Extended Data Table 1B | Effect of professional identity on honesty in Middle Eastern bank employees

Explanatory Variable	Model (a)	Model (b)	Model (c)
Professional Identity	0.026 (0.028) p=0.360	0.024 (0.028) p=0.404	0.031 (0.028) p=0.276
Age	-0.006*** (0.002) p=0.006	-0.005* (0.003) p=0.077	-0.005* (0.003) p=0.068
Male	0.038 (0.032) p=0.224	0.039 (0.032) p=0.224	0.042 (0.031) p=0.180
University Education	0.012 (0.061) p=0.838	0.008 (0.063) p=0.904	0.009 (0.062) p=0.890
Relative Income	-0.013 (0.010) p=0.185	-0.011 (0.010) <i>p</i> =0.287	-0.014 (0.010) p=0.176
Core Business Unit		-0.024 (0.029) p=0.412	-0.016 (0.029) p=0.589
Years in Industry		-0.001 (0.003) p=0.868	0.000 (0.003) p=0.938
Competitiveness			0.045** (0.020) p=0.022
Number of observations	1,480	1,480	1,480
Sample	ME bankers	ME bankers	ME bankers

Probit estimates. The dependent variable is a reported winning toss. The reported results are marginal effects calculated at the median levels of the covariates, and the standard errors (in parentheses) have been corrected for clustering at the individual level. The median covariates are a measure of the change in probability of reporting a winning outcome. The models reported are as per those in Cohn et al. **a.** Reported winning tosses are regressed upon a dummy for the professional identity condition and individual characteristics (n=148). **b.** This model extends model a to include work-related variables (n=148). **c.** This model extends model b to include an additional control of self-reported materialism (n=148). Significance levels: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ****p<0.01 (two-sided Wald tests).