


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To define populism

Under this title a conference was held at the London School of Economics and Political Science between 19 and 21 May 1967.

The verbatim report of the conference, of which only a few copies have been made, can be consulted at the Library, London School of Economics and Political Science. A raisonné summary of the conference was published in the Journal of comparative politics, Government and Opposition, Spring number, 1968. The papers presented to the conference, with three further studies, will be published under the title Populism by Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, and Macmillan, New York. The Humanitarian Trust, London, generously helped with a grant towards the preparation of the proceedings for publication.

List of participants

J. Allcock (Bradford)
Prof. S.L. Andreski (Reading)
Sir Isaiah Berlin (Oxford, chairman of session)
Dr. Conrad Brandt (Oxford)
Dr. Peter Calvert (Southampton)
Nigel Clive (Foreign Office)
Maurice Cranston (LSE)
F.W. Deakin (Oxford, chairman of session)
Prof. R.P. Dore (LSE)
Geoffrey Engholm (Sussex)
E. Gallo (Oxford)
Prof. Ernest Gellner (LSE, chairman of session)
Prof. Julius Gould (Nottingham)
George Hall (Foreign Office)
C.A.M. Hennessy (Warwick)
Prof. Richard Hofstadter (Columbia)
Ghița Ionescu (LSE, rapporteur)
James Joll (Oxford)
Ellen de Kadt (LSE)
Emmanuel de Kadt (LSE)
Dr. Werner Klatt
Dr. John Keep (School of Slavonic and East European Studies)
Francis Lambert (Institute of Latin American Studies)
Dr. E. Lampert (Keele)
Shirley Letwin
Dr. L.J. Macfarlane (Oxford)
Prof. Donald MacRae (LSE, chairman of session)
Dr. I. de Madariaga (Sussex)
Prof. G.F. Mancini (Bologna)
Kenneth Minogue (LSE)
Prof. W.H. Morris Jones (Institute of Commonwealth Studies)
Dr. John Saul (Dar-es-Salaam)
Prof. Leonard Schapiro (LSE, chairman of session)
Prof. Hugh Seton-Watson (School of Slavonic and East European Studies; chairman of session)
Dr. T. Shanin (Sheffield)
Geoffrey Shillinglaw (School of Oriental and African Studies)
Dr. Zoltan Szabo
Prof. Alain Touraine (Paris)
Prof. F. Venturi (Torino)
Dr. Andrej Walicki (Warsaw)
Derek Waller (School of Oriental and African Studies)
Prof. Peter Wiles (LSE)
Prof. Peter Worsley (Manchester, chairman of session)

London School of Economics

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Conference on Populism

- 1. Mr. J. H. Coatsworth (Chairman)
- 2. Mr. J. H. Coatsworth (Secretary)
- 3. Mr. J. H. Coatsworth (Secretary)
- 4. Mr. J. H. Coatsworth (Secretary)
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- 19. Mr. J. H. Coatsworth (Secretary)
- 20. Mr. J. H. Coatsworth (Secretary)

London School of Economics

Conference on populism

May 20-21, 1967

VERBATIM REPORT

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Saturday, 20 May 1967

Morning Session

Chairman:- Prof. Donald MacRae

THE CHAIRMAN: I have the genuinely very pleasant task of welcoming members of this Conference on behalf of the London School of Economics and Political Science. I am by no means clear why this task has fallen to me, except that there is a theory that I have been built in to the walls and foundations of this building, out of which a number of people would like to chip me. That is by the way. What I have to say on behalf of the School is merely this: here we have always tried to bring together people from many countries and many disciplines to advance their thinking and understanding in the social sciences. We have seen this as our primary task. We see a conference of this sort as an important and extraordinarily delightful opportunity to pursue this aim.

I wish to say on behalf of the School that everyone is welcome, and this welcome extends to making very free of the facilities of the School during the next two days. I very much hope that people will make use of the provisions which have been made for lunch and particularly this evening for the dinner which is being given by the School and also for lunch and dinner tomorrow.

I should like to make a small point about the timetable. We are going to begin to assemble tomorrow morning at 9.30 so that we can start our proceedings at, or, if possible, slightly before 10 o'clock - a little later than is suggested in the official programme. We believe this to be more realistic. Perhaps we shall be able to make a start before 10 o'clock.

I should like now to call on Professor Leonard Schapiro to tell you something about the origins of the Conference and then, after him, there will be a few words from the master mind behind all our organisation, Mr. Ionescu, on the mechanics of our working.

PROF. LEONARD SCHAPIRO: Perhaps I had better leave the question of the origins of the Conference to Mr. Ionescu, because, as Professor MacRae rightly said, it was his idea and his inspiration. I am merely one of the many wheels of the machine



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which he erected. However, although I have also been built into the fabric of this institution, I should like for a moment to speak as a participant.

Speaking for the participants, we are grateful to the School for offering its hospitality and premises to us, and for making it possible for us to meet in one of its most desirable rooms. Although it is in the tradition of the School to do that - and I hope that it long may remain so - I think that we owe the School our special thanks for that. I should also like to mention that we owe our thanks both as organizers and as participants to the Humanitarian Trust, which very generously made us a grant towards the publication of the proceedings. It is certainly the intention that the proceedings should be published in one form or another. I say "in one form or another" because we have not been able to decide as yet in what form they should be published - whether in book form or in some form in connection with the journal "Government and Opposition". Those are matters which will have to be looked into within the limits of possibility. Professor Gellner, Professor Worsley, Professor Hofstadter and Mr. Ionescu will be consulting on that in order to do the best that can be done about it.

May I say a word on the way in which I see these various groups of meetings. They are, as it were, attempts, as we saw it, though without being rigid about it, to see whether there is such a thing as "populism", something which applies to the various movements to which the name has been given, and which is more than a mere coincidence of name. We thought that at the first meeting the matter could be examined in terms of those ideologies which could be described as populism as against those which could not. Then, this afternoon we could look at the political forms which populism takes - the relationship between populist movements and political parties, and so on. Then tomorrow morning we could consider the comparison between the older populisms before the First World War, in Russia and America, and the later ones, those in the contemporary world, or at any rate the movements to which that name has been applied. We hope that that might lead by the afternoon, in the final and general discussion, to some kind of attempt either to say what populism is, or to decide that it is not possible to say what it is.

I suppose that one should apologise for having made this a rather crowded, essentially working Conference. But, on the other hand, time is so short and we so seldom get the opportunity to gather together for discussion that we felt that probably all participants would welcome the rather intense programme of work which we have devised. Mr. Ionescu will know much better than I do about the method of work and organisation. Therefore, I leave the description of the rest of the practical arrangements to him.

MR. G. IONESCU: I will take only a few minutes to tell you about what I think we can call the rules of the game. As Prof. Schapiro reminded us, we are meeting here with the purpose, as our first letter to you stated, of defining populism. Although in the valuable and excellent papers which we received the twelve authors have bulldozed for us a lot of the ground and opened the first paths in this kind of jungle of a problem, they were neither expected to offer the final and comprehensive definition, nor to agree with each other. But thanks to them, we are well on our way. However, the Conference has still to do its job, which is to define, if this is possible, populism.

It seems to me that this Conference is, in a sense, what I would call a work of instant research. There is no doubt in my mind that we shall be breaking new ground. Although there are several almost classic works on some of its aspects, there is not, to my knowledge at least, one single work on the concept itself. The term continues to be used in many different ways. There is no doubt either that we have in our midst a number of people who know a great deal about the subject, so it can be reasonably assumed that we can attempt a definition.

How should we do this work? In so far as the people who were invited to this Conference were invited in view of their knowledge of the subject, one of the rules of the game is obviously that every one of them should make their contribution, or contributions, to the discussions. I should like to offer a little statistical estimate. I think that there will be, by and large, 40 speakers and we have altogether 700 minutes to play with. Therefore, the organizers offer each participant a credit of between 20 and 30 minutes to be used as he wishes during the first meeting and also the general meeting, in which we should like everybody to join.

I think that the other rule of the game is to try to stick as much as possible to the main question which we are asking: Can a single concept of populism be extrapolated from all the populisms and their aspects which we shall look at; or shall we conclude, on the contrary, that what people call by the same name in different parts of the world and different periods of history are entirely different things and as such should be left different and should be called each by another and more specific name? It seems to me that our ten reports are rather divided on the subject. For instance, Prof. Worsley's stands at the optimistic end of believing that there is such a thing as a universal concept of populism, whereas Dr. Walicki's report is pessimistic and believes that there are many things of the same name.

This is why we have thought it better - and this is the third rule of the game - to group the papers round the three main questions: First, what is and what is not populist ideology; secondly, why is populism a political movement and yet it does not

usually crystallise in political parties; and, thirdly, what are the differences between the populism of before the First World War and that of after the Second World War?

There is an enormous amount of overlapping, and it would be very difficult to disentangle and keep all these things separate, but we thought that the papers of Professor MacRae, Professor Worsley and Messrs. Waller and Shillinglaw should provide the framework for the first meeting; the papers of Professor Hofstadter, Professor Mazrui, Mr. Engholm and Dr. Walicki for the second historical meeting; and the papers of Messrs. Stewart and Minogue, Professor Lazar and, last but not least, Dr. Saul for the political meeting. We have asked the rapporteurs not to present their papers at the beginning of the meeting, for everybody is meant to have read them by now, but to answer at the end of each meeting the various observations or references which might have been made about their papers during the discussion.

The fourth rule of the game is this. We have asked, and ask again, speakers to put down in advance their names for the meeting or meetings at which they would prefer to make their main contribution to the discussion so as to have as much order as is possible, but at the same time we should like the Conference to be as much of a round table discussion as possible.

There is also somebody described as a rapporteur here. His role - and this is the final rule of the game - will be to listen carefully to everything which will be said and to try to clarify points which might be more useful for the general conclusions and then at the beginning of the Sunday meeting I shall endeavour to submit draft conclusions and definitions which afterwards will be offered for the general discussions.

The language of the Conference will be English, but anybody who prefers to speak in French is welcome to do so. The discussions are both tape recorded and taken down in shorthand.

THE CHAIRMAN: You have heard from Professor Schapiro and Mr. Ionescu what we are trying to do. As Chairman of this session, I want to maintain an open and round table atmosphere. But I think that perhaps we should remember that the people listed on the blackboard have expressed particular interest in this morning's subject. Perhaps Professor Andreski would like to begin.

PROF. S.L. ANDRESKI: Unfortunately, I have to transgress the rules laid down by our organiser. The point which I want to make concerns all the sub-headings of this Conference, especially the definition of populism which is supposed to be the last thing which we are to discuss. It seems to me that if one reads the papers which have been distributed it is obvious that by populism they mean very different things, although I must add that I see no reason why people should be prevented from using the word "populism" in different senses. Perhaps what we shall achieve will be not an agreed definition but rather an elucidation of the various possible definitions.

I have made a short list of the various meanings which the authors have attached to the word. One is that populism is any kind of movement aiming at the redistribution of wealth, regardless of how it is done; the second is that it must be a movement of protest on the part of the lower classes. The third variant is further restricted to a movement not just of the lower classes in general but of the rural lower classes in particular. The fourth interpretation is that populism is a movement which aims at the preservation of a traditional rural way of life. The fifth meaning is that of idolisation of the peasant. In view of the discrepancies among these various meanings, we could either adopt a very broad definition, saying that populism is any kind of movement which aims at the preservation or improvement of the position and freedom of the lower classes, or we would have to specify the various narrower meanings.

The other general point is the problem of the discrepancy between words and deeds. Everybody knows that such discrepancy is never absent, but it is equally obvious that it varies enormously. There are some people who take their ideologies seriously, while others do not. Although their existence is generally known, nobody has so far offered an explanation of these fluctuations. It would be a valuable contribution, if somebody would try to construct a theory which would explain why, under certain circumstances, ideologies are taken seriously and why in others they just elicit lip service. Clearly there must be a certain degree of harmony between the content of an ideology and the structure of society, but one would have to specify the factors which produce mutual reinforcement or its opposite. The unification of the world in terms of communication, incidentally, has led to a situation in which an ideology may be professed, not because it corresponds to local conditions, but because it sounds good by international standards imposed by countries which are leading in the industrial sphere.

This brings me to African populism. If one looks at the behaviour of the African leaders it is clear that the last thing that they are is populists in any of the senses

mentioned previously. In no way do they imitate the peasant ways. The Russian populists occasionally dress like the peasants but this does not happen in Africa. The agbada is the dress of the wealthy classes, not of the ordinary African. If we take clothes as an index of the attitude to the peasant way of life, they rule African populism right out; there is not such a thing.

There are, however, examples of vestimentary populists, such as Keir Hardie or Wincenty Witos, the Polish Prime Minister at the time of the Pilsudski coup d'etat, who used to appear in Parliament and elsewhere dressed like a peasant. He refused to wear a tie. To judge by the clothes, the Cuban Fidelistas as well as the Chinese communists are unquestionably populists who are trying to bridge the gap of disdain.

In Africa the rulers are too near to the peasant condition to idealise it. Like other cults, a genuinely believed populist mythology - not just phraseology - requires a certain distance from the object of the worship.

PROF. HUGH SETON-WATSON: I would throw out some ideas which I think should be thrown out at a fairly early stage. In a way, they are connected with what has just been said.

First of all, it seems to me that whatever else populism may be, it includes one element which there cannot be populism without, and that is idolisation and worship of the people. The people are the repository of certain basic virtues which have become lost, perverted, and so on. This purity of the people is contrasted with the sins of the elite, which may be a traditional, oppressive tyranny like the Russian czarism or a Philistine, materialistic, oppressive bourgeoisie like that of the United States, or it may be an attack against clever people and intellectuals generally. There may be other forms. The particular kind of sins held against the elite depend on the situation, but the essence is that the people are held up as an object of veneration and purity.

This idolisation of the people should be contrasted with and distinguished from various other things. In the first place, it should be distinguished from flattery. Flattering the people and demagogy is a characteristic of all mass democratic or quasi democratic movements of the Left and Right in history. If we take any movement which flatters the people and call it populist, the word loses any meaning at all.

Secondly, it should be distinguished from mobilising the people. Political movements and political leaderships and ideological groups which acquire a technique of mobilising the masses, as the main instrument to hit their enemies with, extol

the virtues of the people. This phenomenon of mobilising the people is not the same as flattering the people. The first is demagogy; the second is modern mass mobilisation technique.

Here, Communists and other mass movements - perhaps Fascists - enter into the picture. To regard Mao Tse Tung's Communism as populist is absolutely impermissible. Here is a case of a tremendously efficient technique of mobilising the people, but the aim is not to raise up the people in any abstract sense. There is no idolisation of the simple virtues of the people inherent in Maoism, even though you might find a little bit of that in the terminology of it.

The third thing which you must distinguish it from is political ideologies which have a rational plan. It seems to me that Marxism is not populism. There have been cases of illegal underground Communist movements which have had a great deal of what I might call a populist people-idolising mentality. Marxism, as an ideology, was different. Marx was planning an ideal order. He was intellectualising in a rational scheme. The essence of Marxism is that those who practise it claim to be rational, scientific people. Their aim is scientific criteria measured by intellectual categories and not just a worship of the people. Therefore, Marxist and all rationalistic political ideologies are something different from populism.

Those points suggest some of the things which populism is not and one essential thing which populism is, but this is only a small part of the picture. If we take idolisation and worship of the people, something like this can be found a long way back in history. There is much in the papers about a cult of the noble savage in the eighteenth century, but you can go further back than that. You can find a whole strand, a sort of deviation from Christianity expressed sometimes by Christians, heretics or otherwise and sometimes by those who are not Christians but deriving from that element in Christianity which stresses the humble and meek at all costs. From this is drawn the conclusion that because people are humble, meek, poor, primitive and ignorant and are living in incredible squalor they are, therefore, more virtuous than anybody who is not living in squalor and that squalor and misery in themselves are virtuous. I do not think that Christianity ever says that, but it is a deviation from Christianity. Possibly a worship of the most squalid, most miserable, most oppressed and most insulted goes back through Christianity to an earlier Judaic tradition.

I should like to make two more brief points. I should have thought that we would do well to devote some attention to talking about words. I rather hoped that the philosophers among us would do this. There are four words which I would commend to your attention as worth talking about. They all appear to mean the same thing in four different languages, but in fact they do

not. The words are "peuple", "narod", "populo" and, in some ways, almost the most important word of all, "volk", with the adjective of that word and all that it has meant historically.

Lastly, the ideologies of populism which one might regard in one way or another as populist come from, on the whole, intellectuals. Populist movements start with the intellectuals rather than with the people, although the people are drawn in. It seems to me that the role of the intellectuals is important. In this connection, I would say that another word which we should talk about is "intelligentsia". What I propose to say is particularly relevant to Russia. I should be inclined to try to limit - but I think that it is impossible - the use of the word "intelligentsia" to the particular phenomenon which I mention now, and that is the position of the modern educated person of the eighteenth, nineteenth or twentieth century belonging to the modern intellectual elite of the day who finds himself in a society which is overwhelmingly traditional in background and which is being rapidly and artificially modernised from above. This situation is a special one. The pattern is that the government, the ruler, the autocrat decides to modernise and starts it artificially and rapidly. One of the first things which he is bound to do is to create artificially a small modern intellectual elite. It has been artificially created and it finds itself in the middle of a different kind of society, and all sorts of frustrations and troubles result from that.

This is the classical Russian example, not so much after Peter the Great as in the nineteenth century. It is the pattern in many African and Asian countries. The kind of situation in which the intelligentsia has been artificially created and is particularly aware of its artificial position provides an extra incentive to it to worship, idolise and feel a conscience pang towards the people. This has been classically expressed in the Russian "To the people" movement. This whole notion "To the people" is central. You find it in Balkan and other countries, but in so far as this predicament of the modern intellectual elite in a backward and artificially modernising country is a central feature, it is right and understandable that so many of the papers should have stressed the developing society situation - the African situation, and so on. It is understandable that they should have talked about nationalism emerging in those societies. But we must distinguish between them. Because this sort of modernising intellectual predicament is essential to our problem, we should not, for that reason, simply equate any kind of traditional society nationalism with populism. There is a danger that in some of our papers we may do that.

Lastly, although the people-idolising mentality has predominantly turned up in this kind of society, it need not necessarily be so. The United States is the obvious exception to this. I am not sure to what extent the populist leaders in the United States were intellectuals. I am not sure to what extent

one could say that they were intellectual or semi-intellectual. They were, I suppose, anti-intellectual. But the element of idolising the poor, the abject and the rejected can be found certainly in an advanced society and in an urban society. It does not have to be in a peasant or modernizing society. I suppose that the American populists of the turn of the century are not the only example of this. The civil rights movements and the attitudes of radical young intellectuals in the United States - the most advanced society there has ever been - and the idolisation of the people and the negro masses may be a significant fact.

Therefore, I would put before you a distinction between idolising the people, and mobilising and flattering the people, and a distinction between worship of the people and forming rational plans for social blueprints. We should also consider the special role of the intelligentsia in modernising society. Finally, I would make a plea that somebody talks to us about words and tells us what is meant by "people".

THE CHAIRMAN: One thing which we shall have to consider very carefully is what is the cash value of the word "peasant". I should now like to ask Professor Alain Touraine to speak to us.

PROF. ALAIN TOURAINE: My first remark will be very near the comment just made by Professor Seton-Watson. Our main difficulty is to speak of a well rounded, well organised, closed ideology defending the gemeinschaft or traditional society. It seems to me that in almost all cases, except some extreme cases, the first characteristic of a populist movement is that it is loosely organised and full of contradictions. Two contradictions should be pointed out. First, it is a movement or an ideology defending some traditional values and, at the same time, directly oriented towards problems of economic change or economic problems. All kinds of populist ideologies deal with problems of social control, of economic change. So it is not just backward looking, but forward looking. It is a set of ideas about the type of social change. Secondly, as Professor Seton-Watson has just pointed out, most of the time, but not always, it is about peasants but not by peasants. It is not produced by peasants.

Therefore, instead of describing from within what the populist ideology is, I should like, first, to define the kind of social situation which produces such an ideology. Perhaps not in all cases, but in a large array of different cases, we can find three inter-related elements of the social situation which produces populism. First, it is about a social category which is halfway engaged in a process of economic change, a category which is defined, not by economic circumstances or as an interest group, but in a

process of collective social mobility, be it upward or downward. In Africa or Latin America, it is often, but not always, upward social mobility. In the United States, it is probably much more downward social mobility. But the main fact is that these categories are halfway in a sub-culture or traditional culture and part of a new predominant economic system.

The second main element is that the centres of economic power are in a parallel situation. The economic power seems always to be alien to the society with which it is directly concerned. That can take different aspects. The most obvious is a colonial situation in which economic power belongs to a colonial power - that is, to foreigners. But, in a relatively traditional dual society, the power of the oligarchy can appear as a foreign power for the rest of society. Instead of there being, as, say, in Western Europe, a direct opposition between two conflicting elements of an industrial society - like factory owners and workers - it is a face-to-face relationship. We have an indirect and partial relationship. Both elements are engaged in their country, so they are defined in terms of ascription and achievement at the same time.

The result of the situation is that in between there is a certain free space between economic power and the mass which is used for some institutional gain. There is, therefore, a large discrepancy between economic power and political organisation. There is a certain fluidity of an intermediary level of political gain. That can be expressed in terms of the existence of some elements of middle class. It is not a social class which will intervene in the middle, but some centres of influence - intellectuals, politicians, military people. Instead of a stable and fundamental conflict which is a direct conflict - like a colonial power-colonised people, workers-factory owners - we have a game which is not with two elements but three. Populism is never directly a challenge of the predominant economic system. Populism is always more than economic mobilisation or economic change. It is always less than change in the economic system or in the system of economic power.

The ideological or non-ideological aspect of the populist movement depends essentially on the type of relationship which exists between these three elements. Let us take some very rapid examples. If the mobilisation of the mass, - taking mobilisation in a Germanic sense - is very limited, if the traditional society is more destroyed or shattered than changed, if at the same time the centres of economic power are far removed from the society, the space of free gain for these middle elements will be maximum. In that case, populism can appear essentially as an intellectual manipulation or an ideological manipulation for the sake of the interest of the new middle ruling class of the mass. The comments made by Dr. Saul and others about Africa seem to be near this kind of extreme situation where populism is more an ideology than a movement, more an effort to create artificially a kind of social and cultural unity in a rural society which is largely disorganised.

To go on to the second stage of mobilisation, if we consider a society where there is a beginning or a promising mobilisation of the rural masses, and where the centres of economic power are less removed from the rest of society, the free space for these middle class elements is reduced. Here we see that populism begins to be not just an ideology, but a movement. But due to the fact that the masses as such are not mobilised, it is not a social movement, but much more an intellectual movement.

This situation, which may be the Russian situation, is different both from a situation of pure political ideology and from the third situation which I shall describe, which is a situation of real social movement. Populism appears as a social movement when the mobilisation of the masses is much more advanced. Perhaps tomorrow I will have an opportunity to speak at greater length about Latin America. But it is essential to state that there is no reason to say that populism is always about peasants. In Latin America, it is fundamentally not about peasants. In one of the papers there is a reference to A.P.R.A. A.P.R.A. always comes first, and A.P.R.A. is, in my opinion, very little populist.

Most of the big populist movements - and perhaps the most typically populist movement is the Colombian Guyitanismo - including the Right Wing populist movements, are based on urban population and essentially on migrants. That means that they are based on a highly mobilised population - people coming from the countryside or from small towns to the cities. In this kind of situation, we have a very strong feeling of the dependence of the economic system in a semi-colonial system or, like in Argentina, in an economy which is directed from outside by the conditions of world markets. In that situation, we see that the movement as such is relatively important. But it can never be understood without taking into consideration the manipulative role of some elements of the middle class whose position is always ambiguous, making an alliance with the new mobilised masses against the oligarchy and, at the same time, trying to maintain or restore a kind of social equilibrium and political integration. The dual aspect which is quite obvious in the two aspects of the Peronist movement or in the Vargas movement and in others shows that it is always necessary to use these three elements of structural analysis of a populist movement.

I am much less sure about the possibility of applying this kind of general scheme to situations of downward social mobility, because the three kinds of examples which I have just mentioned are examples of mobilised or pre-mobilised masses. What happens when some categories of rural workers or peasants, or some urban categories, are going down? Returning to the remarks made by Professor Seton-Watson, probably the main difference between a populist movement and a non-populist movement is always the existence of a middle element. If some category - say, small shopkeepers or craftsmen directly opposed the big new factories

or the concentration of economic interests into big corporations at a certain stage of industrialisation, there is a direct link - perhaps a Fascist or Poujadist movement or extremism at the centre, but there is no populism. There is populism in the American case where there is some possibility of political gain in the middle. That is why they express themselves through votes and political actions. There are always these three elements.

The whole array and diversity of populist movements can always be located between some kind of extreme situation where the face-to-face conflicts within a relatively integrated social and economic system predominate. Populism appears where there is no such integration when the two main opponents are both within and without and when this intermediary situation leaves some free space for political and intellectual manipulation in between.

DR. ANDREJ WALICKI: I feel that my command of English is not sufficient to express everything that I have to say, but please treat with tolerance the linguistic accent in my speech.

First, I must defend myself against the view that I am simply against a more universal definition of populism. In Poland I have published two books, a large introduction and many articles on populism. I have often pointed out the fact that there were some features in Russian populism which are to be found in the different populisms of the present day.

However, it is one thing to look in Russian populism for such features which pointed to and anticipated the different populisms of the present day, and another to attempt to define Russian populism in terms of present day populism. We must reject any attempt to define populism which puts the emphasis on the relationship between Russian and present day populism but at the same time defines modern populism in a way which emphasizes those features of it which have very little in common with Russian populism. If we want to put the emphasis on the relationship between Russian populism and contemporary populism - and I do not say that we must do so; perhaps it is not necessary - but if we wish to treat Russian populism as a prototype or a pattern for different populisms of the present day, we must define contemporary populisms in a way which draws attention to those features which, indeed, have some relationship with Russian populism.

My remarks will be divided into two parts. One part will be destructive and the other part constructive. I shall confine myself to the three papers which were classified as dealing with the ideological aspect. We have a very interesting paper by Professor Worsley. But certain points in his definition of populism contradict the idea that the populism which he is defining has Russian populism as its prototype. For instance, there is "the proposition that socio-economic classes are not the crucial social

entities that they are in developed countries." I do not think that this can apply to Russian populists who were very conscious of the class division. The main idea of Russian populists of the seventies, the idea of the so called social struggle as opposed to the political struggle, was based on the absolutisation of the class struggle. They thought that the class struggle could be separated from the struggle for global political change. They had no idea of social solidarity.

Professor Worsley goes on to say: "The Party is the agency of liberation, and the Party-State the agency of development (unlike early Russian populism) . . ." The idea of one party rule was hardly to be found in Russian populism. Also, Professor Worsley uses the expression "earlier Russian populism" meaning nineteenth century Russian populism. But Russian populism of the sixties and seventies is classical populism, not early populism. What is "early"? If it is classical, it is not early. It looks as if Professor Worsley considers fully fledged Russian populism to be social-revolutionary and early Russian populism that of the nineteenth century. No historian of Russian social thought would agree with this usage.

Then Professor Worsley says: "The unity of the nation is expressed in the single-party, and sometimes elaborated into a philosophy which links Party, nation, village-life, and self-activity into an ideological complex." That feature cannot be found in Russian populism except perhaps in Tkachev, but he was not very typical in this respect.

Later, Professor Worsley says: "Populism is a development ideology par excellence. It is an ideology of transition, from 'rural idiocy' to modernized society;". I would agree in part. I have pointed out that two very interesting features in the ideological and economic programmes of such Russian legal populists as Danielson and Vorontsov. Indeed, their ideology was not only an economic programme, but a programme of development. They proposed something like a non-capitalist way of industrialisation. But in the case of Russian populism the stress was not upon development but upon non-capitalist development and not upon modernisation but upon non-capitalist modernisation. There were some populists - for instance, Mikhailovsky - who were ready to sacrifice development, who thought that it was much more important to develop along non-capitalist lines than to develop. Development as such was not very important. Professor Worsley says: "It is, very much, a development ideology, not merely an ideology of national independence . . .". But Russian populism was not an ideology of national independence. If we wish to treat Russian populism as a prototype, we must put emphasis on this difference.

The last generalisation which Professor Worsley makes is that "the key atomic unit in the anarchist dream is the free individual independent producer". In the case of Russian anarchists,

that was not so. Russian anarchists were also communalists. There were populists who were at the same time anarchists, but there were also populists who were not anarchists. For instance, legal populists were, as a rule, state Socialists. They believed that a strong state, even a czarist state, could curb the economy, and they were in favour of state interference because they believed that the state could prevent capital development. Therefore it was possible to be a populist and at the same time to be a statist, although it was not possible to be both an anarchist and a statist. The two concepts of populism and anarchy in the case of Russia overlap, but only partially. It was possible to be an anarchist without being a populist, and it was possible to be a populist and a statist at the same time.

Professor Hofstadter has written that "the United States has not had a peasant class; . . . What the United States has had . . . is a class of cash-conscious commercial farmers . . ." Therefore, we cannot say that Russian populism was of the same species as American populism. It was something very different. One of the main ideas of the Russian populists was to prevent Russian peasants from becoming "cash-conscious commercial farmers". There is an article which was treated by Lenin in his paper "The Economic Content of Populism" as a typical example of the ideology of classical Russian populism. This article contained such statements as "The farmer is a true soldier in the ranks in service of capitalism"; "Russian peasants must not become farmers. It is our first enemy - farming"; "Farmers are begetting capitalism". The Russian peasants in their peasant communes are something different. There was a violent hostility towards farmers.

I come now to the constructive part of my remarks. Populism is a dynamic and not a static concept. It is possible to arrive at a definition on the basis of those components which would embrace some typical features of both Russian populism and what is now called populism. I shall begin with what can be found in the papers presented to this Conference, using them to formulate a general definition. Populism is the socialism which emerges in backward peasant countries facing the problems of modernisation. It must be a peasant oriented socialism, usually idealising peasants. It is expressed and organised by intellectuals. It represents - this is very important from my point of view - a curious blend of the tendency towards modernisation with an idealisation of a great past. This is what Professor MacRae called the "element of romantic primitivism", but I do not agree that this is the essence of populism. It is only one of the components, and I would not define populism only in terms of romantic primitives.

There has been a reference to "looking for non-capitalist ways of solving the problems of modernisation". This is treating capitalism as a social disease which attacks one's country from without. Hence the equation of capitalism with Europeanism - very

important both for Russia and for the countries of the so-called third world. Here we have a combination of the external and internal aspects of the response to the problems posed by industrialization. All these features we can find in the papers.

I would like to make another distinction: that between populism and peasantism. In the paper on Maoism I have found a reference to Mitrany's book "Marx Against the Peasant", where Mitrany simply identifies peasantism with populism, but this is fallacious. Populism is a Socialist phase of peasantism. Lenin expressed this by saying that populism is the advocacy of radical agrarian change guided by Socialist dreams. Populism is a combination of plans for non-capitalist modernisation of backward countries with dreams of a socialist nature. Let us not in this context forget the impact of Western socialism, one of the main sources out of which Russian populism emerged. Like socialism, populism was a global ideology; not merely a political or economic programme. It was a vision of the world, a view of personality and society. There is nothing like this in simple peasantism, which does not involve Socialist dreams. On the contrary, peasants are not Socialists as a rule. Therefore I do not agree that Witos could be called a populist. Witos was a peasantist. We did have populism in Poland during the romantic period. Some populists were Utopian Socialists, aiming at a global transformation of society. We had populism in the first half of the nineteenth century in Poland, but after that it was replaced by peasantism.

In Russia, the transition from populist to peasantist was more direct. For example, the legal populists could be treated as a link between populism and peasantism. Social revolutionaries were a link between populism and peasantism. Populism is peasant-oriented, whereas peasantism is peasant-generated. Populism is a peasant-orientated socialism. Peasantism cannot be socialism.

I found in the book of Mitrany a quotation from a Rumanian peasantist, Constantin Stere: "Every Socialist must be a populist and cannot be a Socialist except through being a populist" - in Rumania, of course. But not every populist need be a Socialist. I would put it like this: Every populist must be a Socialist and cannot be a populist except through being a Socialist. Otherwise, he is not a populist but a peasantist. This is why American populists are different from populists in Russia - because American populists had nothing in common with socialism.

I am not against the very broad definition of populism. I realise that it is possible to define populism in such a way that it includes all radical movements which are led by intelligentsia, which appeal to the masses, and which are not confined to the working class but stand for the cause of the people as a whole. All such movements could be called populist movements. It would be useless to insist that the word "populism" can only be used in the exact sense in which it is used by historians of Russian social thought, and I thought that we should avoid a controversy of terminology. But if we wish to treat Russian populism as a prototype of present day populism, we must concentrate on those features of present day populism which have something in common with Russian populism.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Dr. Walicki. May I trespass on two points, breaking the rule of a good chairman? In the paper which I submitted I was writing of populism as an ideology. I was not attempting to offer a sociology of populism. I was tremendously struck, to my surprise, by the overlap between Russia and America - this is something which I do not imagine I shall get much agreement on - at the ideological level.

I should like to say something more general and direct, not personal. We have a very interesting problem. I said earlier that we must look at the word "peasant". In this country, in the United States, and, for that matter, in areas of Africa - such as the West African cocoa farmers - we are not dealing with people who are peasants. We are dealing with capitalist farmers - different scales and of different natures. Nevertheless, we might want to distinguish general ideological features which are likely to occur among and appeal to all cultivators and then make a division between the different kind of cultivators thereafter. From the point of view of definition and understanding, we might find this a useful procedure.

PROF. PETER WILES: I believe that I am the only economist present: a very pleasant feeling in some ways - I am, as it were, socially promoted and intellectually displaced. To each, of course, his own, and I think that each of us is showing the cloven hoof of academic self-interest in offering these definitions, so I will offer mine. But I will declare my interest first. I am a sovietological economist, I am of British nationality and I have long resided in the United States. So I define populism as something about virtue residing in simple people and in their traditions. It has to be loosely organised and without a strict ideology. It is very creative simply to say what results from that complex. Unlike Dr. Walicki, who seems to be some kind of Russian, I do not regard Russian nineteenth century populism as the sole prototype. I think that it is productive to look at such definitions and take such attitudes as would include nineteenth century American populism and certain features of my own country.

But I share Dr. Walicki's doubt as to the utility of this concept in the modern world. I do not think that the behaviour of African states at the United Nations is to be linked productively in any intellectual sense, with this essentially nineteenth century word. I would rather use the word and define it to suggest that this nineteenth century phenomenon has a number of residues in the modern world. A number of markedly populist features are to be detected in Mao Tse Tung, Nkrumah and Lenin.

Populism is an anarchy, but a moderate one. I think that it is more anti-establishment than anarchist in principle - anti creditor, anti-military. We have not heard enough about anti-creditor movements. Therefore, I do not want to define it as socialism. I would rather say that Russian populism is socialist populism and United States populism is capitalist populism; and I would define British populism as the usual British compromise.

Thirdly, it concerns small enterprises as a general rule, but not only peasants. It may, as in the Russian case, have great ideals about abolishing even small enterprises and going communitarian, but it does not actually do so. It is about and comes out of small enterprise societies. Where there is a lot of land and a society is very rich, the small enterprises are big enterprises, but we should not exclude populism just because the people who adopt it, although small by their standards, have large enterprises by somebody else's standards.

A curious and purely economic point is that populism always believes in monetary expansion. The Russian populists resisted the adoption of the gold standard. The American populists were pro-silver. The what I shall call Birmingham populists were against the London bankers. It is a general principle that if you have a small enterprise you like inflation, because your own personal income depends upon it. You cannot survive a slump on fixed interest or, perhaps, on half of your previous income. You go out of business. Therefore, monetary expansion is an absolutely regular feature of all nineteenth century populism. That means that, on the whole - and even Russia might be included in this - small capitalism is all right. It is financiers who are attacked, and, certainly in the Russian case, large capitalists. I do not detect very much anti-kulak feeling. I do not detect even the word "kulak" in the nineteenth century.

Can there be an urban populism? I think that Professor Touraine is absolutely correct: surely there can. Something very similar to classical populism of the United States or the Russian kind was evident in Britain throughout the nineteenth century, especially in the town of Birmingham: a town of small masters at that time, not exporting but concerned with the internal market, the town which produced all the monetary cranks. You can allow your historical imagination to play upon what would have happened if Engels had lived in Birmingham and not Manchester.

There are many remnants of this kind of urban populism in modern Britain. There are literary remnants such as Professor Richard Hoggart. There are the novels of Wells and Arnold Bennett. There is the fact that we do not call our Left Wing party a Socialist Party unless we wish to make propaganda against it. Its official name is "Labour Party". There is the whole Chartist movement. I should have welcomed a paper or a few words from an expert on the question, was Chartism populism? Populism - and here I must disagree with Professor Seton-Watson - opposes gross inequalities of income and wealth. But surely it permits those inequalities which are traditional among populists - the inequalities of the Russian village, the inequalities of nineteenth century Birmingham, the enormous inequalities of the Middle West. These were not the object of populist attack for the simple reason that they were traditional. Therefore, I do not think that we should include in the definition of populism a dedication to the extremely poor, to the rejected, to the oppressed, to the Maxim Gorki lot. On the contrary, populism, as a whole, is against that kind of person.

Can you have an affluent populism? I like always to point out to my United States pupils that their present President is an affluent

populist and behaves in very many ways like that. An enormous number of policies can be explained quite simply by the fact that he used to be a straight populist, but then he made fourteen million dollars.

I believe that peace and isolationism - here I cease to speak as an economist - are part of populism. I am inclined to use them as belonging to the definition of the word. It enables one to exclude the Russian Tsar, who otherwise would be rather difficult to exclude from being a populist. You would have to put in something about peace or disinterest in foreign affairs in order to get him out.

May I put two other questions of the type: Was Chartism populism? Am I not right in thinking that Gandhi was one of the most perfect of the old nineteenth century populists? Have we an expert here who could tell us about that? I should have thought that he exhibited every part of the nineteenth century syndrome and must be regarded perhaps as the lass classical populist. Can it go without religion? My inclination is to say "no". A populist must believe in God. William Jennings Bryan believed in God. There is a whole anti-intellectualist acceptance of tradition. Should I say "acceptance of religion" rather than belief in it personally? At least that is part of the definition of populism.

I was very struck by the absence of intellectual leaders, so far as I am aware, in the United States populism. The reason for this is not to do with populism. After all, most movements have intellectual leaders. It just happens that in the United States, in the nineteenth century, there were no intellectual leaders in politics. When we find that there was no intellectualism of this kind in United States populism of that time, all we are making is a generalisation, not about populism, but about the United States.

(Adjourned for coffee)

Chairman:- Prof. Leonard Schapiro

DR. CONRAD BRANDT: Since the aim of this conference is to arrive at an acceptable definition of populism, not of Maoism, I shall confine my remarks to the possible presence of populist strains in the Maoist offshoot of the Chinese Communist movement without making any attempt to define Maoism as well.

The previous speakers at this conference have left me with the distinct impression that one can generalise about populism at least to the extent of saying that it has never been an actual popular movement but rather a movement to the people launched by urban intellectuals drawn to the peasantry in search of a wisdom earthier than their own and usually also determined to transform that latent wisdom through education into a political force. To ascribe superior wisdom and energy to a whole group of human beings at large invariably betrays a bent towards romanticism; and such a bent does indeed seem to be a common trait of virtually all populists, if only because their view of the 'people' conforms more to an ideal than to any concrete reality. It can hardly be denied that Mao Tse-tung has often expressed such an abstract view of the Chinese people, lumping millions of men and women into one organic whole. Nor can it be denied that, with the possible exception of Fidel Castro, Mao is the most romantic revolutionary leader of our day. But does that make him a populist?

Looking at the best known of his early writings, his Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan (February 1927), one feels that the answer should be an unequivocal yes. Mao had toured only five counties - including a predominantly urban one - of his native province; yet he concluded that the Chinese peasantry as a class - not the Chinese proletariat - would constitute the principal force in the Chinese revolution. At the same time, being himself of peasant origin, he remained too close to his native milieu to glorify the peasants beyond recognition; even in the Report, his most lyrical assessment of their historical role, he stopped short of lumping them together as indiscriminately as an urban populist would have been prone to do. In other words, he perceived their weaknesses and the presence of 'bad elements' among them precisely because of being familiar with them from his youth. He himself has admitted that his native village milieu, far from instilling him with a life-long sympathy for the peasantry, filled him at first with such strong feelings of revulsion that he took the first opportunity to escape to the nearest city.* Moreover, when he began his career as a professional revolutionist, he began by working among the urban proletariat, and only turned his

* Edgar Snow, Red Star over China (New York, 1938), p.128ff.

attention to the peasantry after the first great defeat of the Chinese trade-union movement in 1925.* We have seen that this shift of attention led him by early 1927 to the heights of enthusiasm expressed in his report on the peasant movement in Hunan; but it should be noted that this report is no more typical of his other political writings than of communist writings in general. Its lyrical, a-Marxist tone is no longer to be found in his next published report, written in the autumn of 1928, even though the Party had by then lost nearly all of its foot-holds among the urban workers.** From his mountain refuge on Chingkangshan, Mao even admitted (if only for the record) that nothing but continued urban leadership could save the Party from degeneration into 'petty-bourgeois' radicalism. Moreover, he admitted that part of his band of Robin Hood-like followers would have to be dispersed unless they could be taught to be class-conscious like proletarians. Henceforward, he dwelt more and more often on the need to educate and re-educate the Party's rural following: an emphasis that may seem populist in spirit unless it be remembered that by 'education' Mao meant first and foremost Marxist-Leninist indoctrination. In fact, he meant more; the remoulding of one's whole mentality in such a way that, regardless of one's actual class background, one becomes proletarian in spirit. Such remoulding (or *kai-tsao*) became more and more necessary for the Party's survival as it ran out of real proletarian adherents; but the success of it was only moderate until the Japanese invasion of China gave it a powerful impetus - at least in one direction. As late as November 1938, Mao still found the peasantry lacking 'national consciousness' and a sense of solidarity - shortcomings they gradually overcame by being increasingly exposed to the invaders' atrocities.*** But the guerilla war by which Mao and his generals first defeated the Japanese and, later, their Nationalist rivals could only be won at some sacrifice of the Party's central authority. Only by concessions to local initiative not always easy to reconcile with 'democratic centralism' could the Party Centre gain or retain the allegiance of scattered villagers. The traces of this experience still remain clearly visible in Mao's post-war use of the 'mass line' to gain the broadest possible support for any one of his policies. First, his party cadres 'go to the people', both to learn from them and to instruct them, but not - as we shall presently see - in the manner of the Populists. The cadres 'go to the people', first, to sound out their sentiment and, secondly, to transform that sentiment into enthusiasm for any one given policy of the Party Centre. The Party Centre, for its part, takes account of popular sentiment in formulating its policies and certainly prefers persuasion to coercion in the process of giving effect to them. It also leaves more room for 'action from below' than the Soviet leaders have been willing to grant in the face of Lenin's explicit warnings against yielding to 'spontaneity';

* Snow, *op.cit.*, p. 160ff.

** Mao Tse-tung, *Selected works* (London, 1954), Vol.1, p.63ff.

*** *Ibid.*, Vol.II, p.202.

but then, one may wonder how much true spontaneity has inspired the 'mass line' in China. The Chinese leaders have often admitted that 'commandism' on the part of the cadres has supplanted persuasion - or that, in plain words, the will of the masses had to be bent forcibly to conform to the general 'mass line'.

This is not to deny that a populist streak runs through Mao Tse-tung's thinking and occasionally tinges it to the point of making it seem a-Marxist. But for every one of Mao's 'populist' boasts about more than six-hundred million Chinese standing solidly united, we find many more admissions, Marxist in spirit, of struggle behind that unity. Though not a class struggle, properly so-called, it is its direct descendant: a struggle of the 'people' against anti-people who wish to return to capitalism. The will of the people, as expressed by Mao, remains in this sense 'proletarian'; but it is not *narodnaya volya*, any more than the Red Guards are Populists.

PROF. W.H. MORRIS JONES: Professor Seton-Watson said that one could not expect populisms to be too coincident because if they were essentially anti-élitist movements it would depend on what was the character of the élite. I think that the variations we find in populist movements must depend also, more than people seem so far to have acknowledged, on what is around in the way of local ideas. Each populist movement springs up in a particular intellectual situation and is bound to derive some of its colour from that.

On Professor Wiles' point, Gandhi was too complicated to be a classical anything, let alone populist. But it is a good example of the way in which you cannot have populist thinking in India without its being coloured by such elements of populist thought as were put forward by Gandhi.

A further complication is that we have been talking as if there were a series of national populisms. This would seem to exclude the possibility that you can have different kinds of populist movements in one country even at a particular time. I think that this is certainly the case in many Asian countries. You have some populist movements of thought which are of the kind described here - that is, total world views, cases for a transformation of the nature of society, a change in the way of life - and others which are quite local protest movements against a particular kind of outside domination which cannot be coped with or faced. You can have little local populisms inside a country running concurrently with and in no way connected with larger populist movements.

I cannot avoid taking examples from India, which is not a bad thing, because Asia seems to have got left out of the papers rather badly. I should have thought that the main populist strain of thought in India at the moment was that associated with Jai Prakash Narayan and his writings, which were mainly influential, if at all, in Northern India. They were certainly in the form of wide-ranging

radical ideas. But I should have thought that some of the sentiments to be found in the writings of Tamil separatists in the South had strong populist strains quite unconnected with Narayan and more limited in scope.

Reference has been made to social situations of frustration as being a sort of common starting point to populist thought and populist movement. I wonder whether one could go further than this in the association of populism with frustration. To my mind, it is not simply that populism arises in situations where particular groups are confronted with an impasse which they cannot understand, which they find distasteful and painful; it is also that a characteristic of populist thought is that it is self-fulfilling. Populists ask for things which are so impossible that they perpetuate the sentiment and feeling of frustration. It is more than an idealisation of village life. It is a demand that village life should be everything that it patently is not. They ask for a communitarian society in the most sharply divided of all conceivable societies. They ask for this communitarian society partly to overcome these divisions; at the same time they propose it in opposition to a Western 'atomic', 'individualised' society. They have chosen the one clearly losing battle they could have chosen - either against the way in which a village society is traditionally divided, or against the direction in which that village society is changing. For on the whole, the way it is changing is in the direction of ruthless individual definition. They propound the notion of a participating as opposed to a representative democracy in a situation where the clearest feature is profound apathy. They have chosen as their leading points all the things on which it is almost impossible to make headway. This connection between populism and frustration seems to me to be of a more intrinsic kind than merely the result of certain people finding themselves in a frustrating social situation.

I agree with many points made about contradictions. The one about primitivism as against development sentiment has been put clearly enough. I would want to stress perhaps a little more than has been done another contradiction - that between praise of the unsophisticated and, simultaneously, a claim that what is being put forward is a scientific and rational programme because it conforms to something which is latent at least in human nature. This happens certainly in the Asian situation, because many populists are ex-Marxists and they have not been able to get so far away from their Marxism as to be willing to abandon the prestige which attaches to the scientific and rational claim. While there are strong romantic elements in their thought, and while their understanding of the social situations in which they are trying to act is certainly unrealistic, nevertheless the main claim which they make is that their thought is scientific and that what they are putting forward is a solution, not to a particular problem, but to a total world problem and that out of their thought can come the salvation not only of India or any other individual country but of the world.

Agrarian, yes, but again one can have fairly subtle forms of this where the campaign is not against industry in any simple way, but takes the form of proposals and programmes which would tame

or render less damaging industrial development, and, therefore, notions of agro-industrial communities of a completely new kind. All this is part of the general theme that this country need not take the course taken by other countries, that new 'mixes' are possible. This would be one of the main ones.

I would not regard the 'words and deeds' dichotomy as essential. I should have thought that many Indian populist leaders were in fact noted and up to a point respected for carrying out in their personal lives the sort of things which they profess. But this does not make their movement any more effective.

DR. L.J. MACFARLANE: I start by taking up what Professor MacRae says in his paper very early on, that if we are to make sense of populism we must treat it as though it is, although not only, an ideology. That seems to me to have been borne out by a number of contributions as well as by the papers. The most that we can say is that there are certain movements with common features, characteristics and situations and, therefore, they have certain points which we can see in most or some of them. This entitles us, perhaps, to classify them as populist movements, but certainly not to say that they have a common ideology. Some of them, on the basis of these features, may erect an ideology. They pick out local situations, local ideas and needs to build one up, or they may not produce an ideology at all.

One of the values of Dr. Walicki's papers is that he showed that, among what seems to be in many ways the more unified of populist movements, Russian populism, there are a number of different strands of thought, so that it is difficult to talk of the ideology of Russian populism but only of an ideological structure within which many positions are possible. Some of these positions are complementary to one another, some of them are in contradiction to one another. Some of them look back to the golden age of the past and are willing to defer industrial development if it means going through capitalism. Others see it primarily in terms of a means of skipping the capitalist phase of development and industrialising under state control. There is a big difference of emphasis.

What is most striking, comparing Russian populism with American populism, is the paucity of the ideas we find in American populism. It is very much an "ag'in" movement; it is against Wall Street, financial speculation and corrupt politicians. It has some peculiar ideas on money, but certainly it has no developed theory. It is stretching it much too far to talk of the ideology of American populism. I would go along with Mr. Minogue when he talks about the rhetoric rather than the ideology of American populism.

Professor MacRae lists seven ideological features of populism. I do not suggest that he is proposing that all of these are there in any particular combination, but he obviously thinks that

they are common, important features which make it possible to talk of an ideology of populism. He talks of the peasant, of yeoman primitivism, fraternity, the value of belonging to a group, conspiratorialism, anti-progressive, the idea of the restoration of the old order (although it may be in a new form) the emphasis on the complete man against the division of labour, the emphasis on locality, a-political and anti-party.

It is very doubtful whether we can talk of these ingredients as being either necessary or sufficient ingredients. There are many cases in which these ingredients are absent and others in which they are present. We have not got a developed ideology. Professor Worsley, in his book, points to Saskatchewan populism, which is not conspiratorial; it is progressive. It resulted in the formation of a political party, and it had a socialistic ideology.

It is also very doubtful whether we should talk of McCarthyism in America as an example of populism. I do not see how McCarthyism either incorporates the principles which Professor MacRae talks about or the ideas which Professor Worsley puts forward in his book. It does not help very much to label a movement like McCarthyism as populism. We have to be careful how we use such labels. Similarly, I doubt whether one can call Poujadism populism. It is a reaction to a particular set of circumstances and policies, and when they are satisfied or met or broken that is the end of it. One could talk in this way of the agricultural riots in Britain of the 1830's as being this sort of reaction. When we go back to this sort of period in British history, we are dealing with people who were not educated, in the main, and who did not have leaders who could express their ideas on paper. Therefore, by and large, we know very little about the ideas behind these movements. This sort of movement has as much claim to be regarded as populist as Poujadism.

Professor MacRae admits that some of the points which he made would apply well before the nineteenth century. Something like the seventeenth century "digger" philosophy, a quite sophisticated set of ideas, very much looking back to the past, restoring the true England which existed before the Roman Conquest, with every man getting his own piece of land of which he had been robbed. The ideas of what we think of as populism can be applied in an industrial, non-rural situation as much as in a rural situation, even if they are more common in a rural situation.

Mr. Minogue's idea of populism being seen as a sharp reaction by those who find themselves peripheral to the centre of political power is useful. We find it in something like Chartism, as Professor Wiles suggested. I should think that there is a much closer parallel between the ideas of Chartism and Saskatchewan populism than between Saskatchewan populism and Poujadism. If we look at the Peronism in twentieth century Argentina as a populist philosophy, are not we dealing with people coming into an industrialised situation, with some sort of agricultural rural roots, similar to what happened in Britain at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century? You get this protest movement against what has happened in the past, with certain regrets that the past has gone,

but looking forward to a new order of things which will create something new. We have to be aware of the danger of giving populism a label which can apply to everything, so that we have to spend all our time trying to find different brands of populism, just as there are different brands of soap powder in the shops.

I react very strongly against the idea of treating Maoism as populism. The authors talk of the early period of the C.C.P. as broadly carrying out populist policies, but they earlier define populism as rejecting the necessity and desirability of proletarianising the peasantry and say that the rural society is better than the urban. It does not seem to me to make sense to talk of Maoism or Chinese Communism in terms of these two categories, which they regard as distinctive of populism. Mao's attitude to the peasantry went beyond that taken by Lenin, but it was based on the attitude taken by Lenin. It is a question of tactics. You take account of peasant demands, but you have the conception of the wholesale transformation of peasant village life.

After 1927, the Chinese Communists had no industrial base. They were cut off from the town. They were forced to go into the village. They take up this idea of a party built on peasants primarily. But even in the Hunan report, Mao distinguished very clearly, as Lenin had done much earlier, between rich, middle and poor peasantry and suggested that it was only the poor peasants who had taken the revolutionary line. This is not pure Leninism, but it is based on it. The idea was to bypass capitalism which is what Russia had done. Mao's idea was to bypass capitalism, as Russia had but without having to go through collectivisation. I do not think that these ideas in Maoism - the idea of a new democracy, a bourgeois democratic revolution - are interpretable in terms of populism. They are only a transitional stage to socialism, and, most important, in this transitional stage of the joint dictatorship of workers, peasants, and progressive bourgeoisie everything is clearly to be under the firm control of the C.C.P. No-one is more clear on this than Mao himself.

PROF. F. VENTURI: Many of the points which I wanted to stress have been stressed by Professor Walicki. He is right when he says that we must think of populism in Socialist terms. It is not true to say that populism is socialism and that you can just put a sign for the two things. The real problem is to find out what are the connections between the populist and Socialist movement and ideology and problems. We must look to populism as a situation of some moment in the general development of socialism. The most important thing is to think a little of the idea that populism can be defined in a way in which one is looking backwards and forwards at the same time. But certainly that is true of socialism at certain moments.

Take, for example, the Socialism which came out of the French Revolution, which was the origin of the ideology of Babeuf. Georges Lefebvre, the great French historian, said that he was looking to the peasantry and to the communal habits of the peasants in his own

Picardy where he was born. Socialism was the thought that you could take the idea of the communal life in the past and try to translate it in modern terms. You can do translations of this kind in modern populist terms when you take from the past not only the fact that you want a pre-capitalist society translated in modern terms, but the ancient pre-capitalist society has some forms which could be good even in the future. That is true for the Narodniky. It is certainly true of Babouef and of the agricultural socialism of England at the beginning of the nineteenth century. I think that the great book of Costa on collectivism in Spain explains these ideas very well. It comes from the idea of the common fields and from the common earth, and it can be translated in ideological forms. That is one of the ways to Socialism, and that is the populist way.

Let us take another example - the importance of the peasants in the new deal of the Socialists in France after the commune. There is an important element of populism in Jaurès. He thought that the society of free proprietors and free people who lived in the South of France could be transformed in a Socialist frame and could become real Socialists. From this point of view, coming back to Russia, I am not of the opinion of Dr. Walicki that they were not socialist. They were populist and socialist.

DR. A. WALICKI: I thought of the transition from populism as a phase of socialism to populism.

PROF. VENTURI: If you take the old movement from Babouef to the present situation in the world, socialism is much bigger and larger than Marxism. In Russia the result was very important. In the constitutional elections, the majority of the Russian people voted Socialist in different shades. When we think that Russia skipped the bourgeois democratic revolution and came directly to socialism, that was not only the will of the Communist Party, of Lenin or Stalin; that was, in a way, the situation of Russia. Russia voted for socialism in the majority. In the constitutional assembly, it would be possible to see all the phases of socialist thought and ideas from populism to bolshevism. It is in this frame that we can better understand the populist movement, not only in Russia, but especially in the nineteenth century.

May I give a very important example about which, unfortunately, I do not know enough, and that is Yugoslavia. The populist element in Titoism is much more important than it is in Maoism. We must understand populism as a movement of the twentieth century in Europe. We must look specially at the Bourbons, and perhaps to the peasant movement in Italy and the Communist Party in Italy in some ways. Gramsci had to translate the word 'narod'. He said that the Communist Party must be 'nationale popolare'. He could not translate it in one word. He translated it in two words. That was the only way to do it. I see populism as one special kind of socialism, and I think that the Russian example from this point of view is specially important.

MR. GEOFFREY ENGHOLM: I was worried earlier as to whether populism existed in Africa at all if one viewed the matter in the light of the two obvious historical precedents - the Russian and American examples. But I think that a case can be made out for the existence of populist movements and the style of conducting political activities to which this label could be legitimately attached. My reasons for asserting this are based, admittedly, on a limited example, although it is possible to find others, I am sure.

My remarks relate to the peculiar situation which has developed during the last 60 years in the kingdom of Buganda. Here there has been a group of people with a genuine grievance which dates back to the period when there was a revolution which removed from them a great deal of their social status and the land which they controlled as clan leaders. This left them with an identifiable and continuing grievance. Their opponents were the big landlords who occupied freehold estates under a remarkable system of freehold land tenure. We have the elements here of something which is not altogether different from the older historical examples about which we have been hearing.

In recent years there have been outbursts of violence of popular enthusiasm within this kingdom, which contains two vital populist elements. One is that it is backward looking in the sense that these people want a return to the situation as it was before 1900 which, as one moves away from it, appears more and more as a golden age. The second is that it is also forward looking because in their attack on the big landlords they were careful to include a demand for democratic rights - that is, a demand that there should be popular elections so that they could control the political machinery.

The interesting thing about this is that the so-called nationalist leaders have not been able to capitalise on this. Their ideological universe draws on very different kinds of roots. There is one which has been imported from people like Rousseau, who has been read at university, and there is the other one, which is increasing in volume, which stems from their reflection on their position in Africa as political leaders.

Both these are forced to pay attention in Buganda - one could find other instances - to populism as I have defined it. But it has meant that populism has not been intellectually led. It is a movement without leaders, because the leaders are doing something else. They are trying to manipulate the whole system, not just a part of it, as with the Buganda populist leaders.

Therefore, I should like to put in a bid for identifying pockets of populism in Africa from examples of this kind. I do not want to get in an argument with Professor Andreski. There was an awkward moment when I thought that he was producing a sort of fifth ace when he said that you could not have populism in Africa because the political leaders wore clothes and that they were not sufficiently removed from the peasantry for populism to have appeared. It is possible to refute this line of argument, but it would take me far

beyond what I am talking about. I have yet to be convinced about the place of clothes in the general discussion on populism.

THE CHAIRMAN: I hope that we shall have other opportunities to return to Africa.

PROF. PETER WORSLEY: I suppose that we all expected it: populism is obviously the biggest growth industry. It has led us to Gandhi, Chartism, Roman Christianity, Maoism, Titoism, and so on. We all knew that this would happen. It is an exploding universe, and it will continue to explode unless we do something. It is nice to take the view that many flowers bloom and to be very Voltairian, but we shall get into an awful mess if we do not tackle the problem of conceptualisation. This is not unique to a discussion of populism.

One could perform the same operation which has been done this morning on any other "ism". You can do it for Communism. There are many contemporary Communisms. There are archaic progenitors and predecessors, and, in some meaningful sense, we call them all Communism. Weber and others have done the same thing for capitalism. Therefore, the analysis of populism is not a unique problem.

It is perfectly legitimate to define populism in the widest, most latitudinarian fashion, as Professor Wiles and Professor Macrae are inclined to do. Although latitudinarian, this is precise. You are giving the term a wide meaning and making it clear what you are doing. What is less valuable is to leave it loose. We have, then, the "universalists". Massness, radicalism, orientation to dramatic change (particularly the advent of capitalism), location among the small people, the participatory concept - all these are elements which we utilise. If you use that broadest, most latitudinarian definition, you are in great trouble about drawing any kind of boundary, for these are elements which can be found in some combination or other in any modern and many ancient movements.

Then there are the "localists", who believe that we should restrict these to specific attributes and characteristics of particular movements. There is Russian populism, North American populism, contemporary Afro-Asian populism. There are those who believe that no general conceptual specification can be attempted. But however one defines it, and especially if we adopt, as many people suggest, the North American and Russian movements as somehow prototypical, populism must change in so far as the world has changed, and contemporary populism cannot be solely concerned with resistance to the inroads of capitalism, because we live in a world in which there are two major blocs, one of which is not capitalist: populism has to adapt to that situation. This is a new and special feature of contemporary populism.

There are, however, some common elements, which are not universally agreed upon, but for which one senses some general support. There is the reaction to capitalism, the reaction to externality, and so on. There is massness, at least in aspiration, if not in the realisation. There probably would be agreement on what one might call the Janus syndrome or, to use the language of jazz, that there are both "trad" and "modern" elements in populism. It looks back in order to look forward. Fifthly, it is an ideology elaborated by, usually, the intelligentsia and other elements for or on behalf of the masses, and the realisation of this in action is not necessarily always achieved. This latter one might call "not so much a way of life, more a programme" phenomenon.

I do not suppose that we shall ever reach agreement about some of the differences, and it might be worth highlighting them. First, there are some empirically identifiable ones. There is the difference between those, who, like Professor Walicki and Professor Venturi emphasised that it is a strand within Socialism, and those who would extend the label to cover many kinds of radicalism, including Right forms of radicalism - Poujadism, Nazi-ism, McCarthyism, and the North American phenomenon of the entrepreneurial, monetary-focused individualist, speculative, capitalist farming operator - quite different from movements within a socialist framework.

An unexamined difference has emerged between those who insist on the global Weltanschauung characteristic of the populist ideology and those who insist that it is a hotch-potch of syncretic and badly assimilated elements. There is a further division of opinion, analysis and interpretation between those who would locate it or identify it specifically as a peasant or rural phenomenon and those who would extend it to embrace various forms of non-rural urban society.

I suggest three points which have not clearly emerged in the discussion in order to promote further division. Professor Venturi began to touch on the issue of communitarianism. This we must face in the coming session. It will involve us in difficult questions of the delineation of the borderline between anarcho-syndicalism and populism in particular and in a discussion of the difference between communitarian populisms and others.

Secondly, we have not discussed much the extent to which the movements do involve the mobilisation of large masses of people who are analytically, structurally identifiable as belonging to different classes or sub-segments of classes. The third issue for attention is the "not so much a programme" problem - the extent to which they are actually participatory mass movements of the people, the extent to which this is merely rhetoric or aspiration.

Finally, the diffusion of populism as a phenomenon of some considerable interest was raised incidentally in the form of

discussion about the words used. This is important in that it focus attention on the ideological sources which inform contemporary populist thinking. We know very little about where Nyere, Kenyatta, or whoever it may be got their "populist" ideas from.

MR. GEOFFREY SHILLINGLAW: I should like to comment on one or two remarks made about Maoism in the papers. First, Professor Worsley says at the bottom of page 18 of his paper: "The common central element, here, between Maoism and populism is the . . . abandonment of the notion of the 'hegemonic' class, and of the notion of the class struggle itself in the post-revolutionary period." I doubt if this is true about Maoism. Certainly the notion of class struggle has not been abandoned. A little earlier Professor Worsley talks about one of the elements of populism being "the displacement, for all practical purposes (and even to a large extent in theoretical pronouncements), of the revolutionary proletariat or even the poor peasantry as the leading revolutionising agency, by the Party and/or the Army . . ." My feeling would be that identification of the Army as one of the elements in populism is rather an élitist concept. I would rather class any ideology or attitude of mind which identified the Army as the leading revolutionising agency as an élitist rather than a populist one.

The second brief point was in Mr. Minogue's paper on page 15, where he says: "Populism is a reaction by those whose profoundest impulse is to industrialise". This is, I think, the core of what we are debating. I disagree with this, as I tried to argue in the paper. I suggest that populism is a reaction by those whose profoundest impulse is not to industrialise. (Professor Ulam, in his book, The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism, argues that Marxism, historically performed the role of bringing together those whose profoundest impulse was not to industrialise and then leading them into industrialisation.) May I ask Mr. Minogue to expand on his statement?

MR. MINOGUE: Not at this minute. I think that you are probably right. It is something which I will mention tomorrow.

MR. SHILLINGLAW: The third point which I should like to raise has already been discussed, and that is whether populism is Socialist or not. Professor Walicki came down heavily on the side of saying that it is Socialist. He cited Stere, the Rumanian populist, and rephrased him. This puts us in the dilemma that we have to rephrase somebody who acknowledged himself to be a populist and yet who said

that not all Socialists need be populists nor all populists Socialists. I should like this criticism to be expanded and to have an explanation of Stere's attitude.

THE CHAIRMAN: If possible, it would be better to leave that to another session.

MR. IONESCU: I was thinking that we should invite someone in the afternoon session to speak at length about East Europe.

THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly.

MR. DEREK WALLER: I get the feeling that perhaps the title of our paper is a little misleading, giving the impression that we are defining Maoism as populism. Perhaps there should be a question mark after the title of the paper to which the answer given in the paper is no - a qualified "no", but a "no" nevertheless. On the question of bypassing the capitalist stage of historical development - a concept characteristic of the nineteenth century Russian populists - this occurs in Maoism, but there all similarity ends. It is obvious that this was a tactical move, replacing the stage of bourgeois dictatorship by one of new democracy under which the Communist Party would have total power. There is obviously no similarity between that and the nineteenth century Russian populists.

As Professor Seton-Watson said on the question of peasantry being a populist trait - another speaker referred to the peasants being an object of virtue - one can see this in Maoism. It is definitely there, running right from the Hunan report of 1927, or even earlier, to the present day, but nevertheless overridden to a large extent by Mao seeing the peasants more as a method of achieving the revolutionary end rather than an object of virtue in themselves. They are a means to a revolutionary end by the fact that China is predominantly a peasant society and by the situation into which Chinese Communists were forced in 1927 into the countryside.

One thing which we did not mention in our paper which has been brought up elsewhere is the question of populist states which are in some way on the periphery of economic power. China would fairly clearly fall into this category, and this has been made explicit in Lin Piao's 1965 statement on the global situation

vis-a-vis China, that China, Latin America, Asia and Africa form part of the world's countryside on the periphery of the economic power of the cities of the world - Western Europe and the United States - generalising from their own historical experience, the Chinese Communists see the future of the world as being one in which the countryside surrounds the cities. It is interesting to note that in this case the position of the USSR is not clear as to whether it is to be surrounded or whether it is to do the surrounding. However, if China is to be populist in this category, surely there must be some kind of goodness in being in this state whereas it is obvious, to my mind, that China desires above all to industrialise and to leave the world countryside and join the world cities, and that therefore the Lin Piao statement is a cry of frustration at the slowness at which it is achieving this aim. Once again, Maoism is not populism.

PROF. DONALD MACRAE: Going back to my paper, I stress again what I said briefly to Professor Walicki, that it is a paper about ideology and involves a certain conception of ideology which I do not ask other people to share. It is not intended, therefore, to be a paper which defines populism, which is the purpose of our Conference, but it makes a contribution in one important direction towards such a definition.

I should like to take up a point of Professor Andreski; that we do not have a theory of occasions on which ideological structures of this kind - I am assuming for the moment that there is one - emerge. I agree with him. But I would make a sociological generalisation which is probably not clear and on which there might not be agreement if it were clear. In most societies, we can analytically separate the culture of the society in the sense in which the anthropologists use the word "culture" and the social structure, particularly the institutional structure, of the society. In circumstances in which there is a congruence between these two, and precisely where the institutional structure is weak and the cultural elements of the society are strong, you do not get ebullitions of the kind we call populism as serious factors in society. It is when there is a simultaneous weakness in both these areas that you get such ebullitions, and from this I think that one could work out a certain understanding of the emergence into practical importance of items of this kind.

This leads me quite directly to what I think is a disagreement with Mr. MacFarlane. He wants, on the one hand, to say that we should call populism everything which has ever been called populist in concrete historical and contemporary situations. I am sure that that is not "on", and perhaps I misunderstood him on this point. But I was struck by the fact that the constellation

of items making up the ideology of populism seemed to me, when in answer to Mr. Ionescu's invitation I prepared this paper, very much more coherent and not consistent but recurrent than I had believed.

I therefore disagree with the identification of populism with socialism although all populism appeals to the state to rectify a disapproved of situation. All populism is certainly statist in this sense. This is one of the points of differentiation between populism and most things which have been legitimately called anarchism and distinguishes it from some forms of communitarianism. Statism is to be present. There is much more overlap than one might expect, for other reasons, in Russian and American populism. I am still unconvinced that I am wrong in this belief. Perhaps I am unconvinced because I suspect that I do not adopt either as an ad hoc working sociology or as an overt and developed sociology a position which approximates to Marxism. I mean "Marxism" with a very small "m" in the sense that people of political complexions can be said to have certain ideas about the relationship of ideology to social structure. My view is probably very much more un-Marxist than that of the majority of people here. It is out of that that the views which I have tried to express develop.

I should like to turn to Marx. There is an interesting point at issue. The concern of the matters with which we are concerned of Marx belongs to Marx certainly after 1848, particularly to Marx of the 1860's and 1870's, and to Engels after Marx's death. One name which has not been mentioned so far and which I do not think occurs in any of the papers is that of Eccarius^x, that rather nice German craftsman who most seriously formulated - this was accepted by Marx and Engels as a formulation - the position of Marxism towards the agrarian world in Europe, including Slavonic Europe. That is a view which is quite incompatible with any kind of populism. Mikhailovsky is urging that if the Eccarius-Marx position is correct, then the right thing to do is to encourage the division of labour and move in a direction which makes any hope of the populist dream being realised quite impossible.

But today when one talks of Marxism, one talks of a large variety of things, particularly not of the Marxism based on the Marx after 1848, but of the earlier Marx. In the earlier, romantic Marx there are things which, if they are not populist - and I do not think that they are - are extremely congruent with populism.

^x Cf. J.C. Eccarius, Eines Arbeiters Widerlegung.

It is these things which have re-emerged and which perhaps are transforming some of the manifestations of Marxist politics today and may also be associated with - they are not derived from - certain things which are happening in the incorporation of populist elements in the general Maoist position. This is not to disagree with Dr. Brandt or with Mr. Waller and Mr. Shillinglaw.

I do not expect agreement on this and, perhaps, if is not necessary for our discussion. The total repertoire of items to recombine in ideologies in the European world or which are derived from Europe is comparatively small. Outside China, this repertoire is basically one developed within Christianity, or if it contained Judaic elements, these are elements which developed within Judaism after the rise of Christianity and do not belong to earliest history, the Old Testament history of Judaism, for there there were certain apocalyptic elements which seem to have populist overtones.

I stress two things which Professor Wiles said and with which I agree. One is the importance of his point about inflation and the other is his point about anti-militarism in populism. I hope that we shall not lose sight of either of these things. I do not believe that, although there is a populist trend in English thinking, there has been a real populist movement since industrialism in this country. I would say that Cobbett was undoubtedly a populist and could have been used to illustrate my paper extremely well, but I do not think that the Chartists were populists. I think that people like Chesterton, G.D.H. Cole, and all sorts of other unlikely people, were populists, but, on the whole their populism has not been tremendously influential. Professor Hoggart, among our contemporaries, is a populist, but it is not populism which explains his influence. Why this populism has not come off in this country is to be explained in terms of the structure rather than the culture of English society, but that is a large point.

I would stress one thing which I think is important. It takes me slightly back to Dr. Walicki and my paper. Just as populism is statist in a curious sense of that term, but in a real sense, we must say that even if populism can be individualistic, it is always against any form of competitive individualism - not merely competitive individualism in an economic sense, but in all spheres and areas of life. If we lose sight of that, we lose sight of certain very important things about it.

I conclude with a word about what Professor Worsley said. What he said about my position was basically correct, and I would agree with it. We could develop a classification, a taxonomy, of different varieties of populism which have in common a massive overlap of ideological items, but which nevertheless diverge

seriously from this common element. This might be one of the things which could come out of our further proceedings

THE CHAIRMAN: We have laid a foundation for our afternoon's meeting when we can discuss individual cases of populism. I think that we hope that the discussion will not be confined to individual cases but that members will make contributions on other areas not covered by the three papers. The ideas which have been raised in discussion this morning will fall into perspective and relief if we look at them against that background.

(Adjourned for lunch)

Afternoon Session

Chairman:- Mr. F.W. Deakin

THE CHAIRMAN: I have very strict instructions that we should move from definitions to examples. I do not think that it is up to the Chairman to produce guide lines of discussion, but I hope that members of this Conference will not feel inhibited or confined to the three main subjects in the papers, namely, Russia, America and China. As this is a meeting of a historical nature, we should extend our examples to other regions of the world and try to reach more precise definitions tomorrow. We have touched briefly on India and Africa. I suggest that we might discuss populism in Eastern Europe. I should perhaps disclose a personal secret: my neighbour, Mr. Ionescu, is the nephew of Mr. Stere, the Rumanian populist.

Secondly, as you will see from the list of names on the blackboard, we shall extend the discussion to Latin America which was touched on by Professor Touraine this morning. A point which also has not been raised, and which may come up tomorrow, is whether there are any populist elements in the study of European Fascism.

PROF. ALAIN TOURAINE: I wish to introduce Latin America into the debate. The first point to be made is to try to draw a distinction between two situations and two types of social movements in Latin America - the so-called populist movement, or the populismo, which are essentially based on urban populations, and movements based on rural populations, be they the Mexican revolution or some aspects of the Bolivian one or part of the Peruvian popular movement. In that case, there seems to be a direct opposition between the vast mass of the peasants and essentially the Indians of the countries I have mentioned which have large Indian populations and, on the other side, the oligarchia which is represented as a very traditional élite. In those cases, we can have revolutions or pre-revolutionary movements, but it is precisely in the countries where there is already a great deal of movement from the countryside to the city that a different kind of movement appears.

Many of the characteristics which have been described in peasant societies can apply to the Mexican revolution or the Peruvian movement when the A.P.R.A. was founded in 1924. It was described as an anti-imperialist revolutionary movement. There is nothing similar in the movement created in Columbia, in Bogotá, in Argentina, in Brazil or in Chile. Therefore, the first point is that there is a very distinct set of movements organised round new urban masses.

The second characteristic is the fact that the political system is relatively open, because of a certain liberal middle class tradition, and because of the characteristics of industrialization. The fact that industry is relatively limited in most of these countries except Argentina and the fact that they had to go in for mature imports meant that the weight of the industrialisation was not as heavy as it was in Europe and the necessity of harsh social control by industrialists was not felt necessary.

The third point is the existence of a ruling class which is partly linked to foreign interests. It can be said that populism is stronger in all situations when the oligarchy is more unified, more modern and more powerful. Compare Argentina, which has a ruling class, with Peru where there is no unity between the traditional land owners of the interior and the capitalist land owners of the North coast. That explains many of the differences.

On the whole, it can be said that the populist movement in Latin America is the consequence of a crisis in the economic system and in the system of legitimacy. Most of the movement appeared after the crisis. This was the case in Columbia, Argentina and Chile after the first crisis in 1920. It was obviously the case in Brazil.

Therefore, we have a mixture of three different elements. One is the mass movements of new workers. The second is the double attitude of political centres in the middle class. On the one side there is a tendency to make an alliance with the new masses and on the other side there is a stronger force to restore the shattered social order and to manipulate the new urban masses, not for the sake of their interest, but just for the sake of the restoration of a certain order. Generally, when the alliance with the new masses is more visible, the intelligentsia plays the main role. When the main problem is the restoration of a political order, the military takes the lead, as was the case in Argentina. It was a totally different case in Chile and Brazil.

What is more interesting from an analytical point of view is to try to make a comparative analysis of the different

movements in terms of the changes in the relative position of the three elements to which I have referred. It can happen that the push upwards of the new urban masses and the reinforcement of a middle class as an element of the political system are much more pronounced than the defensive attitude of the oligarchy. In that case, we can see a passage from a populist movement to a popular front movement. A classical case is the Chile case. After the Alisandrismo in the 1920's, which was dominated by the middle class in 1938, there was a popular front which was an alliance between new workers and the middle class which was less and less populist. Sometimes the movement from below can be the strongest element of the whole picture. Those in the middle can be scared and can oppose this movement and try to make an alliance with the old oligarchy. In that case, we can have, as we had in the last years in Bolivia, a tendency to return from the populist stage to the rural revolution.

The tendency in Latin America is to simplify the game with the three players. With the middle class being disorganised and relatively weak in some countries, we have a direct clash between the new urban masses and the oligarchy or foreign interests. This was the case in Venezuela and Colombia at the time of the dictatorships of Rochos and Perez. This populism, which is more or less Leftist at the beginning, tends to become Right Wing, extremist and authoritarian. Another possibility is that the movement downward of the popular masses and of the middle class political elements are parallel, and so the story ends with the triumph of an oligarchal reaction against a popular revolution, which was the unique case in the Dominican Republic.

Finally, we have situations in which it is the middle class which reinforces its own power in front of popular classes whose bargaining power is diminishing and against an oligarchy which is going down, too. Then populism is progressively incorporated into a middle class constitutional government. This was referred to in Professor Lazar's paper. This is to a large extent the Chilean case where the populist aspect is the alibi type of government which is essentially based on middle class and whose main purpose is to develop the capacity for investment of the Chilean economy, and populism is simply an indirect means of controlling a floating population. The bargaining power of the masses is diminishing and a new alliance appears between some elements of the middle class and of the oligarchy, and that leads in turn to a military reaction as happened in Brazil, Peru and perhaps, to some extent in Argentina.

By making a comparative analysis, I meant to show that it is possible to explain, not only the general nature of the populist movement in Latin America, but in a more historical way the history, changes and outlets of the populist movement

due to the fact that what happens in any kind of populist movement in Latin America can be predicted from the relative change of position of one or other of the elements in this threefold structure.

MR. IONESCU: You referred, Professor Touraine, to the alibi type of populism. Would you go so far as to say that they use populism for mobilisation?

PROF. TOURAINE: No. I mentioned this alibi type of attitude in a process of disintegration of populism. At the beginning, an autonomous type of populism appears in the Argentine case when the political crisis is the main fact and some of the middle elements can try to manipulate these new masses. But, nevertheless, the push upwards towards social and economic integration of the new masses is a reality. It is different from the Chilean situation where at the last election in 1964 some big support was given to the Christian Democratic Party in some suburban parts of Santiago, in some very poor sectors of the city. But it is a floating population. It is not a population in a process of integration. It is in a process of disintegration, because the capacity of the economy to absorb migrants diminished after 1955.

DR. JOHN KEEP: I address myself to the Russian example, because we all agree that this is the prototype of the populism which we have seen since in other countries.

I begin by congratulating Dr. Walicki on his very learned and most stimulating paper. He did us a great service in successfully dispelling some of the myths which have clouded the subject of Russian populism for so long - for example, the idea that there was a hard and fast line of division and conflict between populists, on the one hand, and Marxists on the other. He has rightly pointed out that their ideas influenced one another. He has salvaged the reputation of Danielson, who stoutly maintained his Marxist faith, despite a barrage of criticism from Marxists in Russia like Plekhanov and his followers and Engels, who does not seem to have come out as a very good Marxist. My remarks are intended to encourage Dr. Walicki to proceed a little further in correcting some of the distortions of vision which are still fairly common, and I think that some traces of them remain in his paper.

Two points in particular might be made: one on the chronological periodisation of Russian populism, and the other

on its content. On the chronology, it is noteworthy that, while Dr. Walicki gives us a date for the beginning of classical populism, 1869, which is a very acceptable date, he does not give a date for when the classical period ended. One might have thought that 1900 or 1901 was a fairly obvious, even self-evident, turning point. But he does not give it. His silence may not be accidental. It may reflect a quite understandable reluctance to recognise the importance of the period which came afterwards - the period between 1900 and 1918 - in the history of populist thought in Russia, and particularly the importance of Victor Chernov. It seems to me clear in retrospect that it is this period, not the 1870's, which represents the classical period of populism, whether one considers it as a movement or an ideology.

Dr. Walicki argues that this period represents a transition to peasantism - that you have populism and something else called peasantism which comes afterwards. But in this later phase it is not the peasants who shape the policy of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. It might have been better for that Party if the peasants had done so. On the contrary, it remains an intellectual creation right up to the end of its days, and it is as an intellectual creation that it wins a remarkable degree of support, clearly manifested in the elections to the Russian constituent assembly in 1917. Whether, as Dr. Walicki suggested, this represents a victory for Socialism, and indicates that the Russian people voted for Socialism, I am not sure. But it was an affirmation of popular confidence in the party which claimed to stand for the peasants' interests, as the proprietors of their land claimed to stand for rural democracy or co-operative economics and all the other ideals for which the Socialist revolutionaries fought against opponents on the right, Conservatives, and Marxists on the left.

Chernov's achievement was precisely this, that he brought to a triumphant conclusion the process which Dr. Walicki rightly noted for the earlier phase, and that is the fusion of European Marxist ideas and notions which were traditional to Russian agrarian Socialism. Chernov brought this about in a very practical and realistic manner which was relevant to contemporary conditions. Perhaps this practicalism of his was why his opponents, being more abstract, dogmatic and rigid, were rather jealous of his success and accused and mocked him as a syncretist and of being inconsistent in his ideas. That is not to say that, although Chernov produced a good programme, he was a good party organiser. That is a different question.

In this final phase of populism, the new ideas took over all that was healthy, vigorous and constructive in the heritage of this old narodnichestvo of the 1870's, which Dr. Walicki calls a classical age.

Coming to the content, I am referring to the individualistic libertarian and, above all, the moral aspect, which is perhaps the key to our understanding of the phenomenon. If we continue to apply the old class formulae and to regard the populists as petty bourgeois, as they were often regarded in the 1890's, we are not getting as close to the truth as we can, because the movement began as an act of moral revulsion against the existing establishment in the Russian state and against the tyranny of accepted ideas which had hitherto held intellectuals in subjection. It was a triumphant assertion of the right of man to shape his destiny and pursue the truth as he saw fit - everything for which Belinsky and others of his time had fought. That is why Mikhailovsky, the greatest of the populists perhaps as a thinker, kept a bust of Belinsky on his desk and said on one occasion that if the muzhik crowd ever dared to penetrate into the quiet of his study and try to smash the statue of Belinsky, he would resist them to the death. So you have this libertarian aspect as well as the Socialist element of populism. These two elements are in contradiction throughout its history. The populists never succeeded in settling this question, and one has to deal with both aspects.

May I make the other points which are not so fundamental. One is about religion, which Professor Wiles raised. The idea here, perhaps, is that populist Socialism is a secularised form of certain tendencies in Russian religious thought - certain dissident, anti-establishment tendencies. Dr. Walicki mentioned Eliseev, this character in the late 1860's, and said that he was influenced by Marx. But far more interesting is the fact that Eliseev went off to study the old believer communities in certain parts of Russia, and some work has been done by Soviet scholars on the inter-action between religious dissent in Russia and populist thought at this time.

Secondly, Mikhailovsky's theory of progress, his hostility to the division of labour, perhaps owes more to Auguste Comte than it does to Marx. This idea of progression through stages of history was common ground to the nineteenth century thinkers in Europe, and one should be chary of attributing it to Marx. It was not directly his, because his influence as a philosopher in Russia in the 1860's and 1870's was much slighter than his influence as an economic or social theorist.

I come lastly to Professor Seton-Watson's remarks about semantics and the meaning which should be attached to the word narod and where it stands in relation to the German volk or the French people. The Russian populists used to distinguish between narod and natsia - people and nations - which is why you cannot translate narod into a language like Italian. To the French, people simply means all citizens. To the Germans, volk is a kind of mystical body. The Russian narod may fit in between the two.

Narod is all people except for the possessing class, except for the establishment. It is the 99 per cent, who some of the more utopian members of the sect believe would accept the new regime once the old one had been overthrown. It was a highly unrealistic, if not abstract, concept, but perhaps less abstract than the German volk and more abstract than the French peuple.

MR. SHANIN started his comments by referring to Dr. Walicki's paper. Dr. Walicki had left out a major body of Russian populist thought which underlined the social and economic ideology of the populist social theorist. One could possibly exclude from the discussion of populism the work of the populist social scientist as being much more factual than the general political theory discussed by Dr. Walicki's paper. But then one should also exclude Lenin or at least split Lenin between his political programme and his studies of the development of the economy of Russia. The social research developed by so-called statisticians of Zemstvo (the regional local authorities) had a clear conceptual content. That was highly significant and possibly the most important contribution of populist thought to the ideologies and images of contemporary Russia.

Dr. Walicki had referred to the impact of Marxism on populist thought; the influence was mutual, however. There was not just one important Marxist scholar who analysed the Russian peasantry in the nineteenth century, namely, Lenin, but at least three - Lenin, Gurevich and Rumyantsev. The importance of Lenin had, of course, grown in stature in the twentieth century for obvious reasons. Yet the other two had tried to integrate the element of social analysis put forward by Chernenkov into Marxist thought and their work and impact cannot be disregarded. That was not the end of that tradition, because the tradition of trying to integrate Marxist and populist thought was carried on by Maslov, Khryashcheva and others. One could find traces of that tradition even in some of the contemporary work of Soviet scholars. Mr. Shanin did not think that an additional analysis of the impact of populist ideology on the media of social sciences would undercut Dr. Walicki's conclusions, which he accepted. However, he believed that without that additional dimension of social analysis the scheme of understanding would be regrettably limited.

It had been said that a populist movement was basically an intelligentsia movement, not a movement of the peasantry. Mr. Shanin said that he did not agree that it was a question of either populism or elitism. Elitism was implicit in any populist movement.

PROF. G.F. MANCINI: It was Professor Morris Jones, I believe, who said that different brands of populism may develop and thrive in the same country: a very precious observation which perfectly fits the case of Italy. There has been a Pisacane in Italy, as Professor Venturi so aptly pointed out; there is today a Danilo Delcic; there have been populist elements in Fascism; there has been an organised Catholic populist movement since 1919. Actually, in our political literature, populism is usually identified with the ideology of the Christian Democratic left (the R.C.L.I., Fanfani, the late Father Milan and so forth.) But by far the most important example of populism in contemporary Italy has been, in my opinion, the Communist Party especially during the fifties.

I believe that the inspirer of this attitude was Antonio Gramsci. Of course, I am not prepared to say that Gramsci was a fully fledged populist. What I mean is that there is an evident and powerful populist trait, particularly in his late thinking. In other words, Gramsci's original Marxist and partly anarcho-syndicalist inspiration (just think of his early emphasis on the works councils as bodies designed to supersede both party and union in the leadership of the working class) was watered by a more than generous addition of populism in the 1930's when he was in jail. His notion of the party as the 'modern prince' - this, I believe, is the title of the English translation of his notes on Machiavelli -, as a 'collective intellectual' creating and directing a popular and national coalition is a remarkable example of populism. Autochthonous populism, mind you: populism Italian style. I am not at all sure, as it has been submitted, that by using the phrase 'popular and national will' Gramsci was trying to translate into Italian the Russian concept of 'narodnaja volja'. I am rather inclined to believe that he borrowed it from Gioberti in whose writings one often finds references to the popular-national nexus. Now Gioberti died in 1852: long before the heyday of the narodniki.

I find this connection between Gioberti - roughly a liberal Catholic - and the 'marxist' Gramsci extremely stimulating, were it only because its mention infuriates present-day Italian Communist intellectuals; and it is a pity that I have no time to elaborate on it. I shall confine myself to pointing out that, once the notion of popular and national will is adopted, the very idea of the proletariat as the 'agent of change', to put it like Wright Mills, is bound to wither away; and even the notion of proletarian hegemony, for all the lip service paid to it (and Gramsci paid a lot of them), dwindles to nothing. The emphasis is necessarily laid on the humble, the oppressed, the downtrodden; the concept of class struggle is replaced by that of redress. New, or rather old, sometimes ancestral, values come to the fore.

Sociologically, Gramsci identified the Italian humble and downtrodden especially as the Southern peasants; and this - mind you - in a country where, unlike Russia of 1917 or China of 1946, as much as 24% of the active population was engaged in industrial activity and boasted a pretty remarkable record of pugnacity, stamina and organizational ability. The Southern peasants should have been led.

by the party from behind the backdrops to the limelight of national politics; they should have become an essential (sometimes one has the impression that Gramsci really means the essential) factor in the forging of a new Italy. In the light of this programme, it is no wonder, I believe, that the aspect of Machiavelli's book which interested Gramsci most was the task that the Florentine Secretary entrusted to the prince: building a powerful nation state in Italy. Let us not forget that to Machiavelli one of the fundamental preconditions of the prince's success was that he involved in his struggle for national unification all the people by substituting a national militia of townsmen and countrymen for the traditional mercenary armies used in the Italian wars.

When I mentioned all this to Professor Worsley during lunch he showed some surprise. Wasn't Gramsci - he asked - the Marxist thinker who most emphasised the role of the intellectuals? Wasn't he the philosopher of the intellectuals par excellence? Professor Worsley will be even more surprised hearing the following quotation from Gramsci's "Letteratura e Vita Nazionale": "The word 'democracy' should be taken (by the intellectuals) not only in its lay, secular meaning, but also in its Catholic, even reactionary meaning. What really matters is (for the intellectuals) to get in touch with the people, with the nation as an active living unit, whatever the contents of its life may be". Nor is this all, my dear Worsley; Gramsci went so far as to urge the Italian intellectuals to "Go down to the people . . . however backward and conventional they may be". "There will not be a new Renaissance - he wrote - if we don't start writing serial stories of the lowest kind or third-rate melodramatic operas". Now I am not going to say that this is intellectual baiting in the tradition of American Bible-belt fundamentalism; but you will grant me, I hope, that it isn't either a magnification of the intellectuals' role in society!

From 1945 to 1961 the Communist Party of Italy turned its back on the industrial proletariat. The centres of proletarian action in the Northern factories had traditionally been the works councils. The councils had won certain important privileges for themselves in 1947; but the Communist-oriented Labour Confederation so scantily supported them during the employer counteroffensive of 1949 as to force a majority of the FIAT workers in Turin (the city of Gramsci!) to vote in 1954 for the candidates of the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic unions, the protégés of Walter Reuther and old George Meany. The metal-workers contract, which is the pattern-setting arrangement in Italy since it covers one million, three hundred thousand workers, was not renegotiated for eight years, between 1948 and 1956. Most energies of the party were employed for the organisation of women - admittedly a down-trodden segment of our society - , the small retailers, the relatively well-off mezzadri (sharecroppers) of Emilia and Tuscany, and the self-employed farmers throughout the country. In other words, the Communists devoted themselves above all to

the organisation of kulaks, because this is what Italian independent farmers and mezzadri are, actually or potentially.

In the sixties the situation has changed. The percentage of the population engaged in agricultural activity has dropped to about 22% and the C.G.I.L. - the Communist-inspired labour organization - has, so to speak, returned to the factories, though with a new approach, essentially a social-democratic approach to labour-management relations. But there has been a populist chapter of tremendous importance and lasting consequences in the history of the Italian Communist Party. I find it striking that Antonio Gramsci - the man Professors Stuart Hughes and George Lichtheim describe as a Marxist thinker alongside whose writings Lenin's theoretical works look crude indeed - should have been responsible for the deflation of the Marxist and revolutionary potential of the party he so much contributed to mould.

MR. JAMES JOLL: I want briefly to try to extract the Anarchists from this discussion and, in contradistinction to Dr. Shanin, to suggest that they do not belong here, and perhaps to express the hope that at some time someone will organise a comparable conference on anarchism where, no doubt, we should find it as difficult to define what an anarchist is and what an anarchist's ideology consists of as we are finding with populism.

It is true that the psychological attitude of anarchists and, in many cases, the social situation of anarchists are similar to those of the populists. There is the desire for a total reversal of moral values, the feeling that society has got entirely on to wrong lines and that we have to jolt it back by an enormous shake on to a direction where the potentialities of human beings can develop properly. Because of this rejection of the values of existing society, many of the individual points in anarchist programmes are similar to the points in populist programmes. There is a desire for some kind of original primitive pure rural life. We find it very strongly in Proudhon, who is looking back from the wickedness and corruption of Paris to the purity of peasant life. We get it with Bakunin, with his insistence on the moral values and moral mission of the peasantry. But we also get, not only a desire to look back to some idealised pre-industrial past, but the desire to leap at once into a totally new world which bears no relation to past experience because it adds a new dimension to human social organisation. This is very strong in Spanish anarchism, particularly in Andalusia, where although there is a great sense of solidarity in the pueblo, in the village, the society which they are looking forward to is not a revival of a past society, but an entirely new society based on social justice, repartition of the land, and so on.

In common with the populists, the anarchists held as the great villain the whole set-up of banking and exchange. The anarchists went much further than the populists. They did not want simply to substitute silver for gold. They wanted to get rid of money altogether as being an automatically corrupting influence in society. On the other hand, their

attitude to industrial society seems to me ambiguous, partly because we find anarchist movements in certain industrial sectors, particularly in the textile mills of Catalonia, but strongly among the more artisan-type industrial activities in the Jura. Because they are prepared to accept some degree of industrialisation, they were forced to produce a plan of industrial organisation and, as a result of this, there was in the 1890's a shift over to anarcho-syndicalism and an attempt to provide a reasonable method of running industrial life. This is the point at which the real difference between populism and anarchism emerges.

The anarchists had a picture of a new social order about which they were reasonably clear. Whether it was attainable or whether it was so revolutionary that it was never attainable, they nevertheless had a clear plan of social organisation and a clear idea that this must be carried out by individuals and not, in any circumstances, by the state. On the other hand, the populists had clear ideas about the new values which they wanted to introduce and less clear ideas about the social order which they wanted to introduce, and were comparatively indifferent to the means by which these changes were brought about. If the Russian state would reform itself in accordance with their programme, they would be delighted to accept that reform from the state.

While these two movements have many things in common - one could go on with an analysis to show that often the social and economic situations which led to them were similar - they differ in kind because of the anarchists' insistence on the means by which changes must be brought about and because of the kind of vision of the ultimate society of the anarchists in which state and government would never have a place in any circumstances.

PROF. HUGH SETON-WATSON: I return to my point about idolisation and worship of the people as an essential characteristic of populists and to see whether we can go on with the process of demarcating populists and non-populists by reference to historical examples: I mean by "populist" the ideology of worshipping the people. In extreme form the notion of the people is a God substitute. Somebody said that there is a religious element in populism. Some movements which might be called populist were still religious. Others rejected religion, but the people as a substitute for God while not perhaps essential to populism, was, by and large, a legitimate oversimplification of the attitude of the Russian populists. You can have small groups of people, more or less conspiratorial, of this type, and you can have fairly large political movements of this type developing in opposition to a government which they are fighting.

What you cannot have is populist régimes. Once they are in power, they are not populist any more. The business of running a government is quite different from the business of admiring an ideal people. You can have a government in power which appeals to all sorts of nationalistic mystiques - traditionalist, romantic, historical

mystiques - to whip up popular enthusiasm to give itself a mass base. This is not populism. These are people who are governing, and they are ruling and organising their subjects and telling them what to do. They are winning, or capturing, or cheating the confidence of their subjects, but they are not people-worshippers. You can have populist ideologies and parties, but not populist régimes.

Secondly, you can have something else which is a movement, again in opposition, which contains elements of populism, but which I would not call a populist movement. This is a distinction which has not been stated categorically and which we may find useful. First, I would agree with Professor Venturi that the Russian populist movement and all the Eastern European populist movements in their early and purer stages were Socialist. This is, perhaps, merely another way of saying that this phenomenon of worshipping the people which appeared in Eastern Europe, including Russia, in the late nineteenth century appeared at a time when Socialism was the movement of ideas into which this sort of attitude to the people was integrated. They were almost bound to be Socialists because Socialism was the movement of that time - the source of all their inspiration. The Russian movement was Socialist right to the end. I agree with what Dr. Keep says. The S.R. Party is certainly a continuation of it and continued to be a Socialist party.

The movements in the Balkans are interesting. Here you had in several Balkan countries a populist movement which was rather small but which had one or two outstanding people with ideas, and practical revolutionaries, who clearly belonged to the populist and Socialist tradition. But from the activities of those people there gradually emerged political movements which ceased to be Socialist and which passed through two stages. First, they became peasant movements. This is where Dr. Walicki's remark about populists becoming peasantists is true in regard to the Balkans and Poland, but not in regard to Russia. There was never a peasant party in Russia. The S.R. never became a peasant party, and after 1917 things were completely different, whereas in Poland the Wyzwolenie group which had a populist background became a peasant party. In Serbia you have the transition from Markovich, who was essentially a narodnik Socialist, to Nikol Pashich, who began by being a sort of Socialist, a revolutionary, and ended up as a sort of new-style Turkish pasha and plutocrat of the most reactionary kind.

Taking Rumania, Stere, who I should have thought was clearly a populist ideologue of a sort, was an inspiration in the founding of the peasant party of Rumania. Therefore, you have in the case of Rumania and Serbia Socialist populism turning into peasantism and the peasants taking it over and making it much more moderate so that it loses its Socialist character. Then you have a third stage where the peasant movement is completely embourgeoisé and ceases even to be a peasant movement, and you have the get-rich-quick types who put their hands on the moneybags of Serbia and Yugoslavia - Pashich, is a symbol of that - and in Rumania you have people like Iuliu Maniu, who was a very respectable and admirable man, but nonetheless a middle class provincial lawyer, taking over his party so that it becomes peasantised and embourgeoisé. It ceases to be populist altogether.

A point which was made earlier was that you can have a populist element in movements which are not populist. The Yugoslav Communist Party has been mentioned. In the 1930's, before the war of liberation, there was an underground Yugoslav Communist Party. As long as it was led by a few Comintern people, it was not very effective.

The success and dynamism of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia in the late 1930's was attributable to students, and young people who were not perhaps literally students, who were essentially populists in their outlook and behaviour and yet were in the service of a Marxist movement. Marxist doctrine is not populist doctrine. But the young people of Belgrade University, who were more or less Marxist, "went to the people". Their attitude to, and idealisation of the people were far closer to the narodniks of the Russia of the 1870's than to the new stream-lined Bolshevik party.

Another example of populist mentality, which may seem odd, can be found in a fascist Party - the Rumanian Iron Guard. It came into being as a gang of thugs and police provocateurs, but it became a mass movement in the thirties and recruited precisely the sort of people I have been talking about - Rumanian students, young people, village priests, young rural intelligentsia, school teachers, and so on, who were indignant about the peasants' suffering, who were impoverished and badly treated. They led a kind of revolutionary peasant movement. I do not think that their aim was to create a peasant society, but it was the sufferings of the peasants which aroused their indignation, sympathy and compassion and their desire to make a revolution. This was associated with Fascism and anti-Semitism, which was part of the picture.

Who was the enemy? It depends on which enemy one is fighting - whether czars or bureaucrats, or big land-owners, or the bourgeoisie. In this case, it was the Jews. This was largely a myth, largely untrue and largely propaganda nonsense, but it had an element of truth in it. The small capitalist element with which the exploited peasant came into contact was, in many places, Jewish. You will remember Bebel's phrase that anti-Semitism was the Socialism of the imbecile. This element of anti-Semitism in the Rumanian Iron Guard was a sort of ersatz revolutionary feeling. I am saying this, not because I admire the Rumanian Iron Guard - I lived there for a time, and I had no reason to admire or like it - but because it recruited people of this kind, some of whom I knew and admired. Their strong and weak points are essentially the same as those of the original populists.

The Nazi Party is different in many ways. Above all, it operated in a highly industrialised, highly advanced society - a situation which was quite different from that in the developing societies of Yugoslavia, Russia and the Balkans. But this kind of strange völkisch element, this murky element - worship of the volk, a reactionary, mythical, ridiculous as it seems to us, romantic view of the German past - was an element of intellectual enthusiasm, a kind of element of populism in a certain Nazi intelligentsia within the Nazi Party which was not without importance. But I am not saying that the Nazi party as a whole was populist, least of all Hitler. Most of the bosses of the Nazi Party

were not. But some of these people - Rosenberg, Darré, and so on - had something in common with the black African racialist négritude ideology of the present time. An element of populism is to be found in a movement which is not in itself populist.

Peron was another man who had a great ability to mobilise the masses into his movement and lead them to victory and use them to rise to power. But was he a populist in the sense that he had a mystical view of his people? Was Peronism a populist movement, or was Peron simply a brilliant demagogue who had a modern, streamlined demagogic technique.

I come finally to populism in Asia and Africa. I have been talking about a certain populist mentality, an intelligentsia, which wants to serve the people. We find this kind of attitude at certain stages among the intelligentsia of various Asian and African peoples in the period of their struggle against colonialism or in the struggle against a sort of imperialist-dominated reactionary régime. But there seems to me a difference between the mentality of these people and their Russo-Balkan prototype, which is this. Whereas the Russo-Balkan prototype was concerned, above all, with service to the people and an idealistic desire to sacrifice oneself to serve the people, the modern Afro-Asian post-war variant is much more concerned with modernisation, with making his country independent, and with modernising and developing it both because modernisation is a good thing for his people and country, and particularly because modernisation will create big jobs for the boys, including himself. There is a self-interested careerist element which is essential to the Afro-Asian type, which is almost absent in the Russo-Balkan pre-1917 type. The Afro-Asian one is concerned with efficiency and the earlier one is concerned with justice. We have the passion for justice on the one hand and the desire for modernisation on the other.

I suppose that this reflects the different world situations in which it operated. First, the stage of world economic development was quite different. The problems of industrialisation and modernisation loomed far larger in the 1950's than they did in the 1880's. Secondly, and less important, the colonial régimes, and even the quasi independent Middle Eastern régimes against whom they were fighting, were very much milder in their treatment of them than the Russian or Balkan rulers. The Russo-Balkan régimes of the late nineteenth century oppressed with real cruelty and savagery, which created a spirit of idealistic self-sacrifice. On the other hand, it was not difficult to fight against the British government in the Gold Coast. As for some of the later African states, they merely had to shout for independence and they got it almost in a few minutes. The experience through which they went was utterly different.

But it is possible that there may be in future in African states a repetition of what happened in the Russia of the 1870's. The militarist or authoritarian or totalitarian régimes may produce revulsion, hatred and despair among the young people. The parallel with the Balkans is not a bad one, because in the first flush of independence everyone in the Balkans was enthusiastic, believing that at last they had got the Turks

out and that they were free. They soon found that the heroes of independence turned into new-style pashas just as beastly as the Turks before. They had to fight the battle all over again two or three generations long. This predicament is already occurring in some African states. So we may see Narodnaya Volyas in Africa in 1975.

MR. HALL: I should like to say something about Latin America. I will not touch on some of the parties mentioned which have been called populist, but I should like to talk about one particular party - Acción Popular in Peru, which is the government party. It is a very new party. I shall try to describe what it is without necessarily saying how it links up with populism and perhaps touch a little on the A.P.R.A. Party, which is the much better known - it is also called a populist party - in Peru.

Professor Seton-Watson talked about the impossibility of populist régimes. We have in Peru what calls itself a populist régime. Acción Popular is the government party, although it is in coalition; but its coalition partner is very small. The President is the founder of Acción Popular. He embodies what the Party stands for. He founded it and formed it; it belongs to him. It was developed roughly between 1948 and 1955. Perhaps I can attempt to show that it has no real or traceable roots outside Peru.

If you asked Belaunde what the programme of the Acción Popular Party is, he will tell you that it is Peru. If you ask him what he means by that, he says, "The conquest of Peru by the Peruvians". What is he talking about? He is talking about national integration. He is concerned with the question of who is a Peruvian. This was very much in doubt, and still is in doubt. If you talk to people in Peru, they will tell you that they are whites or Indians or come from Arequipa or they may be born in Peru, but they are Europeans. It is difficult to find anybody who calls himself a Peruvian. Belaunde's programme of the conquest of Peru by the Peruvians is also concerned with the physical integration of the country. The question of communications is uppermost in his mind. But, above all, the conquest of Peru by the Peruvians is a return to the glories of the past. It is a reaction against the intolerable conditions of the Peruvian people in the Sierra, in the high mountains of Peru. Belaunde sees the answer to Peru's problem in a return to the great traditions of the Incas and the pre-Inca Indian civilisations of the country. He sees it as a solution to the individual's problems and the problems of the country.

The principal institution which Belaunde would wish to see developed as an institution and as a spiritual matter is the so-called "minka" - the voluntary communal labour of the Inca and pre-Inca communities. He calls this Popular Co-operation. The idea of Popular Co-operation is to be applied as a doctrine and dogma to all the problems of the country and all sections of the country and its people. He sees it also as an answer not only to the internal

problems but to the external problems of the country or to the problems which have been introduced into the country from the exterior. He sees it as a way for Peru which is not capitalism and which is not Communism - a third way. He does not advocate the application of this solution outside Peru. This is a purely Peruvian solution for a Peruvian situation.

Belaunde is not, and most of his followers are not, anti-foreign. But they are anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist, whether that colonialism or imperialism comes from capitalism or Communism. I was fascinated to hear Professor Venturi talk about the translation of pre-capitalist society into modern terms and bringing into use some of the institutions of the past. This is exactly how Belaunde sees it. He sees also a direct link between himself and the people. This is a mystical charismatic thing. He does not believe in the possibility of the people of Peru making wrong choices or doing wrong things. In the elections of 1962, when he was narrowly defeated but no-one had an absolute majority to become President, he was absolutely convinced that there had been fraud in the elections. He did not heed any figures because he thought that the people could do no wrong and it would have been wrong not to choose him. He still feels this very much. The people of the highlands in Peru feel the same way about him. There is a mystical bond between them; there is an organic feeling. It is not, as Belaunde sometimes thinks, an understanding between equals. They look upon him as a strange man from the moon who says things which mean something to them and who believes in them and they believe in him. It works. I have seen him talking to the peasants. He has learnt to speak their language in the last ten years or so. He decides things on the spot with them. Laws are made on the spot with them. If he tells them that they must wait for agrarian reform and that they must not invade local lands, then that is what happens.

This kind of feeling is reminiscent of the paper by Professor Mazrui and Dr. Engholm. They talk about the Presidential shovel in Tanzania becoming the symbol, the general ethos, of anti-pluralism - I am not sure about Belaunde and anti-pluralism because he believes in some intermediary organisations of a traditional kind, he is very careful about keeping to them - and not the Presidential shovel, but the Presidential digging stick is something which has a part in this general ethos. On page 11 of the same paper there is a quotation from Nyerere which one could put straight into the mouth of Belaunde - and it would be very characteristic - about the place of honest voluntary work in society.

Another significant thing about the Accion Popular ideology is its attitude to international relations. Fundamentally, the Party is not interested in international relations. It is interested only in Peru. It is interested in foreign relations in so far as they have a direct effect on Peru. However, one of the planks of its platform is relations with all the peoples of the world. It consistently does not maintain relations with all the governments of the world, but it wants to have relations and trade with all the people of the world.

Then there is the question of the attitude to finance and banks. One of the planks of the platform of Acción Popular was the nationalisation of the Central Bank. This was one of the first things which was done. Action was also taken against other banking institutions. Under previous governments, the accounts of the central government were held by private banks who used to make a lot of money in this way. But this has been transferred to the State or Government cash boxes. This was claimed to be the popularisation of national financing.

The question of the anti-military character of populist movements has been raised. To a large extent, Acción Popular came into power on the backs of the military. They were supported by the military. It is nevertheless true that Belaunde personally is anti-military. He has difficulties with the military and, on the whole, the military institutions have no part in his general philosophy or ideology except as uniformed development forces to assist in the internal development of the country.

What about the roots of the Acción Popular philosophy? Belaunde comes from the town of Arequipa in the highlands, which is basically Spanish - perhaps more Spanish than Lima. He comes from a very aristocratic family. Arequipa however is in the middle of an agricultural area. His uncle was very much involved in his youth in the question of the frontiers of Peru. The question of geological and historical work on the delineation of frontiers has had a very marked effect on Peruvian thinking and particularly on the Belaunde family. The whole question of national identity comes into this. His father similarly was a politician who was concerned with those things and also with the reactions against modern capitalism which were produced by the introduction into Peru of the business cycle.

Belaunde was partly educated in France. He is certainly an admirer of Rousseau. However, he is not consciously a populist in the sense that we are talking about. He does not know anything about populism. He sees himself as a purely Peruvian product. Undoubtedly he owes a debt to Haya de la Torre who has influences from Marxism. Belaunde is a strong Catholic. If he were to see some of our papers here and if he were to hear some of the comments made about Russian populism as being the prototype of populism, he would be extremely surprised since he has never heard of any of those gentlemen with Slavonic names like Plekhanov. He would not understand them if he read them. He is an intellectual, but of a very mystical kind. He is an architect, and an artistic architect rather than a scientific architect. The remarks made about clothes have been harshly treated. Clothes are very significant. Belaunde likes to go round dressed in Indian dress.

I said that Belaunde does not understand about populism. He also does not understand about Socialism. He would not consider that his brand of populism had anything to do with Socialism which, as a doctrine, he abhors. Professor Venturi opened up the question of

Socialism and what it consisted of. If we are to define Socialism, we shall find that Socialism and populism are intermingled. Belaunde, if he knows anything about Socialism, knows something about Babeuf, Saint-Simon and Owen; but as for Marx or anyone like him he certainly would not understand them, and if he did he would find them very anti-pathetic.

What about the reality of the Peruvian situation in regard to Acción Popular? The votes for Acción Popular come from the peasant areas of Peru. They come from the highlands and from the towns, and from the younger intellectuals, whether they are rich, poor or middle class. Belaunde won the 1963 election because he received the support of everyone to the left of him, including the Communists. His proposals for a return to Inca ways provide the possibility of an answer being found to the problems of the highlands. To a certain extent, Acción Popular is working and can work in this situation. But it provides no answer for the towns and industry of Peru or for the capitalist agriculture of the Peruvian coast. This comprises something like 30 to 40 per cent. of the Peruvian people.

When questions are asked as to how Popular Co-operation is to be applied to the industrial and capitalist sector, there is a lot of talk about co-operatives and other kinds of participation by the workers in industrial institutions. But in Peru there are perfectly straight mixed economy development policies of exactly the same kind as are carried on in other Latin American countries and countries elsewhere. When we talk about the coastal agricultural workers, the small proprietors and craft trade unions, we touch on the other group called populist, A.P.R.A. In spite of the myths about it, this never made any progress in the highland areas as far as votes are concerned.

There is one section of the Peruvian community which I might touch on, namely, the mobile element, which is of great importance in Peru, where the migration from the country to the town is one of the leading social and economic phenomena. The position of migrants in Peru is, as far as I know, different from that of the migrants in other areas in Brazil, Venezuela, Chile or Argentina. The so-called *barriadas* - the shanty towns around Lima in which one and a quarter million of the population of nearly two and a half million live - are not slums or higgledy piggledy associations of rootless elements who have no place in society. They are incipient suburbs. They are settlements on a communal basis, organised by the people themselves. Usually they are people of the same local origins from the Sierra who are building their own houses by self-help, laying out their own towns, electing their own mayors, and building their own schools. They are carrying out Acción Popular; they are doing it for themselves. They are getting assistance from the government. But the interesting thing is that they do not support any political group and would not be called populist politically. They tend to be politically apathetic or to vote in a completely mixed fashion, depending on the kind of job that they have.

I think that it may be a saucy analogy, but in Peru perhaps Acción Popular is Russian style populism trying to deal with an area in Peru which has similarities to nineteenth century Russia, whereas A.P.R.A. has similarities to United States populism and deals with an area comparable with the United States in the late nineteenth century.

PROF. F. VENTURI: Professor Walicki has given us a good basis for discussion. I want to defend my book. The only thing to do is to write a history of a movement - not about the ideas of a movement, nor of the social situation which gave the basis to the movement. The task of the historian in this case was to write a history of the whole movement. That is why it is too large and too broad and, at the same time, too little. Professor Walicki's point of view and mine are different. He starts from the history of the ideas. I am starting from the point of view of the history of a political movement. That is more complicated, and probably less clear. That is why it is necessary to put in the history of populism some people and to take out some other people.

Let us take the most extreme example - the one of Mikhailovsky. I have to reply what La Place said to Napoleon when he was asked why he did not put God in his treatise on astronomy. He said that in his astronomical calculations he could not find God. My researches into the books which these revolutionary people read in Russia during the 25 years in which the classical populist movement existed show that Mikhailovsky was not very much read. I found that many of the people had less importance as thought but more importance as influence. That is why Mikhailovsky did not have a very great impact in the history of the Russian movement for populism. It may be that he is right and I am wrong.

The great problem of Lenin is a problem of methodology. I do not believe that the weapons which are necessary to fight against a movement are generally the best way to understand it. I suppose that Lenin's definition of populism was a perfect instrument to fight against populism and not understand it. That is why I cannot accept it. Lenin was full of the great Russian tradition, but he could not have an historical or sociological or philosophical point of view agreeing with populism. He knew perfectly well that that was his own great rival. They were instruments of political struggle and not a way to understand the facts.

The heritage from one class to the other was so big that the class element was put aside and the classical populist took out of Hertenzen, not his nobility side, but one thing which is much more important. It is a political way of life and a religion, in the sense that you must not only believe in populism, but live as a populist. This is what Hertenzen created. This is the immense difference in the democratic or liberal movement of the nineteenth century.

The people who fought for independence and liberty during the Risorgimento fought for their ideas and sometimes died for them; but they did not believe that all their own life had to be created on the model of a political creed. That was a new thing out of Russia, especially out of

Hertenzen. That is why I do not believe that it is possible to divide the classical populism into two parts, even in this very accurate and moderate way that Professor Walicki has done, with Hertenzen on one side and the classical populism on the other side. They have in common a moral and ethical attitude, and that is the important thing. As far as the influence of Marx on Russian populism is concerned, if you divide the populism in this way you can trace a very large amount of Marx's influence in the second part of the classical populism, as Professor Walicki called it. But I suppose that the influence of Proudhon is the greater.

I was interested to hear what Professor Seton-Watson said about populist Socialists in Russia and populists starting to be peasantist and after that becoming a bourgeois party of central Europe. This happened in no other part of the world. Why? My reply is very simple; because the populist movement in central Europe and the Balkans was connected with national problems. The great agent of corruption from this point of view of Socialist populism is nationalism. So we have to contrast nationalist movements and populist movements. They are contrary things. When they meet, as in Peru, they corrupt the Socialist side, the most important side, of the populist ideology. I am not sure that the development of Russia was much faster than the development, for example, of Hungary or Bohemia. These parties became bourgeois and peasantist because they were connected with nationalism. They are two elements which are near, but when they meet and when the social side of the story fades away it is, from this point of view, corrupt.

As far as the influence of Chernyshevsky and Semlia y Volia ia concerned Professor Keep is right, because the idea of putting together freedom and the land is most important for the real populist. Hertenzen is the man who taught the Russians that without the problem of individual liberty the problem of a populist Socialist was unthinkable. From this point of view, the theoretical originality of Hertenzen may be greater than that expressed in the paper of Professor Walicki. May I say how much I admired and enjoyed reading his paper.

MR. G. IONESCU: May I add a footnote to what Professor Seton-Watson said about splitting the original populist movements? Surely we should take into consideration the fact that there were in the East European countries two sets of reforms - agrarian reform and electoral reform. The peasantist movement in those countries became strong after these reforms.

PROF. VENTURI: In Serbia?

MR. G. IONESCU: Serbia had a very strong peasant movement.

PROF. VENTURI: But not many agricultural reforms, as far as I remember.

PROF. SETON-WATSON: Yes, there were.

(Adjourned for tea)

Chairman:- Prof. Hugh Seton-Watson

PROF. P. WILES: I should like to bring us back to the Socialist nature of populism. In the bar at lunchtime, I thought of another purely individualist populism apart from the United States variety - that is, Social Credit in Alberta. It fulfils all my criteria for being a genuine populist movement. It is inflationary; it is biblical - it originated in a school of bible knowledge; it looks inward upon itself; it attributes virtue to the simple people; it is anti-establishment - or it was when it originated. Therefore, we have two perfect cases of individualist populism, both from North America.

I should like to use the word "co-operation" with a little more emphasis. We would not want to call the populism, if that is the right word, of the rural movements of Ireland, of Saskatchewan, of Scandinavia, or the Iron Guard of Rumanian Socialism; we would want to call them, and naturally do call them, co-operative. I suppose that we should define both "co-operative" and "Socialist". I meant by "Socialist" - and I am sorry to have to say these things - the public ownership of the means of production, coupled, if possible, with central planning. I mean by "co-operation" the agreed ownership on a small scale, in localities, in a democratic manner of some of the means of production. There is always in co-operative societies a good deal of pure private enterprise - on principle. We have rather forgotten that there is a large amount of purely co-operative populism.

Once we have that word firmly before us, is there a case for saying that there is any Socialist populism at all? Is not narodnichestvo co-operative and profoundly non-Socialist as defined? I am open to correction, largely because I do not know anything about any given example of populism above cocktail party level. It may be that there were genuinely Socialist, as I understand that word, narodniki. The mir was the traditional co-operative. In the mir you had mostly your land all the time. In any case, livestock was meant to be privately owned. Lenin did not call it Socialist. I do not call it Socialist. I do not suppose that Mr. Attlee would have called it Socialist. It was owned in part co-operatively, especially in repartitional communes, and was managed privately in virtually all cases. The cropping plan of the individual was very seldom determined by anybody except himself. Management was more private than ownership. Therefore, there is not a case for using the word "Socialist" in connection with the mir, and so a fortiori not with populism.

I should like another expert to compare for us the mir and the Grange. There is something about the American Grange movement which exudes the same atmosphere as the mir. The Grange is certainly something which one would want to call populist. I do not know very much about the Grange, but I have had to read about the ejido. The ejido is an old-fashioned mir. As far as Aztec records go, it is the same as the old Aztec calpulli. It is not repartitional. There are certain restrictions on inheritance. Management is strictly private. The cropping plan of the individual is private. The ownership of livestock is private. Yet we all want to say that Mexico is one of the most populist of countries.

I pass now to less important points. I deal first with the role of racial myths about oneself, about the people. I do not mean anti-Semitism. It may not be coincidental that there are many myths about the racial origins of the people who are populists. The first populists were the Diggers. The Diggers believed in the Norman Yoke. They believed that the English people were essentially Anglo-Saxon and that there had been superimposed on them a Norman-speaking aristocracy. This essentially racial distinction was of political importance at the time of the Commonwealth.

The Irish are a splendid example of all sorts of populism. The racial myth in that country, with its stress not so much on race as upon language, is notorious. I was fascinated to hear from Mr. Hall about the Inca myth in Peru. I proposed to bring up the Aztec myth in Mexico in any case. The more I was told about Belaunde, the more I was reminded of Cárdenas. The Mexican murals are full of populist mythology and they date back to beyond the same Spanish conquest, which also took Peru, to an imagined Aztec period. The Mexican ejido claims descent not from the Spanish communitarians, who have been described by Joaquin Costa,¹ but from the Aztec calpulli. There is a certain tendency in populist movements everywhere to adopt a racial myth if they can.

On the intellectual origins of Titoism - and I say this merely in order to provoke the Warden of St. Antony's into correcting me - it is obvious that the self-administration of Yugoslavia is not populist. This self-management is an imposed system from above. It is what the French call "voulu". It did not arise out of something which had been suppressed in the post-war period. It was born apparently in the brain of Tito in about 1950. It appeals to the future and not to the past. Professor Venturi mentioned the Zadruga. The secondary sources say that the Zadruga was finished in the early part of the inter-War period. It is highly improbable that the Zadruga contributed very much, because there is just one place where you do not get self-management, and that is in Yugoslav agriculture, which is what one would expect if the tradition of the Zadruga had survived in a strong way. The Titoists do not claim any kind of origin in Balkan history or thinking. They clearly look back to the Paris Commune, which you might call populist in some sense, but I should not like to do so myself. But it would be interesting to hear from an expert as to whether there were not proto-Titoist ideas current in the Balkans in the late 1930's.

THE CHAIRMAN: We have not talked about American populism so far. I should, therefore, like to break the order and ask Professor Hofstadter to speak.

PROF. R. HOFSTADTER: I came to the Conference thinking that our two types of populism would be Russian populism and American populism and that a good deal of our time might be spent trying to decide whether we

1. El Colectivismo Agrario en España, Madrid 1915.

stature. You have, not a situation in which a highly intellectualised elite is romanticising a segment of the population, but rather an elite drawn out of the lower middle class - country lawyers, small town merchants, occasional capitalists of middling stature who have come up against credit difficulties - who forged the intellectual apparatus of the movement.

One of the interesting latent assumptions of American populism is the idea that the basic mechanisms of a market society are quite adequate to achieve remedies for the ills which they are trying to redress. This fits in with Professor Wile's reference to inflation. The prevailing assumption was - although one draws this out largely by implication rather than by manifest statement in populist literature - that if you can rectify the monetary and credit system of the country, other reforms will follow hard upon that, and will be easy to achieve because the back of the anathematised banking elite will have been broken. Also, the other reforms which one might advocate are relatively trivial compared with achieving the inflation which is always sought for in movements of this kind.

A question was raised earlier about the place of the man of peace in populist movements. It is interesting and perhaps significant of the American climate of opinion that American populism had a strong nationalist bent, but by no means a militarist one. American populist attitudes towards peace were always based on hostility to military establishments. This is an anti-establishment kind of ideology rather than a pacifist one. There was a tremendous fear, rooted in the late eighteenth century American thinking about the evil effects on republicanism of a standing army. It became axiomatic that one could trust a people's army but not a professional military establishment.

One has to sort out the element of nostalgia. Someone said today that a populist movement looked back in order to look forward. This is certainly the case with American populism. The golden age which American populists had in mind was generally the period of the 1830's and 1840's - the early nineteenth century in the United States. You find this note recurring over and over again in populist literature - that in those days there were no beggars and no poor to speak of in the United States. It was only in the period after the civil war, with the gradual conquest of society by deflationary bankers working in concert with bankers abroad, that the people were given an unsatisfied form of society.

Populism in the United States was forward-looking in the sense that it took a totally pragmatic view of the use of the state. It was statist in the sense that there were no inhibitions among populist thinkers about the use of government, whether on a state or national level, bringing about certain kinds of reforms, and in this respect the inheritance of populism is quite strong. It runs into the era of the New Deal.

A little bit might be said about the after-history of American populism. During the McCarthyist period, quite a number of us were intrigued by the way in which McCarthy and some of his followers took up an anti-establishment style which plainly owed a lot to the populist ambience of American thought. There was no intention - or if there was

it was doubtless miscarried - to attribute a kind of genetic affiliation of McCarthyism to earlier agrarian movements, although some people have spent a lot of energy in refuting us on this count. McCarthy was of a different stripe. It is significant that a far right movement should have found it expedient and possible to twang these populist strings if it could. Today there is a certain feeling in many quarters of the New Left, as it is getting to be called, that they owe something to populist ancestry. It would be interesting to look into the extent to which there is any kind of intellectual continuity between the populism of the 1890's and the contemporary new left. Some of the new left people think that there is, but my impression is that they are not really very much interested in the populists of the 1890's. This is one case in which ignorance is an advantage.

THE CHAIRMAN: Some of the forces which took the form of populism in the United States in a country with some slight similarities in its origins - Australia - found their way into the Labour Party. Perhaps somebody can talk about this and say something significant. The fact that there should be a Labour Party in Australia is due to obvious facts of American history.

PROF. D. MACRAE: May I return to Professor Wiles's questions, because I should be interested to hear an answer to them. He is the first person who has said anything about ejidos which did not bore me stiff. His questions should be answered by the experts before they go out of their minds.

THE CHAIRMAN: Can anyone answer those questions?

PROF. P. WILES: I do not think that I put a question on ejidos.

MR. C.A.M. HENNESSY: The point about the ejidos brings in the question which was raised of the possibility of populist régimes, because at the beginning Mexican intellectuals looked back to the calpulli organisation, but immediately they started setting up ejidos the problem of how they were to be financed arose. So you get from the beginning a distinction between those ejidos which benefit from state credit and those which are starved of it. The reason why the whole ejido has proved a disappointment was that when Cardenas came on the scene in the thirties you get a distinction between the ejido and the collective ejido which is the one which Cardenas tried to be. But the ejido where the private element was allowed to develop was the one which increased agricultural production. So you get it tied up with the question of agricultural efficiency. One of the reasons why so many intellectuals have been alienated from the Mexican revolution has been a disappointment in the way in which the ejido has worked out in practice.

PROF. WILES: The collective ejido?

MR. HENNESSY: Yes. Mexico is the only country in Latin America with this tremendous agricultural expansion in productivity; but it is in the private sector, not in the collective ejido.

PROF. WILES: I was not talking about the collective ejidos, but even during the period of Cardenas it involved only about two per cent of the agricultural labour force. It can be almost demonstrated that that was Communist influenced. The Communist Party of Mexico wanted to collectivise ejidos. That is Socialist, but it looks as if the influence came from the Soviet Union.

THE CHAIRMAN: On the other hand, the Mexican régime as it has developed could not be described as populist. You have these ejidos and survivors of a revolutionary tradition.

MR. HENNESSY: There are pockets. It is very uneven. It is difficult to generalise, but, as far as the official ideology goes, I think that this is true.

THE CHAIRMAN: Would Professor Hofstadter say something about the presence or absence of populism in the Negro problem? Is populism within the Negro community or a populist attitude by the Negro intelligentsia towards their own people relevant or not?

PROF. HOFSTADTER: In so far as you want to call populist anything that sentimentalises or romanticises the folk, there is something of this on the part of Negro intellectuals. In the past, there has been a bit of it on the part of white intellectuals. The more negro spokesmen like Stokely Carmichael take it up in slogans like "Black Power". It is a bit early to say whether this is an important strain. The Negroes in America are suffering from a serious trauma about identity like almost any people who want to mount up a movement of some kind. They are looking for a past which is not just a past of slavery and oppression, a past of aspiration, struggle, achievement and so on - and moreover not just one of achievement in Africa. African art will bring no solace. This is a hard thing for them to do, but it is one of the things which they are calling for. They are asking for a study of Negro history which will give them a mythology and morale of a kind which they need.

PROF. MACRAE: May I return to Professor Wiles's questions about which I am still worried. He raised a general question which is of great importance and I should like to follow it up, namely, how far co-operativists in the wide rather loose sense in which he used the phrase, are important in understanding a great deal of populism. There were two subsidiary questions to one of which I am sure Professor Hofstadter could give an answer. One was about the ideology and its connection with what Professor Wiles was talking about - the Grange - and the other was the specific question of what became of Zadruga, and the origins of ideas in contemporary or near contemporary Yugoslavia.

PROF. HOFSTADTER: The Grange has a kind of strange ambiguous relationship with populism. On the one hand, it grew out of an attempt primarily to remedy - not to bring about political militancy - but to remedy the fundamentally rootless and non-communitarian character of American rural life. It was started, not by farmers, but by Washington bureaucrats who travelled round the country and persuaded a number of farmers to organise. Its purpose, in the first instance, was social. The large extent of American farms, the thinly scattered rural population, the rapid mobility in many parts of the country, both physical and social, led to a certain kind of inconstancy and rootlessness in the American agricultural community, which is the antithesis of the kind of rural society which one finds in an anciently established peasant village.

By the 1870's, people were becoming acutely aware of the barrenness and desiccation of this kind of life. When Oliver H. Kelley started organising the Grange, he had this in mind. The Grange took on as a political movement, because once it had begun to develop in what later came to be called the older Middle West, it became drawn into the battles with the railroads at that stage of settlement and succeeded in getting regulatory laws affecting railroads and warehouses and public facilities, bearing on the marketing and transporting of agricultural production.

Then the Grange seems to have been supplanted by the farmers' alliances of the late 1880's and the 1890's and to have become a relatively obscure and uninteresting side of the agricultural movement in the nineties. It largely died out in the West because in the new areas coming up it never struck the militant note which seems to have been called for in the late 1880's. It survived, but, oddly enough, mainly in the East, so that when one visits the States now and looks for Granges one finds most of them in the older agricultural areas. The Grange has completely lost its character as a crusading organisation with a politically populist dimension and has become simply a set of social clubs which do a bit of lobbying which is not of basic political consequence.

I cannot offer an explanation for the strange evolution of the Grange, but one can say that it has a quasi-populist phase to its history in the 1880's and that in more recent times it has become a very innocuous object, politically speaking.

THE CHAIRMAN: It has been said that the Zadruga, or the idealised conception of the Zadruga, figured in the plans of Serbian populists in the 1870's and perhaps later. But essentially people like Markovich saw in the Zadruga, which they did not understand, the same thing that the Russian populists saw in the Mir. The Zadruga certainly died out as an institution long before Tito's war of liberation. Certainly there is no element of populism of any sort, and no element of spontaneous popular initiative, which is different from populism, in the workers' councils of Yugoslavia or the Tito régime. What I suggested earlier was that there was a populist mentality in the young intellectuals going to the people in the thirties. We do not want to spend much time on the Mir now, but I suggest that perhaps among other things Dr. Walicki might say something about it later. To say that the preoccupation of the Russian populists in the early phase with the Mir is an indication of interest in co-operatives but not in Socialism is a bit artificial, because at the time that they were becoming enthusiastic about the Mir they were looking for forms for a future Socialist society. Nobody knew very much what was meant by a Socialist society. The formulation of Socialism as the nationalisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange had not become generally accepted. That happened only later.

PROF. WILES: When by, say, 1900 everybody was agreed that Socialism meant Clause 4, did the populists think up Clause 4?

THE CHAIRMAN: That is difficult to answer. It is a little bit off our subject.

PROF. PETER WORSLEY: Like Professor Hofstadter, I became increasingly uneasy about the North American movements. I have lived under a populist régime, and that is why I cannot accept that populisms cannot be régimes. My first experience of it was Saskatchewan, albeit in its perhaps second or third stage, when it had become Socialist and, indeed, ossified. There were theorists, but they were not intellectuals, and they were certainly not taking it to the people. They were drawn from the ranks of some of the people Professor Hofstadter mentioned, but largely from the ranks of preachers (Methodists, and others). Tommy Douglas has precisely this background; he is in Holy Orders. Aberhart of Social Credit in Alberta was another theorist with a fundamentalist background. I have also met the grand old man who was Saskatchewan's early theorist of populism (whose works are still circulated and read and are currently printed in pamphlet form.) Some of these were intellectuals going to the people. They were drawn not from the ranks of the farmers, but from the quasi-intellectual middle strata.

The big fundamental difference which alarmed me when I read Professor Hofstadter's paper was that he places emphasis, incorrectly, on the money aspect of North American populism - on the speculative, entrepreneurial, private individualistic, market oriented, capitalistic, small scale economy. That is what it was and what it remained in most cases. When I read Brough

McPherson's book on Social Credit in Alberta, I criticized his use of the phrase "petty bourgeois", but I am becoming more and more convinced that perhaps it was right. Social Credit in Alberta and, I suspect, most of the other North American populisms contrast vividly with my direct experience of the Saskatchewan movement, which is physically embodied today, and has been for a couple of decades, in co-operatives. The skyline of Saskatchewan is punctuated by elevators owned by the Wheat Pool; there are Co-operatives, credit organisations and a whole infra-structure of other cooperative organisations of a very diversified kind. When the CCF came to power as a government eventually, it had become more Socialist. These populists, then, were not individualists of the private entrepreneurial kind that your populists were in North America, Professor Hofstadter, and therefore there is more than one North American populism (or mine is populism and your is not!)

The history of the settlement of the West varies. It is not simply a history of small homesteaders with their axe chopping down the bush. It is a history of the Canadian Pacific Railway, and of government support (deliberately provided largely to keep the Americans out of the West): the Indians were conveniently shot for the farmers, or shipped off to reservations where they remained; the University of Saskatchewan was created in 1908, long before some of our universities, and was precisely the kind of land-grant college so well distributed in the United States (whose *raison d'être* was, among other things, to experiment with discovering the appropriate strains of wheat).

So there was an immense amount of state support, for the most part, to the pioneer of the frontier. He was not an isolated frontiersman. Many other forms of support, notably subsidies, continued. Land was also sold off at nominal prices.

This brings me to Professor Wiles's point which Professor MacRae wishes us to discuss: Is this Socialism, or is it co-operation? This is a definitional matter. Speaking not only as an academic, but as a Socialist, I have always understood this element of co-operation, of participation, of democratic involvement, to be a cardinal part of what is meant by Socialism and not merely centralised state control planning. If you like to define it in that way, you arrive at a different result. But empirically and historically also, it can be demonstrated that this is the case. The Labour Party in Britain contains within its organisational structure the co-operative movement. A phrase like "social ownership" or "public ownership" is a much wider conception than state control. State control is not Socialism. There are all sorts of state control. There, ore Clause 4 is not the beginning and end of Socialism.

There is further empirical evidence, in the areas I have been talking of, of the direct containment of this communitarian co-operative element within the broad mainstream of some kind of overall Socialism. The Saskatchewan C.C.F. became more specifically Socialist and was one of the cardinal building blocks, with the unions principally, in the contemporary New Democratic Party, which is the leading Socialist opposition party in Canada. Institutionally, there you have it. You cannot therefore separate Socialism from co-operation.

THE CHAIRMAN: There is one country in Central Europe which is interesting from the point of view of populism which we have not spoken of yet and which I did not mention earlier in my examples, namely, Hungary, - a Central European, not Balkan country with a powerful land-owning class, a very poor rural proletariat, rather bourgeois, half-rural, half-urban peasant party of a rather conservative kind and an old established peasant party of a rather conservative kind and an old established Social Democratic Party. In Hungary, with its acute social class conflict and political conflict between the wars, there appeared a group which was clearly populist. I should like Dr. Szabo, who was part of that movement, to say something about it.

DR. SZABO said that he was very reluctant to say anything about the populist group in Hungary, first, because he did not want to introduce another country into the discussion, and, secondly, because he was not a student in politics or any of the social sciences. A further incompatibility was that he was a populist.

He said that he became a populist when he was 21. He liked very much the poetry of a certain poet and translated it. At the same time, he was a radical in political thinking at the university, and he had many Communist friends in the then illegal Communist Party in Hungary. However, they had had absolutely no idea about social status in Hungary. In 1931 and 1932 the situation in Hungary was fluid. Many young people such as teachers got together in an endeavour to solve the social problems of Hungary. Two groups of a similar kind were created in Budapest. People started in an empirical way to try to find a solution to the problem. They got the facts first and then tried to find a solution.

In 1936 a group of about twelve writers was formed. The older ones were about 30 and the younger ones were 22 or 23. About two-thirds of them were members of the intelligentsia - poets, writers, university-educated people - but they were of peasant origins. One of them spent three years in Paris and went to the Sorbonne. When he returned to Hungary he became one of the leaders. Some of the books which these people published became best sellers, to everybody's great astonishment, and created a huge outcry.

Out of this emerged a movement which in 1937 formed a political programme. It had two aims. First, it asked for the complete transformation of society in Hungary in a Socialist way. This populist movement was a Socialist movement, but nobody who was told about it found it very important. The next year, a meeting of the group was dispersed by mounted police, and the five writers who had signed the declaration in 1938, two days after the Anschluss started to move towards the right.

The Marxist writers in Prague had created the movement and called it, not populism, but peasant Socialism or people's Socialism. The literary movement in Hungary had ended just after the war because of the censorship. Anything radical was contrary to the interests of the country.

The Hungarian experience had proved that populists seemed to be more at home in movements than in political parties. At the moment that the National Peasant Party was formed, the literary movement faded out.

That party, being one of the four anti-Fascist parties, became part of the coalition after 1945. However, being a peasant party, it did not function too well, because it was not a class party.

Dr. Szabo said that he could not recall that anybody in Hungary had tried to arrive at a definition of populism. The nearest thing to a definition was the belief that those who followed the old, the poor and the oppressed did not lose their way in their ideas. Populism was not so much an ideology, but an approach and a method.

In the Hungarian movement, idolisation of the people or worship of the people was totally absent. Dr. Szabo agreed that this was basic. The relationship of populists towards the people or with the people should be capable of definition.

MR. F.W. DEAKIN: I shall be brief, for one reason: what I have to say is negative, not positive.

Points have been made about Svetozar Markovitch by you, Mr. Chairman, and Professor Venturi. It is difficult to label Markovitch as a populist. It is perhaps significant that the contemporary Yugoslav official historians are very anxious to avoid this subject altogether. There is no printed edition of his work. To my knowledge, there is only one essay written by a young Marxist essayist who was killed in the war. But a far better essay was written by the same man on young Bosnia. Perhaps one could trace and define a slightly populist tradition in the early radicals.

With regard to the partisan movement, I would only say that I do not think that there are any traces of populism in the sense that we have been discussing today. One can find many other trends which are not Marxist. One can even find members of the Black Hand. One point which has been made is very suggestive, namely, that if one looks beyond the hard core of the Marxist party in the thirties, one finds perhaps the real strength of the movement in the organisations of the women, of the young and of the aged. The partisan movement both before and during the war touched the age groups which were not mobilised into traditional political parties. On the other hand, I would not go so far as to say that this was in any sense a non-Marxist phenomenon. If one looks at the text books and pamphlets used by the women's organisations or the students of Belgrade University, one sees that they are simply a basic Marxism.

SIR ISAIAH BERLIN: I should like to make two brief statements on Professor Venturi's remarks. One is about his observation about Herzen as the man who infected Russian populists with that sense of total commitment which is a hallmark of Russian populists. "Total commitment" is a Russian invention. I am the last person to wish to diminish Herzen's importance, but it appears to me that he was not the person who communicated this particular element to them. The notion of individual liberty, of emancipation, of the need for individual independence as part of the general social programme - that is his burden. Social commitment originated elsewhere.

Someone has said in his paper, quite correctly, that Russian populism was less a social and economic programme before the eighties and nineties, as (at the beginning) a search for salvation, one of the preferred routes being a Tolstoyan demand to integrate oneself with the life of the peasants, emphasis on the debt which was owed to the peasants, and about the need to repay that debt. This was a specific Russian motif which one does not often find among populists elsewhere. This was a particular species of the total insistence on total social commitment: this demand does not come primarily from Herzen at all; it comes rather more from Belinsky. He is the severely moral teacher who introduced the categories imperative - the stern duty to total commitment, which forbids a man to divide himself into various types of activity. He is not allowed to say that as a political being that he believes one thing, while as a husband or artist he believes something else. This demand is a falsification of one's integral nature.

This view may rest on a myth, or a total illusion, but this was the element which Belinsky injected into the scene, and the fact that he came from and spoke for the "underprivileged", i.e. the poor, gave it a particular force. Herzen argued more against oppression: Belinsky - detachment and escapism.

The other point which I wish to make is something which we shall have to discuss willy-nilly tomorrow. This is a dangerous but unavoidable subject, namely, the relationship of nationalism to populism. Professor Venturi correctly said that nationalism corrupts populism. No doubt it does. Yet they began very close to each other. Nobody could say that Chernyshevsky was a nationalist, or that any of the Russian populists of the sixties and seventies took interest in foreign peoples. They were victims of total national self-pre-occupation, which is again a Russian phenomenon. Unlike earlier and later scientists they thought entirely about their own Russian past, present and future, and saw themselves as a unique problem. Hence their notion of Russia alone as capable of avoiding capitalism, which stems partly from this national self-absorption.

I do not wish to enlarge on the historical basis of the connection between nationalism and populism, but it seems to me to have been born somewhere in the 1760's or 1770's in Germany and to be a response to some kind of national humiliation in Germany, then as in Russia later, populism stresses the "internal" values of the chosen group as against the "external" values of the enlightened cosmopolitanism of the philosophers of the eighteenth century. The Germans, like the Russians, tried hard not to be nationalists, but the Volk with which both began pervades the ideas of both. Hence this nexus is something which we shall have to touch upon.

In the case of other populisms - for example, American populism - there is an even stronger nationalist element which it is difficult to leave out. There is a xenophobia of a specific kind which is, on the whole, absent from Russian populism except for certain isolated movements in the sixties and seventies among the peasants and the half populists who agitated among the peasants for the sole purpose of increasing general discontent and inciting to revolution.

If one asked what the arly populists contemplated in the way of a regime after the overturn, there would, I think, be silence. In Chernyshevsky you get exceedingly unclear notions about partly local, partly centralised economic control, but if you asked what they thought would happen after the Czarist régime had been destroyed they would merely have said that the people would rise and justice would reign. More than this I have failed to find.

PROFESSOR ANDRESKI: I should like to say a few words about certain aspects of Poland's past which tie up with the remark made by Professor Venturi about how nationalism corrupts populism; although it does not matter, of course, whether we call it corruption or something else so long as we realise that nationalism can up to a point substitute itself for class-oriented populism. When one reads the things said at the turn of the century by Polish writers, one sees many elements similar to those which one finds in the *narodniki*, changed and transfigured into a national rather than class interpretation. It is significant that the People's Party (known abroad as the Peasants' Party) - which was a narrowly based class party and whose support among the intelligentsia was on the whole confined to the sons of peasants who had been to school - was strongest in that part of Poland which was most leniently treated by the governing power before the First World War: namely, Habsburg Galitzia. Where the oppression was stronger, elements of populism were mixed up with nationalism and, therefore, one could doubt whether the resulting phenomenon could be simply called populism. Towards the end of the last century there grew in Western Poland a strong movement for educating the common people and organizing them into co-operatives, sports clubs, and so on, but it was very nationalistically coloured. As the higher classes were to a great extent germanized there was a confluence between nationalism and populism.

SIR ISAAH BERLIN: I may have given the impression that Belinsky was a populist. If I did, I was at fault. He was not. Towards the end of his life, he believed in state controlled or simple capitalist industrialization, or something like it. The identification of the "integral" personality with the peasant does not belong to him. He did not romanticize the common man: still less the peasants whom he knew too well.

PROF. F. VENTURI: The populists had the fundamental idea that social transformation was important and that political things were bad. From that comes the attitude towards all national programmes. It is only in the Russian populism that you find something of this kind. The most important factor is the attitude of Chernov in the Crimean War. The important thing is how the peasants are organised in Lombardy. That is no more the ancient cosmopolitanism or general internationalism.

THE CHAIRMAN: A cynic might observe that the Russians did not show themselves to be interested in national expansion because they already ruled. Fifty-five per cent of the population of the Russian empire were already non-Russian.

DR. ANDREJ WALICKI: I shall begin with what Professor Berlin and Professor Venturi said.

It is not accidental that the Russian Socialists were more internationally minded than East European Socialists. It is quite understandable that an honest Socialist in Russia should adopt such an attitude. But what kind of attitude should an honest Socialist have adopted in an oppressed country like Poland - in a country where the cause of the oppressed nation coincided with the struggle for general human rights which were being trampled upon? An honest Socialist in a country like Poland should have adopted the following attitude. He should have distinguished between the ruling class, the Government which oppressed him, and the Russian or German people. This was done by Polish Socialists in the romantic period. They fought for national liberation of all people, including those who lived in oppressor states. I would protest against the idea that there was something about Russians which made them more internationally minded. I would not say that that was the case.

Romantic populism in Poland was bound up with nationalism in the English sense of the word. "Polish nationalism" is a derogatory term, but in Poland it was a national movement which was nevertheless bound up with the idea of an international community and with the collective salvation of all mankind.

I was asked what I meant by rephrasing Stere. I did not wish to correct Stere. I did not wish to say that Stere was not able to express what he wanted to say or that I am in a position to express his ideas better than he did. I propose a different definition of populism. Certainly he meant by "populist" something different from what I mean. I do not believe that there is one correct meaning of the word "populist". I do not wish to wage a struggle against different usages of the word "populism". I do not believe that it is possible to come to a general agreement that we should use the word "populist" only in this and not that sense. Everything depends on definition, and definition in its turn, depends on the purpose it is to serve.

There are two main definitions. One definition, which I share broadly with Professor Venturi, is that populism is a type of phase of Socialism which is typified by a specific combination of looking backward to the past and, at the same time, looking forward. "Populism" is a general term for all radical movements which appeal to the people, which usually, but not always, idealise the people, and not only a particular class of the people.

What Dr. Keep said was quite right. There was, on my part, a certain reluctance to recognise the importance of twentieth century populism. My knowledge of nineteenth century populism is greater than my knowledge of twentieth century populism. Perhaps the influence of Soviet scholars and Lenin's conception of populism also was instrumental in my thinking.

But my definition of populism, and my conception of it, can be defended. My idea of populism is not limited to the question of how to avoid and prevent capitalism. This is a phase of a populist movement, not the whole story, and it is only the first phase which in fact ended with the industrialisation of the nineties. After that came a second phase, and following the victory of Socialist revolution, the third phase. I limited myself to the first phase of populism, nineteenth century populism and within this conception I will defend the view that classical populism was the populism of the seventies and eighties, and, to some extent, even the nineties, but before the seventies it was early populism.

I will not talk very much about Mikhailovsky, because I agree that the influence of Comge was very important. In my paper, I tried to deal with only two particular problems. Nevertheless, I will defend the view that the influence of Marx was very instrumental in the development of populist ideology. According to Marx there are three stages. There is the first stage of self-sufficiency and property, then the period of the divorce between the means of production and producers, and finally Socialism as a partial restoration on a higher plane of the archaic or mediaeval property relationship. What I have tried to say is that, although it may seem paradoxical, it was Marx's Kapital which caused Russian democrats to conceive of capitalism as the enemy number one, thus contributing to the intensification of the idealisation of the pre-capitalist social relationships.

I come to the point about economists and statisticians. I am grateful to Mr. Shanin for telling us about this particular dimension of populism. I am now in the middle position. At one extreme is Professor Venturi, at the other extreme is Mr. Shanin. We have heard that the mainstream of populism consisted of social scientists. I agree that such a dimension of populism did exist, and I think it is an additional argument in favour of the view that the concept of populism should not be confined to the revolutionary movement. The concept of populism should embrace, not only revolutionary movements, but legal populism. There is no real disagreement between Professor Venturi and myself. It is only a terminological disagreement.

Professor Venturi agrees with me that social populism is a chapter in the history of socialism. If one wants to write a history of socialism without any additional explanation, it will be a history of socialist doctrine. If one wants to write a history of socialist movements, one should entitle the book "A History of Socialist Movements". If populism was a chapter in the history of socialism, by the same token it was a socialist doctrine first, and the movement is defined by a reference to doctrine. So doctrine came first. If I were Professor Venturi, I would have given a different title to my book. I would have called it "A History of the Revolutionary Populist Movement in Russia".

I took Lenin's definition only as a starting point. There are some aspects of Russian populism which were not seen or not taken into account by Lenin. Lenin wished to expose the backward-looking phase of the populist age. But, nevertheless, his definition could be applied - it works. As a means of classification of who was a populist and who was not a populist, Lenin's definition is still very good. Lenin included Tkachev as a populist. I think that he was right. Lenin believed that Chernyshevsky was partially populist and partially not populist. He was right. In this sense, I accept Lenin's definition.

I doubt whether Herten lived as a populist. I think that he lived as an aristocrat. He was attacked by the younger generation because of his aristocratic style of living. But that is a minor point. I agree that populism should be seen within the context of the Socialist tradition as a whole.

(The Conference adjourned)

Sunday, 21 May 1967

Morning Session

Chairman:- Prof. Peter Worsley

THE CHAIRMAN: We move on from discussion at the first meeting, which was primarily of ideas, beliefs, systems of ideas and ideology, and from the second meeting, which looked at the classical and historical manifestations - the Narodnik and North American movements - which leaves a lot of residual movements which we have not dealt with so far, particularly those in the contemporary and recent underdeveloped emergent countries of Africa and Asia. But by no means will we confine discussion to those countries. It is simply that here is a place in the programme in which they can be represented and talked about. I hope that those of you who are Narodniks, Populists, and so on, will not feel repressed in this situation. It is residual in some other respects too, which make it less tidy, and it may well, therefore, begin to spill over to this afternoon, when we can pull together the strands of the several discussions.

Equally, one would not want to preclude discussion of what are broadly labelled the political aspects. We have been discussing the political aspects throughout, but I take this title to have the implication of structural and organisational aspects of the movement: such issues as the distinction between a movement and a party; whether populism can be a movement or a régime; whether it is inherently Left or may also appear in Right varieties; the conditions under which it emerges, the forms it takes, the social functions - if I am allowed to use that term - that it implies and serves in a given society; its relationship with other related and perhaps interwoven forms of organisation (other parties, nationalism, and so on); the sources of social support (on which Professor Touraine opened discussion yesterday); class composition, differentiation, social mobility, and so on.

Finally, I would like to put in my own private oar: that if we are to discuss particularly Afro-Asian movements and to appraise recent populisms, one has to do this very much within a world context. It struck me yesterday, listening to the discussion on nineteenth century Russia, that just as the populists there were, on the one hand, struggling intellectually, debating with the Marxists on the Left, and fearing the onslaught and inroads of capitalism on the Right - on the other side of the fence - so, too, the populists in the contemporary Afro-Asian world have tried to remain uncommitted as between Moscow on the one hand and Washington on the other hand.

We all tend to be "specific" populists: in Peru, Kenya or wherever it may be: but we must not lose sight of the fact that this is a world phenomenon taking place in the context of what is a world battle.

A large number of speakers have indicated an interest in participating in the discussion and I would like to go ahead and call on Mr. Hennessy.

MR. C.A.M. HENNESSY: I am a little worried about the application of the term populism to the Latin American scene. For that reason, I shall concentrate mainly (apart from the Acción Popular movement discussed yesterday, which is as far as I know the only movement in Latin America which specifically calls itself populist) on what I think is a clear example of a populist phenomenon, namely, Castroism and the Cuban revolution.

The first thing that I should like to emphasise is a point which has been mentioned in the historical context but which, I think, is brought out very forcibly in Cuba and reflects one of the peculiarities of the Latin American scene. This is the importance played in the populist movement by youth. Generational conflict, as we know only too well, is always with us, but one of the interesting questions is to ask why, at particular places and at particular times, this takes a political form. In the 1920s and 1930s fascism capitalised very much on this generational conflict aspect.

In Latin America it is not so much the "people" as the younger generation which is seen as being the repository of virtue. I would say that built into Latin American radical movements, and particularly Cuba, is the myth of the incorruptibility of youth. If one looks at the actual mechanics of the Cuban revolution, the part played by the students of Havana university, particularly after it was closed down by Batista and 20,000 students were thrown out on to the streets, is absolutely crucial to an understanding of this movement.

This can be seen in a broader Latin American context if one goes back to the 1918 university reform movement started in Argentina, which as far as I know has no parallel elsewhere. This popularised the idea that society will be regenerated not only by the younger generation, but by the younger generation using the universities as a sort of focus. It is in the way in which Guevara talks about the revolutionary focus that the university reform people were thinking of the university. You create your democratic or populist society, your equality between professors and students in the university, and you move away out from that. This has been the longest example of a revolutionary movement trying to change society in Latin America.

The first point which I would make is the extreme importance of youth in the Latin American context and particularly its integral importance in an understanding of Castroism: the way in which, for example, Castro continually goes into the university in order to renew contacts with the student body. It is significant that on one of those occasions, the 13th March, an anniversary of when many students were

killed in assaulting Batista's palace, he makes a speech from the university steps; and this is nearly always the major policy speech of the year. I think that this is quite deliberate. In a sense, he recharges his batteries from contact with the younger generation.

Secondly, in Castroism there is a very strong ruralist element. But it is all very curious in a Cuban context, because Cuba is one of the most highly urbanised countries in Latin America. (This is a point which should be made for those who are not very well acquainted with the Latin American field: that it is a very highly urbanised continent.) We are coming to the stage when more people live in cities and towns than live in the countryside. In fact, something like 60 per cent of Cuba was urbanised and yet, of course, the economy is entirely dependent on the export of agricultural crops.

One of the real legacies of the colonial period was the urban mentality of the Spaniards which has left an enormous gap between town and country. Castro has quite deliberately set out to try and break down the psychological barriers which have made the professional classes, the middle classes, extremely reluctant to take up any sort of career in agronomy or anything like that. If you look at the way in which the faculties have been reformed in the university, you will see that the traditional position of law faculties, bulging with potential practitioners, has been drastically reduced and agronomy, chemical sciences and the rest has been expanded.

There are lots of aspects of this ruralism and, of course, the guerilla mystique is merely one of them. This brings one to one of the very complicated questions in the case of Castroism; the way in which it has become snarled up in the cold war and the way in which the old Cuban Communist Party has tried to impose its own categories on the movement.

The traditional Communist Parties in Latin America are urban; they have shown next to no interest in the rural population and as a result you have a direct confrontation between the traditional Communist Parties and the Castroist groups. I think, incidentally, that it is wrong to talk about Chinese influence. I do not think that Chinese influence is particularly strong in Latin America. There are Chinese groups, especially in Peru, but I think that this is something which has come out of the Cuban experience.

Castro tends to think in moral, not in economic categories. Although he declares that he is a Marxist, I think that this is very superficial. I think that his whole inspiration can be seen in a Cuban populist tradition stemming from the great thinker Jose Martí, who was a Cuban Mazzinian, and the way in which he continually talks about the "honest man", for example, in many of his speeches. This is the strong moral emphasis which gives a certain resonance to this debate which is common to all communist countries but is particularly fierce between the question of moral and material incentives.

The old Cuban communists, with their support in organised labour, argue in favour of material incentives, Castro and Guevara (before he disappeared) argue in favour of moral incentives, that you cannot create a new society without this moral purification and moral revolution. This seems to me to tie in with the traditional, as I understand it, populist emphasis on the whole man that we were talking about yesterday and the question of moral regeneration.

Another point which can follow on here, after mention of the communists, is Castro's extreme reluctance to institutionalise the revolution. This seems to raise another general point on the analysis of populism. It may be that he wants to avoid the example of Mexico, but certainly, if one looks at the very curious history of the Cuban Communist Party - the new Communist Party (which was formed five years ago), not the old one - it still has not had its national congress; and it is very unclear where the actual focus of power lies outside Castro himself. Indeed, the actual official theoretical journal of the Communist Party of Cuba has recently ceased publication because, as it says, there are certain ideological questions which have to be cleared up.

I think that the reluctance to institutionalise the revolution can also be related to Castro's own desire to keep his predominant position in it. This raises the question which, rather curiously, has not been raised so far: that is - and I use this word with a certain reluctance - the question of charismatic leadership. One has to make the distinction between those leaders who manipulate communications media and those who achieve direct rapport with the people with personal contact.

I would have thought that Peron was perhaps an example of the first, whereas Belaunde, but more specifically Castro, is an example of the second. Eva Peron obviously had charismatic elements here. Perhaps Mr. Gallo will tell us something about this.

This raises the problem of what happens to a populist movement which becomes tied to a leader of this sort. If you take in Colombia, when Gaitan - who had some of this 'charisma' - was murdered, his followers went on the rampage in Bogotá, burning and sacking. Once they had done this, the whole movement lost its impetus and broke up.

Peron raises a very interesting question: can there be Peronism without Peron? And there is the question of APRA in Peru and Haya de la Torre existing since 1924. As the arteries of the old man harden, so the arteries of his populist movement harden as well. This is one point which we should look into, the whole question of charismatic leadership.

The next point, following on from what Professor Morris Jones said yesterday about how the availability of the general sort of ideas lying around in a society determine the type of movement, seems to me to be very important in the Latin American context. Here I would like to distinguish between the demonstration effect and the fascination effect of foreign ideologies in Latin America, the demonstration effect broadly speaking creating the revolution of rising expectations from contact with a highly developed consumer society in the North, with the fascination effect of foreign ideologies whereby Latin American intellectuals, as a means of escaping from oppressive North American influence, look, and I think increasingly look, to European example. This seems to me to be a very big problem.

There are so many present examples that it is very difficult for an intellectual group to decide which are the most relevant for their own particular societies. In the case of, say Mexico and Peru, where

you have people who are visibly different and who have been exploited - namely, the Indians, and where you have a distinctive culture, with visible remains as at Tiahuanaco or Machu Picchu - you can have a situation where the populist movement glorifies the pre-Spanish past and it has what I would call a telluric base.

In Chile, which is very largely Europeanised, where does the populist movement look for its ideas? It is largely derivative. It looks to Europe, it gets its ideas from Mounier, Teilhard de Chardin, etc. Professor von Lazar's paper on communitarianism in Chile brings out the fuzzy and rather airy fairy nature of populist ideology there.

But in the case of Cuba, of course, this problem was very acute. There was a cultural vacuum, no pre-Spanish culture which could be idealised by the intellectuals, and pre-revolutionary Cuba was characterised by an acute sense of cultural deprivation, open to pernicious foreign influences coming down from the North.

The way in which Castro is thinking and seeing Cuba's role in ideological terms, is quite simply that Cuba has suffered more than any other Latin American country - the 30 years' War of Independence against the Spaniards and then economic exploitation by the United States; and for this reason Cuba is better able to understand the problems of the rest of the continent and is morally in a much stronger position to provide the leadership. There is a sort of, as I understand it, Polish Messianic feeling that because Poland suffered more than any other country, it will thereby become the regenerator of Europe - so with Cuba and Latin America in Castroist ideology.

If I may come back to Eva Peron, I hope you will not think it entirely flippant if I raise the question of the attitude of populist movements to women, because this is rather important. After all, if you appeal to the people and you exclude 50 per cent of the people just because of their sex, it seems to me to be a rather tenuous sort of populist movement. It is very important in the Latin American context, in a male dominated society, where you have the Macho complex - i.e. you must father as many children, preferably male children, as possible, whether legitimate or illegitimate - women are very much an exploited group. I think that built into Castroism is the view that the movement must emancipate women. I do not know whether this occurs in the Argentinian case.

In the case of Mexico, of course, there was a very strong feminist element in the 1920s, but it looks to me as if Mexican women are fighting a losing battle against male aggression and the Macho complex.

Finally, the relationship between Castroism and nationalism. I think that the cultural vacuum in Cuba is one reason why anti-Americanism has inevitably to play an extremely important part in the story. But also, I think this was an imperative. Perhaps the break with the United States was unavoidable in the sense that you could not have a situation where, after you had created your populist revolution, you had your do-gooders, etc., coming down from the United States with a whole set of cultural ideas. What many Cubans fear more than anything else is to find themselves in a Puerto Rico-like situation where the sense of cultural deprivation was increased. I think, therefore, that this business of cutting themselves

off, creating a sort of insular situation, is something which a populist movement, if it is to draw sustenance from its own roots, must inevitably do. Better the devil at 10,000 miles than the devil on the doorstep.

The fact that Russian influence comes in is the price that has to be paid, but one doubts that Russian influence is anything like as strong as it may appear on the outside. Ultimately, the populist strand in Castroism and the Cuban revolution - I think that this can be seen in the whole development of revolutionary strategy and the attack being made on traditional communist parties - will come out on top.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. We want to group preferably a number of speakers on Latin America initially, The first four are therefore bracketed. Dr. Calvert.

DR. PETER CALVERT: Ironically, I was not planning to say a great deal about Latin America, but I would attempt to draw together some strands which seem to have emerged during the course of this discussion which would certainly not be irrelevant.

As far as I can see, we have been talking basically about populism at three levels: Populism with a capital "P" in the United States and Russia; populism in its manifestations in south east-Europe and Mexico, Peru, and wherever we may decide that we can talk about authentic populist movements, without the actual label of populism being attached to them; and we have been talking about a populist element in the politics of other countries.

Throughout, however, we have been talking more in terms of political movements. We have considered the question of ideology. I think we agreed more or less that the ideology was a flexible element, and my impression was that we might be coming round to a view that populism, strictly defined, was a movement which tended to exist in different ideological climates and to take on the hue of the environment, but basically that it was a rural movement seeking to realise traditional values in a changing society. This could be only a very broad basis for a definition.

This is important because if we look, for example, at the most clear and obvious example, that of North America, which we discussed late yesterday afternoon, we have a populism of the United States which is relatively early in historical time, occurring at the end of the nineteenth century. We have the populism of Saskatchewan and Mexico occurring in a climate in which socialist ideas are already widely prevalent, well articulated and available for use to support certain points of view rather than others.

As a political movement, however, populism in each of those three areas seems to have been essentially a moral rather than an ideological construction. In each case undoubtedly, it seems to me, the political characteristic of promotion by the intelligentsia is much more regular than perhaps it has been made out. Particularly if I may

refer to American populism - United States populism - I think that one has tended to forget how much the mobile quality of American life meant that the sort of people who dominated American populism were, in fact, the intelligentsia of their own particular communities.

I did a study some years ago on Governor Davis Waite, of Colorado, one of the few Populists to reach gubernatorial level. He was born in New York in the 1820s, gradually migrated his way across the United States. Everywhere he went he set up a newspaper, wrote articles and became one of the intellectual centres of the community. He gradually moved his way across the United States until he wound up strategically in Colorado in nice time for the Populist movement and became Governor of the State. He was a man whom I would have regarded as being cultivated and well read within the small, biblical context of the time.

I think that we could take this model as the basis for assuming that although populist leaders may not appear to have been, by standards of the world view, people who were distinguished contributors to the history of political thought, nevertheless they were powerful within their own communities and effective within the limits of their own field of operations. Coupled with this is the undoubted quality of the Americans in particular as preachers, as people who appeal as personalities. I am glad that Mr. Hennessy has raised this charismatic element, because this is fundamental. We are talking about moral movements and ethical values.

There are two points which I particularly wanted to take up. One is the comment on the apocalyptic nature of the populist world view as exemplified by Ignatius Connelly in Caesar's Column. I think that this can be overdone a bit. After all, Ignatius Donnelly is writing at the same time as H.G. Wells was forming his early ideas, and it seems to me that the apocalyptic view presented in Caesar's Column is not all that different from Well's The Sleeper Awakes - for example, from his view of the inevitability of destruction of the order of society as it was - and yet I do not think that one would turn round then and say that socialism was liable to an apocalyptic view. There are apocalyptic socialisms and there are non-apocalyptic socialisms.

The North American populists were realists. They had a realistic view of this alien element; this alien structure of power, the alienness of the money tie. This seems to me, in the Latin American context at least, and certainly in the other examples which we have been given, to have been the consistent factor governing the realism of their political approach. If they are faced with a problem of doing something about a situation which is effectively speaking beyond their control, how realistic can one expect their responses to be?

It is all right talking about populists not having a coherent programme, a series of actions which they will perform once they get into power. But if they are conscious within their situation of something that is too big for them to deal with, I do not see how one can expect to have a consistent reaction in this sense because the moment one attempts to apply the reaction, one finds oneself up against an unknown problem.

This takes me to Professor Wiles' comment on Cordenas. It is true that the Cordenas achievement was limited to taking the long view,

but it was very considerable by the standards of its day. But it is a bit hard on Cordenas to say that on the one hand he was a populist, which undoubtedly he was, but that on the other hand, however, his most populist characteristic - the land distribution element - was forced upon him by the communists. I do not think that I could wear this one historically speaking.

I think that this would be a misunderstanding of the role of a leader like Cordenas in playing off so many powerful elements and in the Spanish-Mexican context the very well articulated Marxism which was already well developed by the 1920s. This problem could not have conceivably faced anyone in an earlier generation and it could not face any populist movement today, for the simple reason that the standpoints are by now well established and, therefore, people have much more defined preconceptions about it than they had in the 1920s and 1930s.

Therefore, if we look for populisms today, we will look for a different sort of animal. We are looking for a type of movement. We need not expect to find the same sort of ideologies as were found in either of those two other periods. Therefore, in a sense, we can relate this to what happens when a populist movement achieves power.

As I see it, a populist movement can form a government. There can be a populist government within a system of society which is accepted more or less generally. One cannot have a populist régime as such because the characteristic of a populist movement is to take on the ideological hue of its surroundings. One cannot speak of a dominant populist system or society. One can only talk about the populist party within a society of a different sort of hue. Therefore, to that extent, populism is a 'non-ism' in the sense that it is not an ideological phenomenon. It is a political one.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. A number of issues arise out of Mr. Hennessy's contribution and the last contribution which also appear in the papers. One is the question of the nature of the elite, including the charismatic component, if any. I would have thought that in this section concerning Latin America, too, we should discuss the question of the urban nature or otherwise of populism. Mr. Hennessy told us, for example, that there is a rural mystique in Castroism, (the guerilla movement and so on), which seems to be very different from what is conventionally called "populism": the Peronist kind. So perhaps this would be worth talking about.

MR. DE.KADT: An isolated point to begin with. We must not lose sight of the fact that populism is an ideology: the view of a (usually small) group of persons about the mass of the people and their place in society. But yesterday, during the discussion, I had the feeling that for a good part of the time we were talking about the history of ideas rather than the history of ideology. One of the things that we do not want to do too much is to get involved in an analysis of the ideas of people who never in any sense become the ideological leaders of a politically active group.

I want to begin by taking up Peter Worsley's suggestion that there is a first and a second-stage populism. That makes a good deal of sense to me. There are really two major sets of populisms which do, of course, have a large number of characteristics in common but which also differ quite considerably from each other. An important difference is that, on the one hand, we have a kind of protest, or opposition, or marginal populism, a populism of people who seem to have nothing to lose and a lot to gain. On the other hand, we find a government, state, or integrative populism, a populism of people who seem to have a lot to lose. Remember the idea put forward yesterday by Professor Seton-Watson of 'jobs for the boys'. The latter type appears often to develop out of the former, which seems especially to have been the case in Africa.

These two types of populism are perhaps especially distinguished by the nature of the expected involvement of the masses, whether they are peasant or urban. Various papers and many speakers have pointed to that aspect of the ideology of populism which calls for mass involvement and mass participation. Many have also stressed the question of the romanticising of the people and of the idea that men should help themselves and promote their own welfare. In the case of most of these protest or marginal populist movements there is probably an authentic identification of the movement's ideologues and members with the masses, and there is a feeling among them that the masses themselves should really find their own destiny, that the masses should somehow fully participate in the creation of a new kind of society.

I don't think that that is true for the majority of the governing or 'integrative' populisms. For their case we would do well to remember Ken Minogue's distinction between rhetoric and ideology: very often there is much of the former and little of the latter. There is mobilisation of the masses rather than a true feeling of letting the masses find their own destiny. At worst, there is manipulation of the masses, which is, incidentally, very often achieved through previously existing paternalistic dependency structures in the society.

To the extent that a government movement allows the expression of the interests of the people 'as a whole', of the masses, it might usefully be called populist. Alastair Hennessy's discussion of Castroism is quite relevant in this respect. If, however, such a governing movement is basically manipulative and paternalistic, basically concerned with keeping the masses in check rather than letting the masses decide on their own solutions to the problem of running society, (which is the sort of thing which has happened in Latin America: it is what Peronismo was about in its later stage, and it is certainly what Getulismo was about in Brazil. then I do not think there is much point in calling it populism.

In this context I would now like to turn briefly to Professor Von Lazar's paper. It has the merit of clearly showing up the elements of paternalistic manipulation by the now ruling Christian Democratic Party in Chile, the rhetorical aspects in their otherwise populist ideology. On another point however, he seems to misread the evidence. This occurs when he takes rather literally the views expressed in one single publication, where some stress is placed on the importance of the early Christian world view. Von Lazar sees this as a (populist) return to a pristine Christian community. This shows that he fails to understand the way in which Latin American radical catholic groups, before they get into government, use the sources of religious thought - the Church Fathers, the Bible and so on.

They do not go back to these sources because they have some kind of primitivist view of the world. On the contrary, they use 'primitive' but 'orthodox' texts in order to combat the less 'primitive' views which are currently held by the 'establishment' of the Church, a church of which they consider themselves very much a part. It is the radical nature of the primitive texts in the present circumstances which is the relevant point here.

Finally, I would like briefly to look at the extent to which the characteristics which have been put forward as belonging to populist movements are present among the existing small radical catholic protest groups in Latin America. These groups seem to have much in common with the first kind of populism which I have tried to discuss, namely protest populism. They have, as far as I know, never been called populist, nor has the similarity with other populist movements been noticed.

The movements in question are élite movements in which the drive comes from a very small number of people: students, intellectuals, and so on. These people continuously talk about the masses - but the movements in no sense really originate from the masses. They romanticise the ordinary and they romanticise the people. Thus in Brazil, during the period of Goulart, one saw the rise of the Movement of Popular Culture, (Movimento de Cultura Popular), set up in the first instance by Marxists, but later joined - and developed in a non-Marxist direction - by radical catholic groups and individuals who gave the efforts a clearly populist twist. It led to a tremendous romanticisation of the masses, of the people, of the culture of the people. It wanted to steer Brazilian culture back to the 'culture of the people' and away from the sophisticated (and especially: imported) culture, which had supposedly been imposed upon them. Furthermore, speaking again in general terms, there is, among these radical catholic groups in Latin America, a strong stress on direct participation by the people, finding concrete expression in co-operativism and theoretical expression in communitarianism.

There is, of course, another source of these ideas: the catholic social doctrine of subsidiarity; This doctrine states, a little simplified, that one should aim at getting things done, socially and politically, in the smallest (and most 'intimate') social unit which can operate effectively. It was developed, as a doctrine, in Europe, in opposition to centralising, state-emphasising socialism. But the radical groups we are talking about, interested though they may be in participation and cooperation, do see that in Latin America the state has to play a very important role. This in fact leads them to clash with the traditional anti-state, Catholic viewpoint. The radicals realise that the context of the mid-twentieth century is quite different from that of even only 30 years ago. And they have taken their clue from - and are impressed, perhaps over-impressed by - the socialist bloc.

These radical catholic groups, moreover, have developed a strong utopic element. Donald MacRae spoke about the single apocalyptic deed which the populist movement craves for - the escape from the burden of history. That too one finds again in this kind of movement. The hope for an escape from the burden of history finds expression in the belief that it is possible to create a society without evil or 'contradictions', as well as in the hope for the emergence of a radically new kind of man.

One also quite clearly encounters the conspiratorial element. But here we have to be careful. These people may have an exaggerated tendency to blame everything on the bad Americans, on the C.I.A., or on the local capitalists. However, as Peter Worsley has already pointed out, there are important elements in the really existing social, political and economic situation which make this kind of view not totally irrelevant.

What does this all amount to? So far we have together been thinking along the following lines. We have been enumerating the traits that are found in those movements we have labelled populist. We have discovered that the label is rather widely applicable - in some cases to hitherto ' unsuspected' situations. We have tentatively, decided that there are two kinds (or perhaps stages) of populism - for each of these, then, we have begun to construct an 'ideal' type. These ideal types should prove useful, because with them we can look at situations like those I have described for Latin America and begin to ask ourselves relevant questions. Questions such as why, in some cases one finds most characteristics of the ideal type, and in others a much less complete set. Questions, then, also about the way in which these traits hang together, about the dynamics of populism; questions which may give us some reasons why populism (full-fledged) does develop under certain circumstances and not under others. That is, after all, what Weber was trying to do about capitalism, when he looked at societies which did not develop the full-fledged thing, and asked why this had been so. That is the kind of approach we might in the end find useful; it is certainly what this gathering has stimulated me to do with my own research data on radical catholicism in Latin America.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I particularly appreciate the emphasis which you have introduced of the study of ideology (a) as a system and (b) in terms of its social niche and the contrast between that and the history of ideas which are two distinct things and have tended to become rather blurred and confused in the discussion. I understand that after a period of remarkable self-restraint, Professor Schapiro suddenly wishes to erupt in the middle of Latin America. Is that right?

PROF. LEONARD SCHAPIRO: Not particularly. I have one or two remarks to make, but they are very close to what Mr. de Kadt has just said although they do not relate to Latin America in particular.

THE CHAIRMAN: If they relate to what Mr. de Kadt has said, please carry on.

PROF. SCHAPIRO: The relationship really consists in that I, too, have considerable difficulty - perhaps I ought not to be here at all - in seeing the relevance of the term 'populism' to many of the variable phenomena which we are discussing. But possibly Mr. de Kadt, with the invocation of Weber, gives us some consolation that our efforts may after all not be in vain.

My particular difficulty about attempting to construct even an ideal type is that we are talking about something which we give a name to, which comes into our language from America, from the end of the nineteenth century; and then, being historians, we remember that there was a thing called *narodnichestvo* in Russian which the dictionaries translate as "populism", and so we say that we must relate it to that prototype. This may be right, but it creates difficulties, because I do not myself see any serious relationship between what we have been told, what one knows, about American populism, and what one knows about Russian populism.

As many people, including Ken Minogue and now de Kadt, have pointed out, one obviously has to see these movements, ideologies or whatever they are in the context of their own particular history. The first thing that I could not help thinking about all yesterday when populism was being discussed was that one element which somehow seemed to me to be missing was that all these ideas, all these emotions which grew up in Russia in the nineteenth century, grew up on the soil of orthodoxy. It may well be that a lot of people who, so to speak, practised populism had deserted orthodoxy. But that all this grew up on the soil of orthodoxy, with its particular sense of the divine mission of the people and of the presence of Christ among the simple and humiliated people which is so strong in Russian tradition, something which has been there for centuries, cannot, it seems to me, be left out of account.

However, what I am primarily concerned with, - and this is where I feel that I am very much in agreement with de Kadt - is that we were perhaps concentrating yesterday very much on ideas, whereas if we are to talk about Latin America and Africa and populism in those areas, we have to talk a little bit about the realities of politics. The realities of politics when it comes to populism in its Russian prototype was only touched upon very much in passing by Professor Seton-Watson, but otherwise scarcely discussed.

The reality of Russian populist politics, as I understand it, was the relationship which these people saw, which the ideologists saw, between the people and the duties of the leader. After all, all politics consist to some extent of establishing some kind of relationship between the leader of a party or of a movement and those whom he claims to lead. Personally I take populism, as Dr. Keep does, right into the revolution and even later. It is arguable that there are elements of it there today, but certainly 1917 and 1918 must be taken into account, because that was when the theory came to be tested. That was when the Chernovs and the Kerenskys, who was populist in background, and a lot of the so-called Cadet members of the provisional government who were in effect populists in their tradition, had to act; and when they had to act what came to the fore was precisely the populist tradition of leadership, - the anti-*élitist* tradition that on no account must you attempt to impose a doctrine on the people, that the people must learn to speak with their own voice and that you must merely give expression to it; that the people's will ultimately always will be right. Belaunde was astonished that the people did not vote for him - astonished and hurt. Lenin would not have been astonished and hurt. He would merely have said that it was a badly managed election.

But this innocent faith that the people's voice must always be right, and that you cannot manipulate it, seems to me to be the absolute essence of the Russian Provisional Government. Every single one of their acts is imbued with the fear that if they do not let the voice of the people be heard - if they try to keep them in order, even to try to stop chaos - they will be sinning against history and against the Revolution. Every single speech of Kerensky, and particularly of Lvov, the first Prime Minister, is steeped in this fear. Chernov, the leader of the socialist revolutionaries, the latter-day populists, was faced with an overwhelming majority of votes in the country at the election of the constituent assembly and yet could do absolutely nothing to defend it. It is no good complaining about this. That is the nature of populism. Populism - that is why I agree so much with de Kadt - is essentially something which is inconsistent with the kind of realities of politics and of leadership which, in the Russian case, Lenin's ideas represent.

To talk of charismatic populism or populism led by leaders, which seems to me to be the case in Latin America as far as I can understand it - the successful or the less successful ones, that is - to talk of led populism, populism with charismatic leaders, the sort of manipulated or exploited populism, all that kind of thing, if I might borrow a phrase from another great populist, Khrushchev, is like talking about fried snowballs. It is something which to me is totally inconsistent.

If we want to forget about the Russians, well and good. Let us leave all that aside as a peculiar piece of Russian history which has nothing to do with anything else and then try to find our model. But if we take the Russian experience as a prototype, it seems to me that the element of anti-*élitism*, the fear that the people's will will be frustrated by leaders who attempt to impose upon it, cannot be ignored.

May I remind you of perhaps one of the most dramatic Russian populists - Alexander Blok - with his detachment of Red Guards with Christ at the head of them in "The Twelve" - with his idealisation of the mob, writing in his diary in June 1917, words to the effect of "How dare we, the intellectuals, attempt to dictate to this wise and all-knowing people" - all this in the middle of the riots. That kind of sentiment, this intoxication, was something which was, I suppose, to a very large extent the populists' own invention and their own myth. It was, I think, a reflection of this deliberate refusal and deliberate abstention from the duty of leadership. That seems to me to be an historical and political fact.

I was enormously interested in what Professor Mancini said about Gramsci and, as it were, populism being reflected in Italian communism, curious as it may seem that any kind of communism could have anything to do with populism, because in that respect they are poles apart. That seemed to me to be a fascinating element.

Another way in which this kind of factor in my view should be applied is to the question of populism and fascism. Of course, there are elements of populism in the fascist movement, in national socialism, particularly in the exploitation of a certain ideology and of certain realms of thought and tradition. But when it comes to leadership - there you have the big difference. That is why I personally would not

be able to see these expansionist movements, or for that matter the Caudillist Latin American ones as being in the same category because it is a different attitude to the problem of what you do with the people. You may exploit the same kind of sentiments, but what matters is what you do about it. It is whether you are dealing with small protest movements which de Kadt described; or whether it is that you are merely pretending, so to speak, to act for the people, but are really manipulating them to get their votes and carry out some kind of policy of the leader. That seems to me to be the essential difference and one which, in the search for definitions we ought not to leave out of account.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Professor Schapiro. With that nostalgia for Lenin, security and order, we will break for coffee.

(Adjourned for coffee)

Chairman:- Prof. Ernest Gellner

MR. GALLO: I would like to comment briefly on the peronist case. I think it would be meaningless to label peronism nowadays as a populist movement. I believe this statement will hold even if we accept as broad a definition of the term as the one suggested by Prof. Walicki, namely any radical movement not based on a single social class. The peronism movement is a typical working class party overwhelmingly based on the support of industrial trade unions. And I would regard this situation as valid since the early 1950's. Thus we are limited to a rather short period of time in which the populist label could be applied (1945-1950).

In doing so we should start by accepting Prof. Touraine's criteria about the feasibility of applying the term to urban movements. The links of peronism with rural life were both feeble and marginal. No nostalgia for a bygone rural past can be found in the early peronist ideology. I would therefore disagree with the remarks made on this point by Mr. Stewart in his otherwise very interesting paper.

The grounds on which the populist hypothesis has been based are the following: (1) the importance of rural newcomers in the making of the movement; (2) the support given to Peron by groups other than the industrial working classes, i.e., the Army, the Church and a small sector of industrial entrepreneurs, and (3) the nationalistic (pre-industrialist) and authoritarian bias of the peronist ideology.

All these elements were undoubtedly present in the early days of peronism. They were of great importance too. However, the current literature on the subject has, in my opinion, overemphasized the importance of the above mentioned elements. It has also too frequently forgotten that the decisive fact in the coming of peronism was the support given to the movement by an already large and experienced trade union organization.

Important sectors of the previously socialist or anarchist leadership started to shift towards peronism in these years. By 1945 the CGT (General Confederation of Workers) decided to support Peron, and in the same year the Partido Laborista (a typical working class political organization) came into being. I would regard these changes as much more decisive than the presence of rural newcomers. The impact of the latter was chiefly felt in the following areas: (i) in a second stage of peronist history, with Peron fully in power, they supported enthusiastically the government in its struggle against some reluctant trade union leaders, and (ii) they gave peronism that very strong resemblance with XIX century European Jacquerie.

The support of rural newcomers enjoyed by Peron was not due, as it is often stated, to the special receptivity of people with a recent rural past to authoritarian ideologies. It was chiefly due to the formidable redistribution of wealth that took place in the period 1943-1949, and which was rightly linked with Peron's policies.

Distributionism was indeed the major issue of the peronist ideology and has remained as the central one up to the present days.

The nationalistic and industrial sides of the ideology were much more ephemeral. They were inherited from former conservative governments who had fostered considerably the rate of growth of the industrial sector since the middle 1930's. A growing economy with a labour intensive basis, made possible the existence of the 1945 political coalition. Other factors were also important, namely, the fears of some industrialists of a possible return of export oriented economic policies and, perhaps more important, the presence of traditional leftist parties (Socialists and Communists) in the political coalition opposing Perón (this was particularly important in the case of the Church and the Army). But when the economic situation of the country began to worsen (ca. 1950) and the risks above mentioned faded out, the peronist coalition started to crumble away. By 1955, the Army and the Church led the coup d'état that put an end to the Perón régime. Needless to say, the coup was received with great enthusiasm by the bulk of industrial entrepreneurs.

The so-called populist features of 'peronismo' were neither central nor permanent characteristics of the movement even in its early stages. Many of the 'untypical' features of peronism (authoritarianism and the like) can indeed be traced in any other western labour movement. On the other hand, it would be difficult to find amid populist movements one with the sort of stubborn identification with organized labour that has characterised peronism throughout its history.

DR. MACFARLANE: I would like to follow on from Mr. de Kadt to see whether we can cut populism down to size. This is what we are concerned with. Too many people are likely to get in on the act and we want to make it a manageable act. This is one aspect of what we want to do. The other thing is to try to compartmentalise populism to some extent, to get some dimensions of it so that we can put them in particular squares of populism rather than having them in a composite whole where they are with other animals which are more likely to gobble them up than to mate with them.

The dimension which first occurs to me is the one we have already talked about, the stages of which we have spoken, and the other is in relation to the strength of populism. We can look at this strength of populism both in relation to ideology on the one hand, and in relation to the movement itself on the other hand. We could talk of a strong ideology of populism, or rather a strong populist ideologies, because I do not consider that there is an ideology; there are ideologies which are populist: where there are well differentiated sets of ideas, where they aim at an integrated, satisfied community, where they aim at affecting the whole life of those in the community, where they are built on the concept of the natural goodness of man as he is rather than the idea which we find perhaps in communism or fascism in having to build a new man, in transforming man. The existence of some of these features will enable us to say that this is a strong form of populist ideology which we are dealing with.

With weak populist ideologies we are dealing with people concerned usually with a very immediate issues, with a comparatively narrow range of grievance and expectations. I think that in these terms a weak populist ideology tends to spill over into the concept of a pressure group of people with a narrow sort of objective which may be satisfied

relatively simply and which does not involve the transformation of the nature of society. Clearly, in ideological terms I think we would say that American populism is very obviously weak in this sense.

The strength of the movement side: at one end of the scale we will find the sort of thing we were talking about yesterday in Hungary, with a few scattered intellectuals who may have little or no contact with those for whom they claim to act; and at the other end of the scale the full strength that we get is of a populist government or a government which is claiming to be populist which is put into the position of trying to realise the objectives that it has.

We can see that there will be difficulties here if you have a movement with a strong populist ideology which is then in a position of strength. There is a contradiction exposed between what it is aiming at, and the unreality of some of its aims; it may collapse or it may take the form of seeming to betray the principles for which it stands.

There are stages of populism; I think we are more or less agreed on this point. We have the take-off point for industrialisation, the early stage the stage one of industrialisation, and here we have either a reaction against the prospects or the early effects of industrialisation. I emphasise here that this can be either rural or urban. It may well be that the reaction is on the part of urban workers and particularly if they are handicraft or home industry workers, their reaction would be of this form.

Secondly, we are likely to see this in forms of asking for and trying to get some sort of state intervention. Clearly there is a very different sort of situation if this early stage of dealing with the prospect of industrialisation is one where you are the state; the whole perspective of dealing with the ill consequences of industrialisation is altered if you are the people who have power. Secondly, if industrialisation is well under way, we are likely to see populist type movements here among those who have not developed effective means of applying pressure on society or of getting their expectations realised. It may be because an event suddenly throws up a certain group of people who are not well established within the existing means of getting their expectations or interests looked after, or it may be an existing group finds that the existing means simply do not get the results they want. Therefore, I think that we would contrast this with those who have developed the established means, who will on the one hand perhaps have formed political parties. On the other hand, if they are more narrow and sectional, they will have become well established pressure groups.

This stage two populism is likely to be weak ideologically. This is not necessarily so, but there is quite a strong chance of it. In this area they will take their distinctive nature from whom they see to be their main enemy: "What is the main reason why we find ourselves in this subordinate exposed position?" And so the characteristic which will appeal to people will be the fact that it is anti-Jewish, because the Jews are the enemy, or the financiers or coloured immigrants are the enemy. These groups are likely to be rather weak ideologically but they may be very strong from an organisational point of view. They may attract hundreds of thousands or millions of people. If they become strong as a movement, there is a counter-tendency that one would expect that either an existing party will bid for their support, as in the case of South American populism, or they may become a sort of formalised pressure group if the worst dangers or fears, the ones which seem overwhelming, are overcome.

There are one or two other features that I would like to mention quickly in passing. A populist movement is liable to rapid changes. We may think that we have pinned it down, but if we go away and we come back a few years later, we will find that it is a different animal with rapid changes of fortune and position and even of objectives in what may be the characteristics of the movement at one stage because -(and this is particularly true of second stage populism) - the situation changes and, therefore, what they are trying to do changes.

Also, the stronger the ideological content, the greater the frustration you are likely to get, either because you do not make any headway, because you cannot get the support which you want or alternatively, as I said earlier, you get the position where you think that you can achieve your objective but then you find that your objective simply is not realisable within the context of what you are trying to do.

My last point is again one on which I think there is general agreement. There are a number of cases where we are not dealing with populist movements or ideologies but with movements or ideologies which have populist elements in them. What we should try to do is to restrict as far as possible those to which we are giving a populist label from those in which there are populist elements, otherwise the thing will get extremely confusing with other sorts of labels like nationalism, on the one hand, and socialism, on the other hand. Nazism, to which Professor Schapiro referred, is a good example of a movement which has all these three labels. It was nationalistic, it was socialistic to a real extent, and it was populist in that it had quite a number of the flavours of what one might call aspects of American populism - anti-financier, anti-big business, anti-chain store and anti-foreigner. These combined with a sort of socialist way of dealing with things, nationalisation on a scale which makes the Labour Party look a very weak and windy organisation, and nationalistic of course very strongly. But I do not think that we would want therefore to describe it as a populist movement although it had an important populist strain in it.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. We will now have an additional group of the regional contributions from Africa. Dr. Engholm?

DR. ENGHOLM: Would it be possible for me to comment after Dr. Saul? I prefer to do that.

THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly.

DR. SAUL: I think that Professor Worsley was going to say something in reply to some of the points I made in my paper. I do not know whether I should put my points now.

THE CHAIRMAN: In that event, I think that it would be more logical for Peter Worsley to speak now.

PROF. WORSLEY: As I said, I am on the Left. I remember that commercial on television some months ago for the TV Times in which a bearded agitator on a soap box addressing a rather unimpressed cloth-capped worker says: "Revolution. All out on Monday, comrades. The revolution is due to begin." The other man replies, "You can't go out on Monday because television is showing football." So the agitator says "All out on Tuesday." "You cannot do that" he is told - because of some other Programme. He goes through the whole of the week but still the worker will not respond. So off the worker goes to watch television. The agitator turns to the audience and says "Oh dea, and I so wanted a revolution."

I would similarly like to believe that the sharpening of class consciousness that John Saul spoke of, or the emergence of a more clearly delineated class-pattern in East Africa is beginning to display itself. In reading the paper, I felt myself transported back in time where I started with all this business: through reading Lenin on the development of capitalism in Russian agriculture. What he seemed to me to be saying to the Narodniks and others is "Do not talk about 'people'. Do not talk about vague macro-entities of this kind: 'the' peasants or 'the' mass. Analyse the situation in much refined class terms and analyse the process of differentiation that is taking place in the countryside." Hence that is the germinal place where modern Marxist theory of large, middle and small peasants emerges.

Basically, I think that this is the same kind of operation which John Saul has very successfully and carefully done. He has been quite right to belabour me for having perhaps blurred a lot of this. I should say in self-defence that I think it is not as blurred as all that. For example, the passage from Wrigley's book on Buganda which he cites as a crucial instance of class differentiation visibly occurring under our eyes in Africa was not only cited in my work, but I actually put in the figures as well.

Secondly, there is always the problem of distinguishing oneself as analyst and commentator: in reproducing what the populists say, without at the same time appearing necessarily to approve of it. The formula which he cites from my book is a little more nuanced than perhaps he gave me credit for. I said there that the theory, or the notion, that society is very largely homogeneous, and that the great mass of the population are peasants, was not simply delusion. I was implying that a lot or some of it was, and was also a manipulable doctrine.

This manipulative element is very important because when Professor Schapiro talked earlier this morning about the utilisation of populist elements in Fascism and Nazism, for example, it reminded me vividly that in Hitler's early speeches there was a lot of reference to planning, even 5-year planning. The word "worker" occurs in the party title, and there was a lot of appeal to elements and themes which would find ready echo in a population already affected by socialist and communist ideas. But, Mr. Macfarlane, Nazism was not socialism. It used Socialist "elements", certainly, but the total framework of action was anything but socialist. One can find therefore elements incorporated, manipulated and utilised for quite other ends than that to which they were attached when embedded in their original context.

Broadly, therefore, it seems to me that the Lenin/Narodnik debate is a crucial confrontation. One of the sub-variants of this general theme running through modern sociological literature is the relevant utility of

class theory on the one hand as against mass theory on the other hand in a specific form of it. It is possible to do this Leninist operation and to make very careful analysis of the growth of cash farming - for example, participation in the cash economy, the importance of industry in the African setting - and thereby emphasize the extent to which the model of the undifferentiated village is mythology.

On the other hand, one might paraphrase that famous challenge of Sombart's when he asked "Why no socialism in the United States?" and ask "Why no revolution in South Africa?". That, I think, is the only interesting sociological problem in Africa. Nobody has answered it, certainly none of the books which have been written has answered it, because you have all the class conditions, one would have thought, for total confrontation on all dimensions - not just class, or ethnicity, but in all dimensions of life: residence, education, church: wherever you look, a great polarisation, and broadly along the same lines - but no great massive head-on confrontation.

There are reasons for this which are worth considering and I suggest that they are not solely matters explicable in terms of severe repression. Two of them are functions of the state of social relationships in the countryside in particular, to which John Saul has drawn our attention. First, I would say that the process of moving from the town to the country is pretty quick if you get on a train physically, but it is pretty slow sociologically. To become an urbanite, let alone an industrial worker, and anything like a class-conscious industrial worker, is a process which is measured not in years but perhaps in decades.

Those of you who have read Philip Mayer's interesting book called Tribesmen and Townsman, about East London in South Africa, will know that there are people who have been 30 or 40 years in towns in Natal whose consciousness, and whose value-orientation, we primarily still orient to rural society. Even in the town they live and interact with people from their home area.

The pattern of labour migration is particularly crucially important and may be one explanatory variable in explaining why there has not congealed or jelled a marked class-consciousness on the part either of the rural strata as separate classes, or in the towns. So the consolidation of class culture, or even just of urban culture, is a very slow process and it is not automatic and not very fast.

Secondly, I think that the visible processes of class differentiation do not necessarily result in an outcome in the form of inter-class struggle, but there may be what Merton would have called functional alternatives. It may take the form, which of course it did, of struggle of a national kind, a nationalism, a struggle of independence, which subsumes and also milks off the class and other frustrations.

Secondly, of course, an alternative form is ethnic hostility and ethnic struggle - the very confusing and complex problem that one encounters when trying to analyse the meaning of nationalisation in many of the countries, which is of course a most double-barrelled ambiguous term which can merely mean the Africanisation, the substitution of indigenes - nationals - in a structure that is fundamentally unchanged. That is very different from socialisation and nationalisation. So that ethnicity - the siphoning or diversification of frustrations into inter-ethnic struggle - is an alternative possibility.

Thirdly, it is against outsiders in general - bigness, the city, intellectuals, all the people that the populace classically dislike: tax collectors and government extension officers in agriculture. These people generally get into trouble and very often are the people around whom peasant riots centre.

Fourthly, the struggle becomes not necessarily one between one class and another class, but a struggle very often against something called the state. I was very interested a few weeks ago in listening to Theodore Shanin, discussing the history of Russian agrarian discontent up to about 1925, in which he said that, I think, 80 per cent of the outbreaks of agrarian rebellion and discontent that he had studied were directed not at another class, but primarily against the state (or manifestations of the state in the form of particular individuals, officials, and so on.) Am I right?

MR. SHANIN: It was 1906.

PROF. WORSLEY: Thank you. Why is it, therefore, that what would appear to be a nice ready-made situation for the maximisation of sharpening of class-awareness and inter-class hostility does not produce it so rapidly immediately and directly? One of the reasons which Theodore suggested was simply that a lot of people die, and infant mortality, and even adult mortality, are very important ways in which, for example, land pressure is alleviated; emigration is another basic mechanism.

Migration, and periodic migration, which has been the dominant form in East, Central and Southern Africa, means that you are oscillating between town and countryside; you are sending money back to the village; the village becomes dependent on labour migrants in many cases and functions effectively by virtue of the money that is siphoned back into the rural areas. Watson's work on the Mambwe demonstrates this. There is the whole process of circulation in general, in which, in times of distress and economic breakdown (for example, the depression of the 1930s) tens of thousands of people go back to their village, which is always there as a kind of safety net or welfare state built into the situation, because your kinship connections give you access to land and title to land in rural areas.

There is also the fact that there may well be (and there is a lot of evidence from Meyer Fortes' Tallensi right through to more recent African data, reinforced also by more of Theo Shanin's material) a cyclical process going on in the peasant-farming household-economy, in which you do not just simply get a polarisation of large farmers, middle pocket handkerchief horticulturalists, and landless proletarians, but an oscillation in the rise and fall of households, for reasons which are connected with the structure of the family and which are not solely technological or economic. That being the case, this is an inhibitory mechanism which cuts across what otherwise would be a dominant tendency towards polarisation and differentiation.

Finally, in Africa at least, in most parts - of course there are areas in which this is not true - there is a lot of land. I am reminded of Marx's famous comment on Australia that they exported to the then colonies the capital and the labour but that they forgot to export the

relations of production. What happens is that the people who were supposed to do all the work on the land for the squatters had access to land themselves, since Australia was "empty", and they started farming on their own account.

In Africa, unlike say Java - and I suppose that one could make a broad global antithesis between Asia and Africa - there is still the possibility of feeding yourself at the very lowest level, because of access to land, which is a very important inhibiting mechanism which prevents many of the phenomena of severe class polarisation and distress which is found much more classically in Asia and may have a lot to do with their different political developments.

It is for these various reasons which in general, I suppose, could be summed up as the circulatory nature of the African labour force, that we should be very cautious before assuming that although one can empirically trace incipient or even quite advanced class differentiation in occupational, economic, market and other terms, this will somehow necessarily quickly produce manifestations and registration of these economic facts in the political sphere, particularly in the emergence of conscious class identification and class hostility.

THE CHAIRMAN: Does Mr. Ionescu wish to say something?

MR. IONESCU: Not really. Perhaps Dr. Saul would be kind enough to summarise some of the ideas for people who have not yet been able to read his paper.

DR. JOHN SAUL: I will go over my paper briefly by way of summation. I begin by making two general points: one is the difficulties some of which have come out clearly in the ongoing discussion, one being the difference between the distinction of ideas and ideology and the characterisation of movements. One of the aspects of the African literature has been the tendency to lump two things together and to talk about movements as populist when in fact what one seems to be talking about is ideas on the part of a relatively small group of people within the leadership of a specific political movement. Some people have tended to generalise from ideas that certain people have to characterise to involve everybody in a particular movement. That is one general point.

My second point was that, again in the literature, there seems to be a difference of definition of populism between a group which sees populism as meaning somehow the will of the people, that a populist ideology and populist movements are either an ideology which says that the will of the people is somehow important and the key criterion for political activity, and related to that on a movement level characterisations of movement as somehow a popular movement as distinct from a minority movement.

Secondly, Professor Worsley talked particularly about the group in which populism has a response to the impingement of capitalistic development

in changing societies and he had seen populist ideologies and populist movements as responding to the changes which these are bringing in traditional and changing societies.

In the first section I went on to look at some of the people who have in the literature used the idea of populism as expressing the will of the people, taking a number of case studies where this term has been used, particularly a study by Low on Buganda, which Dr. Engholm mentioned yesterday.

I tried to show the way in which, using the term rather loosely, Low has obscured some of the differentiations within the movement and made the general point out of this that one of the dangers of a term like populism is that it tends to oversimplify and make particular movements more monolithic than they often are. I think that this has been particularly true in Africa and increasingly, for example, in the study of the nationalist movements.

We have seen the way in which various groups, for a variety of reasons, came together in a moment of nationalism which was articulated as a popular movement at the highest level by the leadership but often in terms of the group which were involved at the local level had very different ends in view than some sort of national popular movement. In fact, the interplay between leadership and mass within a movement of this sort is very important and the terminology of populism, at least in certain examples which I have cited, has tended to get in the way of covering the full complexity of a specific situation.

Professor Schapiro has just made the point that there is a danger in any generalisation, but it seems to be particularly a case in the generalisation of populism, of oversimplifying the contextual characteristics of different movements and blurring some of the distinctions between them. There seems to have been, at least in the African literature, a term which has tended to do this, which has tended to lead to a danger of hyperbole in a whole variety of ways in terms of the spread of popular involvement, in terms of the level, uniformity and consciousness of various people involved in specific movements. This was the main point that I made. There are a number of other points.

I also made a distinction that Professor Seton-Watson began to make yesterday on the different types of possible popular movements, if you like, and the different types of foci which tend to characterise pre-independence and post-independence Africa. There are certain continuities between them but also certain distinctions between these movements.

I tried to talk a bit about that and relate it to what populism might mean in these contexts. I particularly brought in, in this context, Vande de Nome, who, I think, is a thinker of Africa. At least, he is a North-West Indian but still he is very much working in the African context of Africa. As somebody who seems archetypal as a typical populist thinker, I suppose that Vande de Nome comes as near as anybody who has been there in terms of articulation of philosophy. In this instance, at least one side of it is a reaction to the élite and a reaction to any call on the part of the people in some sense to rise against in the first instance the colonial powers and in the second instance the élite that is now in control. There are continuities here which are important as well, and I have outlined some of them in the paper.

The second thing which I took up was the notion of populism as the defence against capitalism. In this context I talked about Professor Worsley's observations in his book *The Third World*. One of the things, incidentally, which comes up in this, I think, is a difference of opinion between Professor Seton-Watson and Professor Worsley over the question of populist régimes. There is I think a danger here in Professor Seton-Watson's discussion of populist régimes of apotheosizing the nation-state as the end and the bounds of political action. It seems to me that there are tensions such as he might have been getting at; I am not quite sure what he was getting at, but as far as I can understand it there are tensions within a movement of a very similar order prior to seizing state power by the leadership and the mass which might be ambiguous. There are also possibilities of situating a nation-state or particular movement or, now, régime in the context of an international social or economic order which make the type of solidarities at least a possibility.

Professor Worsley mentioned that the international dimension and the confrontation between régimes and an international order, particularly an international economic order, can be a very important one. So it may be that the difference between a movement and a movement in power may to some extent be oversimplified. If in fact one can conceive of a populist movement, it seems to me that one can conceive also of a populist régime, although there may be some ambiguities in that.

One of the important things that I tried to bring out in the paper on the question of populism as a defence against capitalism which has to be discussed, but which has not been sufficiently discussed, because yesterday we were primarily concerned with question of ideas, is the necessity of situating any discussion of populism in the context of a process of social change. This ideology may be in fact the peg on which one would hang the relationship between ideas and the context in which they are articulated and therefore the relationship of them to movements which arise.

That is a very important aspect in two ways. First, yesterday again Professor Seton-Watson and several others mentioned the idea that populism in some ways was articulated in the context of a worship of the people. Professor Wiles spoke about populism as having a notion of the virtue of the people. One of the difficulties is that this tends to make the articulation of populist ideas rather too static a process.

One of the things which we have to continually bear in mind is that anything which we are calling populist is a changing phenomenon and a changing relationship to broad social changes. One of the important things which was said about populism - it is probably an obvious point but it is still an important one - is that this is a set of ideas insofar as we can isolate them which arises from a traditional community and traditional society confronting the demands of industrialisation and the demands of social change.

One of the aspects that makes ambiguous any easy reference to a populist set of ideas or a populist movement is that these movements themselves face a continually changing process. This means that their ideas are in flux. We noticed yesterday the way in which populist ideas of certain sorts seem to change and we tried to figure out why they change. This is because, particularly at the level of the leadership, there is a changing awareness of what is necessary to implement the values that they have. Oftentimes a leadership which has this sense of responsibility and

solidarity with the people may find that because a process of change is taking place, their backward looking view is increasingly less related to goals which they would like to implement. It is too easy in a way to see a populist ideology once you look at a changing sort of thing and something which is situated in moments of social strife, to see it as a defence of the status quo, as a straightforward worship of the people as they are at any given moment. There is this constant tension between a desire to protect the people, if you like, in the context of this idea of a defence against capitalism, against this capitalistic incursion, and holding on to what they have and the awareness that this is changing, that their relationship to social development is a changing one.

You find this in a number of populist movements. People who are attempting - I have seen this particularly in President Nyerere's thinking, which is changing very rapidly in Tanzania. You have him articulating an idea of defence of status quo and yet continually being aware that changes are taking place in his country to which he has somehow to respond. So that there is a possibility of an identification with the people but also a growing awareness of perhaps the hard necessities of what a defence against their decline might mean or a defence against the impact of these various forces.

If we leave out the fact that the people, the constituency of leaders is a changing one, we lose some of the nuance of their changing ideas. This may account for some of the problems. We were talking yesterday about Maoism as well.

The two people who wrote the paper articulated very clearly that in Maoism there was this identification of the people of a very real order. This was seen to be the populist dimension that the Chinese communists had some sense of responsibility for what was happening in the countryside. On the other hand, there seemed to emerge an awareness that perhaps more positive action was necessary to realise some aspects of these virtues.

I think that in the paper on Maoism one thing was perhaps left out which is very important because it fits in somewhere here. The dichotomy which was enunciated in the China paper was that Maoism was a compound of a view of the virtue of the people at the same time as it was a desire for production and that it was finally the desire for production which led to a rather harder line in the countryside.

That leaves out an important third dimension which must be brought in here. This again brings us to the whole question which has to be faced about the relationship of populism to socialism. We have not quite buried that one. In China, one of the important elements there, a third dimension in addition to production and in addition to a desire for some kind of solidarity with the people, is an awareness of this very fact of social change. The social change which is being articulated it seems to me, particularly in China - we can debate later what is happening in Africa - is the emergence of class differences and there is, I think, in China this third dimension to Maoism: that somehow by identifying with the status quo you are not really saying anything about social reality because what is happening is that social reality is changing. You have already articulated class differences which they are articulating themselves. If a more positive content is not brought into your programme, your decisions will have been made for you by the ongoing social changes.

Therefore a populist, it seems to me, is on this kind of knife edge. He is trying to protect the peasantry or whoever it is from what he sees to be the worst depredations of development in other countries and he is constantly aware that these changes may take place willy nilly unless a more positive aspect is brought to the forefront.

The way that I have attempted to articulate this - this may be acceptably schematic, but I think that there is something to it - is to relate populist responses, insofar as one can talk about these at all, to the development of capitalistic relations. As I say in my paper, Kilson and others have seen in Africa the impact of modernisation as primarily phrased in terms of the emergence of a cash nexus which carries with it, as he and others have seen it, the growth of differentiation.

I want to say something briefly about that, but these are obviously in Africa much less articulated than in other countries. It is however still a dimension of thinking of people in these kinds of movements or of those who have begun to ask these programmatic questions going beyond the romantic phase. This is perhaps the thing to which many of them are responding.

One of the things that may link Russian and American populism is their responses to this process of social change. It is not unidirectional but I think there is a movement in the whole process of modernisation from traditional solidarities through a people emerging into cash economy to differentiations within that cash economy. This can be deflected obviously by various types of traditions and so on; it does not take place in quite that logical progression.

But one can still see that in various situations there is a type of populism, if that is what we want to call it, that is reacting to the breakdown of traditional solidarities, which is attempting to retain certain types of solidarities, which is reacting against individualisation. If this kind of reaction is socialistic - it may or may not be; it is not very useful to define socialism merely as the ownership of the means of production and distribution. As Professor Worsley has said, it has rather broader implications. Whatever it is, however, I think that it is a reaction to this kind of capitalist differentiation.

The movement is in this direction insofar as it is not deflected by various other social forces. It is in the direction from the breakdown of communal solidarities. This is perhaps what the Russian narodniks - this is very schematic - obviously were reacting to. But it is a movement towards complete differentiation and it is also a movement towards industrialisation and advanced capitalisation.

This is the point at which people who have emerged from traditional solidarities or who never had them, like the American farmers, are small individuals who confront a further phase of capitalist development which is the development of large capitalist sectors, finance capitalism and all these various things, and then articulate an ideology which is opposed to the furtherance of rationalisation of their position.

One of the things which is important about American populism - again, Professor Hofstadter knows more about this than I do - is that in the long run most of the American populists were definitively and economically dead. What happened in the rationalisation of American agriculture over a time, as he shows in his book The Age of Reform, many of these small farmers in America dropped out. They were defending themselves against something very real and there was the increased rationalisation of this capitalist process, of the process of the articulation of differentiation in rural areas. So that it may be that we can find some thread running through some of these populist reactions in a reaction to this modernisation process, whether we call it capitalism, the advancement of capitalisation, modernisation or whatever else.

So that one of the reasons why we see a populist movement being drained off is that on the one hand people are drawn back from the implications of a programme to defend what these virtues might be and becoming part of a conservative movement, becoming peasant movements which are bending in a slightly different way and perhaps in some instances their constituencies pass out of existence, or on the other hand moving towards more socialist philosophies which attempt to think out ways in which modes of production might be worked out which would carry on this defence and actually engage in defence rather than try through rhetoric and so on to pretend that it is not taking place. There is a point there. I am groping with what this might mean.

One of the other aspects that fits into this is the whole question of what is the co-operative content of populism, to what extent is co-operation or communitarianism a substitute for socialism; what is the logic of this. One of the difficulties is that when we use the term "co-operative" we tend to talk about co-operatives as mirrors in a way and co-operatives in the North American sense as unities of individuals or cash croppers coming together to defend themselves against what they see to be the outside economic forces. Again, we have to differentiate different types of co-operation in the context of some model of what social changes are taking place.

My own point, with which I think that Professor Worsley tends to disagree, is that these co-operatives in a way are a substitute for what I think would be the impossible process at this stage of thinking of what kinds of modes of production might sustain lack of class differentiation. I am not sure that cutting off class differentiation is a possibility. Certainly co-operatives in terms of defending whatever these solidarity virtues are, which at one point populism must have meant, is an ambiguous instrument at best because it is in fact an instrument to which differentiation takes place in a way.

I have seen in Africa, at least in Tanzania, which is a relatively undifferentiated and economically unrevolutionised society, a process by which co-operatives have been taken over by those farmers or peasants who have differentiated themselves the most and have become to some extent at least instruments for further differentiation on their behalf. That, however, is a question which we might want to talk about: where co-operatives fit in and what sorts of populisms react through co-operatives and what it means in terms of their basic goals.

I wanted to talk briefly about one of Professor Worsley's points. One of the things which has to be seen here when talking about class differentiation in Africa - and I have probably overstated this; I am at a relatively early stage of trying to find out what is happening there myself -

but one of the most important things there is the subsistence sector. One does not have large peasants and small peasants in quite the same way as perhaps there are in other societies. You have large peasants, small peasants, market orientated peasants and subsistence peasants. What is happening is not necessarily a class polarisation in Africa in terms of any forms of class consciousness. You have a number of peasants who are staying in the subsistence sector, and insofar as they see co-operatives and so on being used by large peasants and you see differentiations taking place, I think that there is a retreat to the subsistence sector to some extent, I hope we can talk more about this at some other time.

One of the things which we have not talked about sufficiently is the complexities of movements. I made this point at the outset. It is very important. We have talked about the complexities of ideas but we have to think more of the complexity of the changing social context in which changing ideologies and movements are articulated but also get some idea of relationships between leadership and the led and the degree of awareness and also the relationship between the actual masses involved in these movements themselves as to what their foci are. Again, I think that populism as a term tends to blur this and to oversimplify. Certainly in the way it is used in the literature on Africa, it tends to oversimplify the uniformity of response of these various peasants. I have mentioned that at several points in the paper.

In the last section of the paper I mention the various ways in which ideologies can be used by movements. They can be used manipulatively and as an ideological rallying cry for movements. Whatever one thinks of them, they think that they are transforming and meeting the problems of transformation in a positive direction. They are used by many single-party states, of which Tanzania is one; a populist ideology is used for what they conceive, on the whole probably accurately, as progressive measures to bring about development.

Again, therefore, one has to look at the reasons why élites use these ideas insofar as you finally come down to a decision that populist ideologies are used by élites, and may not have that much relationship to what the views of the mass, even though they may be mobilised to involvement, really are.

PROF. S. ANDRESKI: Concerning the problem of class struggles in Africa (which obviously has some bearing on the question of populism), I think that the explanation of why there is no clear-cut class struggle in Africa is quite simple and is connected with the problem of the relationship between populism and nationalism, and the fact that the struggle for wealth and other privileges is developing along ethnic divisions. I do not think that subsistence agriculture accounts for this. The subsistence farmers have plenty of grounds for resentment against the wielders of authority and against the way they are treated by the tax collectors; but the successful individuals who get power lift with them a big crowd of their clan-brothers who get a share in the spoils and remain very loyal to their luckier kinsmen. Consequently a clear-cut class struggle cannot develop.

Concerning South Africa, I think that efficient repression is a sufficient condition of the status quo but one would still have to ask why it is so efficient, and the crucial point here is the unity of the privileged

layer. A comparative survey suggests that no successful revolution has ever taken place where the privileged layer of society was completely united. Why in this case they are so united is a separate issue which we could debate at length. On the other hand, as far as the ethnic divisions within the ruled are concerned, I think that they are of less significance in South Africa than in any other place in Africa.

MR. A. STEWART: When I began to read Dr. Saul's paper, I did not realise that I would have such a complete ally for the views expressed in my own paper. One had the impression in reading the earlier part of his paper in particular that he was very sceptical about the possibility of using the term "populism" in a general sense at all. In going over his paper this morning he again gave us the reasons for this.

The problems he raises have come up again in the course of discussion when we have been talking about whether McCarthyism is populism, is Poujadism populism, is nazism populism and so on. The point that Dr. Saul makes about the danger of overgeneralising and making assumptions about the motives of the supporters of such movements is equally true in the case of all these other movements: one blankets together a great many different groups in society when one speaks about nazism as a phenomenon in exactly the same way as when one speaks of populism. In relation to these other movements there is a similar problem of oversimplification and a failure to recognise differentiation, both in relation to 'the élite', the groups who lead such movements or who articulate ideas which are influential in producing them and in relation to the support for such movements.

The appropriate strategy to meet these deficiencies is not simply to recognise the complexities of specific situations. One can meet this point by noticing the need to draw distinctions between types. But the drawing of distinctions between such types will be possible, as I think our discussion yesterday showed, only after we have constructed some sort of analytical model.

This proposition has bearing on some points which Mr. Gallo made about my treatment of the question of Peronism. I would entirely agree and I do not think that I suggested in the paper that rural origins are of sole or even major importance in the analysis of the evolution and structural characteristics of Peronism. What I was concerned with in referring to "rural origins" was the coalitional character as I described it of the mass base of Peronism. I think that one has such a coalitional character, and the reasons for this have been suggested this morning. While it is true to say that Peronism is weak in rural areas, support for Peronism is not non-existent in rural Argentine. This is important in relation to points which I want to make later about the model.

If Peronism is or has a populist element in it, it certainly relates to the very early period, as you suggest, in which the role of rural newcomers is vitally important: this role is their use as a weapon against the leaders of organised social groups in the urban context. This is a more general point which has come up in a number of discussions about different movements: i.e., the difference between mobilised individuals and social groups. One cannot speak of groups because one wants to speak about mobilised individuals as opposed to organised groups. I suggest in my paper a number of ways in which one could look at the context which would favour the confrontation of such mobilised individuals and masses with organised groups.

Related to this point about rural newcomers in the Argentine case is a point which was made to me in informal discussion yesterday about the Roumanian case - i.e., the people who support the Iron Guard are again first-generation ex-peasants. This relates to the point which Peter Worsley was making about the length of time involved in moving from, in some senses, a rural to an urban culture. So that it is not possible simply to point to numbers of individuals in cities - particularly when one has very rapid rates of urbanisation such as occur particularly in Latin America - and use the resultant statistics as a definite criterion with which to argue that 'if populism is in some senses involved with the countryside, then these are not populist movements'.

I was trying to get round this problem in using the expression "ruralist" in my paper, although it is not a very happy expression. My chief concern was to stress the importance of either the fact of rural origins or the actuality of being based in the countryside in some sense or the fact of fairly recent rural origin.

If I may come on to the question of the model, Professor Touraine yesterday came closest to what I had in mind and indeed elaborated details of a possible analytical model in considerably more detail than I had done. His model, as did the ideas which I threw out myself, arose out of a suggestion that one wanted to look at the specific contexts in which populism is used. We need to construct some sort of ideal type of populism (a term which both Professor Worsley and, later, de Kadt have used).

The construction of this model relates to the difficulties which we have been having over other movements which have more definite labels, or rather more conventionally accepted labels, such as McCarthyism, Maoism, etc. If we are talking about movements, the fact that one says, for instance, that McCarthyism is not simply a populist movement has led us rather too rapidly during the discussions to a negative position. That is to say, we have been concerned to say "Not my movement" or "My particular area does not produce populist movements."

Taking, for instance, the example of nazism, and the fact that there is a populist movement encapsulated within it, it is not the particular details but the relevant approach to analysis with which I am concerned. There was a populist movement in Germany not merely in the 1920s but previously existing which was assimilated into, if one likes, the fully-fledged Nazi movement. As I mentioned in my paper, the process of that assimilation in terms of the ideology and interests, in terms of the particular supporters of the apocalyptic elements in full-fledged nazism, are described in some considerable detail in Schweitzer's book on Big Business in the Third Reich. He elaborates what he calls "middle class socialism", which had considerable discussion about co-operative forms, etc., in it. This is the sort of factor indicated in talking about the coalitional character of populist movements.

It may well be the case that this coalitional character is purely aspirant in some cases. It was my impression from a number of things which Professor Venturi said in his book that insofar as there was a populist movement in Russia, apart from a discussion of ideas between particularly important individuals, its base was substantially located in urban areas. Although this base in urban areas was quantitatively very small, there was some attempt thereafter to make contact with other sorts of older movements in the rural areas - an unsuccessful attempt, but the coalitional character is at least an aspiration tentatively there.

The coalitional character may be imposed on a situation. That is, in doing this analysis we may 'impose' the coalitional character in the sense that we point to differentiated interests and quasi-groups within the society under study. Both Worsley and Saul in their book and paper respectively raise this question of the consequences of differentiation. Obviously this is particularly important in talking about African populism.

One anticipates political consequences resulting from or contemporaneous with differentiation, if one says that post-independence even a relatively small degree of economic development will produce differentiation and as a consequence a coalitional base to the movement party. Whether or not this coalitional base receives formal institutionalisation and whether it leads to class polarisation or has some other structural consequence is an open question. The possibility that not only class polarisation, but also the presence of relatively permanent conflict groups may be avoided by whatever means raises another problem which Dr. Saul mentioned. What type of production would be necessitated by a society which was not stratified? Obviously African leaders, either at the level of rhetoric or in actual policy making are attempting to 'implement' such a state of affairs.

I suggest in my paper the distinction between "manipulative" and "spontaneous" populism. It is one which came up in our discussion yesterday and again this morning. I drew attention to the possibility that one would have this element. I think that it would be possible, and obviously this will be our concern this afternoon, to construct a model in which one would have the necessary elements for saying in what sorts of situation one will get manipulative populism and in what sort of situation one can speak about spontaneous populism.

To go back to Dr. Saul's paper; as I have said initially he is fairly sceptical about the possibility of generalising about populism. But the point I am making, about the necessity to construct an analytical model first and then take it to particular situations is precisely the point which he quite rightly stresses as being importantly made by Kilson. Saul remarks that Kilson "has articulated a usage of the concept 'populism' which avoids at least some of the limitations we have mentioned above" - i.e., the difficulty of overgeneralising about a particular movement and about making assumptions about the motivation of particular individuals involved in a movement. Kilson "implicitly . . . attempts to situate 'populism' as merely one element of broader movements and processes of change, not merely as a global characterisation of relatively more complex phenomena".

One accepts that this is necessary in relation to a particular movement. I think that probably we have somewhat put the cart before the horse. This has come out in the sort of tentative terminology which we have been inclined to use by speaking about a populist element in nazism, McCarthyism, etc. We will probably not get very far towards our goal of producing some sort of analytically useful definition of populism if we approach it in this particular way.

Two other points which I would stress about the model would be the question of the importance of the internal-external split, which came again this morning in remarks made by Mr. Hennessy about the demonstration-fascination effects. I used the term "direct" and "indirect"

in my paper and, again, the remarks that Professor Touraine made yesterday are highly relevant to what I had in mind, particularly when he was speaking about the absence of direct confrontation between social groups.

One final point which I would make about approaching the study of populism from this end would be that the ideas that I threw out under the general heading of institutionalisation would somewhat help to meet the sorts of points that were raised by Mr. Macfarlane, for instance, when he spoke about the rapid changes which one finds in looking at any particular populist movement.

Obviously, to go back to the point about Peronism, if we look at Peronism at present or even in the early 1950s, it is manifestly not a populist movement but in the early stages it may be argued that it is. One constructed a model for analysing the institutionalization of such movements. In the Peronist case, the urban wing becomes a more organised quasi-labour movement as I describe it. This would help one to deal with the problem of what we have called ideological chameleonism.

It was suggested that one might study populism by looking at the context in which particular ideas emerge, but if one looks at the ideas one has the problem that some of the movements which we have discussed under the heading of populism take over and make use of a particular configuration of ideas which are already around. So that what one wants to look at is the relation of these ideas to the position of particular groups.

In an early phase of populism, one may get a particular group supporting the populist movement and at a later stage not supporting it, according to its changing social position.

MR. KENNETH MINOGUE: Let me make two retractions. One of them was pointed out by Mr. Shillinglaw. I made a remark about populism being a movement by people whose profoundest impulse was to industrialise. I was thinking at the time primarily of the American populists. Since a strong disposition has erupted at this conference to unfrock the American populists as a collection of impostors, my generalisation is based on what is coming to be, by the drift of our discussion, a peripheral example.

I think my remark is broadly true of a lot of African populism, and it is one of the impulses which underlies populism; but it has also emerged fairly clearly from the conference, that there is a perfectly genuine attachment to the village and rural life which industrialism threatens.

The other retraction which I should make was pointed out to me by Professor Schapiro. I tended to assume in the paper that Russian populism diminished and went into a decline after about 1890 or 1900. I am sure that he is perfectly right in denying this. My mistake is an example of the worst vice which one can make in history: that is to ignore the defeated: the fact that it was a lost cause should not mean that one merely pushes it to one side.

I now want to move on, keeping as my motto Bacon's remark that truth comes more easily from error than confusion. I want to put forward a number of schema. I have been reminded as I listened to the attempts to define populism of the common case of couples living happily in sin for many years, who decide to get married - and live miserably ever after. Definition is like marriage in this respect. Populism is clearly something which can loosely be used with a certain amount of meaning. If we marry these components up into a definition, we may well get something which will explode. It is a situation, as it were, of six intimations looking for a character.

We might ask in the first place: why do we want a definition of populism? If we are thinking historically, we do not need a definition. Any designation will do. The historian has his particular concrete material and he can use abstract terms simply at will.

If we would be doing philosophy, we might start off, I suppose, from any point, but we would rapidly transform such a view in such a way that we would not be worried by many of the complexities which we have discussed in the last two days. What we are left with is the enterprise of constructing a political science. We want a general theory of populism such that it ties together a number of things and says that these things are always found together and constitute this particular phenomenon. The definition has, as it were, a necessary connection simply by stipulation. At this point we need not worry about how much these things are found in reality.

What we would like to use the definition for is to be able to mount arguments of many forms: for example, populism has the characteristic X; this thing is a populism; therefore, this has the characteristic X. Or: populism is X; this is an X; is this also in all respects populism? We want to get a definition which would be sufficient to perform operations of that kind with it.

My next point is that populism is a self-characterisation. A good rule, I suppose, in both life and in political science is that one should distrust self-characterisation, because the way people and ideologies describe themselves is designed not to illuminate for academics but to get support and approval from others. Hence the Populist emphasis on "people" presents the nicest, the best and the most support-gathering aspect of populism; it is something we should regard with a good deal of suspicion.

Throughout all our discussions we have found populism jostling cheek by jowl with a number of other things on exactly the same level of abstraction - for example, anarchism, fascism, socialism, Marxism. All are ideologies. Therefore, it seems to me that the best tactic is, at least briefly, to move up one level and to discuss ideologies generally. To do this, we need something to contrast them with. We need to find an area which is clearly non-ideological.

At this level of abstraction, two things seem to me to be worth contrasting with ideology. One of them has emerged in our discussion and the other has not. The first is tradition, because we are commonly dealing with a situation where people have previously been ruled traditionally - that is, by sheikhs, by sultans, by tribal chiefs, and so on; and afterwards they have become "modernised" and acquired themselves ideologies. Tradition is one entire style of politics. In the social sciences it appears as a comic

strip in which there is a hierarchy, chieftains running the politics, and people tilling the soil who are governed largely by custom. Politics is left entirely to a special class of people. The second thing that seems to me to be worth marking off is what, for want of a better name, we can simply call democracy or the pluralist politics of modern Western states of America. This is an area which is primarily characterised by the fact that all or most political questions are decided by balance of advantage. There is a clear recognition of the fact that politics is about choice. So we can have tradition, and democracy, as a generic contrast to ideological politics, which includes Populism.

At this stage it is worth making a number of remarks simply about ideologies, and assuming that populism is an ideology, then the remarks I make about ideology should be true of populism. An ideology is a response, I think, to a sense of bafflement, in particular the sense of bafflement which comes to people who move out traditional societies in which everything seems fixed into a world which they find it difficult to understand. The way they attempt to understand it is by some sort of intellectual apparatus which looks a bit like a philosophy and a bit like a theology but is different from both because it must function in politics. It is a tool for removing bafflement rather than something with an independent character of its own.

Furthermore, an ideology emerges at the moment of secularisation. There has been a lot of play in our discussion with the fact that populism is closely connected with religion. We have seen populist notions of Christ residing in the people; we have heard Mr. Hennessy talk about Castro having a sort of communion with university students at various stages, and it seems to me that one of the absolute presuppositions of populism, as with any kind of ideology, is secularism: that is, people must have moved out of a world where religion infiltrates all areas of life and they must start drawing a distinction between religion on the one hand and this world on the other hand. There is a redirection of interest: that is, whatever people think they are doing, they tend to act far more in terms of the concerns of this world than of the other.

One of the favourite explanations of the ideological style of politics is to suggest that it is suitable to people who do not like making choices: that is, they do not like the responsibilities of choice, which for the moment at least induces too much anxiety; and one way in which they solve this problem is by constructing ideologies, whose function is to supply necessity. It is, of course, an illusory and bogus kind of necessity, but none the less on the basis of an ideology one can say "I did not choose to do this. It is simply necessary, in terms of the objective situation, that this particular action should take place."

Furthermore, it is also characteristic of ideologies that they see the world as at present in a stage of becoming and moving towards a state of being. The state of being in the future is, I think, essentially static. It is a dream world in which nothing fundamentally changes. Our present condition on the other hand is one of crisis and transition. In other words, ideologies are about transformation, and they must therefore nominate an agent who will transform the world.

A large number of possible agents are available. We have, for example, the state, the race, the class, the individual - here I am thinking of the individual in anarchism - the will, which is the transforming agent of fascism, the nation, and indeed the people.

If we wish to adopt a philosophical transformation of these various ideologies, I would suggest that these transforming agents constitute the differentia by which one would attempt to bring some sort of order into the general field of ideologies.

The generic unity of ideology is further made plausible if we remember that any ideologist will trespass, plagiarise and steal bits of clothing from a fellow ideologist. Indeed, there is almost something which could be called a kind of ideology kit - a set of devices, a set of images and particularly a set of emotions to which it is easy to appeal.

The actual technique or art of constructing of ideology is perfectly simple. We would all here in this room be perfectly capable of constructing an ideology for pixies, gnomes, Martians or any other class of people who are not adequately catered for in this field - and, indeed, sometimes do - I trust involuntarily! - in our academic work.

I think it was Professor Worsley who characterised populism as a mass movement, marked by radical protest. These things are, I think, general characteristics of ideology. Because they are true of ideology, they are also true of populism, but they are not sufficiently tied into populism as a specific form of ideologies.

So the problem is to work out what specifically attaches to the concept of the people as the transforming agent of an ideological situation. In so far as we can find certain particular tricks of the populist trade, we could then in principle move on, I suppose, to find some connection between these tricks and political realities, between the actual political movement and its ideology.

I should make one important qualification: the way I have presented ideological politics makes it look like a transitional phase. It looks as if I am suggesting that first comes tradition, it breaks down, there is a ferocious ideological stage of politics and eventually people end up with what we have, which is political maturity, democratic, beyond ideology and so on. It is a tempting picture of political development, but I do not for one moment think that it is true. Obviously ideologies erupt into all modern societies, turning up unpredictably.

All I want to do now is to suggest one abstract schema which occurred to me in the course of all this and which might be of use. This concerns the question of equality. It seems to me that when tradition breaks down, people begin to acquire certain notions of what this new world is all about and particularly the notion of equality, something which they did not have before. Never having thought in these terms before, they are taught about Rousseau etc.; from missionaries they learn that all people were created equal before God and from schoolteachers that everyone is equal before the law. So that the question of equality becomes something to which, as a psychological matter of fact, people become sensitive.

Society thereafter appears as a structure of privileged. There are the superior in certain respects: wealth, prestige and, perhaps most of all, education; and there are the inferior, the poor, those who have bad jobs, and so on. Inequalities in modern societies present people with the psychological problem of how to adjust to them. They are felt to be painful, not perhaps by everybody, but at least on some occasions the inequalities worry everybody.

It is obvious that many who are low down, who are less equal than others, will feel resentful at the system and be unhappy with the situation. But what is equally true is that those who are superior, the rich and the well educated, also suffer from some sort of feeling that equality is the norm and inequality is something wrong. The most familiar recognition of this fact appeared in the attack upon bourgeois socialists as being people who simply suffer from a guilty conscience. But we need not worry about the motives which lead people to feel this way. The feeling of unease which afflicts the superior may well involve other motives than guilt: for example, the desire to impose a static perfection upon reality. Some may be dissatisfied with the flux of things and decide that it is inequality which causes the flux. In such a situation it is the educated elite who seek to abolish the very basis of their own superiority. Clearly this is a chapter of Hobbes which needs to be rethought.

What I suggest as a result of this abstract schema is that populism happens when the superior and the inferior come together in an attack upon the inequalities of the society in an early stage of the breakdown of tradition. Very commonly it is the superior who make the first move; they may have to drum up discontent with inferiority before the movement can get under way. I have the feeling that some situation of this kind tended to happen in Russia. Indeed, in a sense, all ideologies are made up by the superior on behalf of the inferior. But this seems to me to be particularly true of populism.

Finally, I would suggest that so far as we want to generalise populism, we would need to describe stages of growth. It could not be simply a definition. It would have to be a process.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. I am very pleased with that final contribution.

(Adjourned for lunch)

Afternoon Session

Chairman:- Sir Isaiah Berlin

THE CHAIRMAN: Before we attempt to alter the vocabulary of politics, which I think is our official task, it might be better if those who have remarks to make of a general kind - i.e., of a substantial and not formal kind, not about models and definitions - and who were not able to speak this morning, were given a quarter of an hour to make their points.

MR. ALLCOCK: The main point I wanted to make is connected with the sort of classification of the problem with which we approached the discussion. It is interesting that the three sessions so far have been entitled the ideological, the historical and the political aspects in populism. One thing which has crept in only almost illicitly into the discussion has been the economic aspect of populism. I myself am not qualified to discuss or to present first-hand information in this respect; but I would like to have seen more discussion, for example, of Professor Wiles' point about populism being a political phenomenon connected with the interest of small producers or small enterprises, and the various comments which have come into the discussion again, incidentally, about the class composition of populist movement. I would have thought that any attempt which we might make this afternoon to attempt to approach a definition of populism would be pretty fruitless unless we were able to bear in mind the sort of economic factors which bear upon the origin and course of development of populist movements.

Again, I must regret that I am unable to present much first-hand information in this respect, but it is useful to comment that the discussion should be pointed very firmly in this direction. The ideological element of populism has, to my mind at least, tended to intrude rather too much into our discussion of the problem to date, and I would like to see the balance rectified if possible later.

A second point is that I have my doubts about the sort of methodological presuppositions which seem to me to have been in people's minds, and which have crept in fairly incidentally during the discussion. In his comments this morning, Mr. Minogue seemed to expect that our definition of populism would be arrived at by gathering a number of illustrations of something which is called populism and then finding some sort of common denominator. I would much prefer to see a rather more systematic methodological approach to the problem in this respect and possibly an attempt made on Weberian lines to develop an "ideal type" of populism; not of the sort to which Peter Worsley refers in his paper, which, as he admits, is limited mainly to the ideologies of populism; but we should be more rigorous methodologically about our approach to the definition of populism than the conference has tended to be so far.

PROF. MACRAE: I have only two points which I can make briefly. One follows from what Mr. Allcock has said. He raises the question about the economic basis and, I suppose, by implication, that certainly was interesting from Professor Wiles: the economic aspirations of populism as a general phenomenon. One of the things which we have not considered, and which I do not think we can consider but which is perhaps worth leaving in people's minds, is to ask the question, if the various stage theories of populism which have fluttered briefly in this room and have then sunk out of sight are to be taken seriously, why it is that in the economic development of Western Europe on the whole one does not find populism? We may find populists - I mentioned Cobbett as an English populist; other people have mentioned others down to the present. I suppose that except for a conspiracy theory, one could find the whole of what I would call an ideological populism in an eighteenth century writer like Robert Burns.

We find certainly in the Low Countries, particularly among the Flemings, things that are populist. One finds in Suisse-Romande writers like Ramuz who seem to me to be populist and so on. But the striking thing is surely that in Western Europe, including Germany, we do not on the whole find populism; and yet, if the stage theories are right, this must demand explanation.

I am not sure whether my other point is relevant, but it turns on what Professor Worsley was saying. Let us go back to Africa. Professor Worsley asked the question why there has been no revolution in South Africa. I do not think that it is our point to try to answer that question. Indeed we might want to answer in terms of that very reactionary Franco-English populist, Hilaire Belloc. Whatever happens, we have got the gabbling gun and they have not.

But I would say something further about Africa than that. I think that although the theory of revolutions, if there is such a thing - and I believe that there is - is not very advanced, it is not something that would lead one to expect a revolution in South Africa. Nor indeed in Africa in general would I expect class struggle, for the simple reason that it is very difficult to have class struggles unless one has thoroughly developed social classes; and on the whole in sub-Saharan Africa one does not, or, if they exist, they are in very small and fragmented groups, so localised that they are not really likely to be of great importance.

But even when you do have a thoroughly developed class system - which I distinguish from a general order of stratification, which is a different point - you do not necessarily by any means get class struggle; you do not get polarisation of classes, confrontations, and all these things.

We are haunted here by a slightly romantic vocabulary and the question of why populism has provided many ideological themes which have been used by all sorts of people throughout Negro Africa - e.g. Nkrumah, particularly in his last book before his fall, Neo-Colonialism, has a conspiratorial populism - and the autobiography of Oginga Odinga which is just about to be published, is the most populist thing I have ever read in my life. Although these things exist, I do not think that there has been any African populism and I do not believe that there are the bases for it.

I think that a Jacquerie, that sort of revolt, can come from below. But revolutions come from a much more complicated interplay of segments within a society and they involve, among other things, quite certainly a defection of the intellectuals on a scale which has not taken place in Africa. This means that intellectuals had an importance in the society which on the whole - allowing for one or two possible small exceptions - they don't.

African nationalism is a different matter. Nationalism coloured by populism in Africa, certainly. African populism and revolution in South Africa, I think, on the whole no. This, however, is said so briefly and it is, perhaps, a little off the field that I stop there rather than try to elaborate it.

MR. SHILLINGLAW: I should like to make three brief comments in relation to what other speakers have said. First, I would like to have taken up John Saul's remarks on Maoism. I take very well his point, if I understood him correctly, that populism should perhaps be considered in relation to emergence of class differences. One difficulty here in China is that the basic work on class differentiation after 1949/1950 has not yet been done and it is impossible to speculate about China as we can perhaps talk about Africa.

The second point concerns the distinction which Mr. de Kadt drew in relation to authentic identification, when he argued that one sort of populism - the protest or marginal populism - was one where the masses should participate fully, and he suggested the idea of self-help as being one of the characteristics of this. This element, if we want to treat this as populism, is very much present in policies pursued at least by the Chinese leadership. In fact, you get a rather paradoxical situation where perhaps you could say that the party as a whole is manipulative but that at the level of the co-operative - and here I speak up to perhaps 1955 or 1956 - very much stress was laid on genuine participation, genuine self-help, and the fact that the peasants themselves should make decisions in accordance with their own needs. Again, however, a lot more work needs to be done on this.

The third point which I wanted to make briefly concerned the list of attributes which Mr. Hennessy gave of Castroism, which I found very interesting. If you want to describe or characterise populism in such wide terms, there is a lot in the list which he gave which could be applied to Maoism: for example, the role of youth. At the present moment in China, it is interesting to observe that Mao has, if we can make any sense of recent events, by-passed the middle generation and tried to draw on what he has called the successors to the revolution. This problem of successors to the revolution, of the role of youth in the revolution, is a continuing preoccupation with Mao.

Secondly, the strongly ruralist element which Hennessy mentioned is, of course, very present in Maoism and the myth of Venan and Mao's "guerrilla style" of approach to social change has been one source of criticism made by other party leaders. This certainly is a very on-going myth in China and has contributed, for example, to the position that the army has occupied in the relationship between army and party and army and people.

Thirdly, Mr. Hennessy suggested that Castro thinks in terms of moral incentive as opposed to material incentives. Again, yes, if one wants to give this as a characteristic of populism, I certainly agree that it is a vital element of Maoism. Mao's whole emphasis on struggle is completely opposed to materialistic incentives. The central idea of the self-criticism so extensively practised in China is that, through the "change of thinking" produced by it, the masses can be brought to will the Party's goals. Thus moral regeneration obviates the need for material inducement.

Again, Mr. Hennessy mentioned the role of women and suggested that the emancipation of women was almost built into Castroism. I do not know whether I would go so far as to suggest that this is built into Maoism, but at least it is one of the continuing concerns of Mao and we know that this attitude to women has influenced Mao himself very deeply.

Next, the relationship between Castroism and Nationalism. Mr. Hennessy suggested that the cultural vacuum in Cuba necessitated an anti-Americanism. I think again that one could make the same sort of remark about China, that there was a need to create an insular situation in China so that the new body politic develop its own roots.

Finally, I think that perhaps the most important point in this listing of characteristics was when Mr. Hennessy mentioned Castro's extreme reluctance to institutionalise the revolution. Yes, certainly, I think that we would want to say that this also is characteristic of Mao. You might want to link this with his anti-bureaucratism as one of the dominant elements of the Maoist vision of what sort of society should evolve in China. But I think that the paradox in China - this is why I would certainly not describe China itself as in any way a populist régime - is that side by side with this goes such a terrific emphasis on organisation, which seems to me to run completely counter to what I at least understand by populism.

PROF. G.F. MANCINI: I have been fascinated by the remarks made by Professor Schapiro this morning. Obviously, a narrow interpretation of his words would remove from the area of populism as we have tried to define it here a number of movements which stress the role of leadership in terms of various ideologies (and I suspect Professor Schapiro has used the latter word, perhaps unwittingly, in its classic Marxist meaning, that is essentially as "mystifications").

But I am not certain Professor Schapiro's view can be completely accepted. To be sure, the religion of the people is a fundamental feature of populism. Other traits, however, seem to be no less important and, above all, especially in underdeveloped or awakening countries, the notion of "ruralism". Take Cuba. Mr. Hennessy has just pointed out the role of "rural mystique" in Castro's thinking and his emphasis on the emancipation of women as an exploited segment of the people. I agree with him on these points and I might add as a footnote that Castro reverses the usual relationship, as codified by Mao Tse-Dun and Giap, between the party and the fuerrilla movement. He deduces the party from the peasant "foco guerrillero" rather than the other way round. The rural guerrilla squad up in the Sierra is the mother and the party down in the cities is the scion. This is the gist of Castro's open critique of the Venezuelan Communist Party and - let us face it - the gist of his implicit critique of Leninism.

Yesterday, I tried to describe the passion for the people living off agriculture which darkened the mind of Italian Communists in the 1950s. Of this passion I could give you one more example. In 1953 the Communist Party discovered what it itself christened "cultura contadina", i.e. peasants' culture, imposing it on a bewildered but by no means reluctant Italian intelligentsia. For a few years all Italian intellectuals who wanted to be à la page got interested in the Tarantula religion in Apulia; they rediscovered the "integral man", the undivided soul in the Southern farm-hand or shepherd; they made a best-seller of a book by a self-styled peasant poet, Rocco Scotellaro: a little book about his people of Basilicata (the Italian deep South) with the improbable title "L'uva puttanelle", which could be translated as "the little trollop's grapes". I may assure you that today we all are slightly ashamed of not having feared to tread where angels do.

Of course, as I have pointed out, Professor Schapiro has most certainly a point. The respect for or the worship of the people, the refusal to politically rape the people are obviously essential ingredients of populism. It seems to me, however, that the religion of the people may take various forms. In certain historical situations, for instance when a populist element is grafted on a movement which has undergone or is critically undergoing the experience of Leninism, it may simply consist in a reluctance to bring exceeding pressure to bear on the people or in fostering more participation by the people.

As an example, the Communist leaders in Italy and Fidel in Cuba, particularly in his famous "Playboy" interview - by the way, I wish somebody would explain to me why he chose "Playboy" to expound his views to Western readers - have both reacted to the charge that they manipulate the people by pointing out that through their organisations huge masses which previously vegetated in a state of utter anomie have come in contact with the realities of their stance in society. In other words, the P.C.I. and Castro have made a tremendous and active political participation possible where there was none.

I am of course quite aware of the limits inherent in this argument. Clearly enough, the political education of the masses by the Italian Communist Party has been allowed only up to a certain point: the point where the masses begin asking questions involving the principles and the strategy of the party; in other words, the point where the critical analysis of the masses, prompted by the party, turns from the outside (the Italian society as viewed through the screen of the P.C.I.) to the inside (the P.C.I. itself, perhaps already perceived by the very masses as a distorting screen). Nevertheless, in the Communist contention there is something very real, something that could hardly be denied. Had it not been for the Communist Party the rural Centre and the rural South would probably still be described, as they cynically were by conservative pre-fascist politicians, as "reservoirs of wisdom", because they sent to parliament right-wing deputies who could in turn be manipulated by national leaders such as Giolitti. I am inclined to believe that the same holds true as regards Cuba and I wonder whether Mr. Hennessy agrees with me on this very important point.

PROF. SCHAPIRO: I would only observe that whether you call it Caudillism or personalism or something of that kind, the essential difference, if you take the original model of Russian populism, is that in the one case you have a leader on whom the whole thing hinges, on whom the whole thing was built up: he does not regard it as his duty to become, as it were, a vessel for the wisdom of the people. He is giving his own imprint to the movement. That is totally alien, as I understand it, to what these latter-day populists of 1917 when confronted with an actual political problem regarded as their duty.

THE CHAIRMAN: Now we must address ourselves to the biting of the sour apple, a difficult part of our proceedings, which is the attempt to formulate some kind of model or definition or formula into which we can fit all the various types and nuances of populism which have been discussed; or, if we think that we cannot do it, to give reasons for our failure to do so, which might be equally fruitful. Perhaps we might decide upon one or two models, or three or four models. At the moment, I should like to conceal my own opinion about either the desirability or possibility of this, which I hope to be able to formulate later.

Until 4.45, we had better simply have general discussion of the subject started off by Mr. Ionescu, who will make a report on the lines on which we should proceed. After that, people can speak for a maximum of four or five minutes each, but with a right of speaking more than once.

MR. IONESCU: I am still not sure, at the end of the conference, whether a definition will emerge from it. As the rapporteur I think that a definition is not essential. The discussion, like the play, has been the thing. And in any case, provided an agreement can be broadly reached on what seems to me to have been the six issues most debated by the conference, a broad and preferably short definition could still be proposed by someone.

One controversial issue is whether populism is primarily an ideology (or ideologies), or a movement (or movements). Personally from what I have heard during these forty-eight hours I think that the majority are inclined to lean towards the ideological aspect.

But some of the speakers seem to have meant by this, and that is a second issue, that populism is a sort of recurring mentality, appearing in different historical and geographic contexts as the result of a special social situation, for instance the situation of change faced by a society in which, as Professor Touraine has described it, the middle social factors are either missing or too weak.

Thirdly, in this mentality what I would describe as the element of political persecution mania is more acute in populism than in many other political psychologies. The political psychology of populism is imbued with the feeling that identifiable or unidentifiable conspiracies are at work, deliberately and tenaciously, against the 'people'. The basic attitude is one of defence against the unknown outside forces.

As such populism is characterized by a peculiar negativism. Many speakers have stressed that it was anti-, anti-capitalistic, anti-urban, as well as xenophobic and very often anti-semitic. It carries with it great doses of blind hatred.

In contrast, and this is the fifth point, it seems to me that one of the large areas of agreement of the conference is the fact that populism worships the people. But which 'people'? Surely not the proud demog of the Greeks or anything like the Herrenvolk. The people the populists worship are the meek and the miserable, and the populists worship them because they are miserable and because they are persecuted by the conspirators. The fact that they are more often than not embodied in the peasantry is because the peasants were and are, in any underdeveloped societies, the most miserable of the lot - and the more miserable they are the more worshipped should they be.

Finally this recurring mentality disappears usually by absorption into stronger ideologies or movements. But here I disagree with those who think it could lead only to, or is merely a phase of, socialism. There are three possibilities. In some cases it could lead to socialism. In others it leads to nationalism. And, as for instance in Eastern Europe at the beginning of the century, it leads to peasantism. This third possibility should not be overlooked.

THE CHAIRMAN: That gives us ground for discussion. What I propose as a method of discussion is that people should speak freely now - a "free for all", I think, is the term; a very populist slogan - until 4.45, and after refreshment we will try to generate something. The meeting is now open for discussion.

MR. M. CRANSTON: I would suggest an approach to the question of definition at the same time more cautious and more cheerful than that proposed by Mr. Ionescu. Perhaps we might get a clue from Wittgenstein's later theory of meaning, according to which it is not so much a matter of looking for a common denominator or hard core of meaning, but looking for family resemblances. We all know how things seem to fall into families: Alfred resembling John and John resembling Angela, but all three having nothing in common.

It is these resemblances between the different members of the family, different resemblances in each of them, which we find when we look at the different forms of populism which have been expounded to us at this conference, in the papers and in the discussion. We should not despair if we do not find anything which all these different populisms have in common, but should rather give up the hope of finding such a common denominator, and then might be more conscious of the differences and the resemblances between the alleged members of the family and by that means we might achieve something in the way of a definition. That is, by not doing too much, we might do more.

I think as a matter of fact, however loose the membership of the family may be, it is extremely useful to have this word "populism", especially in looking at countries like those in Africa: because if one goes to Africa, thinking in terms of democracy one is apt to come away very disillusioned and disappointed. If, however, you go fortified with the language of populism, you might come back home more stimulated although perhaps no happier.

THE CHAIRMAN: May I ask a question about this, to me very sympathetic idea. If you press it very hard, if you say that A is like B, B is like C and C is like D, but A is not like D, anything can be made to resemble anything. In the end, all political movements can be arranged on that kind of slide and we shall not get any nearer. That is the only objection I have. Therefore, would you not say that if we are to employ this method, one should try to formulate something which all these things resemble to some appreciable degree?

MR. CRANSTON: I agree. Of course.

THE CHAIRMAN: Rather than have a complete interchange.

MR. CRANSTON: Rather than have a zig-zag, yes.

DR. SZABO: I wanted to mention the words which struck me as practically refuting my experience of populism in Hungary and to my notions and personal experience and to my notions on populism in other countries. Mr. Ionescu said that it was a function of expression which is less of a fancy and more a defensive concept. I would like to suggest, in view of today's discussion only and of a definition, consideration of the last sentence of Mr. Minogue's paper, which in my opinion expresses it completely when he spoke of how populism happens. I found it absolutely correct about the true sense of the struggles in society. Again, speaking personally it is exactly in line with the populist movement in Hungary.

PROF. MACRAE: I would like to support what Mr. Ionescu has said. I came here having written the paper on populism as an ideology, not expecting for a moment that I would come to the conclusion that this might be a useful way of defining populism. I have now come to the conclusion that family likenesses within the ideology do seem to me to help us in this direction.

I do, however, have certain disagreements and worries here. One of the things that has been very obvious is that the contributions which have been made belong either to people who see populist movements individually as historically specific or to others of us who are concerned perhaps for professional reasons with generalising and systematising. I believe that I professionally belong to the second group and that some sort of systematisation which will in its turn be of help to the historically specific people might well be possible.

I would, however, like, in the point about systematisation, to say that much as I agree with some of the things which have been said by Mr. Minogue, who in a way began this part of the discussion this morning, I also disagree rather strongly with him and it might be useful, therefore, if we could put one sort of systematisation on one side as likely to cause a disagreement.

I disagree both with his theory of stages of political consciousness in terms of tradition, ideology and democracy and I also disagree - and here I may be in a minority - with his idea, which has been expressed by other people, of being able properly to distinguish stages within populism. I think that populists, once they have undergone certain kinds of experience, stop being populist although they may continue to exhibit populist elements in their ideology. What I am saying is that routinisation, institutionalisation and power are death to populism. Although populist elements may survive, I think that is all that we can say.

I would like to say a little about ideology which is relevant to what Mr. Ionescu has said. My own view is that humanity, perhaps regrettably, has a very limited repertoire of elementary ideas, many of which are extremely old, archaic and primitive. I sometimes go so far as to think that someone who has read his Homer and Hesiod and selected books of the Old Testament, St. Paul and one or two other things, probably knows nine-tenths of the repertoire of ideas that are combined and recombined in ideology. I mean that seriously and not as a joke.

I believe both that the number of ideas of themes or items that combine and recombine is limited, and that these recombinations are not combinations of great logical consistency although they of course have their consistencies internal to the ideology and also in terms of external circumstances.

Occasionally new ideas are added, and they are usually added by people who are in some sense intellectuals, philosophers, prophets, social scientists and politicians of a less sophisticated type. They are transformed, separated out. These new elements become slippery once they are detached from their sources, and can be recombined in very different ways.

In a sense, I am suggesting that ideologies can be conceived as being like a ballet with dancers waiting in the wings and reappearing in different costumes but in perpetual movement.

Some ideologies are merely theories, but very often theories are the rationalisations of the educated and those aspiring to education. Theory is not a necessary charter for ideology. Mr. de Kadt made a distinction between the history of ideas and ideology. I do not think that this distinction works, and this is one of the reasons why I support what Mr. Ionescu has said. I believe, in fact, that we are inevitably bound up with the histories of ideas, because ideas have sources; the limited number of ideas available have sources of the kinds which I have suggested.

There are many things that I would like to have said. I would like to make a point about something which Professor Venturi said yesterday which is relevant. Professor Venturi made a point, with which I am sure I agree, about the comparative unimportance of Balevsky (?) in populism as a movement in Russia. I agree about that in one sense. Looking at it as a historian, I would think that undoubtedly he is right, but Mikhailovsky and people of that sort make overt much that is implicit in a situation, and he has this kind of importance. It is not the importance of direct influence.

Secondly, his articulation of these matters as part of the intellectual tradition of all other societies which we have been discussing is helpful to us in our thinking. Although he is absolutely

correct on the historical point, somehow Mikhailovsky seems to me to be of importance, and a fortiori the intellectuals and articulators, even if they are crack-brained, seem to me to be helpful.

I would have liked to go on to say what I think are the major elements in rather more detail than Mr. Ionescu did, but I have exhausted my time.

DR. SAUL: I am rather uneasy about this concentration upon ideologies. It is something which some of us may feel is not legitimate. One of the things which has been raised very clearly is the way in which these ideologies can be used. It is clear that in some movements there are people who really identify with the people and there are people who manipulate these ideas. If we concentrate upon the ideas of the ideology or whatever it is called to the exclusion of situating these ideas both in terms of the changing society and in terms of the political movements with which they are related, we will find ourselves not talking about a lot of the things that we would want to talk about when we talk about populism.

It seems to me that this is an important dimension that may be dropped out and it will become the history of ideas without any situating in this way and without any ability to assess what they mean in social terms and how manipulative or non-manipulative they are.

PROF. HUGH SETON-WATSON: It seems to me that Mr. Ionescu's scheme is a good one to work on but the essence is the ideology: what are the populist mentality and the populist ideology? We must assume when we try and work it out that it is a genuinely held ideology. Manipulation by others obviously is another dimension. One should keep it distinct.

For our starting point, we might consider the content of populist ideology. If we have a picture of what a populist ideology or mentality is we can then, now or later in life or in our later thinking, ask ourselves whether and to what extent this element is present in a given movement or, secondly, to what extent a given movement is wholly populist in character. But it is not so important to label movements as it is to be clear in our minds what the phenomenon is.

I want to clear away a little dead wood. There are a number of points which are not essential to the content of this ideology and which we can, therefore eliminate now. One point which has been mentioned a good deal this morning is the appeal to an element which I would call the new urban poor - that is, the people who have come in from the countryside into industrialising areas, the unskilled working class, the unskilled manual workers in the urban agglomeration, as distinct from the established, efficient, disciplined working class.

In Eastern Europe some decades ago an obvious example was the contrast between the printing workers, who were permanent, well-organised workers, children of workers with a social democratic consciousness, and on the other hand miscellaneous unskilled workers. The fact that populist movements in various countries at one time or another have appealed to these uprooted first-generation urban poor who do not yet deserve to be called working class

- there is a difference between urban poor and working class - the fact that they did this, for example, in the time of the Narodnaya Volya, is true and important, but it is not specific, because all revolutions did the same thing. Lenin appealed to this element. Communist parties in many countries throughout the world have appealed to these people. For example, in Hungary the Communists appealed to the unskilled people and won their support both before and after the Second World War. The printing workers remained solidly Social-democratic. In Spain, the uprooted labourers from Andalusia who came to Barcelona as unskilled workers became anarchists and some became communists. They did not become regular social democrats. Again, fascists had similar successes - Peron appealed precisely to those people. Thus the fact of appealing to the transitional new urban poor is true of populism but is not specific to populism. Let us, therefore, cut it out altogether.

Another point is peasants. In any society which is overwhelmingly agricultural, the peasants provide the mass of the population. They are the poor. Not all peasants are injured and humiliated, but very many are, and most people who are injured and humiliated are peasants. Therefore, all revolutionary movements include peasants. This again is not specific to populists.

It is still unfortunately necessary to repeat this cliché because things have recently been said which seemed to ignore it: the fact of manipulating peasants in China is not a specific indication of populism. The fact that you appeal to peasants and use peasants, as Mao did, has nothing to do with populism.

The third thing which is not specific to populism is defence of the people against capitalism. Of course, the populists were anti-capitalists - that is true - but so were all forms of socialist party in the early days of socialism. So were the first Marxists in later days, and so were the communists later still and so to some extent in varying degrees have been fascist movements. Therefore, once again defence against capitalism is not specific to populist ideology.

My last point is a reference to what Professor Schapiro said this morning. I was very happy to hear what he said and I entirely agree with it, but one wants a little more precision in the use of the words "élite" and "élitism".

It seems to me that the populist movements first in Russia and then in other underdeveloped societies (I am not sure about America) started, and their ideology was first propounded, by an intellectual élite. Therefore, the element of élite enters in. This intellectual élite was something which was formed by a social process initiated in almost all cases by the deliberate will of a ruler, whether it was Alexander I, Peter the Great or Mohamed Ali or anyone else. A rapid and artificially created modernization process produced a rapidly and artificially created intellectual élite, and it was from this intellectual élite that the initiative came and it was there that the ideology was formed. But it does not follow from that that this élite is élitist in its outlook.

On the contrary, the populist leaders, the worshippers of the Narod, were a social and intellectual élite, but they wanted to abolish élites. That is the point made by Professor Schapiro. He is absolutely right.

However, there is a further differentiation to be made because it is possible, and it was indeed true, that some of those social élites embarking on a populist programme, self-sacrifice for the people, serving the people, and so on, decided that the best way to operate was to have an élitist hierarchical conspiratorial organisation. After all, the Narodnaya Volya was nothing if not élitist in that sense, but it regarded the élite as an instrument, not as an aim. The question to what extent this problem is specific to populism is something on which I am not clear.

I think that the distinction between an élite playing a role and an élite with élitist aims is significant. The distinction between an élite using élitist methods and an élite having an élitist society as its objective is important. The fascist parties, of course, all aimed at an élitist hierarchical society. To them the élite was the end as well as the means.

I said yesterday that the Roumainian Iron Guard, which was a Fascist movement, was not a populist movement but had a strong populist element in it. Undoubtedly it was élitist not only in its procedure, not only in the origin of its leadership, which was produced by the development of the modern intelligentsia of Roumania, not only in its procedure which was conspiratorial, but even in its aim, which was a hierarchical society. Communists, on the other hand, and the Bolsheviks - if we take Lenin's original ideas - did not aim at an élitist society, although it worked out that way. Populists have in some cases been completely oblivious to the need for hierarchy, have been anarchical and passive like what Professor Schapiro said this morning about Kerensky. This has been their weakness. Other populists were élitist in method, but no populists were élitist in aim.

DR. PETER CALVERT: Going on from what Professor Seton-Watson has said, this I hope will try to take another area out of the discussion. We are in essence dealing with two peculiar historical movements as the origin of the concept with which we are trying to deal, and we must set outside the bounds of discussion the question of whether or not American populism is populism or even, for that matter, whether Russian populism is populism. We are stuck with two specific historical equivalents and from these we must try to derive the general concept if we wish to use it for anything else. Any other method will be confusing.

Having gone on from that, it seems to me that very much the only thing which these two concepts have in common is not an ideological content, although there are ideological derivations which are important, but the fact of being a political movement, of being a response of a particular sort of circumstances.

While I would not go along with the view of these being a response to capitalism as such, I would like to advance the thought that they are a rural reaction to a centre of economic power, whatever the nature of that centre of economic power might be. It is a specific syndrome, a specific form of response to a suddenly perceived danger from without.

DR. WERNER KLATT: I apologise for the fact that I have not been at the first three meetings. Contrary to the last contributions which tried to eliminate the point made by Mr. Ionescu, it seems to me that one point in the seven of the reconciliation which have been listed has been missed out, and that is the question of leadership. It seems to me to be true that the intellectual leaders were as rural as the transistor radio, as one of the papers said. One could, of course, say that other ideologies and movements were also led by bourgeois intellectuals rather than by representatives of the groups that they were trying to represent or for whom they tried to formulate an ideology, but I think that this is where the difference lies between populism and peasantism which Mr. Ionescu mentioned.

In the peasant parties one found men who were actually peasants or former peasants. The intellectuals who conceived the idea of populism were invariably urban intellectuals. One could, of course, say that that applied to Marxism, too, but in the application of Marxism, both in the trade union and in the Socialist movements, there were representatives of the working classes in leadership positions. This is where we should make a distinction between populist and peasant parties and try to apply the ideology.

Although I am an economist, I am inclined to think that it is right to stick to the ideology and not to dwell on the economic content of populism, otherwise we may find ourselves in a position where we argue what populist elements are in the National Farmers' Unions of the various countries, and that would be throwing the net a little too wide.

I do, however, think that economic aspects come in, perhaps not into this meeting or into this discussion, but they come in when one considers the question of whether populism could be overcome or replaced, particularly in the so-called third world, which is of course not one world but many different worlds.

When one asks oneself the question "Can populism be replaced or overcome in these territories", I am inclined to think that this reference to hostility and to the experience of risk or risk-taking is an important aspect which has economic undertones. Probably the only way to eliminate the influence of the populist ideology would be to speed up the process of risk-taking. But I will not say any more because this may not be relevant in the session where we are concerned with definition.

PROF. TOURAINE: I am quite in agreement with what Dr. Saul has said because it seems to me that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to create a general descriptive notion of populism. It is a characteristic feature of populist movements that they are in great part a movement of ideas: that means movement laying with a certain intellectual and cultural tradition in such a way that the difference from, say, Marxism is that it does not appeal directly to an economic analysis of the situation. It is much more voluntaristic. It is much more concentrated on aims and objectives. It is normal, therefore, that there is a great diversity. Each movement has a particular ethos and the counterpoint of that is that I do not think that it is possible to generalise and to isolate some common elements.

Secondly, I suppose that my impression is that it is equally impossible to define populism by a social basis. To speak of marginal people or marginal categories is certainly insufficient to speak about anomie as well, because that does not explain the formation of a movement. I suppose that it is quite insufficient, and it would be even false, to define the social root or social basis of a populist movement by a situation of a certain category in a process of social mobility. If people are just defiant, going upwards, that can explain the formation of a movement directed towards social integration, or if the people are a downward mobile that can explain a type of fascist movement or an effort to retain some social status. The consequence of these two impossibilities seems to me to be that it is necessary to come back to an analysis of the situation.

I do not think that it is possible to define a general concept, not a descriptive notion, but a concept of populism, if not as a direct expression of a situation. I mean by that not some specific aspect, but a constellation of elements, because populism is always a political movement. By that I mean that problems of power are directly dealt with in one sense or another. At the same time, it is not an organised aiming at directly transforming the power situation.

I hope later to have an opportunity to try to define in a relatively precise way which kind of situation corresponds to a populist movement. I simply want to make clear now that I am impressed by the series of questions asked by Mr. Ionescu, but I do not think that any of these features could be applied to all movements. It is necessary to use a relatively different method of concentrating on a study from an analytical point of view.

After all, if we were here to discuss socialism and what socialism is, I suppose that we would spend our first hour speaking about capitalism and processes of industrialisation and then to understand socialism as a social response to an economic situation. The problem is, which kind of economic, institutional and political situation is at the root of the populist movements.

PROF. VENTURI: I was impressed by what Professor Seton-Watson said. It makes me think once more of a point about which I spoke yesterday. Of course, the problem of these uprooted peasants who come to the town is very important. I agree that that does not make the natural normal basis of a populist movement.

The proof can be given also in Italy. After all, the populist side of the history of the Communist Italian Party after the war was before the uprooting of the peasants of the south coming, for example, to my own town of Turin. Half of my town now is comprised of peasants from the south and no populist movement is emerging. It is, therefore, true that it comes out of Left movements - Communist, Socialist and so on - but not specifically and not always populist.

But the history of Russia makes one think that in one case this thing is populist. The peasants do not only bring the fact that they are uprooted, but they bring into the town their own institutions. That is the populist side of the story. The peasants from Lucania who come to Turin have nothing to bring to Turin from their own institutions of political organisation, but the peasants who came from Algiore had something to bring

to Moscow. That was imported to the textile industry in Moscow, Petersburg and so on. That was populism.

The difference is not only because they are peasants and uprooted, but because they have political organisations and ideas. The great difference in the history of the populist workers' movement and the Marxist populist workers' movement in Russia was exactly that. Afterwards, the greatest weapon was strike, and the fault was the organisation inside the textile or other industry. That was very important because one idea was put inside the workers' Russian movement that not only the organised worker has a right to speak, but everybody has. That is in a way very important, as everybody knows, in the history of Russia, not only in the workers' movement, but generally. That is a populist idea in that it comes directly from the institution of the villages and the great tradition out of the village.

Secondly, a point from the problem of methodology. I agree, that is a great problem. For every student of history and ideas, what has been said is very important and true. I always think that as far as the historical point of view is concerned, the most important thing is the ideas. I do not believe in theology. I do not believe in religion, I am afraid, but I believe that religion is very important concerning historical problems - but not theology, or less theology. Therefore Mikhailovsky's theology of the workers' movement is not the man creating an ideology.

I was very much impressed about Professor Schapiro's problem of the contact. I feel that this is the great problem. The difference among populist movements and others is very often this: "What is my duty in the face of the people?" Russian history teaches us that, and it is very important. I am afraid that very often it is true - I do not say always, but from a nineteenth century point of view.

Nineteenth century revolutionaries, with exceptions, thought that their duty was to take power and, if possible, to kill; in any case, to eliminate everybody who did not think as they did. That is a very twentieth century idea. But eighteenth and nineteenth century people did not even do that, even in the French revolution. Even Robespierre probably was not so sure that that was his duty. He did it in a way, but I take it that it was not his own ideology.

In the nineteenth century ideology, a revolution is specially and fundamentally a negative idea. It is to remove all the obstacles, everything that is impossible, to enable the people to govern themselves. That is the idea.

I was always extremely interested by my great master Salvemi, who stopped the history of the French revolution in 1792. I always wondered why, from a nineteenth century point of view, it was right. Monarchy was destroyed, the people were freed, and that was the real revolution, probably after something bad had happened. He was interested from a historical point of view, but as far as concerns the revolutionary, which Salvemi was - the idea that after the king was killed and all the obstacles of feudalism were removed, in the end the masses could govern themselves - a revolution was there. I am afraid that we have improved too much in the twentieth century to understand this point of view of populism.

DR. WALICKI: I would like to propose an ideal type of modern populism. First, it is a peasant oriented socialism, the characteristic feature of which is a combination of backward-looking utopianism with modern socialism. It means a combination of modern socialism with an idealisation of pre-capitalist relationships. This peasant oriented socialism leads in its development either to modern socialism or to peasantism, and in both cases the archaic features disappear.

Secondly, it is characteristic of backward countries in confrontation with developed capitalistic countries. This point is very important, and it is a bridge between Russian populism and populism in the countries of the third world. I shall deduce from this second point two other points.

The third point, which is bound up with the second, is that because populism emerges in backward countries in confrontation with developed capitalist states, the intelligentsia play a very large role in the leadership of the movement and in the formulation of its main ideas. The reason is obvious. The intelligentsia in backward countries is simply a product of the character of this confrontation with the developed countries. Hence also the worship of the people, because the intellectuals, the members of the intelligentsia, being the product of Westernisation, feel themselves alienated and put forward the idea of returning to the people who have roots in the soil.

Fourthly, the last feature, which is also bound up with this same confrontation with the developed capitalist states, is the possibility of identifying capitalism with something which comes from outside and therefore, of course, the possibility of combining populist ideas with nationalism, with xenophobia, and so on.

In the last analysis I agree with Mr. Ionescu that there are three ways out of populism: modern socialism, peasantism and nationalism. This outline is very similar to what I tried to say earlier in my paper, but perhaps it is clearer.

MR. HALL: I do not want to comment directly on what Dr. Walicki has just said. Perhaps a little later one will come down more specifically to these questions of definition. Perhaps, however, what I will say will show that I disagree fundamentally with what he has said.

On the question of methodology, I agree very much with what Professor Touraine has said. Dr. Calvert talked about taking the American and Russian examples as models, and Professor Venturi proposed the very dangerous idea that one should look to nascent ideas. This, I think, has been inherent in what he has said before about prototypes. If we talk about prototypes of populism, we will get ourselves into very great difficulty.

Those of us who know something about seventeenth century England, which has been touched upon slightly, will believe, I think, that if we start talking about prototypes we will need two more weeks on historical questions of prototypes of populism. We have, therefore, to do away with any ideas of thinking of Russian or American populism as prototypes and we must come back to the kind of analysis of existing and historical situations of which Professor Touraine has spoken.

Dr. Walicki qualified what he said just now by talking about modern populism, but to talk about populism in general, to introduce the word "capitalism" in any way that can be easily defined or socialism in any which can be easily defined, seems to me to be particularly wide of the mark. We have got to look at some other kinds of populism which do not necessarily employ the words "capitalism" or "socialism" or, perhaps, even "nationalism". But perhaps I am swinging away to the school which says that it cannot be defined.

PROF. ANDRESKI: I would like to make a few general methodological or philosophical remarks about the whole problem. First, it seems to me that underlying assumption of some of the pronouncements which we have heard is the idea that there is something to be unveiled, something that is intrinsically populist; which is a mediaeval realistic approach to the nature of concepts. It is obvious that we can define these things in any way we like. We could agree tomorrow to call cats dogs and dogs cats, and if we agreed that would be fine.

To decide on a definition, we have first to decide whether we want to use 'populism' as a proper name for some specific historical phenomenon or as a generic sociological category. If we opt for the latter we may define it in such a way as to exclude all the movements which have in the past labelled themselves as populist.

We then have to decide why we want to define it one way instead of another. Obviously, we want to have some order and some pigeon-holes which will enable us to classify the phenomena which we are studying in the most convenient way, and therefore one of the considerations which must be taken into account is which other words do we have which might serve our purpose? For instance, the phenomenon described by Professor Schapiro could be called purist democratism, or democratic purism, or purist democracy. Some of the other features mentioned in our discussions could be described by the term egalitarianism, which I have not heard despite its obvious usefulness. If we are to be guided by criteria of utility we must make a survey of the related terms so that we make the best use of the existing vocabulary, and therefore let us define populism in such a way that it will not be co-extensive with other available terms.

DR. CALVERT: I feel sure that Professor Andreski is pulling our legs gently in suggesting that as a sociological term we could define populism in such a way as to exclude the only two authentic historical instances on which we are able to agree. This would admittedly be possible but I feel sure that we will not attempt to do that.

At the same time, it is important to notice that the fact that one must define it in such a way as to include these historical instances does not mean that one must be bound by them to the exclusion of all else or that one is in any way elevating two historical categories into the classification of prototypes. We are not talking about prototypes. We are talking about a historical problem from which we want to borrow a name to use to cover certain situations. Therefore, we are confronted with a specific set of circumstances.

Therefore, I do not feel that I can go along with Mr. Hall's remarks about the English situation. It is perfectly true that one could find prototypes there, no doubt going way back to the sixteenth century, but this would not be particularly useful and I hope that we will chop off the discussion on this topic at this point.

MR. HALL: My words were an attempt to prevent us from doing exactly that.

PROF. ANDRESKI: May I say that I was not doing any legpulling! I believe that it is perfectly possible to define populism in such a way as to exclude both of those two concrete historical phenomena. On the other hand, if we want to have a generic term to cover both it would have to be a fairly wide concept because they differ so markedly that to include them both we would have to include almost all the other phenomena which have ever been mentioned during our discussions.

The contrast between American populism and Russian *narodnitschestvo* are striking. One is engineered by the intelligentsia, the other emanates from the class concerned. One is defending the existing (and unusually high) status of the farmers, while the other is striving towards improving the condition of the oppressed peasants. The one shows a clear commitment to a very crystallised form of political organisation, while the other is just vaguely wanting to help the people and to tell them what to do.

One could probably find a number of other features which are highly divergent. For this reason, I suggest that if we have a definition which includes both, it will have to be a very general one, something like, "Any movement which strives towards defence or the protection of interests of rural population", or something of that sort. If you narrow it down, you exclude one or the other.

DR. MACFARLANE: The thing which we are most concerned to do is to make this manageable, but I do not think that it will be manageable if we think in terms of constructing a "T" model or an ideal form of populism. We are more likely to get somewhere in following Professor Seton-Watson's idea of first saying those things which are not essential to populism. I would add to this that it need not be rural.

Secondly, because populism of its nature seems to be very much an "against" thing, we might say that there are certain fairly generalised aspects which populist movements are against. Professor Seton-Watson mentioned that they are anti-elitism. This needs strongly to be stressed because it delineates this sort of movement from other sorts of movements.

There are one or two other things which we might possibly add to this. It seems to me to be anti-specialisation; it is anti-rootlessness, the idea of being adrift in the community; and perhaps more specifically, it is anti the existing current method of carrying on politics, either

because the existing methods and instruments are inadequate to secure their objectives or because there just are not any instruments available to this particular group. I think that if we are rather more humble and try to see the things which are not essential to it, on the one hand, and see the things which it is definitely against, we may get a greater region of agreement.

On top of that, I do not think that we can talk of an ideology of populism. What we will have are certain common features which, I think, will be of a negative character. But on top of that there will be the specific things which the movement is against or is striving for. It needs emphasising that as far as people coming into the movement are concerned, it will be the thing which is specific which attracts them; its being directed against these business men, these jews, or whatever it is. This distinctive feature of a populist movement cannot be brought into any general definition just because the movement may be directed against any one of a whole range of bodies.

It may be that in the future we shall see populist movements which are directed against the trade unions coming from those who feel unprotected and in some senses suffering from the activities of trade unions. We cannot, obviously, rule out the possibility of anti-trade unionism or an anti-communist party - in Russia there might be a basis of a populist movement if it could only get off the ground. We have got to aim rather lower in our sights if we are to make any move forward.

DR. KEEP: I endorse Dr. Walicki's working definition of populism, subject to two minor amendments: one to the preliminary clause to add that populism is a specific historical phenomenon, the only authentic version of which occurred in a particular country at a given time, namely, Russia between 1848 and 1918, which found emulators elsewhere in situations of rough equivalence, some of which took over features from Russia and some of which did not; and then to add to the fourth point yet a fifth to say that it is a secularised religion with a strong moral note based on a perversion of Russian orthodoxy influenced by European romanticism and much too imprecise to be considered an ideology. That is my definition of populism.

PROF. ANDRESKI: If Dr. Keep takes that standpoint, why would he insist on giving his pupils or his friends a name which has been invented by the Americans, whereas the Russians call themselves Narodniks? Why does he not call them Narodniks?

DR. KEEP: I would add a footnote to say that there is no historical connection between Russian and American populism.

PROF. SETON-WATSON: I think that Dr. Walicki's definition with these emendations is an admirable basis for discussion but it does not fully satisfy me. Before putting anything forward, however, I would like to attack another piece of dead wood in a rather provocative way. I hope that I do not offend.

It seems to me that in this discussion of populism and the literature about it, there is a danger which I would like to warn us to avoid. The word seems to have become current in connection with governments in underdeveloped countries for which some useful, respectable word is required. It seems to me that possibly this has come from American social scientists studying underdeveloped countries. They have wanted to find a word, and they have taken a word from the American experience and derived from an understanding, possibly imperfect at that, of American populism with its peculiar characteristics. They have applied this word particularly to what they find in Africa. The reason why they have done this is that they wanted to find a respectable word to describe something which is not very respectable at all; namely authoritarian nationalist despotism.

To give an analogy to make my point even more provocative: those who study the Soviet Union have long been aware that Soviet writers have long needed a word to describe a social group which clearly is not working class or peasantry but is something else, which Stalin described as a stratum and not a class, in fact the top portion of the Soviet social pyramid. They could not admit that they had a bourgeoisie, or that they had State capitalism, or that they were dominated by a bureaucracy, and so they had to find a word which was respectable and which was not completely divorced from reality.

The word which they took was the venerable, admirable, splendid word "intelligentsia". And so the phrase "toiling intelligentsia" was used to describe a state bourgeoisie. It had nothing to do with the intelligentsia as it used to be understood in Russia.

Equally, the word "populism" is being taken, in the first instance by Americans - there is nothing anti-American involved in what I say; there have been far more articulate Western students of these societies from the United States than from anywhere else.

This word "populism", with its American connotation, has been taken and used as a sort of fig-leaf to cover up something which it is taboo to call by simply but shocking words.

I suggest that there is more to be said about populism than Dr. Walicki and Dr. Keep have given us, admirable though that is. But I think that populism is a bit more than that. But it is a great deal less than authoritarian African nationalism.

PROF. WORSLEY: I would like to dissent from Professor MacRae's emphasis upon the elemental components which are, as it were, existent in human social relationships at the beginning of time, so to speak, and are to be found in any culture. The problem is to locate these firstly in time and secondly in social structures within specific periods of time. In terms of time, I take what Mr. Minogue said. I think of a process at the widest level. The term which he used was "becoming".

I would accept that, and I think that we can specify it a bit more - I do not know whether it is acceptable to you - in terms of one particular "becoming" process: the reaction to industrial challenge to an agrarian order which has been so widely talked about or, in a more modern derivation of it, the "development" problem.

I would say that we want to specify and locate populism in this temporal process, and secondly, to locate it in terms of its sociological niche in so far as - and I have to differ here from Professor Seton-Watson - I think that the peasant marginal niche is the relevant one: either amongst the peasants in the villages, or amongst the recent migrants from the villages, or in the minds of those people who think about them.

PROF. SETON-WATSON: It is true, but it is not specific.

PROF. WORSLEY: No, it is not specific, but that is where you find it.

PROF. SETON-WATSON: We agree on that: it is not specific to populism.

PROF. WORSLEY: We agree, but you do not find it anywhere else.

PROF. SETON-WATSON: Yes, you do.

PROF. WORSLEY: All right! So much for the led.

The leaders are a great problem. Three of Dr. Walicki's four points might be acceptable, but we know that the intelligentsia-leadership phenomenon is not true of the North American movements; and that introduces a severe problem.

Thirdly, I think that there is a way of finding a diffuse formula which might straddle the varieties of North American populism through rural Russian forms to even modern Afro-Asian ones. The element of stress on the desirability of participation would cover this. It would include individualistic conceptions of participation in the running of your own lives, even in making money and speculating on the market and in land values. It would also cover co-operativism and various communitarian forms of economic organization.

MR. IONESCU: And administrative.

PROF. WORSLEY: Yes.

PROF. MACRAE: I would like first to correct the impression which I have given Professor Worsley. I do not think that these things are timeless.

I have great sympathy with everyone of these suggestions which have been offered towards definition, with the exception of one for a quite clear reason: what was said by Dr. Keep. Dr. Keep is in a most respectable position that goes beyond that of the Göttingen school of Ranke and this is highly respectable, but there are many other purposes which men have than to work in that particular tradition, and I think that we can try and go beyond it. If we fail, very well. We are still left with what Dr. Keep has said; that is fine.

A working definition is not a history nor a sociology. Far less is it a model or a declaration of a timeless truth. It is an attempt to get at a useful device. Some of the useful devices which have been suggested, combining elements which I have heard said, to mention names arbitrarily, by Professor Seton-Watson, Professor Andreski, Dr. Walicki and others, could be bound together for this end.

But I still would like to go back to ideology as in a sense a defining point and go through some of the items, rather too many of them perhaps, which might be looked at here and which might help us to bridge something which, as I am convinced, is genuinely bridgeable and worth bridging, and that is the Russo-American gap.

What I am proposing is that we treat - I am concerned a little like Professor Marshall McLuhan's saying that the medium is the message - the ideology as the reality - for our purposes only, not as a declaration of a philosophical position - and say that a movement is a populist one when the charter of its existence, its acts and its propaganda contains a majority of the following elements. I have not worked out these elements in a good logical order but I am sure that they can be reduced to a smaller number.

One - to go back to a point which Professor Seton-Watson has been making - is the idealisation of a Volk, and it has to be a particular one - not idealisation of the people, but a people.

Secondly, primitivism - i.e., I mean that the future is to be an improved archaic past. I took strongly here the point made by Professor Venturi that this could be seen as an improvement by an elimination, by a pruning process of the present - that is, by the nineteenth century - idea of revolution. This often involves archaism.

Thirdly, statism: the state is justified in its interventions if these are to restore society to health, to produce the pruning process of which Professor Venturi spoke. It is not statist in any other sense.

But fourthly, although it is statist, it is even more social in its stress that society is more important and prior to, stronger than, embodies more values, than the state. The state is the instrument of society.

Fifthly, it is personalist; a belief in the whole man and that sort of thing. Sixthly, it is localist, even communitarianist.

Then the xenophobic. Then, an involvement of all these things in a hatred of an advanced stage of the division of labour, of advanced social differentiation, occupational differentiation, multiplication of social roles, call it what you will.

Then I come to a number of things which are perhaps almost accidental and yet I cannot help feeling that they will have a certain gravitational attraction for each other, but I cannot fully express what that attraction is: for example, anti-militarism, but not pacifism. The point stressed by Professor Wiles about inflation, easy credit, currency reform, rather than economic planning, is perhaps an aspect of the point about society, and points about the society and the state, but it goes beyond them, I think. It is, therefore, worth looking at.

Then again, populism is conspiratorial; as the specific people is naturally good; therefore to explain why things are not good, there must be devils. You must have an idea of conspiracy. This goes along with the xenophobia, but not all xenophobia is conspiratorial and not all conspiracy theories are xenophobic.

Next, apocalyptic dreams. These may involve the dreams of a particular populist redeemer, a particular kind of populist hero, or a particular sort of Rousseau or Lycurgus or the like. However, I do not want to stress that.

Then, belief in spontaneity. This is something which we have not heard enough about but as a virtue, if you like, it is a separate aspect of being a whole man for a whole man is a spontaneous mass of untutored and immediate virtue. This is also important.

Then, an affiliation with religion. This applies more surely to the Russian than the American thing. The origin in one case is Orthodox and in the other case it is American Protestantism. But there are certain things which are perhaps in common there, and William Jennings Bryan is to be understood perhaps because of or through his religion.

I should have put earlier anti-élitist, but inspired often - as Professor Seton-Watson has said in one of the most valuable of our contributions - by an élite and prepared to use an élite in the destruction of an élitist situation. I have tried to summarise what I understood him to mean.

Then there is a point which is not stressed sufficiently but again was made by Professor Wiles: it is either totally against competition, both economic and social competition, or it wishes to limit competition to a degree that will prevent the mass of inequalities and the emergence of new élites. It has a hostility, to use a phrase which appears in Mr. Mingue's paper, to risk, not merely political risk, but also to economic risk.

When you have the majority of these things present you have a populist movement; and when not, not.

There are one or two other points which I should like to make on populism. First, our declaration, if we reach one, - at least I am sure that we can all agree on this - must make a point which is so simple that

one is ashamed to make it, but it might not occur: that is, that the word "populist" is not equivalent to the word "popular". Secondly, we also ought to say that populism, which if we take it from this point of view is certainly a weak kind of ideological complex, is only important where alternative items such as nationalism or disciplined totalitarianism parties are absent. Of course, both nationalism and totalitarian parties may exploit, as many other people may do, items from the populist ideology, but that is a different point.

Secondly, I would like to say that populism seems to me to be less a movement of the directly oppressed than of the displaced, in two senses of that word: of those who feel that they have been by-passed, and those who hold that their position ought to be central, because they are cultivators. I suggest the use of the word "cultivators" as a word to include small capitalist farmers as well as peasants, who are different kinds of creatures. Both come together very often in populism: those who believe that they are by-passed from the central position to which they feel that they are entitled or who feel that they have been made marginal. Hence, we get the sense of loss and the sigh for the restoration of the archaic past which I mentioned when I was talking about the ideological items.

Then, populism in a sense cannot properly be the ideology of a party. It can be the ideology of a movement and it may even go to the poll, but it cannot be a party for a reason which has come up once or twice: that populism believes that history is to be rectified - to go back to Professor Venturi's formulation - and then brought to an end, become static and therefore, there is no real place for an on-going party. This is one of the things which helps to make populism weak even as a movement.

Finally, I would like to ask a question. I wonder whether some things that will be very close to populism, incorporating many of these ideological items, might not be coming into existence in our own time - looking for the whole virtuous untutored spontaneous man in either of two directions with which we are unfamiliar in our political history.

One with which we are certainly unfamiliar is looking for the untutored, whole, spontaneous man in terms of some sort of psycho-analytic cult, the sort of thing that underlies some of the things that Frantz Fanon is saying and giving a geographical base, and which you get put forward in this country by Drs. Laing and Cooper.

Another place where this might be found, and something with which we are more familiar - we heard about it in the Argentine - may be that you look for your whole, untutored, spontaneous man not on this earth nor in touch with the sacred soil but in touch with a renewal of things through youth; virtuous because young.

These also are questions which we might consider, although it is rather wicked of me to bring them in at this late point.

MR. ENGHOLM: I would like to make a small plea for something. It is a kind of black cat in a coal hole really. It arises in this sense from one of the pieces of elimination to which Professor Seton-Watson has drawn our attention and I agree with much of his approach.

All the examples which we have been discussing, with hardly any exceptions, have arisen in literate communities. In the Russian example, if I understand it correctly, the populist movement was a sort of pre-packaged deal. The intellectuals went to the peasants but the ideas had already been worked out, although in the American case articulated at grass roots levels.

I would maintain, as opposed to Professor MacRae that there are genuine examples to be found in Africa of populism which would satisfy many of the criteria which we have just heard but which have one characteristic which makes it exceptionally difficult to talk about them; that is the fact that they are not led by literate people. Therefore, the only way that one can find out about them in the absence of literary records is to conduct research by interviews etc. into particular outbursts.

I do not think, therefore, that one wants to confuse populism of that kind with the kind of things that the articulate African political leaders are saying in interpreting to the outside world some disturbance in their own territory and explaining that it happened because of this, that and the other cause. This may well be a distinctly misleading phenomenon. I merely put in this plea for what I call the black cat in the coal hole. It is a difficult thing to pin down but I nevertheless think that it exists.

PROF. MACRAE: I know about these things but I had forgotten them. I accept the point.

PROF. HOFSTADTER: I would like to revert to Professor MacRae's list of trades which seems to me to be admirably comprehensive and it registers very much with me. Since it is a very long list of trades, it will not be quarrelling too much to say that there are two points on which once again you have to except the Americans, where you make them seem less deviant if you list them than anything I have heard during the last two days.

First, I think that you have to cut them out of any criterion of opposition, differentiation of labour. They are certainly not unequivocally opposed to modern industrial organisation; and, secondly, on account of hostility to competition. Their conceptual model is based on unacceptance of a competitive order. It has been messed about by monopoly and monopolistic organisations.

There is one way of putting it, which, in a sense, is latent in your list, but is, perhaps, worth restating or combining with some of the items. That is that it seems to me that there is very widespread in these movements as a part of their romantic primitivist orientation and this adulation of the volk or some part of the volk, a very profound anti-institutional bias which accords very much with what you said about party and even apparent exceptions like the interests of the American populists in forming a party dissolve if one looks at it broadly enough.

I suppose that most of us in our political thinking are used to conceiving man as a fallible instrument with his wicked side and reckoning with the fact that at some point or another our institutional apparatus will embody these failings.

The whole emphasis on getting back to the virtue of the folk somehow assumes that there is a way by which you can enthrone that virtue at the centre of the society, at the state, and circumvent or by-pass all the problems, that of institutional life which most of our thinking about human society deals with. You certainly find this in the American populists in their sense of the pure party that they were going to build, against which there was a tremendous reaction when they found, as one of them said, that there were boss managers, as in all the other parties.

MR. IONESCU: Following Professor Hofstadter's institutional point, I wonder whether Professor MacRae would like to be a little precise. I also like very much your list, but when you spoke of statism what I think you meant is that they are for the division of the state, while they are in opposition as a political movement in opposition; but do you mean to say that they are also for the centralised state?

PROF. MACRAE: No, I certainly do not mean *étatisme*. I mean that they are ready to use the state as an implement to carry out the kind of pruning of the existing order which was put very importantly by Professor Venturi as essential to the nineteenth century concept of revolution. The state is O.K. if under society, if to keep society pure by occasional interventions, which can sometimes be very drastic, as American populists wanted them to be.

May I say something on what Professor Hofstadter has said. The idea of the pure party is a point which we should look at because this is an idea of a non-party; it is a contradictory idea, and I am grateful for it. Such things matter ideologically.

About competition, I would like to make a distinction. I would have thought that we should distinguish between competition as it actually occurs in complex societies which produces a situation tending towards monopoly, the importance of finance capitalism of different kinds, and so on. Against competition in this sense, surely American populism also is. Populists believe of course of the myth of the market, but they believe that the market has to be restored and they believe in a very limited kind of competition.

What I said was that you believe either in no competition or in a strict limitation of competition, which is also a utopia and a related one. On the differentiation point, I think that you are absolutely correct.

MR. MINGHUE: I should like to make a few remarks about Professor MacRae's process of definition by check list, which certainly is a very useful collection of characteristics to discuss, but in the end it is likely to be self-defeating. That is, it will give us an apparatus

by which one might identify populism in a statistical way by saying that if it has 60 per cent of those characteristic it is populism; and if it does not, it is not. This may help in identifying, but not in explaining, populism. For that, what one needs is to find coherence within the check list, so that one can see what bits of it fit together and what bits of it are accidental. Unless we can achieve that, I do not think that we have achieved what we set out to do.

One principle which might be used in bringing order to these various characteristics is to see populism as both a revulsion against some things and an affirmation of others; and, of course, the revulsion and the affirmation will not be unconnected.

One of the things which comes up in Professor MacRae's list, is a revulsion against competition. This may explain why the élite is so enthusiastic about sinking itself in the great sea of the people. They want a situation where there is no damned merit nonsense, because the sheer strain of competition is something which people in general flee from if they possibly can.

In this context, one of the most interesting differentiations which has arisen this afternoon is Professor Seton-Watson's differentiation between fascism, on the one hand, and populism on the other hand, in terms of élites versus élitism.

Professor MacRae remarked that ideology is a reality. One might protest against separating too clearly ideology and movement. The evidence we have of what people are feeling is partly what they say and partly what they do, and each needs to be checked against the other. When one talks about the ideology, one is also talking about the movement.

THE CHAIRMAN: The hour for refreshment has come. According to my observations, 12 of the speakers say that it is possible to obtain some kind of, if not definition, at least a useful concatenation of criteria for the purpose of defining populism. Three suppose this to be on the whole not possible and, indeed, undesirable. Mr. Macfarlane, I think, is betwixt and between.

(Adjourned for tea)

Chairman:- Sir Isaiah Berlin

THE CHAIRMAN: Now, we proceed with the task of producing or attempting to produce a model or models which we can regard as useful in identifying populism, either populism everywhere at all times and in all places or populism in specific circumstances of the nineteenth century or the twentieth century, populism in America, in Latin America, in Asia, in Africa, in the Balkans and so on. May I ask for suggestions as to how this should be done?

PROF. A. TOURAINE: My starting point is that I certainly accept the lists which have been given by Mr. Ionescu and Professor MacRae but I am interested in trying to relate the organisation of these attributes where the characteristics of a certain situation exist. There seems to be a special feature of all these attributes, because it seems to me that any kind of populist ideology or intellectual movement is an attempt to overcome some contradictions, or some opposite trend; and we should look at the situation which gives birth to such contradictions and to a course to overcome them.

I am struck by one major fact - that the social or institutional structure of the societies where populism arises seem to be divided into two. On the one side the main problems appear between some economic centres which are partly in the society and partly outside, which are regarded as some invasion from outside or some domination but which nevertheless are present in the society. On the other side there is, let us say, a mass - the word is not very good - which is partly engaged in a process of change and partly still out of it. So that there is a contradiction between these two elements of the political and economic situation.

But the main fact is that because there is some vacuum between these two elements, there is an absence of direct connection between these big problems or these objectives and the level of means and institutions. Because the centres of economic power are partly outside the society, the economic processes which are felt within it are considered in a fetish way. The people within their own society are more sensitive to money problems and tax problems more than to problems concerning the economic structure. At the same time, there is a parallel fetishism of the institutions: I mean the fact that the state or any kind of political institution, sometimes a party state, is considered in certain senses independently of the problem of economic decision-making.

Therefore, my general idea is that the populist situation is made up of a loose connection of these four elements:

1) a popular group - it does not matter which content it has: peasants in most cases, urban workers from rural extraction in others, but that does not matter too much;

2) centres of economic power;

3) some economic processes; and

4) some political channels.

The main fact seems to be that the social, political, economic and cultural facts are relatively independent of each other. We are not in an integrated society. When we speak about an industrial society, we assume that the connection between these various elements is not entirely direct, but at least it is much stronger. So the themes and the contents of a populist ideology are always an effort to overcome the absence of unity of the situation. I would accept all the themes which have been mentioned, just asking for a formulation in terms of double-faced orientations.

For example, 1) is related to the fact that a large part of the population is still out of the process of economic change. So there is a defence of traditional values, but this is not practical as traditional values are not seen in a perspective of social change. Probably that is why populist movements speak about moral regeneration. They value tradition or folk more than they defend a past situation.

Secondly, the centres of economic power are partly outside society. They are both an orientation towards social control of economic change and looking for short cuts to avoid the contradictions of economic development, as Professor MacRae mentioned.

At the same time there is acceptance of social change, the will to develop a new type of social control and, at the same time, the image of a stable world. As much as there is a functional autonomy of the institutional system, we find in the same way a double attitude which is distrust of institutions, organisations and hierarchies and, at the same time, a tendency to lean on state intervention or political intervention.

The fourth and final point is that because of the opposition to some economic processes more than opposition to economic power, there is a tendency not to fight on deep fundamental economic matters, but an opposition to economic processes which are viewed as the expression of irrational forces.

So I would say that we could perhaps look for a unity of populism, not in terms of a unity of content, but in terms of the unity of effort to deal with these opposing tendencies. The diversities of the ideologies correspond to the diversities of the element and the relative autonomy of the elements of the situation.

I do not know much about that, but it may be possible to draw some conclusion from the anti-élitist movement that Professor Seton-Watson referred to and which seemed to be quite central. This may be a direct or a functional expression of an absence of unity of movement which expresses itself in the absence of integration of the situation.

It is possible to have an élitist type of political movement just when we assume that all elements of the situation are relatively integrated to each other, and so the movement can go to one direction and the organising problems of organisation are the most important problems, but the meaning of the situation is one-dimensional.

At the same time, I suppose that it is possible to come back on the problems of relationship between populist and non-populist but connected movements. Because of this web of contradiction, it can happen that the movements not only give a certain emphasis on one of the elements but, much more than that, it can happen that the movements locate themselves on a lower level of integration of these diversified elements.

For example, it is quite possible that in some cases the movement is unable to maintain a certain unity among these opposite trends and so it is reduced to a movement of social integration of upward mobile people or, in some other cases, to a movement of anti-disintegration or a movement of defence against a loss of social status for downward mobile. But all of that would be, say, a connection of populist movement with a non-populist movement.

My main theme is essentially to say that beyond a list of attributes it is necessary to try to organise a list to understand that it is a series of contradictions and that this contradictory and unstable nature and diversity of populist ideology may be partly explained in terms of a specific social situation.

THE CHAIRMAN: We really have a contrast between, on the one hand, an attempt to produce some kind of so-called analytical model or models of populism without necessarily bringing in questions of specific developments of specific kinds and at specific places. On the other hand, there is the problem of historical change which does stress the specific nature of the development of populism in particular countries and places and times, in order not to blur or eliminate the characteristics of specific populisms in the interests of some kind of artificial unification.

I think we are probably all agreed that a single formula to cover all populisms everywhere will not be very helpful. The more embracing the formula, the less descriptive. The more richly descriptive the formula, the more that it will exclude. The greater the intension, the smaller the extension. The greater the connotation, the smaller the denotation. This appears to me to be an almost a priori truth in historical writing.

Having laid down these platitudes, there is one other point which occurs to me - I am in sympathy with Professor Andreski - that we must not suffer from a Cinderella complex, by which I mean the following: that there exists a shoe - the word 'populism' - for which somewhere there must exist a foot. There are all kinds of feet which it nearly fits, but we must not be trapped by these nearly fitting feet. The prince is always wandering about with the shoe; and somewhere, we feel sure, there awaits it a limb called pure populism. This is the nucleus of populism, its essence. All other populisms are derivations of it, deviations from it and variants of it, but somewhere there lurks true, perfect populism, which may have lasted only six months, or in only one place. That is the Platonic idea of populism, all the others being dilutions of it or perversions of it. I do not think that this approach would be very useful, but this is what all persons pursue who think that words have fixed meanings, particularly in historical and sociological subjects. I do not know whether anyone here does so. We must not, I suggest, be tempted in that direction.

At the same time, we must not be tempted in the other direction, which some have taken, to suppose that the word populism is simply a homonym; that there are movements in America, in Russia, in the Balkans and in Africa, that they are all called populism owing to confusions in human heads, but that they have too little in common; their differences are far greater than their similarities; and that therefore, nothing but confusion can be sown by using these general descriptions and we must try and fit seven, eight or nine perfectly precise terms to all these different things, which have little in common, and this may clarify thought.

Yet I also have a feeling that whenever a word is much used, even if it is an exceedingly confusing or over-rich word, like romanticism, idealism, populism, democracy, and so on, something real is intended, something, not quite nothing. There is a sense in which one should look for the common core.

I think that the most helpful contributions containing lists of attributes are those of Dr. Walicki and Professor MacRae. The former produced four criteria and the latter, as far as I could count, produced 15. These are not entirely fusible. Still they are pointers.

I should have done some homework during the tea interval to try to tie these things into bouquets or clusters to produce something smaller out of them. I do not know that I can do very much, but let me try the following on this assembly and after that debate can break out again. Supposing we say that what is common to all populisms everywhere - this cannot be true, but we will try it on - is a vague notion and vague name for it, which is intelligible to everybody here, the notion of Gemeinschaft - that is, that famous integral society which everybody talks about, some kind of coherent (all these words are capable of being shot down in the same way as populism) some sort of coherent, integrated society, which is sometimes called Volk, which has roots in the past, either imaginary or real, which is bound by a sense of fraternity and by a desire for a certain kind of social equality and perhaps liberty, but of the two equality is probably nearer its heart than liberty - and which is opposed to competitive, atomised society, although in the American case it obviously believes in limited competition which is regulated in some so-called 'natural' fashion as against all kinds of 'unnatural' distortions of it.

It is broadly speaking apolitical: that is to say, it is not principally interested in political institutions, although it is prepared to use the state as an instrument for the purpose of producing its ends. But a state organisation is not its aim and the state is not its ideal of human association. It believes in society rather than in the state. The state is an instrument, as Professor MacRae said. Moreover all these movements believe in some kind of moral regeneration. I am sure that that is common to them all.

In some sense they are dedicated to producing spontaneous, natural men who have in some way at some time become perverted by something. There must have been a spiritual fall somewhere. Either the fall is in the past or it is threatening - one of the two. Either innocence has been lost and some kind of perversion of men's nature has occurred, or enemies are breeding within or attacking from without. Who the enemies are, we do not need to classify. That will depend upon the specific situation.

The enemy may be capitalism, it may be foreign states which have forms of political, social or economic organisation which threaten the spontaneous integral group and the sense of brotherhood which unites them. It still unites them, or once united them, so that one can now resurrect the unity from the past.

Populism certainly does not believe, so far as negative propositions are concerned, in the uniqueness of historical stages in the sense in which, say, most historicists believe that nothing from the past can ever be rescued: that what has happened once has happened once and for all, and, therefore, that there is no way of looking back to the past to try to salve its values. It may believe in the translation of these ancient values into contemporary terms, but it believes these values to be rooted somewhere in the past; they cannot be brand new. I do not think I know of any populism which assumes that man was born in a low or undesirable state and that the golden age is somewhere in the future, a novel situation which has never given any evidence of existence in the past. Some degree of past directedness is essential to all populisms.

I am trying to think what else is common to them, because these characteristics seem to me to be common to the American and the Russian types - the principal varieties. I cannot speak - I know too little - about Africa and Latin America. It seems to me to be one of the roots of American populism - I speak in ignorance and I am sure Professor Hofstadter will put me right - it is one of the causes, for example, of the indignation say, in the relatively undeveloped Middle West, against all kinds of phenomena which its spokesmen regard as hostile - the excessive civilisation of the East Coast, its centralised capitalism, Wall Street, the cross of gold, frivolous, polite, smooth forms of insincere behaviour on the part of Harvard or Yale university professors, or smooth members of the State Department, contrasted with the free spontaneous, natural behaviour of uncorrupted men, cracker-barrel philosophers in the village drug store, from whom simple wisdom flows, uncorrupted by the sophistication of the Eastern cities, the result of some kind of degeneration of a political or of some other kind. This is common to all the populisms: that is, the central belief in an ideal, unbroken man, either in the present or in the past, and that towards this ideal men naturally tend, when no one oppresses or deceives them.

Professor MacRae talked about personalism. Localism, I think, is part of the phenomenon, but it is not an absolutely essential one. I do not think we need put that in now.

Having established very tentatively something as common to all these various forms of populism, let me add this. One must again return to the notion of the people. Who the people are will probably vary from place to place. On the whole, they tend to be, as somebody said quite correctly - I think it was Professor Seton-Watson - those who have been left out. Professor MacRae said this too. They are the have-nots, in some sense. They are peasants in Russia because they are the obvious majority of the deprived: but they might be any group of persons with whom you identify the true people and you identify the true people with them, because the ideology of populism itself springs from the discontented people who feel that they somehow represent the majority of the nation which has been done down by some minority or other. Populism cannot be a consciously minority movement. Whether falsely or truly, it stands for the majority of man, the majority of men who have somehow been damaged.

By whom have they been damaged? They have been damaged by an elite, either economic, political or racial, some kind of secret or open enemy - capitalism, Jews and the rest of it. Whoever the enemy is, foreign or native, ethnic or social, does not much matter.

One more thing can be said as being true of all populisms. That is, that in some sense it would be just to say that it occurs in societies standing on the edge of modernisation - that is to say, threatened by it, or hoping for it; it does not matter which, but in either case uneasily aware of the fact that they cannot stand still; that they will have to take steps towards meeting either the challenge or the danger of modernisation, whether at home, on the part of classes or groups in their own country who are pushing towards it, or on the part of persons outside it, whose economic and social development is of such a kind as to threaten them if they do not in some way catch up or create some kind of walls with which to resist them. This seems true of all the varieties of populism.

Then we start with variations. For example - Dr. Malicki can put me right on this - there is on the one hand the root of socialism and on the other hand the root of peasantism. These are alternative roots, and therefore, alternative species of the same thing. Again, you could probably say that there are certain other variants - for example, elitism. Some forms of populism believe in using elites for the purpose of a non-elitist society and some object to it on the ground that even using elitism as a means leads to elitism in the end.

The controversy among the Russian populists in that respect is fairly instructive. (I do not know whether there is an American parallel.) There was the famous controversy of Tkachov and Lavrov in the seventies, for example. Tkachov was advocating, for purely practical reasons, dictatorship by a small élite of professional revolutionaries, since otherwise capitalism could not be destroyed in sufficient time. Lavrov's counter-argument was that this would defeat itself: once an élite gained power one would not get rid of it and this would, in fact, perpetuate a totalitarian state in the very effort to create an anti-totalitarian one, an élitist state in the effort to produce an egalitarian one.

Some populists believed in an élite, some did not; some believed in it except as an instrument, a means to the end, so that to a large extent it was a tactical difference and not a real one. Of course, all these movements and ideologies wished to produce a fraternal, equal society and not a hierarchical or deferential one. Therefore they must be distinguished from other forms of what might be called romantic archaism or romantic nostalgia for a glorious golden past. There are dreams of a golden past in which men are anything but socially equal or self governed.

The desire to return to the Middle Ages, of let us say, Chesterton or Belloc, had something in common with the craving for equality and fraternity, if only because they were anti-industrial, anti-individualistic, anti-capitalist. What they wanted to reproduce was a hierarchical order in which the king was on his throne served by his nobles, over a pyramid of subjects each placed by God or by nature in the station most appropriate to them. This "comparative" society, agrarian, state, clerical, non-industrial, is a cohesive, neo-feudal Gemeinschaft but of course essentially unequal and deriving its beauty and unity and romantic attractiveness from its hierarchical or theocratic structure. All forms of populism are wholly opposed to this. You can say that these reactionary dreams and utopias have populist strains in them, because they are anti-industrial and collectivist, but they do not qualify as populist because they do not stress the essential elements of populism - fraternity, freedom from imposed authority, above all equality. Liberty is not essential. Some populist movements demand it, some do not; it is inessential.

What else is at stake? One final thing that I should like to say is that I cannot tell how many of Professor MacRae's criteria this by now embraces. The opposition to centralised economic planning comes in under hostility to élites of any kind.

PROFESSOR MACRAE: Twelve, I think.

THE CHAIRMAN: Twelve is unexpectedly satisfactory. Twelve out of fifteen is very promising.

Now as to religion. Affiliation to a religion is, I think, a specific property of perhaps some streams of Russian populism - but populism obviously need not be religious. American populism has surely been tinged with Protestantism. But I daresay that if you found some bone dry atheists to be members of a populist movement you would not exclude them on the ground that religious faith was at the heart of such an outlook, that it was at the very least a secularised form of an essentially religious movement.

Then there is the apocalyptic dream and the hero: yes, all populisms, it seems to me, are voluntaristic and anti-necessitarian. They do not accept an inevitable pattern of history. They believe that it is possible by means of a spontaneous gathering of the will of the god to leap into the new society and create these new men. They all believe this. They do not believe in a historicist time table. They do not believe in necessary stages of historical development, which causes this to grow from that, and that to grow inexorably from something else - a predictable ascent up a tremendous historical ladder, the rungs of which are unalterable, which makes it utopian or impossible to do certain things until the uniquely appropriate stages is duly and inevitably reached. This, after all, is one of the chief differences between every form of Russian populism and every form of Russian social democracy and Russian Marxism.

This was, after all, one of the fields on which the great battles were fought. It was to refute this determinism that Socialist Revolutionary followers exerted themselves - Herzen against the Western determinists of his time, Mikhailovsky against social Darwinism, Plekhanov, and the Marxists, who looked on populism as utopian precisely because of this unhistorical standpoint. For the early Russian Marxists there was a rigid timetable, and unless we obey that, we would never get anywhere at all, even if, to some extent, the ends of the various socialist movements were not altogether different from one another.

There is one further point: false populisms. We need not spend too much time on this because I think that on this we have reached general agreement. False populism is the employment of populist ideas for ends other than those which the populists desired. That is to say, their employment by bonapartists or McCarthyites, or the "Friends of the Russian People", or fascists and so on. This is simply the mobilization of certain popular sentiment - say hostility to capitalism or to foreigners or Jews or hatred of economic organisation or of the market society, or of anything you like for undemocratic ends. The mobilized feeling could be genuine. This pseudo-populism does not necessarily involve cynical employment of tactics of a "double-think" kind. It is clear that some of the demagogues of this type - Poujadists, Greenshirts, social creditors and the like - did in fact sympathise with some populist sentiments, but employed them for the purpose of creating some kind of élitist or socially or racially unequal régime, which is totally incompatible with the fundamental - if not fraternity then, at any rate, the passionate egalitarianism - the real populist movement. That is enough to distinguish, for example, Bonapartism or Greek Tyrannies, which were in a certain sense also a revolt against the aristocracy, against traditionalism, against hierarchical and deferential systems, from populism proper. This probably applies equally to modern "tyrannoi" like Nastezoz Nknmahoz.

Wherever the general will which these people profess to embody is ultimately embodied in the general himself, whether the general is a person or a group or a leader, wherever the general will is incarnated in this fashion, it is reasonable to suspect that a perversion of populism has occurred. That is why I think that the Black Pulez populism, fascist populism, Poujadist populism, various kinds of clerical populisms, and so on, may share genuine elements with populism. But their goals are fundamentally incompatible with those of Narodniks of any kind: and that is enough to distinguish them.

Perhaps I have not embraced all Dr. Walicki's criteria. I have, perhaps, assimilated too enthusiastically with the subject of our discussion. I have behaved in an excessively "spontaneous" and "integralist" a fashion, too precipitately, without calculation of the results. Perhaps I should have said something about the intelligentsia. It is reasonable to say that, historically speaking, populism like all ideologies is created by ideologists. Ideologists are, on the whole, educated or half educated persons, and educated and half educated persons, particularly in Russia, tended to turn into an intelligentsia for certain historical reasons.

Dr. Walicki is right in supposing that one of the motives of most populist movements is the desire on the part of the creators of populism itself to be re-integrated into the general mass of the people from which they have become divided by their education, by their social position or by their origins.

Therefore, all populisms - I offer this as a general proposition about populism - distinguish between the alienated good and the alienated bad: the alienated good are persons who have become alienated as a result of historical circumstances, but are in a state of contrition. That is to say, they are repentant, they wish to repay their debt to society and re-integrate themselves into the mass of the people. They wonder, like Chernyshevsky, whether they sufficiently express the will of the people because they feel that they are not members of the people. They live at a distance from the masses and, therefore, they are always worried, honourably worried, about whether they are sufficiently penetrated by the spirit with which they wish to be at one.

This is the topic of the debate by Russian populists: do we "go to the people" to tell them what to do, or to learn this from them? What right have we to tell the people what to want? The only person completely outside this is Tkachov who expressed the greatest possible contempt for the masses and wished to save it against its will. One day no doubt the people will be wise and rational, but we must not listen to what the peasants - stupid, reactionary, dull - say today. This, however, was, before Lenin, a comparatively marginal case.

This kind of populist who has a ferocious contempt for his clients, the kind of doctor who has profound contempt for the character of the patient whom he is going to cure by violent means which the patient will certainly resist, but which will have to be applied to him in some very coercive fashion, is on the whole ideologically nearer to an élitist, fascist, communist etc. ideology, than he is to what might be called the centre core of populism. But such theorists exist. They exist and they have to be accommodated somewhere on our map. For Lenin Tkachov was a populist, and his authoritarianism is in part derived from that tradition.

There is one specific populist attribute which may or may not be universal - of that I am not sure; it is the one which Dr. Walicki rightly stresses. That is the advocacy of a social and economic programme for the single purpose of avoiding the horrors of industrialisation and capitalism; this is not a passion for integralism, nor the visionary new-mediaevalism of William Morris, this has nothing to do with Morris dancing, or arts and crafts or Gandhi's spinning wheel, or a return to the Middle Ages; it is simply a sober theory of how we are to avoid the horrors of what is happening in the Western world. This is the kind of populism which was professed by sober statisticians and economists towards the end of the nineteenth century in Russia who were not necessarily partisans of some kind of Gemeinschaft. This was a perfectly rational social doctrine, founded, or at least aspiring to rest on sober calculation and estimate of the facts: simply a social policy coexisting with other social policies, something which, I should have thought, was probably most prevalent in backward countries as Russia was in the nineteenth century, or the Balkans, not therefore equally prevalent in the United States and, therefore, representing a particular attribute of a particular populism at a particular time in a particular place. Beyond this I cannot go. I do not know whether all this constitutes a workable model or not. I am afraid all I have done is to have spoken too long.

MR. IONESCU: It seems to me that we are getting somewhere. We are surely getting further, and I shall put together the points. We also listened to what Professor Touraine had to add. I think that we are getting towards a coherent formula.

MR. HALL: I agree very much with almost everything you have said, Mr. Chairman, and indeed with most of what Professor Touraine also has said. The only point which I would not emphasise so much is the question of the economic situation, because I think it can come out of social or cultural challenges as well as out of economic challenges.

I have drawn up, to throw in to the pool, two sentences seeking to make a very short definition of how I would see the matter, looking at populism from the point of view of movements. These are:-

"Populist movements are movements aimed at power for the benefit of the people as a whole which result from the reaction of those, usually intellectuals, alienated from the existing power structure to the stresses of rapid economic, social, cultural or political change. These movements are characterised by a belief in a return to, or adaptation of, more simple and traditional forms and values emanating from the people, particularly the more archaic sections of the people who are taken to be the repository of virtue."

PROFESSOR ANDRESKI: I find this stress on the word 'fraternity' very helpful because it distinguishes populism from another possible word, 'egalitarianism'. Fraternity means more than simply equality.

Regarding Mr. Hall's definition, I have one methodological objection: namely, that one should define classificatory concepts so as not to prejudge the genesis of the phenomena in question. We should define X in such a way that we can tell that something is X when we see it. If we define X as something which has originated from Y, we may in fact be prejudging a theoretical and empirical issue by definition, which is highly inadvisable.

I am impressed by the persuasive way in which Sir Isaiah has found the foot of Cinderella, in spite of his previous statement that it belongs to the realm of fantasy. I find his definition very appealing but I would still like to hear about the reasons why we should adopt it in preference to other possible definitions.

THE CHAIRMAN: I am simply presenting a true image. That is my own reason! Does Professor Seton-Watson accept Mr. Hall's definition about archaic sections of the people rather than something like the unfortunate or the oppressed?

PROFESSOR SETON-WATSON: I do not think that I am very happy about "archaic". It is often that, but it does not have to be that. What I think is essential, and what came out of the end of the definition, is the belief that the people is better, is right, and the fact that this belief is really held. People who do not really hold this belief passionately are not populists.

But I think that there is a certain tendency to prefer the very humiliated and suffering: the more squalid and suffering a people is, the more right it is. If we go on record as saying that the most archaic or the most backward are always the best, I do not think that this would narrow it too much.

I have one general comment from your own observations, Mr. Chairman. I feel that the element of religion is, perhaps, a little more important than you suggested. As Mr. Minogue suggested earlier, these ideologies are at the moment a pure secularisation. There is a close connection in time between the disappearance of religious faith and the emergence of populist ideology.

THE CHAIRMAN; You could say the same about Marxism or any secular ideology in that sense.

PROFESSOR SETON-WATSON: Perhaps you could.

THE CHAIRMAN: But not about this one in particular.

PROFESSOR SETON-WATSON; No. In this one, the place of God is taken by the notion of the people.

THE CHAIRMAN: Or class. All I would add is that there are two things which I would add to Mr. Hall's definition. One would be that the enemies of the people have to be specified, whether it be capitalists, foreigners, ethnic minorities, majorities or whoever it might be. They have to be specified. The people is not everybody. The people is everybody of a certain kind and there are certain people who have put themselves beyond the pale in some sort of way whether by conspiring against the people or by preventing the people from realising itself or however it may be. The people must be specified. So must the enemy. The people is not the whole of society however constituted.

The other thing is that there is a studied vagueness about means of political action. I do not think that populism as such indicates the specific way in which it is to act. Provided that the people act as a whole to bring about that in which they believe - the means are left in various stages of indefiniteness. The people is not committed to any form of political action, except that on the whole it is directed against any form of control by minorities, whether representatives of a parliamentary democracy, or member of other institutions which it allows because of its fear of élites, even democratic ones as a permanent form of government.

MR. HALL: I did not detect any commas, but in answer to Professor Seton-Watson I was thinking of "emanating from the people, particularly the more archaic section of the people, who are taken to be the repository of virtue."

A SPEKAER: Does your definition, Mr. Chairman, effectively exclude those populisms which are "in power"? I get the feeling from your list, with which I agree basically, that the sort of characterisation which comes out of this fundamentally excludes most of the kind of movements that we have called populist at some part of the discussion, like the African populist states. I wonder whether you consider it to be true and, if so, what Prof. Worsley would have to say about it.

THE CHAIRMAN: I would suspect that it excludes the Africans, but I do not know enough about the facts.

THE SAME SPEAKER: How does that accord with the sense of the meeting?

THE CHAIRMAN: I would suspect that the African states tend to identify the general will of the people with some particular section of it, which is the self constituted privileged expounder of this

will, dispensing pretty well with the need for continuous consultation which, I think, is at the base of real populist ideology. The real populist ideology is a kind of unbroken, continuous plebiscite as long as it is needed. At a certain point it will no longer be needed because everybody will be on family terms with everyone else. The idea is of a hugely extended family, in which you do not need constantly to consult its members because where relations are those of affection, there is a continuous general consensus, a pre-established harmony founded on sympathy which guarantees virtual unanimity on all central issues. Rousseau occasionally spoke in this fashion. But he was pretty pessimistic about its emergence.

MR. DE KADT: The definition virtually seems to exclude the possibility of any movement which comes to power, because any movement which comes to power can no longer have these total characteristics - if this is so, and populism is basically a radical small movement in opposition. It might be nice if we could be clear about this and whether this is true.

PROF. MACRAE: I said that one of the points I would like to have considered was the proposition that a populism which has become routinised or institutionalised over a long period or has come into power ceases to exist as a populism. That is one of the things which I have learned. I thought that it was true. I now think I know that it is true.

DR. SAUL: We have talked over, and Mr. Hennessy talked about, Castro trying to create his links with the people on a continuing basis. It seems to me that most of these characteristics could characterise the State. It may be that once a movement gets into power, the tendency is for it to institutionalise itself. I am not sure that it is all the way inevitable. The points which I made this morning are relevant that, on the one hand, one can still conceive of a state as being marginal to a world process and, therefore, seeing itself with most of these characteristics of the threat, whatever it is, being a continuing dimension of a particular leadership. One can also conceive of a leadership, even though it is in power, trying to retain these sort of links.

Also, I think that many of the ambiguities which one might raise about a state could be raised about the relationship between the leadership and the members of a movement. Mr. Ionescu dismissed this possibility of a regime being populist, but if this is an acceptable one I am still not quite convinced that one could not conceive of a régime which held these specific differences.

PROF. ANDRESKI: I think that if we take relation between states as the basis for ascribing populism to some ideology, we would land

ourselves in such a predicament that we would have to extend the privilege of deserving this label to Nazi régimes and fascists, because they all claim to have been representing the people.

DR. SAUL: There is a catch there, because in a way it is not necessarily a state-to-state relationship. It can be a people as a régime in relationship to an international economic process, just as it can be a particular segment of a state vis a vis a particular economic process which is both national and international. I think again that this is the apotheosis that I mentioned earlier. I am not sure that it is necessary to see it as a state-to-state relationship. It can be a régime relationship to a particular world economic process. This is at least a possibility. I am not sure that it can be dismissed quite that readily.

PROF. MANCINI: Cuba regards itself as being a liberated territory of America and the first region of a much wider and broader political construction that could be liberated in the end. I think, therefore, that what Dr. Saul says makes a great deal of sense. It solves the Castroism problem.

PROF. SCHAPIRO: As to Mr. Hall's definition, I worry about two things. One is the phrase "for the benefit of the people as a whole". First, "as a whole". "People" for populists is a very mythological term. "People as a whole" certainly does not mean everybody in the country. Quite obviously, as you, Mr. Chairman, have said yourself, there are some who are outside the pale.

In some way or other, therefore, "people as a whole" has to be rather more clearly defined and defined subjectively in terms of what the participants of the movement themselves believe "the people" at different times and at different stages to be.

The other words that I would question are "for the benefit of the people" standing by themselves. There has not been a tyrant in history who has not acted in the name of the benefit of the people. The bloodiest tyrannies ever known have been done in the name of the benefit of the people. Nobody ever says "I am doing this for my own fun".

I come back to the point of leadership. To qualify as populism it has to be for the benefit of the people as determined by the people themselves, some element of that kind which shows that the participants of the movement believe that it is the people themselves who must say stop, otherwise you must leave open the suggestion that you can have leaders who will know better what is good for us and will impose it upon us. Subject to that, perhaps not as a definition, but as a general description it does not immediately raise objections in one's mind. I think that it is pretty good.

PROF. WORSLEY: I would like to keep the states in it if I could, or I would be out of business - and not only because of that, but because I think there is something there. The Fanonist thing about the millionaire nations and the proletariat nations in a world system seems to be profoundly of this kind; that is, the external relations of states as they see themselves or as they rhetoricise themselves.

Internally, of course, when they come to power, other things happen. This applies to any opposition party. Nobody puts their programme into action; they operate within restraints, traditions, and so on; they often never intended to anyhow. This could be applied to certain governments not a thousand miles away from here.

Internally, however, there are certain aspects of it which are institutionalised. Firstly, they experiment, sometimes on a large-scale, with cooperative and communitarian schemes - and, secondly, they practise consultation. Even if it is rhetorical, formal and illusory, it is there. Castro goes along and talks to the people. They have a rhetoric and an ideology. They sell it and they teach people it and they communicate it. It is still there. They may have abandoned a great deal else, but it does not entirely disappear.

PROF. GELLNER: I am very unhappy about one thing pathologically, the same point as Professor Worsley has put, but for different reasons, a point shared by Professor Schapiro and Professor MacRae. That is, the exclusion of successful populists from being populists at all. A successful populist ceases to be one ex officio. That seems to me to be wrong logically because it involves a kind of double set of criteria.

The tacit implication of the argument is that before they were in power, what they believed was true, but before they were in power what they believed was not available for testing because they were not in power; but in the sense in which they were falsified after the event, they were also falsified during their years in the wilderness as well. That is the mixture. It is partly an empirical business.

I think that our ambition has been misled by the very high standards which the Russian populists set in this business. They were very good populists. Tacitly, you might be a very good one. If you are politically very effective and keep on looking over your shoulder at the people, of course this is disastrous for you. Nevertheless, these guys in Russia had a very high standard. In Africa they are not so good. It seems to me that this is relevant. In the sense in which they are shown to be false after the event, they were false anyway.

THE CHAIRMAN: I would not say that by definition. I agree that there is something very queer because what has been said is true and improvising for somebody else is true. This obviously would not work. The idea is that logically it is perfectly variable. The obstacle to its realisation is the facts. There is nothing illogical or self-contradictory in the notion of a society which is bound by the kind of

affection which only religious sects have and which are bound by some kind of family relationship, hence the sociological problems. If you could have a régime of that sort, it would be a successful populist régime.

PROF. GELLNER: No. It is not quite as you have put it. As has repeatedly come out in the discussion, the plausibility of the realisation does not simply hinge on the hard facts of the society of men. It also hinges on the lack of observation or definition of the concept of law. What is this people whose will is sovereign? The part of the populist system which seems to be essential to it is precisely the use of nebulous concepts. The artist abilities inherent do not necessarily arise because hard facts can be falsified.

THE CHAIRMAN: I think that the populist Press could give a list of sociological characteristics, sociology characterising what they would regard as members of the people. They can do it.

PROF. GELLNER: This comes out quite clearly. I have a little experience of a populist kitchen. I spent two months in one under Nkrumah at a thing called the Institute of African Studies, which was not what it was called. Its conception of African studies was basically to prove that Africa had a glorious past and a socialist future with the provision of populist ideology. They had enormous difficulty in giving any concrete definition to what this African personality is.

Looking at it concretely, of course, Africans vary a great deal. If statelessness is to be a virtue, what do you do about those who build up fine states? There are all kinds of other concrete contradictions. It is very difficult to make concrete. Nevertheless, the goods were being delivered. It was a kind of good ideological centre and the ambiguity was inherent in it. I would still want to call it populist although they were operating under conditions of success.

What hinges on this is a point made yesterday by Professor Schapiro, which seemed to me to be mistaken, and that is the exclusion of movements from populism if they have a charismatic leader. It seems to me to be logically neat and correctly to exclude any kind of systematic élitist doctrines on populism unless the élitism is of a temporary nature and tactically a device by which it is to be abrogated. But charismatic leadership is perfectly compatible if the belief is that the charismatic leader is legitimate precisely because he embodies this thing. The fact that the criteria embodiment are untestable seems to me to be an important characteristic of this syndrome of ideas.

PROF. VENTURI: It may be that some of these points may be clarified if we turn to the economic side of the story. In the definition given by Mr. Hall, probably that is where I think he is too vague.

Marx said that he did not want to invent dishes for the cooks of the future. That is exactly anti-populist by definition. Populists are always inventing dishes for the cook of the future.

One of the characteristic effects of the whole populist movement is to try to invent a new way outside the normal classical and outside the idea, which is very Marxist, that to live to the national development of the capitalist, the task is to make the sterilisation and to have the development in general of the economy. That is anti-populist by definition. That is very important even from a strictly historical point of view.

I am persuaded that there were the Russian populists and all people thinking about the Russian populists, and so on, and after the general Russian Karushin movement who really put the basis of the theory of economic development, not in the capitalistic sense. After all, our everyday ideas about economic development are not in origin a Russian idea - that would be absurd - but the idea did come out of the great debates mentioning populists in Russia. It is certainly not by chance that the great economists of this kind are generally speaking Russians.

Thus we must return to define, if possible, the idea of backwardness in a better way - i.e. the idea of a new and original way to pass from backwardness to something completely good from an economic point of view and even the idea of stages through which it is necessary to pass and stages which depend on the will of the people. That is a populist idea in theology.

So I think that the economic point of view is important because it is the roots of the idea that a modern non-capitalist development comes directly from populist ideology.

DR. MACFARLANE: I wonder whether this apparent difficulty can be overcome if we say that what we are talking about is the idea of populism and what populists are trying to do. We do not get this problem when dealing with communism. We talk about the ideology of communism and of people working towards the idea of a society in which we have the abolition of old classes and contradictions; everyone has a natural harmonious relationship to one another, where the state has withered away and where everyone can participate.

But in China, Poland, Yugoslavia and all sorts of other states where there are communist parties in power which hold to this ideology, but where we do not have this state of natural harmony, we do not say that therefore these people are obviously non-communist, they do not hold to their ideology. What we do say is, "Is this their objective? Are they in some senses generally concerned with it?" If we see that they seem just to be mouthing this and making no attempts at all to have their tactical policies affected by this conception, we could make the sort of distinction that Professor Seton-Watson made earlier that these are false populists or false communists, people who are just carrying out the old stances. But certainly we could see other instances where this is still the genuine objective affecting the way in which people act who know the facts of the situation, facts that may be very much against them.

I would have thought we could certainly do the same thing with populism and we could distinguish here between those cases where the rulers of a movement with populist aspirations are only mouthing it, not holding to it in any genuine way at all; they are building up a class society or an élitist society and are quite happy with it, and those who are trying with all the terrific difficulties in which they are placed in these exposed states, so much more dependent on other people than the Soviet Union or China, to realise their objectives. In such cases, populism is still an element in the way the state is run. I would have thought that this was true in what we were talking about in Castroism, for example; that this is still a very important factor as to why people act as they do and if they did not hold to their populist philosophy they simply would not do the sort of things that they are doing or be concerned with establishing the sort of relationships that they are trying to establish, albeit very imperfectly and perhaps unsuccessfully.

PROF. SETON-WATSON: The comparison with the communist movement made by Mr. Macfarlane is valuable but we have to ask ourselves the question: what is it that they do not do? What the communists do not do is more uncertain than what the populists do not do if only because the populists are more utopian in their aims.

We may continue to think that communist governments are communist in spite of the fact that they do not achieve the withering away of the state, because the communists have laid down a whole body of doctrine about the stages through which you must pass first. Therefore, a very good case can be made in defence of any communist régime, that it must inevitably advance slowly but it has not betrayed; whereas if the populists' aim is fraternity, and a complete fraternal utopia, it is very obvious that they are not achieving that.

I would not want to be too dogmatic about this. I think perhaps I was too dogmatic in saying that the populists, once they are in power, cease to be populists, although on the whole it seems to me that this is a different sort of situation from what communist governments have to face. It is very difficult for populists to be in power very long and remain populists, more difficult than it is for communists.

DR. MACFARLANE: Are you suggesting that it is a qualitative difference? Surely you could distinguish between those people who are trying to bring about a fraternity with all the difficulties involved and those who are not. The first category one would think of as a populist régime attempting to operate, as a communist régime is attempting to operate, a good deal easier framework of reference as you say in explaining it and, therefore, the people have a better idea of what they are trying to do and the way they have got to do it.

PROF. SETON-WATSON: That is a good point. The transitional period is probably shorter.

PROF. MACRAE: I am very worried about what is happening to the discussion, Mr. Chairman. I thought that with your help and that of Mr. Hall, we had reached the position of having a working account of populism which would apply to quite a large number of societies in historically specific situations. I am a little worried that if we try to include too much, we will lose a great deal that is helpful.

I have, however, great sympathy with what Professor Seton-Watson has said and also with something that Mr. Macfarlane said. I admit cheerfully that I am as dogmatic as I am about the impossibility of populism really continuing as a régime quite simply because I have ideas which are quite possibly wrong, a set of ideas which you might call a political sociology, which I am quite willing to explain at some other time.

I would have thought, however, that most of us have such political sociologies and that they are realistic. If you prefer to have a somewhat softer and probably more correct form such as Professor Seton-Watson offered, I would be perfectly happy with that although I personally would still hold to my initial opinion.

But I am baffled by certain of the arguments which I have heard. I do not really understand them. It may be that this is because of my normal stupidity or the stupidity at the end of two very interesting but tiring days. I do not understand some of these things. Of course, there have been lots of societies which have regarded themselves as having a sacred and redeeming role for the world. Some such societies you may like. Most of us probably in some sense think that in its own days and terms, the society of Periclean Athens was a perfectly good sort of society which made itself as it claimed the education of Hellas.

We may or may not like Calvin and Geneva or that interesting sort of populism which enforced fraternity with the executioner's axe in the populism of the Anabaptist Munster and so on. This is a perfectly common historical phenomenon in different forms, but I do not see that it affects our understanding of populism. I just do not take the points which have been made, which seem to me to suggest that "All right, these states are not populist, but that is because they intended to be the carriers of populism to the world or to an unredeemed America or something like that." I just do not think that that is on. I feel more baffled.

I am sure that I cannot understand what Professor Gellner said, because nobody would surely claim that Ghanaian society or Ghanaian politics were populist. The existence of the ideological institute does not seem to me to affect the case. I cannot have understood what was being said here. I have become very puzzled indeed, but perhaps my puzzlements do not matter.

The point I wanted to make was that I would be quite happy to accept Professor Seton-Watson's formulation in this area and that I think it is a pity if we allow these problems to take us away from something that actually is working.

There is one tiny footnote which I will permit myself. I think it is quite true that quite large numbers of individual historical populists were very sweet, generous and nice people, but one thing also has to be said. I do not think it has been demonstrated to us that populism in itself is, if I can bring categories of values and professional judgment into it, a nice thing. On the whole, I think not.

PROF. ANDRESKI: Surely these issues depend on the definition. If we include purist democracy in our definition and say that populism involves absolute compliance with the will of the people, then there could never be such a thing as populism in power, as this would be self-contradictory. The relations between 'have' and 'have-not' states constitute a different problem which should not be mixed up with the question of populism.

Personally I would like to define populism in such a way that, for one thing, it would be co-extensive neither with purist democratism nor with egalitarianism.

From Sir Isaiah's list, the items which appeal to me most are 'gemeinschaft', fraternity, the idealisation of the common man, and possibly idealisation of the past; although I have doubts about the last item. If an ideology contains the first three elements, I would be prepared to call it populism. For this reason, I would call Castro a populist, because of his stress on fraternity. However, we would have to decide at which degree of authoritarianism we would say, "No, this is no longer fraternity now. The big brother is too big". But I think it is possible to construe the idea of fraternity as including a big brother, provided that he is not too cruel to everybody but only to the unfaithful boys.

THE CHAIRMAN: I would like to add one historical footnote. There are certain philosophical presuppositions in populism. I wish to say something in connection with a point made by Professor Venturi earlier, in a very illuminating way. I do not wish to stress the hallowed name of Rousseau again. The point is that the doctrine begins in the eighteenth century. This is to answer to some extent something which Professor Gellner and Professor Schapiro said. There was a doctrine in the eighteenth century according to which there had existed such a creature as natural man. Natural man was done in by artificial man. I do not mean that someone did natural man in. Man did himself in. Natural man is struggling inside artificial man, trying to get out. This is what Diderot says.

Alternatively, you can conceive the situation as one in which there are large numbers - a majority - of natural men, who have at some time or other been done down by various minorities of artificial men. If you do not accept this proposition, and think that it is a fantasy, then the whole structure begins to collapse. Professor Venturi remarked that the notion of the populists - which is also to be found in the writings of his and my friend, the late Professor Salvemini, is that there are fetters which bind men, certain fetters with which artificial man is strangling natural man. If you strike off these fetters, natural man asserts himself and there is no further problem. You have reset his life, so to speak, in a natural pattern. No guidance, still less force, is required by the liberated prisoner. To direct him then is to maim him again: to substitute new yokes for old.

There is no point, then, in asking what the new organisation, the post-revolutionary establishment should do in the name of democracy; should there, for example, be consultation and plebiscites? All these questions fall away because they only arise in connection with the use of organized power; this is *eo ipso* a perversion of original uncorrupted human nature. This disaster has been brought about by some kind of terrible event: the Flood, original sin, the discovery of iron and agriculture, or whatever else it may be; there was a blissful natural state: then the Fall and the yearning for the original unity. This can be restored, possibly by violence.

If populists were asked who the people are, I think that they would produce a definite answer. They would say that the people is the majority of their society; natural men who have been robbed of their proper post in life: then try and point to groups of artificial, corrupt men as holding down large groups of natural men. If the victims are not the large majority, populism falls. The Calvinist notion that a vast collection of corrupt men has to be rescued by a small minority of good men seeking to tell them that the truth is the opposite of all populist faith. That is the metaphysics of populism, although I know well that modern psychology may deny every part of it.

DR. WALICKI: About *gemeinschaft*, I think that it is a little more complicated. I am talking, of course, of Russian populism, from this point of view. If *gemeinschaft* is so essential for the definition of populism, I would say that in this case Lavrov, whom everybody here treats as a populist, would not have been a populist because the whole

history of Lavrov is a transition from the unconscious emotional solidarity of Castro - that is, *gemeinschaft* - to conscious solidarity between critical thinking individuals, which is not *gemeinschaft*. Why? But there are some elements of *gemeinschaft* here, of course, and I would add a little modification. I think that populists should be either in favour of the tradition of *gemeinschaft* or propose a kind of synthesis between *gemeinschaft* and some of the values which were created by the process of the emancipation of the individual and by certain bourgeois élites. I think that this would be *gemeinschaft*, but not necessarily pure *gemeinschaft*.

DR. SAUL: I think that Professor Schapiro was right in saying that this notion of the people was an operational one. By the same token, however, his concept that somehow the populists see these goals as being defined by the people is also a very difficult one to operationalise. This relates to my earlier point that even movements are institutionalised in some way, and the point has been made about striking off fetters.

It will be very difficult to characterise a particularly pure example of the people defining their goals by themselves, because there is a whole range of various ways in which people are approached and in which they are influenced. There are many people who hold good ideas or what are the carriers of ideas, and at the other extreme whips and scourges are used. I think that it will be rather difficult to pin down. We have to think about this if we are to do the final definition. We would have to think about what sorts of influences are legitimate and remain legitimate means for a populist leadership to use vis a vis the constituency to which they are in some relationship.

Striking off fetters can also vary over a wide range of possible activities to removing monopolies, to a wide variety of things that may in fact impinge in a very real way on people and in the short run may be diverting them in some ways. Even to get back to the natural man, sometimes the person who is a natural man but not quite aware of it may have to be convinced. So there are these questions about relationships between leaders and led which still remain. It is too easy to say that somehow the people have to define them for themselves.

PROF. SCHAPIRO: WE have, after all, an historical example in the Provisional Government of the way in which it was put into practice, and the result. This business of striking fetters, that was pure Prince Lvov from beginning to end. The fetters were struck off, tyranny has fallen, and natural man has come out and, therefore, everything will now be all right.

That is perhaps where Professor Gellner is wrong when he thinks that populism is compatible with a charismatic leader. The charismatic leader would become just precisely that fetter on the natural man which populists reject.

DR. MACFARLANE: Are we tending now to get into byways? We started by putting forward those principles and ideas of populism on which there seems to me to be a great deal of agreement. Then we had the problem of whether Mr. Hall's definition in terms of a movement would rule out actual populist régimes. That is why I suggested that we might get back on to the main road and without any sleight of hand accommodate those who are concerned with populist régimes.

Let us take Sir Isaiah Berlin's basic ideas of populism and say that these are the ideas of populism. It is a different question how these ideas get translated into movements and the forms they take and the particular problems which arise when a movement actually comes into power, which raise real questions about how far the ideas are practical and how one attempts to apply them.

I suggest that while we are perhaps not hoping to end up with something which we can all take home on a post card and show to our wives as the reason for our absence, nevertheless we can get sufficient from these basic ideas of populism for Mr. Ionescu or someone else to frame for Government and Opposition without too many of us feeling that he has misrepresented what we really feel.

THE CHAIRMAN: I do not think that a breathless world is expecting a communique from this assembly. I do not think that we need formulate our proposition in too precise a form.

Does anyone else wish to say anything ideologically? . . . If not, I arrogate to myself the role of charismatic leader. My whole idea of populism I have learned in this assembly. Not for one moment would I claim to be expressing the views of anyone else or wish to be anti-populist in sentiment. But I would like to call on Professor Gellner to say a few words.

PROF. GELLNER: Like yourself, Mr. Chairman, all I have learned about populism I have learned at this conference. Consequently, I feel a great debt of gratitude to the person who has organised it. When I suggested earlier to the Chairman that a vote of thanks was required, I had completely forgotten that my name appears on the Organising Committee. That is entirely anonymous as far as I am concerned. I do not know about the others. As far as I could see, however, the effective and real work in organising this conference, which obviously was extremely well done and is profitable to me and, I believe, to everyone else, has been the work of one man, Ghița Ionescu, and I would like to propose a vote of thanks to him.
(Applause)

MR. IONESCU: I shared with my six colleagues on the Organising Committee all the work, and then I have shared with all of you, and with you, Mr. Chairman, the pleasure of all the very useful work that we have done here. I believe with Dr. Macfarlane that something will come out of it. Thank you very much.

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