

Indonesian jihadi training camps: Home and Away

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Abstract

This article looks at Indonesian training in foreign camps in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Syria as well as domestic training camps and opportunities in Ambon, Poso, Aceh, and Java. It examines the roles that these camps played not only in building military capacity but also with respect to ensuring organizational continuity, building networks, and fulfilling the obligation of jihad. This article argues that jihadi military training both in Indonesia and abroad has not only served to acquire the necessary skills to fight repressive regimes but also to acquire the capacity to defend the Islamic state the jihadis were seeking to establish. It further argues that foreign training camps provided opportunities for intensive training with heavy weapons and the experience of being part of a global jihad while domestic training camps served caderization, the defense of Muslims in conflict areas, and as preparation for foreign training camps. And finally, this article demonstrates that both domestic and foreign training camps provided opportunities for network-building, leading to new training possibilities..

Key words: jihadi training camps, Indonesia, Darul Islam (DI), Jemaah Indonesia (JI), Mujahidin KOMPAK, Afghanistan, Mindanao, Ambon, Poso

Introduction

Training camps are a key mechanism through which militant groups from across the ideological spectrum prepare their members to use violent methods in pursuit of their goals. They are a common form of socialization, caderization, indoctrination and networking. The Muslim Brotherhood ran paramilitary camps in Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq for its members in the 1980s.¹ Between the 1970s and the 1990s, Libyan leader Muamar Gaddafi hosted training opportunities for a wide variety of groups from Tuareg rebels seeking to undermine governments in Mali and

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Niger to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Free Aceh Movement fighting a secessionist war against Indonesia.² Furthermore, over the past four decades, jihadi networks operated training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Mindanao, Sudan, Indonesia, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.

In Southeast Asia, jihadi groups have used training camps to translate *salafi-jihadi* and *takfiri* principles into violent actions. They have been an important free space for indoctrination, socialization and preparation, irrespective of whether this resulted in joining battles in conflict zones or participation in jihadi operations. Since the 1980s, the landscape of jihadi training has featured domestic camps primarily catering for local recruits and international and transnational camps, open to foreign volunteers and located abroad for most trainees. International camps brought together jihadi volunteers from various different parts of the world, allowing for an exchange of ideas and the internationalization of ideologies as well as providing unparalleled opportunities to network and establish lasting connections. Among the jihadis who trained in both foreign and domestic camps were Indonesians from Darul Islam (DI/NII) and after 1993, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). They participated in training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the 1979-89 Soviet-Afghan war, in Al-Qaeda's Camp Al-Faruq in Afghanistan prior to the US invasion in 2001, in the Southern Philippines during the Moro conflict on the island of Mindanao between 1994-2005, and most recently in Syria. JI and its affiliates also established training camps in Indonesia after the fall of the authoritarian Suharto government in May 1998. Most of these were set up in the context of the communal conflict in 1998-2007 in Poso (Central Sulawesi) and in 1999-2005 in Ambon (Maluku), which pitted Christians against Muslims. Additionally, domestic training opportunities were created to prepare volunteers for training in Syria.

The literature on jihadi training camps primarily comprises case studies or thick descriptive qualitative work that explores the significance of training camps in the process of becoming a member of an extremist group. These studies tend to highlight the purpose and function of training,³ training camp curriculum,⁴ and the different types of training camps.⁵ They also classify training camps into permanent and semi-permanent,⁶ mobile and pop-up,⁷ as well as electronic/virtual.⁸ The most well-known permanent and semi-permanent jihadi camps have operated in theatres of conflict, including Afghanistan, Pakistan and the border areas between them, as well as Kashmir, Mindanao, Bosnia, Iraq, and Syria. Thomas Hegghammer notes that

these training camps functioned as a core mechanism for building internal cohesion and spreading a common “ultra-masculine culture of violence” in the Al-Qaeda network.⁹ He explains that the camps hardened the 10,000-20,000 people who attended Al-Qaeda training camps, broke down their moral barriers to the use of violence, ideologically indoctrinated them that such violent actions were legitimate, and generated deep inter-personal relationships.¹⁰ Training camps functioned similarly for ISIS in purpose and objectives. However, ISIS prioritized recruitment of teen and tween boys to a degree that Al Qaeda did not and in doing so, there was another objective, what Horgan et.al. referred to as “subjugation.”¹¹ Both Heghammer and Horgan et.al explain that the hardships experienced in the camps also tended to foster a sense of camaraderie among camp participants.¹² Whereas attendance at permanent and semi-permanent training camps tends to be top down where participants are chosen by existing organizations, the process can be less formal for mobile camps. In some instances, as Peter Nesser notes, small groups of men formed their own pop-up session.¹³ The jihadi ideologue Abu Musab al-Suri favored this sort of camp in his advocacy for the decentralization of training. Rather than have Muslims flocking to a specific locale for training—something he termed “calling the Islamic nation to the camps,” he advocated the opposite.¹⁴ Training opportunities should be widespread—“in every house, every quarter, and in every village in Muslim countries.”¹⁵ These training locales could vary from secret training in small safe houses, to training in small secret camps in areas of operation, to overt training in states providing safe havens or open fronts.¹⁶ Al-Suri envisaged the former to be ideology-heavy and military-light, in order to avoid alerting security forces to their presence.¹⁷

The shift from permanent training camps to mobile, pop-up and virtual camps has occurred over time in response to changes in opportunities and constraints. The onset of the Global War on Terror and some 15 years later, the destruction of the ISIS Caliphate drastically curtailed the free and unmonitored space available for large-scale permanent and semi-permanent training camps built over acres with an extensive physical plant. Thus, what permanent camps still exist tend to be small, one or two buildings and perhaps a firing range so as not to attract attention. Mobile and pop-up training camps or training spaces in homes, as recommended by al-Suri, have become more common, for they are less likely to attract the attention of authorities.

Finally, there is also a role for the internet in training. Here, scholars debate whether the internet constitutes a virtual training camp,¹⁸ or whether it is more akin to a library.¹⁹ Anne Stenersen characterizes the internet as a “resource bank maintained and largely accessed by self-radicalized sympathizers.”²⁰ Siqueira and Arce concur stating that “the internet is no substitute for brick and mortar camps.”²¹ However, Gabriel Weimann points to Al-Qaeda’s Al-Battar online training camp, which provided materials to conduct basic lessons in military training.²² In the Southeast Asian context, the internet has tended to function as a library more so than as an actual virtual training facility.

We would be remiss to ignore the biographical and autobiographical sources on training camp experiences. These are particularly valuable for understanding the Afghan theatre and how participation in the training in Afghanistan and the jihad itself shaped the identities, social ties, and ideology of notable jihadi figures. For example, Hegghammer’s biography of Abdullah Azzam chronicles his experiences in and with training camps in Jordan as a young man and later in Afghanistan and Pakistan as a leader of the global jihadi movement.²³ Lia’s biography of Abu Musab al Suri recounts his experiences at camps in Afghanistan; how they shaped his ideological development; and how those experiences and the contacts he made there led him to join Al Qaeda.²⁴ Algerian-born commander Abdullah Anas comprehensively details the factors that led him to participate in training camps in Afghanistan and to join the jihad on the ground alongside Ahmed Shah Masoud.²⁵ Finally, Nasir Abas’ *Inside Jemaah Islamiyah* details the experience of Darul Islam members in training camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Philippines, noting the courses studied, who went in which batch, the relationships built with other organizations and how participation affected his ideological and personal identity.²⁶ Each of these are rich sources of knowledge, which enable us to understand motivations for participating in training camps, networks built, curriculum studied, and one’s personal transformation as a result of participation.

Scholars of Southeast Asia have typically discussed training camps in the context of larger analyses of terrorist behavior, usually highlighting Indonesian training experiences at the As-Saddah, Torkham, and Al-Faruq camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan; at MILF and MILF-adjacent camps on the island of Mindanao in the Southern Philippines; or more recently, in Syria.²⁷ Chernov Hwang, Solahudin and Temby highlight the role of training camps in the process of becoming a participant in a jihad or in a terrorist attack, while Abas offers a fine-grained account of participation and curriculum.²⁸ Domestic training camps in Indonesia are

discussed by Chernov Hwang and Schulze in the context of the process of joining Indonesian jihadi organizations,²⁹ while Schulze has also looked at training camps in her analysis of local jihad in Ambon and Poso.³⁰ However, to date, there are no comprehensive analyses on the evolution of Indonesian jihadi training camps since 1985. This study seeks to address this gap.

This article looks at the Indonesian jihadi training camp experience since 1985, focusing on DI and subsequently, JI and its affiliates. To be clear, it was a faction of Darul Islam, led by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, that sent members to Afghanistan initially. Following their split from DI in 1993 and subsequent formation of Jemaah Islamiyah, much of the conversation around training camps centers on the experience of JI and its affiliate groups. In this article, we examine the role that permanent, semi-permanent, and mobile and pop-up camps played not only in building military capacity but also with respect to ensuring organizational continuity, building networks, demonstrating global Muslim solidarity, and fulfilling the obligation of jihad. For the purposes of this article permanent training camps are defined as having been operational for several years as well as having a fixed location, a large physical plant with buildings and facilities, an extensive curriculum, iterated batches of trainees, and training course lengths ranging from several months to several years. Semi-permanent camps, in contrast, have shorter training courses ranging from one month to several months with an abbreviated version of the curriculum, and a smaller physical plant with temporary structures but also iterated batches of trainees. Mobile and pop-up training camps often do not have a physical plant, offer training sessions ranging from one day to a couple of weeks, ideally only have one batch of trainees before they move to a different location. They have a far shorter and less detailed curriculum which often focuses on one particular skill such as physical fitness, basic defense, marksmanship, or bomb-making.

Drawing upon extensive fieldwork in Indonesia, interviews, published and unpublished jihadi primary sources, as well as Indonesian court documents this article argues that jihadi military training both in Indonesia and abroad has not only served to acquire the necessary skills to fight repressive regimes but also to acquire the capacity to defend the Islamic state the jihadis were seeking to establish. It further argues that foreign training camps provided opportunities for intensive training with heavy weapons and the experience of being part of a global jihad while domestic training camps served caderization, the defense of Muslims in conflict areas, and as preparation for foreign training camps. And lastly, this article demonstrates that both domestic

and foreign training camps provided opportunities for network-building, leading to new training possibilities, and a pool from which to put together teams for particular jihadi operations including cross-organizational ones.

Permanent Training Camps

The first Indonesian jihadi training in permanent camps took place outside of Indonesia, on the Afghan-Pakistani border, in the Ittihad al-Islami camp, more commonly referred to as As-Saddah, and the military academy at Torkham, which the Indonesians established on land given to them by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, head of Ittihad al-Islami. For Darul Islam (DI/NII), and subsequently, Jemaah Indonesia (JI) these camps provided an unmatched opportunity to obtain the military skills necessary for fighting the repressive Suharto regime. Between 1985 and 1994, DI sent some 12 batches of recruits to these camps, with between 10 and 59 persons per batch.³¹

According to Solahudin, because the Indonesian trainees had no prior military experience, they were enrolled in a basic military training program that included infantry, map reading and navigation, weapons training, field engineering, explosives and demolition.³² The program of study lasted three years or six semesters, culminating in a final exam that required students to shoot, make a mine, fire heavy weapons, and put infantry strategies into practice in a war setting.³³ The best graduates were either appointed as instructors for later batches or offered the opportunity to go on for further training in weapons and explosives.³⁴

Participation in military training at As-Saddah, however, did not only increase the military capacity of Indonesian jihadis but it also had spillover effects on ideology and social networks. First, it disrupted what had been, to that point, a largely parochial perspective of DI. As former JI amir Abu Rusdan, who himself trained in Afghanistan, explained:

The goal of sending *ikhwan* (Muslim brothers) to Afghanistan was very broad. One was *tadrib* (military training). Another was to expand our horizon on jihad so we were not so narrow minded. Before we were sent to Afghanistan, we felt that the Indonesian Islamic State (NII) [the DI movement] was the only existing Islamic community and those who were not NII were not Muslim. This was before we were sent to Afghanistan.³⁵

Indeed, of all the locations where Indonesians have trained since 1985, there was perhaps no paramilitary training theatre more significant for the ideological development of DI and JI than Afghanistan. It exposed them to ideas of transnational jihadism and to *salafi-jihadi* ideology

through religious classes, lectures, and sermons by key jihadi personalities such as Abdullah Azzam, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, and Abu Burhan, who globalized their ideological perspective.

Second, it enabled them to take inspiration from as well as develop relationships with members of other Islamist extremist groups. The closest relations formed were with other Southeast Asians at As-Saddah where trainees were divided into several *qabalah* (tribes), grouping trainees linguistically and geographically. Training together allowed Indonesian Islamist militants to build ties with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines and Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM). Ties with the latter paved the way for KMM members to attend jihadi training in Maluku in 2000, where they also joined the Ambon jihad in the context of the Christian-Muslim communal conflict which had erupted the previous year. Ties with the former proved especially fortuitous. In 1994, the MILF permitted JI to train its members at MILF Camp Abu Bakar on the island of Mindanao and in return, JI members trained MILF elite forces.³⁶ In 1997, when JI sought a camp of its own, the MILF gave JI territory within Abu Bakar to establish their own facility, which they named Hudaibiyah.³⁷

As in Afghanistan, the proximate goal for JI in establishing the camp was to obtain paramilitary training for their members in order to prepare themselves to carry out *jihad-qital* (military jihad) against the state when the time came. At Camp Hudaibiyah JI instructors attempted to replicate the program of study in Afghanistan, albeit in an abridged format of 1-2 years.³⁸ Hudaibiyah, while smaller than As-Saddah, had extensive physical infrastructure, including an obstacle course, a football field, kitchen, barracks, mosque, labs, and classrooms.³⁹ Like As-Saddah and Torkham, the subjects were both military and religious, including instruction in engineering, map reading, tactics, weapons, explosives and religious studies. The major difference, according to Nasir Abas, the camp's commander, was the source of the weapons. In Afghanistan, students were trained on Russian-made weapons, while in Mindanao students learned on American-made rifles.⁴⁰ Abas detailed the subject matter:

Students learned weapons, map reading, tactics, combat training and self-defense. How to use geometric instruments and compasses. How to improvise bombs. How to repurpose damaged shells as hand grenades. How to make booby traps. How to fire at a visible target, how to calculate target distance, how to fire RPGs, and how to fire at a moving target. Day training. Night training. Leadership. Students also learned religious studies like *tafsir* [Quranic exegesis] and *fiqh* [laws of] *jihad*.⁴¹

After the Philippine military overran Camp Abu Bakar in 2000, occupying MILF-controlled villages as part of its “All-out War”, Abas and the other Hudaibiyah commanders made the decision to relocate their camp to higher ground, taking what equipment they could carry. The new camp they established, Jabal Quba, was deep in the mountains and the jungle. Due to the landscape and the need to stay hidden, it lacked the physical infrastructure of Hudaibiyah. There were no barracks, buildings, or mess halls. The firing range was smaller and they were unable to move some of the chemicals from the lab at Hudaibiyah to construct a similar one at Jabal Quba as it would have been too dangerous.⁴² However, despite these physical plant deficits, they endeavored to replicate the Hudaibiyah training curriculum as closely as possible. Training at Jabal Quba lasted until 2005.

While in the Philippines, JI prioritized the training of its members and its MILF allies over cultivating relationships with smaller Philippine groups or foreign fighters on the ground in the Philippines seeking training. For example, when members of the Abu Sayyaf Group, a jihadi group renowned for its kidnapping operations, sought training from JI, Nasir Abas, the camp commander, dispatched Zulkiefli to train them, preferring to keep Hudaibiyah’s location secret.⁴³

In addition to building ties with other Southeast Asian jihadi groups, Darul Islam in Afghanistan developed relations with groups outside its *qabalah*, most notably with Egypt’s Al-Gamaah al-Islamiyah. Bonded by the shared experience of being oppressed by secular dictatorships at home,⁴⁴ Darul Islam and Al-Gamaah al-Islamiyah developed a strategic partnership. According to one Afghan veteran, “we had separate camps, but we would help each other. We would borrow weapons from each other.”⁴⁵ Then, in 1990, Al-Gamaah al-Islamiyah invited Darul Islam to participate in a short course at their camp near Khost. When Al-Gamaah al-Islamiyah needed instructors to train Kashmiri militants, Darul Islam provided the trainers. There was also an ideological component to the relationship. Quinton Temby posits that those DI members who subsequently became JI took inspiration from Al-Gamaah al-Islamiyah’s central text, the *Manifesto of Islamic Activism*, borrowing its point about organizing as an Islamic community or congregation rather than focusing on an Islamic state.⁴⁶

The Afghan experience also enabled the development of friendships between specific JI members and certain Al-Qaeda men. These relationships tended to be built not in the camps *per se*, but on their outskirts. For example, Hambali befriended both Khaled Sheikh Muhammad and

Osama Bin Laden while he was in Peshawar. Later, he would return to Afghanistan to meet with Bin Laden, where they made an agreement to cooperate on areas of mutual interest.⁴⁷

Hambali's Al-Qaeda ties enabled some 30 members of his Malaysia-based division Mantiqi 1 to receive training at Al-Qaeda's Camp Al-Faruq between mid-1999 and 2001,⁴⁸ not simply to acquire the capacity to fight the Indonesian government but to acquire the skills, strategies, and tactics specific to Al-Qaeda's global jihad. The deepening of Hambali's relationship with Bin Laden would also lead to Al-Qaeda financing the 2002 Bali bombings. At the same time, it created ideological divisions within JI between Mantiqi 1 which prioritized the targeting of the "far enemy" and the Java-based Mantiqi 2 which focused on the "near enemy", seeing "the global", as Azzam had done, largely in terms of Muslim solidarity.

Camp Al-Faruq provided unmatched specialized military training opportunities as well as unparalleled networking for those who attended. The curriculum differed from As-Saddah, Hudaibiyah and Jabal Quba insofar as the courses were shorter and there were more opportunities for graduates of their three-month basic course to move into a wider array of areas of specialization. Its "basic course," covered standard subject matter, including understanding light weapons, map reading, proficiency on the battlefield and explosives.⁴⁹ Top graduates of the basic course could go on to gain proficiency in mountain warfare, urban warfare, and sniper training.⁵⁰ In contrast to As-Saddah's "tribes" approach, students who attended Al-Faruq were expected to be proficient in Arabic and as such, the composition of courses was more international. Indonesians could find themselves taught by Egyptians and in classes with Yemenis, Pakistanis, Algerians, Tunisians, Tajiks, and Saudis, which, in turn, afforded far more opportunity to build cross-national organizational ties.⁵¹ Likewise, Al-Qaeda members were more frequent visitors to Al-Faruq. Former JI member Muhammad Rais contends that in his two years at Al-Faruq, first as a student and later as a trainer, he met key figures in the Al-Qaeda leadership including, Osama Bin Laden, Abu Hafs and Saif el-Adl.⁵²

None of these regional cross-organizational relationships, international cross-organizational relationships, or relationships among individuals residing thousands of miles away from one another, would have been possible at that juncture in history without the permanent camps in Afghanistan. The technology available did not allow for it; in person camps were the only way to facilitate those bonds. They not only created the shared physical space for

interaction but also enabled the development of deep social bonds based on common experiences and ideological indoctrination.

Lastly, approximately 100 JI members also trained in Syria between 2012 and 2018,⁵³ after JI amir Para Wijayanto sent a small JI team to Syria in 2012 to map a route and establish cooperative relations with the jihadis already there.⁵⁴ According to him, JI sought

to have good relations with everyone including ISIS. ... That was right at the beginning then we split when we realised that ISIS was very *takfiri*. I didn't agree with that. I also did not like that we would have to swear the *bai'at* [loyalty oath] to ISIS. So I said no. We are Ahlus Sunna wal Jamaah and we are not in favour of *takfir*. It is counter-productive....[So] we sent people to train with the Free Syrian Army, Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, Suquour al Izz and Hayat Tahrir al Sham. ... [Eventually] we set up our own training camp near Salma; only JI trained there.”⁵⁵

The purpose of this military training was to increase JI's military capacity so that it could protect the sovereignty of the Islamic state it was building, especially from attacks by non-Muslim states.⁵⁶ Second, it allowed JI to build relations with groups in Syria like Jabhat al-Nusra, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and Ahrar al-Sham as well as to re-establish ties with the Al-Qaeda core.⁵⁷ These ties were important as they enabled education, training and mutual assistance to take place on the ground in Syria, which was a priority for the JI leadership.⁵⁸ Finally, it also served as JI's contribution to global jihad. JI member Dede Anung Somantri, who was sent to Syria for training, explained that JI's mission was twofold: First, to join with Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) to help their Muslim brothers who were being slaughtered by Asad and ISIS. And second, for JI to learn in Syria what it could put into practice when they returned to Indonesia.⁵⁹ Another Syrian-trained JI member, Budi Trikaryanto, added that the training in Syria served to prepare the cadres of future JI leaders.⁶⁰

In Syria there were several training options open to JI. Some trained for a month or less with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in 2013 and 2014, receiving basic instruction in map reading, weapons and field engineering.⁶¹ Others joined the training offered by JN which comprised 45 days of religious training and 45 days of military training.⁶² As JI member Agung, who trained with JN in 2015, explained: “I had 45 days of Islamic studies (*dauroh shar'i*) in a religious

school in Syria”, followed by another 45 days of military science studies (*dauroh askari*) which included learning about “battle tactics, assembling and disassembling long-barreled and short-barreled firearms, marksmanship, and learning about bombs”.⁶³ Two months into his training with JN, he joined a month of sniper training under a Syrian instructor named Anas.⁶⁴ After three months of being with JN, Agung recounted that he “was assigned *ribat* (guard duty) on the border of Jabhat al-Nusrah’s territory in Bait Awan, armed with an AK47”.⁶⁵ After he had completed that he “lived in the villages with the people” where he continued to carry an AK47, attended Islamic studies sessions held by various sheikhs around the mosque where he lived, and also carried out guard duties in Bait Awan.⁶⁶

Those who trained with Ahrar al-Sham and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) trained for up to two years, learning the same skillset but at a higher level of capacity; it was expected they would become instructors upon return to Indonesia.⁶⁷ Yet another program taught different kinds of specialized expertise: sharp shooting, sniper training, bomb making, intelligence, combat tactics and medical work.⁶⁸ Training in Syria also imbued the younger JI generation with the zeal that only participation in a jihad and a global jihad could offer as well as adding valuable weaponry and demolitions skills to their tactical toolbox. Moreover, it enabled JI to expand its networks to other groups in Syria, including Al-Qaeda affiliates JN and HTS and independent outfits like Ahrar al-Sham and the FSA.

Training in permanent camps for a period of years was a defining experience in the lives of DI and JI members who participated in them. The practical military experience gained in these camps turned soft young men into hardened soldiers trained in battlefield tactics, weaponry, explosives, and combat training. When they returned home, they had the capacity and the skills to organize and conduct military operations. The permanent training camps also facilitated, through shared experiences, a common worldview, ideological perspective, and cross-organizational relationships that otherwise would not have occurred. In the first Afghanistan training experience these were an unexpected by-product. However, as these relationships bore fruit in facilitating further training experiences, they became incorporated into the goals when new training opportunities were sought. Finally, the experience of the training camp, with its rigorous curriculum under difficult conditions, bonded participants to one another, turning strangers into brothers.

Semi-Permanent Training Camps

The fall of Suharto in May 1998 provided the political space for the exiled JI leadership and their followers to return to Indonesia; the Christian-Muslim communal conflict in Ambon which erupted in January 1999 created the physical space to establish the first training camps on home soil. They were semi-permanent in nature, meaning they replicated many of the features of the permanent camps, but courses were shorter, facilities more make-shift, and their existence temporary. Indeed, while they occupied a defined place and had a set curriculum, their existence was directly tied to the duration of the conflicts which gave them cover from the Indonesian security forces. They were also much more accessible so that many more JI members could receive training there compared to Afghanistan or Mindanao.

The primary purpose of JI's semi-permanent camps was to increase JI's military capacity and to provide military training to their own members to prepare for and protect the Islamic state JI was trying to establish now that the Suharto regime had fallen. The semi-permanent camps also served the purpose of kaderization, meaning the development of JI as an organization not just militarily but also administratively, structurally, and, most importantly, cultivating the next generation of leaders. Here, JI's semi-permanent camps continued in Indonesia some of the most important aspects of the permanent camps abroad, many of which by this point had been dismantled.

Shortly after the conflict erupted, JI military commander Zulkarnaen sent some members of his special forces team, Laskar Khos, composed mostly of Afghan alumni, to Ambon to assess the situation. However, it was not until May 1999, when Laskar Khos member Ali Imron returned for the second time, that preparations for setting up a training camp were made. One month earlier, in April, Zulkarnaen had surveyed an area on Buru island which he had "felt was suitable for becoming a place for military training".⁶⁹ Ali Imron proceeded to this place near Waimurat village, accompanied by JI member Arismundar who headed the Solo branch of the humanitarian aid organization KOMPAK (Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis). Finding the right location was crucial. It had to be "near Ambon but not so close that the security forces would spot us".⁷⁰ Subsequently, JI established further semi-permanent camps on Seram island which is also adjacent to Ambon, indicating a strategic territorial division that designated Ambon island as the arena of jihad and neighbouring islands as areas of training.

Waimurat became the first semi-permanent jihadi camp in Indonesia, “financed by KOMPAK and managed by JI”.⁷¹ The first batch trained at Waimurat comprised the eight Javanese KOMPAK members who had accompanied Ali Imron and Arismunandar.⁷² These were followed by further batches of mainly Javanese volunteers who were either already affiliated with JI and sometimes DI or were unaffiliated volunteers.

While the instructors were almost always JI members, often Afghan alumni, who trained volunteers from all backgrounds, the trainees from JI and DI did not usually train with the unaffiliated who came via KOMPAK. Instead, they had their own separate sessions.⁷³ This reflected the nature of the groups involved as well as the function this training served for the respective organizations. JI (and DI/NII) were underground organizations with an elaborate and lengthy recruitment process. By the time JI volunteers went or were sent to Waimurat or the JI camps on Seram, they had already been vetted. The military training thus not only aimed to prepare them to help the Muslims in the Ambon conflict but was part of the “joining” process.⁷⁴ Waimurat thus played a role in building JI as an organization through caderization, increasing JI’s military capacity, and building social bonds among members via the shared experience of training. In contrast, KOMPAK was the gateway for unaffiliated and unvetted Javanese volunteers to go to Ambon and help the Ambonese Muslims to defend themselves.⁷⁵ Waimurat for KOMPAK, therefore, was simply a way to provide military training for those Javanese who had no prior training,⁷⁶ focusing on increasing the individual’s military capacity. Mujahidin KOMPAK was and remained situational, meaning its purpose and existence was framed by the Ambon and Poso conflicts. It did not have broader, long-term aims or social, educational, and governance structures. Consequently, there was no need for organizational caderization.

The training at Waimurat replicated part of the JI curriculum of the training courses held at the military academy in Afghanistan and Camp Hudaibiyah in Mindanao at an expedited pace, combining religious study sessions, physical fitness, and combat training. Courses varied between one and three months, representing different levels. One-month courses offered basic training with a focus on discipline, firearms, and religious study. Two-month courses included the introduction to bomb-making while three-month courses had full bomb-making and demolition training.⁷⁷ In order to facilitate the latter Zulkarnaen in May 1999 had already brought with him 50kg of potassium chlorate, 5kg of Sulphur, and 100 detonators.⁷⁸

In January 2000, JI and KOMPAK stopped sharing Waimurat, after an acrimonious dispute over money.⁷⁹ KOMPAK set up its own camps on Buru, one near Namlea and one near Waimasin where it put on one-month training courses.⁸⁰ There was also training near Wailikut and Wamsisi. The training continued to be mainly for volunteers from Java “but some locals also joined”.⁸¹ KOMPAK volunteer Ramly believed that it was not just a case that JI was more selective, training its own, smaller numbers, but also that KOMPAK was more popular with locals because it was more focused on “military offensives” and had more weapons.⁸² The KOMPAK training, which was still being carried out by JI instructors “included marksmanship, infantry tactics, field engineering, guerrilla warfare and bomb making”,⁸³ and usually it ended with a jihadi operation (*amaliyyah*) against non-Muslims.⁸⁴

In February 2000, JI member Suhaeb arrived on Buru to re-establish the JI training after the split. This time JI decided “to live together with the society” so that they could also train “volunteers from the local community as well as mujahidin from the outside”.⁸⁵ As before, the training included both military and religious elements “but the emphasis was on defense”.⁸⁶ Yet the separation of JI and KOMPAK remained messy. Not only did JI continue to supply the instructors for KOMPAK camps, but JI volunteers also continued to go through KOMPAK because the leadership of JI’s Mantiqi 2 had still not given permission to its members to go to Ambon.⁸⁷

One such JI member was Farihin who was fed up with “all the bureaucracy in JI” while Muslims in Ambon “were being slaughtered like goats”.⁸⁸ Another was Sri Puji who had joined JI around 1996, taking the *bai’at* three years later without having had any military training. Sri Puji explained that he had “heard about training in Moro but not all could go there”.⁸⁹ Then when the Ambon conflict erupted, he wanted to go but “JI at the time did not send people to Ambon, so I went with KOMPAK”.⁹⁰ Sri Puji received basic training at Waimurat, including physical exercises such as “running, rolling, tiger jumps, and crawling”.⁹¹ His batch comprised 20-30 volunteers, including 6 JI members.⁹²

In early October 2000, JI also started sending preachers (*da’i*) to Seram island.⁹³ This was followed later that month by the establishment of the first training camp.⁹⁴ JI ended up establishing several training camps on Seram, the two most of important of which were in West Seram on the Hoamoal peninsula. One such camp was located in the mountain hamlet of Tanah Goyang, above the village of Loki, which JI member Jibril described as “the key to Seram”.⁹⁵

Loki became the target of the last large mujahidin attack in the Ambon jihad in 2005. Another JI camp was located above the town of Luhu. As JI member Handzollah explained:

The mountains above Luhu were excellent. Luhu itself is on the coast. You could make the bombs in the mountains and do the physical training on the beach. There was no military near there.⁹⁶

He then elaborated that “a typical day of training would start at 3 am when everyone would get up for prayer. At 5:30 am there would be physical training including running, push-ups, and sit-ups”.⁹⁷ The undisturbed locations on Seram allowed for lengthy training courses. Not surprisingly, these were quite successful locales for kaderization.⁹⁸

The semi-permanent training camps that were established in the context of the Ambon conflict became JI’s first domestic training opportunity after the fall of Suharto. Their significance cannot be overstated. These camps served to provide military skills to old and new JI members, who would become the army that would protect the state for which JI was starting to lay the foundations. They were also crucial for the kaderization of JI, developing it as an organization beyond the military. The training camps on Buru, as those in Afghanistan, became important places for networking. Waimurat in 1999 was the hub through which “mujahidin from all groups except Laskar Jihad had to go before they could fight” in Ambon.⁹⁹ Once the Poso jihad started in 2000, Buru became a training and network node connecting the Ambon and Poso jihads as KOMPAK brought volunteers from the Poso conflict to Buru for training. Mujahidin also started to rotate from Ambon to Poso and back again. This resulted in a transfer of strategies and technology. As KOMPAK volunteer, Jack Harun recalled:

We transferred the knowledge. At that time, we experimented a lot with different materials and compositions for making bombs. This was before the Bali bombs. We tried different combinations to see what worked better.¹⁰⁰

The relationships and networks established in Buru remained relevant even after the end of the communal fighting in Ambon in February 2002. Eight months later two JI suicide bombers exploded themselves in Bali, killing 202 people and wounding 209 others. One of the bombers, Feri alias Iqbal was a Central Javanese who had trained at Waimurat and had been a combatant in the Ambon jihad.¹⁰¹

Several years later, in 2010, a mixed group of jihadis drawn from the networks established in Afghanistan and Buru, including members of JI and KOMPAK, came together to set up another semi-permanent camp in Indonesia, this time in the province of Aceh. The shared “purpose of the training was to prepare militarily”.¹⁰² However, each participant group also had their own, separate agenda. As Sofyan Tsauri, one of the initiators of the Aceh training camp, explained, “some wanted to prepare so they could go to Southern Thailand for jihad; some were inspired by the 2007 Mumbai attacks; and some wanted to expel the [post-tsunami] foreign NGOs from Aceh.”¹⁰³ They chose Aceh as the location for this camp as this Indonesian province had been granted the right to implement Islamic law in the context of settling the separatist conflict there.¹⁰⁴ The camp in Jantho, however, was short-lived. It was shut down by the Indonesian security forces after locals had reported it. What the jihadis had failed to take into consideration was the unwillingness of the local population to tolerate outsiders threatening the political stability only just achieved. However, what the attempt to establish another semi-permanent jihadi training camp makes abundantly clear is that there was still a need to have a trained force that would be capable of protecting and defending the Islamic state-building project under way, and that there was still interest in jihad for which training was necessary.

Mobile and Pop-up Camps and Training Opportunities

The third type of training camp prevalent in Indonesia has been mobile and pop-up camps. Unlike semi-permanent and permanent camps, these required few facilities. During the years of the Ambon and Poso conflicts, they tended to be located directly in the arena of jihad, popping up when there was a training need and when a place for training became available. However, JI also ran pop-up training opportunities on Java. Training sessions could range from one day to a couple of weeks, depending on the nature of the training and the location. As with the semi-permanent camps, the Ambon conflict provided the first opportunities in post-Suharto Indonesia to set up mobile and pop-up jihadi training camps and opportunities. The goal of these was to train local Muslims to defend themselves. The first of such training in Ambon was the immediate result of the visit by JI Laskar Khos members Ali Imron, Nurudin and Saifudin to Ambon to look into the causes of the conflict. Ali Imron recalled:

We went there and talked to Muslim leaders but not known ones and not politicians. They were ready to defend themselves against Christian attacks. From what I saw and the

stories I heard I got the impression that they needed lessons to prepare themselves. Just some basic lessons on how to use a gun and how to make bombs but the most important was *fiqh jihad*. So we started instructing them.¹⁰⁵

They trained “around 15 people” in “houses in different neighborhoods and villages”.¹⁰⁶ This first batch was taught by Nurudin and Saifudin “how to use guns, how to make bombs, the tactics for attacks, and *fiqh jihad*”, while Ali Imron left Ambon to go to the Philippines to procure weapons.¹⁰⁷

As more Javanese Islamist groups arrived in Ambon mobile and pop-up training camps and training opportunities mushroomed across the island and to a lesser extent Seram and Saparua islands. Specialized courses such as demolition training were offered in addition to basic military training and the Javanese mujahidin not only played a key role in increasing the military capacity of local Muslims but also in uniting them, organizing them, and helping them establish a contiguous Muslim territory.¹⁰⁸ As with the semi-permanent camps, the Afghan alumni “were crucial to the training”.¹⁰⁹ Most of the instructors were JI while the camps ran under the generic label of Laskar Mujahidin.

JI’s mobile and pop-up training was never attributed to JI. Unlike the organization’s semi-permanent camps there was no set curriculum and courses could be as short as a day or two such as the demolition training JI offered in Kebun Cengkeh where its instructors included Dulmatin and Uceng.¹¹⁰ Other JI training locations were near Hila and Hitu where Ali Fauzi, Ali Imron, Syawat and sometimes Mubarok served as trainers.¹¹¹ There was also a mobile training camp in Bukit Malintung, the hills above Ambon city, where JI member Syaiful instructed a mix of Javanese and Ambonese.¹¹² The training there lasted for three days and consisted of “physical exercises - just the basics – and some religious teaching like what really is jihad, how do you pray in conditions of war during battle, and how you are not permitted to kill the elderly, women and children unless they are combatants or spies”.¹¹³ The latter was particularly important for JI instructors who were shocked by the nature of some of the violence. Here Farihin highlighted that Ambonese Muslims were “cutting up bodies, cutting off heads, and using magic”,¹¹⁴ while Handzollah emphasized that Ambonese Muslims needed to be taught that jihad “is for the defense of religion only and not for personal conflicts”.¹¹⁵

The mobile and pop-up training camps and opportunities in the Poso conflict differed from those in the Ambon conflict. As in Ambon their primary purpose was to train local

Muslims and to help them defend themselves against local Christians. And, as in the Ambon conflict they were located in the arena of jihad, moved around, had few facilities, and were of short duration. However, unlike Ambon, both JI and KOMPAK established local affiliates in Poso and JI instructors no longer trained those affiliated with KOMPAK. This was partially because the split between JI and KOMPAK in Ambon had turned into full-blown enmity by the Poso jihad in mid-2000. It was also because, from JI's perspective, the Ambon jihad was too chaotic.¹¹⁶

The military training in Poso came in short bursts of one to three weeks and was conducted in rotating locations.¹¹⁷ Local Muslims who were interested in getting military training from JI's affiliate Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh would start with religious sessions which were kept geographically separate from the military training with which it alternated. Indeed, batches of trainees were taken out of Poso city for military training. The first batch comprised 30 volunteers who were trained near the village of Uekuli for one week.¹¹⁸ Other mobile training sessions took place near Lage, Ampana, Toyado, Male, and Tombiano.¹¹⁹

The training was conducted by JI instructors - Afghan alumni - who taught "strategy, tactics, warfare, and force formation as well as how to shoot, camouflage, make bombs, and protect yourself from the enemy."¹²⁰ Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh volunteer, BR, who was among the first to receive military training described the average training day as follows:

After *subuh* prayer we studied the Quran. Then there were physical exercises in a field – not grass but stones. Then we came back and had breakfast and studied tactics and strategy as well as *tafsir* and *fikh* jihad. After that we put our studies into practice in the field, followed by lunch and rest. But it wasn't really rest because the *ustad* had a whistle and whenever the whistle was blown, we had to run toward the direction from where the sound had come and gather there. They timed us and if you were slow or not fully dressed there were sanctions - sanctions such as 3 minutes late 3 push-ups etc. This happened day and night. The first three days I still took my shoes off before I went to sleep, after that I started sleeping with my shoes on. The post-lunch rest was followed by more physical exercises – running, push-ups, and rolling. After the *maghreb* prayer we studied until the *isya* prayer. There would also be a sermon. Then guard duty.¹²¹

The first session of military training would be followed several weeks later, after more religious studies back in Poso city, by a second session.¹²² In this second session, which saw the volunteers travel to a different location, "there was more emphasis on weapons training" including on "weapons such as M16, SS1, SKS, M3, and M4".¹²³ Sometimes there was also "short training" of 3 days or "evening training" that took place alongside the fighting.¹²⁴ While

the first batch was exclusively trained by JI instructors, who were locally simply known as the Javanese *ustadz*, skillful graduates from the first batch assisted the Javanese instructors in the training of subsequent batches. Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh volunteer Cecep, for example, became a self-defense instructor,¹²⁵ while the above-mentioned BR taught marksmanship.¹²⁶

After the end of the Ambon jihad in 2005 and the Poso jihad in 2007, JI had to come up with other ways to physically train its members to ensure a minimal capacity across all members with respect to physical fitness and using weapons.¹²⁷ This gap was initially filled with outdoor activities under the label of “devout Muslims love nature” (*santri pecinta alam*, SAPALA) which served as a way to select and recruit but also to provide a basic level of fitness without arousing the suspicion of the Indonesian security forces. Such activities included hiking, running, orienteering, camping in the jungle, and survival skills.¹²⁸ They were carried out in small groups across the mountains of Java. Alongside the SAPALA activities, a more formalised program of “open nature activities” (*kegiatan alam terbuka*, KAT) was established in 2009. JI’s KAT program was both pop-up and mobile. There were two locations that year: Lawu Mountain on the border of Central and East Java, and Golkar mountain in Tasikmalaya, West Java. The Lawu mountain training lasted two days and had participant groups as large as 40 persons. It included hiking, navigation, and survival skills. The Golkar mountain training had slightly smaller groups at 30 persons and a longer training period. This training started with four days indoors followed by three days in the jungle. It covered navigation, compass use, map reading, and a range of physical exercises. Similar open nature activities were also conducted in the mountains around Semarang, most notably Ungaran mountain and Bandungan mountain, where JI held short training courses that included “hiking up the mountain, orienteering, how to use a map and a compass, survival skills, physical exercises, and everything you need to know if you are on the run”.¹²⁹

When civil war erupted in Syria, JI took mobile training to the next level. In 2011, JI amir Para Wijayanto decided to launch “close quarter combat training” (*qital qorib*) initially in the area of Ngawi, East Java. He envisaged that different techniques of self-defense used by countries such as “Russia (Spetnas), Israel (Krav Maga), China, Korea” would be taught based on Youtube videos.¹³⁰ He believed that close combat was an expertise that JI could offer Jabhat an-Nusra in return for training them militarily, showing that he saw this as a reciprocal relationship. As he explained:

I sent JI to Syria with self-defence skills. They also had therapeutic massage skills. To help heal the wounded. For me this was give and take. We could give the Arabs martial arts skills and therapeutic massage skills.¹³¹

Close combat training developed into JI's "gym program" which sought to establish gyms in residential homes which functioned as mobile training camps to provide select JI members with the "skills or capacity in order to make a contribution to jihad, especially in Syria".¹³²

In early 2012, JI rolled out this program with the establishment of the Satria Muda Ungaran gym,¹³³ the Bara Satria Salatiga gym, and the Satria Muda Ambarawa gym – all in Central Java. Satria Muda Ungaran's first batch had 10 people and the training lasted for six months. Subsequent batches trained for one year and sometimes even a bit longer.¹³⁴ In 2013, the Satria Muda Ungaran moved to a different location but still in the Ungaran area, where it trained the second batch which comprised 12 persons. By 2014, all gyms had changed location again, with Satria Muda Ungaran moving to the Bawen Semarang Terminal area,¹³⁵ while Bara Satria Salatiga moved to the area near the Salatiga military hospital.¹³⁶ Changes in location sometimes also meant changes in name. Satria Muda Ungaran became Satria Muda Bawen. Similarly, Bara Satria Bawen became Satria Emas Purwodadi when it moved to Purwodadi in 2018.¹³⁷ Regular changes in location and name ensured security as did the use of normal, residential houses, and the severed cell-structure introduced by Para Wijayanto, which limited the knowledge of the location of the gyms to those who worked or trained there.

Between 2012 and 2018, some 7 batches were trained across multiple sites in Central Java. Each batch had 10-15 trainees. According to Para Wijayanto, of these between 4 and 6 went to Syria every year.¹³⁸ This number is almost certainly too low. A mid-level JI military commander in the Semarang area estimated in 2019 that around 60 JI members had been sent to Syria, most of whom had returned.¹³⁹ Indonesian police believe the number to be closer to 100. Those who did not go to Syria became trainers and remained in Indonesia.¹⁴⁰ Syria alumni also returned to the gyms to share both the religious and military knowledge they had acquired.

The training varied from location to location depending on what facilities were available. Budi Trikaryanto who trained at Satria Muda Ungaran explained that the first six months focused on building muscles through exercises such as weight-lifting, running, push-ups, sit-ups, self-defense (kicking, punching, blocking) while months 7 to 12 developed throwing, wrestling and ground fighting techniques, taught hostage-taking and provided weapons training with samurai

swords, fighting sticks, throwing knives, and ninja stars.¹⁴¹ Agung, who trained at Satria Muda Ambarawa in 2013 started with “basic combinations of punches, kicks, and blocking”, quickly moving on to “sparring, knife throwing exercises with wooden targets, ninja star throwing exercises with wooden targets, Samurai sword exercises with bamboo targets and straw dolls, and how to escape when held at gun point”.¹⁴² The training offered by Bara Satria Salatiga, according to Dede Anung Somantri who trained there from August 2016 to November 2017, comprised running, self-defence, push-ups, sit-ups, swimming, and training with replicas of long-barrelled and short-barrelled weapons.¹⁴³ It also included KAT activities in the form of climbing Ungaran mountain in Semarang, Andong mountain in Magelang, and Sumbing mountain in Wonosobo every three months.¹⁴⁴ And the third component was Islamic studies once every three months.¹⁴⁵

Mobile and pop-up training camps on Java differed from mobile and pop-up training camps in conflict zones because their primary aim was to give committed members the opportunity to perform *i'dad* [preparation] and in doing so to reinforce caderization. Indeed, JI's SAPALA and KAT activities were so successful that they were later emulated by numerous Indonesian pro-ISIS groups who would spend a day or a weekend doing training-like outdoor activities on a beach or in other secluded but public areas. The activities of both JI and these pro-ISIS groups was innocuous enough to not attract attention, but this must be contextualized by the fact that military training by private groups was not an unusual occurrence throughout much of Indonesia's history. In fact, domestic paramilitary training linked to terrorism was only explicitly banned in 2018.¹⁴⁶

Conclusion

This article has shown that the jihadi military training both in Indonesia and abroad has not only served to acquire the necessary skills to fight repressive regimes but also to acquire the capacity to defend the Islamic state the jihadis sought to establish throughout various stages of its development and thereafter. Permanent international training camps in Afghanistan, the Philippines and Syria enabled members to develop military expertise in tactics, heavy weapons and demolitions as well as specialized skills. They also facilitated members and organizations to develop ties with other like-minded groups and, in doing so, share space, resources, ideological content, and training. Semi-permanent camps in Indonesia, like their international counterparts,

provided an opportunity to get military instruction and to perform *i'dad*. They also played a crucial role in networking jihadis and for Jemaah Islamiyah these camps were important components of the caderization process. They built ties of loyalty not only among participants in the training but also between participants and the network itself. Finally, pop-up and mobile training camps served to train local Muslims in conflict areas to defend themselves. In the form of outdoor nature activities, they served to maintain general fitness levels when formal camps were not available; in the form of gyms they allowed Jemaah Islamiyah to vet potential candidates for jihad in Syria while also providing them with the close combat skills JI's amir Para Wijayanto believed would be of interest to Jabhat al-Nusra, HTS, Ahrar al-Sham, and the Free Syrian Army.

¹ Brynjar Lia, "Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaida Strategist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri." Oxford: Oxford University Press, 41-43.

² "Profile: Muamar Ghaddafi." BBC. June 11, 2011 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12488278>; Mandel, Judyt, "Libya-Public Diplomacy. Libya Under Qadhafi: A Pattern of Aggression." *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Collections*. Box 91721. <https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/digitallibrary/smf/nsc-communicationsandinformation/mandel/91721/libyaunderaqdhafi-apatternofaggression.pdf> , 2

³ Brynjar Lia, "Doctrines for Jihadi Terrorist Training." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 20 (2008) Thomas Hegghammer "Global Jihadism After the Iraq War." *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 60, No.1 (2006).

⁴ Roel de Bont, Dan Weggmans, Ruud Peters, and Edwin Baker, "Life at ISIS: Roles of Western Men, Women and Children," *Security and Global Affairs*. September 2017; Edwin Bakker and Roel de Bont, "Belgian and Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters (2012-2015): Characteristics, Motivations, and Roles in the War in Iraq and Syria." *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol 25, No 5 (2016); Joshua Keating, "What did you Learn at Terrorist Training Camp." *Foreign Policy*. May 10, 2010; James Forest, *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes*. Westport: Praeger Security International (2006).

⁵ Peter Nesser, "How did Europe's Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.20, No.2 (2008); Gabriel Weimann, "Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges (2006); Anne Stenersen, "The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Vol.20, No. 2 (2008)

⁶ Lia, "Doctrines for Jihadi Terrorist Training"; de Bont, Weggmans, Peters, and Baker, "Life at ISIS"; Bakker and de Bont, "Belgian and Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters (2012-2015)"; Nesser, "How did Europe's Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes"; Hegghammer, "Global Jihadism after the Iraq War"; Kim Cragin, "Understanding Terrorist Motivation." *Testimony presented before the House Homeland Security Committee*. December 15, 2009; Sean Maloney, "Report from the Field: Army of Darkness: The Jihadist Training System in Pakistan and Afghanistan, 1996-2001." *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol.26, No.3 (2015)

⁷ Nesser, "How did Europe's Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes"; Lia, "Doctrines for Jihadi Terrorist Training".

⁸ Stenersen, "The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp"; Weimann. "Terror on the Internet"; Kevin Siqueira and Daniel Arce, "Terrorist Training: Onsite or via the Internet." *European Journal of Political Economy*. 53 (2020); Reed Alasdair and Haroro Ingram. "Exploring the Role of Instructional Material in AQAP's *Inspire* and *ISIS Rumiyah*." EUROPOL 5/26/2017.

⁹ Hegghammer, "Global Jihadism after the Iraq War", 14.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ John Horgan, Max Taylor, Mia Bloom and Charlie Winter, "From Cubs to Lions: A Six Stage Model of Child Socialization into the Islamic State." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. 2016, Tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1221252, 10-11

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- ¹³ Nesser, “How did Europe’s Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes”, 242-243.
- ¹⁴ Lia, “Doctrines for Jihadi Terrorist Training”, 533.
- ¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁶ Lia, “Doctrines for Jihadi Terrorist Training”, 534.
- ¹⁷ Ibid, 536.
- ¹⁸ Weimann, “Terror on the Internet”.
- ¹⁹ Stenerson, “The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp”, p.215; Siqueira and Arce, “Terrorist Training: Onsite or via the Internet”, 2.
- ²⁰ Stenerson, “The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp”, 215.
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- ²³ Thomas Hegghammer, *The Caravan: Abdullah Azzam and the Rise of the Global Jihad*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2020).
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- ⁴⁷ Schulze and Chernov Hwang, “From Afghanistan to Syria”, 22.
- ⁴⁸ Unpublished autobiography, Mohammed Rais, who attended and taught at Al-Qaeda Camp Al-Faruq.
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- ⁸⁴ Interview with Jack Harun, former Mujahidin KOMPAK member, Solo, 18 August 2015.
- ⁸⁵ Interview with Suhaeb, former JI member, Jakarta, 7 December 2010.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid.
- ⁸⁷ See Schulze, “From Ambon to Poso” for a more detailed analysis of the discussion within JI on going to Ambon.
- ⁸⁸ Interview with Farihin, former JI volunteer in Ambon, Jakarta, 7 April 2017.
- ⁸⁹ Interview with Sri Puji, former JI member, Semarang, 7 August 2017.
- ⁹⁰ Interview with Sri Puji, former JI member, Semarang, 6 August 2019.
- ⁹¹ Deposition of Sri Puji Mulyo Siswanto alias Puji, 16 December 2010.
- ⁹² Interview with Sri Puji, former JI member, Semarang, 6 August 2019.

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- ⁹³ Deposition of Arif Sunarso alias Zulkarnain alias Daud alias Pak Ud alias Mbah Zuk alias Zainal Arifin alias Zul alias Abdullah Abdurrahman alias Abdul alias Abdurrahman, 28 December 2020.
- ⁹⁴ Interview with Suhaeb, former JI member, Jakarta, 7 December 2010.
- ⁹⁵ Interview with Jibril, former JI member, Jakarta, 4 November 2010.
- ⁹⁶ Interview with Handzollah, former JI member, Solo, 20 August 2015.
- ⁹⁷ Ibid.
- ⁹⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹⁹ Interview with Suhaeb, former JI member, Jakarta, 7 December 2010.
- ¹⁰⁰ Interview with Jack Harun, former Mujahidin KOMPAK member Solo, 18 August 2015.
- ¹⁰¹ Ali Imron, *Sang Pengebom* (Jakarta: Penerbit Republika, 2007), 108-109.
- ¹⁰² Interview with Yudi Zulfahri and Sofyan Tsauri, initiators of the Aceh training camp, Depok, 29 July 2023.
- ¹⁰³ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁴ For a detailed discussion see ICG, “Jihadi surprise in Aceh”, *Asia Report No. 189* (20 April 2010).
- ¹⁰⁵ Interview with Ali Imron, JI member, Jakarta, 6 December 2010.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁸ See Schulze, “From Ambon to Poso”, see also Sumanto Al Qurtuby, *Religious Violence and Conciliation in Indonesia: Christians and Muslims in the Moluccas* (London: Routledge, 2016) and Badrus Sholeh, *Jihad, Conflict and Reconciliation in Ambon, Indonesia: Local and National Responses* (Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012).
- ¹⁰⁹ Interview with Abdullah Sonata, head of KOMPAK Ambon 2000-2001, Jakarta, 7 December 2010.
- ¹¹⁰ Interview with Farihin, former JI member, Jakarta, 7 April 2017.
- ¹¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹¹² Interview with Syaiful, former JI instructor in Ambon, Solo, 19 August 2015.
- ¹¹³ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁴ Interview with Jibril, former JI member, Jakarta, 4 November 2010.
- ¹¹⁵ Interview with Handzollah, former JI member, Solo, 20 August 2015.
- ¹¹⁶ Schulze, “From Ambon to Poso”, 48.
- ¹¹⁷ Interview with Iwan Ambo, former Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh member, Palu, 5 August 2017.
- ¹¹⁸ Interview with BR, former Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh member, Palu, 6 August 2017.
- ¹¹⁹ Interview with Cecep, former Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh member, Palu, 5 August 2017.
- ¹²⁰ Interview with BR, former Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh member, Palu, 6 August 2017.
- ¹²¹ Ibid.
- ¹²² Interview with Cecep, former Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh, Palu, 5 August 2017.
- ¹²³ Interview with BR, former Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh member, Palu, 6 August 2017.
- ¹²⁴ Interview with Iwan Ambo, former Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh member, Palu, 5 August 2017.
- ¹²⁵ Interview with Cecep, former Mujahidin Tanah Runtuh member, Palu, 5 August 2017.
- ¹²⁶ Ibid.
- ¹²⁷ IPAC, “The Impact of the Taliban Victory on Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah”, 14.
- ¹²⁸ Interview with Yusuf, former JI member, Semarang, 7 August 2017.
- ¹²⁹ Interview with a JI member, Semarang, August 2019.
- ¹³⁰ Deposition of Para Wijayanto alias Abang alias Mas alias Abu Askary alias Abu Faiz alias Aji Pangestu alias Aji alias Ahmad Arif alias Ahmad Fauzi Utomo, 19 July 2019.
- ¹³¹ Interview with Para Wijayanto, former JI amir, Jakarta, 11 August 2023.
- ¹³² Deposition of Para Wijayanto alias Abang alias Mas alias Abu Askary alias Abu Faiz alias Aji Pangestu alias Aji alias Ahmad Arif alias Ahmad Fauzi Utomo, 19 July 2019.
- ¹³³ Deposition of Budi Trikaryanto alias Budi alias Abu Aiman alias Haidar alias Denis alias Budi Prasetyo alias Sukri alias Gani Bin Panut Cipto Mulyono, 10 July 2019.
- ¹³⁴ Ibid.
- ¹³⁵ Ibid.
- ¹³⁶ Deposition of Dede Anung Somantri alias Dede alias Amung alias Jarot alias Gatot Sampurna, 27 April 2018.
- ¹³⁷ Deposition of Agung alias AJI alias David alias Riko Bin Suparno, 15 May 2019.
- ¹³⁸ Deposition of Para Wijayanto alias Abang alias Mas alias Abu Askary alias Abu Faiz alias Aji Pangestu alias Aji alias Ahmad Arif alias Ahmad Fauzi Utomo, 19 July 2019.
- ¹³⁹ Interview with mid-level JI commander, Semarang, 5 August 2019.

¹⁴⁰ IPAC, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Military Training Programs”, p.10.

¹⁴¹ Deposition of Budi Trikaryanto alias Budi alias Abu Aiman alias Haidar alias Denis alias Budi Prasetyo alias Sukri alias Gani Bin Panut Cipto Mulyono, 10 July 2019.

¹⁴² Deposition of Agung alias AJI alias David alias Riko Bin Suparno, 15 May 2019.

¹⁴³ Deposition o Dede Anung Somantri alias Dede alias Amung alias Jarot alias Gatot Sampurna, 27 April 2018.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ “Indonesia’s Legal Framework on Terrorism”, Article 128, paragraph 1, *Indonesia’s Criminal Law Update*, issue No 3 (2018) <http://icjr.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/ICLU-3-2018.pdf>