [1934]:333).

²⁷See for instance the interview with Lieutenant General Jesus Gonzalez del Yerro (Mérida 1979:135–135).

²⁸For instance General Kindelán in 1943 asked the military not to accept a 'passive' approach to discipline but to adopt an 'active discipline' according to which they should wish to receive orders from their superiors. He continued that the type of passive discipline led the French Army to the defeat in 1940 and that he preferred the sort of indiscipline evidenced in May 1808 against the pro-Napoleonic government or in July 1936 against the Republican government. Kindelán, through a rhetorical exercise, was asking for a move against Franco (Kindelán 1981:125).

played by the armed forces in Francoist indoctrination and propaganda campaigns made them especially vulnerable and acquiescent to these types of control tools. The new generation of officers that in the 1960s took over senior positions in the armed forces meant a radicalisation of the ideology. The new generals had always been subordinated to Franco and had never considered him as 'a primus inter pares' as some of the older generals had. For these new generals Franco had always been the supreme leader. They were extremely obedient and loyal to Franco and had been strongly influenced by Franco's propaganda especially during the 1940s (Cardona 2001:213).

The ideological military cohesion was fostered by their gradual divorce from society at large. There was little ideological evolution in the Francoist army, which became more insulated in a changing society (Preston 1990:134). Several factors had favoured this isolation: their elitism, social endogamy, self-recruitment, military housing, separation of education and work from civilians, a ritualised system of values and territorial uprooting (Busquets 1984 [1971]). According to the social origin the Francoist Military were the most, or at least among the most, elitist in the world (Olmeda 1988:290–292). The provision of housing for the families reinforced the esprit de corps but also stimulated the endogamy in the officers corps. According to Payne, from 1961–1963, 70% of the new officer candidates were sons of other officers. That was a higher percentage than in any other western country (Payne 1967:448). Fifty percent of the officers married the daughters of other officers (Preston 1990:179–180). Thus peer pressure was strong and the Armed Forces in Spain were fundamentally united in support of Franco and his regime.

6.2.6 The final years of the regime

Despite the great degree of cohesiveness and support for Franco, during the last years of the regime, two different groups of military began to stand out. On the one hand the 'liberal' or 'reformist' group of military primarily concerned with the professionalisation and modernisation of the armed forces. On the other hand there was a reactionary group, the 'bunker', which favoured a praetorian view of the state and was preoccupied with the prolongation of the dictatorial regime after the death of Franco. This was a more powerful group that dominated the senior ranks of the armed forces through the former Blue Division combatants, 'Generales Azules', and the secret services.²⁹

The military cooperation with the US and NATO³⁰ convinced some officers that change and modernisation of military methods and doctrine were necessary (Puell de la Villa 1997; Fernández López 1998). As in Portugal, the international exchanges had created a sense of non-conformism in some sectors of the military. For instance some of the prominent liberal military that later promoted reforms such as Manuel Díaz Alegría, Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado

²⁹Generals Alfonso Pérez Viñeta, Tomás García Rebull, Carlos Iniesta Cano, Ángel Campano López were considered part of the bunker. Some secret service officers such Colonel José Ignacio San Martín and Colonel Federico Quintero were later involved in the reactionary 23F coup attempt in 1981 (Preston 1990:153, 156–158).

³⁰Although Spain was not a member, the country began to collaborate with NATO to the extent that the Navy can be considered *facto* integrated in the alliance after 1963 (Olmeda 1988:153).

and Sabino Fernández Campo, had participated in the negotiations with the US in the early 1950s and later in the renewal of the agreements in the late 1960s.³¹

In parallel to the moderate liberalising socio-economic reforms in the 1960s and early 1970s some changes were introduced in the armed forces. However these were not as fundamental as the liberal military had expected. The unification of the three branches that had become a request from military scholars and from within higher education system was not undertaken (Salas López 1974:250–251). In the 1970s, the armed forces and especially the Army continued to have poor salaries and equipment and many officers were confined to administrative tasks (Olmeda 1988:251). Although in the government the military ministries had fought against the reduction of the military budgets, the more influential technocrats managed to convince Franco of the opposite. The Army did not benefit from the economic boom the Spanish economy experienced during the 1960s. Still, the priority of many officers was the continuation of the authoritarian regime rather than enhancing the operational capacity of the armed forces.

This scenario did not considerably reduce the support for the regime. The ‘Matesa’ corruption scandal in 1969, that tainted the reputation of the technocrats in the government, as well as the increasing ETA terrorist attacks, whose most important action was the assassination of the PM Carrero Blanco in 1973 contributed to the radicalisation of the hardliners who publicly expressed the need to reinforce authority in Spain. The extreme right exerted pressures to secure the dominance of reactionaries among the top tiers of the administration and questioned the attempts to modernise the political system.³²

Finally the Carnations Revolution in Portugal in 1974 inspired the Democratic Military Union, ‘UMD’. Founded in summer 1974, the UMD was a clandestine group of officers that sought for a reorganisation and democratisation of the armed forces and the end of the authoritarian regime. The UMD wanted to provoke a ‘pronunciamiento’ similar to the contemporary military rebellions of Portugal, Greece and Abyssinia or nineteenth-century Spain in order to force a transition to democracy (Fortes and Otero 1983:236–238). Although UMD reveals the existence of liberal ideology within the ranks, the fall of UMD in 1975 and the severe punishment suffered by its members indicates the supremacy of the reactionary views in the Spanish Armed Forces that after the death of Franco complicated the transition to democracy. The ‘liberal’ military championed the reforms of the armed forces, which also affected many of the tools of control. However, these were to a great extent slowed down by the ‘reactionaries’ and many of them took place several years after the death of Franco (Chapters 7, 8).

³¹ See Viñas (1981) and documents on the negotiations conducted by Díaz Alegria with the US in 1968 and 1969 (FNFF, documents 19413, 19149, 19311, 19312, 19313, 19423, 20343). Fernández Campo had studied in the US.

³² For instance the campaign against the modernisation attempts of Arias Salgado, called the Gironazo (28/4/1974) that ended up with the dismissal of some ‘progressive’ ministers and influential civil servants (Preston 1990:173).

6.3 Transition and Democracy

6.3.1 Suárez's governments

The socio-economic modernisation in the 1960s and early 1970s can be considered the main accomplishment of the Francoist regime but also an important factor for its demise. Spain had become an urbanised and industrialised country that attracted tourists and foreign capital. By the time of Franco's death, there was a majoritarian belief in Spanish civil society of the necessity of a democratic political system. Spanish political elites, including the clandestine opposition parties and members of Francoist administration, with the support of intellectual and economic elites launched a transition into a western-type pluralistic democratic system (Viñas 1999:246–247). The Spanish transition was not the result of a military intervention as those of Portugal and Greece. It was basically a civilian led process, initiated by pressures from inside the regime and its apparatus (Fishman 1990; Linz et al. 1995).

Franco died on 20 November 1975 leaving King Juan Carlos as his heir and head of state and Carlos Arias Navarro as prime minister. Social and political contestation and the inability to conduct the reforms forced Arias Navarro's resignation.³³ In July 1976, the King appointed Adolfo Suárez as Prime Minister. Suárez, a former general secretary of the single party, became a key figure who launched and conducted the main political reforms that led Spain into democracy. His party, Democratic Centre Union (UCD) won the first two democratic general elections since 1936, in June 1977 and March 1979.

The military who continued to be loyal to Francoist principles (Aguilar Olivencia 1999: 440) did not fully endorse the political reforms nor participated in the core decisions during the transition. The military were persuaded that Franco's appointed successor, Juan Carlos, was the safeguard for the continuity of the regime and initially accepted a secondary role in the reforms (Agüero 1995:43, 61–62). Once the King and Suárez's Government showed commitment to a profound democratisation process, military discontent grew and subordination weakened. The military that had considered themselves for decades as guardian of Francoist traditions and national values (Blanco Ande 1987:212) thus became the main threat for the transition to democracy.

Several factors contributed to military unrest. Some of the structural problems were inherited from Francoism. For instance, officers were insufficiently qualified, badly paid and subject to a system of promotion based almost exclusively on seniority. There was an abnormal abundance of high ranking officers, a scarcity of material means, a territorial distribution similar to that of an army of occupation and strong isolation within Spanish society.³⁴ Nonetheless, the military generally did not blame the dictatorship for their problems. Most of them, even the reformists, continued to feel admiration for Franco (Gutiérrez Mellado and Picatoste 1983:49–58). The tolerance displayed for the structural problems during the dictatorship disappeared during UCD's governments.

³³See Preston (1986), Powell (1991) and interview with Antonio Garrigues (FOG, 4/10/1984, cassette J9).

³⁴See Viñas (1988:153–154) and Bañón (1988:342). The excess of officers can be attributed to the preparation for the Sahara conflict that accelerated the training period for the cadets in 1975 (Fernández López 1998:88–90; Serra 2008:119).

A series of decisions and incidents throughout the transition period contributed to military dissatisfaction and complicated civil-military relations. First, the evacuation of the Spanish Sahara protectorate that concluded in February 1976 was a setback for military pride (Alonso Baquer 1978:170–172). Second, the Political Reform Act meant the legal self-dissolution of the regime, to the extent that it was termed as the political ‘harakiri’ of Francoism. Although half of the military representatives in the Cortes voted against this Political Reform Act (Sánchez Navarro 1990:23), it obtained a landslide majority in the Cortes (November 1976) and in the subsequent referendum (December 1976).³⁵ The majority considered Francoist principles and laws as immutable, and therefore considered the Act as treason, putting some generals in a state of ‘total dissonance’ with the reforms launched by the transitional governments.³⁶

Third, the legalisation of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) during Easter 1977 was considered as a betrayal by many senior generals. The formal objection of the Higher Council of the Army and the protest memorandum addressed to the king co-signed by several lieutenant-generals (Játiva conspiracy) evidenced military discontent.³⁷ Fourth, the restoration of the Catalan regional government ‘Generalitat’ in September 1977 and the ongoing decentralisation process, initiated with the approval of the autonomy statutes of the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia and Andalusia in referenda between 1979 and 1980, was seen by the military as a threat to the unity of Spain. Finally after the death of Franco, the growing spiral of terrorist violence by ETA, GRAPO and other groups reached its peak in 1980 with 91 attacks and 124 persons assassinated (Reinares 1990:272–295). The military were priority targets. For instance, of those killed by ETA between 1976 and 1986, 89.7% were professional military or policemen (Agüero 1995:143).

Suárez, aware of the risks that some military represented, had appointed the liberal General Gutiérrez Mellado as deputy prime minister (1976–1981). Gutiérrez Mellado who also became the first defence minister of democracy (1977–1979) launched a series of reforms that aimed at the modernisation and professionalisation of the armed forces as a means to counter the influence of the reactionary ‘bunker’ and to consolidate military subordination.³⁸ These reforms were reflected in many different types of control tools (Chapter 8). The government created new coordination bodies such as the Board of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JUJEM) and the Defence Ministry (1977). A new legal framework was enacted to regulate the armed forces, including several important articles in the democratic Constitution (1978), the Organic Law 6/1980 which regulated the basic criteria of National Defence and military organisation as well as the Organic Law 9/1980, which reformed the Code of Military Justice (Ballbé 1983; Rodrigo 1992:69).

Although the UCD government had set the process of normalisation of civil-military relations in motion, its reforms were widely criticised, considered incomplete and proved to be

³⁵ 425 votes for, 59 against and 13 abstentions in the Cortes 94% in favour in the referendum.

³⁶ Interview with Antonio Garrigues (FOG, 4/10/1984, cassette J9bis).

³⁷ See Bañón (1988:342). Suárez had promised in a meeting with the top generals that this legalisation would never happen under his rule (Iniesta Cano 1986:16; Preston 1986:97, 115). Nonetheless others doubt that this promise was explicitly made (Interview with General José Miguel Vega Rodríguez, FOG 14/10/1986, cassette J19).

³⁸ See Powell (2001:258–262) and interview with former Presidency and Education Minister José Manuel Otero Novas (FOG, 17/1/1985, cassette J1).

insufficient to consolidate civilian supremacy (Serra 1986:175; Navajas Zubeldia 1995:183–188). Due to the strong military opposition, the changes eventually implemented at the level of control toolkit were not as decisive as Suárez's government had initially wanted. For instance, the new legal framework left room for an ambiguous interpretation concerning the chain of command (Puell de la Villa 2005:236). Honour Trials or the Francoist formula of oath to the flag were not abolished, conscientious objection was not regulated and the promotion of reactionary officers opposed to the government and reforms continued (Busquets and Losada, 2003:135–144). In addition, the problems with the implementation of some of the norms also had a negative impact on military subordination. The practice often did not follow the formal principles (Ballbé 1983:469–488). Although the Constitution of 1978 established that military justice was limited to strict martial matters such as indiscipline, insubordination, sedition or desertion, the military courts often exceeded their functions by judging civilians. Military courts also imposed soft sentences on those responsible for aggressive police repression or anti-democratic actions. UCD governments failed to persuade the armed forces of the necessity of reforms and were too permissive with anti-democratic attitudes (Busquets and Losada 2003:138).

Finally, the socio-economic and political problems that Suárez's government encountered became an additional source of military discontent and an alibi for potential intervention. The UCD government failed to solve the enormous economic problems fostered by the second oil crisis in 1979. The crisis affected the manufacturing industry and the banking system, increased unemployment and the public deficit and constrained military budgets (Powell, 2001:259, 268). Suárez's Government ruled in minority and had to face strong opposition, not only from rival parties (PSOE, PCE, AP), but also from within the UCD (Hopkin 1999:225–231). The growing discontent in the Spanish society and armed forces and the political pressures resulted in Suárez's resignation in January 1981.

6.3.2 Anti-government plots

Initially Suárez underestimated the threat posed by the military. He believed that their sense of discipline and legalism would prevent them from interfering in politics (Fernández López 2000:17). Suárez's government carefully launched the major political reforms scrupulously respecting the framework of Francoist legality so that the military could not question them.³⁹ However, most military rejected the advent of democracy and adopted an attitude of passive resistance towards liberalisation.⁴⁰ The dominance of the reactionary generals opposed to the reforms and the discrepancies between the more liberal ones weakened civilian supremacy.⁴¹ Some military even questioned the legitimacy of the government that had allegedly betrayed

³⁹See Armed Forces and Military Consolidation workshop organised by Powell and Bañón (FOG, 25/4/1988, cassette CF1).

⁴⁰Interview with Lieutenant General José Vega Rodríguez (FOG, 14/10/86, cassette J19).

⁴¹Although a group of reformist generals held important positions during the transition, such as Generals Díez Alegria, Gutiérrez Mellado, Ibáñez Freire, Saenz de Santamaría or Fernández Campos, the conservative generals still predominated; for instance, De Santiago, Iniesta Cano, Campano, Coloma Gallegos, Milans del Bosch or Pita da Veiga. Moreover there was even a division among the liberal or reformist military, for instance General Vega Rodríguez resigned as JEME due to discrepancies with Gutiérrez Mellado (Interview with Lieutenant General José Miguel Vega Rodríguez, FOG, 14/10/1986, cassette J19). From the beginning, Juan Carlos feared the military bunker (Interview with José María de Areilza, FOG, 13/9/1984, cassette J8).

some of the principles agreed upon before initiating the process of transformation (Cardona 2001:261–262). The high degree of military autonomy and the permissiveness vis-à-vis the reactionary propaganda and acts of indiscipline (Chapter 8 Section 8. 4) instilled anti-government activity.⁴² During the transition and early years of democracy several conspiracies and military plots took place.

After Franco's death the 'bunker' had begun to organise large-scale strategic actions to sabotage the political reforms and to promote a military intervention. Extreme right newspapers such 'El Alcazar', 'El Imparcial' and 'Reconquista' and magazines such as 'Fuerza Nueva' or 'Servicio' fuelled military discontent. Their discourse constantly stressed the necessity of military autonomy vis-à-vis political power and their role as keepers of the public order against the 'internal enemy'. These publications projected a pessimistic vision of Spain, denouncing the government's 'civil praetorianism', the dissolution of the unity of Spain, terrorist impunity, degradation of moral values and the planned destruction of the Military establishment. The government failed to assess the impact of the bunker propaganda among the ranks (Preston 1990:194).

The extreme right also committed acts of violence against left-wing students, workers, bookstores and even clergymen and more moderate conservatives⁴³ For instance, the assassinations of five people in a law firm linked to left-wing unions in Madrid in January 1977 tried to provoke a violent reaction from the left and to escalate the violence, which would have legitimised a military intervention. The terrorist attacks of ETA and GRAPO were instrumentalised by reactionary groups. Funerals of Civil Guards or military officers assassinated by terrorist groups were used to hail radical positions and calls to resist the reforms (Gutiérrez Mellado and Picatoste 1983:107–114). The acts of military indiscipline against the government became recurrent.⁴⁴ Moreover, after the bad results of the extreme right parties in the first elections in June 1977, the military bunker realised that maintaining the regime would only be possible through non-constitutional means. Hard-line generals discussed the possibility of pushing Juan Carlos to establish a stronger government and even a military coup.⁴⁵

The government miscalculated the level of discontent within the Armed Forces and the capacity of the bunker to organise a military coup. The lack of sanctions to overt antidemocratic attitudes within the ranks had reinforced the bunker's conviction of the likelihood of success of a military intervention.⁴⁶ According to the Foreign Affairs minister Areilza, during the transition there was a state 'permanent military conspiracy'.⁴⁷ The first important coup attempt was the 'Operación Galaxia',⁴⁸ which was planned for the 17 November 1978 in or-

⁴²The severe sanctions imposed on the UMD, whose members were expelled from the armed forces which shows the extent of this reactionary trend in the armed forces (Preston 1990:183–191; Reinlein 2002). UMD was dismantled and all its members imprisoned while the acts of indiscipline by hardliners, that had become very common during the transition, were seldom censored.

⁴³For instance, the violent attack to the traditional Carlist pilgrimage to Montejurra (9/5/1976) (Cardona 2001:267–268).

⁴⁴See interview with Lieutenant General José Miguel Vega Rodríguez (FOG, 14/10/1986, cassette J19)

⁴⁵Civilians, such as José Antonio Girón de Velasco, Blas Piñar, García Carrés or Utrera Molina, also collaborated with military hardliners.

⁴⁶The government dispensed a 'kid-glove treatment' to the military; the lack of punishment of radical attitudes ended up facilitating military conspiracies (Preston 1990:161).

⁴⁷Interview with José María de Areilza (FOG, 13/9/1984, cassette J8bis).

⁴⁸'Galaxia' was the name of the coffee-shop where the plot was planned.

der to prevent the Constitutional Referendum on 6 December 1978. It took advantage of the absence of the King, the Defence Minister and many senior officers that were out of Madrid on that date. However, the secret services informed the government of the attempt. The leaders of the plot Lieutenant-Colonel of the Civil Guard Tejero and Captain of Police Ynestillas were arrested. Although the government tried to play down the importance of the incident as an isolated act of subversion the fact that many military were aware of the plot and did not denounce it meant that military loyalty to the government was not assured anymore (Ballbé 1983:472–473; Preston 1990:197–198; Busquets and Losada 2003:139).

Another attempt was aborted in 1979. The Armoured Division (DAC) located in Madrid was the key to control the capital. The DAC had become a bastion of reactionary ideas due to the influence of the reactionary Generals Milans del Bosch and Torres Rojas. In 1979, under the command of the latter some unauthorised manoeuvres simulated the seizure of Madrid. Apparently Torres Rojas was plotting to take control of the Presidential Palace of Moncloa with the help of the Parachutist Brigade stationed in Torrejón and later use the DAC to control the city. The coup was delayed due to insufficient supply of ammunition and fuel which would have risked the operation. Eventually the government demoted Torres Rojas (Preston 1990:200).

The 23F coup on 23 February 1981 was the most important attempt and had a stronger impact. A group of Civil Guards hijacked the congress during the investiture session of the new Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo following Suárez's resignation. The act was being broadcasted live by the television. Some officers such as General Milans del Bosch and Colonels Tejero and San Martín had planned a Turkish or Chilean-style coup followed by draconian measures. On the other hand, General Alfonso Armada preferred a coup along the lines of De Gaulle's. Armada sought to take advantage of the situation resulting from the Milans and Tejero violent coup in order to force the king to approve the introduction of a Government of National Salvation that would be headed by Armada himself.⁴⁹ Thanks to the action of the King, the royal military household, the political parties and some loyal military, the coup failed and the plotters were incarcerated (Preston 1986; 1990:176–177; Medina 2006).

The failure of the 23F had a great impact on civil-military relations. The coup attempt shocked Spanish civil society which for the most part was unaware of the extent of the military threat. Moreover the coup was covered live by the radio the TV, which amplified its impact. Spanish society reacted strongly against the plot. The behaviour of the plotters during the coup and their trials embarrassed most military and became a tipping point in the political influence of the bunker and its ascendancy within the ranks (Preston 2004:498). Calvo Sotelo's government undertook some important measures concerning military subordination. It was the first government not to include any military member and to appoint civilians to top positions in the ministry of defence.⁵⁰ It reinforced the intelligence services CESID, appealed against a military court's 'soft' sentences of the 23F conspirators and signed NATO member-

⁴⁹Not only ideological but also personal reasons triggered this plot. Many senior officers disliked some of the military appointments made by the government. For instance, General Gabeiras Montero claims that Milans del Bosch's participation in 23F coup was mainly due to Gabeiras's appointment as JEME (Interview in FOG, 15/12/87, cassette J32bis).

⁵⁰Eduardo Serra as Undersecretary of Defence and Jesús Palacios as Secretary General of Economic Affairs.

ship (Agüero 1995:176). However the consolidation of military subordination continued to be an issue during Calvo Sotelo's mandate.

The 'Manifesto of the Hundred' signed by 100 officers on December 1981 in defence of the 23F plotters and against military subordination to civilian rule was a new sign of contestation. Conspiracy groups such as the 'Unión Militar Española' (UME) continued to operate. Finally a hard-line coup seeking to prevent the elections of October 1982, 'Operación Cervantes', was aborted (Bañón 1988:342; Busquets and Losada 2003:145, 159–166). Although some of the plotters' claims and fears were shared by the majority of the military, overall the armed forces had stopped endorsing insurgency. Many top rank officers during transition had fought in the Civil War and were preoccupied with the idea of a new bloodshed during the transition. Other younger officers had not fought the war but had lost their parents during the conflict and shared those concerns (Barrachina 2002:389). Finally, the socialist party, PSOE, won the general elections and took over government without any further military interference. This peaceful transfer of power can be considered as the end of the military threat and the culmination of the transitional process (Linz and Stepan 1996:108).

6.3.3 The First socialist government

The landslide victory of Felipe González in October 1982 elections granted his government the legitimacy and a solid parliamentary majority to conduct fundamental reforms. The government restructured and liberalised the economy, developed the autonomous communities' territorial model, negotiated the membership to EEC, introduced some education and social reforms and, most importantly, profound transformations in the defence and military policies. This was the first left-wing government in more than four decades, and paradoxically it suffered much lower contestation to its reforms than the previous centre-right UCD governments. The growing popular support for democracy reinforced military subordination to the government (Danopoulos 1991:36). Even among conservative voters, those supporting democracy were a majority.⁵¹ This new context enabled the government to implement the necessary in-depth changes in the control toolkit to ensure military subordination (Chapter 8, 10).

Narcís Serra, an economist and former mayor of Barcelona, was appointed Defence Minister.⁵² Serra spent his first year in office analysing the Ministry and the armed forces and designing a plan to increase centralisation and strengthen the power of the government vis-à-vis the military as a requisite for further reform and modernisation (Agüero 1995:188). González and Serra, conscious that ideological change within the ranks was not achievable in the short-term, concentrated their efforts on obtaining material obedience and on developing a regulatory framework aiming at profound transformations in the long-term. They approved a set of reforms that eliminated the ambiguity introduced by the UCD governments the interpretation of which had led the military to enjoy an excessive level of autonomy (Comas and Mandeville 1986:148).

⁵¹The percentage of people preferring democracy to any other form of government rose from 49% in 1980 to 69% in 1984 (Gunther et al. 2004:163–164).

⁵²He was the fourth Defence Minister of the democracy and third civilian that occupied this position after Agustín Rodríguez Sahagún (1979–1981) and Aberto Oliart (1981–1982).

The reforms launched by the first socialist government were far-reaching and served to consolidate civilian supremacy.⁵³ The Organic Law of Defence 1/1984 that replaced the Law 6/1980 unambiguously stated the supremacy of the Prime Minister and centralised powers in the hands of the Defence Minister, who became an active player in international relations, the link with the Parliament, in charge of arbitrating conflicts of interest and budgets within the armed forces (Serra 2008:107–108). The command of the King as Chief of the Armies became basically symbolic. In order to improve coordination the position of Chief of the Joint Staff (JEMAD) was created and hierarchically subordinated to the Defence Minister. The reforms also tackled the ‘brutal excess of personnel’ that compromised most of defence budgets for personnel costs hindering military modernisation⁵⁴ and rejuvenated the Army, which during transition had the oldest average officer corps in the world. The socialist government reinforced the policies of early retirement initiated by Calvo Sotelo’s government in 1981, planning a 20% reduction of the officers (Comas and Mandeville 1986:151). Other important measures were the regulation of the military service (Law 19/1984), the introduction of conscientious objection (Law 48/1984), the homologation of benefits with those of the civil administration (Laws 20/1984 and 40/1984) and the separation of the armed forces and the State Security Forces, National Police and Civil Guard (Law 2/1986) (Chapter 8 Section 8.4).

The consolidation of civilian supremacy was facilitated by Spain’s integration into NATO. After several years of negotiation, Spain officially became a member on 30 May 1982. The military welcomed this decision.⁵⁵ The Navy, which collaborated closely with NATO, was especially keen on Spanish membership but the support to NATO was also majoritarian in the Air Force and the Army.⁵⁶ González, who as leader of the opposition had previously been opposed to NATO, understood its importance with regard to military subordination and changed his discourse to the extent that, in 1986, PSOE was the main defender of the ‘yes’ in referendum that confirmed NATO membership. NATO doctrine justified changes in the territorial organisation and strategic planning of the armed forces, a growing presence of civilian personnel in the Defence Ministry and increases in defence budgets.

Overall, the reforms by the first socialist government meant a reinforcement of the Defence Ministry and a centralisation and modernisation of the processes of defence management (Agüero 1995:190–203). These reforms were inspired by NATO templates and involved all categories and subcategories of control tools (Chapter 8). They were more profound than those attempted by UCD governments.⁵⁷ The military cooperated with these reforms because they were concerned with the future of the armed forces and individual prerogatives rather than because they fully endorsed democratic values (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986:24–25). General adherence to democratic values was not a precondition for the success of this transition but an outcome of a longer period of adaptation (Rustow 1970:361–363). Probably the clearest expression of the success of the PSOE government was the changing nature of military

⁵³See interview with General Saez de Tejada (FOG, 17/11/87, cassette J25bis) and with Admiral Liberal Lucini (FOG, 27/11/87, cassette J27).

⁵⁴Interview with JEME, Lieutenant-General José Gabeiras Montero (FOG, 15/12/87, cassette J32).

⁵⁵For instance, all members of the Council of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in favour of the incorporation into NATO (Interview with former President of JUJEM Lieutenant General Ignacio Alfaro Arregui, FOG, 18/12/87, cassette J33bis).

⁵⁶Although especially in the Army some officers feared that NATO would diminish the traditional weight of the Army (Interview with the first JEMAD Admiral Liberal Lucini, FOG, 4/12/87, cassette J30).

⁵⁷Interview with Admiral Liberal Lucini (FOG, 20/11/87, cassette J27bis).

discontent (Agüero 1995:214). Protests now came from specific problems found during the implementation of the reforms, such as promotions and career patterns, bureaucratic excess or preferential treatment of some units, and from structural deficiencies. With the exception of a plot by a small group of hardliners to assassinate the King and some members of the government during a military parade in La Coruña in 1985, quickly unveiled by the secret services, no further serious challenge was posed to civilian supremacy. By 1986, most military had realised that the catastrophic predictions of the defenders of authoritarianism had proved exaggerated and Spain was better off under democracy.

6.4 Summary

Spain experienced processes of political transformations during the twentieth century that were similar and parallel to those of Portugal. Nonetheless, the evolution of Spanish civil-military relations was very different. The Spanish Armed Forces were more cohesive and submissive to the dictator than the Portuguese ones. During the Civil War the Spanish Armed Forces had been purged. For the rest of the dictatorship the military became strong supporters of Franco and his regime. He concentrated more power in his hands than Salazar and never saw his authority seriously threatened internally. The regime suffered an embargo and insulation from the international arena until the early 1950s, however, it never faced an external challenge of the scale of Portuguese Colonial Wars. Thus, Franco did not have to be so concerned with military intervention and moreover the basic control resources available were not depleted in the same way than the Estado Novo's (Chapters 3, 4).

After the death of Franco the situation changed drastically. The military, very critical the political democratic reforms undertaken by the Suárez's governments, withdrew their support and became a growing threat. The UCD governments faced several different socio-economic and political problems, which limited their resources and capacity to undertake action. However, the defeat of the military plots, in particular the 23F coup in 1981, and the landslide PSOE victory in 1982 again changed the civil-military relations in Spain. The reactionary military plotters were discredited and the armed forces understood that the democracy was irreversible. Moreover the electoral results and the socio-economic and political reforms granted the first Gonzalez's government legitimacy and capacity to undertake the actions required for the consolidation of military subordination.

Chapters 7 and 8 show that tool choices also reflected the specific circumstances in Spain in terms of civil-military relations. There were clear discrepancies in tool choice vis-à-vis Portugal and also different uses of the toolkit according to time periods.

7 Francoist tools of government

7.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the tools that the Francoist regime utilised to keep the military subordinated. Many of these tools were similar to those observed during the Estado Novo (Chapter 4). However there are some fundamental discrepancies concerning the intensity or salience of some types of tools that contribute to rejecting the hypothesis of the existence of a common ‘authoritarian’ style of control in both countries.

Table 12 summarises the fundamental features of the Francoist control toolkit developed in this chapter. It suggests that the first period of the regime (1936–1945) was characterised by a very intensive use of coercive *organisation* (Section 7.2.1) and inquisitorial *nodality* detectors (Section 7.3.2). Repression was much stronger than in Portugal. However, after the thorough purges in the armed forces and coinciding with the fall of the Axis in Europe, Franco changed his stance on military subordination. The use of courts-martial, imprisonments and executions decreased. Moreover (unlike in the Estado Novo), the paramilitary militias were banned and the use of the secret services to spy the military was kept at low levels. Rather than punishments and inquisitorial surveillance, the regime sought to maintain military loyalty through rewards and incentives. Franco trusted ‘his’ armed forces and adopted a softer control approach. The scarcity of *treasure* (Section 7.5) was compensated with *organisation*, *nodality* and *authority* rewards. For instance the regime provided services, jobs and goods to the military and their families (Section 7.2.2); ideological gratifications through propaganda, laudatory speeches and censorship (Section 7.3.1); promotions, special functions in the regime apparatus and high degree of lenience with the military that did not follow a professional conduct (Section 7.4.1). Franco’s governments utilised organisational design following a ‘divide-and-rule’ logic to prevent the emergence of any figure or group with the capacity to defy his power. Military education and training were never a central concern and the impulse to professionalisation and modernisation of skills and procedures reached Spain late, in the 1960s (Section 7.2.2). These features contrast with the Portuguese case, where the NATO influence during the 1950s had produced an emergence of defence coordination bodies, such as the Defence Ministry and the CEMGFA, and important reforms in military education and training (Chapter 4 Section 4.2.2). The recourse to *treasure* was minimal. Military salaries were low in general and until the 1970s the equipment was scarce and obsolete (Section 7.5).

Table 12: Summary of tools of government during Francoism (1936–1975)

Tools	Trajectory	
Organisation	<p><i>Coercive</i> (Section 7.2.1): Summary executions, courts martial, prisons until mid-1940s. Paramilitary militias were not allowed and the security forces were controlled by the Army and not used as a check on the military</p> <p><i>Non-coercive</i> (Section 7.2.2): Formal military education and training. Exchanges with the US Armed Forces</p> <p>Organisational design following a 'divide-and-rule' logic</p> <p>Provision of services and goods to the military and their families. Provision of jobs in the public administration</p>	Very intensive utilisation from 1936 to 1945, then essentially abandoned
	Reintroduced in 1940. Until late 1950s military exercises were rare and the military education served to instil Francoist values	
	Emphasis on professionalism and development of modern skills fostered from the 1960s	
	Stable	
	Very important during the post-war period. Declining from the 1960s	
Nodality	<p><i>Information effectors</i> (Section 7.3.1): Propaganda and censorship. Intensive use of public speeches, media and specialised publications praising Franco, increasing the status of the military and diverting the attention away from the scarcity of resources</p> <p><i>Information detectors</i> (Section 7.3.2): Many different intelligence services collected information about the military (such as SIPM, 'Tercera del Alto', Brigade for Social Investigation, SIP and SECED).</p> <p>Friendship networks within the military</p>	Very intensive throughout the regime
	Very important during the war and decreased afterwards. The information services were fragmented and intensive espionage on the military was avoided. Centralisation and increase in salience in the 1970s.	
	Important throughout the regime.	
Authority	<p><i>Rewards and incentives</i> (Section 7.4.1): Appointments of loyal officers to high responsibility positions in the state apparatus and armed forces</p> <p>Special powers granted to the military related to the maintenance of public order (judiciary and security forces)</p> <p>Tolerance with secondary employment and abuses of privileges</p> <p>Integration of militia fighters as permanent officers in the Armed Forces</p>	Very important throughout the regime, especially at the end of the Civil War.
	The powers of the military in the justice system decreased from the mid-1940s.	
	Decreased from the 1960s.	
	Very important at the end of the Civil War and after the Sidi-Ifni war.	
	Basically in the 1950s.	
	Stable	
	Important after the monarchic plots in the 1940s.	
	Stable	
Treasure	<p><i>Staff expenditure</i> (Section 7.5.2): Salary rises (often through extraordinary budget allocations) to compensate inflation and special circumstances that could provoke military unrest</p> <p>High salaries and benefits to reward loyalty of top-rank officers</p>	Low salience in the overall control strategy
	Stable	
	Low. The scarcity of equipment and military materials. From 1953, new equipment was introduced. However not in-depth modernisation efforts, the economic growth of the country was not matched by a similar increase in military expenditure.	
	Increasing in the 1970s	

7.2 Organisation

This section shows the evolution of *organisation* control tools during Francoism. The utilisation of coercive means such as imprisonments, summary trials and executions was central from the outbreak of the Civil War until the mid-1940s. Once the armed forces had been thoroughly purged, Franco drastically reduced the use of coercive *organisation* means to control the military. Among the non-coercive control tools, education and training were not central but increased their salience from the 1960s. Franco also used the institutional design of the armed forces with a divide-and-rule logic and the provision of goods, services and jobs, especially in the aftermath of the civil war when the complete state apparatus had to be reconstructed.

7.2.1 Coercive organisation

In Spain, imprisonments and executions were instruments of political cleansing within and outside the ranks. The penitentiary and judiciary became control tools at Franco's service. However from the mid-1940s the use of coercive *organisation* tools decreased rapidly. Security and paramilitary forces had a much smaller role than in Portugal. Franco knew that the use of these forces would be considered intrusive by the military and thus be counterproductive.

From 1936 to 1945, *organisation* was intensively used in a repressive manner by Franco's government on both civilians and the military. During the war, martial law was imposed and summary executions conducted frequently.¹ Tens of thousands were executed the goal was to eliminate the opposition to the regime within and outside the ranks (Payne 1967:409–420). There is no agreement on the exact number of people executed, partly because the official records were often destroyed to remove all evidence. The latest research by local historians estimates about 130,000 judiciary executions. To that figure it should be added about 50,000 people executed without even the of a trial (Preston 2006 [1986]:302). Beevor (2006:405) estimates 200,000 deaths, including the official executions, the random killings during the war and the deaths in prison. These figures exclude the killings in the Republican camp.

The judiciary and penitentiary systems were coercive *organisation* tools at the service of the government during and after the war. The High Court of Military Justice, from 1936, and later the Supreme Council of Military Justice, from 1939, undertook continuous ordinary and summary inquisitorial processes (Gonzalez Padilla 2002:156–158). Military courts counted on the complicity of important segments of the population (Anderson 2009). At the end of the war 300,000 soldiers were kept in concentration camps (Puell de la Villa 2005:212). Franco also punished many former members of the Republican Army forcing them to work in 'disciplinary battalions of worker-soldiers' (Preston 2006 [1986]:309). For instance, 90,000 prisoners were sent to 121 labour battalions and 8,000 to special military workshops (Beevor 2006:404).

The Law of Political Responsibilities launched on 9 February 1939 officially regulated repression after the war. After Franco's victory, around 20,000 people were executed (Preston 2011:17). The military that had served in the Republican camp were court martialed and

¹It seems that the rhythm of executions considerably decreased from 1941. See for instance, Solé i Sabaté (1985), Moreno Gómez (1987), Dueñas (1990).

when found innocent normally expelled from the armed forces (Cardona 2001:56). About 5,000 officers were purged (executed, imprison or exiled) after the end of the war (Preston 1990:179–180; Fernández López 1998:48). General Varela, Army Minister from 1939 to 1942, was especially central to the purges. He organised ‘Honour Trials’, expelled military, forced retirements, relocations and other types of administrative repressive means to purge the Army of any suspected Masonic, liberal or republican officer (Losada 1990:13; Cardona 2001:52).

Through these purges Franco managed to shape the armed forces, to the extent that ever since they were considered the ‘Francoist Armies’: a new institution almost completely disconnected from its immediate past as Armies of the Second Republic.²

Nonetheless by 1942 the coercive instruments of control of the regime began to show signs of overstretch. From 1939 to 1941, the Regional Courts of Political Responsibilities tried 38,055 cases but they had still 188,671 cases pending. Similarly the Military Courts had also over open 30,000 cases. Moreover, the number of prisoners greatly exceeded the normal capacity of the Spanish penitentiary system (Beevor 2006:404–405). At the beginning of the Second Republic, Spain had 12,574 prisoners. This number reached 270,710 prisoners in 1939. The number of prisoners decreased after the war but in 1942 there were still 124,423 inmates (Jordana and Ramió 2005:1023).

The government was forced to drop many cases and reduce the severity of punishments. The Law of Political Responsibilities was reformed and softened in 1942. The judiciary reform of 1942 reduced both the presence of the military in courts and the general levels of repression (Dueñas 1990:150–155) However, executions and long prison sentences continued until 1944 (Delgado 2005:31). A series of laws were launched to reduce the prison population (Gonzalez Padilla 2002:1960). The number of inmates dropped to 43,812 in 1945 and then continued to decrease gradually so that in the 1960s, Spain reached levels similar to those of the beginning of the Second Republic (Jordana and Ramió 2005:1023). The Law of Political Responsibility was finally revoked in 1945 but only in 1966 were the people condemned under this Law amnestied and liberated (Dueñas 1990:158).

Thus, Franco had stretched to its limits the capacity of the penitentiary and judiciary systems. Moreover the Armed Forces had been purged completely so the government decided to reduce the utilisation of coercive *organisation* tool on the armed forces.

Finally, unlike many other authoritarian regimes in the twentieth century, such as Salazar’s, Tito’s or Mussolini’s, Franco’s government did not use the civilian paramilitary forces to control the military. The paramilitary militias Falangist (fascist) and Carlist (conservative traditionalist) that had played an important role during the war were unified and placed under military command in April 1937 and disarmed in July 1944. Even during the war military officers were used to control the militia battalions rather than the other way around. Many military officers disliked Falange’s pro-Axis and anti-monarchic views. Any attempt to use Falange militias as a check on the military would have produced unrest within the ranks.

²This idea remained entrenched even after the end of the regime. For instance Lieutenant General Sáenz de Tejada in an interview (17/11/1987) speaks of ‘an Army born from a military victory in 1939’, ‘a new Army’ or ‘the Army of the victory’ (FOG, cassette J25).

The defence and security forces were the sole ones authorised to carry arms, and therefore the security forces were the unique organisational bodies that could develop any kind of coercive power to oppose the military. However the most important security forces, the Armed Police and the Civil Guard were militarised bodies in which most of the officers proceeded from the Army. There is no evidence showing that the paramilitary or police forces played any role countervailing the coercive power of the armed forces.

In brief, neither armed militias nor security forces were used as *organisation* deterrent tools against the Armed Forces. Thus from mid-1940s, the utilisation of the state *organisation* capacity in a coercive way on the military was practically nonexistent due to the saturation of the judiciary and penitentiary system and the completion of the purges within the ranks.

7.2.2 Non-coercive organisation

The most important non-coercive *organisation* tools in the Francoist regime were: formal military education which was used until the late 1950s primarily as a means of indoctrination; organisational design which followed a 'divide-and-rule' logic; and the provision of services, goods and jobs in the administration.

First, military instruction was part of the control strategy. Franco, who was a former director of the General Military Academy of Zaragoza, was aware of the impact of education in shaping military beliefs and attitudes. In 1940, the General Military Academy was re-opened and in 1943 the Navy Academy was transferred from San Fernando to Marín and the Air Force Academy was founded in San Javier. Military education gave prevalence to indoctrination of the regime's religious, moral and social values rather than to technology or strategy (Preston 1990:39). The Army Ministers Generals Varela (1939–1942), Asensio (1942–1945), Dávila (1945–1951) and Muñoz Grandes (1951–1957) strongly contributed to the indoctrination process and to the prioritisation of ideology in military education. General Barroso (1957–1962) tried to break that tradition.

After 1953, some young military officers spent long periods training and doing courses in the US and other Western countries, such as Germany, France and Italy. This helped introducing new ideas and a growing concern for military professionalism. On average 200 officers were trained by the US each year. The US Armed Forces became the doctrinal, tactical and organisational reference for the Spanish military (Platón 2001:109, 122–123; Barrachina 2002:229–230, 257–258). The impact on the Navy was particularly strong. The exchanges with these more modern and better organised armies, as well as, the Sidi-Ifni conflict served to highlight the severe deficiencies of the Spanish Armed Forces. The necessity of emphasising capacity and operational aspects over indoctrination became evident. The Army Minister General Barroso's reforms from 1958 were the first steps towards professionalisation. The size of the officers' corps was reduced, barracks were built away from cities and there was a much stronger effort to organise military manoeuvres (Payne 1967:446–447).

This initial impulse was followed by further reforms in military education in 1964 and 1973. The fundamental goal of these reforms was to increase the mutual knowledge among the different branches and to unify doctrine and procedures.³ In 1964, the Centre of National

³See for instance Decree-Laws 69/1964, 70/1964 and 528/1973.

Defence High Studies (CESEDEN) was created to coordinate the military academies and to develop a joint military doctrine and the education of military cadres.⁴ It was inspired by the encounters with foreign military education systems and its purpose was to modernise the Spanish Armed Forces. CESEDEN contributed to the process of convergence with Western standards and to shift from a doctrine of national security into that of national defence. The logic of the internal enemy lost prominence in military education (Agüero 1995:111–112, 279). The professional reforms and new roles adopted by the military during the transition were based on discussion and debates that took place in CESEDEN (Barrachina 2002:300–301). CESEDEN was also fundamental to bridge the gap between the military and civilians and to introduce ideas from other armies, especially the US. Following this growing concern about military education, the Higher School for Army Generals and the High Staff School for chiefs and officers were merged (1964), the Service of Operational Military Research (1965) and the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (1973) were established and the military curriculum was reformed to introduce academic standards in an effort to bring the military closer to society (1973) (Salas López 1974:209–214; Olmeda 1988:236).

In brief, the reforms in military education aimed to create institutions that served the government as non-coercive *organisation* instruments, initially to indoctrinate the military in Francoist values but later also to professionalise and modernise the armed forces.

Second, Franco also relied on organisational design to reinforce the subordination of the military. He had the capacity to shape the structure of the state apparatus, including the defence institutions, at his will. The division of the armed forces into three different ministries and that of the territory into many different military regions for each of the branches⁵ can be seen as an exercise of ‘divide-and-rule’ (Wheeler 1979b:199; Preston 1990:135). The Law of Re-organisation of the Central Administration of the State in 1939 produced the fragmentation of the National Defence Ministry into three different ministries directly subordinated to Franco. Thus, no military or civilian other than Franco could dominate the military institutions. Moreover, the scarce budgetary allocation to the inter-branch coordination body, the High General Staff, usually less than 1% of the military expenditure shows the weakness of this organ as a coordination instrument (Olmeda 1988:236). Franco never wanted to create any organ or position concentrating too much power nor did he want to eliminate the rivalries and jealousies among ministers (Puell de la Villa 2005:188, 231–232).

The multiplication of structures hampered coordination in the armed forces. This was revealed during the Sidi-Ifni conflict (1957–1958), which forced the creation of an inter-ministerial commission for the improvement of the organisation and coordination.⁶ Despite the coordination problems, the government preferred to maintain this structure and it was not until 1975 that a unified command for the Canary Islands was created. In sum Franco employed the organisational design as a control tool reinforcing his central power and preventing the rise of any alternative source of military leadership (Olmeda 1988:109).

⁴The CESEDEN, created by the Decree 70/1964 (16/1/1964) was responsible for prestigious courses such as EMACON and ALEMI.

⁵After the war, Spain was divided in eight military regions (Ministerial Order 4/7/1939). A ninth military region was later added (Order 22/2/1944). Spanish territorial waters were divided in 4 maritime zones (Organic Law 4/7/1970). Initially Spanish air space was divided in 5 air regions and 3 air zones (Decree 17/10/1940) but later reorganised into three air regions and one air zone (Decree 1/2/1968) (Guaita Martorell 1986).

⁶Ministerial Order 23/7/1957.

Third, Franco also used the machinery of the state as a tool. The provision of services and goods free of charge or at reduced prices for the military and their families compensated low salaries. Housing, transportation, education, health, food and medicine were provided for free or at reduced prices.⁷ This was an especially important privilege during the post-war period which characterised by the extreme poverty and high numbers of disabled veterans. Although most of these benefits were maintained until the end of the regime, the priority given by the technocratic governments to economic development restrained military budgets heavily affecting the provision of services and goods from the 1960s (Puell de la Villa 2008:198–243).

The provision of jobs in the public sector was another crucial tool for the co-optation of the military and fulfilled several purposes. Through the provision of jobs the regime rewarded loyalty while enabling the military an alternative source of remuneration, influence and prestige. It also helped improving control on the administration through strategic posting of loyal military and contributed to reducing the size and age of the officers' corps. The annihilation of the Republican Administration created an opportunity for the government. In 1937, 50% of the new civil service positions were reserved to those having fought in the Francoist Armed Forces⁸ and in 1939 that quota was increased up to 80%.⁹ From 1936 to 1945, 31.32% of the jobs in politics were occupied by military (Viver Pi-Sunyer 1978). Moreover Spanish security forces also became an important job destination for the military.¹⁰ The reforms aiming to reduce the size of the Army in the 1950s¹¹ meant the absorption of many reserve military officers by the central and local administrations (Busquets 1971:172–175). Finally, the development of a significant defence industry under the umbrella of the National Institute of Industry (INI) meant new job opportunities for many military and ex-military.¹² Although from the 1960s, it became gradually less acceptable for the military on active duty to undertake second jobs in the administration and to appoint military to the public sector, this practice persisted until the transition.

7.2.3 Conclusion

During the Francoist regime there was an evolution of the type of *organisation* tools used by the government to control the armed forces. It initially favoured coercive means on the military such as martial courts, imprisonments and summary executions. In Spain, there was a more intensive coercive component of control than in Portugal but its use quickly declined after the armed forces had been purged and the repression tools showed signs of saturation in the mid-1940s. Unlike Salazar and Caetano, Franco did not grant the security or paramilitary forces the function of controlling the military.

⁷Some officers resold products in the black market as a source of extra income (Payne 1967:435).

⁸Decree 12/3/1937.

⁹Law 25/8/1939.

¹⁰The officers in the Civil Guard came from the General Military Academy or the Infantry and Cavalry Corps and those of the Armed Police came from the latter (Olmeda 1988:139).

¹¹See Section 4.2.

¹²The INI (created in 1941) comprised among others the aeronautic industry CASA (set in 1942); the Shipyards 'Bazán' (1947); the weapon and ammunition company 'Santa Bárbara' (1960); the components industries 'Experiencias Industriales S.A.' and 'Empresa Nacional de Optica' (1960); and the research centre 'Instituto Nacional de Electrónica' (1965) (Daguzan 1982:116).

With regards of the non-coercive use of *organisation* tools for control purposes, the government used military education, the design of the military organisation and the capacity of the state to supply services, goods and jobs. Until the late 1950s, military education was mainly used as a control device prioritising the indoctrination of Francoist values the preparation of the military to the new modern requirements of warfare. After the contacts with the US Armed Forces and the Sidi-Ifni conflict, there was a gradual change aiming to modernise the education and develop professionalism and increase operational capacity. Organisational design was used according to a 'divide-and-rule' logic. The idea was to maintain internal competition and to preclude the concentration of power in any military figure that could challenge Franco's authority. Finally, the government provided goods, services and jobs to improve the well-being of the military and their families. The utilisation of the state organisational capacity for the provision of goods, services and jobs, was very important to increase military living standards and therefore their satisfaction with the regime. Although this supply function had its peak during the post-war and later gradually declined, it never stopped being important for the government's control strategy.

7.3 Nodality

The Francoist regime relied heavily on information manipulation tools such as propaganda and censorship to maintain the military under control. *Nodality* effectors were employed to exaggerate Franco's leadership, indoctrinate the military in the regime values and make them rationalise the poor material conditions in which they worked, overstate the threats Spain faced and hide inconvenient news and developments that could have undermined Franco's rule. *Nodality* detectors were important during and after the war to control civil society. However, they were not as intensively used to control the military. There were many different information services during the regime, but Franco, aware of the unrest that their use would create, avoided intensive espionage on the military. On the other hand, Franco's continuous personal interaction with the military constituted a valuable source of information and means to influence the military.

7.3.1 Information effectors

Franco's propaganda machinery was established during the Civil War and used initially to assert his leadership over other potential rivals. All the media were controlled by the government including the radio, the press, military publications and later the official cinema news report No-Do. Moreover, Franco and his government continuously used military speeches as information effector. Propaganda became a fundamental weapon in the Spanish Civil War, which is claimed to be the first war to have been photographed for a mass audience (Brothers 1997:2) and to have been instrumentalised by competing international powers (Wingate Pike 1968; Barrera 2006:3). The military were continuously exposed to it. Not only political parties and unions produced pamphlets and newspapers, most army corps, divisions or brigades also produced their own publications.¹³ Franco took advantage of this context to

¹³ Beevor (2006:248, 475–476) provides more than thirty examples from both camps.

consolidate his leadership. The media, the nationalist administration, Falange and even the Church excessively praised him as a military and political genius. Any comment against him could be considered as treason (Cardona 2001:39).

After the war, propaganda was used to increase the prestige of the armed forces and as a means to compensate their poor salaries and working conditions. The propaganda acclaimed the institutional values of the Spanish military such as discipline and courage, and stressed their past glories as imperial armies and the Civil War victors (Cardona 2001:119). The government instrumentalised the symbolic power of military achievements during the war. Annual military parades such as those of the 'Pascua Militar' (6 January), Day of the Victory (1 April), Day of the Uprising (18 July) and Day of the Caudillo (1 October) became ideological gratifications. For instance an enormous parade, with 50,000 ex-combatants, commemorated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the uprising against the Republic (18/7/1961). This was accompanied with a campaign in the official Army magazine 'Ejército' framing the Civil War as a Crusade.¹⁴ The continuous displays of public recognition had an important impact on the morale of the troops, which were otherwise badly paid and equipped. The military felt that their status under Francoism was high.

The propaganda machinery diverted the attention away from the penury and professional problems suffered by the military, especially until the mid-1950s when the exchanges with the US began. In fact, the government could not afford the motorisation of the Army and there were very few tanks, most of them from the Civil War (Losada 1990:59–66). The necessity of more modern and ample material supplies was questioned by government propaganda. For instance, General Mendoza wrote in 'Ejército' that having secured a minimum of military material, the only important things in war were 'morale, drill and discipline'.¹⁵ The government conveyed the idea that Franco won the war thanks to his moral principles not to superior material means.¹⁶ During the Second World War the propaganda overemphasised the relevance of any war action in which traditional cavalry was involved while minimizing the importance of motorised cavalry.¹⁷ The influential military ideologist Jorge Vigón rejected the findings of some studies that showed the impact of the diet on troops' efficiency. He argued that these were arguments 'lacking spiritual sense'.¹⁸ Franco in the 'Pascua Militar' speech in 1951 emphasised that in warfare 'despite the perfection of the machine and the accumulation of numbers, the man, the tactics and the spiritual and moral values continue to have primacy'.¹⁹

¹⁴ See monographic issue in 'Ejército' n. 258 July 1961. This coincided with the withdrawal of troops from Morocco and with the most far-reaching propaganda campaign of the regime '25 years of peace' (Aguilar 1996:164).

¹⁵ 'Ejército' n. 24, January 1942: 'Los Ejércitos modernos ante el material'. 'Ejército' appeared in 1940 as 'Revista de las Armas y Servicios del Ejército de Tierra', and was Published by the Central Joint Staff. It was the magazine of the Army and the Navy and the Air Force had their own publications.

¹⁶ 'Ejército' n. 15, April 1941, 'Con ocasión del 1 de abril'.

¹⁷ Some officers defended the view that the allies had committed a mistake by not using traditional cavalry. Monasterio and other important generals opposed to the replacement of horses by armoured vehicles alleged that that was an act of cowardice. Lieutenant Colonel Valero Valderrabano proposed a mixed cavalry with tanks and horses in Ejército n. 60, January 1945 'La caballería y la mecanización'. The doubts about the mechanisation of the Army were not exclusive of the Spanish Army (Liddell Hart 1959; Harris 1996); it is nonetheless striking that these doubts persisted in 1945.

¹⁸ Vigón (1956 [1950]: 140) criticises an article appeared in 'Military Review' (September 1947) that argued that the diet had an impact on military efficiency.

¹⁹ Ejército n. 132, January 1951, 'Discurso de la Pascua Militar'.

In sum, *nodality* effectors were used to convey the idea that moral values were more important than material means so that the military would not be demoralised.

Nodality effectors were also used to claim for military unity against internal threats. For instance, Franco and the ministers blamed communists and Masons for Spain's problems (López Rodó 1977:39–41; Preston 1990). On 28 April 1956, in a military speech, Franco justified the return of the troops following Morocco's independence as a means to concentrate on the 'internal front' (Cardona 2001: 171). The military speeches of the vice-president Admiral Carrero Blanco on 24 April 1968 (Carrero Blanco 1974:212–215), that of the Captain-General of the Canary Islands Pérez Luna, on 24 October 1972 (Celhay 1976:112, 118), as well as the several speeches made by the government after the Carnations Revolution in 1974 show that the threat of the internal enemy was a recurrent element of Franco's propaganda.

In addition to manufacturing and diffusing information in favour of the regime, the government also censored information deemed dangerous. The Press Law, inspired by Italian fascism and enacted in April 1938, during the war, was very restrictive and was in effect for many years (Martín de la Guardia 2008:18). The Falange was initially in charge of censorship until the establishment of the Ministry of Information and Tourism in 1951. The government controlled the production of news, appointed editors, restricted the number of newspapers and journalist licenses and exerted an intense censorship (Barrera 2006). The goal was to suffocate and prevent any opinion that could jeopardise the stability and continuity of Francoism.

Francoist censorship was a crucial device to maintain the morale of the troops during the Civil War and post-war, limit the monarchic ideas in the barracks and keep the military unaware of many of the international political developments.²⁰ For instance, after the defeat of the Axis, Don Juan the heir in exile published a Manifesto in Lausanne, requesting Franco to abandon power and reinstitute the monarchy. The Francoist censorship prevented the document to be spread throughout the barracks (Cardona 2001). Censorship was employed to minimise the information available about the Sidi-Ifni war, which had revealed the lack of operational and logistic capacity of the Spanish Armed Forces fighting with a comparatively very weak adversary (Segura Valero 2006). The new Press Law in 1966, which replaced that of 1938, aimed a relaxation of the censorship in Spain. However its effects were not very profound. It was quickly countered by the Law of Official Secrets in 1968 that brought the suppression and withdrawal of many publications and censored themes such as the decolonisation of Equatorial Guinea, the Matesa corruption scandal and some cases of terrorism (Martín de la Guardia 2008:17–45). In the final years of the regime, the number of political articles increased, including those dealing with political intervention of the armed forces. Hardliners tried to politicise the military in order to prevent democratisation (Olmeda 1988:332–342).

In brief, propaganda and censorship tools became fundamental in the governmental control strategy. The strong use of propaganda and censorship during the Civil War paved the way for the continuation of the manipulative use of information during peace time. *Nodality* effectors were important to create symbolic rewards and enhance military prestige, to drive the attention away from the material and organisation deficiencies of the Spanish Armed Forces, to reinforce the sense of unity against the internal threats and to limit the exposure of the military to certain developments that otherwise would have created unrest.

²⁰Although some monarchists were aware of the situation, when Don Juan requested his partisans to resign from their function only the Duke of Alba and the General Alfonso de Orleans obeyed him (Cardona 2001:115).

7.3.2 Information detectors

The regime's intelligence services were fundamental control tools for the subordination of the military during the Civil War but they lost prominence afterwards. Many relatively small intelligence systems emerged during and after the war. Franco feared the concentration of power in one single service. Moreover, as a military he was aware of the unrest that intelligence services created among the ranks.²¹ After the war the intelligence services began to shift their attention to the control of civil society and to collect military information for administrative rather than for strict control purposes. Informal information networks developed by Franco and entourage replaced a more formal surveillance on military attitudes. Only in the final years of the dictatorship did intelligence services again acquire salience in the military subordination strategy.

During the war, the Francoist camp had several different small information structures that aided his war effort; some linked to the Civil Administration, others to generals and even businessmen (Mola 1940:320–321).²² The most important organisations were: the Fifth Column, which was a decentralised organisation that operated in the Republican zone with acts of sabotage, propaganda and disinformation, the Military Police of Vanguard, which paradoxically acted as a counter-information and anti-infiltration organisation, and the Service of Information of the North-East Frontier (SIFNE), founded by the politician Francesc Cambó and the businessman Juan March, which connected the rebels with foreign powers. The SIFNE was transformed in 1938 in the Service of Information and Military Police (SIPM), which had military and political control functions and was directly controlled by Franco's headquarters.

New information detectors were created at in 1939 to ensure military subordination. Following the 'divide-and-rule' logic, Franco avoided that intelligence functions were concentrated in a single organisation. For example, the Service of Personal Information (SIP) aimed to identify subversive tendencies within the armed forces but quickly became a merely bureaucratic body that compiled data about the new recruits. The defence information service of the High Joint Staff, the 'Tercera del Alto', had precarious means and ended up investigating civilian subversive groups in Spain. From 1944, it was in charge of military counter-espionage functions. Finally, the Brigade of Social Investigation²³ was an information service linked to the Staff Offices of the three branches and aimed to eliminate any trace of republicanism in the ranks. However, its control capacity was also very limited. Other intelligence services that operated during the regime were: the 'Brigadilla' of the Civil Guard, the information systems of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Police, Falange, the 'Hermandad de Alfereces Provisionales' and the 'Servicio de Información de Presidencia'. These sometimes monitored the military but mainly focused on civilian affairs (Ros Agudo 2002; Díaz Fernández 2005). The lack of resources and coordination of the information services constrained their effectiveness as control tools. Moreover, Franco was aware of the unrest that information services created among the ranks.²⁴ Thus, once the war was over and the Armed Forces purged these types of information detectors were not very intensively or intrusively used within the ranks.

²¹ Interview with José María de Areilza (FOG, 13/9/1984, cassette J8).

²² According Díaz Fernández (2005:87, 106–113) the military intelligence services were less developed than in most of the other European countries.

²³ Also known as 'Segunda Sección' or 'Segunda Bis'

²⁴ Interview with José María de Areilza (FOG, 13/9/1984, cassette J8).

After the agreements with the US regarding the use of military bases, the intelligence services began to develop again, but fundamentally for defence and civilian control purposes. Only in the 1970s, the intelligence services acquired again salience in the government toolkit. The Central Documentation Service (SECED) established in 1972 and composed of Army officers but hierarchically linked to the Prime Minister was the first step towards the organisation of a powerful service concentrating different intelligence functions including counter-subversive action.²⁵ Despite the emergence of SECED, a myriad of intelligence services coexisted until the end of the regime. By 1975, there were still eleven different intelligence services most of them controlled by the military (Ynfante 1976:24–31). Most of them were relatively weak and focused on countering subversion within civil society. The sole well-known example of the utilisation of the intelligence service against military was the detection and arrest of the UMD members by the Brigade for Social Investigation (Díaz Fernández 2005).

Finally, the lack of strong formal surveillance on the military in Spain was compensated by informal information networks. Over the years, Franco built a far-reaching social network within the armed forces. His privileged position in the centre of that network allowed him to receive and spread information as a non-intrusive *nodality* detector and effector. He used the phone, letters and his official office. The salience of Franco's personal involvement as information detector in the armed forces is indicated by the extremely abundant private audiences he held with the military. For instance, in 1951 alone, there is evidence that Franco granted personal audiences in his official office to more than 184 military men.²⁶

Franco invested personal efforts as a government tool to win the favour and convince some of the critical generals, sometimes dividing them and pitting them against each other (Preston 1990:102, 104). For instance, following a letter signed by eight generals requesting the restoration of the monarchy in September 1943, Franco spoke to each of them separately and convinced them that the country was not ready for a monarchy yet (Payne 1967:433–434). To counter the effects of Don Juan's Manifesto in March 1945, Franco immediately organised a seminar with the highest rank generals in which he personally explained why his regime was necessary by stressing the communist threat. In the presence of Franco, only Kindelán defended the return of the monarchy. No single general dared to challenge Franco's rule (Cardona 2001:116). In 1948 when some generals proposed again the restoration of the King, Franco spoke personally with each of them and applied different sanctions and rewards to ensure their subordination. Some generals were threatened, some arrested, some promoted and others simply flattered to dismantle the conspiracy.²⁷ The fact that Juan Carlos was sent to the three military academies to study was part of a plan devised by the government to build a social network similar to that previously enjoyed by Franco around the future King. Later, Juan Carlos's personal ties proved useful to appease the military during the 23F coup.

7.3.3 Conclusion

Nodality instruments were very important means of control of the military, especially during and right after the war and in the 1970s. The government fundamentally promoted manip-

²⁵SECED replaced the National Counter-subversive Organisation (OCN) founded in 1969.

²⁶There are more than 70 documents about military audiences in Franco's Personal Archive in FNFF.

²⁷Interview with José María de Areilza (FOG, 13/9/1984, cassette J8).

ulative information effectors that spread the regime propaganda and censored inconvenient news and ideas. Military speeches, specialised publications and the mass media were used to raise the morale of the military and to divert the attention away from their professional problems. Thus, *nodality* was used to overstate Franco's leadership skills, the supremacy of moral values over material means, the glorious past of the Spanish Armed Forces and the internal threats as means to reinforce unity. With regard to information detectors, the intelligence services, although very important during the war, lost prominence and did not play as central a function as in Portugal. Franco knew the military disliked being spied on and minimised the utilisation of this type of tools. Moreover he feared the concentration of power and decided to maintain multiple smaller intelligence services. Franco's friendship networks, built before the war, and the constant meetings he held with many military served as a less intrusive but equally effective means to assess the levels of satisfaction and to counter contestation within the ranks.

7.4 Authority

Authority-based rewards and incentives were very important in the government's strategy to control the military. The main *authority*-based rewards used were: appointments of military to top positions in the state apparatus; the special functions that the military were granted in the Francoist regime, mainly related with the maintenance of the public order (police and judiciary functions); the tolerance of second jobs and lenience regarding certain transgressions; and finally the integration and recognition of militia fighters as officers. *Authority*-based sanctions and constraints were also used as means of control among which the most important were: the regulations aiming to the size of the Army; the constraints imposed to the military, in an attempt to reinforce their distinct *esprit de corps* and conservative values; the sanctions imposed on those that did not fully endorse Franco's decisions; and the legal restrictions imposed in the civilian sphere aiming to attract the support of the most conservative military.

7.4.1 Rewards and incentives

First, political appointments to senior positions became a fundamental way of rewarding allegiance. Franco, who had been promoted to the rank of General at a very young age thanks to the merit system of the Republic, re-established the seniority principle after the Civil War. The merit-based system of promotions that operated during the Republic had been strongly criticised in the ranks and Franco decided to abolish it. Nonetheless, in such a centralised regime, Franco and his government enjoyed the authority necessary to reward loyal military by granting them key positions in the state apparatus. Under normal circumstances, a Captain would only be promoted to the rank of Major according to his seniority but could aspire to be appointed civil governor or union leader on the basis of merit or allegiance to the regime (Cardona 2001:57). The appointment of military to senior political/administrative positions was extremely important to ensure loyalty throughout the regime (Viver Pi Sunyer 1978:70–72; Jerez Mir 1982; Preston 1990:137) (Table 13 and Table 14).

Table 13: Percentage of military 'procuradores' (MPs) in Spanish Francoist Cortes

Session	Years	Percentage of Military Procuradores
I	1943–1946	19.1
II	1946–1949	19.2
III	1949–1952	19.9
IV	1952–1955	20.2
V	1955–1958	22.9
VI	1958–1961	22.8
VII	1961–1964	22
VIII	1964–1967	18
IX	1967–1971	14.9
X	1971–1976	11.3

Source: Aguero (1995:49)

Table 14: Military presence in the senior positions in the administration (%)

	Ministers	Undersecretaries	General Directors	Total
Jan 1935–Jul 1945	45.9	42.3	34.1	36.8
Jul 1945–Jul 1952	37.8	37.8	32.1	34.9
Jul 1951–Feb 1957	51.2	51.2	33.3	36.6

Source: Aguilar Olivencia (1999:27)

Second, although seniority was the general rule, there were special circumstances in which military promotions and distinctions were used to reward allegiance to the regime. The division of the armed forces into many military regions and the reintroduction of the ranks of Captain General (1938), Lieutenant-General and Admiral (1939) created an opportunity used by the government to reward loyal senior generals (Guaita Martorell 1986:16, Aguilar Olivencia 1999:48–49). Suspicious of a monarchist military conspiracy in 1943, Franco reacted by promoting 26 generals to the rank of Lieutenant-General and awarded the Medal of Military Merit to 26 generals and admirals. In March 1945, Franco repeated the tactic by making appointments in order to prevent a new monarchist plot. Muñoz Grandes was appointed Captain-General of Madrid, Moscardó Chief of the Military House and Solchaga Captain-General of Barcelona (Payne 1987:346–347). In April 1945, Franco, aiming to divide the monarchist camp, bought the allegiance of some of their most prominent figures. He appointed the monarchist José Monasterio and Juan Bautista Sánchez as Captain-Generals (Cardona 2001:116). At the end of 1959, in order to counter the malaise of the military due to the decolonisation of Morocco, the incidents in the Sahara and the bottleneck in the promotion system, the government decided to exceptionally promote 1,075 captains to majors in one week (Busquets 1984 [1971]:109–110; Cardona 2001:202). Finally, Franco even created

nobility titles to reward loyal officers; Moscardó was named ‘Conde del Alcazar de Toledo’ and Juan Antonio Suanzes ‘Conde de Fenosa’.²⁸

Third, Francoist government also granted the military some special functions to make them feel empowered and in control, and therefore more inclined to support the government. These functions were fundamentally related with the maintenance of public order, i.e. police and judicial functions. Although the Army was not directly involved in the maintenance of public order as during Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship, military officers were in charge of leading the Security Forces (Delgado 2005:60–62). The Law of Police in 1941 established that the cadres of the Armed Police were military officers and the statutes of the Civil Guard in 1942 established its integration in the Armed Forces structure and its military character (Blanco Valdes 1999:54–55). The military officers in the security forces which had sided with the Republican camp were purged, especially from 1941 to 1944. Only from June to July 1944 more than 1500 military were expelled from the security forces. These positions were filled by ex-combatants from the nationalist camp (Delgado 2005:35–36).

The military played an important role in the judicial system. They had the capacity to judge civilians and political crimes while they reserved the right to be judged exclusively by military courts. For instance, the Special Tribunal for the Repression of the Freemasonry and Communism established in 1940 was led for several years by General Saliquet. The Law of Political Responsibilities in 1939 provided that the Regional Courts for political crimes always had to include military judges (Dueñas 1990:149–150). In addition, the powers of ordinary military courts were far-reaching: 270,719 people were court martialed in 1940 (Olmeda 1988:279–280). After 1943 offences against the public order were equated to military rebellion and subject military jurisdiction.²⁹ Equally the Code of Military Justice of 1945 provided that any information jeopardising national defence could be prosecuted by military courts. Although the far-reaching scope of the military justice was gradually reduced, military courts continued to judge civilians until the end of the regime.³⁰ In 1971 and 1972, military courts handed down sentences for 277 ‘political crimes’, mainly due to verbal offences directed at the armed forces (Oneto 1975:63–67).

Fourth, the level of tolerance with some unprofessional practices can be considered as tool aiming to incentivise the military for the regime. Spanish officers were permitted to take second jobs or take long-term leave in order to work in private business or the administration to compensate the very low salaries.³¹ As mentioned in Section 7.2.2 a high number of positions in the administration were legally allocated to the military. Usually the work in the quarters was interrupted very early during the day and in the afternoon officers left to do other jobs to compensate the poor salaries. This practice was so widespread that officers often protested and tried to avoid military exercises due to the problems they posed for the working routines in their other jobs. It seems that in the late 1950s two thirds of the officers in Madrid and one third of those in the provinces had a civil job in parallel (Puell de la Villa 2005:207). This

²⁸Fenosa was a public company ‘Fuerzas Eléctricas del Noroeste, Sociedad Anónima’.

²⁹See Ballbé (1985:412–413). Moreover the extremist and terrorist activities against public order were equated to military rebellions (decrees of 24/1/1958 and 21/9/1960) until the creation of a civil tribunal of public order in 1964.

³⁰For instance, the Penal Code of 1944, the Spanish Bill of Rights of 1945 and the Decree-Law against Banditry and Terrorism of 1947 removed some crimes from military jurisdiction (Payne 1967:437).

³¹From 1952 reserve military officers could take full-time positions in the Administration.

practice extended to all levels. For instance, General Gabeiras maintained a secondary job until he became Brigadier; General Gutiérrez Mellado took a leave of several years to work in the private sector due to financial problems; even General Barroso, after launching Army reforms aiming professionalisation, requested Franco in a private letter to recommend him for a position in the board of Tabacalera, the national tobacco company.³²

Often the government turned a blind eye to Army corruption as a means to maintain the military under control, especially in the post-war period. Senior officers with business interests used troops and even prisoners of war as cheap labour; they used the official cars for private business and conscripts as handymen or baby-sitters (Preston 1990:105–106). In order to control the generals, Franco gave them great levels of leeway and often tolerated their abuses of their position of power (Cardona 2001:119). It was common for officers to resell the goods and materials destined to the military on the black market (Payne 1967:435). Even physical abuses by officers were permitted by the Code of Military Justice supposedly as a means to maintain discipline of the troops (Cardona 2001:55). In sum, the inaction in these cases were positive-*authority* tools that enabled many military to enjoy some unofficial benefits.

Finally, the incorporation of militia fighters in the officers' corps in the armed forces was another example of the use of *authority* as a control instrument. This recognition aimed to reinforce loyalty for Francoist principles within the ranks while counterbalancing the monarchist aspiration of many career officers (Preston 1990:139). Out of the 29,033 'alféreces provisionales' that fought in the Francoist camp, 9,758 remained in the Army after the conflict (Busquets 1984:106–108). The government granted these militia fighters the rank of officers after an eight months period in military academies that were created *ad hoc*. The favours to the 'alféreces provisionales' continued throughout the regime, in 1959 out of the 1,075 officers the government decided to promote through an extraordinary procedure, 976 were 'provisionales' (Cardona 2001:202). For Franco their political loyalty compensated their lack of military training and the eventual bottleneck this abrupt influx of officers created in the system of promotions.

In sum, Franco rewarded and incentivised loyalty through appointments to senior positions in the state apparatus; military promotions and distinctions; a special role in the maintenance of internal order through their participation in the security forces and the far-reaching scope of military justice; a high degree of permissiveness with non-professional practices; and privileges for militia fighters.

7.4.2 Sanctions and Constraints

The Francoist dictatorship used sanctions and constraints such as limitations to the retirement age to reduce the size of the armies; limitations on the private life of the military in order to enhance a distinct *esprit de corps*; discharging or relocating the military suspected of not endorsing the government; and imposing prohibitions and constraints to other actors of Spanish society in order to please the military.

³² See, Puell de la Villa (1997:141–142) interviews with Lieutenant-General José Gabeiras Montero (FOG, 11/12/1987, cassette J31bis), Lieutenant-General Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado (FOG, 8/9/87, cassette J20), and letter signed by Barroso (29/7/1962) (Franco's Personal Archive, FNFF, document 938).

First, Franco believed that given limited financial resources a smaller Army could be better paid and equipped, and thus more satisfied. Franco used regulation to reduce the size of the Army. The two years reduction in the retirement age in 1952³³ and the laws stimulating an early passage to the reserve (with generous economic compensations) in 1953 and 1958 were the most significant examples.³⁴ Nonetheless, in the long run the success of these instruments was limited; especially the law of 1958 did not result in significant reduction of the number of officers. The problem of oversize persisted after the end of the dictatorship.³⁵

Second, legal constraints were used to reinforce the conservative principles of Francoism within the ranks and to maintain a separate and homogeneous esprit the corps. Secret societies were forbidden and prosecuted, officers suspected to be Masons were placed under surveillance;³⁶ the military could only marry catholic Spanish, Latin American and Filipino women; officers were banned from participating in sports teams, and, until 1941, to dress as civilians. Most importantly, the Code of Military Justice of 1945 introduced the notion of crimes against military honour such as cowardice, unjustified surrender or homosexuality and imposed severe punishments for them. The military 'Honour Trials' acted as an *authority* tool based on peer control. Officers could be tried and punished by their peers for any behaviour deemed deviant even in their private lives outside the barracks.

Third, any displays of military insubordination or criticism against the regime or Franco was reprimanded or sanctioned with demotions and relocations (Comas and Mandeville 1986:36). After the monarchic plots in the 1940s, many generals were relocated or sacked. Orgaz went from being high commissioner in Morocco to being Central Chief of Staff, Saliquet was appointed head of the Supreme Council of Military Justice, both positions without command of troops. Varela was sent to Morocco and therefore far from Madrid and Kindelán was sacked from the Army Higher School and confined in Tenerife. General Aranda was temporarily exiled in Portugal in 1943 and after demanding political asylum in the US embassy, he was arrested for two months and sent to Mallorca in 1946 (Cardona 2001:118, 127). Generals Beigbeder and Kindelán were arrested in 1948. In 1957, Juan Bautista Sánchez, the Captain-General of Barcelona died when he was about to be discharged for his possible participation in a new monarchic plot, and two colonels close to him were fired.³⁷

The 'liberal' military were also sanctioned by the regime. The government decreed the dissolution of 'Forja' in 1959. Forja, created in 1951, was a group of military officers seeking to develop professional and religious values within the military. Although Forja members were never subversive, they criticised the lack of professionalism in the armed forces. Some of the ideas first promoted by Forja were later embraced by the UMD (Busquets 1982:142–145). In 1970 the reformist Chief of the Joint Staff General Manuel Díez-Alegria was dismissed

³³According to Pérez Muñelo (2009:113) the retirement age was the highest in Europe.

³⁴Ministerial Order (18/7/1952) and Laws of Reserve (17/7/1953 and 17/7/1958)

³⁵In fact, the number of military officers in the Army grew from 0.02% of the country's population in 1936 to 0.04% in 1975 (Olmeda 1988:168–169, 147).

³⁶Franco's Personal Archive, FNFF, documents 14022, 15234, 26892.

³⁷Some rumours claimed that the heart attack of Bautista Sánchez was provoked by a bitter discussion with a colonel of the Legion (the Legion has been sent to Catalonia for military exercises although the real purpose was to control a potential monarchic uprising) or even that he was suffocated with a pillow (Busquets 1982:141; Cardona 2001:180).

for holding an interview with the exiled leader of the PCE Santiago Carrillo. These sanctions satisfied many conservative officers.

Finally, some of the restrictive laws and norms directed at other social actors were very often requested by the military and can be construed as tools aiming to increase military satisfaction. For example, the prohibition to carry arms to the Falangist and Carlist militias after the war; the prosecution of dissidents by the Tribunal for the Repression of Freemasonry and Communism from 1940 onwards; the Law of Security of the State in 1941 that made strikes and spreading rumours against the regime and the armed forces illegal; the Law of Repression of Banditry and Terrorism in 1947, which reduced individual liberties; the Law of Official Secrets in 1968; and the suppression of the habeas corpus for six months in 1970 are examples of the use of *authority* aiming indirectly to foster military satisfaction and therefore having a positive impact on their subordination. Francoist armed forces were very conservative they liked the repressive measures that the regime imposed on society.³⁸

7.4.3 Conclusion

Franco enjoyed high levels of support from the military, which granted him the capacity to effectively use *authority* as a source of power. The authority rewards and incentives were crucial control tools. Unlike the Estado Novo which used the 'escolha' as an ordinary mechanism for promotions to the senior ranks, the Francoist government reintroduced the seniority principle. Nonetheless, Franco still had the capacity to reward loyal officers through military distinctions and appointments not only to especially prestigious positions in the armed forces but also in the political-administrative apparatus. The special functions conceded to the military related to the control of internal public order, the general tolerance towards vis-à-vis secondary jobs and the favourable treatment of 'alfereces provisionales' became salient tools for military subordination specific of Spain.

The *authority*-based sanctions and constraints were for the most part similar to those in the Estado Novo. Some regulation was launched to downsize the armed forces to alleviate the scarcity of material means and to enhance the distinct conservative 'esprit de corps' of the military. Sanctions were imposed on military who had been critical of the regime. The 'Honours Trials' established by Franco, through which the military had the capacity and obligation to control their peers and the utilisation of more constraining laws on Spanish society in order to increase military satisfaction differentiate his from the Portuguese regime.

Overall there were no major changes in the use of *authority* tools throughout the regime.

³⁸For instance on 14 December 1970, a delegation by captain generals Fernández de Córdoba, García Rebull, Pérez Vifeta and Chamorro asked Franco to suppress the habeas corpus; Franco accepted (Preston 1993:753). On 27 September 1975, when Franco was already seriously ill, the prime minister Arias Navarro ceded to the pressures of military hardliners and ratified the last death sentences of the regime: Those of three members of the FRAP and two of ETA (Cardona 2001:245).

7.5 Treasure

In Spain, as in Portugal, the poor economic conditions during the regime precluded the utilisation of treasure tools. In the 1960s, when the economy grew and therefore more financial resources were available, the government prioritised social expenditure and investment in infrastructure over defence or military expenditure. Nonetheless, there is still evidence of the utilisation of some *treasure* tools; fundamentally salary rises. This section briefly analyses the evolution of defence budgets explaining whether these changes were linked to efforts to impact military subordination.

7.5.1 Evolution of military budgets

The disastrous socio-economic situation and the oversized Army inherited from the Civil War limited the leeway of the government. The economic situation of the country after the Civil War was extremely dire (Jiménez Jiménez 1987). The Second World War aggravated the crisis. This is evidenced by the fact that against the official pro-axis discourse and with the mediation of Portugal, Spain secretly accepted the provision of thousands of tons of food products funded by the UK government in 1940,³⁹ phosphates by the French government in 1941⁴⁰ and diesel fuel from the US in 1942.⁴¹ Nonetheless, after the end of the Second World War, the US did not offer Marshall Plan aid to Spain, which continued the autarchic economic policy adopted in 1939. It is estimated that until 1950 Spain did not recover the per capita level of income and industrial activity of 1935 (Pérez Muñoz 2009:111). Military expenditure remained high during the Second World War; some years, it accounted for more than half of the total budget of the State. After the Second World War budgets declined, both as a percentage of the GNP and of the total public expenditure (Figure 12, Figure 13).

From 1953, the economic aid received from the US through cheap raw materials, food and credits as well as the liberalisation of the economy through the Stabilisation Plan (1959–1961) and the Economic Development Plan (1964–1967) reinforced economic growth in Spain (Pérez Muñoz 2009:113). However, the general improvement in the economy did not translate to military budgets. During the 1950s and 1960s, the economy and total public expenditure constantly grew but there was a decline in the weight of military expenditure, fundamentally due to the strong increases in other budgets, especially those of public infrastructure, education, and agriculture (Comín and Diaz 2005:929–934). The technocrats that


³⁹A report classified as top secret (23/5/1940) explains the British plans for the provision of 10,000 tons of wheat for Spain in a triangular procedure called 'Anglo-Spanish clearing' (AOS/CO/NE-2B1, Folder 6, Section 4, Pages 443–445). See Salazar's handwritten comments (*ibid.* pages 441–442); Document of the British government listing vessels and quantities of grain already diverted to Spain (over 50,000 tons) (*ibid.* page 446); Document from the Foreign Affairs ministry (4/7/1940) confirming the acceptance of the proposal and the quantities wished by the Spanish delegation; 44,000 tons valued at 600,000 GBP (AOS/CO/NE-2B1, Folder 6, Section 5, pages 447–448) and an amendment to the triangular agreement by Spain requesting an increase in the supplies (up to a value of 726,000 GBP) (5/9/1940) (AOS/CO/NE-2B1, Folder 6, Section 6, Pages 449–450).

⁴⁰See agreement with French Morocco for the supply of phosphates in the document about the emergency aid to Spain (9/3/1941) (AOS/CO/NE-2B1, Folder 6, Section 16, page 498).

⁴¹See Foreign Ministry note (30/4/1942) (AOS/CO/NE-2B1, Folder 6, Section 33, page 585). See extensive evidence of this type of triangular agreements with Portugal in Salazar's personal documentation (AOS/CO/NE-2B1, Folders 6–7).

controlled Francoist governments since 1957 prioritised the developmentalism of the country over military and defence problems (Aguilar Olivencia 1999:111). Despite the nominal increases in the budget of the three branches (Figure 14) there was a continuous decline of military expenditure as percentage of total public expenditure (Figure 12).


Figure 12: Spanish military budget as a percentage of the total budget (1940–1975)[†]



Source: Based on Olmeda (1988:204)

[†] Figures include Military Administration, Military Security and Public Order Forces (Guardia Civil and Dirección General de la Seguridad). See detail in Olmeda (1988:200–203)


Figure 13: Spanish military budget as a percentage of GDP (1940–1975)



Source: Based on Olmeda (1988:204)

Overall, after the Second World War military budgets were low as a percentage of the GDP (see comparison with NATO countries in Chapter 4 Table 9) and per soldier. For instance, in 1966 the military expenditure in Spain was 1,783 dollars/soldier, similar to that of Portugal (1,660) and far below other Western European countries, such as the UK (12,763), France (12,087) and Italy (5,315) (De Miguel 1975:161). In 1975, the military expenditure

Figure 14: Spanish military budgets in constant pesetas of 1940 (including extraordinary allocations)



Sources: Inflation from Maluquer de Motes (2005:1292). Military budgets and extraordinary budget allocations in Comín and Diaz (2005:929, 947).

in Spain was 4,538 dollars/soldier, more than that of Portugal (3,230) but still far below the UK (28,901), France (21,440) and Italy (9,242) (CESEDEN 1988:113).

7.5.2 Staff Expenditure

Franco's government saw its capacity to use staff expenditure as a means to control the military constrained. In the armed forces, as in the rest the public administration, the evolution of staff expenditure was determined by law. Budgetary incrementalism and repetition of the allocations was a general practice during the regime (Gunther 1980:293–296; Olmeda 1988:217–234). Although the share of the total military budgets devoted to staff was very high (Figure 15), most of the financial resources were allocated to officers' salaries and the general living costs of the troops. Expenditure in military salaries was determined by size of the Army (nearly 300,000 men) and, as in Portugal, by the disproportionately high level of senior officers whose salaries were very high (Table 15, Table 16).

However, Francoist governments still had some flexibility to use *treasure* tools. During the 1940s, the government utilised important extraordinary budgetary allocations for the military ministries. These allocations were *treasure* tools to offset the high inflation in the 1940s (344% accumulated in the decade) which was also damaging the purchasing power of the military (Maluquer de Motes 2005:1292). Thus, salary raises kept discontent under control. For instance in 1940, Franco increased the salaries of the military officers: 15% for colonels, 26% for captains and 40% for first lieutenants. Another 40% pay rise took place in 1949 (Payne 1967:527, 532). The next significant general pay raise took place in 1956 to counter military discontent resulting from the loss of Morocco: 104% for majors and lieutenant-colonels, 81% for first lieutenants and 62% for generals (Cardona 2001:1973).

Table 15: Percentage of generals among total officers in active duty in Spain, Portugal and the US

	Spain		Portugal		US	
	Year	Generals/ Officers (%)	Year	Generals/ Officers (%)	Year	Generals/ Officers (%)
Army	1930	1.3	1930	0.5	1920	0.4
	1968	1.3	1965	1.8	1950	0.8
	1975	1.5	1970	1.8		
Navy	1930	1.4	1930	1.9	1920	1.3
	1968	2.3	1965	3	1950	0.8
	1975	2.2	1974	2.1		
Air Force	1968	1.7	1965	2	1950	0.5
	1975	1.5	1973	3		

Sources: Based on Jordana and Ramió (2005:1015–1018); Carrilho (1985:442); Janowitz (1960:67).


Table 16: Military annual salaries and annual per capita consumption in Spain (in pesetas)[†]

Ranks	1936–1939	1940	1949	1956
Captain General	30,000	50,000	70,000	—
Lieutenant General	27,000	30,000	42,000	68,000
Major General	22,000	25,000	35,000	57,700
Brigadier General	17,000	20,000	28,000	48,500
Colonel	13,000	15,000	21,000	41,500
Lieutenant Colonel	11,000	13,000	18,200	37,100
Major	9,500	11,000	15,400	31,300
Captain	7,500	9,500	13,300	25,000
First Lieutenant	5,000	7,000	10,500	19,000
Second Lieutenant	4,000	6,000	9,100	16,150
Average per capita annual consumption	1,111	1,484	3,858	9,753

Sources: Based on Payne (1967:527, 532); Nicolau (2005:125–126) and Maluquer de Motes (2005:1286).

[†] Total per capita consumption includes food and tobacco, clothing, rent and utilities, hygiene and personal care, transportation, leisure and others.

Figure 15: Defence budget distribution of expenditure in percentage (1946–1976)



Source: Based on Pérez Muñuelo (2009:93).

The government was more concerned with the loyalty of senior officers than with that of junior officers. Junior officers' salaries, despite the nominal pay raises, were not enough to cover the expenditures of a family, which in the case of the military tended to be very large (Table 16). They relied heavily on secondary jobs and on the services and goods provided by the regime. Top rank officers, in addition to higher salaries, enjoyed other benefits and subsidies that increased their income over 50%. For instance, in 1953 about 2,000 senior officers retired with their full salary (Payne 1967:439–443, 532–534).

In sum, despite the rigidity of the budgeting process linked to regulations and structural features, the government used some extraordinary salary raises, essentially as palliative measures, attempting to counterbalance the degradation of purchasing power and to limit military discontent. The clear bias in favour of senior officers can also be considered as a *treasure* control tool.

7.5.3 Equipment expenditure

As the government's financial resources were extremely constrained the living conditions of the military were prioritised over the expenditure on weaponry and material means more directly linked to the defence function. After the Second World War, the external threats and the emphasis on improving military capabilities dwindled. The government prioritised other types of expenditure and investment and largely relied on American military aid to partially modernise equipment. The use of *treasure* for equipment expenditure remained very low until the 1970s, when new programmes for material acquisitions were launched.

Although the part of the defence budget in equipment was higher than that on staff until the late 1950s this was to a great extent due to the investment and expenditure in military housing, hospitals, food-stores and pharmacies, highly appreciated especially during the pe-

riod of extreme economic deprivation that followed the Civil War. For instance at the end of the 1940s the Armed Forces managed 21 hospitals and 23 health centres compared to 34 hospitals, and 28 health centres in the early 1960s (Massons 1994:549–553).

Overall, the Spanish Armed Forces were poorly equipped. The large quantities of weapons acquired during the Civil War became technologically obsolete and there was a lack of spare parts (Preston 1990:136–140). The gold reserves of the Bank of Spain had been depleted due to the military effort of the Republican government and the Second World War limited the capacity to import weapons and even the availability of basic resources for their manufacture. Before the agreements with the US in 1953 the equipment of Spanish Armed Forces was even older and more inadequate than that of the Portuguese ones. In 1953 Spain, with a larger Army, had only 950 trucks, 20 modern tanks and 548 pieces of artillery while Portugal had 3698 military trucks, 193 modern tanks and 619 pieces of artillery (Telo 1996:221, 357).

Later, Spain became a valuable ally for the US thanks to its geographical location, its resources in terms of raw materials and its relatively large Army (Liedtke 1999:229–235). The Madrid Pact signed in 1953 allowed the US to establish Air Forces and Navy bases on Spanish soil in exchange for help in rebuilding and modernising Franco's armed forces. The financial aid received from the US was very important for the morale of the Spanish military. The impact of this support was particularly positive for the Air Force that until 1953 was using airplanes from the Civil War.⁴² From 1954 to 1964, Spain received military aid of 600 million dollars value and extra economic aid of 500 million. In addition, Spain obtained 1 billion dollars from American private institutions and 500 million from the US Export-Import Bank.⁴³ The value of the materials received from the US was higher than the ordinary allocations for investment in materials in the defence budgets.⁴⁴ The agreements with the US had also paved the way for the restoration of military cooperation with France, Germany, Italy and the UK and the membership to some international organisations. Franco had become an acceptable ally. Spain bought weapons from Germany, France or the US and produced in its military industrial complex equipment that had been patented by its European allies. Thus, thanks to the better relations with Western developed countries the government managed to supply better materials and weapons to the military (Liedtke 1999:237–239).

Still, the funds received by Spain from 1953 to 1963 were very low compared to those received by the European beneficiary countries of the Marshall Plan (Barciela López 2000). For instance, France and the UK, received six times as much from the US; Italy four times; Germany three times; Greece and Turkey twice as much (Cardona 2001:211). Moreover, despite the agreements with the US, the new financial aid agreed was considerably lower. For instance, in 1963 Franco obtained a 100 million dollars loan from the US Export-Import Bank, 100 million dollars in military equipment and the permission to buy 50 million dollars worth of materials. The financial aid obtained by the renegotiation of the pacts in 1970 was reduced to 50 million dollars of military aid and 25 million dollars in loans (Salas López 1974:301–303; Liedtke 1999:240–241).

⁴² Interview with Lieutenant-General Ignacio Alfaro Arregui (FOG, 18/12/1987, cassette J33). See a similar account by his brother General Emiliano José Alfaro Arregui interviewed by Mérida (1979:24).


⁴³ See Payne (1967:446) and Liedtke (1999).

⁴⁴ According to Pérez Muñoz (2009:114) the aid received was 500 million dollars, equivalent to 7,970 million euros (at 2009 value) while the ordinary budgetary allocation for investment in materials for the same period was equivalent to 5,716 million euros.

The agreements of mutual defence with the US and the cooperation with other Western countries injected significant quantities of military materiel and were very positively perceived by the military, but they also entailed some important downsides. First, the concessions of sovereignty in return for the financial support created unease in the ranks.⁴⁵ Second, the military industry became gradually more dependent from the US and other Western European powers.⁴⁶ The Spanish military industry was crowded out and the investment in military research reduced.⁴⁷ Finally, American military aid made led the government to believe that they could rely exclusively on foreign aid to modernise equipment. In the successive years, governmental funds that should have been normally destined to the military ministries were diverted to other ministries.⁴⁸ Figure 15 shows the drastic reduction of the percentage of equipment expenditure in military budgets after Spain started receiving US military aid.

Moreover, military expenditure was largely devoted to salaries. Little attention was paid to the equipment of the armed forces and military working conditions remained poor.⁴⁹ Only in the 1970s did the modernisation of the equipment become a priority for the government. The Law 32/1971 sought to launch a new programme of investment and renewal of equipment of the Armed Forces during the period 1972–1976 and in 1975 the Council of Ministers declared the National Defence a priority (Pérez Muinelo 2009:116). This more important utilisation of *treasure* to improve military material conditions can be observed in Figure 16.

Figure 16: Defence equipment expenditure (including investments) in constant million euros of 2009 (1946–1976)



Source: Based on Pérez Muinelo (2009:93)

⁴⁵There were five American bases on Spanish soil. Moreover, the US put pressure on Spain to abandon Morocco. The independence of Morocco meant that from 1956 to 1961, 44,200 soldiers had to return to Spain. The military had always seen Morocco as a place to accelerate their careers and where the standards of colonial life were very good. These aspects had a negative impact in the military morale (Preston 1990:143).

⁴⁶See Daguzan's explanation of the dependence relation (1982:107–112).

⁴⁷According to Gabriel Peña Aranda, former Director of the Defence Division of the INI (Seminar 'Armed Forces and Democratic Consolidation', 26/4/1988, FOG, cassette CF6).

⁴⁸Interview with Almiral Liberal Lucini in FOG, 27/11/1987, cassette J29 and 4/12/1987, cassette J30).

⁴⁹Gutiérrez Mellado and Picatoste (1983:56).

7.5.4 Conclusion

Treasure was a scarce resource for Francoist government and its utilisation vis-à-vis the military was constrained by the size of the Army and also the excessive proportion of senior officers. *Treasure* was a resource that had been depleted due to the Civil War. When the economic situation improved, the government preferred to invest in the industrial and social development of the country rather than in the military and defence. Most of the resources of the regular military budget were devoted to salaries and other living expenses for the Army, such as housing, hospitals, pharmacies and food stores. Salary raises and economic benefits were subject to regulations and there was little flexibility in the use of salary expenditure to ensure military obedience. Nonetheless, Franco used extraordinary budget allocations and salary raises, but these were fundamentally designed to compensate the impact of inflation and loss of purchasing power of the military. The high salaries and economic benefits received by top rank officers shows the government was more concerned with the subordination of senior officers. The purchase of equipment and weapons for the military were not central to the strategy of military subordination. No modernisation was conducted after the Civil War and the situation remained dramatic until 1953. After the defence agreements of 1953, thanks to the US military aid, Franco's government acquired equipment and materials which improved the defence capacity of the armed forces and the morale of the military. However, overall, the government did not pay attention to the quantity and the adequacy of the material means of the armed forces until the 1970s when equipment expenditure was prioritised and grew steadily.

7.6 Summary

During the Civil War and the early 1940s the utilisation of coercive *organisation* power was very intense. Franco's initial totalitarian repressive strategy served to cleanse the armed forces (and civil society) but also overstretched the Spanish judiciary and prison systems. Coinciding with the demise of the Axis and totalitarianism in Western Europe, the government decided to reduce drastically the use of coercive *organisation* tools vis-à-vis the military. The non-coercive uses of *organisation* became more important than the coercive ones. For instance, indoctrination through the military education system, a organisational design based on a 'divide-and-rule' strategy and the capacity of the state to supply services, goods and jobs were used for control purposes. Overall, the organisational power of the state was used not so much to improve the military professional skills or enhance Spanish defence capabilities but to reward loyalty. This shows a discrepancy with Portugal where from 1950, due to NATO membership, important reforms had been introduced in organisational design, military education and training aiming at improving defence coordination and professionalisation. In the 1960s, the Estado Novo abandoned these reforms due the Colonial Wars. Conversely, the Sidi-Ifni War (1957–1958) and the cooperation with other western armed forces betrayed the deficiencies of the Spanish armies and triggered some gradual changes in military education 1960s.

The utilisation of *nodality* effectors to keep the military away from politics and loyal to the regime was very similar to that in Portugal. Propaganda and censorship were pervasive. In

Spain, the intensity was higher especially due to the importance that information control had acquired during the Civil War and to the longer insulation of the regime and of the Spanish military. Franco disliked the idea of spying on the military. He largely trusted them (after the purges), felt close enough to them to obtain information through informal/friendship networks and knew they would feel harassed if spied upon by other state institutions.

Franco had centralised the executive and legislative powers and had shaped state institutions to his convenience, acquiring an extensive capacity to use legality, through *authority* tokens, as a means of control not only of society but also the military. *Authority* incentives and rewards were extremely important. A fundamental difference with the Estado Novo can be found in the system of military promotions. Salazar introduced the 'escolha' merit-based system. Franco restored the seniority principle for military promotions but used his power to appoint loyal officers to important positions in the government and the political-administrative apparatus of the state. The armed forces enjoyed important powers in the regime. They controlled the security forces and held broad judiciary powers. Franco's government also enacted laws to allow militia fighters to integrate into the permanent structure of the Army. This was a means to reward those who had fought in his camp and to introduce in the Army men that strongly endorsed the values of the new regime and that would later act as an internal check on dissent within the ranks. To a lesser extent, *authority* was also used in a constraining fashion to reinforce the 'esprit de corps', reduce the size of the armies and to sanction those suspected disloyal to the regime. For instance, the 'Honour Trials' granted the military the authority (and obligation) to self-regulate deviant behaviour. Moreover, repressive or action constraining tools applied on society usually had a positive effect on the satisfaction of the very conservative Spanish military. Franco's regime did not tolerate any type of criticism from the ranks. Nonetheless, overall Franco opted for a 'carrot' approach to *authority* with the military.

Finally, the utilisation to *treasure* tools in Spain was constrained by a lack of resources. Three years of civil war had a devastating impact on the Spanish economy. Simultaneously, the international context of instability and the wars pushed the governments to maintain a large Army that, due to the profusion of senior rank officers, limited the flexibility in terms of the allocation of financial resources. Although there is evidence of the utilisation of direct *treasure* tools, general salary raises and generous financial compensations for the senior officers, the impact on subordination was mild. Despite the fact that most defence budgets were spent on salaries, these remained low, especially for lower rank officers. *Organisation*, *authority* and *nodality* instruments became necessary to compensate for the frustration that could have emerged for the poorly paid services of the military. The utilisation of equipment expenditure was even less relevant. The resources devoted to the acquisition of materials and equipment were minimal. Some ideas and perceptions underpin these choices. Franco, like Salazar, believed the main threat came from the internal enemy. Therefore a modernisation of the weaponry and equipment necessary for conventional warfare was not a top priority. Moreover, the military became used to the outdated and meagre equipment and ended up, thanks to government propaganda, believing than moral values were more important than the material. From 1953 onwards, the US began to supply foreign military aid that enabled a relative modernisation of the equipment and pushed new defence doctrines. Nonetheless, in the approach to *treasure* remained largely unchanged. In Spain the economic paradigm embraced by the technocratic governments channelled the funds available thanks to the economic boom

in the 1960s to other non-military expenditures. *Treasure* tools continued to be used until the 1970s when some efforts were made to improve the material conditions of the military.

8 Tools of government in the Spanish transition to democracy

8.1 Introduction¹

This chapter analyses the control strategy developed by the governments from the death of Franco in 1975 to the end of the first PSOE government in 1986. It shows that the transitional governments deeply transformed their control tool-mix to face the new challenges that the military posed and to enhance professionalism in the ranks. The role and attitude of the military in the Spanish transition was completely different than that of the Portuguese one (Chapters 3, 6). While in Portugal the military defined and controlled the political transformations, in Spain the military were excluded from the most important political decisions. Whereas in Portugal, left-wing military dominated the ranks, in Spain extreme right-wing officers were the most influential. Whilst in Portugal the military pushed for thorough reforms, in Spain the military wanted to keep an authoritarian regime and resisted most changes that the governments launched. These different circumstances had a strong impact on the choice of control tools, in particular during the period of UCD governments (1976–1982). Suárez enjoyed great legitimacy only in the eyes of civil society, not the military. Suárez, afraid that some control tools could generate more discontent in the armed forces, adopted a somewhat ‘laissez-faire’ approach to military subordination. This strategy was proven inadequate by the growing military disloyalty and various anti-government plots (Chapter 6 Section 6. 3.2). The first PSOE government (1982–1986) undertook many changes in the control strategy in order to consolidate military subordination. González counted with wider social support and did not have to face as serious military challenges as Suárez.

Table 17 synthesises the findings of this chapter. Coercive *organisation* tools were marginal before the 23F coup and nonexistent afterwards (Section 8.2.1). There were important changes in the use of non-coercive *organisation*, in particular after 1982. Military education was reformed to stimulate professionalism and emphasise technical skills over indoctrination. Military training was also reinforced thanks to the closer collaboration with NATO. Very important changes were conducted in the organisational design to centralise power in the Defence Minister and PM. The provision of services grew but that of jobs was abandoned for being considered counterproductive for military professionalism (Section 8.2.2). As for *nodality*, information detectors gained relevance to the detriment of information effectors. The government dismantled the Francoist propaganda and censorship machinery but reinforced the secret services (specially after the 23F coup) (Section 8.3). *Authority* incentives and rewards

¹This chapter refers to the transitional process in a broad sense, encompassing also the period of constitutional governments and democratic consolidation until 1986.

were more intensively used during the UCD period. Liberal military were promoted to important positions. Symbolic rewards and high levels of autonomy were granted to the armed forces (Section 8.4.1). From 1982, the socialist government intensified the use of sanctions and constraints in order to enhance professionalism and limit the autonomy and power that the military had enjoyed since the inception of the Francoist regime (Section 8.4.2). Although *treasure* remained the least salient category in the toolkit, its relative weight increased, in particular that of equipment expenditure (Section 8.5).

Table 17: Summary of tools of government in Spain (1976–1986)

Tools	Trajectory	
Organisation	<p><i>Coercive</i> (Section 8.2.1): The Army acted as a self-control device. Civil Guard and Police forces were minimally used</p> <p><i>Non-coercive</i> (Section 8.2.2): Military education abandoned the emphasis on moral indoctrination. Training was reinforced alongside the process of modernisation of the equipment and incorporation into NATO</p> <p>Provision of services was reinforced (ISFAS)</p> <p>Provision of jobs in the public administration</p> <p>Organisational design employed to increase coordination centralise power in the hands of the government</p>	<p>Very low utilisation (none after the 23F events)</p> <p>Education and training grew especially after 1982</p> <p>Provision of services grew from 1978.</p> <p>Abandoned during transition</p> <p>Extremely important. Its salience grew with the PSOE governments</p>
Nodality	<p><i>Information effectors</i> (Section 8.3.1): Media were used to gain support for the democratic reforms: Public TV and mainstream private press. Lack of control on the reactionary press</p> <p>Use of formal and informal meetings, visits, public speeches to convince the military and in particular the senior ranks of the advantages of the new political system and democratic values. Personal involvement of Suárez, Defence Ministers and the King</p> <p><i>Information detectors</i> (Section 8.3.2): The secret services spied on the military and neutralised some military plots</p> <p>The personal network of the defence ministers</p> <p>The independent media, academics and politicians were used as a source of information</p>	<p>Lower utilisation than during Francoism. The government dismantled the propaganda and censorship machinery. Free press law and elimination of the state-owned press</p> <p>Decreasing importance during the PSOE government which focused on achieving material obedience rather than on changing the ideology</p> <p>The use of secret services increased. First centralisation of functions into CESID and after the 23F coup reorganisation of CESID</p> <p>Stable</p> <p>Growing salience</p>
Authority	<p><i>Rewards and incentives</i> (Section 8.4.1): Appointments and promotions sometimes decided by the government circumventing the seniority principle</p> <p>Symbolic rewards: centrality of the armed forces in the Constitution, new military statutes and the figure of the King as (honorary) supreme commander</p> <p>Degree of autonomy of the armed forces. Ambiguity in the line of command</p> <p>NATO membership pleased many officers and created incentives to maintain subordination</p> <p><i>Sanctions and constraints</i> (Section 8.4.2): Legal constraints aiming to enhance professionalism (prohibition to political activities or expressing political views, elimination of multi-job situation, reduction of size of the Army and retirement age)</p> <p>Punishment to officers responsible for acts of indiscipline or anti-government plots</p> <p>Limitations to the power held by the military. Their power within the defence sphere was reduced and the functions as guardians of internal order (police and justice) eliminated</p>	<p>The interference of the government in promotions decreased in practice during the socialist period</p> <p>Mostly during UCD governments</p> <p>Very high until the PSOE government then drastically reduced</p> <p>Growing salience since 1982</p> <p>The regulation aiming to increase professionalism and reduce non-defence functions were initiated by UCD but reinforced under the socialists</p> <p>Very abundant but soft sanctions during UCD governments. Severe sanctions to the few acts of insubordination under PSOE's rule</p> <p>The process was initiated by the UCD but the PSOE government gave a strong impulse making it a priority.</p>
Treasure	<p><i>Staff expenditure</i> (Section 8.5.2): General salary raises to prevent protests, compensate inflation and achieve exclusive dedication (professionalism). In parallel with the effort of reduction of the size of the Army. Pensions were increased to stimulate early retirement</p> <p><i>Equipment expenditure</i> (Section 8.5.3): Modernisation of weaponry and materials. Expenditure in equipment was prioritised and some flexibility introduced in the budgetary process. Centralisation of investments. Lower salience of American military aid but increasing cooperation with other western allies and the reinforcement of Spanish defence industry favoured rearment. Rationalisation of the process of acquisitions</p>	<p>More frequent utilisation than during Francoism. The weight of staff expenditure decreased during Suárez's governments and remained stable during González's first mandate</p> <p>Increasing concern for military material means until 1985. Prioritised over staff expenditure</p>

8.2 Organisation

The government continued to prefer non-coercive *organisation* tools over coercive *organisation* tools the utilisation of which had become marginal since the 1940s. Although there were a few examples of utilisation of coercive power, in Spain only the military could effectively control the military by violent means. Moreover the memories of the Civil War made coercive *organisation* tools undesirable. Non-coercive *organisation* tools were extremely important for the military subordination. The provision of services replaced the provision of jobs in the public administration. Military education and training and, more importantly, the organisational design sought to improve the defence capacity of the Spanish Armed Forces and the professionalism of the military so that they would concentrate on their duties and not challenge the government.

8.2.1 Coercive organisation

Coercive *organisation* tools of control were uncommon during this period. Nonetheless at least in two occasions they were employed. First the state's organisational capacity was used as a deterrent tool during an illegal demonstration of members of the Armed Police and Civil Guard, which had military status, in Madrid on 17 December 1976. The Armed Police and the Brunete Armored Division of the Army (DAC) were deployed to control the demonstrators. Eventually, the demonstration was dissolved and a violent intervention was not necessary (Fernández López 2000: 24). Two-hundred and eighty policemen and civil guards were arrested and kept in custody in the prison of Soria, 240 were sanctioned, among which 14 were dismissed (Delgado 2005:296–300).

The second and best-known case of utilisation of coercive organisation tools can be found during the 23F coup attempt in 1981. The deterrent capacity of the DAC and the police forces was important for the neutralisation of the 23F coup. Although initially insurgent officers deployed some of the DAC units to control strategic targets, such as TV and radio stations and the congress, the intervention of the Captain-General of Madrid Quintana Lacaci and the JEME General Sáez de Tejada reversed the situation. They persuaded the heads of the DAC units to return to the quarters and to use their coercive power to neutralise the insurgents. The plotters had lost the coercive superiority and their chances to succeed militarily (Fernández López 2000:136–154). Moreover, the National Police, following orders of General Sáez de Santamaría, surrounded the congress to prevent any type of support to the group of 200 civil guards that kept the members of the parliament hostage. The special operations units from Guardia Civil and National Police had a plan to free the congressmen by force. In the end the use of force was not necessary (Prego 1999:619). The plotters were convinced to follow the orders of military hierarchy and the King and surrendered without offering resistance.

Despite these examples, the use of coercive *organisation* tools to control the military remained marginal, no state organisation had the power to deter the Army and moreover the government did not want to challenge the military. The approach was to show confidence in the obedience and self-control of the armed forces. The memories of the Spanish Civil War were very strong among political leaders and society at large and ruled out the use of violence as a control device during transition (Pérez Díaz 1993; Aguilar 1997).

8.2.2 Non-coercive organisation

The non-coercive use of organisation continued to be important for governments after the death of Franco although some evolution can be identified. Military education and training were emphasised. The provision of services by the state organisation was reinforced but that of jobs was reduced. The utilisation of organisational design gained salience in the control strategy. Contrary to the 'divide-and-rule' logic that Franco employed, transitional and early democratic governments tried to increase the centralisation of power and coordination among the branches.

First, military education was used to bridge the gap with civil society by introducing democratic values, to enhance cooperation among branches and to stimulate professionalism. The study of the Constitution and some changes were introduced in the curricula by the UCD government (Rodríguez Sahagún 1986:193). The need for inter-branch coordination was emphasised.² Later, the PSOE government tried to shape the process of socialisation in the armed forces and make the military accept the changed social values and the new political system. The military could not continue to act as guardians of authoritarianism. The responsibilities for military education were also transferred to the coordination body of the Defence Ministry and the autonomy of the branches was reduced.³ The emphasis on indoctrination and moral values over professional training, which Franco had imposed was gradually reduced. CESEDEN and the Institute of Strategic Studies were two fundamental tools in this endeavour in which military from the three branches cooperated (Agüero 1995; Barrachina 2002). From 1982, the General Direction of Information and Social Relations of Defence (DRISDE) served to promote wider and more professional information about defence, workshops, cultural activities and collaboration with universities and research centres and thus to converge the military and civilian spheres (Ministerio de Defensa, 1986: 393–405).

Moreover, military training improved. NATO membership introduced a series of joint military exercises and courses with other armed forces providing the Spanish military with a benchmark in terms of professionalism and promoting a change in their views.⁴

Despite all these efforts a gap in terms of values and preoccupations between Spanish and other military from western countries persisted. In 1987 Spain, there was a paternalistic conception of education that prioritised the instruction of values over that of skills. The gap and lack of exchanges between civil and military education persisted.⁵ The most part of the military rejected the plots against the new democratic system but it seems that this was not due to a change in their values and political ideas but to their sense of discipline and loyalty to the King and the senior rank that supported the government.

Second, the provision of services to the military was enhanced by the early transition democratic governments. The goals and financial efforts linked to the developmentalism of the 1960s undermined military salaries and social services (Aguilar Olivencia 1999:117). The

²Interview with Lieutenant-General Ignacio Alfaro Arregui (FOG, 18/12/87, cassette J33).

³Interview with General Sáez de Tejada (FOG, 17/11/87, cassette J25bis).

⁴Interview with Admiral Liberal Lucini (FOG, 4/12/87, cassette J30). He stresses the impact on the Navy and Air Force.

⁵See the seminars 'Comparative perspectives on military education' organised by Bañón and Rodrigo in Cangas de Onís in 1987 with the participation of German, Italian, Argentinian and US experts (FOG, 30/6/1987 and 01/7/1987, cassettes A2–4, A2–5, A2–7 and A2–8).

fundamental instrument to correct this trend during transition was the Social Institute of the Armed Forces (ISFAS). The institute was created in 1975 and began to deliver its services in 1978. Its purpose was to get closer to the level of health services provided to civil servants, which after the reform of the Spanish Social Security at the end of the dictatorship were of higher quality (Puell de la Villa 1997:212–213; 2008:225–243). The ISFAS provided services to over 300,000 members. ISFAS also organised cultural and leisure activities, supported retired officers and, particularly, promoted the construction of military housing (Rodríguez Sahagún 1986:193). For instance, up to 50% of the military enjoyed military housing in 1984 (Bañón 1985). On the other hand, the provision of jobs in the administration, crucial during the dictatorship, was severely reduced. Having more than one job became incompatible with the standards of professionalism. The traditional positions reserved for the military in the Administration or public companies were eliminated.⁶ The government believed that to improve their efficiency and reach civilian supremacy the military had to be disentangled from the political-administrative apparatus and concentrated exclusively on military duties.

Third and most important, the government used its capacity to modify the organisational design of the defence and military institutions as a tool of control. The logic was the opposite to that of ‘divide-and-rule’ that Franco has imposed. Increased coordination of the branches and centralisation of the power in the hands of civilians became the underlying principles. The military reforms initiated by General Gutiérrez Mellado and the UCD governments aimed to change the organisation of the armed forces and to gradually regroup and adapt the structures that were scattered among the military ministries so to increase coordination. The reorganisation was very ambitious and affected 440,000 people. The goal was to improve the operational capacity and efficiency of the armed forces⁷ but also to consolidate civilian supremacy (Rodríguez Sahagún 1986:190–192). Nonetheless, the process of re-design of the defence organisation was gradual and followed several steps.

In February 1977, the re-organisation of the armed forces was launched with the creation of a Board of Chiefs of Staff (JUJEM) hierarchically linked to the Prime Minister.⁸ The institutionalisation of JUJEM sought to guarantee the coordination of the military branches under civilian control. This new institution worked to create a unified doctrine, integrated plans of defence, and to advise the National Defence Board (Junta) on military policy. This tool was an intermediate step to establish a unitary Defence Ministry because it started separating operational from administrative tasks previous to the reunification of the three ministries.⁹ The second step important step by Suárez’s governments was the regulation of the functions and organisation of the Defence Ministry¹⁰ and the re-definition of the functions of the higher defence institutions including the JUJEM, the National Defence Board and the Chiefs of Staff of the military branches.¹¹

However the new configuration of these defence bodies can still be characterised as a dual structure due to the separation of political-administrative and military affairs and due to the fact

⁶Interview with Lieutenant-General José Gabeiras Montero (FOG, 11/12/87, cassette J31bis).

⁷The JEME, General Gabeiras Montero argues that the situation of the Army was ‘disastrous’ in terms of organisation (*ibid.*).

⁸Law 11/1977 (8/2/1977). Navajas Zubeldia (1995:179) claims that it initiated the ‘military transition’.

⁹See Seminar ‘Armed Forces and Military Consolidation’ (FOG, 25/4/1988, cassette CF2).

¹⁰Royal Decree 2723/1977 (2/11/1977).

¹¹Law 83/1978 (28/12/1978).

Table 18: Percentage of the total Defence Budget allocated to the central coordination bodies

1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
0.42	0.41	0.38	5.46	5.75	6.85	8.6	11.93	14.3	12.81	13.97	16.85

Source: Based on Muinelo Pérez (2009:91)

that the General Headquarters of the Army, Navy and Air Force were integrated in this new structure but not the three branches as such (Navajas Zubeldia 1995:181; Serra 2008:149). This ambiguity was mainly introduced because most military did not want to give up their autonomy in military affairs, did not share the ideal of civilian supremacy in defence issues and wanted two different hierarchical chains for civilians and the military.

The same concern and ambiguity was reflected in the new Organic Law 6/1980 that regulated the basic criteria of National Defence and Military Organisation. The law did not make explicit the subordination of the JUJEM and the newly created Chief of Defence Staff (JEMAD) to the government. Although the JUJEM and JEMAD were created following the American model for which civilian supremacy was a basic principle,¹² most of the military continued to think that Defence Minister and the Government remained merely administrators of military budgets (Puell de la Villa 2005:236).

The organisation of the Defence Ministry was reformed by the PSOE government, mainly through the Organic Law 1/1984 and the Royal Decree 135/1984. The reforms launched by the new Defence Minister, Narcís Serra, concentrated power in civilian hands and limited the autonomy of the military. The central coordination body of the Defence Ministry was restructured into three sections, two of them led by civilians,¹³ and its personnel grew steadily. Many competences were transferred to the central coordination body from the three branches, which lost much of their autonomy (Table 18).¹⁴ The Defence Minister was in charge of the elaboration and implementation of military policy and, by delegation from the Prime Minister, of the command, coordination and leadership of the Armed Forces (Ministerio de Defensa 1986:63). Civilians saw their participation in the Ministry grow and their influence gradually surpassed that of the military (Agüero 1995:192–196).

The JUJEM passed from being the supreme collegiate body in the chain of command to being merely an advisory board for the Defence Minister. The unified command of the armed forces was placed under the direct authority of the Minister, contrasting with the UCD period when the head of the JUJEM played that role (Powell 2001:374). With the Law 1/1984, the JEMAD became the main assistant of the Minister in the planning and execution of operative aspects of military policy and represented the Minister and armed forces in international or-

¹²See interview with General Sáez de Tejada (FOG, 17/11/87, cassette J25T).

¹³The first, headed by the JEMAD, was in charge of operational military matters. The second, under a Secretary of State, dealt with the management of financial resources, procurement and investment in infrastructure. Finally, the third block was headed by an Undersecretary of State and dealt with personnel policy and military education (Viñas 1988:176).

¹⁴See interview with General Sáez de Tejada (FOG, 17/11/87, cassette J25T and J25bis).

ganisations (Ministerio de Defensa 1986: 63). The new unified intelligence service (CESID) and the Civil Guard were directly subordinated to the Defence Minister, although the former was functionally dependent on the Prime Minister and the latter on the Interior Minister. In 1984, the territorial organisation of the armed forces was simplified. Spain was divided in 6 military regions and 2 military zones for the Canary and Balearic Islands (previously, there had been 9 military regions plus 4 maritime zones and 3 air zones).¹⁵ Finally, in 1985, the relationships within the Defence Ministry were regulated with the purpose of overcoming red tape and to facilitate information flows.¹⁶

In sum, the reorganisation launched by the socialist government intended to reduce the frictions between the branches and increased the contacts and collaboration among them.¹⁷ Most changes in the design of defence organisations aimed to enhance the coordination and centralisation of decisions into civilian hands.

8.2.3 Conclusion

During the Spanish transition the use of the *organisation* capacity as a control tool evolved. The changes can be mostly spotted in the non-coercive tools. The use of the coercive *organisation* instruments on the military such as the Armed Police or Civil Guard continued to be marginal. The fighting capacity of some Army units could not be challenged by violent means. The memories of the Civil War and the fear to the repetition of any type of armed conflict disqualified coercive tools as valid control methods.

The government preferred non-coercive *organisation* tools. Among them, the institutional and organisational design was the most salient for the subordination of the military. Franco had shaped the organisation of the armed forces with a divide-and-rule logic to eliminate any concentration of power and potential challenge to his personal leadership. On the other hand, the transition governments aimed to improve coordination among the branches and efficiency as well as to gradually concentrate decision-making power in the hands of the civilians in the Defence Ministry. Gradually military education switched from indoctrination of values to development of skills and training was reinforced, especially after NATO membership in 1982. The development of professionalism was expected to reduce military interventionism. Following the same logic, the governments stopped providing jobs for the military in the public administration because these diverted the attention away from purely military duties. In parallel, the government increased the provision of services for the military, mainly through the ISFAS, as a means to increase their well-being and to compensate low salaries.

8.3 Nodality

The use of *nodality* by the governments changed drastically after the death of Franco. The propaganda and censorship machinery that Franco had used to indoctrinate the military and society were dismantled. The governments used formal and informal channels of communica-

¹⁵ Royal Decree 1451/1984 (1/8/1984). See Guaita Martorell (1986:27).

¹⁶ Ministerial Order 18/1985 (1/7/1985).

¹⁷ See interview with Admiral Liberal Lucini (FOG, 4/12/87, cassette J3obis).

cation to persuade the military of the virtues of the political and military reforms. However, fuelled by the reactionary media, antidemocratic attitudes persisted in the armed forces. The socialist government reduced its reliance on information effectors prioritising material subordination over ideological endorsement. Additionally, information detectors gained importance, especially after the 23F coup. The independent media and the new centralised secret services became a check on the military.

8.3.1 Information effectors

The tight control of the information that Franco enjoyed thanks to his propaganda and censorship machinery was not reproduced in the transitional and early democratic period. Propaganda and censorship had been identified with the authoritarian rule and the democratic government tried to avoid them. This feature contrasts with the Portuguese transition where propaganda and censorship were very important until the coup in November 1975. Some *nodality* effectors continued to be used but their salience and effectiveness in the military control strategy was drastically reduced. Rather than eliminating or imposing manufactured information, Suárez's governments used the media, meetings, speeches and official communications to convince the military, and society at large, of the advantages of the political and military reforms. Since the results of Suárez's information strategy within the ranks were mild, the socialist government modified its approach.

The will of the Suárez's government to break with the information control of the authoritarian period is revealed by the Royal-Decree Law 24/1977, which established the freedom of expression and information, which was later also enshrined in the 1978 Constitution. The propaganda machinery was also dismantled. The official cinema news report NO-DO disappeared in May 1978 and most state-owned newspapers were closed in June 1979.¹⁸

However, the media continued to be important tools in the military subordination strategy. The Office for Information, Diffusion and Public Relations was established in order to improve the image of the Defence Ministry and the armed forces in the media. The government needed to counter the effects of the extreme right-wing newspapers, such as 'El Alcazar' and 'El Imparcial', which launched a smear campaign against the government.¹⁹ The privately owned mainstream press, such as 'ABC', 'Diario 16' and 'El País', built a consensus in favour of the political reforms during the and provided nuanced opinions on the military (Cayón 1995:465–477). Thus, the mainstream media played a stabilising role minimising the tensions between the armed forces and society at large (Busquets and Losada 2003:166; Preston 2004:498).

Suárez used the influence of the Spanish national television to consolidate his image in public opinion, the support of which served to shield the government from attacks from the extreme right and facilitated the reforms (Preston 1986; Morán 2009). The live TV coverage of the 23F coup was especially important to raising the awareness of the military threat. Suárez, skilfully used his oratory skills to achieve a great impact on Spanish public opinion.

¹⁸'Arriba' was the most important. With the competition from the new private press they were not economically viable. In May 1984, the last state-owned newspapers were closed (Martín de la Guardia 2008:250–265).

¹⁹Interview with Admiral Liberal Lucini (FOG, 20/11/87, cassette J27bis).

Notwithstanding, Suárez's media strategy was also criticised and for allowing 'an antidemocratic island in a more and more democratic ocean' (Busquets and Losada 2003:138) and also for a supposed lack of pedagogic effort, failing to persuade the armed forces of the necessity of reforms (Osorio 1980:183–189). The government did not censor the extreme right publications that incited the military to plot. 'El Alcazar' was probably the most significant of the publications that promoted military subversion and an instrument for the military bunker. Tens of thousands of copies of the journal were sent free of charge to all military units.²⁰ This shows that Suárez's government was afraid of the reactionary sectors in the armed forces and did not dare to take action against their preferred media.

In addition to the media, Suárez's governments used other *nodality* effectors such as personal communications with top officers, military speeches and official reports. Many formal and informal meetings were conducted between members of the governments and senior military leaders; although with mixed results for military subordination. A landmark of *nodality* use was the meeting that Suárez held with the top rank generals on 8 September 1976 to explain his plans of reforms and convince them to support the upcoming Law of Political Reform. However, this meeting ended up being counterproductive. During the meeting Suárez insinuated that he would not legalise the Communist party, which he did next year during Easter break without consulting with the generals creating serious unrest among the ranks. For instance, the Higher Council of the Army issued a formal objection, the Marine Minister Admiral Pita da Veiga resigned and several generals sent a protest memorandum to the King.²¹

Some individuals became also important information effectors. The Deputy Prime Minister Gutiérrez Mellado often visited military quarters addressing officers and troops, e.g. when he undertook a campaign to explain the Constitution. The effectiveness of this approach was unclear since Gutiérrez Mellado often encountered displays of indiscipline and insults in his visits, as in the Cartagena quarter and the funerals of military assassinated by terrorists. The first civilian Defence Minister, Rodríguez Sahagún, also tried to develop a close personal relation with the military in order to earn their trust, even playing cards or going to restaurants with them.²² Despite these efforts the government struggled to penetrate certain sectors of the military where antidemocratic values were deeply rooted due to the previous Francoist indoctrination.

Juan Carlos was also a significant nodal effector. The King played a crucial role in appeasing the military and in transmitting the ideal of civilian supremacy. Through his visits to military institutions and speeches he highlighted the need to keep the military away from politics and the necessity of cooperating with the reforms in the armed forces (Agüero 1995:213). He maintained very good personal relations with many senior officers, partially due to his education in the three military academies (Bernecker 1998:76–68). They recognised him as the rightful successor of Franco and respected him as their supreme commander (Tusell 1995:633). He used his influence whenever he perceived a threat from the armed forces. His intervention was fundamental to discourage a military putsch after the legalisation of the

²⁰Interview with José María de Areilza (FOG, 13/9/1984, cassette J8bis).

²¹Bañón (1988:342, 349). Although the meeting reassured some generals, it did not completely persuade them, all military representatives in the Cortes voted against the law. There are many different accounts about what happened during the meeting. See for instance interview with Vega Rodríguez (FOG, 14/10/1986, cassette J19); Osorio (1980); Gutiérrez Mellado y Picatoste (1983:148); and Fernández López (1998:91–92).

²²Interview with Admiral Liberal Lucini (FOG, 20/11/87, cassette J27bis).

communist party by the UCD government in 1977.²³ During the 23F events, he personally called every top rank general to announce his opposition to the coup and to command them to capture the insurgents.²⁴

Military speeches and official communications were also important information tools. They aimed to inculcate political neutrality and respect of the government's reforms and to counter the growing number of episodes of military indiscipline. For instance, military speeches and communications emphasised the need to preserve discipline, hierarchy and loyalty;²⁵ the degree of military autonomy;²⁶ rehabilitated the image of liberal officers;²⁷ stressed the apolitical character of the military²⁸ and tried to calm to the military.²⁹

Nodal effectors were not very salient during the PSOE government, which preferred information detectors. The military held an ideological position even more distant from that of the PSOE. Informal negotiations, visits and speeches lost prominence. On both sides unexpected political reforms and secret plots had generated suspicion. The government continued to use some nodal effectors to gain the confidence and respect of the military but gave up in the goal of convincing the military to change their values and wholeheartedly embrace the reforms (Cardona 1990:206). The government emphasised the most appealing aspects of its military policy to justify many of the reforms, such as the non-intervention in the promotion system or the virtues of NATO membership (Rodrigo 1985:369; 1992:73). Moreover the PSOE government also enjoyed a favourable support from the mainstream media that wanted to avoid a return to authoritarianism.

In sum, the Spanish government abandoned the Francoist *nodality* strategy that had been grounded in intensive propaganda and censorship. Suárez's governments tried to persuade the military to support the political and military reforms through press releases, appearances in the media, meetings and informal negotiations with senior officers and public speeches. Notwithstanding, the deeply rooted anti-democratic values in the ranks and the pressures from the bunker limited the success of these tools. The Socialists were aware of the poor results that the *nodality* strategy had for their predecessors and of the ideological gap that separated them from the military and accordingly their reliance on *nodality* effectors decreased.

²³Interview with Alfonso Osorio (FOG, 29/11/1984, cassette J14-3).

²⁴See Preston (1986), Tusell (1995); Powell (1996). Juan Carlos's stance against the plot legitimised the monarchy in the eyes of most Spaniards (Preston 2004:519).

²⁵See for instance, Fernández López (1998:101); Gutiérrez Mellado (1981:70–87); *El País* 6 January 1977 'Los militares deben obedecer también al mando político'.

²⁶For instance Gutiérrez Mellado's speech in Seville in 1977 and in the Parliament in 1978 claimed that the Chiefs of Staff were the 'first authority in the military command chain' (Gutiérrez Mellado 1981:75, 206–207).

²⁷*El País* 6 January 1978 'El general Vega elogió la capacidad militar de Lister y Modesto'

²⁸For instance, Gutiérrez Mellado's intervention at a conference at Seville's general headquarters (7/2/1977) and the General Report 1/77 of the Defence Ministry issued in September 1977 (Gutiérrez Mellado 1981:115–132, 140–145).

²⁹For instance, the General Reports of the Army 1/76 in September 1976 and the General Report of the Defence Ministry 1/78 issued in October 1978.

8.3.2 Information detectors

The information detectors gained salience during the transition. Suárez's governments centralised and rationalised the secret services although these remained dominated by conservative military hampering their capacity to control reactionary plots. The reorganisation and civilianisation of the secret services after the events of 23F improved their value as a control tool for González's government. In addition, personal informal networks continue to be a valuable means to obtain information. The media, academics and politicians also served as valuable 'ear trumpets' to monitor the military.

During the transition the intelligence services were concentrated. 'Tercera del Alto' and SECED merged in 1977 into the Higher Centre of Defence Information, CESID. The Brigade for Social Investigation was dissolved in 1978 and its functions passed to CESID. This meant a change from the authoritarian regime during which the information services were scattered so that none of them had much power. The CESID collected all internal affairs information and became very powerful in the armed forces. From then on the intelligence services were progressively civilianised (Díaz Fernández 2003:234–255, 289). Although the secret services served to prevent some military plots, including the 'Operación Galaxia' in 1978, their overall attitude towards military insurgence remained ambiguous. They were dominated by conservative officers and have been accused of passivity and even participation in the 23F coup (Fernández López 2000:214–218; Díaz Fernández 2005; Palacios 2009). Colonel San Martín, one of the plotters sentenced for his participation in the 23F coup had been the head of SECED until 1974.

After the events of the 23F, the CESID was reorganised and fighting reactionary military coups became its priority (Serra 2009:85–86). The new director of CESID, Colonel Alonso Manglano Manglano, created a network to spy on the armed forces.³⁰ The CESID reported directly to the Prime Minister.³¹ Among other contributions, the CESID exposed the 'Operación Cervantes' in October 1982 and the assassination attempt on the King and several members of the government in La Coruña in 1985 (Díaz Fernández 2005:221–224, 235). After 1985 military conspiracy was no longer the main priority for the secret services.

The nodal location of some important figures in the government served to obtain first hand information valuable to assess the situation in the barracks and to inform decisions. For instance, many of the top-rank officers during the transition were old colleagues of Gutiérrez Mellado, from the time of the General Academy and the High Staff School (Puell de la Villa 1997:55, 178). As mentioned earlier, Rodríguez Sahagún and, in particular, Juan Carlos also used friendship as a means to collect relevant information. Narcís Serra spent his first year as Defence Minister analysing the Ministry and the Armed Forces, supported by military aides, studying the experience of other European countries and meeting weekly with the President of the Government (Agüero 1988:44). This process of information collection was fundamental to establish the new defence policy and the reforms that ended up consolidating military subordination.

Finally, the function of oversight developed by journalists, academics and politicians was made possible by the new rights concerning freedom of speech and the effective limitation of

³⁰See interview with General Saez de Tejada (FOG, 17/11/87, cassette J25bis).

³¹Royal Decree 135/84 (25/1/1984).

the jurisdiction of military justice. The moderate media played an extraordinary role detecting relevant information. Not only did they support most democratic political and military reforms but they also acted as a detector and deterrent against military insubordination. They reproduced and criticised any declaration of relevant officers or politicians against the reforms. The government could easily monitor the acts of indiscipline and subversion and take disciplinary measures with greater legitimacy. The media paid an enormous attention to military affairs.³² One of the clearest examples of the detection function can be found in 1980. The director of 'Diario 16', Miguel Ángel Aguilar, accused General Torres Rojas of preparing a plot against democracy and the government quickly removed him from the command of the powerful DAC.³³ The role of the media was especially important during the 23F coup and its aftermath. Equally the academic and political elites became more concerned about military subordination. Research and publications proliferated and in the parliament defence commissions acquired more relevance. The DRISDE and CESEDEN also assisted the government monitoring the military and establishing links with the media, universities and research centres (Ministerio de Defensa 1986).

8.3.3 Conclusion

With the advent of democracy, the Francoist approach to *nodality* tools became discredited. Guided by democratic ideas, Suárez's governments dismantled the propaganda and censorship machinery and guaranteed freedom of information and opinion. His governments used the media, formal and informal meetings, visits to the quarters and public speeches to convince the military of the necessity of reforming the political system and to subordinate the military to civilian authority. The political instability and lack of information control was opportunistically used by anti-democratic elements to undermine the image of the government. The number of acts of indiscipline and military plots indicates the limited success of the information campaign of the government within the ranks. González's government learnt the lesson shifting efforts from information effectors to information detectors. If convincing the military was not possible, the priority became to monitor military behaviour and to punish any deviance. The new powerful information services, CESID, the personal networks of the members of the government and the King, the media, as well as academics and politicians became useful sources of information for the government in the endeavour of controlling the military.

8.4 Authority

Authority-based rewards and incentives as well as sanctions and constraints were used to change some behaviours and practices that were not compatible with the new democratic model and to achieve military subordination. Suárez's governments placed liberal military and civilians in key positions and granted great autonomy and special functions to the Armed Forces. The

³²For instance, Barrachina (2002) counts 548 news items in *El País* related to the Armed Forces in 1977.

³³Paradoxically, Miguel Angel Aguilar was then tried by a military court for 'insulting' the armed forces (Ballbé 1983:474–475).

PSOE government relied less on military promotions and symbolic rewards and reduced military autonomy. NATO membership became a tool in their control strategy. A series of constraints were imposed on the military in order to increase professionalism. Sanctions for discipline and anti-democratic behaviour as well as the legal restrictions imposed on the scope of military justice had been timid until the advent of the PSOE government. From 1983 the socialists perfected the legal framework that established the boundaries of military functions and imposed punishments for indiscipline. Overall, there was a gradual shift from rewards and incentives, preferred during the UCD period, towards sanctions and constraints during PSOE period.

8.4.1 Rewards and incentives

The transition and democratic governments continued to use *authority* tokens to provide incentives for military subordination, although this decreased over time. The capacity of the government to decide on certain promotions and appointments, symbolic rewards, a high degree military autonomy granted to the armed forces and NATO membership can be construed as *authority*-based tools that motivated the military to endorse the democratic system.

Franco had used his authority to appoint military to key positions in his administration but had respected seniority as the promotion criterion within the ranks. After the death of Franco this practice was reduced and completely abandoned during the PSOE government. The transitional government used promotions within the armed forces to reward loyalty and to ensure endorsement of the upcoming reforms inside the military. Seniority was not strictly respected in the promotion of senior officers. Political loyalty or other merits were considered. For instance, Arias Navarro promoted Vega Rodríguez to Captain-General of Madrid and Gutiérrez Mellado to the rank of Lieutenant-General and Central Joint Staff. During Suárez's rule, the appointment of Gutiérrez Mellado as Vice-President (1977–1981) and Defence Minister (1977–1979) aimed to avoid military opposition to the reforms. Gutiérrez Mellado also used strategic posting to consolidate his power. He relied on graduates of the prestigious High Staff courses that had experience working with foreign armies to implement the reforms (Puell de la Villa 1997:189, 203–204). The appointment of Generals Ibáñez Freire and José Timón de Lara as heads of the Civil Guard and Armed Police in 1976; the promotion of Ibáñez Freire as Captain-General of the IV Military Region in 1978; and the appointment of General Gabeiras Montero as JEME in 1979 were some of the most important, albeit controversial, measures aiming to replace reactionary generals by more moderate ones.³⁴ The appointments of Eduardo Serra and Jesús Palacios³⁵ as the first two civilians in the Defence Ministry and later that of Rodríguez Sahagún as Defence Minister in 1979 held a symbolic importance, too (Preston 1990:198).

Calvo Sotelo's government passed the Law 48/1981 (24/12/1981) to regulate military promotions in the Army. It established that the generals had to be promoted by the government

³⁴For instance, José Vega Rodríguez resigned in protest against the promotion of Ibáñez Freire as Captain-General which did not respect the seniority principle (Preston 1990:195–196 and interview with Alfonso Osorio in FOG, 29/11/1984, cassette J14–3). Gabeiras Montero claims that this was one of the main causes of the 23F coup, because it deeply upset Milans del Bosch (interview in FOG, 15/12/87, cassette J32bis).

³⁵Serra as Undersecretary of Defence and Palacios as Secretary General of Economic Affairs in the Defence Ministry.

and that colonels who were not promoted for six years would pass to the reserve. This law, together with the Law 20/1981 of Active Reserve (6/7/1981) were intended to renew the conservative top tier of the armed forces. Nonetheless, these laws created unrest in the ranks.³⁶ Finally, the socialist government, although it still had the capacity to appoint senior officers, decided to follow a policy of non-interference. They made clear that any act of disobedience or public declaration related to politics would result in expulsion but also that the government trusted the capacity of the military to select their own elite.³⁷

Second, some *authority* tokens were used as symbolic rewards aiming to increase military status and self-esteem emphasising the salience of their functions. For instance, the armed forces were dignified by the 1978 Constitution whose Article 8.1 established that their mission ‘is to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain and to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional order.’ The idea was to make the military feel at least in control of the situation and as participants in the fight against regional separatism that was one of the main concerns they expressed during transition.³⁸ The fact that the Constitution recognised the King, a military, as supreme commander of the armed forces was also as a symbolic reward for the military who acknowledged him as rightful successor of Franco.³⁹ The enactment of new military statutes, ‘Reales Ordenanzas’⁴⁰ was also used as a symbolic reward. These statutes, which substituted the previous ‘Ordenanzas de Carlos III’ of 1768, were not very restrictive and recognized many rights of the military. Their drafting was entrusted to a military committee and approved by the Parliament without any significant amendment (Bañón 1988:328). The statutes also set limits to the obedience principle. The article 34 of the ‘Reales Ordenanzas’ established that the military were not obliged to follow orders from their commanders when they were in conflict with the Constitution. Thus, the military were given the capacity to reject orders from superiors attempting to attack the regime.

Third, the UCD governments granted a great degree of autonomy to the military expecting to motivate them and reinforce their allegiance. Although the Defence Ministry made some strategic choices, the military took most day-to-day decisions without any interference or control from the ministry. For the military there was a difference between ‘authority’, held by the government, and ‘command’ held by the military top ranks.⁴¹ This legal ambiguity, introduced with the creation of the Defence Ministry, was not corrected by the new Organic Law 6/1980 (1/7/1980). The sense of autonomy was reinforced by the fact that the military occupied most of the positions in the Defence Ministry too. However, the PSOE government

³⁶See interviews with General Séez de Tejada (FOG, 17/11/87, cassette J25bis) and with Admiral Liberal Lucini (FOG, 27/11/87, cassette J29).

³⁷See Rodrigo (1985:368–369) and seminar ‘Armed Forces and Military Consolidation’ organised by Powell and Bañón (FOG, 25/4/1988, cassette CF1).

³⁸See interview with Admiral Liberal Lucini (FOG, 20/11/87, cassette J27bis) and Ballbé (1983).

³⁹Article 62, section h), that ‘[i]t is incumbent upon the King (...) [t]o exercise supreme command of the Armed Forces’. Nonetheless his supreme command over the Armed Forces was limited by Article 64 which requires the actions of the King to be ratified by the government. The Spanish King, similarly to British or Norwegian monarchs, holds a merely honorific mandate (Lafuente Balle 1987:6–12).

⁴⁰Law 85/1978 (24/12/1978).

⁴¹See interview with Admiral Liberal Lucini (FOG, 20/11/87, cassette J27bis) and Gutiérrez Mellado (1981: 75, 206–207). Nonetheless, the 1978 Constitution asserted the principle of civilian supremacy. Article 97 states that ‘[t]he Government shall conduct domestic and foreign policy, civil and military administration and the defence of the State.’

put an end to the autonomy the military. The Organic Law of Defence 1/1984 (5/1/1984) was the fundamental *authority* tool that set the pillars for the new military organisation and unmade the ambiguity of the military subordination to the Government. The law also eliminated the requirement of being a military to occupy certain positions in the Defence Ministry, accelerating the process of civilianisation (Puell de la Villa 1997:210). Military autonomy, although it had been initially positively perceived among the ranks, also fuelled anti-democratic attitudes.

Finally, the adhesion to NATO can be considered an *authority*-based incentive for the military. It created opportunities for the military to develop a more professional career and created incentives for military subordination. The Spanish government signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1982 and ratified it after a referendum in 1986. Many Spanish political leaders campaigned for the Alliance (Arenal and Aldecoa 1986:213–232). The majority of the military were also in favour of the integration, in particular those in the Navy.⁴² NATO membership served separate the military from domestic politics away from domestic politics (Gillespie 1989:425), to expose them to the company of new allies with more democratic values (Fernández López 2000:189) and to provide a new powerful enemy, the Eastern Block (Aguilar 1985:51). NATO contributed to improve civilian expertise on military affairs and helped the government to justify many of its reforms by arguing that these were a membership requirement (Rodrigo 1992:73). Even the PSOE, previously opposed, once in power decided to support NATO membership as a means for increasing professionalism and reducing reactionary attitudes. This shift in the stance of the PSOE leadership was welcomed by the military and helped dissipating some of their fears. The socialists seemed to have abandoned their ideological dogmatism towards a more pragmatic standpoint.

8.4.2 Sanctions and constraints

The governments after Francoism also used their legal authority to establish limitations and sanctions in order to prevent and punish non-compliant behaviour. These *authority* tools aimed to reverse many of the attitudes and practices developed during the dictatorship. Thus, legal constraints were imposed to enhance military professionalism, punish rebellious officers and limit the powers and functions of the armed forces to avoid their interference with political decisions.

First, the government imposed a series of legal constraints to military life and rights in order to enhance professionalism and subordination. The Royal Decree 10/1977 (8/2/1977) prohibited political and union activities to members of the armed forces. It banned the military from the expression of political views in public and holding political positions until retirement. An exception was made for the military ministers.⁴³ In 1978, Gutiérrez Mellado, as a means to enhance professionalism extended the regular working hours until 5pm. This was intended to prevent the military from undertaking second jobs in the afternoon, which until then had

⁴²See interview with Admiral Liberal Lucini (FOG, 27/11/87, cassette J29bis). Agüero (1988:42) stresses that in the Army many were opposed to NATO integration, especially those linked to the legacy of Africanism.

⁴³This decree was further amended by the Royal Decree 706/1977. Osorio stresses that following to the criticism of the exception made for the ministers, Gutiérrez Mellado ended up giving up military career. Interview with Alfonso Osorio (FOG, 29–11–1984, cassette J14–3).

been a common practice. Extra funds were allocated to compensate their loss of purchasing power. Secondments to the administration or public companies were also eliminated.⁴⁴

The Law 20/1981 (6/7/1981), regulating the passage to the reserve, also served as a mechanism to reinforce professionalism through the reduction of the size of the armed forces and the rejuvenation of its cadres. Younger and smaller armed forces could be better paid and equipped, more open to change and develop professionalism. This law also limited the capacity of the military to decide on the promotions to the top ranks. Notwithstanding, the oversize and the excess of officers persisted.⁴⁵ The reforms initiated by the PSOE government were more successful when it came to reducing the size and rejuvenating the armed forces. The Law 40/1984 (1/12/1984) defined the maximum number of officers in active duty per rank in the Army;⁴⁶ the Law 19/1984 (8/6/1984) reduced the length of mandatory military service to 12 months; and the Law 48/1984 (26/12/1984) introduced the possibility of conscientious objection.⁴⁷ These authority tokens contributed to improve professionalism and indirectly military subordination.

Second, the government dismissed the senior officers acting or speaking against the government. For instance, Deputy Prime Minister General de Santiago was obliged to resign due to his disagreements with Suárez in September 1976. In October 1976, Suárez's government decreed the passage to the military reserve of the generals De Santiago and Iniesta Cano.⁴⁸ General Félix Álvarez-Arenas was sacked on 1976 as Director of the Army Higher School due to the mishandling of a breach of discipline. General Prieto López was also discharged from the command of the Sixth Zone of the Civil Guard due to his criticism of the government in a funeral speech (Fernández López 1998:117–119). General Campano was substituted by General Ibañez Freire as head of the Civil Guard and General Aguilar by General Timón de Lara in the Armed Police after the illegal demonstrations of Police and Civil Guard agents in Madrid in 1976 (Gomáriz 1979:72–73).

Although sanctions for insubordination were very common they were not severe. In many cases, the sanctions were simply reassessments to different positions, usually of a similar level. For instance, in 1977, the reactionary General Milans del Bosch was removed from the DAC but was appointed Captain-General of the Third Military Region. General Armada was sacked from the secretariat of the King's military household for urging people to vote for the right-wing party Alianza Popular during the 1977 elections but then put in charge of the Army Higher School.⁴⁹ In August 1978 Lieutenant-Colonel Tejero wrote an open letter to the

⁴⁴Interview with Lieutenant-General José Gabeiras Montero (FOG, 11/12/87, cassette J31bis).

⁴⁵Between 1975 and 1983, the number of officers rose by almost 40% (Bañón 1988:331). The periods of effective command for senior officers were very short and the average age continued to be higher than that in most Western armed forces (Serra 2008:119–120).

⁴⁶As a means to reach this number, Royal Decree 1000/1985 (19/6/1985) introduced the 'transitory reserve' that allowed the military to pass to the reserve, maintaining their full salary.

⁴⁷According to Puell de la Villa (2005:246, 274) the General Plan for the Modernisation of the Army (META), initiated in 1985 and concluded in 1989, halved the number of officers. Fusi and Palafox (2003:393) claim that the Armed Forces passed from 66,000 officers and sub-officers and 270,000 soldiers in 1982 to 58,000 and 200,000 in 1992.

⁴⁸El País 2 October 1976 'Pase a la reserva de Iniesta Cano y De Santiago'. This was a controversial decision because it was done by loosely applying a law from 1942 that in theory was to be applied only to ex-combatants from the civil war (Fernández López 2000:20–23).

⁴⁹El País 21 February 1982 'Hubo careo Suárez-Armada en el otoño de 1977'.

King, published in the front page of ‘*El Imparcial*’, criticising the government. Only a minor penalty was imposed (Fernández López 1998:121–125, 130). Minor disciplinary sanctions were taken against seven officers who participated in an illegal meeting with the extreme-right leader Blas Piñar in Ceuta in March 1978.⁵⁰ General Atarés Peña, who, during a visit of Gutiérrez Mellado to Cartagena in November 1978, had insulted and attacked the government, was acquitted without any charges from a court-martial.⁵¹ During the funerals of two officers of the Armed Police and a Civil Guard assassinated by GRAPO in January 1977 and that of General Ortín, assassinated by ETA, in January 1979, some officers insulted Gutiérrez Mellado and the government. Only some of them received (minor) sanctions (Gutiérrez Mellado and Picatoste 1983: 107–114). The prestige that the outspoken military earned from their reactionary colleagues compensated the minimal punishments imposed (Fernández López 1998:130–132).

Contrary to the severe punishment against the clandestine liberal group UMD,⁵² the sanctions against the reactionary military that attempted to overthrow the democratic system were very soft during the UCD governments. For instance, the sanctions against ‘Operación Galaxia’ plotters in November 1978 were minimal. Captain Sáenz de Ynestrillas was sentenced to only six months of preventive arrest and was soon after promoted to the rank of Major. Tejero was imprisoned for seven months and soon given a post as head of a transport unit. General Luis Torres Rojas, commander of the DAC that had been involved in a plot in January 1980, became military governor of La Coruña (Ballbé 1983:472–473; Preston 1990:177–178). After the 23F coup, only 33 plotters were tried, among which 22 sentenced to prison. The infrequent sanctions to overt anti-democratic attitudes within the armed forces had ended up reinforcing the ultras’ conviction of the likelihood of success of a military intervention.

The PSOE government, aware of the failure of the soft policy in terms of punishments started a non-tolerance policy. After 1983, the Ministry began to use regularly sanctions against anti-constitutional attitudes as a sign of firmness and control. For example, Captain-General Soteras was sacked for trivialising the importance of the 1981 coup, General Fernández Tejeiro for a laudatory speech on Franco, and Vice Admiral Moreno de Alborán for circulating a memo criticising the government (Agüero 1995:212). Serra also appealed against the reduction of the sentence for the authors of the ‘Operación Cervantes’ decided by a military court (Busquets and Losada 2003:183).

Third, the government constrained the powers of the military, reducing their capacity to interfere with other institutions of the new democratic regime. The Royal Decree 2723/1977 (2/11/1977) that created the Defence Ministry, the 1978 Constitution (6/12/1978), the Organic Laws of Defence 6/1980 (1/7/1980) and 1/1984 (5/1/1984), as well as the other regulations that accompanied them meant a transfer of functions and powers away from the military. Through these legal reforms, the coordination and control of the armed forces, the command in case of war, the definition of the strategic goals and the approval of military policies were assumed by the Prime Minister. The Defence Minister exercised the management of defence policy and of the armed forces. All collective decision bodies in the armed forces

⁵⁰ABC (10/3/1978) ‘Expedientados en Ceuta siete militares por una reunión con Blas Piñar’.

⁵¹El País (29/5/1979) ‘El general Atarés, absuelto’.

⁵²The sentence against the UMD members may be seen not only as a sanction against its members but also as the use of legal authority in order to appease the reactionary generals that opposed the reforms (Busquets and Losada 2003:183).

were transformed into advisory bodies as a means to reinforce discipline and effectiveness in the chain of command and to clarify individual responsibilities (Serra 2008:97). Some military prerogatives were eliminated, such as the exclusive capacity over promotions, logistics, infrastructures and military education, which were transferred from the military branches to the new Defence Ministry. All companies controlled by the armed forces became part of the INI.

Formal constraints were introduced to gradually eliminate their previous role as guarantors of the internal order, to limit police and judicial functions of the military.⁵³ The process restricting the powers of the military was initiated in 1976 with the elimination of the Public Order Tribunals in which the military had played an important role.⁵⁴ In 1978, the Constitution established a clear separation between the Armed Forces and the Security Forces (Articles 8 and 104; Ballbé 1983: 460) and limited the scope of Military Justice (Article 117). The Organic Law 9/1980 (6/11/1980) reformed the Code of Military Justice. However, the 'Honour Trials' were not abolished (Busquets 1999:271) and the implementation the new formal principles was met with many obstacles (Ballbé 1983:469–488). Some of the limitations imposed on the military were not effective. They were always judged by other military officers and often suffered minimal or no punishment for their actions. Moreover the military continued to use their powers on civil society. For instance, in 1978 a military court tried and sentenced some actors of the theatre group 'Els Joglars' for offending the military institutions in the play 'La Torna'. The film director Pilar Miró was tried in 1980, because her film 'El Crimen de Cuenca' 'offended' the Civil Guard (Cardona 2001:286). In 1981, the journalist Miguel Angel Aguilar was tried for denouncing a military putsch (Ballbé 1983:474–475) and the union leader Romualdo Irujoa for insults against the Armed Forces.⁵⁵

Therefore, the PSOE government launched further reforms circumscribing the scope of military justice and further separated the Police and Armed Forces. The Organic Law 12/1985 (27/11/1985) developed a new Disciplinary Regime of the Armed Forces re-defining military offences and their sanctions. The Organic Law 13/1985 (9/12/1985) introduced a new Military Penal Code that specified which could be considered crimes against the military institution and the limits of military jurisdiction. Some crimes, such as military sedition during peace time or espionage, were integrated into the Ordinary Penal Code by Law 14/1985 (9/12/1985) (Valenciano Almoyna 1986:147–152). Ultimately, the government also incorporated military justice into the civilian justice system through the Organic Law 4/1987 of Competences and Organisation of Military Courts (15/7/1987). This law replaced the Supreme Military Council by a Military Chamber (Fifth Chamber) within the Spanish Supreme Court. The Military Chamber was composed equally of military and civilian judges and limited the competences traditionally held by Captain-Generals. This law concluded the process of delimitation of military justice (Agüero 1988:45).

⁵³During the transition some military still used their prominent role in the security forces and their far-reaching justice powers to interfere in Spanish political life. For instance, they commanded the suppression of left-wing demonstrations especially in 1976 and 1977 (in some occasions civilians died and even legal demonstrations were repressed such as in Malaga in 1977 at Tejero's orders); prosecuted civilians for political crimes and imposed soft sentences on those responsible for exacerbated police repression or clearly anti-democratic actions.

⁵⁴The Tribunals that prosecuted political crimes had been created after the dissolution of the Tribunal for the Repression of the Masonry and Communism in 1963.

⁵⁵ABC (22/2/1981) 'Consejo de Guerra contra un dirigente de Comisiones Marineiras'.

Moreover, the Organic Law 2/1986 of State Security Forces (13/3/1986) eliminated the military nature of the police forces. Only the Civil Guards kept a military status but became independent from the Army and were jointly administered by the Defence and Interior Ministries. Troops were redeployed away from the main urban areas. The Brigades of Operative Defence of the Territory eliminated and their functions assumed by the Civil Guard (Payne 1986: 186). Thus, from 1986, the preservation of internal public order was exclusively assigned to security forces independent from the military branches.

8.4.3 Conclusion

The utilisation of *authority* tools evolved greatly during this period. Overall, during the UCD governments *authority* was primarily used through incentives and rewards. Conversely, the PSOE government introduced many legal constraints to limit the military's autonomy and power. In general, loyalty was not rewarded by appointments to the public administration or state owned companies but by military promotions. The government promoted 'liberal' generals and civilians to key positions in the Defence Ministry to facilitate the reforms. The prominence and autonomy that the new legal framework granted to the armed forces sought to motivate the military and to attract their support for the democratic reforms. The armed forces occupied a privileged position in the constitutional text which established them as defenders of Spain's territorial integrity and of the constitutional order. They were also initially entrusted with great autonomy and decision-making powers although later the PSOE government drastically reduced them. NATO membership from 1982 can be seen as fundamental political instrument for civilian supremacy. The participation in the Alliance created many incentives for the military to accept their subordination and the political reforms.

On the other hand, *authority* tokens were also used to establish constraints on the capacity of the military to interfere with the political system and society beyond their strict functions as well as to punish disobedience. The prohibition of political activity and secondary jobs as well as the laws limiting retirement age and the size of the Armed Forces were the most salient. They helped addressing some of the problems that had hindered professionalism during the dictatorship, such as lack of dedication, politicisation, excess of officers and opposition to change and modernisation. The evidence shows that the sanctions to deviant behaviour were soft and not systematic and that the reforms limiting the reach of military justice were insufficient during the period of UCD governments. *Authority*-based sanctions and constraints increased their salience during the PSOE government. Punishment of deviant behaviour became more severe. The power of the military concerning defence, military education and the armament industry was limited. The reform and subordination of military justice to civilian justice as well as the effective separation of the Armed Forces from the Security Forces was achieved. In brief, through a series of regulations, the PSOE government managed to re-define the boundaries of military functions and to consolidate the principle of civilian supremacy.

8.5 Treasure

This section shows that after the death of Franco, Spanish governments tried to increase the amount of financial resources devoted to defence and to change the structure of military expenditure restoring the balance between staff and equipment expenses. The goal was not simply to increase the defence capacity but also to motivate the military and contribute to their depoliticisation and professionalisation. This section, first, analyses the evolution of military budgets and its distribution between staff and equipment expenses and investments. Second, it shows that the successive governments wanted to modernise equipment and increase salaries as a means to increase professionalism. Military budget allocations grew, especially those spent in equipment. However, military expenditure remained low in comparative terms and the excess of staff in the Army hindered not only the increase of salaries but also investments in weapons and materials.


8.5.1 Evolution of military budgets

Military expenditure grew during the transition and during most of the first socialist government. The admiration and extreme loyalty to Franco had served to keep down the criticism directed at the poor economic and material conditions of the military. After his death, the military became less willing to accept poor working conditions under a government that was dismantling the regime they had served and defended for several decades. The government understood that the symbolic rewards were not sufficient anymore and that in a situation of instability and discontent military loyalty had to be, at least partially, bought. The utilisation of treasure that had been intensified at the end of Francoism (Figure 17) received a new impulse after the end of the regime. *Treasure* gained salience in the governments' control strategy in democracy. In order to improve the efficiency of *treasure* as a tool of control the distribution of expenses was adjusted and the budgeting and investment processes centralised and modernised. Nonetheless military budgets grew less than other budgets in the public administration and in comparison with other countries they remained low.

Defence budgets grew in nominal and real terms, as well as a percentage of Spanish GDP from 1975 to 1985 (Figure 18, Figure 19). The most important increases coincided with the years of higher political instability. Thus, right after the death of Franco, in 1976 and 1977 defence budgets grew 8.18% and 8.95%. In 1982, the year of the general elections and one year after the 23F coup attempt the budget rose by 8% (Pérez Muñelo 2009: 85). The new impetus to the utilisation of *treasure* tools during the first democratic governments were possible due to the success of the far-reaching economic plans launched following the Moncloa Pacts. These were cooperation agreements signed in October 1977 by the political and economic elites. The pacts created a social climate of stability necessary to tackle the structural economic problems inherited from the rapid development of the previous decade and the oil crisis (Tarrow 1995; García Díez 2000).


As during Francoism, defence budgets grew slower than other public budgets. Public expenditure grew 136% from 1975 to 1986. Spain, as well as Portugal, was still far behind most European countries in terms of economic development and social welfare and other invest-

Figure 17: Total Defence budget in constant million euros of 2009 during Francoism




Source: Based on Pérez Muinelo (2009:85)

Figure 18: Total Defence budget in constant million euros of 2009 (1975–1986)



Source: Based on Pérez Muinelo (2009:85)


Figure 19: Defence budget as a percentage of GDP in Spain (1975–1986)



Source: Based on Pérez Muñuelo (2009:84)

ments and expenses were prioritised.⁵⁶ Although in the final years of the dictatorship and the initial years of transition the weight of defence budgets increased, from 12.25% in 1972 to 15.54% in 1976, later their share of the total public expenditure gradually shrank to 8.81% in 1986 (Figure 20). The mild increase in defence budget in 1986 did not compensate the inflation and in real terms, the defence budget decreased by 6%.

Figure 20: Defence budget as a percentage of the total public expenditure in Spain (1975–1986)




Source: Based on Pérez Muñuelo (2009:84)

⁵⁶See data on social expenditure in Comín and Díaz (2005).

Governments not only increased the quantity of resources dedicated to the military but also adjusted the distribution of financial resources and the budgeting and investment procedures to enhance the professionalisation of the armed forces. The UCD government increased investments and acquisitions of weapons and materials so that equipment passed from 39% of the total defence budget in 1976 to 49% in 1982 (Pérez Muinelo 2009:93). Calvo Sotelo also aimed to further change the structure of the consumption of financial resources reducing staff expenses to 40% of the total defence budget.⁵⁷ However, this target was never achieved. During the first PSOE government (1982–1986) the balance between staff and equipment remained basically unchanged (Figure 21).

Figure 21: Defence budget distribution of expenditure in percentage (1975–1986)



Source: Based on Pérez Muinelo (2009:93)

Aware of the problems of coordination among the three branches, the governments developed a centralisation strategy for the military economic policy. The Defence Undersecretariat was created in 1982⁵⁸ to coordinate the allocation of financial resources and the acquisition of equipment. From 1984, the State Secretariat of Defence⁵⁹ was in charge of budget planning and control of financial resources. An Economic Affairs General Directorate was introduced to improve the budgeting process. The government aimed to coordinate and rationalise military expenditure and investments. The responsibilities for procurement were transferred to the Defence Ministry and the branches had to plan and justify their staff and equipment demands and to compete for the allocation of economic resources.⁶⁰ Overall the process of evaluation of needs and planning of military expenditures was greatly improved.⁶¹

⁵⁷Law 44/1982 (7/7/1982).

⁵⁸Royal-Decree 252/1982 (12/2/1982).

⁵⁹Royal-Decree 135/1984 (25/1/1984).

⁶⁰Interview with Lieutenant-General Sáez de Tejada (FOG, 17/11/87, cassettes J25-T and J25-bis).

⁶¹See seminar 'Armed Forces and Military Consolidation' (FOG, 25/4/1988, cassette CF2).

Notwithstanding, military expenditure was considerably lower when compared to other western democracies and Mediterranean countries as percentage of GNP (CESEDEN 1988). For instance, from 1980 to 1984, the average military expenditure in Spain was 2.3% of the GNP while the average of European NATO members was 3.6% (Cosido Gutiérrez 1994:182).

8.5.2 Staff expenditure

As during the dictatorship, salaries were periodically raised to counter inflation and to reduce military unrest. Higher salaries were also considered necessary to achieve professionalisation and exclusive dedication in a time when second jobs had become a widespread problem (Gutiérrez Mellado 1981:216). Salary increases were possible thanks to the reduction in military personnel. However, salaries remained low and the governments did not manage to durably reduce the share of staff expenses in the military budgets in imitation of other more advanced western allies as they had wished.

Suárez's government increased military emoluments not only as a response to protests but also to foster professionalism. The goal was to increase military salaries to the level of civil service salaries, which at the time were 30% higher. In 1976 there was a general increase of 3,000 pesetas and in 1977 a reform in the salary regulation to equate military conditions to those of Spanish civil servants.⁶² Next, in 1978, the government announced new raises; salaries grew 14% for the top ranks and 25% for the lower ranks and pensions increased between 20% and 40%. These overall raises were accompanied with a change in the salary structure that largely benefited lower rank officers, and with the introduction of a salary supplement for exclusive dedication to gradually eradicate secondary jobs (Bañón 1988:342–343; Puell de la Villa 1997:210–211).

Although salaries increased more by than 20%, on average they did not noticeably reduce the pressures against liberalisation from the ranks (Preston 1990:196). The most reactionary military and political leaders interpreted these concessions to the military simply as signs of weaknesses of the government and continued to promote insubordination. Moreover, salaries continued to be lower than those in the civil service and other western armed forces.

Calvo Sotelo's government intended to protect salaries while reducing staff expenses by diminishing the size of the officers corps.⁶³ The reduction particularly affected the senior ranks.⁶⁴ However, as officers continued to earn their salaries in the reserve, the impact of this policy cannot be appreciated in the short term, and expenditure in staff remained almost constant in the following years (Figure 22).


The PSOE government followed a similar logic, trying to increase salaries while reducing the cost of staff and attempting to strengthen professionalism. The Law 19/1984 reduced the length of the mandatory military service to 12 months and Law 20/1984 again raised salaries to make them equivalent to those of civil servants, simplified the benefit system and introduced new remuneration for technical abilities, level of responsibility, productivity and

⁶²Royal Decree-law 22/1977 (30/3/1977) and Decree-law 923/1977 (13/4/1977).

⁶³Law 20/1981 (6/7/1981). It aimed to retire from active service 4,332 officers between 1982 and 1987 (Comas and Mandeville 1986:52).

⁶⁴For instance the number of lieutenant-generals was halved (Interview with General Ignacio Alfaro Arregui, FOG, 18/12/87, cassette J33bis).

Figure 22: Distribution of defence budget (equipment -including investments- and staff in constant million euros of 2009)



Source: Based on from Pérez Muñoz (2009:93)

extraordinary services (Ministerio de Defensa 1986:173–179). The cost of early retirement policies aiming to reduce the proportion of senior officers, combined with the salary increases, thwarted the government's goal of increasing material and investment expenditures to 60% (Powell 2001:377).

8.5.3 Equipment expenditure

Expenditure and investment on equipment were prioritised to achieve not only stronger but also more professional and obedient armed forces. The UCD and PSOE governments were aware of the poor material conditions of the Spanish military and committed themselves to modernisation. Funds allocations were increased (until 1985) and budgeting and investment procedures improved. The development of a defence industry and cooperation with other western countries contributed to the rearmament and modernisation, which were, however, slowed down by the needs in terms of staff spending.

Following that initial boost by the Law 32/1971 the expenditure in materials continued to grow during the transitional period (Figure 22).⁶⁵ The salience of the American direct aid had been greatly decreased by the beginning of the transitional period down to only 2% between 1972 to 1976. The government aimed to expand and update military budgetary resources in order to fulfil the plan of modernisation of materials and weaponry for the period 1976 to 1979.⁶⁶ In 1977, the government granted 686,948 million pesetas for the modernisation of materials to make credible the commitment to professionalisation of the armed forces (Rodrigo 1989:229–231). Moreover, the governments also facilitated defence acquisition pro-

⁶⁵See seminar 'Armed Forces and Military Consolidation' (FOG, 25/4/1988, cassette CF2).

⁶⁶Decree-Law 5/1977 (25/1/1977).

grammes by remitting the pending debts of the military ministries in 1976 and by financing the interests of some of their credits (Pérez Muinelo 2009:116–118).

From 1977 to 1982 UCD governments made an effort to renew and modernise military equipment that had been neglected during the dictatorship.⁶⁷ During this period the running costs and investments in new equipment and materials increased from 39% to more than 49% of the total defence budget (Figure 22). US aid continued to decrease to 1.4% although American loans accounted for 13.5% of supplementary funds for equipment acquisitions (Pérez Muinelo 2009:118). The first Strategic Global Plan of Defence (PEC) (1979/1980) aimed to help the Spanish defence industry and reduce the dependency from external suppliers. Spain acquired technology and agreements for joint production with other countries such as Germany, France, Italy and the UK (Rodríguez Sahagún 1986:191). Nonetheless this plan suffered several delays and was not fully implemented until the advent of the socialist government.⁶⁸

The PSOE government continued to promote the acquisition of equipment. Law 44/1982 established that budget for acquisition and running costs of equipment and weapons would be at least increased on average by 4.43% annually in real terms from 1983 to 1990. The Spanish defence industry, military research and development as well as the cooperation with supranational organisations were reinforced. The government exempted the import of equipment from taxation. Furthermore the government obtained 1,582 million dollar loans from the Federal Financing Bank from 1983 to 1986. The acquisition of F-18s and the plan of naval modernisation can be considered amongst the most relevant investment programmes.

However, the targeted increase in equipment expenditure was not achieved because the government also established a ceiling to the maximum average increase of the defence budget (2.5% excluding some budget allocations)⁶⁹ but did not manage to cut staff expenses sufficiently. In the end, the objective of modernisation was partially hindered by the increases in staff expenses. Another problem was that sometimes the needs in running costs were underestimated in the budgets which made later reallocations necessary. In fact, in real terms in 1986 equipment expenditure (including investment) was slightly lower than in 1982.⁷⁰

8.5.4 Conclusion

Treasure gained salience in the government control strategy after the death of Franco. Many military questioned the authority of the government and were not willing to continue operating with the same conditions of penury than during the dictatorship. Many of the symbolic and material rewards they had been receiving during Francoism were abandoned. The government embraced the idea, widespread in the NATO area, that better paid and equipped military would develop a more professional dedication and abstain from interfering in politics. Military expenditure grew continuously until 1985, but not as fast as other social and

⁶⁷Gutiérrez Mellado and Picatoste (1983:56).

⁶⁸Interview with Lieutenant-General José Gabeiras Montero (FOG, 15/12/87, cassette J32b).

⁶⁹Law 44/1982 (7/7/1982).

⁷⁰Here, Pérez Muinelo's book (2009:93, 120–123) published by the Defence Ministry contradicts Powell who claims during the first PSOE legislature there was a increase in defence investment, rising from 36% of the total state investment in 1982 to 47.6% in 1986 (Powell 2001:378).

infrastructure expenditures. The procedures for budgeting and investments were modernised and centralised in order to increase the impact treasure tools.

Although both staff and equipment expenditures were used to control the military, globally, the governments tried to enlarge the share devoted to equipment. Thus, in order to increase salaries while reducing the proportion of staff expenditures, the size of the Army was reduced. Several salary raises were decided in 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1984 and in parallel pensions were increased to stimulate early retirement. These measures served to bridge the economic gap between civil servants and the military while countering the unrest created by the political instability. The UCD government revitalised the modernisation plan initiated in 1971. The governments tried to facilitate acquisitions of equipment and materials by condoning previous debts, reducing import taxation, supporting the Spanish defence industry and acquiring foreign technology. The three branches had to plan their needs and compete for funds. Equipment expenditure was increased to the level of staff expenditure. In the short term, staff costs remained high due to the extraordinary payments and pensions inherited from the policy of reduction of personnel. Overall, the growth of military spending slowed down during the socialist government when the military threat had vanished and Spanish defence budgets one of the lowest in western developed countries.

8.6 Summary

After Franco's death there were deep transformations in the patterns of utilisation of control tools. The underlying principle was that more professional, better prepared and equipped military would concentrate on their duties and not interfere in politics. Many of the prerogatives they had enjoyed during the dictatorship had to be sacrificed. The changes were for the most part gradual and can be observed in each of the four types of tools of government.

Coercive *organisation* tools were minimally used but non-coercive tools acquired new salience and were utilised in a different fashion than during Francoism. Military education and training were intensified, especially after NATO membership in 1982. Gradually the attention shifted from inculcating distinct moral values to introducing technical skills and approaching the military to society. The state organisation capacity replaced the provision of jobs by the provision of social services. Organisational design became the most important mechanism of control. UCD and PSOE governments introduced far-reaching reforms abandoning the Francoist 'divide-and-rule' logic. They created a unified Defence Ministry and shaped the armed forces to improve coordination and centralise decision-making powers under civilian authority. During the UCD governments the incipient administrative machinery of the ministry was fragile and the laws and regulations that established it were ambiguous and incomplete, leaving room for interpretations incompatible with the western democratic principle of civilian supremacy. During the PSOE government, the bureaucracy and legislation grew, steadily achieving a transfer of competences to the Ministry and a reduction of the autonomy of the three branches. Moreover, the new organisational design demarcated the functional boundaries of the military making explicit civilian supremacy.

Franco's approach to *nodality* was also reversed. Information effectors saw their relevance reduced. The propaganda and censorship apparatus was dismantled. Rather than indoctrination

and limited access to information, the democratic approach favoured persuasion and freedom of information. Public speeches, meetings and the media were used to convince the military of the need of political reforms and civilian supremacy during the Suárez's rule. González's government was not convinced of the effectiveness of information effectors in changing military mentality and put emphasis on detecting threats from the ranks and learning from them. Information detectors grew in importance. The information services were strengthened. Academics, politicians and, in particular, the media contributed to monitor military insubordination.

Authority-based sanctions and constraints grew in salience while some of the traditional rewards were abandoned. The UCD governments limited the seniority principle to promote loyal liberal generals but did not appoint military outside the ranks. The special treatment that the military received in the Constitution, the honorary role of the King as supreme commander, the new military statutes and, in particular, the high degree of autonomy of the armed forces, intended to foster military support for the new political system. However, these formal recognitions were not comparable to all the prerogatives and symbolic rewards received during the dictatorship. Probably the most effective *authority*-based incentive was the decision to join NATO that encouraged professionalism and subordination. The limitations to military autonomy and to their prerogatives became crucial mechanisms of control, in particular under the PSOE government. The regulations launched by the PSOE government clarified that the military were completely subordinated to the government, imposed a new disciplinary regime and completed the process of limitation to their judicial and police powers.

Finally, the approach to *treasure* tools also evolved in this period. These tools became more salient in the control strategy. The contact with the western allies had made evident that the Spanish armies were badly paid and armed. Salary raises were believed to be necessary to achieve exclusive dedication. In order to increase salaries the governments tried to reduce the size of the Army. A smaller Army would allow better salaries and material means. Franco, being more concerned with the internal than with the external enemy, did not attach great importance to equipment expenditure. The democratic governments wanted to maintain the military exclusively concerned with the defence of the country from external threats. The modernisation of equipment and rearmament became a top priority in order to achieve a greater degree of professionalism in the military. Military investments and acquisitions were stimulated and the budgeting process was modernised and centralised. Equipment expenditure reached the level of staff expenditure during the initial years of the socialist government. Notwithstanding the growth of defence budgets was slower than of other ministries, and the extra costs derived from the early retirement policy constrained the modernisation of the armed forces. Once the danger of military intervention declined the budgets shrank, especially those dedicated to equipment.

In sum, during this period many important changes were introduced in the control strategy. Two broad different trends in control can be observed. First, Suárez's government, afraid of the reactions of the most conservative sectors in the armed forces, adopted a somewhat 'laissez-faire' approach with low interference in military affairs and great levels of tolerance towards the acts of indiscipline. Second, after the 23F coup attempt and in particular during the first PSOE government (1982–1984), more decisive actions were taken to restrain the autonomy and powers of the military.

Part IV

COMPARISONS AND EXPLANATIONS

9 Comparative analysis: trajectories in tool choice

9.1 Introduction

This chapter compares the trajectories in tool choice from a country perspective and the evolution of each of the four basic resources (*organisation*, *nodality*, *treasure* and *authority*). Finally, it addresses the first two analytical claims, introduced in Chapter 1, about general styles of control. Due to its long time period covered, this study focuses on the trajectories at the meso and macro-level and not in the micro-level decisions concerning the design or calibration of particular tools.¹

Section 9.2 compares the basic trajectories in tool choice and civil-military relations from a country perspective. It shows that the most significant changes in the trajectories of tool choice coincide with important historical junctures. The Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, the creation of NATO, the colonial conflicts, the fall of the authoritarian regimes as well as the military coup attempts in Portugal in 1975 and Spain 1981 coincided with the points of departure and/or closing stages for distinct trajectories. This chapter shows that although the trajectories in Portugal and Spain sometimes converged (such as during the 1940s and in the 1980s) most of the time the patterns in tool choices were different (such as during the Spanish Civil War, after the creation of NATO, during Portuguese Colonial Wars and during the initial stages of their transitions). Chapter 10 develops further the impact of the legacies of these macro-historical events on tool choice.

Section 9.3 explains the most salient features from the point of view of the four types of basic resources showing that *organisation* and *nodality* tools experienced more variance across countries and time than *authority* and *treasure*. For instance, in Spain coercive *organisation* tools, which had been very important during and in the aftermath of the Civil War, were abandoned in the mid-1940s. In Portugal the utilisation of coercive *organisation* tools remained constant until November 1975 and then abandoned. The utilisation of non-coercive *organisation* tools was notably intensified in Portugal during the 1950s and in Spain after the end of Francoism, in particular during the first PSOE government. As for *nodality*, the utilisation of information detectors was very different in both dictatorial regimes. Salazar spied on the military while Franco preferred to detect threats through his own personal close relationships with the hierarchy of the armed forces. Conversely, propaganda and censorship were central information effectors for both regimes but abandoned in 1976. In Spain this happened right after the death of Franco while Portugal did so when the MFA-Moderates displaced the Radi-

¹It is assumed that micro-level decisions concerning specific tools are embedded into wider scale meso-level and macro-level choices linked to mixes of tools and government styles (Hall 1993; Howlett 2009).

cals from the government. There were also some significant changes in *authority* and *treasure* tools (Chapters 4, 5, 7, 8 Sections 4 and 5) but overall in these countries, organisation and *nodality* were better indicators of the transformations in governments' control styles.

Third, this chapter concludes that no stable distinctive style of control can be associated with geopolitical factors or regime type. The hypothesis of an existence of unique 'Portuguese', 'Spanish', 'Iberian', 'authoritarian' and 'transitional' styles of control can be rejected. Although there are signs indicating common trajectories from 1982, the evidence is insufficient to confirm or reject the existence of a 'democratic' style of control.

9.2 Trajectories in Portugal and Spain

This section outlines that there were periods in which the trajectories of civil-military relations and tools of government in the Iberian countries were divergent and periods when they converged. The Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, the creation of NATO, the colonial conflicts, the fall of the authoritarian regimes as well as the military coup attempts in Portugal in 1975 and Spain in 1981 coincided with the points of departure and/or closing stages for distinct trajectories.

Portugal and Spain developed different patterns of tool choice during their dictatorships. The inception of the regimes profoundly impacted civil-military relations, including the control toolkit. The rise of fascism in the 1930s and Spanish Civil War shaped the paths of civil-military relations and control policies in both countries although more profoundly in Spain. At the level of tool choice, the immediate effect was to create a window of opportunity and incentive for a more repressive approach to control with very intensive utilisation of coercive organisation instruments as well as intrusive nodal detectors and effectors.

The Civil War introduced profound and lasting changes in Spanish civil-military relations. It allowed Franco to purge the armed forces from anyone suspected critical of his regime. Moreover, Franco's legitimacy as ruler was built on his military victory against the Republic (Aguilar Olivencia 1999). He managed to transform the Spanish Armed Forces to the extent that ever since they were considered the 'Francoist Armies'; a new institution virtually disconnected from its past as Armies of the Second Republic. Franco's armed forces were cohesive and professed fervent admiration for the dictator. The levels of contestation in the ranks were very low after the purges. This put civil-military relations on a different path in Spain and Portugal.

In Portugal, the military appointed Salazar as PM. His legitimacy was not based on a military victory but on his capacity to lead the government. The Portuguese Armed Forces were not purged and homogenised, the allegiance to the figure of the dictator in Portugal was not near as strong as in the case of Spain (Duarte 2010). These were not the 'Salazarist Armies'. Often the government's decisions were contested from the ranks and military coups attempts occurred periodically. The degree of military subordination in the Estado Novo was not comparable to that in Francoist Spain. Civil-military relations were less stable and more susceptible to crises. Salazar had to maintain a more active strategy of control vis-à-vis the military.

During the 1940s, a relative convergence in both tool choice and civil-military relations can be observed. In Spain, the repressive approach to control of the military was gradually reduced. The armed forces had been already thoroughly purged and the defeat of the Axis had contributed to the discredit of the control mechanisms associated with totalitarianism. At the same time that Franco softened his control approach on the military, Salazar managed to use the threat of the Second World War in order to consolidate his political leadership and reinforce his authority. Moreover, the Western Allies rewarded the Estado Novo for its collaboration by inviting Portugal to join NATO at its inception. NATO membership brought about some changes in the tools of control and within the Portuguese Armed Forces, putting Portugal's civil-military relations on a path divergent from that of Spain.

At the level of tool choice, Portugal's NATO membership triggered an increase in the intensity of education and training and changes in organisational design (non-coercive *organisation*). It is also associated, albeit to a lesser extent, with modernisation of weaponry and materials (*treasure*), and a gradual decline in information manipulation (*nodality effectors*). The goal was to maintain the military concentrated on their professional tasks and to improve their co-ordination and operational capacity vis-à-vis external threats. Whereas Franco's armed forces became self-complacent and did not question the dictator, the Portuguese military mentality was strongly affected by their participation in the Alliance. The Spanish military continued to be isolated, concentrated on the internal threats and recalling their past glory. The control toolkit remained stable. On the other hand, many Portuguese military went to study abroad or participated in NATO bodies and activities. They became aware of the deficiencies of the Portuguese Armed Forces and the political system. This contact transformed a generation of young officers, the 'NATO generation'. These officers became influential and later developed and spread critical thinking within the ranks, which was one of the main causes for the fall of the Estado Novo (Carrilho 1992; Telo 1996).

The path of civil-military relations that NATO had initiated in Portugal was, nonetheless, truncated by the Colonial Wars. The Colonial Wars forced Portugal to change its military and defence strategy and priorities. During the Colonial Wars the changes made to the control toolkit throughout the 1950s were reversed. Moreover, the wars drained the government's resources and legitimacy. Quickly it became evident that Portugal had little chances to reach a definitive victory and retain the colonies for long. Military dissatisfaction grew steadily. After the replacement of Salazar by Caetano in 1968, the government's position vis-à-vis the military weakened and the military put an end to the regime in 1974. In sum, the Colonial Wars provoked a process of regression in terms of civil-military relations and became the cause of the regime's downfall (Ferreira 2006:60).

Conversely in Spain from the late 1950s there were signs of evolution in some aspects of military policy. Franco reshuffled the cabinet in 1957 and the new technocratic ministers pushed for the abandonment of the previous autarchic ideas and initiated a moderated liberalisation (mainly in the economic sphere) that made Spain more permeable to ideas and normative pressures from the international actors. In this context the contacts with the US and French armies and the experience in the Sidi-Ifni war made the government and the military realise that the reality of the Spanish Armed Forces was far from the optimistic image projected by the official propaganda. In order to overcome some of the serious deficiencies limiting defence

capabilities, reforms in military education and training (non-coercive *organisation* tools) and a modernisation of equipment were launched.

Finally, the end of the dictatorial regimes led to deep but very distinct changes in civil-military relations in both countries. In Portugal the military subverted the traditional relation of power. The government was subordinated to military executive bodies such as the JSN and later the CR. Although the MFA and its revolutionary model meant to be a response against the previous regime and its military policies, the tools of military control employed ended up being to a great extent similar to those used during the Estado Novo, especially in terms of coercive *organisation*, intrusive *nodality* effectors and detectors and low intensity *treasure*. Moreover, military supremacy in politics did not contribute to military subordination in the barracks. Ideologically, the military were very fragmented and posed constant challenges to the governments during 1974 and 1975. The continuous political instability discredited the government led by Gonçalves and the MFA-Radicals. The MFA-Moderates stepped into power and after the left-wing November 1975 coup abrupt changes were adopted in the control toolkit. Coercive *organisation*, propaganda and censorship were abandoned. The special functions granted to the armed forces in internal affairs were eliminated. Non-coercive *organisation* tools and *authority* constraints gained more salience. Professionalisation replaced politicisation as a guiding principle. Nonetheless, the 1976 Constitution prolonged the situation in which the military held important political powers and had complete autonomy from the civilian government. The 1982 Constitutional reform and the new defence law put Portugal on a civil-military relations path similar to that of most of its western allies, including Spain.

The Spanish transition also showed an important degree of political contestation in the armed forces but overall, the trajectory of civil-military relations was very different. In Spain the military lost the agenda-setting power and did not participate in the core political decisions. In Portugal there was, at least initially, an approach to control similar to that of the previous regime, which was followed by a drastic reversal from late 1975. In contrast, Spanish transitional governments gradually introduced a new toolkit after the death of Franco. The re-design of the defence organisation became a fundamental tool of control. Franco's logic of 'divide-and-rule' was replaced by coordination and centralisation of decision-making power under the Defence Minister. Information effectors and *authority* rewards were less intensively used; at the same time, *nodal* detectors and *authority* constraints gained relevance. The modernisation of equipment initiated at the end of the dictatorship was further developed as a means to facilitate professional dedication and divert the military's attention away from politics. Finally, after the 1981 coup attempt and the ascent to power of the socialist party in 1982, far reaching reforms in military and defence policy opened a new trajectory in civil-military relations consolidating civilian supremacy.

In sum, the divergences between the two countries originate from the Spanish Civil War, which enabled a more repressive approach to control. Later, during the 1940s both countries converged: Franco softened his grip on the military and Salazar gained legitimacy by capitalising on his management of the Second World War crisis. Next, NATO membership in 1949 marked the beginning of a new direction in Portuguese civil-military relations. However this direction was truncated by the Portuguese Colonial Wars (1961–1975). During this period, in which Salazar was replaced by Caetano, there was fundamentally a regression in civil-military relations. In the meantime, in Spain the new technocratic cabinet appointed

in 1957 initiated a slow process of opening the regime that together with the bad experience in the Sidi-Ifni War coincided with reforms in the Spanish Armed Forces somewhat similar to those undertaken in Portugal after joining NATO in 1949. Finally, the fall of the regimes initiated in both countries a period of instability in terms of civil-military relations. Spain, embarked on a gradual process of reform of civil-military relations after the death of Franco. After 1982 the socialist government intensified reforms. In Portugal, after two years of revolutionary experience, the government implemented drastic changes. This process received a final impulse in 1982 putting Portugal on a path similar to that of Spain.

9.3 Trajectories in basic resources

This section outlines the most striking features in the evolution of the four categories of government tools. It does not attempt to capture all the changes observed in specific instruments but to establish some generalisations regarding the utilisation of the four basic resources. It shows that *organisation* and *nodality* experienced more variance across country and time than *authority* and *treasure*.

First, *organisation* tools are probably those whose patterns of utilisation more distinctively contributes to demarcate different trajectories in the control approach. Paramilitary and security forces such as the PIDE/DGS, PSP, GNR and Portuguese Legion acted as deterrent devices on the military throughout the Estado Novo, often participating in the neutralisation of military rebellions. Nonetheless, the contribution of these bodies was limited and the participation of loyal army units was fundamental to counter most rebellions. The fighting capacity of these organisations was very small compared to army units. Moreover, as Martins claims (1969:263), the government strategy was to minimise the use of terror. Salazar's Estado Novo had a comparatively low level of political imprisonment and avoided bloodshed as was common in the neighbouring country during the late 1930s and early 1940s (Pimlott and Seaton 1983:45). Although Caetano continued to rely on the coercive power of these paramilitary bodies (Porch 1977:22–23) on 25 April 1974 the loyal DGS, GNR and Legion unambiguously failed to defend the Estado Novo from a few insurgent army units. Despite abolishing the PIDE/DGS and Legion, the MFA-led provisional governments in transition intensified the utilisation of coercive tools. In addition to the ad-hoc created special military unit COPCON and AMI, the security forces, the judiciary, penitentiary services and even groups of armed civilians actively participated in shaping the control strategy in 1974 and 1975. Coercive *organisation* tools were abandoned in November 1975.

In Spain on the other hand, the use of *organisation* power in a coercive way was crucial from the beginning of the war until the mid 1940s. Loyal military units, courts and prisons served Franco to completely purge the armed forces. However, the Falangist and Carlist militias were disarmed after the Civil War and once the purges were concluded, coercion as a means of subordination of the Spanish military was abandoned for the rest of the dictatorship. The transition governments did not rely on coercive *organisation* control either. Even at the height of military insubordination during the 23F coup d'état, its utilisation remained minimal.

Non-coercive *organisation* tools, in particular military instruction and organisational design also help distinguishing changes in governments' control approach. Although some reforms in

the military education system took place in both countries in the 1940s, these were insufficient and the general level of instruction and professional preparation remained deficient. Franco was not very concerned with the levels of professionalism or with an external threat. Little attention was paid to education and training in the sense of developing stronger defence skills and professionalism. The emphasis was on moral values, the strengthening of discipline and obedience to Franco as well as on the reinforcement of the image of a victorious army (Aguilar Olivencia 1999). In the case of Portugal, Salazar always recognised that professionalism would make the military less prone to intervene in politics but at the same time he feared them acquiring government skills and therefore maintained an outdated education system (Wiarda 1988:128). Due to the lack of equipment and ammunition, military exercises were very rare in both countries. Regarding organisational design, the multiplication of command structures reinforced the power of the dictators and prevented the rise of any alternative source of military leadership. Both dictators followed a 'divide-and-rule' logic (Wheeler 1979b:199; Preston 1990:135).

However, NATO membership initiated in-depth changes in the utilisation of non-coercive *organisation* tools in Portugal during the 1950s. A series of reforms promoted by the US MAAG produced what Telo (1996) calls a 'quiet revolution' in the armed forces, which contributed to the modernisation of procedures and skills and to professionalism. Education and training became a priority. Hundreds of officers travelled to the US to undertake military training, new courses were introduced, education institutions were created and military exercises acquired a greater dimension. The organisation of the armed forces was also reformed in order to improve coordination. The creation of the National Defence Ministry and CEMGFA, in 1950, was a cornerstone in the new organisational design. Nonetheless, the colonial conflicts brought new concerns to the government and Portugal drifted apart from NATO and the US. NATO-led reforms were abandoned in Portugal.

In contrast, in Spain no relevant changes can be observed in the utilisation of non-coercive *organisation* tools until 1958. Precisely when in Portugal the *organisation*-based efforts aiming to enhance professionalisation started to be sidelined due to the incipient colonial conflicts, in Spain they acquired significance. From 1958 to the end of the dictatorship, military education and training were significantly reinforced following the NATO doctrine. The influence of the western allies became gradually stronger, in particular in the Navy and Air Force. Moreover while the provision of services, goods and jobs to military families decreased in Spain during the 1960s, in Portugal the utilisation of this type of non-coercive *organisation* instruments increased in order to compensate for the effects of the Colonial Wars.

During the period of transition, organisational design became a central tool of control in both countries. In Spain, there was a gradual reorganisation aiming to improve coordination among the branches and efficiency as well as concentrating decision-making power in the newly created Defence Ministry. In Portugal, two different trajectories can be observed. During 1974 and 1975, new military organisations were introduced to ensure military control on the political sphere and the politicisation of the armed forces. The result was decentralisation and fragmentation of power. From 1976, this trend was reversed, the Portuguese constitutional governments shaped the defence and military structures to centralise decision-making power and coordination. The defence structures were converging in both countries following NATO templates. In 1982, this trajectory was strengthened in both countries. Spain joined

NATO and Portugal abolished the CR and integrated the armed forces into the hierarchy of the Defence Ministry.

As for the other non-coercive *organisation* tools, the importance of education and training was low immediately after the end of the dictatorships but increased gradually. The emphasis on indoctrination of moral values was progressively replaced by a focus on technical skills. The goal was to improve professionalism and develop mutual awareness of the military and civilian spheres. Although there were no very significant changes in the provision of services there was a drastic reduction in the provision of jobs in the public sector for military personnel. The government believed that exclusive dedication to military issues would contribute to drive the military's attention away from politics.

The evolution of *nodality* tools also highlights different approaches to control. During the dictatorial regimes, propaganda and censorship were key instruments for the control of society at large but also of the armed forces in both Portugal and Spain. The information that the government supplied always exaggerated the figures of the leaders: Salazar as an 'economic and political mastermind', Franco as a 'military and political genius'. Moreover, the military were always portrayed as the saviours of the country, in Portugal thanks to their 'peaceful revolution' and in Spain due to the 'glorious victory against the communist menace'. The goal was to increase the self-esteem and status of the military as in order to compensate for the poor salaries and inadequate material conditions as well as to divert the attention away from political problems. Nevertheless, the fundamental difference in terms of *nodality* tools of government can be observed at the level of information detectors. Salazar and Caetano prioritised espionage on the military as a means to prevent plots against the government. In Spain, once the Civil War was over and the armed forces had been purged, there was little use of intelligence services. Franco did not attach great importance on spying within the ranks of the already purged Spanish Armed Forces. He trusted his close relationships with many senior officers as a reliable information detector.

One of the main sources of criticism levelled at the Estado Novo was its manipulation of information. Paradoxically, the fall of the regime did not lead to the rejection but to the intensification of the information tools employed on the military. Propaganda, censorship and surveillance of military activities were carried out by organisations such as the Fifth Division, CODICE and SDCI until 1976. Later, in both countries the propaganda and censorship apparatus was dismantled and freedom of information and opinion were guaranteed. The independent media began to act as a check on military. Nonetheless, the two countries' strategies concerning the information services differed: In Portugal in 1976 most information detectors were abolished and until the establishment of the new centralised secret services (SIRP) in 1984, the government had no intelligence services capable of controlling the military. In Spain, on the other hand, the new centralised intelligence services CESID established in 1978 became an important tool of control, especially after the 23F coup attempt in 1981.

In Portugal and Spain the utilisation of *treasure* tools was comparatively low and relatively stable. Salaries were in general not high but absorbed most of the military budget due to the large size of Portuguese and Spanish armies and the high proportion of senior officers. General salary raises barely compensated the effects of inflation. The economic growth experienced in the two countries was not reflected in clear increases of the financial resources spent to gratify the military or to improve their equipment. In the 1960s, Spanish governments favoured

infrastructure and social expenditure, in Portugal the Colonial War effort restrained the government's flexibility to adjust military budgets. The sole significant change observed was a gradual increase in the salience of equipment expenditure with the introduction of modernisation programmes first in Spain, from the early 1970s, and then in Portugal, from 1985.

The most important feature in the evolution of *authority* tools is that during Franco's dictatorship, during the Estado Novo's as well as during the period of provisional governments in Portugal and UCD's governments in Spain, rewards and incentives were more intensively used than sanctions and constraints. The military enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, symbolic rewards and developed important special functions in the regime beyond their pure defence tasks. Governments were in general very permissive with them. From 1982, this trend changed and in both countries regulations were then implemented to restrict the military to defence activities, increase professionalism and reduce their autonomy. Thus, with some exceptions,² the utilisation of authority was very similar in Portugal and Spain.

9.4 Distinct styles of control and civil-military relations?

As noted throughout the previous chapters, the governments of Portugal and Spain chose a combination of multiple tools for the purpose of military subordination. All four basic categories of tools coexisted at all times, although their degree of utilisation varied. Tools were not completely unrelated to each other or purely the outcome of random selection. The evidence shows that most tool choices were purposefully taken and that governments followed some patterns in their choices. This section assesses whether it is possible to identify well-defined styles for governing the military, linked to the geopolitical context and the type of regime. Based on the empirical evidence, the existence of a constant 'Iberian' or country-specific style of control or model of civil-military relations is rejected. Similarly, it is argued that there is not one single style associated to the type of regime.

The existence of some underlying Iberian ethos and a common political culture is often assumed in social sciences (Chapter 1 Section 1.4). Could the same be said about the style of control, i.e. is it accurate to speak about an 'Iberian style' of control or model of civil-military relations?

The answer is no, as the different trends identified in Portugal and Spain in this thesis refute the existence of a unique distinctive Iberian style of control or a common system of civil-military relations. This rejection, nonetheless, should not be expanded beyond the military sphere and the period analysed.

A superficial analysis of civil-military relations in the nineteenth and early twentieth century before the Estado Novo and Francoism points to many similarities in both countries (Appendices A, B). Equally, after 1982 there seems to be a convergence in both countries (Chapters 5, 8). It would be necessary to confirm that these *prima facie* convergences hold true through an in-depth analysis of tool choices and extend the analysis to other countries in order to verify that such common style is unique or specific to the Iberian Peninsula.

²In Portugal, the military promotions of senior officers during the Estado Novo was based on ministerial appointments and approvals ('escolha') while in Spain seniority was strictly respected until the advent of democracy.

The rejection of an ‘Iberian style’ needs to be further qualified. Despite not having identified an overall single ‘Iberian’ model it is important to acknowledge that the utilisation of *authority* and *treasure* was very similar in both countries for most periods analysed. Moreover there are two phases in which we can observe a general convergence in the toolkit of both countries, namely the 1940s and after 1982.

The analysis of the trends in the control toolkit also refutes the existence of a stable Portuguese or Spanish style of control. As Section 2 of this chapter shows, there were fundamental changes in both countries throughout the periods analysed. Not only did the degree of military subordination vary from country to country but the control toolkit also diverged.

Is it possible to establish, at least, common patterns associated to the type of regime? Again the evidence rejects the existence of cross-country ‘authoritarian’ and ‘transitional’ styles of control on the military. This thesis has unveiled many differences in the control toolkit during the authoritarian periods (Chapters 4 and 7) and in the case of the transition to democracy (Chapters 5 and 8). The differences go beyond tool choice and reach other aspects of civil-military relations.

Despite the many similarities between the Estado Novo and Franco’s regime, the civil-military relations in these countries were very different. This thesis confirms Diamond’s argument (2002) showing that authoritarian regimes, as well as democratic ones, differ among themselves in significant ways. In Portugal there was no total support for the authoritarian government within the ranks. In addition, the fact that Salazar, and especially Caetano, had been appointed by military men limited their authority (Rebelo de Sousa 1990:66). Franco was a military leader before he became a ruler and enjoyed higher levels of support in the armed forces. Franco and Salazar had different personalities as well as different preferences and priorities concerning military and defence policy (Medina 2000). The political institutional structure of the regimes also varied. Much more power was concentrated in the hands of Franco for whom the military were not a veto actor. On the other hand Salazar and Caetano had to share their power and face challenges from the military (Fernandes 2006; Duarte 2010).

Moreover, while Spain opted for a certain degree of isolationism especially after the Napoleonic invasions and the Congress of Vienna, Portugal tried to participate in all important international issues concerning Europe and Africa (Ferreira 1980:48). The Estado Novo was more exposed to the international actors and events. The traditional English-Portuguese Alliance, the Spanish Civil War, the (First and) Second World War, NATO and the Colonial Wars strongly affected Portuguese civil-military relations. The seclusion of Spain was aggravated due to the repression during and after the Civil War and the alignment with the Axis powers. Only after the defence agreements, the establishment of US military bases in the 1950s and the liberalisation of the economy in the 1960s, did Spain very gradually integrate into the western bloc and become more susceptible to the influence of international actors (Salas López 1974). As Section 9.3 shows, these differences contributed to different patterns in the utilisation of the tools of government in both regimes. Overall no one single ‘authoritarian’ model of civil-military relations or style of control can be identified in this research.

During the transition to democracy the discrepancies in terms of civil-military relations were accentuated. Although the Portuguese and Spanish transitions mutually influenced each

other (Sánchez Cervelló 1993) and both countries shared the problem of military insubordination, many of the features of their civil-military relations diverged. The Portuguese transition originated from a military coup and a revolutionary movement. The Spanish transition was not rooted in the collapse of the former system and a military intervention, but, among other factors, by pressures from inside the existing regime (Fishman 1990). The composition of the Portuguese Armed Forces was much more heterogeneous, both ideologically and socially, than that of the Spanish Armed Forces, in part due to the massive recruitment for the Colonial Wars (Carrilho 1985). While in Portugal the military provided the impulse for the democratisation, in Spain many of them, if not the majority, opposed the process. The role of the military was also completely different. In Portugal the MFA military occupied the main posts in the government and advisory bodies, in Spain the military lost the agenda-setting power and remained mainly spectators of the changes (Agüero 1995). Whereas in Spain the military were reluctant to be subordinated to the transition governments, in Portugal the military controlled the transition governments.³

These factors conditioned the strategy and tools of control for the subordination of the military, which differed greatly, particularly during the initial stages of the transition period (Section 9.2, Chapters 5, 8). Therefore it would also not be accurate to refer to a common 'transitional style' of control.

However, these countries experienced a process of convergence in civil-military relations, mainly from 1982 onwards, which was also reproduced in the control toolkit. In Portugal the failed military coup of 25 November 1975 was a turning point in the process of democratic institutionalisation and a first step for the withdrawal of the military from politics, later accomplished with the reforms launched in 1982 (Pinto 2006:64). In Spain, after the 23F coup attempt in 1981 and NATO membership in 1982, the new socialist government gave a decisive impulse to the process of military subordination and consolidation of democracy (Preston 1986; Agüero 1995). Accession to the EEC in 1986 confirmed that Portugal and Spain had developed western liberal democratic systems. The underlying strategy for the governments to strengthen civilian supremacy was to instil professionalism in the ranks (Danopoulos 1991). The convergence in political and civil-military dimensions was accompanied by a convergence in the control toolkit. Non-coercive *organisation* tools such as formal military education and organisational design were used to foster professionalism and coordination; the new independent media and centralised secret services acted as *nodality* detectors to prevent military interference with politics; *Authority* sanctions and constraints were redefined to limit military autonomy; and utilisation of *treasure* aimed primarily at the modernisation of equipment. These common features indicate that a common 'democratic' or 'western democratic' cannot be rejected on the basis of the analysis made by this thesis. More research beyond 1986 and Spain and Portugal would be necessary to confirm such a common 'democratic style'.

³From 1974 to 1976 the Portuguese case seems to confirm the idea that after the fall of an authoritarian regime some countries enter a 'political gray zone' in which the path towards democracy is not certain (Carothers 2002:9).

9.5 Summary

This chapter has shown the evolving nature of civil-military relations and tool choice in Portugal and Spain. It has revisited the main findings of Chapters 3 to 8 in order to establish and compare trajectories across countries, types of regimes and basic resources. It has concluded that there is no distinct single 'Iberian style' of civil-military relations or tool choice. The control toolkit employed by the Portuguese and Spanish governments was significantly different. Moreover, military attitudes and levels of subordination also varied between the two countries. Only during the 1940s and after 1982 was there a clear process of convergence. The changes observed in each of the countries across time, for the most part in *organisation* and *nodality* tools, helps rejecting the existence of one stable Portuguese or Spanish 'style' of control. Finally, this chapter has also rejected common authoritarian and transitional 'styles' but hints at the possibility of the development of a 'democratic style' after 1982. Next chapter explains the changes in civil-military relations and the control toolkit by contrasting two different neo-institutional interpretations that focus on the impact of historical legacies and on that of environmental factors.

10 Explaining change in tool choice

10.1 Introduction

The preceding chapters have illustrated the value of the NATO scheme as comparative framework for the study of civil-military relations. Building on the scheme's empirical application (Chapters 4, 5, 7, 8), Chapter 9 evaluated and rejected the first and second research claims presented in this thesis about the existence of 'Iberian', 'authoritarian' and 'transitional' styles of control. Chapter 10 introduces neo-institutional theory to the study of civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain. It tackles the third and fourth research claims (presented in Chapter 1 Section 1.4), by examining the explanatory reach of two different neo-institutionalist interpretations; one based on 'historical causes' and the other on 'constant causes' (Chapter 2 Section 2. 3). Although these approaches have some limitations, this chapter shows that they do advance the understanding of the evolution of civil-military relations and policy instruments in the cases discussed and potentially beyond.

Thus, Section 2 focuses on the third research claim and assesses to what extent the evolution of civil-military relations and tool choice can be explained by path-dependence. First, it analyses the legacies of the main macro-historical events associated with the most important political and military changes in the Peninsula (Chapters 3–8). It shows that these events altered the toolmix, creating critical junctures and new paths of civil-military relations. Second, it explores the patterns of stability and change observed in tool choice and whether they match path-dependence accounts. Finally, it concludes that although history matters, path-dependence is not sufficient to explain the change in the toolkit and civil-military relations. Section 3 analyses the fourth research claim about the role of context in shaping tool choice. It revisits some of the findings exposed in the empirical chapters (3–8), focusing on the impact of three sets of environmental factors: ideas, political institutional structure and the international environment. Finally, Section 4 recapitulates the main findings of this chapter and argues that both types of explanations are intertwined and complement each other. It highlights that the macro-historical events produced junctures and new trajectories but that these were in most cases not path-dependent. The specific cognitive and institutional context in which choices were made also shaped the trajectories between critical junctures. This section concludes by criticising 'orthodox' explanations based exclusively on historical or contextual factors and suggesting that a combination of both approaches provides a more comprehensive account of change in tool choice.

10.2 Path-dependence: the legacies of macro-historical events

This section explains the major changes observed in the trajectories of tool choice and civil-military relations against the backdrop of the legacies of some macro-historical events. Many authors in the sphere of historical neo-institutionalism interpret institutional change as a path-dependent course of action in which dynamics triggered by a past events or process would reproduce themselves even in the absence of the initial event or process.¹ The empirical evidence (Chapters 3–8) suggests that the beginning and end of certain patterns in tool choice coincided with some non-controllable overarching historical events, such as the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, the Colonial Wars and transitional political processes.² This section analyses whether these events left a legacy on civil-military relations and tool choice which would exhibit the characteristics of path-dependence explanations. Thus, it examines whether these events triggered endogenous self-reinforcing mechanisms and whether the evolution of tool choice followed a pattern of punctuated equilibria. This section argues that the macro-historical events acted as catalysts creating ‘critical junctures’ and change in the control toolkit. It shows that there were periods of relative stability followed by periods of change (sometimes gradual and sometimes more abrupt) in the control toolkit. Moreover, it illustrates the action of some self-reinforcing mechanisms and how temporal sequence affected choices and outcomes. However, the analysis reveals some important limitations of path-dependence explanations, which overall fail to completely capture the evolution observed in Portuguese and Spanish civil-military relations.

10.2.1 Legacy of the Spanish Civil War

In Spain, the Civil War ‘legitimised’ to a great extent the use of violence (coercive *organisation*), manipulation of information (*nodality* effectors) and the concentration of military and political power in the hands of Franco. The Civil War also produced the annihilation of the previous state institutions, enabling Franco to provide jobs in the civil service and to appoint military to political positions (non coercive *organisation* and *authority* tools). It also increased the size of the army, depleted the treasury of the State, and created a long economic crisis that constrained the availability of treasure severely (Chapters 6, 7).

Beyond the direct impact on the basic resources, the Civil War entailed some other deeper and more durable implications that set Spain on a distinct path of civil-military relations which had important implications even after the dictatorship. The victory in the war cemented Franco’s political and military leadership. Franco’s image was mythicised thanks to support of the propaganda machinery (Blanco Escolá 2000; Cardona 2001:213). To the extent that even the ‘liberal’ military men who guided the reforms after his death continued to

¹For instance, Krasner (1984), David (1985, 2000), Arthur (1989), Hacker (1998, 2002), Mahoney (2000) and Pierson (2000, 2002, 2004)

²Although previous macro-historical events such as the First World War (Ferreira 1992; Telo 1993; Duarte 2010) or the Spanish colonial conflicts in Morocco (Cardona 1983; Balfour 2002; Navajas Zubeldia 2011) had a strong impact on civil-military relations, the spotlight here is on those that occurred within the time-span of the research (1932–1986).

declare themselves admirers of Franco. The systematic purges and the influx of heavily indoctrinated militia officers produced ideologically extremely homogeneous and obedient armed forces. Moreover, the scarcity of material means made military education prioritise moral indoctrination over technical preparation. The official discourse portrayed the war as a crusade. Discipline was emphasised as a moral and religious virtue (Chapter 6 Sections 6.2.5, 6.3.1; Chapter 7 Sections 7.2.2, 7.3.1).

Due to the atrocities committed during and immediately after the war and the association with the Italian Fascists and German Nazis, Franco's regime was isolated by the international community (Chapter 6 Section 6.2.2). This isolation limited economic exchanges but also contacts with other armies and obstructed the influx of new ideas and had long-term consequences in civil-military relations. The isolation also aggravated the already dire economic situation of post-war Spain and negatively affected military salaries and equipment (Chapter 7 Section 7.5). The wide gap in terms of material conditions between Spain and most West European armies and the lack of resources to bridge it pushed the government to accentuate ideological indoctrination and isolation as a means to shield the military from a sad reality. Later, self-recruitment as well as the education and socialisation of the military also acted as self-reinforcement mechanism perpetuating a frozen military ideology (Chapter 6 Section 6.2.5). In sum, the Civil War deeply changed the armed forces (and the government) and introduced a series of self-perpetuating mechanisms that contributed decisively to an extraordinary degree of obedience to the figure of the dictator and created an ideologically cohesive military (Busquets 1984 [1971]; Cardona 2001).

The positive impact of the Civil War on Franco's control on the military can be better appreciated when compared to the Portuguese case. The inception of the Estado Novo did not follow the collapse of the previous military regime or a war. It was the result of a peaceful transfer of power from the military to Salazar. However, Salazar and especially Caetano saw their power over the armed forces limited by the fact that they had been chosen by the military, which retained much power in the institutional arrangement. Many military were not pleased with their appointments and others considered that the dictators were indebted to them. Throughout the regime there were always large groups within the armed forces that did not support the government or even conspired against it (Rebelo de Sousa 1990: 66; Gunther 1995: 74; Chapter 3 Sections 3.2.2, 3.2.5). Thus, although both were civilian authoritarian regimes their different inceptions introduced different durable inertias at the level of military allegiance to the respective dictators.

The Spanish Civil War also affected Portugal, but on a lesser extent. Salazar shaped his military and international relations strategy due to the threat that the instability in Spain posed (Ferreira 1989; Ferreira 2006:60). The army grew to face a potential invasion which slowed down the effort of a general modernisation of the armed forces launched in the early 1930s. Salazar took advantage of the war threat to divert the attention away from internal affairs and to personally command the War Ministry from 1936 despite the opposition of the military hierarchy (Telo 1996:149). The conjuncture of the Spanish Civil War also allowed Salazar to launch fundamental reforms for military subordination in 1937 (Faria 2000; Duarte 2010).

10.2.2 Legacy of the Second World War

The Second World War made forced Portugal to continue increasing the size of the armies in order to face an eventual invasion. Salazar's foreign and defence policies successfully managed to maintain Portugal in a delicate balance vis-à-vis the pressures from the international powers while steering internal tension between the military who were also divided in their support for the Allies and the Axis (Rosas 1988; Telo 1989; Carrilho 1989/ed.). During this period the external threat seems to have reduced military conspiracy against the regime and legitimised Salazar's direct control over the War Ministry which he maintained until 1944 (Chapter 3 Section 2.3).

The Second World War also produced a new configuration of the system of international relations consolidating two blocs. This precipitated the creation of NATO in 1949 to which Portugal was invited not only owing to its strategic potential but also as a reward for its cooperation with the Allies during the War, especially through the cession of the Azores military bases. Despite the insistence of the Portuguese government, Spain's accession to NATO was vetoed due to its association with the Axis. NATO marked a new trend in civil-military relations until the outbreak of the Colonial Wars (Chapter 3 Section 3.2.5). It mainly led to an increase in the intensity of education and training and changes in organisational design, and, albeit to a lesser extent, to the modernisation of weaponry and materials and a gradual decline in the salience of *nodality* effectors (Chapter 4). In this case a temporal separation between the event that triggered the process, the Second World War and the change in tool choice trajectory can be observed. This confirms that in some cases the manifestation of change in a social pattern can be delayed from its causal mechanism (Pierson 2003, 2004). Following Collier and Collier's critical juncture framework (1991:30), the Second World War can be considered as an antecedent to or condition for Portuguese membership in NATO, which constituted the critical juncture in the control toolkit.

NATO membership set Portugal on a path pushing the government to effect changes in the control toolkit. However, these changes can also be interpreted not simply as the result of non-controllable external shocks, as path-dependence explanations often assume but as the result of a process of policy transfer or lesson-drawing (Rose 1991; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Lodge and James 2003) in which the Portuguese government chose to apply a transnational template of military organisation and control (Sahlin-Andersson 2002). Using Powell and DiMaggio's terminology (1983), the adoption of NATO templates better fit a process of normative than of coercive isomorphism. The government was seeking legitimacy and support from the military, who in a large majority advocated the NATO doctrine. The fact that the NATO allies could do little to prevent Portugal to abandon (or reverse) most of these reforms when the colonial conflict broke out confirms this point.

When the defeat of the Axis was likely, it became advisable for Franco to abandon the tools of control associated to totalitarianism in order to gain the sympathy of the Allies.³ After 1942 the utilisation of coercive *organisation* was reduced and almost completely abandoned after 1945 (Chapter 7 Section 7.2.1). However, the saturation of the judiciary and prison systems caused by the repressive control policy and the fact that the armies had already been purged

³For instance in 1944 Franco announced a reduction of sentences for political prisoners as a means to change the Allies' negative perception of the regime (Preston 1993:514).

were the fundamental reasons for this change of strategy (Dueñas 1990). Thus, the change in the toolkit in this case seems to be the result of mechanisms of diminishing returns (or self-undermining process) initiated during the Spanish Civil War rather than of a new critical juncture.

The fundamental impact of the Civil War on Spain is related to the new international system that it created. The ideological alignment with the Axis and the support received from Italy and Germany during the Civil War provoked the rejection of Spain by the western allies. As explained earlier, the isolation of Spain and its armed forces as well as the lack of resources contributed to create a stable path of civil-military relations and tool choice until the semi-liberalisation and opening in the late 1950s. The apparent stability in civil-military relations after the Second World War masks what could be described as a sort of 'static process of departure'⁴ when considered against the backdrop of the general transformations that occurred in civil-military relations in most countries in the western sphere, including Portugal. The lack of changes in Spain gradually increased the gap vis-à-vis the model of civil-military relations and armed forces in the West.

10.2.3 Legacy of the Colonial Wars

The colonial conflicts were the next macro-historical event that shaped Portuguese and Spanish civil-military relations. The Suez crisis in 1956 meant a defeat of the traditional European colonial attitude and marked the beginning of a cascade of nationalist independence movements that expanded throughout Africa (Telo 1996:291–318). This crisis can be considered a direct antecedent to the Sidi-Ifni War in the Spanish North-African possessions (1957–1958) and to the longer and more extensive Portuguese Colonial Wars (1961–1975).

In Spain, the colonial problem had a limited impact on civil-military relations. Despite the efforts of the regime to hide the information about the Sidi-Ifni War, this conflict highlighted the deficiencies of the armed forces and triggered the first crisis in the Armed Forces since the Civil War (Losada 1990; Segura Valero 2006). The timid modernisation effort launched by the Army Minister General Barroso in 1958 can be linked to the problems of organisation, training and scarcity of materials that the Sidi-Ifni conflict revealed. Nonetheless, the gradual changes in terms of the control toolkit since the late 1950s seem to be more directly correlated to the opening of the regime and the exchanges with the US military than with the colonial conflict.⁵ Moreover no major changes in the attitude of the military or the government can be associated to the colonial conflict (Chapter 6 Sections 2.4, 2.5, 2.6; Chapter 7).

The impact of the colonial conflicts was much stronger in Portugal. Salazar's colonialist stance was very unpopular among most NATO allies and the Portuguese officers that had embraced the new NATO doctrine. The violence used to suppress a rebellion in Angola in 1957,

⁴A similar argument was used by Paul Pierson, in his lecture 'Welfare State Reform Over the (Very) Long-run' at the LSE (9/11/2010), who argued that the apparent stability of welfare indicators after 1971 was hiding a deep impact on redistribution and social policy when considering all the socio-economic changes that took place after that date.

⁵For instance the article 'El año militar' in ABC, (28/12/1958) stresses the important visits of senior officers to the US, including that of General Barroso who visited the main military facilities and the Pentagon and discussed the need for modernisation.

the likely fraud in the presidential elections of 1958, the steps towards decolonisation by France and the UK and John F. Kennedy's presidency marked a change in the international community's stance towards Portugal. Salazar's rigid colonialism often embarrassed its NATO allies (Robinson 1979:93). From 1957, Portugal began to detach itself from NATO and the US and abandoned the NATO-inspired reforms.⁶ The change in the military and defence strategies and priorities was accentuated in 1961 when the Defence Minister Botelho Moniz, who had launched many of the NATO-related reforms, failed his coup against Salazar and was forced to resign (Maxwell 1995:47–51). Salazar was aware of the American collaboration with the plotters and the independence movements in Africa (Mahoney 1983). The inflexible attitude vis-à-vis the military who surrendered Goa to Indian Armies in December 1961, underscores Salazar's firm decision to prioritise the defence of the colonies over all other considerations. Portugal was, thus, locked into a long Colonial War with little chances to secure a durable victory in the long-term. This war constrained all basic control resources, limited the effectiveness of many of the control tools and enormously increased military dissatisfaction (Chapter 3 Sections 2.5, 2.6; Chapter 4)

The impact of the Colonial Wars on Portuguese civil-military relations also reveals what Pierson calls a 'slow-moving causal process' and 'threshold effect' (Pierson 2003, 2004). The long Portuguese Colonial wars had a cumulative effect on military satisfaction. Many military began to feel gradually more detached and dissatisfied with the regime. The enactment of the Decree-Law 353 in 1973, which granted privileges to conscript officers, was a landmark in the deterioration of civil-military relations. Military discontent reached a critical level and the coup against the Estado Novo was triggered, transforming civil-military relations.⁷

In Portugal the effect of the Colonial Wars was also amplified by the previous impact of NATO on the Portuguese military. This can be construed as an example of how sequences of events matter and can produce unintended consequences (Mahoney 2000). Through the contacts with other armed forces, the Portuguese military had developed a more critical perspective on their professional role and on the policies of the regime. The decisions of the government concerning the colonial conflicts were against many of the ideas introduced by the 'NATO generation'. Gradually, dissatisfaction increased until the military decided to plot against the government. Had Portugal not joined NATO and not been exposed to different military and political ideas, the effect of the Colonial Wars might have been very different. In Spain, the process of decolonisation did not produce any visible impact on military allegiance to Franco. Salazar had previously used the threats of the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War as a means to strengthen his leadership. However, the Colonial Wars became a fundamental cause of the fall of his regime.

10.2.4 Legacy of the Political Transitions

The transitions into democracy in the two countries can be interpreted as macro-historical events producing critical junctures in civil-military trajectories. In Spain, after the death of Franco, some of the political transformations and terrorist violence became a source of discontent in the ranks. The transformations in the control policy introduced during the Suárez's

⁶The change of priorities in defence policy was not made official until 1959 (Telo 1996:324–328).

⁷See abundant information in AHM, divisão 1, secção 40, caixa 1.

governments did not succeed in preventing military insubordination. The strategy of granting a high degree of autonomy and imposing soft sanctions on insubordination did not seem to generate a positive feedback. On the contrary, this strategy reinforced the determination of the military conspirators who interpreted it as a sign of government weakness. The failure of the 23F coup in 1981 as well as Spanish membership to NATO and the land-slide victory of the socialist party in 1982 created the opportunity for new, deeper changes in the government toolkit and contributed to the subordination of the military (Chapter 6 Section 6.3; Chapter 8).

In Portugal, the political instability generated throughout 1974 and 1975 delegitimised the revolutionary approach of the Gonçalvist sector of the MFA. As during the military dictatorship from 1926 to 1932, the insensitivity of the military-led governments to the country's problems made the governments unpopular and convinced most military of the need to hand power back to civilians. The failed coup attempt by the revolutionary left in November 1975 served to consolidate the MFA-Moderates in power and paved the way to depoliticisation of the armed forces and profound changes in the control toolkit (Chapter 3 Section 3.3; Chapter 5).

In both countries the transitions from authoritarian rule were complex processes that did not directly result in a new stable path of civil-military relations and control toolkit. The control policies launched immediately after the end of the dictatorial regimes did not generate any equilibrium or self-reinforcing dynamics that would have contributed to a stable path of military subordination. On the contrary, they contributed to create a window of opportunity for military plotters to try to overthrow the newly established governments. Yet, in both countries the coup attempts failed and ended up strengthening civilian authority and legitimising transformations in the control toolkit.

The coup of November 1975 in Portugal and in part that of February 1981 in Spain can be considered critical junctures. These were not merely the result of non-controllable exogenous shocks but to a great extent endogenously generated by civil-military relations.⁸ This is in line with some critiques of pure path-dependence that tend to ignore the endogenously generated turning points in institutional or policy trajectories (Greif and Laitin 2004; Howlett 2009b).

10.2.5 Patterns in change

This section shows that the trajectories that followed the critical junctures did not always conform to the stable self-reinforcing dynamics that path dependence would predict. Path-dependence explanations usually depict change through punctuated equilibrium models and underestimate incremental changes across time (Thelen 2003; Peters et al. 2005:1278). They have focused on critical junctures that elicit dramatic shifts followed by periods of stability. The previous sections have confirmed that some macro-historical events unleashed critical junctures, truncating trajectories and inducing changes in civil-military relations and tool choice. However in order to assess the fitness and sufficiency of orthodox path-dependence explanations it is also required to scrutinise the modes of institutional change that can be observed in Portugal and Spain throughout the period analysed. This section synthesises the dynamics

⁸The Spanish Civil War can also be considered a to great extent endogenously-generated critical juncture. Since its causes fall out of the time-boundary of this research it has not been mentioned earlier.

observed between different junctures showing that change in the toolkit was not a homogeneous process. Sometimes changes were abrupt, correlated to specific events and conducive to distinct new paths and stability (as path dependency would predict). Nonetheless, at some other times, changes were gradual and cannot easily be linked to the legacy of cathartic events.

The most abrupt changes in the control toolkit following historical junctures took place in Spain at the start of the Civil War and under the PSOE government; and in Portugal after NATO accession, the outset of the colonial conflicts and the failed left-wing coup of November 1975.

The Spanish Civil War triggered an escalation in the utilisation of violent means unparalleled in contemporary Spanish history. Violence suddenly became a control mechanism employed extensively on civilians and military outside the battlefield.⁹ Political trials, imprisonment, torture and executions were systematically applied to those suspected of disloyalty or allegiance to the rival camp (Payne 1967; Preston 2006 [1986]). Equally, *nodality* tools quickly reached a new height. Newspapers, pamphlets, posters, radio programmes and a multiplicity of publications in the armed forces contributed to a far-reaching propaganda campaign aiming to ensure loyalty and motivate the military. Many new information services were created, collecting military and political information (Chapter 7). The reforms launched by the socialist defence minister Narcís Serra were the other example of rapid and drastic changes in Spain and can be easily linked to the legacy of the transitional process and the 23F coup. Having learnt from the problems faced by the UCD's hesitant reform agenda, the socialist government opted for more decisive and swift action (Agüero 1995). From 1984 a set of military reforms were implemented, generating profound changes in the utilisation of all four basic resources and decisively contributing to military subordination (Chapter 8).

In Portugal, NATO membership in 1949 quickly triggered important changes. From 1950 to 1959, the partial modernisation of materials and weaponry and, most importantly, fundamental reforms of the organisation, working methods, education and training were introduced following the model of the US Armed Forces.¹⁰ However, the rise of African independentist movements in the late 1950s and the prospect of a colonial conflict produced new drastic changes. The onset of the Colonial Wars led to the quick reversal of most of the reforms initiated during the 1950s. The US withdrew its material support to Portugal. The need of larger armed forces and the decentralisation and remote geographical situation of the contingents quickly produced a step back in the process of improvement of military education and centralisation of decision-making stimulated by NATO (Chapter 6). Immediately after the fall of the Estado Novo, there were substantial changes at the level of civil-military relations but not so many at the level of the control strategy. Only after the failed November 1975 coup attempt did the new MFA-moderate government drastically change its control approach. Coercive *organisation* instruments as well as propaganda, censorship and political surveillance on the military were removed from the toolkit, and *authority* rewards and incentives were replaced by sanctions and constraints (Chapter 7).

⁹Although the First Carlist War (1833–1840) produced many casualties in the battlefield, arguably political repression was not as systematic.

¹⁰These changes had profound repercussion on civil-military relations and can be connected to Botelho Moniz' 1961 coup attempt and the 1974 Carnations Revolution (Duarte 2010:275).

Orthodox path-dependence interpretations would expect that abrupt changes occurred in critical junctures are followed by stable trajectories. There were only four periods in which these stable paths can be observed: in Portugal during the 1940s and during the Colonial Wars; and in Spain during the Civil War and from 1945 to the late 1950s. As explained earlier (Sections 10.2.1, 10.2.2; Chapter 4), in Portugal the Spanish Civil War did not produce very strong changes in the control toolkit and the impact of the Second World War was delayed until the formation of NATO. Thus, from the reforms launched in December 1937 to those linked to NATO membership there were few significant variations in the control toolkit (despite many transformations at the level of foreign policy and defence strategy associated to the Second World War). The quick reversal of the NATO-led reforms after the outbreak of the colonial conflicts was followed by a period with few changes in the control mix that lasted until November 1975. The MFA-led provisional governments did not produce any considerable change, except arguably for changes in the intensity of some of the tools (Chapter 5). In Spain, the control toolkit adopted in 1936 at the onset of the Civil War remained unaltered for the rest of the conflict. After 1945 the isolation of the regime and the low levels of contestation within the ranks also contributed to a freeze in the control style until the reforms initiated in the late 1950s (triggered by the exchanges with the US Armed Forces and the Sidi-Ifni War) (Chapter 7).

The abrupt changes originated at historical junctures and the stable paths outlined above could match a path-dependence and punctuated equilibrium accounts. Notwithstanding, not all of the evolution observed fits this pattern. There were several other periods characterised by less abrupt but important transformations in tool choice such as the gradual changes implemented in Spain from the end of the Civil War to the mid 1940s, those from the late 1950s to the first PSOE government; and in Portugal the reforms in the 1930s and after 1976.

In Spain, during the Second World War there was a gradual abandonment of the repressive means of controlling the military. These changes are partially associated with self-undermining mechanisms introduced during the Civil War¹¹ but also reflect the loss of legitimacy of the repressive means of control associated with fascism and totalitarianism. In parallel to the gradual opening of the regime, from the late 1950s until the end of the dictatorship, moderate attempts of modernisation of equipment and organisational design were undertaken (Chapter 7). These changes can be very limitedly correlated to any of the macro-historical events analysed earlier.¹² The substantial alterations in the control toolkit during the transition were also introduced in a piecemeal fashion¹³ and did not elicit a stable equilibrium or trajectory.

In Portugal, several successive reforms progressively altered the control toolkit and civil-military relations throughout the 1930s.¹⁴ Overall this period cannot be clearly considered a critical juncture or a stable equilibrium. After major transformations occurred in the wake of the coup of November 1975, the control toolkit experienced new, gradual changes at the level of military education, the modernisation of equipment and the development of intelligence

¹¹These changes can be linked to the saturation of the *organisation* capacity of the state and the fact that the armed forces had already been purged of all discordant voices.

¹²The Sidi-Ifni war had an impact but cannot be deemed the major driver for change.

¹³This was due to the relative political weakness of the government and the opposition encountered within the ranks (Busquets and Losada 2003).

¹⁴These reforms were slowed down and partially hindered by the different contradictory views within the armed forces and by the changing nature of international threats (Faria 2000; Duarte 2010).

Table 19: Patterns in the evolution of tool choice

	Portugal	Spain
Times of abrupt changes	After NATO membership	Outbreak of the Civil War
	Outbreak of the Colonial Wars	After 1983
	After the coup of November 1975	
Periods of stability	1940s	Civil War
	Colonial Wars	From 1945 to late 1950s
Periods of gradual changes	1930s	Second World War
	From 1977 to 1986	From late 1950s to 1983

services (Chapters 4, 5). These choices were not contingent upon the legacy of one specific external shock.

In sum, in both countries there were periods of relative stability and periods of incremental or abrupt change in the tool trajectories (Table 19). The fact that change was often gradual and not directly correlated to any internal mechanism of self-reproduction triggered during a critical juncture disconfirms orthodox path-dependence explanations and punctuated equilibrium models and suggests that beyond the impact of past historical events there were other factors contributing to changes in tool choice.

10.2.6 Summing up: path-dependent civil-military relations?

Most concepts associated with path-dependence explanations (Chapter 2 Section 2.3.1) have been identified in the context of Portuguese and Spanish civil-military relations. They can explain many of the changes observed in civil-military relations in the Peninsula. However, they are by themselves insufficient to capture the entire evolution observed in tool choices. History matters but is not enough to fully explain the evolution of the control toolkit.

The evolution observed somewhat matches path-dependence explanations if considered in a broad sense as what occurred earlier in time affects the outcomes in a sequence of events (Sewell 1996:262–263). Some macro-historical events, such as the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, the Colonial Wars and the political transitions acted as ‘historical causes’ that put the control toolkit on a particular path different from that of the other country which shared similar initial conditions. Thus, like path-dependence explanations, this thesis suggests a certain sense of contingency in the unfolding of events (Mahoney 2000). Moreover, some features of path-dependence explanations have been identified in this chapter, such as the enduring legacies of external shocks, sequence effects and self-reinforcing dynamics (Section 10.2).

However, if path-dependence is understood in a more restrictive orthodox way (Arthur 1989; Mahoney 2000:507; Rixen and Viola 2009) then it fails to explicate civil-military rela-

tions and tool choice in the Peninsula. The evidence shows that choices were not completely locked into paths or the result of increasing returns or positive feedback mechanisms generated by past external shocks (as orthodox path-dependency would predict). The empirical evidence also suggests the importance of agency and that some of the critical junctures may have been largely endogenously generated by the system of civil-military relations. Moreover, what seems a path at one level of analysis is not necessarily one at a different level. Finally path-dependence can illustrate why the opportunity for change is created but it does not help predicting the direction or specific nature of change in the toolkit.

As Section 2.5 has shown, the evolution of the control toolkit and of civil-military relations in general in the Peninsula does not completely fit a model of punctuated equilibria. Portugal and Spain experienced some critical junctures and periods of quick changes but these were not always followed by stable trajectories. Although these critical junctures created new patterns in the utilisation of tools it would be very difficult, at least at the level of the control toolkit to find periods of complete stasis. There were variations between critical junctures not directly linked to the legacies of the events that induced them. Even during the times of relative stability, such as the 1940s in Portugal and from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s in Spain, if analysed closely enough, it is easy to perceive some changes (Chapters 4, 7).

The phenomenon of inertia or institutional reproduction (North 1990; Thelen 1999; Piereson 2000) can be observed at two stages. First, it is portrayed at the level of military ideology and attitudes in Spain. All the officers considered liberal or critical with Franco's regime were purged during and after the Civil War. The military who remained in the armed forces were very conservative and loyal to Franco groomed the following generations of military. This was a self-reinforcing mechanism that made the Spanish Armed Forces increasingly homogenous and loyal. Later, the isolation from other armed forces that followed the Second World War reinforced this inertia.¹⁵ Second, the limited availability of *treasure*, an excess of officers and the oversize of the armies, generated by the wars, 'locked' Portugal and Spain into a pattern of low utilisation of *treasure* that was compensated by an important utilisation of 'cheaper' tools such as *authority*-based rewards and incentives and intensive propaganda. Equipment expenditure was very low and the weapons and technical means for the defence of the countries became obsolete for the new type of warfare the Second World War had introduced. In order to compensate the lack of material means and preserve military morale, the Iberian regimes emphasised manpower and moral values over material means. Moreover, the Second World War proved that the Portuguese Armed Forces could not defend alone the country and complicated the acquisition of modern equipment by the Francoist regime. These facts contributed to shift the role of the military from defence against the external enemy to the defence against internal threats. This new role was more compatible with and the tool mix in place, i.e. high utilisation of *authority* incentives and *nodality* effectors and low use of *treasure* (Chapters 4, 7).

However, self-reinforcing dynamics were not all-pervasive. For instance, the significant reduction of the utilisation of coercive *organisation* tools in Spain from 1942 to 1945 seems to be associated with a process of diminishing returns. In the case of Portugal, it is difficult to identify clear patterns of positive feedback that contributed to the stability of the model

¹⁵As explained in Chapter 3 Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5, the contacts of Portuguese officers with other armed forces created the opposite effect.

of civil-military relations. On the contrary, it seems that the circumstances surrounding the inception and the institutional arrangement of the Estado Novo facilitated continuous challenges to the civilian supremacy and therefore introduced elements of instability. Despite the absence of apparent mechanisms of reinforcement sometimes the control toolkit remained stable, for instance in Portugal after the overthrow of Caetano. This suggests that other types of forces beyond the initial ‘historical causes’ and the existence of a certain degree of agency beyond pure structural or deterministic explanations were at play (Hall and Taylor 1996; Hay and Wincott 1998; Peters et al. 2005). In this case stability in civil-military relations and the reproduction of the toolkit seems to be due to the active involvement of some political actors which were influenced not only by past legacies but also by the current cognitive and institutional context in which they took decisions.

Additionally, orthodox path-dependence explanations would attribute the initial impulse for change to forces exogenous to the systems of civil-military relations (Chapter 2 Section 2.3.1). However, the evidence suggests that individuals and institutions within the system had the capacity to effect changes and shape policy outputs (Chapters 3–8; Chapter 10 Section 10.3.1). Moreover, some of the macro-historical events that triggered critical junctures, if analysed with the sufficient historical distance, can be considered as endogenously generated by the system of civil-military relations. This is the case for the Spanish Civil War, the collapse of the Estado Novo and the coups of November 1975 in Portugal and February 1981 in Spain (Chapter 3, 6). These historical events were, to a great extent, brought about by past decisions from within the system of civil-military relations.

The level of analysis is also problematic (Waltz 1959; Singer 1961; Schonhardt-Bailey 2001). Policy elements are embedded or ‘nested’ in interrelated but not completely synchronous levels. Three levels of analysis or abstraction can be distinguished: a macro-level of general policy styles and abstract policy goals for civil-military relations; a meso-level related to alternative policy objectives and tool combinations; and a micro-level of choices surrounding specific policy targets and tool calibrations.¹⁶ This thesis shows that at different levels of analysis the patterns of evolution observed may vary. Therefore the inertias or paths observed at one level may not be as stable from a different level of analysis.

Probably the most interesting illustration of this can be found in the case of Portugal from the Colonial Wars until the end of 1975. In this period from the macro-perspective of civil-military relations there was a clear break, especially manifested in the Carnation Revolution and the fact that the military took over power (Chapter 3 Section 3.3). However, if this period is analysed from the meso-perspective of the control toolkit it can be concluded that there were no fundamental changes, that the logic of control remained to a great extent similar and that the governments continued to rely on a similar mix of basic resources. Finally, at the micro-level, when examining the specific tool choices it needs to be stressed that the stability in the meso-level did not imply a complete stasis. After the fall of Caetano the provisional governments replaced many of the tools they were using by similar ones. For instance, the PIDE/DGS, Legion, Mocidade and the Estado Novo’s propaganda machinery were replaced by the SDCI, COPCOM, the Fifth Division and CODICE which performed similar control tasks

¹⁶This distinction is inspired by Howlett (2011:37–38). This thesis mainly focuses on the trajectories at a macro and meso level. See ideas about embeddedness of different levels or orders in Hall (1993) and Howlett (2009).

(Chapter 5). Therefore, different patterns and types of explanation can be identified according to levels of analysis adopted. The impact of macro-historical events, and probably also that of other contextual factors and individual actions, can be asymmetric at different institutional and policy levels.

Finally, although the external shocks explain why previous courses of action were truncated and new windows of opportunity for action were opened at the level of civil-military relations, they are less effective in explaining the specific nature of change or direction at the level of the tool mix. Path-dependence explanations fit some of the choices of specific tools but overall the explanatory value of the macro-historical events decreases when descending the ladder of abstraction and looking into the specific choices. The next section shows that other explanations that take into account not only structure but also agency complement path-dependence accounts.

In sum, all four overarching contextual events examined generated critical junctures in the control toolkit and in civil-military relations and produced distinct legacies or trajectories. Path-dependence provides an interesting way conceptualise *ex-post* the evolution of civil-military relations and partly that of the tools of government. The analysis of these trajectories reveals a variety of the fundamental features or mechanisms associated with path-dependence explanations. However, at the same time they also underline some of the main limitations of pure path-dependence interpretations, such as the existence of mechanisms beyond positive feedbacks or inertia, the absence of attention to endogenously generated change and the problems of accommodating different levels of analysis (Table 20). History matters but it does not provide the whole picture and narrow path-dependence interpretations are 'too contingent and too deterministic' (Thelen 1999:385) to capture all choices and major changes observed in this thesis. Therefore, alternative and complementary explanations need to be explored in order to qualify accounts based on path-dependence.

10.3 Environmental factors: the continuing action of context

The previous section has argued that path-dependence models do not appear to be good indicators to predict change.¹⁷ External shocks produced by macro-historical events help explaining the emergence of new trajectories but not their nature or direction. Persistence and inertia do not account for all the change observed. Neo-institutionalism also provides other analytical concepts that are rooted in the ideational and institutional context and can serve to refine the explanations about the evolution of tool choice and civil-military relations (Chapter 2 Section 2.3.2). This section examines three sets of environmental factors (ideas, the political institutional structure and the international environment) and provides examples that illustrate how the ongoing action of context shaped civil-military relations and tool choice.

¹⁷Similar criticisms have been made by Raadschelders (1998), Peters (1999:63–77) and Weyland (2008).

Table 20: Summary of the evaluation of path-dependence explanations

Analytical concepts	Theoretical claims fitting path-dependence	Theoretical claims <i>not</i> fitting path-dependence
Critical junctures	All macro-historical events observed produced critical junctures and deep changes in civil-military relations	Did not always produce stable paths in civil-military relations. Moreover its impact can be asymmetric at different levels of analysis
Exogenous shocks	All change observed has been directly or indirectly associated with external shocks	In the long-term some of the macro-historical events were partially endogenously-generated
Punctuated equilibria	There were periods of stability and periods of drastic changes	During some periods changes were gradual and did not follow a clear stable path
Self-reinforcing mechanisms	Some events produced long term legacies on civil military-relations through self-reinforcing (and self-undermining) dynamics	Choices of tools do not seem completely locked-in by self-reproducing mechanisms
Sequence and timing	Some events saw their effects amplified due to the specific timing or sequence in which they took place. Many choices were shaped by earlier choices, outcomes and events	Some choices do not seem directly correlated to or constrained by past events and choices but fundamentally to the current circumstances

10.3.1 Ideas

The cognitive dimension of the context shapes the toolkit in several ways. Decision-makers operate within an interpretive framework of ideas or policy paradigm that specifies not only the problems and goals but also the tools that can be used to solve a problem (Hall 1993:279–280). The shared ideologies of government and control, the economic and technocratic ideas, and the personal past experiences and individual perceptions of decision-makers, help explaining some of the trends portrayed in the previous chapters.

First, shared ideologies of government and control doctrines affected civil-military relations and tool choice. The origins of these regimes were saturated with the fascist autocratic ideologies that emerged in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s and that legitimised an intrusive approach to control and military participation in the state apparatus.¹⁸ Indoctrination and a partial politicisation of the armed forces were carried out through intensive censorship, propaganda and a significant participation of the military in the state apparatus. Other features of the control toolkit that are associated with these ideologies are the utilisation of paramilitary forces, such as the Carlist and Falangist militias during the Civil War and the Portuguese Legion; the secret political police PVDE/PIDE/DGS; the political purges conducted in the Span-

¹⁸Chapters 3, 6 Sections 2.1. See Campinos (1975) and Payne (1999). However, Salazar's and Franco's were not fascist totalitarian but authoritarian conservative regimes in which a series of different ideologies coexisted (de Miguel 1975:33–34; Medina 2000: 21; Linz: 2000).

ish Armed Forces until 1945; and the concentration of power in the hands of the dictators (Preston 1990, Medina 2000).

Salazar's and Franco's initial admiration for the fascist governments and their partial imitation is well-documented (Ferro 1933; Salazar 1935; Preston 1993; Loff 2008). The adoption of these approaches to control can be interpreted as a process of mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) in the context of a very unstable and changing national and international environment. Thus, uncertainty made the dictators imitate some of the control mechanisms implemented by Mussolini and Hitler. Imitation was also a way to acquire legitimacy and support from these regimes. Later, with the fall of the Axis and in the context of the Cold War, authoritarian and totalitarian views became discredited in the eyes of the international community in the West. The easing of repression in Spain from 1942 as well as the gradual decrease in the intensity of propaganda and censorship (Chapters 7 Sections 2.1, 3.1) can be interpreted partially as the result of new normative pressures from the West and the search for legitimacy and international recognition.

Second, economic ideas also affected on the control toolkit. The austerity approach to public spending that Salazar strongly advocated in the 1930s seriously constrained salaries and the modernisation of equipment (Chapter 4 Section 4.5; Faria 2000). Although the impact of the great depression had not been very strong in Portugal, Salazar was convinced that austerity was the best way to reduce trade imbalances. The initial success of his economic measures reinforced his conviction and austerity remained a driving principle throughout his mandate; only the advent of the Colonial Wars made him soften the grip on military expenditure (Mata and Valério 1994:190–193).

In Spain, the 'developmentalist' economic ideas implemented by the technocratic governments from 1957 to 1973 also severely constrained the availability of *treasure* for military purposes (Chapter 7 Section 7.5). Defence expenditure was not a priority for the technocrats – to the extent that Finance Minister Navarro Rubio considered the military budget was an 'unproductive drain on the economy'.¹⁹ The economic boom of the 1960s served to increase expenditure on public infrastructure, education and agriculture, which was considered priority for the development of the country, but not to increase noticeably military expenditure (Preston 1990:14; Comín and Diaz 2005:929–934). Equally, technocratic ideas during the 1960s made officers' appointments to jobs in the administration and government less acceptable (de Miguel 1975:69). Developmentalist ideas also contributed to the constant decline of defence budgets relative to total public expenditure and a drop of the percentage of military working in the public administration during the transition and early democratic stages in both countries.

Third, the ideas and perceptions of decision-makers, including personal inclinations, experiences or interests, had an impact on the choice of instruments. Although bounded by history and context, decision-makers are still capable of taking purposeful decisions (Katznelson 2003). This was especially obvious during the dictatorships. Franco's and Salazar's personal preferences were to a great extent reflected in their governments' policy choices. For instance, their paternalistic view of the regime can be linked to the use of the state apparatus as a means

¹⁹Speech delivered in the Francoist Cortes in 1957. These ideas were not shared by the military. Army Minister Barroso proposed to submit Navarro Rubio to a military trial for his remarks. However, Franco supported Navarro Rubio's military budget cut plan (Navarro Rubio 1991:141–148).

to dispense services, goods and jobs to the military as well as a justification for information control and censorship (Crollen 1973:51; Bañón 1985:279–280; Medina 2000:42).

Franco's experience as a field officer during the Rif War (1909–1927),²⁰ during which he led several repression campaigns against the local rebels and sometimes had to take harsh disciplinary measures on his troops, had hardened him. This experience can be understood as an antecedent for the repressive control measures he adopted during the Civil War (Preston 1993). Franco always considered himself a military and maintained close contact with them. He constantly granted private audiences to officers, often gave military speeches and used his network of acquaintances in the armed forces as a *nodality* tool (Chapter 7 Section 3.2). Franco, as many other military, believed the armed forces should have an important degree of autonomy and develop their own internal mechanisms of self-control. He avoided the utilisation of paramilitary or police forces and civilian intelligence services as a check on the armed forces and restored seniority as a principle for promotions (Chapter 7 Sections 7.2.1, 7.3.2, 7.4.1).

Salazar was a reserved man, he maintained more distant relationships with the military and did not enjoy public acts of glorification (Ferro 2003 [1932–1938]:55–56). Salazar's past as a law professor was also shaped his somewhat legalistic approach to government and control.²¹ For example, Salazar managed to renew completely the top tier of the Portuguese Armed Forces and to stimulate adherence to the regime, almost exclusively using a set of decrees enacted in 1937 (Chapter 4 Section 4.3). He did not trust the military as much as Franco and relied on espionage and external paramilitary bodies to control them.

The personal experiences of the Portuguese officers in the Colonial Wars also influenced the control toolkit during transition. The counter-insurgency techniques that were intensively used in Africa profoundly marked the strategic thinking of the military (Teixeira 2004:80). The intensive utilisation of *nodality*, the politicisation of the military and the implication of the civilian population in anti-insurgent action are the clearest examples of this. The use of propaganda stemmed from the military exposure to the propaganda techniques used among the pro-independence movements and counter-insurgency in the 1960s and 1970s.²² The psychological action on the local population and the enemy during the Colonial Wars acquired enormous relevance (Chapter 3 Section 3.3.5). The military were also exposed to socialist and communist ideas during their fight, to the extent that many of officers embraced them. The creation of a parallel structure of political control imitated to a great extent the organisation of some contemporary leftist parties and organisations. Finally, the use of loyal civilians to counter military insurgency, as in November 1975, could have been inspired by the utilisation of paramilitary groups of settlers in the African conflict.

²⁰ Franco joined the Spanish forces in Africa in 1912. He received several combat distinctions and was promoted to the rank of major at the age of 24 and to that of brigadier-general at the age of 33. From 1923 to 1926 he was the second in command in the Spanish Legion; an elite colonial corps equivalent to the French Foreign Legion.

²¹ The Estado Novo was characterised by Unamuno as a 'sort of academic fascism' or as a 'military-academic dictatorship'. Originally published in 'Ahora' on 3 July 1935 (Medina 1977:107–117). See also Massis's depiction of Salazar (Massis 1961).

²² For instance Otelo who was one of the most influential figures during the revolution had worked on psychological warfare in the colonies. Spínola was also deeply involved in counter-insurgency in Angola.

During the Spanish transition, the vast majority of the military, including the reformists such as Defence Minister Gutiérrez Mellado, felt a strong sense of attachment to Franco and his regime (Gutiérrez Mellado and Picatoste 1983:49–58). Most members of the transitional governments had been involved in the previous regime apparatus and were averse to drastic changes. This contributes to explain the insufficient military reforms and high degree of military autonomy during Suárez's governments (Barrachina 2002:386–399; Busquets and Losada 2003:138). The majority of the military continued to think that the Defence Minister and the Government remained merely administrators of military budgets (Puell de la Villa 2005:236). Moreover, the traumatic memories of the Civil War also made decision-makers behave very cautiously and avoid measures that could disturb hardliners and provoke their intervention in politics.

In sum, these examples show that ideas altered policy preferences and choices. First, the rise and fall of fascist ideologies can be associated with the introduction and later dismissal of some control tools. Second, the economic austerity and technocratic ideas affected the utilisation of *treasure*. Finally, the personal experiences and views of decision-makers also influenced tool choice. Especially, Franco's and Salazar's individual interests, experiences and inclinations left a clear imprint in the toolkit.

10.3.2 Political Institutional Structure

The political setting influenced tool choice by making available and constraining basic resources and their utilisation. Dictatorial political arrangements facilitated the implementation of the rulers' preferences in the control toolkit. The political transformations which resulted in a distribution of power among diverse actors and institutions were also reflected in the tool choice dynamics. Political conflict and bargaining initially hindered the adoption and implementation of some reforms, but later contributed to stability in civil-military relations and tool-choice.

Salazar and Franco designed their new political and administrative institutional orders. Hence the high concentration of power they enjoyed is not surprising. The state apparatus became a malleable instrument in the hands of the dictators, especially in Spain where the previous institutions had been completely dismantled during and after the war (Richards 2006:13). The new political system was conceived to avoid checks to Franco's actions. He held the absolute authority and was not to be held accountable for his decisions (Chapter 6 Section 6.2.3). Rather than to the strength and supreme authority imposed by the dictator, the longevity of the Estado Novo was more due to Salazar's management of equilibria among the elites (Rosas 1986; 1989). The Estado Novo maintained some institutional features of liberal origin such as the National Assembly, some laws, the higher autonomy of the Church and armed forces. Thus, although in the Estado Novo there was no real scrutiny or political opposition there were more actors with a capacity to influence or oppose decisions from the government than in Spain (Chapter 3 Section 3.2.2).

Equally, the high degree of centralisation of decisions and information flows strengthened *nodality* as a control resource. Salazar and Franco held the executive and legislative powers and no judge would rule against their decisions, the use of *authority* instruments was fully at their discretion. Salazar and Franco also controlled budgets and if they had deemed it necessary they

could have used *treasure* more intensively as well. Overall, the institutional characteristics of the regime stimulated the availability of the four basic resources for the dictators and did not constitute any relevant hindrance for their flexible utilisation (Chapters 3, 4, 6, 7).

During Caetano's rule there was a shift from a system that concentrated most power in the Prime Minister to a system in which power was shared in an unstable equilibrium between the President of the Council of Ministers and that of the Republic (Rebelo de Sousa 1990:66). Caetano also faced stronger political opposition and pressures from the military (Graham 1993; Fernandes 2006). The veto power of the military and the power shift created some rigidity and contributed to the continuation of certain policies and tools despite the preferences of the government. Moreover, during Caetano's rule the changes in the military strategy were constrained by the highly legalistic and bureaucratic institutional framework that slowed down reforms and precluded more energetic actions to counter upheavals (Chapter 3 Section 3.2.6; Maxwell 1995:44).

Executive and legislative power was much more fragmented after the end of the dictatorships. The supremacy of governments was reduced and new actors acquired the capacity to shape or obstruct policy choices. In Spain, during Suárez's minority governments the military gained autonomy and the capacity to shape civil-military relations (Chapter 6 Sections 6.3.1, 6.3.2). The newly created Defence Ministry was in a weak position vis-à-vis the branches; in 1979 only 5% of the budget was controlled by the central coordination body of the ministry (Rodrigo 1989:307). The formal legal subordination of the armed forces to civilian rule remained ambiguous (Puell de la Villa 2005:236). The veto power of the military became evident. Some of the reforms were slowed down by the military ministers and other top rank officers, the practice often did not follow the formal principles and regulations (Ballbé 1983:469–488). For instance, three years were necessary to launch the ISFAS after its legal inception in 1975 (Puell de la Villa 1997:212–213). The Socialist government, having a comfortable majority in the parliament and wide public support, managed to curb the autonomy and veto power of the military and to introduce fundamental reforms (Chapter 8).

Compared to Spain the fragmentation of power and institutional volatility marked more profoundly civil-military relations in the Portuguese transition. During the period of provisional governments, the continuous reshuffles of governments, the multiplicity of bodies sharing governmental functions and the decisions to link the armed forces hierarchically to the President and not to the Defence Ministry undermined the capacity of the government to reform civil-military relations (Chapter 3 Section 3). The middle management in the public administration that had served during the previous regime was removed, accelerating the process of fragmentation. The public sector grew and political appointments increased (Graham 1983:228, 232–243). The over-bureaucratisation of the administrative apparatus hindered the consolidation of strong independent political parties (Opello 1983:216). In this scenario characterised by reversals in policy choices, bureaucratic barriers and internal grievances governments held on to a control strategy that was basically a continuation of that of the Estado Novo. Inertia and red-tape prevailed and the control mix remained essentially unchanged until 1976 (Chapter 5).²³

²³For instance the changes in budgets were problematic and therefore there was little flexibility for the utilisation of *treasure*-based tools. The fragmentation made the different governing factions rely on nodal effectors such as speeches, pamphlets, posters and press releases in order to impose their view on the model of civil-military

From 1976 to 1982, veto actors such as the CR, the President of the Republic, political parties and the military can be considered responsible for slowing down and hindering some of the reforms in civil-military relations. The best example can be found in the Law for Constitutional Reform that faced intense institutional opposition during its drafting process. The CR and the PCP opposed the law and President Eanes tried to veto it. The reform was finally approved by the Assembly in 1982 and contributed to approach Portugal to the western model of civil-military relations by abolishing the CR and therefore the formal veto power that the military had held since the fall of the Estado Novo (Graham 1993). The consolidation of a western democratic type of regime characterised by a division of powers among different political institutions and several legal checks contributed to the stability in the path of convergence observed in these countries after 1982.

In sum, the political-institutional structure acted as a 'constant cause' facilitating and/or hindering tool choices and institutional change in civil-military relations. The highly centralised political-institutional structure created the opportunity for Salazar and Franco to make use of the government's basic resources without political or administrative constraints. However, the political-institutional context became a limiting factor for Caetano and for the transitional governments in Portugal and Spain. Power-sharing among a higher number of actors and institutional instability slowed down reforms in military and defence policies, hindering some choices of tools and perpetuating others.

10.3.3 International environment

Some international actors, countries and organisations influenced choices and civil-military relations through normative pressures and by stimulating the availability of some resources. As shown in Section 10.2, sometimes these international actors acted as 'historical causes' creating critical junctures and durable paths that outlived their initial action. However, in other cases they merely operated as 'constant causes' in the absence of which the effects on tool choice and civil-military relations disappeared.

The origins of the Estado Novo and that of Francoism were intertwined with the rise of fascism and political instability in Europe (Pinto 1995; Saz Campos 2004). Portugal became one of the targets of the Nazi propaganda machinery in the second half of the 1930s. Germany put pressure on Portugal and assisted Portuguese secret services and cultivated institutions such as the Legion and the Mocidade (Stone 2005: 208). Italy and Germany became the source of inspiration for some of the control choices in Spain and through their military participation in the Civil War they also contributed to the creation of Francoist regime. Normative pressures from these international actors can be construed as fundamental reasons for the adoption of some *nodality* and *organisation* tools such as modern propaganda, censorship, emphasis on mass speeches, public displays of power, paramilitary and youth movements and political purges in the armed forces.

After the fall of the Axis, many of the *nodality* and *organisation* tools they had promoted remained in place. This indicates that these totalitarian regimes acted as 'historical causes'

relations. These policy instruments could be employed without agreement within the ruling bodies and at a relatively low cost. In addition, the institutionalisation of the MFA as a parallel hierarchy to the command chain in the armed forces facilitated the use of *nodality* tools on the military.

triggering durable paths in Salazar's and Franco's control strategies. However, these international actors can be also interpreted as 'constant causes' because after their collapse, many of the effects that they were producing on Portuguese and Spanish civil-military relations vanished. For instance, Germany and Italy were very important suppliers of weaponry making a limited modernisation of equipment (*treasure*) in Spain and Portugal possible. Nonetheless the process of re-armament and modernisation was interrupted as soon as Germany and Italy stopped supplying equipment. Additionally, German and Italian political support increased the legitimacy of the dictators in the eyes of the military, which for the most part were pro-Axis. The repressive model of control exerted by the fascist regimes also served as an excuse for the atrocities committed in Spain during and immediately after the Civil War. The fall of the Axis meant the loss of important political support for the Iberian dictatorships and although it did not result in the abandonment of the tools of control in place, it contributed to reduce their intensity. The grip on the information control was gradually softened and in Spain executions and imprisonments were reduced (Chapters 4, 7).

After the Second World War, Spain and Portugal were politically isolated from the international community and were not accepted as members of the UN until 1955. This isolation was partially a choice of the governments²⁴ and partly imposed by the foreign powers.²⁵ Nonetheless, the political isolation was not mirrored at the level of defence and military cooperation. The Iberian countries continued to be exposed to foreign influence. In 1948, Portugal was invited to join NATO due to the strategic value of its Atlantic Isles and signed defence agreements with the US for the utilisation of the military bases in the Azores (Beirôco 2003:72–73). The action of NATO and the US produced important changes in civil-military relations and of the tools for control of the military during the 1950s (Rosas 1994; Telo 1996; Chapter 3 Section 3.2.4; Chapter 4). Many NATO-led reforms were implemented throughout the 1950s despite the reluctance of the regime.²⁶ This is an example of how international normative pressures (from NATO and the US MAAG) shaped tool choice and civil-military relations. Spain, thanks to its geographical location, its resources in terms of raw materials and its relatively large Army, also became a valuable ally for US government in the context of the Cold War. The Pact of Madrid signed in 1953 allowed the US to establish military bases on Spanish soil in exchange for material and logistical support, rebuilding and modernising the Spanish Armed Forces (Liedtke 1999). Spanish and Portuguese Armed Forces were underequipped and poorly trained. The US and its allies facilitated the acquisitions of material²⁷ and supported the education and training of Portuguese and Spanish officers (Chapters 4, 7).

The evolution of tool choice in Portugal and Spain suggests that the US and NATO allies acted as 'constant causes'. The relations between Portugal and its NATO allies were drastically reduced due to their opposition to the colonial conflict (Porch 1977:37). As they drifted apart many of the reforms promoted by NATO were abandoned and the control toolkit became

²⁴Due to their autarchic ideas and fear of 'contamination' with liberal and democratic ideas.

²⁵The West disliked their authoritarian stance and the Eastern Bloc their declared anti-communism. In the case of Spain, the seclusion was aggravated by the repression during and after the Civil War and the alignment with the Axis powers during the Second World War (despite its officially non-belligerent status).

²⁶Salazar had a different strategy concerning the military and defence (Duarte 2010:244) and tried to limit the exposure of the officers to external ideas that could create unrest among them (Telo 1996:211).

²⁷Although there was an important influx of material, technological and financial aid, comparatively speaking the modernisation remained partial and insufficient (Telo 1996:178–182; Cardona 2001:156; Barrachina 2002:269; Teixeira 2004:52).

again similar to that of the 1940s (Chapter 4). Section 2.2 argues that NATO membership was a critical juncture that opened a new path in the control toolkit. Nonetheless, rather than endogenous self-reinforcing mechanisms, what contributed most to the new trajectory in the control toolkit during the 1950s was the continuing pressure of international actors. Arguably, the reversal of this trajectory could have been caused not only by the absence of forces maintaining it but also by the emergence of new pressures in a different direction. For instance, US blocked the sale of equipment to Portugal during the conflict, contributing to dearth of materials and unrest among the military in the African fronts.²⁸ Spain gradually integrated into the Western Bloc due to the defence agreements with the US in the 1950s and the liberalisation of the economy in the 1960s. Thus, Spain became more prone to the ongoing influence of international actors and gradually adopted many of the *organisation* tools and templates that NATO proposed (Salas López 1974; Chapter 7).

During their transitions Portugal and Spain became countries searching for legitimacy and recognition. The international community maintained direct contacts with the Portuguese political and military leaders after the 25 April coup but the ideological fragmentation of the MFA impeded a coherent strategy concerning foreign affairs. For instance, Vasco Gonçalves sought international support in the Eastern Bloc, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho in Cuba and Rosa Coutinho in Velasco's Peru. The USSR kept good relations with the MFA, however, the Soviet influence and participation was limited. Both German states were actively involved in the process, East Germany supporting the communist approach and West Germany the western democratic model (Ferreira 1994:72–86). The US initially maintained a distant approach that can be captured by Kissinger's reference to the Portuguese revolution as a 'vaccine' against future communist revolutions. NATO put pressure on the MFA governments (Ferreira 2006:135–138). Once the MFA-Moderates gained control of the government, Portugal was gradually integrated in the western sphere again. The influence of NATO allies became stronger and was used by the political leadership to legitimise many changes in the control toolkit that would contribute to consolidate military subordination (Chapter 5).

In 1976, Spain signed a new treaty of cooperation with the US and applied for NATO membership. Spain became member of the Council of Europe in November 1977. In 1979 the negotiations for the accession to the ECC started. After the 23F coup in 1981, the idea of joining NATO became a priority. Politicians considered this as a means of diverting the attention of the military away from domestic politics. The adhesion was made official in 1982. The normative pressures from NATO and the more frequent exchanges with other western armed forces can be interpreted as the main explanation for the convergence of the trajectories control toolkit and civil-military relations in the peninsula (Chapter 5, 8).

In sum, throughout the period analysed it is clear that the international actors affected tool choices and civil-military relations through normative pressures and templates and also by constraining and stimulating the availability of some resources. Section 2 suggested that the international actors sometimes created critical junctures, triggering new paths in civil-military relations. This section has shown that the international environment is not only responsible for the initiation of new trajectories but also for sustaining them through its continuing effect.

²⁸Abundant documentation in AOS and AMC.

10.4 Explaining change in tool choice

This chapter has illustrated, thanks to the evidence collected on Portugal and Spain, how both history and context contribute to shaping civil-military relations and control tool choices. It has shown that path-dependence accounts based on external shocks, timing and self-reinforcing mechanisms need to be qualified and that in addition to the 'historical causes' there are environmental factors acting as 'constant causes' intervening along the trajectories in civil-military relations and shaping tool choices. This section argues that macro-historical events and environmental factors are linked in many ways. Thus, an explanatory model of the evolution of choices needs to combine explanations based on the action of macro-historical events and path-dependent dynamics with those obtained from the analysis of the environmental factors present at the time of decisions. Then, it recapitulates how context and history affect specific tool choices through a basic explanatory representation of change in tool choice trajectories.

Macro-historical events and the environmental factors studied overlap and constrain the explanatory capacity of models based exclusively on one type of account.

First, often the impact of macro-historical events can only be explained by referring to environmental factors. The environmental factors acted as intermediaries, channelling the effects of macro-historical events into tool choices. For instance, the Spanish Civil-War can be considered as a macro-historical event that influenced tool choice through the transmission of certain control ideas and the replacement of the political institutional structure; the outcome of the Second World War is associated with the normative pressures on civil-military relations by NATO and the US during the Cold War; and the Colonial Wars transformed the personal experiences and perceptions of the MFA leaders that left an imprint in the control toolkit during the Portuguese transition.

Second, the trajectories initiated in some critical junctures were later altered by the environmental factors which sometimes reinforced or complicated choices. In the period between critical junctures, contextual factors account for much of the variation observed in the policy toolkit (Section 10.3). The ongoing context was fundamental in the configuration of the control policy and in providing opportunities and incentives for change on some occasions and for stability on others. The continuous effect of context accentuated and/or attenuated the legacy of previous macro-historical events. For instance the crisis of fascist totalitarian ideology contributed to the moderation in the use and even the abandonment of some of the control instruments.

Third, the macro-historical events created critical junctures not only in tool choice but also in the environmental factors. The Civil War and the Second World War, for instance, shattered existing institutional settings and transformed the system of international relations. The evolution of the interpretive frameworks of decision-makers is also linked to history and conjunctures. For example, the ideologies that inspired some of the choices of the dictators shaped and were shaped by macro-historical events. As Hall (1993) argues, under exceptional circumstances, usually associated with crises, the framework of ideas changes; a new paradigm involving policy problems, goals and, more important for this thesis, instruments replace the previous ones.²⁹ Thus, macro-historical events not only opened windows of opportunity for

²⁹Hall (1993) describes the evolution of ideas as a 'punctuated equilibrium'. A similar interpretation of the evolution of policy ideas is mentioned by Peters et al. (2005:1276) who, like Hall, is inspired by Kuhn (1962).


change and left legacies in the control toolkit but sometimes also influenced the broader context which, in turn, induced tool choices too. Even when acknowledging that a great deal of the evolution observed was linked to the continuing action of context, the role of inertia and persistence cannot be underestimated. The legacy of past events sometimes did not manifest itself directly through the creation of (endogenous) self-reinforcing mechanisms in the system of civil-military relations, but indirectly through the continuing action of environmental factors which sometimes had been locked in paths at previous critical junctures.

Fourth, if observed with the sufficient historical distance, some of these macro-historical events were not simply the outcome of entirely stochastic processes as determinist path-dependence explanations would claim. The interaction of some environmental factors and previous tool choices can be described as causal mechanisms for some of the macro-historical events. For example, the Spanish Civil War and the Carnations Revolutions were the result of new waves of ideas (fascist, revolutionary and liberation ideologies); the crisis of the existing political institutional structures (Spanish Republican and Estado Novo political models); the action of international actors (Italy, Germany, independentist forces in the Portuguese colonies); as well as previous tool choices (creating military dissatisfaction and making them more likely to intervene). It still remains unclear whether the origin of change is to be found exclusively outside the system of civil-military relations. Tool choices and civil-military relations were not simply the result of individuals' strategic decisions or the mere reflection of exogenous environmental forces (March and Olsen 1984:741). Therefore a 'chicken and egg' problem without a clear solution emerges: what came first? Environmental factors and tool choices or macro-historical events?

Finally, policy elements are 'nested' in not completely synchronous levels. At different levels of analysis, different patterns of evolution can be observed (Section 10.2.6). Although more specific research it is necessary at this point, this seems to suggest that the impact of past events and that of the current context is asymmetrical across levels of analysis. So at some levels the trajectories can be better explained by the action of endogenous self-reinforcing mechanisms caused by past exogenous shocks and at other levels of analysis the evolution seems to be linked to the ongoing impact of the context. Furthermore, sometimes what is considered an endogenous self-reinforcing dynamic triggered by a 'historical cause' may turn into an exogenous 'constant cause' when the analysis is conducted at the micro level.

As these five reasons show, the interplay between different factors and levels of analysis makes difficult to fully isolate the effect of these two types of mechanisms on the control toolkit and therefore to fully assess their independent explanatory value. 'Orthodox' explanations based exclusively on one of the approaches presented in this thesis (path-dependence or environmental factors) will miss important aspects. Moreover, as suggested above, path-dependence explanations are not incompatible with those emphasising the continuous impact of context. On the one hand, path-dependence accounts often rely on the mechanisms or forces used by other neo-institutional accounts to explain institutional genesis at critical junctures (Thelen 2003:218; Martin and Sunley 2006:430). On the other hand, the evolution of the ideational, institutional and international environment, on which other streams of neo-institutionalism base their explanations, cannot be easily depicted without considering macro-historical events, critical junctures and inertias.

Figure 23: Explanatory model of trajectories in tool choice



In sum, this chapter has shown how neo-institutionalism helps providing alternative explanatory narratives for civil-military relations and tool choice. The two explanations introduced have virtues and disadvantages. None of these frameworks is clearly better for the study of the evolution of tool choice and civil-military relations; they seem to be two sides of a same coin. Figure 23 provides a graphical representation of an explanatory model that combines both 'historical causes' and 'constant causes'. This model is not an attempt to capture change in tool choice in its entirety but to illustrate the interplay (and complexity) observed between the two neo-institutionalist angles analysed in this chapter. In doing so, it builds on the social science tradition that considers important the dialogue across theoretical schools or streams of thoughts.³⁰ As this thesis has illustrated, policy-makers confronting complex policy problems usually choose a combination of different policy instruments. Similarly, political scientists facing the study of complex policy problems can also rely on a combination of theoretical frameworks and perspectives, such as those explored in this thesis.

³⁰See a similar argument in Immergut (1998), Peters (1999), Sil (2002), Baxandall (2004), Peters et al. (2005), Hay (2006) and Sil and Katzenstein (2010).

II Conclusions

II.1 Introduction

This thesis has analysed the tools of control employed by the Portuguese and Spanish governments to keep the military subordinated through the authoritarian, transitional and early democratic periods. It has identified and compared the combinations of tools and their evolution, paying special attention to the impact of some past macro-historical events and environmental factors. For that endeavour, this thesis has relied on historical research of multiple primary and secondary sources, on a comparative framework borrowed from the field of public policy (Hood's NATO scheme) and on neo-institutionalist theory. This final chapter recapitulates the theoretical contribution of this thesis from the point of view of each of the elements of accumulation in social research highlighted by Mahoney (2003:132–137). Thus, it summarises the descriptive (Section II.2) and causal (Section II.3) knowledge claims as well as the input of this work at the level on knowledge generation tools with reference to the methodological (Section II.4) and meta-theoretical contribution (Section 5) of this thesis.

II.2 Civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain

Portugal and Spain, despite having experienced similar political regimes and socio-political transformations, developed very different civil-military relations and levels of control on the armed forces. This research did not aim to fully explain this discrepancy in civil-military relations but to explore one of the reasons behind these different trajectories, i.e. whether the governments in these countries used different instruments to control the military.

This is a restricted but novel approach to civil-military relations that has gone beyond most usual case-studies and the typical sociological angle. Rather than assessing the level of military subordination or turning it into an independent variable, as the majority of authors in the field do (Chapter 1 Section 1.3), this thesis has sought a better understanding about *what* is done to control the military and *why*. Instead of developing a general explanation of military control, it has analysed, as narrower dependent variable, the tools of control. This meant moving the focal point backwards in the causal chain aiming to contribute to a less divisive common ground of knowledge and more stable basis for further academic research. This is consistent with the complex nature of civil-military relations and control choices exposed throughout this thesis. This complexity would suggest a shift from a holistic to a more fine-grained partial analysis in order to reach a more nuanced understanding.

Through the analysis of wide-ranging empirical evidence and its classification and comparison according to Hood's four basic resources (*organisation, nodality, authority* and *treasure*) this

thesis has revealed important findings about the control strategy in both countries. Governments always used combinations of multiple tools. This confirms what the dominant literature on policy instruments have anticipated.¹ However, the degree of utilisation of these tools (in particular *organisation* and *nodality* tools) varied across-country and across-time. The comparative analysis from a resource and country perspective leads to the conclusion that there was no common 'Iberian style' of control or civil-military relations. The changing trajectories within each of the countries also disconfirm that there were stable Portuguese or Spanish styles throughout the period analysed. Thus, the existence of well-defined styles for governing the military arising from geopolitical features can be rejected. Furthermore no clear style can be directly linked to the type of regime. The analysis shows that overall there were no common 'authoritarian' and 'transitional' modes of control. Although the Estado Novo and Francoist dictatorships shared many features their control tool-mix portrayed some important discrepancies that were later accentuated during the transitional periods. However the converging trends observed from 1982, indicate that the existence of a common 'democratic' style cannot be discarded. Supplementary research would be needed to confirm or reject this hypothesis (Chapter 1 Section 1.4; Chapter 9).

Finally, the analysis developed here can be interpreted as a contribution to the study of both military history and political transformations in the peninsula. This thesis, by focusing on the tools of government and establishing systematic comparisons, has developed an alternative narrative about military history in these countries. The goal was to provide a more structured and analytical account.²

Moreover, this research has provided a wider picture of the political changes experienced in the twentieth century in the Iberian Peninsula. Many of the findings in terms of control tools and civil-military relations here are associated or precede similar patterns in the control mechanisms and relations of these governments with society at large. These findings could, therefore, inform or support further social enquiry in these countries.

In sum, this thesis has proposed a different angle in order to counter some of the shortcomings in the existing literature. Through the application of the NATO framework, new patterns in governmental actions and civil-military relations have been revealed. This thesis has shown that governments adopted different strategies and used different tools to control the military and that these strategies evolved over time. The existence of an 'Iberian' or country-specific style of control or a model of civil-military relations has been rejected. Likewise it was argued that no unique style associated with the type of regime has been identified. This thesis has not directly assessed the degree of control or the relative success of the tools employed. However, by unveiling the existence of different mixes of tools, it points at one plausible explanation of the divergence regarding the degree of subordination and the evolution of civil military relations in Portugal and Spain. Moreover, the extensive evidence collected, classified and analysed and the narrative built around civil-military relations has aimed to contribute to

¹Hood (1983:154) argues that the action of the government in practice always involves a mixture of the whole range of types of tools available. In the same vein Howlett claims that "administrative practice usually involves the use of multiple tools or 'policy instrument mixes'" (Howlett 2005:33) and Bemelmans-Viduc and Vedung (1998) maintain that policy instruments come in packages rather than in isolated form.

²This contribution is more relevant because military history in the Iberian Peninsula has often been guided by political interests and focused on isolated facts and heroes and not so much linked to the wider political context (Teixeira 1991).

military history and provided an alternative angle to the complex socio-political developments that Spain and Portugal experienced from the 1930s to 1986.

11.3 Complexity in tool choice

Once the changing trajectories in tool choice of Portuguese and Spanish governments had been outlined this thesis discussed why such choices diverged and/or converged. Rather than exploring the causes of specific micro-choices, the analysis has focused on the factors that produced changes in the general patterns of the control tool mix and has shown that history and context decisively shaped most choices.³ Historical legacies, ideas, institutions and international actors both facilitated and hindered ways of action.

This research applied the NATO framework to extensive historical evidence collected in the area of civil-military relations and established cross-temporal and cross-country comparisons.⁴ Most evidence examined defies 'technical' choice models. Neither the primary or secondary sources scrutinised suggest that tool choices were mechanical exercises in which decision-makers simply matched the attributes of the problem to those of the instruments available. Different tools were used to tackle similar problems. The evidence collected in this thesis confirms what many authors had anticipated; that is, instruments are generally used in combinations or mixes and therefore it is extremely important to move beyond single instrument approaches.⁵ Similarly, the evidence challenges pure 'self-interest' and pure 'political' models that, assuming complete technical substitutability between instruments, explain choices based either on the calculated maximisation of individual benefits or by proximity to cultural values and ideology.⁶ This thesis has relied on neo-institutionalist theory to provide an alternative explanation.

The tools of control or policy instruments studied in this thesis can be considered as the institutions that structure the relationship between the governments and the military. This research has analysed the processes of stability and change in the control toolkit against the background of two contending types of interpretations: on the one hand, path-dependence accounts based on external shocks, timing and self-reinforcing mechanisms (historical cau-

³The policy instruments literature recognises that the main problem is linking instrument choice with the factors that stimulated them (Linder and Peters 1989:48–53; Howlett and Ramesh 2003:91, 194).

⁴The need for new comparative empirical work has been noted in the literature in policy instruments (Landry and Varone 2005:131; Lascombes and Le Galès 2007:18).

⁵For instance, Bruijn and Hufn (1998) argue the analogy with tools like hammer, screwdriver, etc. does not hold, for each problem there is not a single better instrument. Howlett claims that understanding the use of 'bundles' or 'portfolios' of instruments rather than that of single tools is necessary, especially in the context of increased sophistication of networks of citizens and available tools and the new 'governance' approach to public purposes (Howlett 2005:49–50). See also Bemelmans-Vidéc et al. (1998/eds.) and Eliadis et al. (2005/eds.).

⁶See Howlett and Ramesh's (2003:197–198) account on 'technical' and 'political' models. The former usually assume the choice of the most 'efficient' instrument for the problem faced. This approached is also termed as 'instrumentalism' (March and Olson 1984; Linder and Peter 1998:37–38). The latter assume the choice closer to the values or ideology of the decision maker. Howlett and Ramesh do not explicitly refer to 'self-interest' explanations but implicitly refer to authors that use 'public choice' theory and self-serving behaviour to explain instrument choices, as well (2003:198). The evidence (Chapters 4, 5, 7, 8) shows that decision-makers did not always select the same types of tools and that their individual interests and political preferences were not completely determinant as new ideas, external pressures and pre-existing institutions conditioned their options.

sation) and on the other hand those grounded in the continuing impact of environmental factors (constant causation).⁷

The empirical evidence suggests that the beginning and end of distinct trajectories in the utilisation of a certain mix of tools coincided with some non-controllable overarching macro-historical events. Chapter 10 has taken a closer look at the legacy of the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, the colonial conflicts and transitional political processes and has shown that these events triggered ‘critical junctures’ in the control toolkit. These exogenous shocks generated sometimes endogenous self-reinforcing (or self-defeating) dynamics that contributed to the stability (or reversal) of certain patterns in tool choice and civil-military relations. Chapter 10 also illustrated how temporal sequence influenced choices and outcomes and that formative periods usually conditioned later developments.

This research has also revealed some limitations of orthodox path-dependence explanations. The evolution of the control toolkit and of civil-military relations in the Peninsula in general does not completely fit a model of ‘punctuated equilibria’. Portugal and Spain experienced critical junctures and periods of cathartic changes but these were not always followed by stable trajectories. The periods following certain critical junctures showed gradual changes not directly associated to the legacies of the macro-historical events analysed (Chapter 10 Section 10.2.5). Self-reinforcing dynamics were not pervasive and in some cases the stability of a trajectory can be attributed to the continuous effect of contextual factors that were not directly related to the ‘historical causes’ that initiated the trajectory. Moreover the evidence has confirmed the role of agency⁸ and suggested that some of the events that triggered critical junctures can be considered as endogenously generated by the system of civil-military relations (e.g. the Spanish Civil War, the collapse of the Estado Novo and the coups of November 1975 in Portugal and February 1981 in Spain). These findings contradict the contingency and determinism that the most orthodox path-dependence interpretations suggest.

Although history matters, path-dependence interpretations need to be qualified. Accordingly, this thesis has examined the impact of three categories of environmental factors: ideas, political institutional structure and international environment (Chapter 10 Section 10.3).⁹ This research has confirmed that these factors acted as ‘constant causes’ shaping trajectories in civil-military relations and tool choice: ideologies as well as the personal experiences and preferences of decision-makers (in particular Franco and Salazar) influenced tool choice. The political institutional structure affected the availability of some basic resources. For instance, the centralisation of power and the absence of veto actors amplified the capacity of dictators to implement their preferred tool choices. The political transitions that resulted in the redistribution of power among diverse actors and institutions were also reflected in the tool choice dynamics; political conflict and bargaining initially hindered some reforms but later contributed to stability in civil-military relations and tool choice. Finally, international actors (countries and organisations) shaped tool choices and civil-military relations through nor-

⁷These two alternative explanations are presented in Chapter 2 Section 2.3. They correspond to the third and fourth research claims introduced in Chapter 1 Section 1.4 and are later addressed in Chapter 10.

⁸Chapters 4, 5, 7 and 8 suggest that some decisions were extremely linked to personal beliefs or interests of some of the leaders in the government. Chapter 10 Section 10.3.1 more explicitly refers to this issue.

⁹The goal in this thesis was not providing a holistic explanation of the action of context but identifying general patterns in its direct and/or indirect impact on tool choice and the evolution of civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain.

mative pressures and by constraining and stimulating the availability of some resources (in particular *treasure* and *organisation*). Thus, this thesis corroborates at the empirical level what many theorists agree on: the fact that the antecedents and the context influence tool choices.

Last, it was been argued that the ‘historical’ and ‘constant causes’ observed in each of the two cases were deeply intertwined and therefore it is important to take both of them into consideration to better explain the trajectories. The environmental factors often translated effects of past macro-historical events into tool choice. These events at times created critical junctures in the environmental factors which in turn often offset or magnified the trajectories of civil-military relations and tool choice. These overarching events were sometimes the result of the interaction of some environmental factors and previous tool choices.¹⁰ Furthermore, the conceptual differences of both alternative types of explanations for the evolution of tool choice and civil-military relations, although initially important, blurred gradually as the focal point of the study travelled through the time dimension and through different levels of analysis. Current contexts become past legacies from a future perspective; stable trajectories may turn into changing paths if the time segment analysed is longer and some endogenous mechanisms of self-reproduction become exogenous environmental factors when looking at an institutional subset. The assessment of these two alternative types of approaches would have a different explanatory capacity according to the time scope and units of analysis chosen. Thus, it can be concluded that tool choices are the result of complex social processes that do not fit a simple causal model with well-defined independent and dependent variables. There are interactions between the factors and feedback effects. This thesis has proposed a simple explanatory framework that merges both the impact of history and the context in which decisions are taking place to explain the evolution of tool choice (Chapter 10 Section 10.4).

In sum, this thesis has provided ‘causal findings’ by illustrating how historical legacies and environmental factors shaped the trajectories of civil-military relations and in particular the combinations of control tools employed by the governments. The empirical analysis has shown that pure path-dependence explanations have some weaknesses that limit their explanatory value and has hinted at ways to bridge these theoretical gaps, namely by looking at the ongoing impact of ideational and institutional environmental factors. Finally, although more research is necessary in this regard, this thesis has confirmed that establishing sharp distinctions between the impact of past legacies and the current context is problematic and that the explanations based on environmental factors cannot be completely disconnected from those grounded in path-dependence or ignore the interplay between them.

11.4 Tools of government revisited

Many authors have previously discussed Hood’s NATO scheme but there have been very few attempts to apply it systematically to a specific empirical case. This thesis contrasts the analytical capacity of the NATO framework for the study of tools of government. Never before have civil-military relations been studied through the lenses of a policy instruments frame-

¹⁰Neo-institutional accounts, as those studied here, are better fitted to explain stability and changes in an existing control tool-mix than to explain its initial configuration. See a similar argument in Peters et al. (2005:1282–1283).

work. As explained above, this innovative approach has helped in depicting trends, establishing comparisons and, therefore, widening the understanding of civil-military relations and other major socio-political transformations in the Iberian Peninsula. However, not only the field of civil-military relations and Iberian studies gains from this exercise; the subfield of policy instruments also benefits from it. One of the shortcomings of this literature is precisely the scarcity of in-depth empirical studies. The historical data on civil-military relations in the Iberian Peninsula have offered the opportunity to test the heuristic value of Hood's NATO scheme and substantiate several of its advantages and limitations.

This research has shown that systematically linking each of the basic resources (or subcategories) with specific policy problems or policy goals is extremely difficult (if at all possible). The wide variety of instruments that each of these generic categories encompasses (see below) as well the impact of history and context (on the nature of the problems, availability of resources and policy implementation) turn this endeavour into a fool's errand. Although the choice of some (but not all) instruments within a category can sometimes be associated to a specific period or style of government, these associations do not hold beyond these subsets.¹¹ The evidence reveals that not all the instruments that integrate each category evolved synchronously, suggesting that analytic associations would better be explored at the instrument level, not at the level of Hood's generic categories.¹² This is consistent with Hood's work which, despite presenting some canons of 'intelligent policy design' or 'good application' of government tools,¹³ never clearly links them to the basic resources.

Indeed, the wide diversity of tools that can be attributed to each basic resource limit the capacity of Hood's NATO scheme as explanatory framework for tool choice.¹⁴ The availability of the basic resources can be directly linked to choices but still this readiness can be seen as just a mechanism mediating the impact of other historical and environmental factors on tool choice, as this thesis has shown. This thesis has escaped this problem by decoupling the comparative from the explanatory framework. This thesis has restricted the role of the NATO scheme to that of a 'marker' or 'indicator' of change in tool choice and has relied on two approaches to neo-institutionalism as explanatory framework.¹⁵

Hood's NATO framework is better suited for the classification and comparison than for informing a theory of instrument choice. It is a resource-based framework and focuses on what governments actually do, not so much on their intentions and, thus, it reduces the level of subjectivity and simplifies the task of classifying tools.¹⁶ Moreover, the NATO framework has proved to be flexible and parsimonious enough to capture and process all the empirical evidence encountered in the research (Chapters 4, 5, 7, 8) and to establish meaningful cross-temporal and cross-country comparisons (Chapter 9). The NATO framework has allowed processing enormous amounts of information from different sources, covering more than fifty

¹¹For instance during the Civil War and its aftermath Franco intensively used many coercive organisation tools and *nodality* effectors. Conversely, the use of non-coercive *organisation* tools and *nodality* detectors was not especially relevant during that period. Other examples can be found in Chapters 4, 5, 7, 8, 9.

¹²A similar problem has been found with the subcategories introduced in this thesis.

¹³Hood (1983:132–133) and Hood and Margetts (2007:144–145).

¹⁴See a similar critique in Linder and Peters (1989: 40–41).

¹⁵Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007) also stress the value of policy instruments as indicators of policy change.

¹⁶Chapter 2 Section 2.2 outlines some of the advantages of resource-based frameworks vis-à-vis other classificatory schemes.

years in the history of civil-military relations in Portugal and Spain. All the tools of control elicited from the scrutiny of the primary and secondary sources have been classified in one of the four categories: *organisation*, *nodality*, *authority* and *treasure*. None of Hood's categories was found to be redundant.¹⁷ The distribution and evolution of these tools within these categories has served to delineate trajectories in the control strategy of the governments. Multi-dimensional models would have made the comparisons more difficult, especially in a context where most control tools cannot be quantitatively measured.¹⁸ By grounding distinctions in kind and not in degree, Hood's framework facilitates the categorisation of tools.

However, the simplicity and flexibility of this framework also entails some problems. First, Hood's basic categories are very broad and not always mutually exclusive. They accommodate much variance within and therefore can hide very disparate attitudes towards military subordination. In order to counter this shortcoming, this thesis has introduced two new subcategories in each of the four basic types. These are different from Hood's subcategories and reflect the way in which the basic resources are used (Chapter 2 Section 2.2.2). These subcategories have enabled to establish a more nuanced, and still balanced, classification of the control tools and helped establishing sharper depictions and comparisons of the action of the governments without over-complicating the analysis.¹⁹

Second, occasionally instruments can be assigned to more than one category. The tools of government can be considered as the building blocks of policies, but they are not indivisible or homogeneous units (Chapter 1 Section 1.4). The evidence on tools for military subordination confirms that often control instruments are bundles of different 'smaller' instruments²⁰ or that they rely on more than one basic resource.²¹ For the sake of simplicity this thesis has allocated each tool to only one basic resource. Although some of the instruments could be arguably placed in other categories this does not completely obviate the use of Hood's framework in this analysis. As explained above, its fundamental purpose is to act as indicator to trace institutional change. Through several consistency checks in the classification of tools, this work has aimed to mitigate this problem. The hybridisation in the context of Hood's basic resources remains a question for future research.

Third, it is important to note that the NATO framework is not time, country or sector specific. This thesis has stressed its value as basis of the analysis of civil-military relations. Despite

¹⁷As Chapter 2 Section 2.2.2 suggests, these four resources synthesise most of the categories proposed in the other generic typologies and accommodates well both substantive and procedural types of instruments.

¹⁸As explained in Chapter 2 Section 2.2.2, more ambitious multi-dimensional frameworks were discarded for the goal here is not the systematic scrutiny of all different dimensions, characteristics or valuation criteria inherent to policy instruments but simply to detect patterns and changes in tool choice, compare them and then explain the variations observed.

¹⁹Hood (1983:18, 88) divides the four basic categories, into effectors and detectors. Subsequently he classifies effectors into 'particular', 'group' and 'general' according to their levels of application and detectors into an 'active/passive' scale according to their degree of mobility or the level of government initiative. In all, he suggests twenty-six subcategories of instruments which would have made the comparison extremely difficult.

²⁰This is anticipated by Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007) who distinguish instruments, techniques and tools according to the level of observation.

²¹For instance, the censorship effort, despite being mainly a *nodality* tool, has an important *organisation* component (teams of censors scrutinising the information) or even an *authority* component (since there is a law that prohibits or constrains certain information, people will exert self-censorship not to commit an offense).

the changing nature of security problems and civil-military relations²² a generic policy instrument framework is useful for the analysis of past, present and future civil-military relations because it does not focus on the specific goals pursued by a government at a particular time but on the tools employed and the generic resources they draw their power from. The revised NATO framework could be similarly applied to other countries with salient civil-military relations issues (e.g. Turkey, Greece, Thailand, Pakistan and Egypt) or to other areas of government action within the same countries (e.g. public order, fiscal policy and education). Additional research in this sense would contribute to complete and refine the debate here initiated about governments' styles.

In brief, the NATO scheme is flexible and parsimonious; it is not time, country or sector specific; it focuses on what governments do rather than on what they intend to achieve and establishes distinctions in kind not in degree. The empirical evidence fits the framework well, showing a somewhat balanced distribution of potential tools that the government can employ across all categories. This thesis has corroborated the strength of this generic classificatory scheme as basis for depicting patterns and change in tool choice and establishing comparisons.

11.5 Bridging meta-theoretical divides

This research has borrowed elements from different disciplines or traditions within the social sciences.²³ This stance is not merely the reflection of a pragmatist standpoint adopted to facilitate the analytical task and to fill up the gaps that orthodox approaches usually leave.²⁴ It is also a conscious effort to contribute to overcome the boundaries that separate different epistemic communities. Three features illustrate this effort.

First, the application of a policy instrument angle in the analysis of civil-military relations is a novelty. There had been little, if any, cross-fertilisation between these two literatures. The study of policy instruments can be traced back a few decades but it can be still considered an undeveloped body of literature with scarce examples of comparative empirical works (Chapter 1 Section 1.4). Although in most cases the literature on civil-military relations analysed adopts historical or sociological analytical angles, the evidence that it provides serves here to substantiate the theoretical discussion about political science and policy instruments. Besides, the literature on civil-military relations, which has been criticised for being excessively self-referential (Chapter 1 Section 1.3), can also gain from the policy instrument approach. The extension the analysis of control instruments to other countries could a new path of cumulative comparative work that would contribute to bridge the gap between civil-military relations literature and mainstream political science.

Second, this thesis combines historical research with a comparative framework from the field of public policy. Its findings are grounded in the historical analysis (including archival work) of Portugal and Spain. This has involved the effort of deconstructing chronologically-based historical narratives into the concept or category-based types of interpretations that

²² See for instance Williams (2000:266–272), Luckham (2003:7–13) and Forster (2006:74–99).

²³ Sil and Katzenstein (2010) develop a similar argument in-depth.

²⁴ For a discussion of the philosophical premises of analytical pragmatism see Rorty (1979) and Bernstein (1983).

public policy and political science research require. The translation of historical data into the revised version of Hood's public policy framework entails some downsides. Especially those not very familiar with the history of the Iberian countries might feel that the substitution of a timeline-based narrative for different partial accounts around eight subcategories of tools may detract from clarity and introduce some repetition. Nonetheless this translation carries a virtue that compensates for these shortcomings; it allows to establish comparisons and to depict general trends in government actions which no other civil-military study dealing with Portugal and Spain has done so far. Moreover, this thesis has also proved that historical analysis and political science approaches are not incompatible, especially once the rigid epistemological positions that sometimes dominate these disciplines are circumvented and the theoretical value of both singularity and generalisations is recognised. History provides evidence to test political theories and these in turn help informing and guiding historical research.

Third, this thesis has contrasted two different neo-institutionalist explanations about change in tool choice and suggested a basic explanatory model that merges elements from both of them (Chapter 10). It has highlighted advantages and limitations of path-dependence accounts and the necessity to complement them with other explanations that take into consideration the continuing action of the ideational and institutional context at a national and also international level. History matters and social phenomena should not be studied in isolation from their temporal dimensions but pure path-dependence does not easily capture how individuals relate to institutions and puts excessive emphasis on contingency and determinism. In brief, the empirical analysis of civil-military relations and choice of policy instruments confirms what several authors had already suggested; i.e. orthodox approaches to neo-institutional theory usually miss an important part of the picture. It is possible to deconstruct these supposedly competing explanations into their basic concepts and mechanisms and then to redesign new explanations that recombine elements from the previously separated streams. The 'walls' that separate different streams of neo-institutionalism have been helpful to support the 'scaffolding' that permitted the development of many useful (often parsimonious and elegant) theoretical concepts and analytical tools. However, some of the theoretical divides such as 'structure vs. agency', 'culture vs. calculus' and, as this thesis shows, 'legacy of the past vs. continuing action of the ideational and institutional context' are not Gordian knots that can be cut or unravelled.²⁵ As the scrutiny of the empirical evidence on government tools of control has shown, these 'walls' are to a great extent artificial. The proponents of different paradigms could potentially fill gaps in their own theoretical developments by exploring alternative approaches.

In sum, explanations from one single theoretical lens normally involve the oversimplification of the problems and causal explanations. Dialogue and exchange between different analytical approaches can contribute to a deeper understanding of complex multifaceted social phenomena. This work has not been an iconoclastic effort against well-defined research traditions nor an attempt to amalgamate or synthesise them into a new overarching one. Rather, the meta-theoretical goal here has been more modest: to develop a better understanding of several different disciplinary angles and practices and to show that it is possible to build bridges over the analytical 'walls' that separate them.

²⁵ See similar arguments in Hall and Taylor (1996) and Bieler and Morton (2001).

References

Books and articles

Abrahamsson, Bengt (1972). *Military Professionalisation and Political Power*. London: Sage Publications.

Adler, Emanuel (1997). 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations*, 3(3):319–363.

Aguado Sánchez, Fernando (1975). *El maquis en España*. Madrid: San Martín.

Agüero, Felipe (1988). 'Democracia en España y supremacía civil', *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, 44:23–50.

Agüero, Felipe (1995). *Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.

Aguilar Olivencia, Mariano (1999). *El Ejército Español durante el Franquismo*. Madrid: Akal.

Aguilar, Miguel Angel (1985). 'The Spanish Military: Force for Stability or Insecurity?' in Carr, Raymond and Joyce Lasky Shub (eds.) *Spain: Studies in Political Security*. Washington D.C.: Praeger.

Aguilar, Paloma (1996). *Memoria y olvido de la Guerra Civil Española*. Madrid: Alianza.

Aguilar, Paloma (1997). 'Collective memory of the Spanish civil war: The case of the political amnesty in the Spanish transition to democracy', *Democratization*, 4(4):88–109.

Ajzen, Icek (1991). 'The theory of planned behavior', *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision processes*, 50(2):179–211.

Alba, Carlos (1981). 'The organisation of authoritarian leadership: Franco's Spain' in Su-leiman, Erza and Richard Rose (eds.) *Presidents and Prime Ministers*. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Policy Research.

Allendesalazar Urbina, Rafael (1977). 'Tradition et Changement dans le Système Militaire Espagnol' in Mandeville, Lucien and Paul Ourliac (1979/eds.) *Reconnaisances du Système Militaire Espagnol*. Toulouse: Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Université de Toulouse I.

Almeida, Leonardo Ribeiro de (1986). 'Discurso Proferido Pelo Ministro da Defesa Nacional em 11 Julho 1986', *Nacão e Defesa*, 13:21–37.

Almeida, Pedro Tavares de and António Costa Pinto (2003). 'Portuguese Ministers, 1951–1999: Social Background and Paths to Power' in Almeida Pedro Tavares de, Antonio Costa

Pinto and Nancy Bermeo (eds.) *Who Governs Southern Europe? Regime Change and Ministerial Recruitment, 1850–2000*. London: Frank Cass.

Alonso Baquer, Miguel (1978). ‘Les Relations Politico-Militaires depuis la Mort de l’Almiral Carrero Blanco (1974–1978)’ in Mandeville, Lucien and Paul Ourliac (1979/eds.) *Reconnaissances du Système Militaire Espagnol*. Toulouse: Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Université de Toulouse I.

Alonso Baquer, Miguel (1980). ‘La Sélection de l’Élite Militaire Espagnole durant le Premier Tiers du XXème Siècle (1898–1931)’ in Comas, José María (1981/eds.) *Deuxièmes Reconnaissances du Système Militaire Espagnol*. Toulouse: Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Université de Toulouse I.

Alonso Baquer, Miguel (1983). *El Modelo Español de Pronunciamiento*. Madrid: Rialp.

Alonso Baquer, Miguel (1988). ‘The Age of Pronunciamientos’ in Barker, Thomas and Rafael Bañón Martínez (eds.) *Armed Forces and Society in Spain: Past and Present*. Boulder: Social Science Monographs.

Alpert, Michael (1982). *La reforma militar de Azaña (1931–1933)*. Madrid: Siglo xxi.

Alpert, Michael (2007). *El ejército popular de la República 1936–1939*. Barcelona: Crítica.

Alvarez Junco, José (1988). ‘Leftist Militarism and Anti-Militarism, 1875–1936’, in Barker, T. and R. Bañón Martínez (eds.) *Armed Forces and Society in Spain: Past and Present*. Boulder: Social Science Monographs.

Amaral, Diogo Freitas do (2000). ‘Forças Armadas em Regime Democrático’, *Nacão e Defesa*, 94:175–185.

Anderson, Charles W. (1971). ‘Comparative Policy Analysis: The Design of Measures’, *Comparative Politics*, 4(1):117–131.

Anderson, Charles W. (1977). *Statecraft: an Introduction to Political Choice and Judgment*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Anderson, Peter (2009). *The Francoist Military Trials: Terror and Complicity, 1939–1945*. London: Routledge.

Andrzejewski, Stanislav (1954). *Military Organisation and Society*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.

Antunes, José Freire (1978). *A desgraça da República: na ponta das baionetas: as Forças Armadas do 28 Maio*. Lisbon: Bertrand.

Antunes, José Freire (1985). *Cartas particulares a Marcello Caetano*. 2 volumes. Lisbon: Dom Quixote.

Antunes, José Freire (1990). *O factor africano: 1890–1990*. Lisbon: Bertrand.

Antunes, José Freire (1994). *Salazar e Caetano: cartas secretas 1932–1968*. Lisbon: Difusão Cultural.

Antunes, José Freire (2000). 'Introdução, Salazar e Caetano nas encruzilhadas do Estado Novo', in Caetano, Marcello [1975] *Minhas Memórias de Salazar segunda edição*. Lisboa: Verbo.

Arenal, Celestino del and Francisco Aldecoa (1986). *España y la Otan: Textos y Documentos*. Madrid: Tecnos.

Arriaga, Lopes (1976). *Mocidade Portuguesa: Breve História de uma Organização Salazarista*. Lisbon: Terra Libre.

Arthur, W. Brian (1989). 'Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events', *Economic Journal*, 99:116–131.

Arthur, W. Brian (1994). *Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Avant, Deborah (1994). *Political Institutions and Military Change*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Azcona, José Manuel, Agustín Rodríguez and Gonzalo Azaola (1994). 'La Guerra de Sidi Ifni-Sáhara (1957–1958)', *Estudios de Ciencias Sociales*, VII:68–89.

Azevedo, Cândido de (1999). *A Censura de Salazar e Marcelo Caetano*. Lisbon: Caminho.

Bacevich, Andrew J. (1998). 'Absent History: A Comment on Dauber, Desch, and Feaver', *Armed Forces & Society*, 24(3):447–454.

Balfour, Sebastian (2002). *Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ballbé, Manuel (1983). *Orden Público y militarismo en la España Constitucional (1812–1984)*. Madrid: Alianza.

Balsemão, Francisco Pinto (1986). 'The Constitution and Politics' in Maxwell, Kenneth (ed.) *Portugal in the 1980's: Dilemmas of Democratic Consolidation*. London: Greenwood Press.

Balsemão, Francisco Pinto (1986). 'The Constitution and Politics' in Maxwell, Kenneth (ed.) *Portugal in the 1980's: Dilemmas of Democratic Consolidation*. London: Greenwood Press.

Bañón Martínez, Rafael (1978). *Poder de la Burocracia y Cortes Franquistas 1943–1971*. Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública.

Bañón Martínez, Rafael (1985). 'La racionalidad de las políticas de remuneraciones y el diseño de la organización militar española', *Revista Internacional de Sociología*, 43(2):269–303.

Bañón Martínez, Rafael (1988). 'The Spanish Armed Forces during the Period of Political Transition, 1975–1985' in Barker, Thomas. and Rafael Bañón Martínez (eds.) *Armed Forces and Society in Spain: Past and Present*. Boulder: Social Science Monographs.

Bañón, Rafael and Ernesto Carrillo (1984). 'Administración de personal y estructura organizativa: el caso del personal civil en las Fuerzas Armadas españolas', *Revista de Administración Pública*, 105 (4):355–389.

Bañón, Rafael and José Antonio Olmeda (1985) 'Las Fuerzas Armadas en España: Institucionalización y Proceso de Cambio' in Bañón, Rafael and José Antonio Olmeda (eds.) *La Institución Military en el Estado Contemporáneo*. Madrid: Alianza Universidad.

Barata, Filipe Themudo (1980). 'Indústria Militar Nacional: como e para quê?', *Nação e Defesa*, 16:85–120.

Bardach Eugene (1980). 'Implementation Studies and the Study of Implements', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Barrachina Lisón, Carlos (2002). *El regreso a los cuarteles: militares y cambio político en España (1976–1981)*. Madrid: Doctoral Thesis. Departamento de Ciencias Políticas y de la Administración. Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología. UNED.

Barrera, Carlos (2006). 'International News and Spanish Newspapers' struggle for Press Freedom During Franco's Dictatorship (1939–1975)' Paper prepared for presentation at the International Association for Mass Communication Research, The American University in Cairo, Egypt, July, 23–29 2006. http://www.aucegypt.edu/conferences/iamcr/uploaded/CD_Carlos%2520Barrera.pdf [Accessed 24 February 2008]

Barros, Carlos P. and José C. Gomes Santos (1997). 'A despesa militar em Portugal: 1950–1990', *Nação e Defesa*, 82:203–216.

Baxandall, Phineas (2004). *Constructing Unemployment: The Politics of Joblessness in East and West*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Beetham, David (1991). *The Legitimation of Power*. London: MacMillan.

Beever, Antony (2006). *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936–1939*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Begonha, Rodolfo A Informação, as Relações Públicas, as Forças Armadas e a Sociedade Portuguesa *Nação e Defesa*, 68:139–169.

Beirôco, Luis (2003). *Cinco Homens de Estado*. Lisbon: Livros do Brasil.

Bemelmans-Videc, Marie-Louise (1998). 'Introduction: Policy Instruments Choice and Evaluation' in Bemelmans-Videc, Marie-Louise, Ray C. Rist, and Evert Vedung (eds.) *Carrots, Sticks and Sermons: Policy Instruments & their Evaluation*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Bemelmans-Videc, Marie-Louise, and Evert Vedung (1998). 'Conclusions: Policy Instruments Types, Packages, and Evaluation' in Bemelmans-Videc, Marie-Louise, Ray C. Rist, and Evert Vedung (eds.) *Carrots, Sticks and Sermons: Policy Instruments & their Evaluation*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Bemelmans-Videc, Marie-Louise, Ray C. Rist, and Evert Vedung (1998/eds.) *Carrots, Sticks and Sermons: Policy Instruments & their Evaluation*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Ben-Ami, Shlomo (1983). *La Dictadura de Primo de Rivera (1923–1930)*. Barcelona: Planeta.

Bennett, Andrew and Alexander L. George (1997). 'Process Tracing in Case Study Research', Paper presented at the *MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA), Harvard University, October 17–19.

Bennett, Andrew and Alexander L. George (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Berlin, Isaiah (1969). *Four Essays on Liberty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bermeo, Nancy (2007). 'War and Democratization: Lessons from the Portuguese Experience', *Democratization*, 14(3):388–406.

Bernecker, Walther L (1998). 'Monarchy and Democracy: the Political Role of King Juan Carlos in the Spanish Transición', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 33(1):65–84.

Bernstein, Richard, J (1983). *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Biddle, Stephen, and Robert Zirkle (1996). 'Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World', *The Journal of Strategic Studies*. 19(2):171–212.

Bieler, Andreas and Adam David Morton (2001). 'The Gordian Knot of Agency—Structure in International Relations: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective', *European Journal of International Relations*, 7(1):5–35.

Blanco Ande, Joaquín (1987). *Defensa Nacional y Fuerzas Armadas*. Madrid: Dykinson.

Blanco Escolá, Carlos (2000). *La incompetencia militar de Franco*. Madrid: Alianza.

Blanco Valdés, Roberto L. (1999). *La Ordenación Constitucional de la Defensa*. Madrid: Técnicos.

Bland, Douglas (1999). 'A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations', *Armed Forces & Society*, 26(1):7–25.

Blyth, Mark (1997) 'Any More Bright Ideas? The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy', *Comparative Politics*, 29(1):229–50.

Blyth, Mark (2002). *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Botelho Moniz, Jorge (1939). *Nação em Guerra; Organização Nacional da Defesa*. Lisbon: Império.

Boyd, Carolyne P. (1979). *Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Brady, Henry E. and David Collier (2004/eds.) *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Braga da Cruz, Manuel António Garcia (1988). *O Partido e o Estado no Salazarismo*. Lisbon: Editorial Presenta.

Bravo Morata, Federico (1978). *La postguerra, 1939–1945*. Madrid: Fenicia.

Bressers, Hans T. A. and Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr. (1998). 'The Selection of Policy Instruments: a Network-based Perspective', *Journal of Public Policy*, 18(3):213–239.

Bressers, Hans T. A. and Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr. (2005). 'Instrument Selection and Implementation' in Eliadis, Pearl, Margaret M. Hill and Michael Howlett (eds.) *Designing Government: From Instruments to Governance*. Montreal: Mc-Gill-Queen's University Press.

Bressers, Hans T. A., Doris Fuchs, and Stefan Kuks (2004). 'Institutional Resource Regimes and Sustainability: Theoretical Backgrounds and Hypotheses', *Environment and Policy*, 41:23–58.

Brothers, Carline (1997). *War and Photography: A Cultural History*. London: Routledge.

Brown, James (1980). 'Greek Civil-Military Relations: A Different Pattern', *Armed Forces & Society*, 6(3):389–413.

Bruijn Hans A. de and A.M. Hufn (1998). 'The traditional approach to policy instruments' in Peters, Guy B. and Frans K. M. Van Nispen (eds.) *Public Policy Instruments: Evaluating the Tools of Public Administration*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Bruneau, Thomas C. (2005). 'Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited', *Armed Forces and Society*, 19(1):111–131.

Bruneau, Thomas C. (2011). *Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in US National Security*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bruneau, Thomas C. and Florina Cristiana Matei (2008). 'Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations', *Democratization*, 15(5):909–929.

Burk, James (1998). 'The Logic of Crisis and Civil-Military Relations Theory: A Comment on Desch, Feaver and Dauber', *Armed Forces & Society*, 24(3):455–462.

Burk, James (2002). 'Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations', *Armed Forces & Society*, 29(1):7–29.

Busquets, Julio (1982). *Pronunciamientos y golpes de Estado en España*. Barcelona: Ariel.

Busquets, Julio (1984 [1971]). *El military de carrera en España*. Barcelona: Ariel.

Busquets, Julio (1991). 'La legislación militar en la Transición española', *Revista de las Cortes Generales*, 22(1), pp. 153–182.

Busquets, Julio (1999). *Militares y demócratas*. Barcelona: Plaza & Janés.

Busquets, Julio and Juan C. Losada (2003). *Ruido de Sables: Las conspiraciones militares en la España del siglo XX*. Barcelona: Crítica.

Caeiro, Joaquim Manuel Croca (1997). *Os Militares no Poder: Uma análise histórico-política do liberalismo à revisão constitucional de 1959*. Lisbon: Huguin Editores.

Caetano, Marcello (1957). *A Constituição de 1933: Estudo de Direito Constitucional*. Coimbra: Coimbra Editora.

Caetano, Marcello (2000 [1975]) *Minhas Memórias de Salazar*, 2n ed. Lisboa: Verbo.

Campbell, Donald T. and Julian C. Stanley (1963). *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Campbell, John L. (2001). 'Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy' in Campbell, John L. and Ove K. Pedersen (eds.). *The Second Movement in Institutional Analysis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Campinos, Jorge (1975). *Ideología Política do Estado Salazarista*. Lisbon: Portugália.

Campinos, Jorge (1978). *O Presidencialismo do Estado Novo*. Lisbon: Perspectivas & Realidades.

Capoccia, Giovanni and R. Daniel Kelemen (2007) 'The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism', *World Politics*, 59(3):341 – 369.

Cardona, Gabriel (1983). *El Poder Militar en la España Contemporánea hasta la Guerra Civil*. Madrid: Siglo xxi.

Cardona, Gabriel (1990). *El Problema Militar en España*. Madrid: Historia 16.

Cardona, Gabriel (2001). *Franco y sus Generales, la manicura del tigre*. Madrid: Temas de Hoy.

Cardoso, Pedro (1980a). 'Os Serviços de Informações Nacionais e Estrangeiras', *Nação e Defesa*, 15:143–157.

Cardoso, Pedro (1980b). *As Informações em Portugal*. Lisbon: IDN

Carothers, Thomas (2002). 'The End of the Transition Paradigm', *Journal of Democracy*, 13(1):5–21.

Carr, Raymond (1966). *Spain: 1808–1939*. London: Oxford University Press

Carrero Blanco, Luis (1941). *España y el Mar*. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos.

Carrero Blanco, Luis (1974). *Discursos y Escritos, 1943–1973*. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos.

Carrilho, Maria (1985). *Forças Armadas e mudança política em Portugal no século XX*. Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional.

Carrilho, Maria (1989/ed.) *Portugal na segunda guerra mundial: contributos para uma reavaliação*. Lisbon: Dom Quixote.

Carrilho, Maria (1992). 'Democracy and the Armed Forces in Portugal' in Herr, Richard (ed.) *The New Portugal: Democracy and Europe*. Berkeley: University of California.

Carrilho, Maria (1994). *Democracia e defesa: sociedade, política e forças armadas em Portugal*. Lisboa: Dom Quixote.

Cayón García, (1995), 'Prensa y opinión en el período constituyente', in Soto, A., J.M. Marín, J.R. Díaz Gijón, P. Martínez Lillo and J. Pan-Montojo (eds.) *Historia de la transición y consolidación democrática en España (1975–1986)*. Vol. II. Madrid: UNED & UAM.

Celhay, Pierre (1976). *Consejos de guerra en España: fascismo contra Euskadi*. Paris: Ruedo Iberico.

CEPP, Centro de Estudos do Pensamento Político (1999–2003). *Acontecimentos: Revoltas e turbulências subversivas durante a Ditadura e o Estado Novo*. http://www.iscsp.utl.pt/cepp/indexfro1.php3?http://www.iscsp.utl.pt/cepp/classe_politica/ditestnov/ditestnovs.html [Accessed 23 January 2009]

CESEDEN (1988). *Estudio Comparativo de la Evolución de los presupuestos de defensa de los países del área mediterránea (1971–1985)*. Madrid: Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional.

Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1998). 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', *World Politics*, 50(2):324–348.

Cheibub, José Antonio (1998). 'Political Regimes and the Extractive Capacity of Governments: Taxation in Democracies and Dictatorships', *World Politics*, 50(3):349–376.

Chilcote, Ronald H. (1990). 'Southern European Transitions in Comparative Perspective', in Chilcote, Ronald et al. (eds.) *Transitions from Dictatorship to Democracy: Comparative Studies of Spain, Portugal, and Greece*. New York: Taylor & Francis.

Christiansen, Eric (1967). *The origins of military power in Spain, 1800–1854*. London: Oxford University Press.

Cizre, Umit (2004). 'Problems of democratic governance of civil-military relations in Turkey and the European Union enlargement zone', *European Journal of Political Research*, 43(1): 107–125.

Clausewitz, Carl von (1966 [1827]). *On War*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Cohen, Michael D., James G. March, Johan P. Olsen (1972). 'A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 17(1):1–25.

Collier, David (1979/ed.). *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Collier, David, and James E. Mahon. 'Conceptual "Stretching" Revisited: Alternative Views of Categories in Comparative Analysis', *American Political Science Review*, 87(4):845–55.

Collier, Ruth Berins and David Collier (1991). *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Comas, José María (1980). 'Les Aménagements à l'Exercice par les Militaires, les Libertés Publiques dans le Cadre des Ordonnances Militaires de Juan Carlos 1er' in Comas, José María (1981/eds.) *Deuxièmes Reconnaissances du Système Militaire Espagnol*. Toulouse: Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Université de Toulouse I.

Comas, José María and Lucien Mandeville (1986). *Les militaires et le pouvoir dans l'Espagne contemporaine de Franco à Felipe González*. Toulouse: Institute d'Etudes Politiques.

Comín, Francisco and Daniel Díaz (2005). 'Sector público administrativo y estado del bienestar' in Carreras, Albert and Xavier Tafunell (eds.) *Estadísticas Históricas de España, Siglos XIX-XX*. Bilbao: Fundación BBVA.

Commission of the European Communities (2001). 'European Governance, A White Paper'. *White Papers*. COM (2001), 428 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com_2001_0428en01.pdf [Accessed 17 January 2011].

Comprido, Baptista (1979). 'Defesa Nacional: Alguns Subsídios para uma Lei', *Nação e Defesa*, 10:35–48.

Correia, Ángelo (1978) 'Reflexões Doutrinárias acerca duma Lei de Defesa Nacional', *Nação e Defesa*, 6:10–29.

Cosidó Gutiérrez, Ignacio (1994). *El gasto militar: el presupuesto de defensa en España (1982–1992)*. Madrid: Eudema.

Cottéy, A, T. Edmonds and A. Forster (2002). ‘The Second Generation Problematic: Re-thinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 29(1):31–56.

Crollen, Luc (1973). *Portugal, the U.S. and NATO*. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

Daguzan, Jean-François (1982). ‘L’expansion de l’Industrie Militaire Espagnole’ in Daguzan, Jean-François and Bernard Labatut (eds.) *Troisièmes Reconnaissances du Système Militaire Espagnol*. Toulouse: Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Université de Toulouse I.

Dahl, Robert A. and Charles E. Lindblom (1953). *Politics, Economics and Welfare: Planning and Politico-economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes*. New York: Harper and Row.

Danopoulos, Constantine (1991). ‘Democratising the Military: Lessons from Mediterranean Europe,’ *West European Politics*, 14(4):25–41.

Dauber, Cori (1998). ‘The Practice of Argument: Reading the Condition of Civil-Military Relations’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 24(3):435–446.

David, Paul A. (1985). ‘Clio and the QWERTY’, *American Economic Review*, 75:332–337.

David, Paul A. (2000). ‘Path Dependence, Its Critics and the Quest for “Historical Economics”’ in Garrouste, Pierre and Stavros Ioannides (eds.) *Evolution and Path Dependence in Economic Idea: Past and Present*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Decalo, Samuel (1976). *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Delgado, Julián (2005). *Los grises: Víctimas y verdugos del franquismo*. Madrid: Temas de Hoy.

Desch, Michael C. (1998a). ‘Soldiers, States, and Structures: the End of the Cold War and Weakening us Civilian Control’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 24(3):389–406.

Desch, Michael C. (1998b). ‘A Historian’s Fallacies: A Reply to Bacevich’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 24(3):587–592.

Desch, Michael C. (1999). *Civilian Control of the Military. The Changing Security Environment*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, Larry and Marc Plattner (1996). ‘Introduction’ in Diamond, Larry and Marc Plattner (eds.), *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, Larry Jay (2002). ‘Thinking About Hybrid Regimes’, *Journal of Democracy*, 13(2):21–35.

Díaz Fernández, Antonio M. (2005) *Los servicios de inteligencia españoles. Desde la guerra civil hasta el 11M. Historia de una transición*. Madrid: Alianza.

Díaz Fernández, Antonio Manuel (2003). *Origen, función y control de los servicios de inteligencia de España*. Doctoral Thesis. Barcelona: Departamento de Derecho Constitucional y Ciencia Política. Facultad de Derecho, Universidad de Barcelona.

DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell (1983). 'The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields', *American Sociological Review*, 48:147–60.

DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell (1991/eds.) *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Doern, G. Bruce and Richard W. Phidd (1983). *Canadian Public Policy: Ideas Structure, Process*. Toronto: Methuen.

Dolowitz, David and David Marsh (2000). 'Learning from Abroad: The role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making', *Governance*, 13(1):5–24.

Dror, Yehezkel (1968). *Public Policymaking Reexamined*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Duarte, António Paulo (2010). *A Política de Defesa Nacional 1919–1958*. Lisbon: Impresa de Ciências Sociais.

Dueñas, Manuel Álvaro (1990). 'Los militares en la represión política de la posguerra: La jurisdicción especial de responsabilidades políticas hasta la reforma de 1942', *Revista de estudios políticos*, 69: 141–162.

Eckstein, Harry (1975). 'Case studies and theory in political science' in Greenstein, Fred I. and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of political science. Political science: Scope and theory*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Eldredge, Niels and Stephen Jay Gould (1972). 'Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism' in Schopf, Thomas J. M. (ed.) *Models in Paleobiology*. San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper.

Eliadis, Pearl, Margaret M. Hill and Michael Howlett (2005/eds.) *Designing Government: From Instruments to Governance*. Montreal: Mc-Gill-Queen's University Press.

Etzioni, Amitai (1975). *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations: On Power, Involvement, and their Correlates*, 2nd ed. New York Free Press.

Faria, Telmo (1995). 'O Comunismo. Un anátema estado-novista', *Revista de História das Ideias*, 17:229–261.

Faria, Telmo (1996). 'As tropas de Santos Costa na elite militar do Estado Novo', *História*, 23/24 Agosto-Septembro.

Faria, Telmo (2000). *Debaixo de fogo!: Salazar e as Forças Armadas (1935–41)*. Lisboa: Instituto da Defesa Nacional.

Feaver, Peter D. (1998a). 'Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the Souring of American Civil-Military Relations', *Armed Forces & Society*, 24(3):407–434.

Feaver, Peter D. (1998b). 'Modeling Civil-Military Relations: A Replay to Burk and Bacevich', *Armed Forces & Society*, 24(4):593–600.

Feaver, Peter D. (1999) 'Civil-Military Relations,' *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2:211–41.

Feaver, Peter D. (2003). *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Military Relations*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Feaver, Peter D. and Richard H. Kohn (2001/eds.). *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.

Feit, Edward (1973). *The Armed Bureaucrats: Military-Administrative Regimes and Political Development*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin

Feo, Julio and José Luis Romero (1968). 'La Administración Pública comparada de tres países continentales: España, Francia y Alemania', *Sociología de la Administración Pública española*, 17:315–376.

Fernandes, Tiago (2006). *Nem Ditadura, nem Revolução: A Ala Liberal e o Marcelismo (1968–1974)*. Lisbon: Dom Quixote.

Fernández Bastarreche, Fernando (1988). 'The Spanish Military from the Age of the Disasters to the Civil War' in Barker, Thomas and Rafael Bañón Martínez (eds.) *Armed Forces and Society in Spain: Past and Present*. Boulder: Social Science Monographs.

Fernández López, Javier (1998). *El Rey y otros militares: los militares en el cambio de régimen político en España (1969–1982)*. Madrid: Trotta.

Fernández López, Javier (2000). *Diecisiete horas y media: el enigma del 23-F*. Madrid: Taurus.

Fernández-Aceytuno, Mariano (2001). *Ifni y Sahara: una encrucijada en la historia de España*. Simancas: Dueñas.

Ferreira, Arnaldo Manuel de Medeiros (1976). 'Factores da Evolução do Ensino Militar Superior', *Nação e Defesa*, 2:139–152

Ferreira, José Medeiros (1980). 'Espace Stratégique et Défensif Ibérique' in Montech, Alain (1982/ed.) *Reconnaisances du Système Militaire Portugais*. Toulouse: Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Université de Toulouse I.

Ferreira, José Medeiros (1983). *Ensaio histórico sobre a Revolução de 25 de Abril - O período pré-constitucional*. Lisbon: INCM-SREC da Região Autónoma dos Açores.

Ferreira, José Medeiros (1989). *Um Século de Problemas: As Relações Luso-Espanholas da União Ibérica à Comunidade Europeia*. Lisbon: Livros Horizonte.

Ferreira, José Medeiros (1992). *O Comportamento Político dos Militares: Forças Armadas e Regimes Políticos em Portugal durante o Século XX*. Lisbon: Ed. Estampa.

Ferreira, José Medeiros (1994). *História de Portugal, vol. 8: Portugal em transe*. Lisbon: Editorial Estampa.

Ferreira, José Medeiros (2000). 'Forças Armadas e o Regime Autoritário', *Nação e Defesa*, 94: 107–122.

Ferreira, José Medeiros (2006). *Cinco Regimes na Política Internacional*. Lisbon: Presenta.

Ferreira, Nuno Estêvão (2009). *A Câmara Corporativa no Estado Novo: Composição, Funcionamento e Inflúencia. Doutoramento en Ciências Sociais*. Lisbon: Universidade de Lisboa, Instituto de Ciências Sociais.

Ferro, Antonio (1933). *Salazar: o Homem e a sua Obra*. Lisbon: Empresa Nacional de Publicidade.

Ferro, Antonio (1938). *Homens e Multidões*. Lisbon: Livraria Bertrand.

Ferro, Antonio (2003 [1932–1938]). *Entrevistas de Antonio Ferro a Salazar*, 2nd ed. Lisbon: Parceira A. M. Pereira.

Finer, Samuel E. (1975). ‘State and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military’ in Tilly, Charles (ed.) *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Finer, Samuel E. (1988 [1962]) *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 2nd ed. London: Allen Lane.

Fishman, Robert (1990). ‘Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe’s Transition to Democracy’, *World Politics*, 42 (3):422–440.

Fontana, Josep (2007). *La época del liberalismo*. Barcelona: Crítica-Marcial Pons.

Fontana, Josep (1986/ed.). *España bajo el franquismo*. Barcelona: Critica.

Forster, Anthony (2006). *Armed Forces and Society in Europe*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.

Fortes, José and Luis Otero (1983). *Proceso a nueve militares demócratas: las Fuerzas Armadas y la UMD*. Barcelona: Argos-Vergara.

Fraga Iribarne, Manuel (1980). *Memoria breve de una vida pública*. Barcelona: Planeta.

Freire, João (2003). *Homens em fundo azul-marinho. Ensaio de observação sociológica sobre uma corporação nos meados do séc. XX: A Armada Portuguesa*. Oeiras: Celta.

Freire, João Brito (1998). ‘O Partido Comunista Português e a Guerra Civil de Espanha’ in Rosas Fernando (ed.) *Portugal e a Guerra Civil de Espanha*. Lisbon: Edições Colibri.

Freyre, Gilberto (1940). *O mundo que o português criou: aspectos das relações sociais e de cultura do Brasil com Portugal e as colônias portuguesas*. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio.

Fusi, Juan Pablo and Jordi Palafox (2003). *España: 1808–1996. El Desafío de la Modernidad*. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe.

Gallagher, Tom (1983). *Portugal: A twentieth-century interpretation*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Galvão, Henrique (1938). *O Império*. Lisbon: SPN.

García Díez, Juan A. (2000). ‘The Government’s Consensual Strategy’ in Threlfall, Monica (ed.) *Consensus Politics in Spain: Insider Perspectives*. Bristol: Intellect.

Garrett, Geoffrey and Barry Weingast (1994). ‘Ideas, interests, and institutions: constructing the European Community’s internal market’, in Goldstein, Judith and Robert Keohane (eds.) *Ideas and Foreign Policy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Geddes, Barbara (1999). ‘What do we know about democratization after 20 years?’, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2:115–144.

Gerring, John (2007). 'Is There a (Viable) Crucial-Case Method?', *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(3):231–253.

Giddens, Anthony (1984). *The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Cambridge: Polity.

Gillespie, Richard (1989). *The Spanish Socialist Party: A History of Factionalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goldstein, Judith (1993). *Ideas, Interests and American Trade Policy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Goldstein, Judith and Robert Keohane (1994/eds.). *Ideas and Foreign Policy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gomáriz, Enrique (1979). 'Los militares ante la transición. El postfranquismo,' *Zona Abierta*, 19:71–88.

Gonçalves, Horacio de Assiss (1972). *Intimidades de Salazar. O Homen e a sua Época, segunda edição*. Lisbon: Bertrand.

González Hernández, Juan Carlos (1999). *Desarrollo Político y Consolidación Democrática en Portugal (1974–1998)*. Madrid: CIS / Universidad de Salamanca.

Gonzalez Padilla, Eusebio (2002). 'La Justicia Militar en el primer Franquismo' in Gutiérrez Navas, Manuel and José Rivera Menéndez (eds.) *Sociedad y política almeriense durante el régimen de Franco. Actas de las Jornadas celebradas en la UNED durante los días 8 al 12 de Abril de 2002*. Almeria: Instituto de Estudio Almerienses.

Grabosky, Peter N. (1994). 'Green Markets: Environmental Regulation by the Private Sector', *Law and Policy*, 16(4):419–448.

Graham, Lawrence S. (1975) *Portugal: The Decline and Collapse of an Authoritarian Order*. London: Sage.

Graham, Lawrence S. (1983). 'Bureaucratic Politics and the Problems of Reform of the Apparatus' in Graham, Lawrence S. and Douglas L. Wheeler (eds.) *In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and Its Consequences*. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Graham, Lawrence S. (1993). *The Portuguese military and the State: Rethinking Transitions in Europe and Latin America*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Graham, Robert (1984). *Spain. Change of a Nation*. London: Michael Joseph.

Greif, Avner and David Laitin (2004). 'A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change', *American Political Science Review*, 98 (4):14–48.

Guaita Martorell, Aurelio (1986). 'Capitanes y Capitanias Generales' *Revista de Administración Pública*, 111:7–50.

Gunningham, Neil and Mike D. Young (1997). 'Toward Optimal Environmental Policy: The Case of Biodiversity Conservation', *Ecology Law Quarterly*, 24: 243–298.

Gunther, Richard (1980). *Public Policy in a No-Party State. Spanish Planning and Budgeting in the Twilight of the Franquist Era*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gunther, Richard (1995). 'Spain: the very model of elite settlement' in Highley, John and Richard Gunther (eds.) *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gunther, Richard, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (1995/eds.). *The Politics of Democratisation. Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.

Gunther, Richard, Nikiforos Diamandouros (2001/eds.). *Parties, Politics and Democracy in the New Southern Europe*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.

Gunther, Richard, José Ramón Montero and Joan Botella (2004). *Democracy in Modern Spain*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Gunther, Richard, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos (2006/eds.). *Democracy and the State in the New Southern Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gutiérrez Mellado, Manuel and Jesús Picatoste (1983). *Un soldado de España. Conversaciones con Jesús Picatoste*. Barcelona: Argos Vergara.

Hacker, Jacob S. (1998). 'The Historical Logic of National Health Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the Development of British, Canadian, and U.S. Medical Policy', *Studies in American Political Development*, 12:57–130.

Hacker, Jacob S. (2002). *The Divided Welfare State: the Battle over Public and Private Social Benefits in the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hall, Peter A. (1986). *Governing the Economy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hall, Peter A. (1993). 'Policy paradigms, social learning and the state: the case of economic policy-making in Britain', *Comparative Politics*, 25(3):275–296.

Hall, Peter A. (1997). 'The Role of Interests, Institutions, and Ideas in the Comparative Political Economy of the Industrialized Nations' in Linchbach, Mark I. and Alan S. Zuckerman (eds.), *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hall, Peter and Rosemary Taylor (1996). 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms', *Political Studies* 44:936–957.

Halpern, Charlotte and Patrick Le Galès (2011) 'Pas d'Action Publique Autonome sans Instruments Propres: Analyse Comparée et Longitudinale des Politiques Environnementales et Urbaines de l'Union Européenne', *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 61(1):51–78.

Harris, J. P. (1996). *Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903–1939*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hay, Colin (2001). 'The "Crisis" of Keynesian and the Rise of Neo-Liberalism in Britain: an Ideational Institutional Approach', in Campbell, John L. and Ove K. Pedersen (eds.). *The Second Movement in Institutional Analysis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hay, Colin (2004). 'Ideas, interests and institutions in the comparative political economy of great transformations', *Review of International Political Economy*, 11(1):204–226.

Hay, Colin (2006). 'Constructivist Institutionalism' in Rhodes, R. A. W., Sarah E. Binder and Bert Rockman (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hay, Colin (2007). 'Globalisation and Public Policy' in Goodin, R. E., M. Rein and M. Moran (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hay, Colin and Daniel Wincott (1998). 'Structure, agency and historical institutionalism', *Political Studies*, 46(5):951–957.

Heclo, Hugh (1974). *Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Herr, Richard and John Herman Richard Polt (1989/eds.). *Iberian Identity: Essays on the Nature of Identity in Portugal and Spain*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies.

Hollis, Martin and Steve Smith (1990). *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hollis, Martin and Steve Smith (1991) 'Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, 17(4):393–410.

Hood, Christopher (1976). *The Limits of Administration*. London: Wiley.

Hood, Christopher C. (1983). *The Tools of Government*. London: McMillan.

Hood, Christopher C. (1983b). 'Using Bureaucracy Sparingly', *Public Administration*, 61(2): 197–208.

Hood, Christopher C. (1998). *The Art of the State*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Hood, Christopher C. (2007). 'Intellectual Obsolescence and Intellectual Makeovers', *Governance*, 20(1):127–144.

Hood, Christopher C. and Helen Z. Margetts (2007). *The Tools of Government in the Digital Age*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hood, Christopher C. and Michael Jackson (1994). 'Keys for Locks in Administrative Argument', *Administration & Society*, 25(4):467–488.

Hopkin, Jonathan (1999). *Party Formation and Democratic Transition in Spain: the Creation and Collapse of the Union of the Democratic Centre*. New York: St Martin's Press.

Horn, Murray (1995). *The Political Economy of Public Administration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Horowitz, Donald (1980). *Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Howlett, Michael and M. Ramesh (1993) 'Patterns of Policy Instrument Choice: Policy Styles, Policy Learning and the Privatization Experience', *Policy Studies Review*, 12(1):1–24.

Howlett, Michael (1991). 'Policy Instruments, Policy Styles, and Policy Implementation: National Approaches to Theories of Instrument Choice', *Policy Studies Journal* 19(2):1–21.

Howlett, Michael (2000). 'Managing the "Hollow State": Procedural Policy Instruments and Modern Governance', *Canadian Public Administration*, 43(4):412–431.

Howlett, Michael (2005: 34–38) 'What is a Policy Instrument?' in Eliadis, Pearl, Margaret M. Hill and Michael Howlett (eds.). *Designing Government: From Instruments to Governance*. Montreal: Mc-Gill-Queen's University Press.

Howlett, Michael (2009). 'Governance modes, policy regimes and operational plans: A multi-level nested model of policy instrument choice and policy design', *Policy Sciences*, 42(1):73–88.

Howlett, Michael (2009b). 'Process Sequencing Policy Dynamics: Beyond Homeostasis and Path Dependency', *Journal of Public Policy*, 29(3):241–262.

Howlett, Michael (2011). *Designing Public Policies: Principles and instruments*. London: Routledge.

Howlett, Michael and M. Ramesh (2003). *Studying Public Policy: Policy Subsystems. Second Edition*. Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press.

Howlett, Michael, Jonathan Kim and Paul Weaver (2005). 'Assessing Instrument Mixes: Methodological Issues in Contemporary Implementation Research'. Paper Presented to The Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association. London, Ontario, June 2.

Huber, Evelyn, Charles Ragin and John Stephens (1993). 'Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State', *American Journal of Sociology*, 99(3):711–749.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1957). *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1991). *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

IISS (1986). *The Military Balance 1984–1985*. London: The International Institute For Strategic Studies.

IISS (1988). *The Military Balance 1986–1987*. London: The International Institute For Strategic Studies.

Immergut, Ellen M (1992). *Health politics: Interests and institutions in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Immergut, Ellen M. (1998). 'The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism', *Politics & Society*, 26(1):5–34.

Iniesta Cano, Carlos (1986). 'Las Fuerzas Armadas (1975–1985)' in Borrás Bertriu, Rafael (ed.). *España: diez años después de Franco (1975–1985)*. Barcelona: Planeta.

Jackson, Gabriel (1965). *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931–1939*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Janowitz, Morris (1957). 'Military Elites and the Study of War', *Conflict Resolution*, 1(1):9–18.

Janowitz, Morris (1959). 'Changing Patterns of Organisational Authority: The Military Establishment', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 3(4):473–493.

Janowitz, Morris (1960). *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.

Janowitz, Morris (1977). *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jennings, Will and Martin Lodge (2011). 'Governing Mega-Events: Tools of Security Risk Management for the FIFA 2006 World Cup in Germany and London 2012 Olympic Games', *Government and Opposition*, 46(2):192–222.

Jerez Mir, Miguel (1982). *Elites políticas y centros de extracción en España, 1938–1957*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.

Jerez Mir, Miguel (2009). 'Executive, single party and ministers in Franco's regime: 1936–45' in Pinto Costa (ed.). *Ruling elites and decision-making in fascist-era dictatorships*. Social Science Monographs, Boulder. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jiménez Jiménez, Juan Carlos (1987). 'Las consecuencias económicas de la guerra civil', *Revista de Historia Económica*, 5(1):121–130.

Jones, Bryan D., Frank. R. Baumgartner, and James L. True (1998). 'Policy Punctuations: U.S. Budget Authority, 1947–1995', *The Journal of Economic Literature*, 60(1):1–33.

Jordana, Jacint and Carles Ramio' (2005). 'Gobierno y Administracion' in Carreras, Albert and Xavier Tafunell (eds). *Estadísticas Históricas de España, Siglos XIX-XX*. Bilbao: Fundación BBVA.

Júdice, José Miguel Alarcão (1978). 'O Artigo 273º, Nº 4, da Constituição da República Portuguesa e a Actual Missão Política das Forças Armadas (Apontamento de Teoria Constitucional)', *Nação e Defesa*, 4:17–32.

Karabelias, Gerassimos (1998). *Civil-military relations: a comparative analysis of the role of the military in the political transformations of post-war Turkey and Greece (1980–1995)*. Final Report submitted to North Atlantic Treaty Organization in June 1998

Katznelson, Ian (2003). 'Periodization and Preferences: Reflections on Purposive Action in Comparative Historical Social Science' in Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.). *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Keynes, John Maynard (1936). *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*. London: MacMillan.

Kindelán, Alfredo (1981). *La verdad de mis relaciones con Franco*. Barcelona: Planeta.

King, Desmond (1995). *Actively Seeking Work. The Politics of Unemployment and Welfare Policy in the United States*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994). *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kingdon, John (1984). *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. Boston: Little Brown.

Kirschen, Etienne Sadi et al. (1964). *Economic Policy in Our Time*. Amsterdam: North Holland.

Kourvetaris George A. and Betty A. Dobratz (1981). ‘Public opinion and civil-military relations in Greece since 1974’, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 4(1):71–84

Knill, Christoph (1999). ‘Explaining Cross-National Variance in Administrative Reform: Autonomous versus Instrumental Bureaucracies’, *Journal of Public Policy*, 19(2):113–139.

Krasner, Stephen D. (1984) ‘Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics’, *Comparative Politics*, 16(2):223–246.

Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Lafuente Balle, José M. (1987). *El Rey y las Fuerzas Armadas en la Constitución*. Madrid: Edersa.

Lakatos, Imre (1970). ‘Falsificationism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs’ in Lakatos, Imre and Alan Musgrave (eds.). *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Landry, Réjean and Frédéric Varone (2005). ‘Choice of Policy Instruments’ in Eliadis, Pearl, Margaret M. Hill and Michael Howlett (eds.). *Designing Government: From Instruments to Governance*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Lanhoso, Adriano Coutinho (1985). ‘Discurso do Director do IDN Vice-almirante Adriano Coutinho Lanoso na Sessão Solene de Abertura do Curso de Defesa Nacional de 1986, em 11 Novembro 1985’, *Nacão e Defesa*, 36:15–22.

Lascoumes Pierre and Patrick Le Galès (2007). ‘Introduction: Understanding Public Policy through Its Instruments—From the Nature of Instruments to the Sociology of Public Policy Instrumentation’, *Governance*, 20(1):1–21.

Lasswell, Harold (1941). ‘The Garrison State and Specialist on Violence’, *American Journal of Sociology*, 46: 455–468.

Lasswell, Harold D. (1954). ‘Key Symbols, Signs and Icons’, in Bryson, Lymon et al. (eds.) *Symbols and Values: an Initial Study*. New York: Harper.

Lasswell, Harold D. (1958 [1936]). *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*. New York: Meridian.

Legislação.org (2010). *Legislação Militar*. <http://www.legislacao.org/tag/militar/> [Accessed 5 May 2010]

Liddell Hart, Basil (1959). *The Tanks: A History of the Royal Tank Regiment and its Predecessors*. London: Cassell & Co.

Liedtke, Boris (1999) ‘Spain and the United Status, 1945–1975’ in Balfour, Sebastian and Paul Preston (eds.). *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*. London: Routledge.

Lijphart, Arend (1971). 'Comparative Politics and Comparative Methods', *American Political Science Review*, 65(3):682–693.

Lijphart, Arend (1999). *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lindblom, Charles E. (1959). 'The science of muddling through', *Public Administration Review*, 19:78–88.

Linder, Stephen H. and Peters, B. Guy (1989). 'Instruments of Government: Perceptions and Contexts', *Journal of Public Policy*, 9(1):35–58.

Linder, Stephen H. and Peters, B. Guy (1998). 'The Study of Policy Instruments: Four Schools of Thought' in Peters, Guy B. and Frans K. M. Van Nispen (eds.). *Public Policy Instruments: Evaluating the Tools of Public Administration*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Linz, Juan (1970 [1964]) 'An Authoritarian Regime: Spain' in Allard Erik and Stein Rokkan (1970/eds.). *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology*. New York: Free Press.

Linz, Juan (1977). 'Spain and Portugal: Critical Choices', in Landes, David S. (ed.) *Western Europe: The Trials of Partnership*. Lexington: Lexington Books.

Linz, Juan (1981). Some Comparative Thoughts on the Transition to Democracy in Portugal and Spain' in Macedo, José Braga de and Simon Serfaty (eds.). *Portugal Since the Revolution: Economic and Political Perspectives*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Linz, Juan (1994). 'Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it make a difference?' in Linz, Juan J. and Arturo Valenzuela (eds.). *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Linz, Juan (1996). 'La Transición Española en Perspectiva Comparada' in Tusell, J. and A. Soto (eds.). *Historia de la Transición*. Madrid: Alianza Universidad.

Linz, Juan (2000). *Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan (1996). *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Linz, Juan, Alfred Stepan and Richard Gunther (1995). 'Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, with Reflections on Latin America' in Gunther, Richard, Niki-foros Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds.). *The Politics of Democratisation. Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.

Linz Juan, Miguel Jerez Mir and Susana Corzo (2003). 'Ministers and Regimes in Spain: From the First to the Second Restoration, 1974–2002' in Almeida Pedro Tavares de, Antonio Costa Pinto and Nancy Bermeo (eds.) *Who Governs Southern Europe? Regime Change and Ministerial Recruitment, 1850–2000*. London: Frank Cass.

Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan (1967). *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National perspectives*. Toronto: The Free Press.

Lobo, Angel (1981). *Otan y España: el precio de una alianza*. Madrid: Sabado Grafico.

Lodge, Martin (2002). *On different tracks: designing railway regulation in Britain and Germany*. Westport: Praeger.

Lodge, Martin and Oliver James (2003). ‘The Limitations of “Policy Transfer” and “Lesson Drawing” for Public Policy Research,’ *Political Studies Review*, 1(2):179–93.

Loff, Manuel (2008). *O Nossa Século é Fascista!: O mundo visto por Salazar e Franco (1936–1945)*. Porto: Campo das Letras.

Lopes, António de Figueiredo (1986). ‘A Industria de Defesa e a Modernização das Forças Armadas Portuguesas’, *Nacão e Defesa*, 38:93–105.

López Rodó, Laureano (1977). *La larga marcha hacia la monarquía*. Barcelona: Noguer.

Losada, Juan Carlos (1990). *Ideología del Ejército Franquista (1939–1959)*. Madrid: Istmo.

Lowi, Theodore J. (1966). ‘Distribution, Regulation, Redistribution: The Functions of Government’ in Ripley, Randall B. (ed.) *Public Policies and Their Politics: Techniques of Government Control*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Lowi, Theodore J. (1972). ‘Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice’, *Public Administration Review*, 32(4):298–310.

Lucena, Manuel (1976). *A Evolução do Sistema Corporativo Portugués, Vol I: O Salazarismo*. Lisbon: Perspectivas e Realidades.

Lucena, Manuel (1984). ‘Interpretações do Salazarismo: Notas de lectura crítica’, *Análise Social*, 20:423–451.

Luckham, Robin (1971). ‘A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations,’ *Government and Opposition*, 6(1):5–35.

Luckham, Robin (2003). ‘Democratic Strategies for Security in Transition and Conflict’ in Cawthra, Gavin and Robin Luckham (eds.). *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*. London: Zed Books.

Lukes, Steven (1974). *Power: A Radical View*. London: Macmillan.

Lustick, Ian S. (1996). ‘History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias’, *The American Political Science Review*, 90(3):605–618.

Macdonald, A. Roderick (2005). ‘The Swiss Army Knife of Governance’ in Eliadis, Pearl, Margaret M. Hill and Michael Howlett (eds.). *Designing Government: From Instruments to Governance*. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Macchiavelli, Niccolò (2002 [1521]). *The Art of War*. Cambridge: Da Capo Press.

Machado, António (2009). ‘M113, O “Cavalo de Batalha” da Infantaria Mecanizada’, *Operacional: defesa, forças armadas e de segurança*, <http://www.operacional.pt/m113-o-cavalo-de-batalha-da-infantaria-mecanizada/> [Accessed 7 September 2010].

Magone, José Maria (1996). *The changing architecture of Iberian politics (1974–92): an investigation on the structuring of democratic political systemic culture in semiperipheral southern European societies*. Lewiston: Mellen University Press.

Mahoney, James (2000). 'Path Dependence in Historical Sociology', *Theory and Society*, 29:507–548.

Mahoney, James (2000b). 'Strategies of Causal Inference in Small-N Analysis', *Sociological Methods & Research*, 28(4):387–424.

Mahoney, James (2003). 'Knowledge Accumulation in Comparative Historical Research: the Case of Democracy and Authoritarianism' in Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.). *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (2003). 'Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agendas' in Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.). *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mahoney, Richard D. (1983). *JFK: Ordeal in Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Majone, Giandomenico (1976). 'Choice among Policy Instruments for Pollution Control', *Policy Analysis*, 2(4):589–613.

Majone, Giandomenico (1989). *Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Majone, Giandomenico (1996). 'Ideas, Interests and Institutions', in Goodin, Robert E. and Hans-Dieter Klingeman (eds.). *A New Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Maluquer de Motes, Jordi (2005). 'Consumo y Precios' in Carreras, Albert and Xavier Tafunell (eds.). *Estadísticas Históricas de España, Siglos XIX-XX*. Bilbao: Fundación BBVA.

Manuel, Paul Christopher (1995). *Uncertain Outcome: The Politics of the Portuguese Transition to Democracy*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America.

Manuel, Paul Christopher (1996). *The Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Portugal: Political, Economic, and Military Issues 1976–1991*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

March James G. and Johan P. Olsen (1989) *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*. New York: Free Press.

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen (2006). 'The Logic of Appropriateness' in Goodin, Robert, Michael Moran and Martin Rein (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen (1984). 'The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life', *American Political Science Review*, 78 (3):734–749.

Marques, Isabel Pestana (2004). '1914–1918. Comportamentos de guerra' in Barata, Manuel Themudo and Nuno Severiano Teixeira (eds.). *Nova História Militar de Portugal, Vol. 5*. Lisbon: Círculo de Lectores.

Martín de la Guardia, Ricardo (2008). *Cuestión de Tijeras: La censura en la transición a la democracia*. Madrid: Síntesis.

Martins, Herminio (1969). 'Opposition in Portugal', *Government and Opposition*, 4(2):250–263.

Martin, Ron and Peter Sunley (2006). 'Path dependence and regional economic Evolution', *Journal of Economic Geography*, 6:395–437.

Mascarenhas, Domingo (1982). *Portugalidade: Biografia duma Nação*. Lisbon: Edições FP.

Mashaw, Jerry L. and David L. Harfst (1990). *The Struggle for Auto Safety*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Massons, José María (1994). *Historia de la Sanidad Militar española. Tomo II*. Barcelona: Pomares-Corredor.

Massis, Henri (1961). *Salazar face à face: trois dialogues politiques*. Paris: La Palatine.

Mata, Eugénia and Nuno Valerio (1994). *História Económica de Portugal: uma Perspectiva Global*. Lisbon: Fundamentos.

Mateus, Abel (1998). *Economia Portuguesa: Crescimento no contexto internacional (1910–1998)*. Lisbon: Editorial Verbo.

Matos, Luís Salgado de (2004). 'A Orgânica das Forças Armadas Portuguesas' in Barata, Manuel Themudo and Nuno Severiano Teixeira (eds.). *Nova História Militar de Portugal, Vol. 4*. Lisbon: Círculo de Lectores.

Maxwell, Kenneth (1989). 'Regime Overthrow and the Prospects for Democratic Transition in Portugal', in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.). *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Maxwell, Kenneth (1991). 'Portuguese Foreign and Defense Policy: A Global Analysis' in Maxwell, Kenneth (ed.). *Portuguese Defense and Foreign Policy Since Democratization*. New York: Camões Center.

Maxwell, Kenneth (1995). *The Making of Portuguese Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

May, Peter J., Bryan D. Jones, Betsi E. Beem, Emily A. Neff-Sharum, Melissa K. Poague (2005). 'Policy Coherence and Component-Driven Policymaking: Arctic Policy in Canada and the United States', *Policy Studies Journal*, 33(1):37–63.

McDonnell, Lorraine M. and Richard F. Elmore (1987) 'Getting the Job done: Alternative Policy Instruments' *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis*, 9(2):133–152.

McLean, Iain (2010). 'Political Science and History: Friends and Neighbours', *Political Studies*, 58:354–367.

MDN (1986). *Livro Branco da Defesa Nacional: 1986*. Lisbon: Ministerio da Defesa Nacional.

Medina, Francisco (2006). *23 F: La verdad*. Barcelona: Plaza & Janes.

Medina, João (1977). *Salazar em França*. Lisbon: Atica.

Medina, João (1979). *Salazar e os Fascistas: Salazarismo e Nacional-Sindicalismo. A história de um conflito, 1932–1935*. Lisbon: Livraria Bertrand.

Medina, João (2000). *Salazar, Hitler e Franco: Estudos sobre Salazar e a Ditadura*. Lisbon: Livros Horizonte.

Melo, José Brandão Pereira de (1970). 'A impresa periódica militar', *Jornal do Exército*, 122.

Melo, Manuel José Homem de (1983). *Cartas de Salazar a Craveiro Lopes (1951-1958)*. Lisbon: Edições 70.

Mérida, María (1979). *Mis conversaciones con los generales*. Barcelona: Plaza & Janes.

Mesquida, Mário (1973). *Portugal sem Salazar (entrevistas)*. Lisbon: Assírio e Avim.

Mesquita, Mota (1986). 'Esforço Financeiro da Defesa', *Nação e Defesa*, 38:43-58.

Meyer, John. W., and Brian Rowan (1977). 'Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony', *American Journal of Sociology*, 83(2):340

Miguel, Amando de (1975). *Sociología del Franquismo: Análisis ideológico de los Ministros del Régimen*. Editorial Euros: Barcelona.

Mill, John S. (1973 [1843]). 'Of the Four Methods of Experimental Inquiry' in Robson John M. (ed.) *A System of Logic*. Toronto: Toronto University Press.

Mills, C. Wright (1956). *The Power Elite*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ministerio de Defensa (1986). *Memoria Legislatura (1982-1986)*. Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa.

Miranda, Jorge (1978). 'A Participação dos Militares no Exercício da Soberania', *Nação e Defesa*, 5:19-30.

Mitnick, Barry M. (1980). *The Political Economy of Regulation: Creating, Designing, and Removing Regulatory Forms*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Mola, Emilio (1940). *Obras Completas*. Valladolid: Librería Santarén.

Moniz, Júlio Botelho (1939). *Nação em guerra. Organização nacional da defesa*. Lisbon: Editorial Império.

Moore, Clement H. (1970). 'The Single Party as Source of Legitimacy' in Huntington, Samuel and Moore, Clement H. (eds.). *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: the Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*. New York: Basic Books.

Morán, Gregorio (2009). *Adolfo Suárez: ambición y destino*. Barcelona: Debate.

Moreira, Adriano (1980). 'Poder Militar - Poder Civil', *Nação e Defesa*, 16:133-150.

Moreno Gómez, Francisco (1987) *Córdoba en la posguerra. La represión y la guerrilla (1939-1950)*, Cordoba: Francisco Baena D.L.

Moreno Juliá, Xavier (2004). *La división Azul. Sangre Española en Rusia, 1941-1945*. Barcelona: Crítica.

Moskos, Charles C. (1977). 'From Institution to Occupation. Trends in Military Organisation', *Armed Forces & Society*, 4(1):41-50.

Moskos, Charles C. (1986). 'Institutional/occupational trends in armed forces: An update', *Armed Forces & Society*, 12(3):377-382.

Moskos, Charles C. (2000). 'Towards a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm' in Moskos, Charles, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (eds.). *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mujal Leon, Eusebio (1978). 'Communism and Revolution in Portugal' in Tokes, Rudolf L. (ed.). *Eurocommunism and Détente*. New York: New York University Press.

Munck, Gerardo L. (2004). 'Tools for Qualitative Research' in Brady, Henry E. and David Collier (eds.). *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Narli, Nilüfer (2000). 'Civil-military relations in Turkey', *Turkish Studies*, 1(1):107–127

Nataf, Daniel (1995). *Democratization and Social Settlements: The Politics of Change in Contemporary Portugal*. Albany: State of New York University Press.

Navajas Zubeldia, Carlos (1991). *Ejército, estado y sociedad en España (1923–1930)*. Logroño: Instituto de Estudios Riojanos.

Navajas Zubeldía, Carlos (1995). 'La política de defensa durante la transición y consolidación democráticas (1976–1986)' in Tusell, Javier and Álvaro Soto (eds.). *Historia de la transición y consolidación democrática en España (1975–1986)*, Vol. I. Madrid: UNED & UAM.

Navajas Zubeldia, Carlos (2011). *Leales y rebeldes. La tragedia de los militares republicanos*. Madrid: Síntesis.

Navarro Rubio, Mariano (1991). *Mis Memorias: Testimonio de una Vida Política Truncada por el Caso MATESA*. Barcelona: Plaza y Janés.

Nicolau, Roser (2005). 'Poblacion, salud y actividad' in Carreras, Albert and Xavier Tafunell (eds.). *Estadísticas Históricas de España, Siglos XIX-XX*. Bilbao: Fundación BBVA.

Nielsen, Suzanne C. (2005). 'Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness', *Public Administration and Management*, 10(2):61–84.

Nispen, Frans K. M. van and Arthur B. Ringeling (1998). 'On Instruments and Instrumentality: A Critical Assessment' in Peters, Guy B. and Frans K. M. Van Nispen (eds.). *Public Policy Instruments: Evaluating the Tools of Public Administration*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Nogueira, Franco (1980). *Salazar Vol. IV: O Ataque (1945–1958)*. Coimbra: Atlântida.

Nogueira, Franco (2000). *O Estado Novo*. Porto: Livraria Civilizaçao.

Nordlinger, Eric (1977). *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. New York: Prentice Hall.

North, Douglas C. (1990). *Institutions, Institutional Change And Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Norton, Anne (2010). 'Politics against History: Temporal Distortions in the Study of Politics', *Political Studies*, 58:340–353.

Nunes, Leopoldo (1930). *O Ditador das Finanças*. Lisboa: Ottosgráfica.

Oakeshott, Michael (1983). 'The activity of being an historian' in King, Preston (ed.). *The History of Ideas: An Introduction to Method*. London: Croom Helm.

O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe Schmitter (1986). *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (1986/eds.). *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Oliveira, César (1987). *Salazar e a Guerra Civil de Espanha*. Lisbon: O Jornal.

Oliveira, César (1989). 'Oliveira Salazar ea Politica Externa Portuguesa: 1932–1968' in Rosas, Fernando and José M. Brandão de Brito (eds.). *Salazar e o Salazarismo*. Lisbon: Dom Quixote.

Oliveira, Pedro Aires (2007). *Os Despojos da Aliança: A Grã-Bretanha e a Questão Colonial Portuguesa 1945–1975*. Lisbon: Tinta da China.

Oliveira, Pedro Aires de, Fernando Rosas and Júlia Leitão Barros (1996/eds.). *Armindo Monteiro e Oliveira Salazar: Correspondência política 1926–1955*. Lisbon: Editorial Estampa.

Olmeda, José Antonio (1988). *La fuerzas armadas en el estado franquista: participación política, influencia presupuestaria y profesionalización, 1939–1975*. Madrid: Ediciones el Arquero.

Olmeda, José Antonio (forthcoming). 'Escaping Huntington's Labyrinth? Civil-military relations and comparative politics', in Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Critiana Matei (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*. London: Routledge

Olson, Mancur (1993). 'Dictatorship, Democracy and Development', *The American Political Science Review*, 87(3):567–576.

Oltra, Benjamín and Amando de Miguel (1978). 'Bonapartismo y catolicismo: una hipótesis sobre los orígenes ideológicos del franquismo', *Papers* 8:53–102.

Oneto, José (1975). *Cien días en la muerte de Francisco Franco*. Madrid: Felmar.

Onuf, Nicholas G. (1989). *World of Our making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Opello Jr., Walter C. (1983). 'The Continuing Impact of the Old Regime on Portuguese Political Culture' in Graham, Lawrence S. and Douglas L. Wheeler (eds.). *In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and Its Consequences*. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Opello, Water C. Jr. (1985). *Portugal's Political Development: A Comparative Approach*. Boulder: Westview.

Ortega, José Antonio and Javier Silvestre (2005). *Consecuencias Demográficas de la Guerra Civil*. Paper presented on VIII 'Congreso de la Asociación Española de Historia Económica', Santiago de Compostela 13–16 September.

Osorio, Alfonso (1980). *Trayectoria política de un ministro de la Corona*. Barcelona: Planeta.

Pabón, Jesús (1942). *La Revolución Portuguesa (de Don Carlos a Sidónio Paes)*. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe.

Palacios, Jesús (1999). *La España Totalitaria. Las Raíces del Franquismo, 1934–1946*. Barcelona: Planeta.

Palacios, Jesús (2009). *23-F: El golpe del CESID*. Barcelona: Planeta.

Parsons, Wayne (1995). *Public Policy: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

Paulo, Heloisa (1994). *Estado Novo e Propaganda em Portugal e no Brasil: o SPN/SNI e o DIP*. Coimbra: Minerva História.

Payne, Stanley G. (1967). *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Payne, Stanley G. (1986). 'Modernization of the Armed Forces' in Payne, Stanley (ed.). *The Politics of Democratic Spain*. Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

Payne, Stanley G. (1987). *The Franco Regime: 1936–1975*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Payne, Stanley G. (1995). *Spain's First Democracy: the Second Republic, 1931–1936*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Payne, Stanley G. (1999). *Fascism in Spain: 1923–1977*. Madison: University of Wisconsin University Press.

Pereira, António Vaz (1986). 'Portugal e a NATO', *Nacão e Defesa*, 39:59–77.

Pérez Díaz, Victor (1993). *The return of civil society: the emergence of democratic Spain*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Pérez Muñedo, Francisco (2009). *El Gasto de Defensa en España: 1946–2009*. Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa.

Perlmutter, Amos (1969). 'The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Countries', *Comparative Politics* 1(3):382–404.

Perlmutter, Amos (1977). *The Military and Politics in Modern Times, On Professional, Praetorian, and Revolutionary Soldiers*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Peters, Guy B. (1999). *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'New Institutionalism'*. London: Pinter.

Peters, Guy B., Jon Pierre and Desmond S. King (2005). 'The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism', *The Journal of Politics*, 67(4):1275–1300.

Pierson, Paul (2000). 'Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics', *American Political Science Review*, 94(2):251–268.

Pierson, Paul (2003). 'Big, Slow-Moving, and ... Invisible: Macro-Social Processes in the Study of Comparative Politics' in Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.). *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pierson, Paul (2004). *Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pierson, Paul and Theda Skocpol (2002). 'Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science' in Katzenelson, Ira and Helen Milner (eds.). *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Pimentel, Irene Flunser (2007). *A história da PIDE*. Lisboa: Círculo de Leitores.

Pimlott, Ben and Jean Seaton (1980). 'The Role of the Media in the Portuguese Revolution' in Anthony Smith (ed.) *Newspapers and Democracy: International Essays on a Changing Medium*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Pimlott, Ben and Jean Seaton (1983). 'Political Power and the Portuguese Media' in Graham, Lawrence S. and Douglas L. Wheeler (eds.). *In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and Its Consequence*. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Pinto, António Costa (1994). *Os Camisas Azuis. Ideologia, Elites e Movimentos Fascistas em Portugal. 1914–1945*. Lisbon: Estampa.

Pinto, António Costa (1995). *Salazar's Dictatorship and European Fascism*. Boulder, Colo.: Social Science Monographs.

Pinto, António Costa (2006). 'Portugal's Transition to Democracy in the 1970's: the Double Legacy' in Minitos, Marietta (ed.). *Transition to Democracy in Spain, Portugal and Greece Thirty Years After*. Athens: Ekdoseis Pataki.

Pion-Berlin, David (1992). 'Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America', *Comparative Politics*, 25(1):83–102.

Pires, Francisco Lucas (1976), 'As Forças Armadas e a Constituição', *Nação e Defesa*, 2:31–39.

Pires, José Cardoso (1972). 'Changing a Nation's Way of Thinking', *Indexes on Censorship*, 1:47–63.

Pollitt, Christopher and Geert Bouckaert (2000). *Public Management Reform: a Comparative Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Porch, Douglas (1977). *The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution*. Stanford: Hoover Institute Press.

Portero, Florentino (1999). 'Spain, Britain and the Cold War' in Balfour, Sebastian and Paul Preston (eds.). *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*. London: Routledge.

Posner, Richard A. (1974). 'Theories of Economic Regulation', *Bell Journal of Economic and Management Science*, 5(2):335–358.

Powell, Charles (1991). *El piloto del cambio: el rey, la monarquía y la transición a la democracia*. Barcelona: Planeta.

Powell, Charles (1996). *Juan Carlos: A Self-Made Monarch*. London: Macmillan Press.

Powell, Charles (2001). *España en Democracia, 1975–2000*. Barcelona: Plaza & Janés.

Prego, Victoria (1999). *Diccionario de la transición*. Barcelona: Plaza & Janés.

Press.

Preston, Paul (1986). *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain*. London: Routledge.

Preston, Paul (1990). *The politics of revenge: fascism and the military in twentieth-century Spain*. London: Unwin Hyman.

Preston, Paul (1993). *Franco: a Biography*. London: Harper Collins.

Preston, Paul (2004). *Juan Carlos: a people's king*. London: Harper Collins.

Preston, Paul (2006 [1986]). *The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, Revolution and Revenge*. London: Harper Perennial.

Preston, Paul (2008). *El gran manipulador. La mentira cotidiana de Franco*. Barcelona: Ediciones B.

Preston, Paul (2011). *El holocausto español. Odio y exterminio en la Guerra Civil y después*. Barcelona: Debate.

Primo de Rivera, José Antonio (1971 [1934]). *Textos de Doctrina Política*. Madrid: Delegación Nacional de la Sección Femenina del Movimiento.

Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi (1993). 'Political Regimes and Economic Growth', *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 7(3):51–69.

Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune (1970). *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. New York: Harper and Row.

Puell de la Villa, Fernando (1997). *Gutiérrez Mellado, un militar del siglo XX (1912–1995)*. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva. UNED.

Puell de la Villa, Fernando (2005). *Historia del Ejército en España. Segunda Edición*. Madrid: Alianza.

Puell de la Villa, Fernando (2008). *Historia de la Protección Social Militar (1265–1978): de la Ley de Partidas al ISFAS*. Madrid: Instituto Social de las Fuerzas Armadas.

Raadschelders, Jos C.N. (1998). 'Evolution, institutional analysis and path dependency: an administrative-history perspective on fashionable approaches and concepts', *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 64:565–582.

Radaelli, Claudio M. (2000). 'Policy Transfer in the European Union: Institutional Isomorphism as a Source of Legitimacy', *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, 13(1):25–43.

Ramalho, José Luís Pinto (1989). *A Estratégia de Futuro de OTAN e a Posição de Portugal*. Lisboa: ISCSP.

Ramos de Ó, Jorge (1989). 'As circunstâncias ocorrentes' in Rosas, Fernando and José M. Brandão de Brito (eds.). *Salazar e o Salazarismo*. Lisbon: Dom Quixote.

Rato, Vasco (2000). 'As Forças Armadas e Democracia Portuguesa, 1984–1982', *Nação e Defesa*, 94:123–162.

Ravara, Rui de Faria (1989). 'As Bases Conceptuais do Ensino e da Investigação no Exército', *Nação e Defesa*, 49:141–174.

Rebelo de Sousa, Marcelo (1990). 'Da Crispação Institucional ao Equilíbrio Instável de Poderes' in Reis, António (ed.). *Portugal Contemporâneo*. Vol. III. Lisbon: Publicações Alfa.

Redding, Stephen (2002). 'Path dependence, endogenous innovation, and growth', *International Economic Review*, 43(4):1215–1248.

Reinares, Fernando (1990). 'Sociogénesis y evolución del terrorismo en España' in Giner, Salvador (ed.). *España, sociedad y política*. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe.

Reinlein, Fernando (2002). *Capitanes Rebeldes*. Madrid: La Esfera Historia.

Rhodes, R. A. W., Sarah E. Binder and Bert Rockman (2006/eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ribeiro dos Santos, António Pedro (1990). *A Imagem Do Poder No Constitucionalismo Português*. Lisboa: Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas.

Richards, Michael (2006). *A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ringeling, Arthur B. (2005). 'Instruments in Four' in Eliadis, Pearl, Margaret M. Hill and Michael Howlett (eds.). *Designing Government: From Instruments to Governance*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Rixen, Thomas and Lora Viola (2009). 'Uses and Abuses of the Concept of Path Dependence: Toward a Clearer Theory of Institutional Change.' Paper presented at the *American Political Science Association Annual Meeting*, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 3–6 September 2009.

Roberts, Clayton (1996). *The Logic of Historical Explanation*. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Robinson, Richard (1979). *Contemporary Portugal: A History*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Rodrigo, Fernando (1985). 'El papel de las Fuerzas Armadas Españolas durante la transición política: algunas hipótesis básicas', *Revista Internacional de Sociología*, 43(2):349–369.

Rodrigo, Fernando (1989). *El camino hacia la democracia: militares y política en la transición española*. Madrid: Doctoral Thesis. Universidad Complutense.

Rodrigo, Fernando (1992). 'A democratic strategy towards the military in post-Franco Spain' in Danopoulos, Constantine (ed.). *From military to civilian rule*. London: Routledge.

Rodrigues, Luís Nuno (1996). *A Legião Portuguesa: a milícia do Estado Novo (1936–1944)*. Lisbon: Editorial Estampa.

Rodríguez Sahún, Agustín (1986). 'La Reforma Militar en los Gobiernos de Suárez,' *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, 36:189–196.

Rollo, Fernanda (1994). *Portugal e o Plano Marshall*. Lisboa: Estampa.

Roman Peter J. and David W. Tarr (1998). 'The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness', *Political Science Quarterly*, 113(1):91–111.

Rorty, Richard (1979). *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ros Agudo, Manuel (2002). *La Guerra Secreta de Franco (1939–1945)*. Barcelona: Crítica.

Rosas, Fernando (1985). *As Primeiras Eleições Legislativas sob o Estado Novo*. Lisboa: Cadernos O Jornal.

Rosas, Fernando (1986). *O Estado Novo nos Anos Trinta*. Lisbon: Estampa.

Rosas, Fernando (1988). *O Salazarismo e a aliança Luso-Britânica*. Lisbon: Editorial Fragmentos

Rosas, Fernando (1989). ‘Salazar e o Salazarismo um caso de longevidade política’ in Rosas, Fernando and José M. Brandao de Brito (eds.). *Salazar e o Salazarismo*. Lisbon: Dom Quixote.

Rosas, Fernando (1994). ‘Estado Novo (1926–1974)’ in Mattoso, José (ed.). *História de Portugal*. Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores.

Rosas, Fernando (2000). ‘El desarrollo económico en los años 30 y 40: industrialización sin reforma agraria’ in Pinto, Costa (ed.). *Portugal Contemporáneo*. Madrid: Sequitur.

Rose, Richard (1991). ‘What is Lesson Drawing?’, *Journal of Public Policy*, 11(1):3–30.

Rose, Richard (1993). *Lesson Drawing in Public Policy*. Chatham N.J: Chatham House Publishers.

Rosen, Stephen Peter (1995). ‘Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters’, *International Security*, 19(4):5–31.

Sahlin-Andersson, Kerstin (2002). ‘National, International, and Transnational Constructions of New Public Management’ in Christensen, Tom and Per Lægreid (eds.). *New Public Management: The Transformation of Ideas and Practice*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Salamon, Lester M. (1981). ‘Rethinking Public Management: Third Party Government and the Changing Forms of Government Action’, *Public Policy*, 29(3):255–275.

Salamon, Lester M. (2002/ed.). *The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Salamon, Lester M. and Michael S. Lund (1989). ‘The Tools Approach: Basic Analytics’ in Salamon Lester (ed.). *Beyond Privatization: The Tools of Government Action*. Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.

Salas López, Fernando de (1974). *España, la OTAN y los organismos militares internacionales*. Madrid: Editora Nacional.

Salazar, Antonio Oliveira (1933). ‘Prefacio de Oliveira Salazar’ in Ferro, Antonio *Salazar: o Homem e a sua Obra*. Lisbon: Empresa Nacional de Publicidade.

Salazar, Antonio Oliveira (1935). *Discursos: 1928–1934*. Coimbra: Coimbra Editora.

Salazar, Antonio Oliveira (1939). *Doctrine and Action: Internal and Foreign Policy of the New Portugal 1928–1939*. London: Faber and Faber.

Salazar, Antonio Oliveira (1951). *Discursos e Notas Políticas 1943–1950. Vol. IV*. Coimbra: Coimbra Editora.

Sánchez Cervelló, Josep (1993). *A Revolução Portuguesa e a sua Influência na Transição Espanhola (1961–1976)*. Lisboa: Assirio & Alvim.

Sánchez Navarro, Ángel (1990). *La transición política en las Cortes de Franco: hacia la Ley para la Reforma Política*, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Working Paper 11, Madrid: Instituto Juan March

Sanders, (2006). ‘Historical Institutionalism’ in Rhodes, R. A. W., Sarah E. Binder and Bert Rockman (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sandfort, Jodi, Sally Coleman Selden, Jessica E. Sowa (2008). ‘Do Government Tools Influence Organizational Performance?: Examining Their Implementation in Early Childhood Education’, *The American Review of Public Administration*, 38(4):412–438.

Santos, José Loureiro dos (1978). ‘Sobre uma possível Lei da Defesa Nacional - Reflexões’, *Nacão e Defesa*, 5:9–18.

Santos, José Loureiro dos (1980). ‘Aspectos a Considerar nas Relações nas Forças Armadas com o Poder Político’, *Nacão e Defesa*, 13:75–108.

Santos, José Loureiro dos (2000). ‘Forças Armadas e Poder Político em Democracia: A Transição Democrática em Portugal’, *Nacão e Defesa*, 94:163–174.

Sartori, Giovanni (1970). ‘Concepts Misformation in Comparative Politics’, *American Political Science Review*, 64(4):1033–1053.

Saz Campos, Ismael (2004). *Fascismo y Franquismo*. Valencia: Universitat de Valencia.

Schiff, Rebecca L. (1996). ‘Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 22(1):7–24.

Schiff, Rebecca L. (2009). *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*. New York: Routledge.

Schmitter, Philippe C. (1975). *Corporatism and Public Policy in Authoritarian Portugal*. London: Sage.

Schmitter, Philippe C. (1979). ‘The “Régime d’Exception”’ in Graham, Lawrence S. and Harry M. Makler (eds.). *Contemporary Portugal: The Revolution and Its Antecedents*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Schmitter, Philippe C. (1999). *Portugal: do Autoritarismo à Democracia*. Lisbon: Instituto de Ciências Sociais.

Schneider, Anne L. and Helen Ingram (1990). ‘Fundamentals for a Theory of Policy Instruments’, *Journal of Politics*, 52(2):511–529.

Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl (2001). ‘A unifying theory of interests, institutions and ideas? Concluding remarks’, in McGillivray Fiona, Iain McLean, Robert Pahre and Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey (eds.). *International Trade and Political Institutions: Instituting Trade in the Long Nineteenth Century*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Seco Serrano, Carlos (1984). *Militarismo y civilismo en la España contemporánea*. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Económicos.

Segal, David R. (1986). ‘Measuring The Institutional/Occupational Change Thesis’, *Armed Forces & Society*, 12(3), 351–375

Segura Valero, Gastón (2006). *Ifni: la Guerra que silenció Franco*. Madrid: Martínez Roca Ediciones.

Seixas, Artur Sá (1978). 'A Estructuração das Forças Armadas e a suas Funções Constitucionais', *Nacão e Defesa*, 5:105–114.

Serra, Narcís (1989). 'La Política Española de Defensa,' *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, 36:173–188.

Serra, Narcís (2000). 'La reestructuración de las Fuerzas Armadas Españolas 1976–1989' in Escuela Superior de Guerra / Pontificia Universidad Javeriana (ed.) *El papel de las fuerzas militares en una democracia en Desarrollo. Memorias de la conferencia internacional*. Bogotá.

Serra, Narcís (2008). *La transición militar. Reflexiones en torno a la reforma democrática de las fuerzas armadas*. Barcelona: Debate.

Serra, Narcís (2009). 'Beyond Threats to Democracy from the Armed Forces, Police and Intelligence: The Spanish Case' in Stepan Alfred (ed.). *Democracies in Danger*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Serrano Suñer, Ramón (1977). *Entre el silencio y la propaganda. La historia como fue. Memorias*. Barcelona: Planeta.

Serrão Joel and António Henrique de Oliveira Marques (1987/eds.). *Nova História de Portugal*. Volume XI. Lisbon: Presença.

Sewell, Williams H. (1996). 'Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology' in McDonald, Terrence J. (ed.). *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Shubert, Adrian (1984). 'The Military Threat To Spanish Democracy: A Historical Perspective' in *Armed Forces & Society*, 10(4):529–542.

SIED (2010). 'Resenha Histórica'. *Serviço de Informações Estratégicas de Defesa*. http://www.sied.pt/reshistorica_sirp.html [Accessed 29 September 2010].

Sil, Rudra (2002). *Managing "Modernity": Work, Community, and Authority in Late-Industrializing Japan and Russia*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Sil, Rudra and Peter J. Katzenstein (2010). *Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Silva Rego, António da (1966). *O ultramar português no século XIX, 1834–1910*. Lisbon: Agência-Geral do Ultramar.

Silva, Aníbal Cavaco (1986). 'Orientações da Política de Defesa', *Nacão e Defesa*, 39:9–20.

Silva, Josué da (1975). *Legião Portuguesa, força represiva do fascismo*. Lisbon: Diabril Editora.

Simon, Herbert (1957). *Models of a Man: Social and Rational*. New York: John Wiley.

Singer, J. David (1961). 'The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations', *World Politics*, 14(1):77–92.

SIS (2010). 'História do sis'. *Serviço de Informações de Segurança*. <http://www.sis.pt/hsis.html> [Accessed 29 September 2010].

Skocpol, Theda (1992). *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Skocpol, Theda (2003). 'Doubly Engaged Social Science: the Promise of Comparative Historical Analysis' in Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.). *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Skocpol, Theda and Margaret Weir (1985). 'State Structures and the Possibilities for "Keynesian" Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States' in Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.). *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Smith, Louis (1951). *American Democracy and Military Power*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Soares (1987). 'Comunicação Social e Forças Armadas Numa Perspectiva de Defesa Nacional', *Nação e Defesa*, 41:160–176.

Soares, Alberto Ribeiro (1987). 'Comunicação Social e Forças Armadas Numa Perspectiva de Defesa Nacional', *Nação e Defesa*, 41:159–176.

Solé i Sabaté, Josep M. (1985). *La repressió franquista a Catalunya (1938–1953)*, Barcelona: Edicions 62.

Sorensen, Henning (1994). 'New Perspectives on the Military Profession: The I/O Model and Esprit de Corps Reevaluated', *Armed Forces & Society*, 20(4):599–617.

Sowers, Thomas S. (2005). 'Beyond the Soldier and the State: Contemporary Operations and Variance in Principal-Agent Relationships', *Armed Forces & Society*, 31(3):385–409.

Spínola, António (1974). *Portugal e o Futuro: Análise da Conjuntura Nacional*. Lisbon: Arcádia.

SPN (1934). *Decálogo do Estado Novo*. Lisbon: Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional.

SPN (1940). *O Estado Novo, Princípios e Realizações*. Lisbon: Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional.

SPN (1942). *A obra de Salazar na pasta das Finanças: 27 de Abril de 1928 a 28 de Agosto de 1940*. Lisbon: Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional.

SPN (1943). *A Revolução Continua*. Lisbon: Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional.

SPN (n.d.1). *Habla Salazar: Algunos Extractos de sus Discursos y Notas Oficiales*. Lisbon: Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional.

SPN (n.d.2). *La pensée de Salazar*. Lisbon: Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional.

SPN (n.d.3). *Portugal ante la guerra civil de España: documentos y notas*. Lisbon: Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional.

SPN (undated 4). *Portugal: the new state in theory and in practice*. Lisbon: Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional.

Staniland, Paul (2008). 'Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Political Environments: India and Pakistan in Comparative Perspective', *Security Studies*, 17:322–362.

Steinmo, Sven, Kathelen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (1992/eds.). *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stepan, Alfred (1971). *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stinchcombe, Arthur L. (1968). *Constructing Social Theories*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Stokey, Edith and Richard Zeckhauser (1978). *A Primer for Policy Analysis*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Stone, Glyn A. (2005). *Spain, Portugal and the Great Powers, 1931–1941*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2005.

Sun Tzu (2003 [c. 500 BC]). *The Art of War*. London: Penguin Classics.

Tamames, Ramón (1973). *La Republica, La Era de Franco*. Madrid: Alianza-Alfaguara.

Tarrow, Sidney (1995). ‘The International Context of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective’ in Gunther, Richard, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds.). *The Politics of Democratisation. Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.

Teixeira, Nuno Severiano (1990). *O ultimatum ingles. Política externa e política interna no Portugal de 1890*. Lisbon: Alfa.

Teixeira, Nuno Severiano (1991). ‘A História Militar e a Historiografia Contemporânea’, *Nação e Defesa*, 59(3):53–71.

Teixeira, Nuno Severiano (2004). ‘Portugal nos Conflitos Internacionais’ in Barata, Manuel Themudo and Nuno Severiano Teixeira (eds.). *Nova História Militar de Portugal*, Vol. 4. Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores.

Teixeira, Nuno Severiano and Themudo Barata (2004/eds.) *Nova História Militar de Portugal*. Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores.

Telo, António José (1989). *Portugal na Segunda Guerra Mundial*. Lisbon: Doctoral Thesis Faculdade de Letras, Universidade de Lisboa.

Telo, António José (1990) *Propaganda e Guerra Secreta em Portugal (1939–1945)*. Lisbon: Perspectivas e Realidades.

Telo, António José (1993). ‘As Forças Armadas ou República decapitada’ in Medina, João (ed.). *História de Portugal: Dos Tempos Pré-Históricos aos Nossos Dias, A República*, Vol. II. Amadora: Ediclube.

Telo, António José (1996). *Portugal e a NATO: o Reencontro da Tradição Atlântica*. Lisbon: Cosmos.

Telo, António José (1999). ‘Portugal and NATO 1949–1976’, in García Leandro (ed.). *Portugal and the Fifty Years of the Atlantic Alliance (1949–1999)*. Lisboa: Ministry of National Defence.

Telo, António José and Hipólito de la Torre (2000). *Portugal e Espanha: nos Sistemas Internacionais Contemporâneos*. Lisbon: Edições Cosmos.

Thelen, Kathleen (1999). 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', *The Annual Review of Political Science*, 2:369–404.

Thelen, Kathleen (2003). 'How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis', Authoritarianism' in Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.). *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thelen, Kathleen and Steven Steinmo (1992). 'Institutionalism in comparative politics' in Longstreth, Franck, Kathleen Thelen and Steven Steinmo (eds.). *Structuring Politics. Historical Institutionalism in comparative analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thucydides (1972 [431 BC]). *History of the Peloponnesian War*. London: Penguin Classics.

Torre, Hipólito de la and Josep Sánchez Cervelló (1992). *Portugal en el siglo XX*. Madrid: Ediciones Istmo.

Trebilcock, Michael (2005) 'The Choice of Governing Instruments' in Eliadis, Pearl, Margaret M. Hill and Michael Howlett (eds.). *Designing Government: From Instruments to Governance*. Montreal: Mc-Gill-Queen's University Press.

Trebilcock, Michael, J.R. S. Prichard, Douglas Hartle and Don Dewees (1982). *The Choice of Governing Instrument*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services.

Tusell, Javier (1988). *La Dictadura de Franco*. Madrid: Alianza.

Tusell, Javier (1995). *Juan Carlos I: la restauración de la monarquía*. Madrid: Temas de Hoy.

Tyler, Tom R. (2006). 'Social Motives and Institutional Design' in Schubert, Christian and Georg von Wangenheim (eds.). *Evolution and Design of Institutions*. London: Routledge.

Vagts, Alfred (1937). *A History of Militarism: A Romance and Realities of a Profession*. New York: Norton.

Vabo, Signy Irene and Asbjørn Røiseland (2010). 'Conceptualizing tools in network governance: Applying the NATO-scheme in a local government context', Paper presented for EGPA - workshop on 'Analysing implementation in the age of governance', 7–10 September, Toulouse.

Valenciano Almoyna, Jesús (1986). 'La reforma de la justicia militar en España durante la transición', *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, 36:141–152.

Valente, Vasco Pulido (1976). *O poder e o povo: A revolução de 1910*. Lisbon: Dom Quixote.

Valério, Nuno (2001). *Portuguese Historical Statistics*. Lisbon: INE.

Van Evera, Stephen (1984). 'The cult of the offensive and the origins of the First World War', *International Security*, 9(1):58–107.

Vedung, Evert (1998). 'Typologies and Theories' in Bemelmans-Videc, Marie-Louise, Ray C. Rist, and Evert Vedung (eds.). *Carrots, Sticks and Sermons: Policy Instruments & their Evaluation*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Velarde Fuentes, Juan (2001) 'Informes y Perspectivas: la Economía Española en el Siglo XX', *Estudios Económicos de Desarrollo Internacional*, AEEADE, 1(1).

Vicente, António Pedro (1996). 'Portugal e a Nato Face ao Isolamento de Espanha' in Telo, António José (ed.). *O fim da segunda guerra mundial e os novos rumos da Europa*. Lisbon: Cosmos.

Vickers, Geoffrey (1965). *The Art of Judgment: a Study of Policymaking*. London: Chapman & Hall

Vieira, Belchior (1995). 'A Instituição Militar e as Suas Relações com a Sociedade e o Poder Político', *Nação e Defesa*, 74:65–76.

Vigón, Jorge (1956 [1950]). *El Espíritu Militar Español. Replica a Alfredo de Vigny*. Second Edition. Madrid: Rialp.

Vilar, Manuel Dória (2009). 'Direito Penal / Amnistia 1974–2009'. Verbalegis.Net: *Portal de Direito* <http://www.verbalegis.net/leisamnistia.html> [Accessed 30 September 2010].

Viñas, Ángel (1981). *Los pactos secretos de Franco con Estados Unidos. Bases, ayuda económica, recortes de soberanía*. Barcelona: Grijalbo.

Viñas, Ángel (1988). 'Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Changes' in Chipman, John (ed.). *NATO's Southern Allies*. London: Routledge.

Viñas, Ángel (1999). 'Spanish foreign policy from Franco to Felipe González' in Balfour, Sebastian and Paul Preston (eds.). *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*. London: Routledge.

Viver Pi-Sunyer, Carles (1978). *El personal político de Franco (1936–1945)*. Barcelona: Vicens Vives.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959). *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press

Weimer, David L. and Aidan R. Vining (1992). *Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice*, 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall

Weingate Pike, David (1968). *Conjecture, Propaganda, and Deceit and the Spanish Civil War*. Stanford: California Institute of International Studies.

Weir, Margaret (1992). 'Ideas and the Politics of Bounded Innovation' in Steinmo, Sven, Kathelen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (eds.). *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Welch, Claude E. (1976/ed.). *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries*. Albany: State University of New York.

Welch, Claude E. (1987). *No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Wendt, Alexander (1987). 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', *International Organization*, 41(3):391–425.

Wendt, Alexander (1991). 'Bridging the Theory/Meta-Theory Gap in International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, 17(4):383–392.

Wendt, Alexander (1998) 'On Constitution and Causation in International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, 24:101–118.

Wendt, Alexander (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Weyland, Kurt (2008). 'Toward a New Theory of Institutional Change', *World Politics*, 60:281–314.

Wheeler, Douglas (1979a). *Republican Portugal. A Political History: 1910–1926*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.

Wheeler, Douglas L. (1979b). 'The Honor of the Army', in Graham Lawrence S. and Harry M. Makler (eds.). *Contemporary Portugal: The Revolution and Its Antecedents*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Wiarda, Howard J. (1977). *Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press.

Wiarda, Howard J. (1988). *The Transition to Democracy in Spain and Portugal*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Williams, John Allen (2000). 'The Postmodern Military Reconsidered' in Moskos, Charles, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (eds.). *Armed Forces after the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Williamson, Oliver E. (1975). *Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications*. New York: The Free Press.

Wilson, James Q. (1980/ed.) *The Politics of Regulation*. New York: Basic Books.

Wolf, Charles Jr. (1987) 'Markets and non Market failures: Comparison and Assessment', *Journal of Public Policy*, 7(1):43–70.

Wood, B. Dan and John Bohte (2004). 'Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design', *Journal of Politics*, 66(1):176–202.

Woodside, Kenneth (1986). 'Policy Instruments and the Study of Public Policy', *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 19(4):775–797.

Ynfante, Jesus (1976) *El ejército de Franco y de Juan Carlos*. Chatillon-sous-Bagneaux: Ruedo Ibérico.

Zuk, L. Gary and William R. Thompson (1982). 'The post-coup military spending question: a pooled cross-sectional time series analysis', *American Political Science Review*, 76(1): 60–74.

Newspapers and Magazine Articles

ABC (28/12/1958) 'El año militar'.

ABC (10/3/1978) 'Expedientados en Ceuta siete militares por una reunión con Blas Piñar'.

ABC (22/2/1981) 'Consejo de Guerra contra un dirigente de Comisiones Marineiras'.

Daily Mail (4/10/1948) 'U.S. seeking ports and airfields'.

Daily Telegraph (4/10/1948) 'U.S. need of Spanish Bases'.

Ejército n. 15, April 1941, 'Con ocasión del 1 de abril'.

Ejército n. 24, January 1942: 'Los Ejércitos modernos ante el material'.

Ejército n. 60, January 1945 'La caballería y la mecanización'.

Ejército n. 132, January 1951, 'Discurso de la Pascua Militar'.

Ejército n. 258, July 1961 'Número extraordinario dedicado a nuestra Cruzada'.

El País (2/10/1976) 'Pase a la reserva de Iniesta Cano y De Santiago'.

El País (6/1/1977) 'Los militares deben obedecer también al mando político'.

El País (6/1/1978) 'El general Vega elogió la capacidad militar de Lister y Modesto'.

El País (29/5/1979) 'El general Atarés, absuelto'.

El País (21/2/1982) 'Hubo careo Suárez-Armada en el otoño de 1977'.

Le Soir (8/10/1948) 'Franco sera-t-il admis dans l'Union Occidentale?'.

New York Times (8/10/1948) 'Western Europe Fears Spain Base'.

Archives

António Oliveira Salazar Archive, Lisbon

AOS/CLB/FA-5

AOS/CO/FI-1 IT

AOS/CO/FI-1 IX

AOS/CO/GR-1 O

AOS/CO/GR-1 I

AOS/CO/GR-1 A

AOS/CO/GR-1 B

AOS/CO/GR-1 C

AOS/CO/GR-1 D

AOS/CO/GR-6

AOS/CO/IN-8A

AOS/CO/NE-17-1

AOS/CO/NE-17-2

AOS/CO/NE-2B1

Portuguese Military History Archive, Lisbon

AHM, divisão 1, secção 39: *Guerra do Ultramar (1961–1974)*

AHM, divisão 1, secção 40: *MFA – Conselho da Revolução (1974–1982)*

AHM, Fundo 26: Arquivo Miranda Cabral

Marcello Caetano Archive, Lisbon

AMC/12-79

AMC/12-1549

AMC/12-425

Council of the Revolution Archive, Lisbon

ACR, Actas Conselho da Revolução – Originais, volumes 1, 2

ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, Assuntos Económicos Sociais – Cartas Particulares – Diversos, volumes 82, 83

ACR, Correspondência classificada do secretariado coordenador, volumes 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20

ACR, MFA/Partidos (84), Pacto MFA-Partidos Parte I

ACR, MFA/Partidos (84), Pacto MFA-Partidos Parte II

Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco (FFNF) Archive, Madrid

Documents 28, 126, 938, 1597, 5064, 8893, 10602, 11048, 14022, 15234, 19413, 19149, 19311, 19312, 19313, 19423, 20529, 20343, 26892, 26943

Audio Archive Fundación Ortega y Gasset, Madrid

Interview with José María de Areilza (13/9/1984, cassettes J8, J8bis)

Interview with Antonio Garrigues Díaz-Cañabate (4/10/1984, cassettes J9, J9bis)

Interview with Alfonso Osorio (29/11/1984, cassette J14-3)

Interview with José Manuel Otero Novas (17/1/1985, cassette J1)

Interview with General José Miguel Vega Rodríguez (14/10/1986, cassette J19)

Interview with General Sáez de Tejada (17/11/87, cassettes J25bis and J25T)

Interviews with Admiral Liberal Lucini (20/11/87, 27/11/87 and 4/12/87 cassettes J27bis, J29bis, J30, J30bis)

Interview with Lieutenant-General José Gabeiras Montero (11/12/87 and 15/12/87, cassettes J31bis, J32, J32bis)

Interview with Lieutenant-General Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado (8/9/87, cassette J20)

Interview with Lieutenant-General Ignacio Alfaro Arregui (18/12/87, cassette J33, J33bis)

Seminars on Armed Forces and Military Consolidation (25/4/1988 and 26/4/1988, cassettes CF1, CF2, CF6)

Seminars on Military Education (Cangas de Onis) (30/6/1987 and 1/7/1987, cassettes A2-4, A2-5, A2-7, A2-8)

Part V

APPENDICES

A Civil-military relations in Portugal from the fall of the ancien régime to the Estado Novo

This section analyses the period that preceded the Estado Novo, from the Liberal Revolution of 1820 to the military dictatorship established after the fall of the First Republic. This period was characterised by intensive military intervention in politics.

A.1 From the Liberal Revolution to the Republic

Portugal, like Spain, had a long tradition of military intervention in politics in contemporary history to the extent that from the 1822 Constitution to the establishment of the Estado Novo in 1932, most prime ministers were military men.¹ The end of absolutist era led to a higher involvement of the military in politics. The Liberal Revolution was initiated by a military coup, *pronunciamento*, in Porto in 1820 that followed the failed military conspiracy of 1817 and the execution of its leader General Gomes Freire. The Liberal Revolution resulted in the expulsion of the British who had established a protectorate in Portugal after the Napoleonic invasions and the introduction elections and a constituent process, which culminated with the Constitution of 1822. This rebellion was inspired by the American and French revolutions as well as by the Spanish liberal Constitution of 1812.² In addition to the introduction of liberal principles and institutions this revolution also aimed to release the Portuguese military from the strict control and subordination imposed by the 'de facto' military governor of Portugal, the British General Beresford (Ribeiro dos Santos 1990:41). This revolution contributed to the consolidation of the bourgeoisie and the military as fundamental political actors (Gallagher

¹Manuel Inácio Martins Pamplona Corte Real (1823–1824); Pedro de Sousa Holstein (Duke of Palmela) (1834–1835; 1842), Luís da Silva Mouzinho de Albuquerque (1832; 1833), Cândido José Xavier (1833), João Carlos Oliveira e Daun (Duke of Saldanha) (1835; 1846–1849; 1851–1856; 1870); Jose Jorge Loureiro (1835–1836); Vítorio Texeira de Andrade Barbosa (1835), António José Severim de Noronha (Duke of Terceira) (1836; 1859–1860); José da Gama Carneiro e Sousa (1836), José Bernardino de Portugal e Castro (1836); Bernardo de Sá Nogueira de Figueiredo (Marquis of Sa da Bandeira) (1836–1837; 1837–1839; 1865; 1868–1869); António Dias de Oliveira (1837), Rodrigo Pinto Pizarro de Almeida Carvalhais (1839), José Lúcio Travassos Valdez (1839–1841), Fontes Pereira de Melo (1871–1877; 1878–1879; 1881–1886), João Crisóstomo (1890–1892), Francisco Ferreira do Amaral (1908), Azevedo Coutinho (1914–1915); Pimenta de Castro (1915), Sidónio Pais (1917–1918), Tamagnini Barbosa (1918–1919); Paiva Couceiro (1919); Alfredo Sá Cardoso (1920); Manuel Maria Coelho (1920); Cunha Leal (1922); António Maria da Silva (1922); Gomes da Costa (1926); Óscar Fragoso Carmona (1927–1928); Vicente de Freitas (1929–1930); Domingos de Oliveira (1930–1932).

²In Spain in 1820 another revolution restored the liberal Constitution of 1812 that had been abolished in 1814.

1983:13). King João VI dissolved the Parliament (Cortes) in 1823. He suppressed an absolutist military coup led by his son Dom Miguel in April 1824 ('Abrilada') but died in 1826 without leaving a heir.

Dom Pedro, First Emperor of Brazil and elder brother of Dom Miguel was proclaimed King on 24 April 1826 and five days later he enacted a new Constitutional Charter trying to reconcile liberal and absolutist ideas. He abdicated in favour of his daughter Maria da Gloria in 1828 and betrothed her to Dom Miguel. Dom Miguel was named regent but soon after, he proclaimed himself King and abolished the Constitution of 1826.³ This initiated a period of civil war between the partisans of both brothers that concluded with the defeat and exile of Dom Miguel in 1834.⁴ Dona Maria II was crowned but tension within the military loyal to the 1822 constitution ('setembristas') and those to the Charter of 1826 ('cartistas') forced successive changes in government and military command. The situation of indiscipline, instability and military *pronunciamentos* ended up with the enactment of a new Constitution in 1838 that would reflect middle ground between the Constitutions of 1822 and the Charter of 1826.⁵ These two stances were also reflected in the new bipartisan political system, the 'Progressistas' and the 'Regeneradores' (Caerio 1997: 41–49).

The political turbulences continued. According to Mascarenhas (1982:260) there were twenty changes in the government from 1836 to 1842. Costa Cabral, Marquis of Tomar, a former 'setembrista' who had developed a less liberal attitude, became the most powerful figure in Portuguese politics. In 1851 a military uprising led by Marshall Saldanha forced his resignation. The ambitious project of regeneration of Portugal by Saldanha was formalised in the Constitutional Reform 'Acto Adicional' of 1852. The reign of Pedro V (1853–1861) was characterised by relative stability. His successor, Luis I with the support of Marshall Sá da Bandeira defeated a new military putsch commanded by Saldanha in 1870 ('Saldanhada'). These two rival military leaders can be considered the most important figures in that period of Portuguese history due to their participation in most governments and *pronunciamientos* from the 1820s to the 1870s (Caerio 1997:49–61).

In Africa, Portugal competed with England and a new emerging colonial power, Germany. This created new tensions within the ranks. In 1890 the British Empire set an ultimatum for Portugal to force them to abandon the aspiration of uniting the territories of Mozambique and Angola. This ultimatum and the acceptance of the conditions imposed by the British opened a period of governmental crisis and the emergence of nationalist and republican ideas (Silva Rego 1966:151, 228–230; Teixeira 1990, Antunes 1990:25). In 1891 a group of officers revolted ('Revolta do Porto') and attempted to establish a republic, imitating the proclamation of the Republic in Brazil in 1889. The rebellion failed and those involved were imprisoned or exiled. This was the last violent military intervention in politics during the nineteenth century in Portugal. Since 1870, the military had been gradually turning their attention away from internal politics and focusing on their external enemies (Caerio 1997:66–69). With

³Dom Miguel returned from exile on 22 February 1828, swore on the Constitution on 26 February but on 23 July he declared himself absolute monarch. Dom Pedro became king.

⁴Note that these wars were contemporary with the first Carlist civil war in Spain (1833–1840).

⁵The most important *pronunciamentos* in that period were the Revolution of September 1836 led by the National Guard that proclaimed again the 1822 Constitution; the absolutist 'conspiração das Marnotas' in 1937 and the 'revolta dos Marechais' in 1837 that opposed Marshalls Saldanha and Terceira ('cartistas') to Marshall Sá da Bandeira ('setembrista').

the exception of the rebellion in Porto, direct military participation was lower during the reign of Carlos I (1889–1908). Ferreira claims that, unlike in Spain, the military did not actively intervene in Portuguese society during the second half of the nineteenth century. He argues that the Portuguese Armed Forces were not a unified institution and became a docile instrument in the hands of the monarchy (Ferreira 1992:29). However, republican ideas persisted especially within secret societies such as the Carbonari and Masons. The military again played an important role in the Revolution that, in 1910, deposed the last king of Portugal, Manuel II, and established the Republic.

A.2 The Portuguese First Republic and the military dictatorship

The military distanced themselves from the traditional monarchic parties and they did not support the latter when the republicans launched their coup (Valente 1976:95–97). The revolution was initiated by a social movement but the involvement of some groups of military was very important for its success.⁶ Nonetheless, many problems affect the new Republic. Portugal was a country in which most of the population lived from agriculture, not very industrialised, with a low per capita income by European standards, high levels of illiteracy and insufficient health and communication infrastructure. In addition, a significant part of the economy was in foreign hands (wine, minerals, transport, telephone and power) and there was a dependency on the exports of primary products (Robinson 1979:128). The Portuguese First Republic was politically very unstable, counting 45 different governments in 16 years (Porch 1977:18–19). The military were disillusioned by the sense disorder and disunity in the new regime and multiplied their interventions. Up to 21 different *pronunciamientos* and coups are identified by Pabón (1942:112).

The continuous military attempts to shape policy aggravated the problems of the young Republic as well as the cohesion and unity of the armed forces. The military reform and purge of the monarchic officers initiated by War Minister Correia Barreto in 1911 had increased polarisation within the ranks. The creation of the National Republican Guard (GNR) in 1910 and the suspension of voting rights for soldiers in 1911 also became controversial measures (Caeiro 1997:95–96). In addition to acts of insubordination and mutinies, a series of military coup attempts took place in Portugal, for instance a radical republican revolutionary attempt in 1913 and the monarchic revolts of 1911, 1912, 1913 and 1914. The beginning of the First World War in 1914 increased the instability, radicalisation and politicisation of the military. The action of secret societies and personal rivalries compounded the problem. In January 1915, a large group of officers of different ideologies leaded by Captain Martins de Lima forced the resignation of the government and the appointment of General Pimenta de Castro as Prime Minister.⁷ Accused of dictatorial policies, the government was again toppled by an armed revolution organised by the Democratic Party in May 1915 (Serrão and Marques 1987:710; Wheeler 1979a: 111–125).

⁶See Carrilho (1985:83–95) and Ribeiro dos Santos (1990:78–79). Alternatively see Torre and Cervelló (1992:79–80) for whom the military involvement was minimal.

⁷The ‘Movement of the Swords’.

Portugal entered the war. Over 200,000 men were recruited and nearly 100,000 fought in either the European or African theatres. In addition to the thousands of casualties, the war effort was economically very costly and had an enormous impact for Portugal (Wheeler 1979:132–133). In this context Major Sidónio Pais became Prime Minister through a military coup in 1917. He imposed a centralised personal system of control and initiated fundamental reforms to create an authoritarian ‘New Republic’ (*República Nova*), the precursor of the Estado Novo. Unlike previous military governments, his was led by middle rank officers (Caeiro 1997:104–109). After the assassination of Sidónio Pais in December 1918 and the attempt to restore the monarchy by a military revolt in Porto in January 1919⁸ a democratic government declared the return to the ‘Old Republic’. This period saw the emergence of new parties and politicians but the instability did not decrease. The government strengthened the GNR as means to shield itself from armed intervention. However, in 1921 some officers of the GNR planned a revolutionary movement and assassinated the Prime Minister António Granjo and some other important political and military leaders.⁹ Army Colonel Manuel Maria Coelho assumed power by the Revolutionary Junta but soon afterwards had to resign due to his suspected involvement with these assassinations (Wheeler 1979: 203–205).

The crises deepened, insurrections and terrorist attacks became common. After a fail coup attempt in April 1925, the Republic was finally put to an end by a nationalist and anti-parliamentary revolution in 1926. On 28 May 1926, the Army under General Gomes da Costa revolted in Braga and marched into Lisbon to end the political and economic instability of the Republic and established a military dictatorship (1926–1933). Although initially the 28 May Revolution was ideologically very heterogeneous, the conservatives eventually dominated (Antunes 1978: 122). After a series of internal fights, prime minister, General Antonio Oscar de Fragoso Carmona forced the resignation of Costa da Gomes and assumed the Presidency of the Republic (Ribeiro dos Santos 1990:400). Carmona became a dictator and was confirmed in office by the presidential elections of 1928. António de Oliveira Salazar¹⁰ was appointed Finance Minister and he took advantage of the government crises to set the foundations for the longest-lasting authoritarian regime in twentieth century Europe, the Estado Novo.

⁸Led by Captain Paiva Couceiro who also participated in those of 1911 and 1912. They declared a monarchy in the north of Portugal.

⁹It was called the bloody night or ‘Noite Sangrenta’.

¹⁰He had previously been appointed to the same position in 1926 but resigned after 13 days .

B Civil-military relations in Spain from the fall of the Napoleonic Invasion to Franco's regime

B.I The period of 'Pronunciamientos'

In the nineteenth century, the military rebellions also called *pronunciamientos* were often characterised by their liberal character and tried to preserve the system against absolutism (Ballbé 1983; Seco Serrano 1984).¹ The Napoleonic invasion (1808–1814), the independence wars in American colonies (1808–1825) and the Carlist civil wars (1833–1840, 1846–1849 and 1872–1876) had created an excess of officers which aggravated the lack of resources and slowed down the process of promotions. The low levels of resources, insufficient training and over-bureaucratisation prevented the Spanish military from obtaining any great victory in the international arena. With the decline of the empire, the military and the governments blamed each other for the military defeats. The military elites that had traditionally participated in politics, many of them as members of the parliament, felt that they needed to restore their lost legitimacy (Alonso Baquer 1988:115–117). The military saw upheavals as the means to achieve their goals. This process was fostered by the politicisation of the armed forces, where generals were often appointed on the basis of political allegiance to a party and by the public support to many of the *pronunciamientos*.

Several important *pronunciamientos* succeeded in shaping the political arena during the nineteenth century. In 1820, General Riego launched an anti-absolutist military uprising. Riego led an army that had been initially reunited to suffocate the rebellions in the American colonies. They forced the King Fernando VII to reinstate the 1812 Constitution initiating a short liberal period in Spanish government. In 1823, with the aid of the French Army, the King restored absolutism and had Riego executed. The three year-old Isabel II inherited the throne in 1833 after the death of Fernando VII. The regency of Isabel's mother, María Cristina, was marked by the first Carlist war (1833–1840). The Carlist wars were civil wars that had their origin in the dispute between the partisans of Isabel II and the pretender to the throne, Carlos María Isidro de Borbon, daughter and brother of the previous King Fernando VII. The supporters of Isabel generally held liberal and modernising views while those of Carlos had more traditional and conservative ideas. During the first Carlist War, a military mutiny in La Granja forced the regent to approve the Liberal Constitution of 1837. At the end of the war in 1840, María

¹Nonetheless Baquer (1988:105–109) stresses that alongside 'liberal *pronunciamientos*', those aiming to address public opinion claims, there were other 'royalists', aiming to restore rights and powers to the monarchy, and 'military' ones, aiming to give voice to corporatist claims.

Cristina was forced into exile and General Espartero appointed regent. During his regency (1840–1843) he successfully suppressed the military coups of Generals Concha and Diego de Leon, but he was eventually overthrown by conservative General Narváez (Christiansen 1967).

Although the government managed to defeat of the second Carlist uprising (1846–1849) stability would not last. In 1854, liberal generals O'Donnell and Dulce launched a new military rebellion that resulted in the appointment of General Espartero as President of the Council of Ministers. Later, Espartero was forced to leave government after another *pronunciamiento* by O'Donnell in 1856. In 1868, another military coup led by liberal generals Prim and Serrano and Admiral Topete, the 'Glorious Revolution', terminated the reign of Isabel II. The provisional military-led government launched the 1869 Constitution and appointed Amadeo I as new king. Subsequently, a new Carlist Rebellion took place (1872–1876). Due to the great political instability the King resigned and left Spain, paving the way for the First Spanish Republic (1873–1874). The political turbulences and social violence continued. General Pavia's coup in January 1874 imposed a new government-led by General Serrano but did not manage to prevent the collapse of the Republic. In December, General Martinez Campos' coup gave the power to Alfonso XII restoring the Bourbon dynasty (Carr 1966; Alonso Baquer 1983; Fontana 2007).

B.2 From the restoration of the monarchy period to the Civil War

During the period of the restoration of the monarchy, civilian governments, mainly the ones led by the Conservative Antonio Cánovas del Castillo² successfully reduced the influence of military in politics but did not eliminate it completely. The military continued to be an important pressure group with abundant representation in the Parliament (Fernández Bastarreche 1988:213–218). Moreover, the period from 1875 to 1886 witnessed several coup attempts such as those in Badajoz (1883), Cartagena (1886) and Madrid (1886). These coups were planned by the republican politician Ruiz Zorrilla. They enjoyed little civilian support among the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and ultimately failed (Alvarez Junco 1988:152–163). The loss of the last colonies (the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Cuba) in 1898, the intensification of the labour and social struggles in Spain as well as the hazardous military campaigns in Morocco (1911–1926) aggravated the dissension between the military and civilian spheres. A generational change in the military elites influenced by the historical events produced a shift in the ideology towards conservatism and a dissonance with the civilian elites (Alonso Baquer 1980:27–42).

The use of the Army to control and repress demonstrations created resentment between civilians and military (Ballbé 1983:279–302). Constant criticism from left-wing parties and unions fuelled the confrontation (Shubert 1984:530–532). The military was in an environment with external and internal threats. They developed an excessive preoccupation for the public order, strong catholic beliefs and especially a growing corporatism (Payne 1967:123–151; Boyd 1979:44–68, 141–159, 236–271; Olmeda 1988:98). Favouritism in military pro-

²Cánovas del Castillo was President six times from 1874 and his assassination by an anarchist in 1897.

motions and jurisdictional disputes with the civilian sphere became significant sources of discontent. The military organised Defence Juntas in order to protect the interests of different service corps. These powerful pressure groups operated mainly from 1917 to 1922 (Boyd 1979:44–68; Cardona 1983:58–60; Seco Serrano 1984:257–258). By 1919, five governments had already been toppled by the Defence Juntas. In 1921, the military disaster in Annual in Northern Morocco, where Spain lost more than 12,000 soldiers in five days, created a profound government crises which deepened the divide between the military and political class. The Juntas were abolished in 1922 but in 1923, a new military coup with the connivance of King Alfonso XIII, granted dictatorial powers to General Miguel Primo de Rivera who governed the country until 1930 (Fernández Bastarreche 1988:232–234).

Despite Primo de Rivera's policies aiming to increase military satisfaction and the victory in the Moroccan campaign, his government was undermined by the confrontation with the Artillery Corps, which embraced republicanism and attempted to overthrow him in 1929. Primo de Rivera also lacked the support of the political class and resigned in 1930 (Fernández Bastarreche 1988:235; Navajas Zubeldia 1991). The short-lived government of General Dámaso Berenguer (1930–1931) also suffered a military coup attempt and was replaced by Admiral Juan Bautista Aznar's. However, the triumph of the republican parties in the local elections in 1931 led to the exile of King Alfonso XIII and the proclamation of the Second Republic.

The far-reaching reforms implemented by the first War Minister of the Republic, Manuel Azaña, were initially supported by the population and the military. However, Azaña's effort to revert all policies of the previous authoritarian government of Primo de Rivera, that he considered illegitimate, quickly dissatisfied the military. The new system of promotion was perceived as an attempt of politicisation of the armed forces. The new policies incentivising early retirement did not succeed in removing the reactionary elements from the ranks. The attempts to professionalise the armed forces and dissociate the military from politics failed due to the lack of resources, the urgency in which they were implemented and political instability (Alpert 1982; Cardona 1983; Fernández Bastarreche 1988). The 'Africanistas', military officers that had been hardened by the experiences in the Moroccan wars, began to occupy the top echelons in the armed forces. Moreover, the socio-political situation of the Second Republic (1931–1939) was very unstable (Jackson 1965; Payne 1995). Especially the 'Africanistas' such as Sanjurjo, Mola and Franco played a crucial role in the uprisings against left governments during the republic, including the first serious military challenge to the Second Republic, the 1932 'Sanjurjada', and the coup on 17 July 1936 that provoked the Civil War (Payne 1967; Balfour 2002).

C Chronology of Events

Table 21: Brief chronology of events

	Portugal	Spain
1926	Coup against the First Portuguese Republic led by General Gomes da Costa. Military Dictatorship is established	Failed Military coup attempt (Sanjuanada) against the dictator General Primo de Rivera
1928	Salazar is appointed Finance Minister	Opus Dei is founded
1929	Stock market crash. The Great Depression. Military Rebellion ('Revolução do Castelo')	International Exposition of Barcelona Coup attempt by artillery officers
1930	National Union movement is set. Portuguese Colonial Act	General Primo de Rivera resigns as head of state
1931	Ambitious plan of the rearmament and modernisation of the armed forces (proposed by Major Barros Rodrigues). Military rebellions in Madeira and in Lisbon	Second Republic is established. King Alfonso XIII goes in exile. Centre-Left governments are elected. War Minister Manuel Azaña's military reforms
1932	Salazar becomes Prime Minister ('Presidente do Concelho')	Failed military coup attempt of General Sanjurjo
1933	Estado Novo Constitution. General Carmona is elected President and appoints Salazar as Prime Minister. PVDE and the SNP are established	Anarchist revolt of Casas Viejas Right wing government elected. Fascist like party Falange Española is founded
1934	Military rebellion of Marinha Grande. The extreme right National-Unionist Party is banned	Leftist revolution in Asturias repressed by the Army
1936	Salazar is (self) appointed War Minister. Captain Santos Costa is appointed Undersecretary of State. The paramilitary Portuguese Legion and the youth organisation 'Mocidade' are created. Communist Navy revolt in Tagus.	Left wing Popular Front wins the elections. The military with the support of right wing groups attempt a coup but it fails (18 July). Beginning of the Spanish Civil War. Franco is appointed chief of the state by the military Junta

Continued...

	Portugal	Spain
	Germany substitutes the UK as the main weapons supplier	
1937	Military reforms introduces the ministerial approval, 'escolha' in substitution of seniority for promotion and the creation of the elite High Staff Corps. New recruitment laws following the model Nation in Arms and the reduction of the permanent Army	Franco unifies right wing parties into 'FET de las JONS' that is assigned the control of the Press and Propaganda. Battles of Jarama, Brunete, Santander and Belchite. Bombing of Guernica. Santoña Pact between the forces linked to the Basque Nationalists
1938	Military plots in March, April and May	Battles of Teruel and Ebro
1939	Signature of the Iberian Pact of Defence with Spain. Beginning of WWII; Salazar declares Portuguese neutrality	End of the Spanish Civil War. Political repression continues. Purges in the armed forces
1940	Military plot in May. Signature of the Additional Protocol of Defence with Spain. Concordat with the Vatican	Spain adopts a non-belligerent position in WWII. General salary raises for officers
1941		The Blue Division begins its deployment.
1943	Agreement with the UK for the utilization of Azores bases.	The Blue Division begins its withdrawal.
1945	End of WWII. Military reform is launched eliminating some units and undertaking the construction of many new military quarters. The PVDE is refounded and becomes PIDE	Spanish Fueros (Bill of Rights) and the Code of Military Justice are enacted. Some Monarchic Generals consider to plot against Franco
1946	Military rebellion 'revolta da Mealhada'. Portugal membership to the UN is vetoed by the USSR.	The General Assembly of the UN recommends the rejection of Spanish membership
1947	First Army Officers' statutes are enacted. Independence of India from the UK. 'Abrilada' military plot	Law of Succession that establishes Spain as a Monarchy is enacted
1949	Portugal becomes a founding member of NATO. Salazar accepts the Marshall Plan for 1949–1950	General 40% pay raise in the Armed Forces.
1950	National Defence Ministry and the CEMGFA are established	
1951	Defence Agreement with the US. Groups of military officers begin to be sent to the US for education and training.	The Ministry of Information and Tourism is created

Continued...

Portugal		Spain
Beginning of decolonisation of Africa (Libya is the first one)		
1953	Law 2066 transforms the colonies in overseas provinces.	Economic and military agreements with the US (military bases in Spain). Concordat with the Vatican
1955	Portugal joins the UN. The Warsaw Pact is established	Spain joins the UN
1956	Suez Crisis	Spain recognizes the independence of Morocco
1957		Sidi-Ifni war in Sahara (1957–1958). Technocrats dominate the government
1958	Rebellion in Angola severely squashed	Spain joins the OEEC, IMF and the World Bank.
1959	Portugal is a founder member of the EFTA agreement. Military rebellion of Sé	Economic Stabilization Plan. ETA is founded
1961	Coup attempt by Defence Minister Botelho Moniz. Portugal loses Goa, Damau and Diu to India. Angola claims independence. Portugal joins the IMF and World Bank	Last Spanish troops abandon Morocco
1962	Military Rebellion in Beja. Independence of Algeria	
1963	Guinea and Cabo Verde claim independence	Tribunal of Public Order is established
1964	Mozambique claims independence	CESEDEN is established
1965	Assassination of the opposition leader, General Humberto Delgado in Spain, supposedly by PIDE agents	
1968	Caetano becomes Prime Minister in substitution of Salazar	Independence of Equatorial Guinea from Spain
1973	Oil crisis. Caetano is forced to cancel the Decree-Law 353, benefiting conscript officers, due to the opposition among academy officers	Carrero Blanco, Prime Minister of the Francoist government is assassinated by ETA. Reform of the military curricula
1974	Military coup attempt in March. Military coup of 25 April (Carnation Revolution). Negotiation for the independence of the colonies. Right wing coup attempt (September)	The clandestine Democratic Military Union is created

Continued...

	Portugal	Spain
1975	Right-wing coup attempt (March). First Pact MFA-Political Parties (April). First democratic elections (April). Left-wing coup attempt (November). Law 5/75 establishes the Council of the Revolution	Last executions of the regime (2 ETA and 3 FRAP members). Spain transferred the sovereignty of the Sahara possessions to Morocco and Mauritania. Death of Franco. UMD is dismantled and its members arrested
1976	Second Pact MFA-Political Parties. MFA apparatus is dismantled. Portuguese Constitution is issued. PS wins the legislative elections. IDN is created	Suárez is appointed PM. Political Reform Act produces the self-dissolution of the Francoist regime
1977		UCD wins the legislative elections. A unified Defence Ministry is established
1978	Stand-by agreements with the IMF	Spanish Constitution is issued. Operación Galaxia plot is neutralised
1979	Centre-right coalition 'Aliança Democrática' wins the legislative elections	UCD wins the legislative elections
1980	PM Sá Carneiro and Defence Minister Amaro da Costa die in a plane crash	National Defence and Military Organisation Law
1981		Suárez resigns. 23F coup attempt is neutralised
1982	Constitutional Reform and National Defence Law. The CR is abolished	Spain becomes a member of NATO. PSOE wins the legislative elections
1983	PS wins the legislative elections	
1984	Stand-by agreements with the IMF. Reunification of the secret services (SIRP)	Organic Law of Defence and creation of the JEMAD
1985	PSD wins the legislative elections	Military coup in La Coruña is neutralised
1986	Portugal becomes member of the EEC	Spain becomes member of the EEC. NATO membership passed a referendum. PSOE wins the legislative elections